The collapse of a major law firm like While Godshall reveals deep structural flaws in the traditional law firm partnership model. Rooted in history and legal ethics, this model allows only lawyers to own firms, creating a system where individual partners—especially "rain makers"—can generate massive client relationships, but their departure triggers a cascade of financial and operational damage. When a key partner leaves, the firm loses revenue but cannot easily cut costs, leading to declining profits and reduced partner compensation. Crucially, remaining partners face significant liability in bankruptcy due to fraudulent transfer laws, as their profit distributions are treated as asset transfers. In contrast, investor-owned firms like Slater & Gordon avoid such collapse by allowing employees to remain employed during downturns and enabling financial restructuring. The partnership model also suffers from generational conflict: partners have no long-term stake, leading to short-term thinking and a lack of investment in future growth. Lateral hiring and rising competition further intensify instability, as firms increasingly poach top talent. These dynamics suggest that the traditional model is unsustainable in a modern, AI-driven, and rapidly evolving legal landscape. New ownership structures—like those enabled by investor participation or AI-powered operations—could offer more resilient, equitable, and future-proof alternatives. The case of While Godshall serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of over-reliance on individual talent and the need for systemic reform in legal business governance.
Finance is increasingly being built on digital rails, but as the adoption of
virtual assets tokenization and stablecoins grows, can regulation not only
keep pace but help accelerate it, find out more later in the podcast.
For big business AI opened up a world of promise, but that world of
promise turned into a world of pain, cost spiraling, data trapped, security and
governance risks multiplying, and ROI out of reach. That's why enterprises
turned to BOOMIE to connect data, apps and AI helping them operate
securely, efficiently and at scale. BOOMIE turns a world of AI pain into a
world of AI gain. As BOOMIE says, we got you. Head to BOOMIE.com. That's
B-O-O-M-I dot com. Small businesses are the pulse of every community.
They bring people together, create opportunities and drive growth.
Chase for Business helps business owners like you with personalized
guidance and convenient digital tools all in one place.
With that guidance and your determination, you can take your business
farther and help build a brighter future for your community.
Learn more at chase.com/business. Chase for Business. Make more of what's yours.
The Chase mobile app is available for select mobile devices.
Message and data rates may apply. JPMorgan Chase Bank and a member FDIC.
Copyright, 2026. JPMorgan Chase and company.
Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news.
Hello and welcome to another episode of The All Thoughts Podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Wysenthal.
Joe, we had some shocking news recently.
Yeah. We had the very, so I know what could she possibly be about to say.
No, we had the very sudden collapse of a law firm that's been in
business for something like 95 years. A big Wall Street one.
A big, you know, pretty elite law firm. One that I have heard of.
Yeah. There's not a long list of law firms that I've ever heard of.
Yeah. So a while gotchal collapse. There's some irony here because it's
perhaps most famous for being a bankruptcy firm.
It worked on stuff like the General Motors bankruptcy,
Lehman Brothers as well, I think. And now itself has failed.
And of course, this has prompted a lot of questions about
the durability of the big law model. And I'm going to give my standard caveat,
whatever we do, a legal episode, which is my husband was a lawyer.
Neither of us enjoyed it very much. But one thing I learned,
one thing I learned from that entire experience is the law model.
It's just so weird. It's weird. And no one seems to be particularly happy with it.
Like neither the partners. Yeah.
The partners probably more so than some other people.
But certainly not like junior associates. And law firms,
they're always going through these efforts where they try to like fix things.
You know, they start de-equodizing some of the partners or try to move out.
Some of the older partners try to make life better for some of the junior
associates. And they never seem to quite get it right.
No. And this seems totally true. I do not know much either about law firms,
how they're structured from a corporate perspective.
And also law firms, how they're structured from a corporate perspective in theory,
as in what is the theory such that maybe people don't like this system.
But it seems to me the least worst system.
It does not seem easily changeable.
I know that law firms are basically like they're never public.
They never have like outside equity holders and so forth.
There are some publicly traded law firms.
I don't know if they're publicly traded, but they have outside investors.
But you're right. You do know one thing about law firms,
which is the standard model is the partnership model, right?
Yeah. Sender partnership is the partnership model.
And you know, it's funny is like, okay, we have this collapse of a pretty big law firm.
It didn't seem to be a big deal in the sense like,
unlike say if there was an equivalent bank that had collapsed,
you'd be like, oh, panic. What does it mean?
It seems like it just sort of happened and life went on.
But the other interesting thing too is I remember in 2008,
when a lot of the banks literally did collapse.
And people were like, oh, this wouldn't have happened if they hadn't abandoned the partnership model.
Yeah. This is exactly what I was-
But I guess partnerships aren't immune to collapse either.
Well, this is exactly what I was going to say,
because I've been thinking about the partnership model,
because both of us read what it blank finds biography earlier this year.
And you can tell he is very wistful for the old partnership model
that they had at Goldman Sachs until they IPO'd.
So yeah, we should talk about how law firms ended up being partnerships,
why they collapse, why does it seem like rain makers are such a huge thing
in the legal industry such that they can basically lead
to the collapse of a single firm, like basically overnight.
Yeah.
And this does have broader importance beyond just the legal industry
when you think about ownership of firms.
There is this like fundamental question of whether or not it's better for a firm
to be owned by its workers directly or by outside investors.
Totally. You know, like we go down every year,
we go down to the future proof conference.
And there's a bunch of registered investment advisor,
independent investment advisors, et cetera.
And you know, you always hear, I'm always interested in hearing
how those small financial advisors structure their thing.
And often there's like a founder and then they like sell their equity over time
when they're ready to retire to the junior.
People come up and maybe take out loans.
I'm very interested in these different corporate structures
and how they, how do people make them work?
And evidently how sometimes they don't work.
Yeah, and how they don't work.
Okay, so we do in fact have the perfect guest.
We're going to be speaking with John Morley.
He has a professor at Yale Law School.
More importantly, perhaps he published an academic paper
that was very prescient in predicting, I guess,
some of the pressures that can come to bear on a law firm
through the partnership model.
So Professor Morley, thanks so much for coming on all thoughts.
Thanks for inviting me.
It's a pleasure to be here.
Why don't I start with the very basic question.
But how did we end up in a world
where the vast majority of big law firms are partnerships?
So I mentioned there are some exceptions,
famous exceptions, particularly in the UK.
But the vast majority of them are owned by the actual partners.
How did this come to be a thing?
It's not entirely clear, surprisingly.
There's not an obvious answer to that question.
I'll answer the question though on three levels.
So the first is history.
Law firms started out this way.
And because it doesn't require a lot of capital to start a law firm,
it really just requires the labor of the workers
and the human capital of the workers.
You can start one without having outside investors.
And so large law firms didn't appear
and by large I mean even more than three or four lawyers
didn't appear until the mid 19th century
in either the United States or the United Kingdom.
But they've always been work-or-owned.
The second level in which I'll answer that question is regulation.
Today, the model rules of professional conduct
which have been adopted in some form in almost every state
generally require that a law firm be owned by lawyers,
which as a practical matter tends to mean
the lawyers who work at the firm.
Then there's a third level at which we could answer
that question which is economics.
Big, big debate about whether this pattern of ownership
is efficient or not should law firms instead
be owned by their investors.
The best answer to that question was given
by a Yale Law School professor named Henry Hansman
who was my teacher and mentor.
His argument was that in a law firm,
the contributions of the workers are relatively easy
to measure and perceive, which reduces the risk of conflict
among the workers.
Imagine if general motors were owned by its workers,
there would be huge conflict between the management
and the people in the factory floor.
There'd be lots of conflict about how much each
of the executives paid because it would be hard
to measure their relative contributions.
In a law firm, it's much easier to measure
people's contributions because they build by the hour.
And you can often identify which clients they brought in.
This is the eat what you kill model, right?
That's right. That's the eat what you kill model.
But even before the eat what you kill model,
there were even simpler ways of identifying
lawyers' productivity and structuring their pay,
which is that every lawyer of a given level of seniority
got paid the same amount.
So worker ownership is more tenable in a law firm
than in other kinds of businesses
because the workers tend to be more similar to one another.
That's the idea.
So let's say I'm a private equity guy and I look at a law firm,
maybe a medium-scale law firm and I look at it and I say,
I bet they could do service to all,
just as one should their clients as they do just as well.
If they got rid of all their junior partners
and replaced them with this AI solution that I developed.
So I'm going to invest in them millions of dollars,
tell them to stop hiring new juniors and use AI instead.
Why doesn't that happen?
Is there a legal thing?
Why can't let's talk about like someone must have,
people have this idea.
People look at law firms and see opportunities
for productivity gains.
Are there legal reasons that this cannot be done?
So first off, there are investor-backed,
venture-backed businesses doing that now.
Okay.
It's harder to do that with a traditional law firm.
In both types of businesses,
the venture-backed businesses and traditional law firms,
you have these rules that prohibit non-lawyer ownership.
The way the venture-backed businesses get around those rules
is by segregating the business into two chunks
that each go into a different entity
with a slightly different set of owners.
On the one hand, you have the law firm
which provides legal services and employs lawyers
and is owned exclusively by the lawyers.
On the other hand, you have what's called
a managed service organization or MSO.
Okay.
The MSO is owned by
a mix of investors and the lawyers who work at the law firm. And the MSO does everything
other than provide legal advice. Oh, it employs the word processing people, the administrative
assistance, the finance, the accountants, the financial administrators. It holds the lease,
it owns the computers. Oh, I see. And so basically what happens is the clients pay fees to the law
firm. And then the law firm pays a price for administrative support to the MSO. So this makes
all sense just real quickly. When you say there are these rules about ownership from non-lawyers,
these state laws are they where do these rules come from? Yeah, they're essentially
legal ethics rules adopted by state bar associations and sometimes by state legislatures.
The American bar association has promulgated a model set of rules called the model rules
of professional conduct. And every state has adopted them in some form. A couple of states
named Arizona and Utah have altered those model rules to permit non-lawyer ownership of law
firms, but only those states. Okay. So the working narrative of what went wrong at while
gotchal is this idea of all the rain makers departed. A bunch of senior partners who had really
strong client relationships started walking away from the firm and then it snowballed from there.
And we'll get into the snowballing because this is basically the essence of a lot of your academic
research on this topic. But just on the rainmaker model itself, this is something that I have never
understood about law firms because you think about the law firm as an organization, they should want
clients to be sticky and loyal to the firm itself. But then in practice, the relationships that are
sticky are between an individual lawyer and an individual client. So when a partner walks away,
they walk away with, I don't know, like $300 million worth of business from a specific client.
Why is that a thing? Like why haven't law firms done more to, I guess, institutionalize some of
these, yeah, some of these relationships? Because it's hard as the answer. There's always a tension
between law firm management on the one hand and individual partners on the other. The management
wants to institutionalize all the clients and make sure that the client's loyalty is to the firm
not the partner. The partner wants to keep the clients individual to the partner so that the
partner can leave and also because under what you kill system, the partner might get credit for
bringing the business in, which means that the partner wants to make sure that the relationship
is unique to that one partner and not spread across other partners as well. And there's a way in
which law firms are undermining their own objectives by adopting any what you kill system.
If you pay partners for tethering their clients loyalty personally to themselves,
that is naturally what they will do. But on the other hand, if you don't pay them for doing that,
well then they'll sit back and wait for other people to generate business. It's what in economics,
we call an optimization problem. You're trading off two variables that are in tension with one
another. We'll get back to the maybe the original sin. It sounds like the original sin for a while,
maybe it goes back to 2013 or something. But if we're in the sort of like the final few months
of the firm this year, a big rain maker walks out the door. I'm still in the door. Tell me why
that's bad for me because we're describing right there's this bank run like pressure. I think
you call it a partner run, but whatever it's a bank run like pressure, what bad happens for the
remaining partners when a rain maker walks out the door. Okay, so let's break it into two pieces.
One is how does that partner's departure damage the firm? Yeah. And second, how do the other
partners get hurt as a result? Yeah. Okay, so the first piece is when that partner leaves, especially
that partner's rain maker and especially that partner's clients are personally loyal to him or her,
then that partner will take revenues with her, right? The clients will leave and the firm will have
fewer revenues as a result. But that's not obviously bad for the firm because in addition to losing
revenues, it also gets rid of some costs. You no longer have to pay that partner the partner's
compensation. Yeah. And indeed, sometimes law firms deliberately fire or de-equitize partners
because the partners are bringing in less than they're taking out. But if the partners bringing
in more than they're taking out than to lose the partner's loss, here's the bigger issue though,
you often can't cut costs as quickly as you lose revenues. So when the partner leaves,
you still got to pay the lease on that partner's corner office. And you can lay off a
associates, but that's kind of a bad thing to do. You can lay off staff, but that's a bad thing
to do. You might have debts to pensioners and retirees from the firm. You might have bank debts.
None of which go away simply because that partner left. There might also be other partners who
depend on that partner for work. If I'm an M&A partner, for example, I'm expected to bring in
business, but if I'm a tax partner, all I really do is work on business brought in by the M&A partners.
So if the M&A guy leaves, well, we still got to pay the tax partners and now they don't have any
business. So you can't cut costs as quickly as you can cut revenues. The answer to the second
piece is a bit more complicated. Why does that hurt the partners who stay? Well, the answer is because
the partners are owners of the firm and not merely employees. And that causes them to suffer for
two reasons. The first is that as owners of the firm, they are paid in shares of the profits.
And so if the revenues have gone down while the costs have stayed fixed, the profits have to go
down as well. That's just simple math, which means that once that rainmaker has left, there are fewer
profits left over to pay the partners who remain. Just as a matter of arithmetic, they can't all be
paid the same. So there pay has to go down. The second reason they suffer is that if the firm
eventually files for bankruptcy, and we'll talk about the snowball or the run that might
propel it into a bankruptcy. But if it ever does wind down, the partners can face a bunch of forms
of liability that are unique to their status as owners of the firm. The most important is a doctrine
called fraudulent transfer liability. The basic intuition behind that doctrine is that we don't
want a debtor to give away assets on the eve of bankruptcy. If I'm about to file for bankruptcy,
we don't want me to give away my car and my house to my girlfriend and my uncle.
So basic rules of bankruptcy say if you give them away money between the period you become
insolvent and the period you file for bankruptcy, all of those giveaways can be voided or clawed back
by the creditors. And here's the catch. A distribution on profits is a giveaway under that doctrine
because it doesn't actually have to be paid. Wages have to be paid because their contractual debts.
If your administrative assistants have worked for two weeks, they've accrued a debt that they
have a right to claim against the firm. By contrast, all the partners are entitled to receive
is a discretionary distribution of dividends, which the firm can choose not to pay.
So for example, Berkshire Hathaway is sitting on billions of dollars of profits,
which it's never paid out as a dividend because it doesn't have to. So what happens in law
firm bankruptcies is after the firm goes south, the creditors show up and say, "Look,
there was a 10-month period during which we consider the firm to have been insolvent,
but during which you were making payments to partners. We want to claw that all back."
And the partners say, "You can't do that. We were workers. Those were wages." And the courts say,
"Uh-uh, you were not employees. You were owners of the firm. And those weren't wages.
Those were discretionary distributions of profits, which it's standard law can be clawed back in bankruptcy."
What's next for virtual assets? I'm Jacob Grease, host of Economy Scale,
a series exploring growth in key global sectors. And this episode, we're diving
into the digital forces, shaping finance. Sean McEw from Dubai based virtual assets
regulatory authority has this to say. We're seeing a lot of insucial players come in,
digital asset dedicated hedge funds, high-frequency traders, and that sort of thing,
and folks who service insucial clients. As more capital enters the market, adaptive regulation
is likely to become increasingly key. Re-Smerika Ripple says, "Lot of regulators globally would like
to keep the industry at arms length." That's the opposite here. I think also what you'll find is
that regulation and frameworks can come out, but some of them are maybe a slight iteration on some
80-year-old policy and not actually in line with what the technology can do and offer. And again,
that's very different in Dubai. Listen to the full episode, wherever you get your podcasts.
This series is brought to you by Bloomberg Media Studios and the Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism.
Underdog already has team picks, player props, money lines, spreads. You name it, they got it.
But apparently somebody over there said, "You know what's missing? Screaming like a maniac
about a rookie card on your couch." And we love them for that. Because Underdog now has rips.
You get a digital pack starting at just five bucks. You check the live odds, see which
grails you could pull, then rip it open to reveal a real physical card. And the grails are no joke.
They have cards up to $125,000 in value and plenty to pull. From football and basketball to
Pokemon with new limited edition packs dropping regularly. Even cooler, you can decide to keep the
card and Underdog will ship it straight to your home or sell it back instantly at 100% of its
fair market value. And the cash goes right in your account. No listing it online, no stranger low
balling you in the messages, just rip, reveal, and cash out instantly. Or make some room on your shelf.
5 free rips packs when you deposit $5 real rips real cards real cash only on underdog
unleash your dog 18+ terms apply top grails are extremely rare.
This is the Bloomberg Market Minute brought to you by Comcast Business.
The markets faced plenty of challenges this year rising energy costs higher interest rates
push back to massive artificial intelligence spending but through it all stocks keep
breaking records and some analysts think they still can with a focus on the fundamentals.
Nadia level is head of global equity strategy at UBS.
But others like Miller-Tayback strategist Matt Maley say those challenges could eventually
lead to a downturn.
Whenever we see a significant rise in bond yields like we have and a significant rise in all
prices like we have the stock market always or pretty much always ignores it for a while.
And Wall Street may be starting to take notice a recent city group index shows more analysts
cut rather than raise their earnings forecasts for corporate America for the first time in
more than five months.
That was the Bloomberg Market Minute brought to you by Comcast Business, one partner powering
90% of the Fortune 500 and millions of small businesses.
When you add it all up no one does business like Comcast Business.
When you own your own business you need to keep things moving.
Need to book a last minute flight, earn a $300 travel credit to cover that.
Need to take a meeting before takeoff?
Do it from the comfort of the Chase Sapphire Lounge by the club.
Need to catch your breath before you board?
Done.
Chase Sapphire Reserve for Business, the business card that gives back all you put in.
The Chase.com/reserve business to learn more, cards issued by JP Morgan Chase Bank and
a member of the I.C. subject to credit approval terms apply.
So the more a partner thinks that a firm might be heading for failure, the more risk there
is that their compensation could be clawed back and that they could be liable for some
parts of the business if it actually fails completely.
But let's go like one step back and talk to us about what happens in a partner's mind
when they see another high-profile partner leave the firm.
What are the sort of cost-benefit calculations that they're doing in their heads where they're
thinking like, "Oh, this guy's getting a lot of money to go to a competitor.
Maybe I should be thinking about doing the same thing."
But on the other hand, maybe I really like my firm.
Maybe I really enjoy working in the structured finance unit of Alan and Overear.
I don't know what.
What are the sort of thoughts going through their heads?
So this is what I call the leave-stay decision.
You might not wake up as a law firm partner on a Wednesday morning and think, "Should
I stay or should I go?"
But implicitly, you face that decision every day.
And so you're going to walk through three kinds of calculus.
The first is to say, "Well, because that guy left and took revenues with him and the
cost of the firm are going to stay the same, we in the aggregate, me and my other partners
have to be paid less as a result.
So I'm going to get paid less.
But the amount I can get paid by moving across the street to Kravath is going to stay the
same.
So whereas previously I was making five million a while and being offered four million
in Kravath, if now I'm making 3.9 a while, suddenly I might begin to move.
The second thing I'll ask myself is, "Well, what about my liabilities?"
And I'll be saying, "Hmm.
If everybody follows the same logic I'm following, they might leave before me."
And then one guy leaves and another guy leaves and all of a sudden we're in a run on the
bank.
And if the firm ultimately collapses, I'm going to have to give back all or a portion of
the money I received from the firm between now and the date of collapse.
So suppose that I'm a partner while God shalt in this past September.
And I think most of my compensation is going to be paid to me in January.
This is a typical feature of law firm compensation.
Partners get paid a little bit every month or every quarter and then they get paid a big chunk
maybe 50% or more of their compensation in January after the books for the prior year
have been settled.
And you say, "Okay, it's September.
I think there's a 50% chance this firm has gone in February.
If it is, every dollar of compensation I receive between now and February is going to get
taken back from me.
So if I'm expecting $2 million in compensation over that period, I have to apply a 50% discount.
It's really only worth a million to me.
So then if Gibson Dunn comes and offers me 1.5 million, it looks on paper like a pay cut
because Wiles offering me too.
But in fact, it's a pay raise because the expected value of Compat Wile is a million,
whereas at Gibson it's 1.5 and it's also less risky.
The third calculus I'll be making is what about the viability of my practice?
So most law firms now, including Wile, have what you kill compensation systems, you get
paid according to your productivity.
Well, if I'm a tax lawyer and I'm in the business of servicing M&A deals brought in by M&A
lawyers, then if all the M&A lawyers have left, I'm not going to look even to my own firms
managing partners as if I'm very productive.
In other words, my own practice might become unsustainable.
So as each partner leaves, the predicament of the remaining partners gets worse and worse
in a spiraling cycle that becomes a kind of run on the bank.
That was excellent.
I love this idea of like, even though the lawyer doesn't think so, actually in reality,
every day they do wake up in the morning and make a decision whether they're going to
leave or stay, hard not to be reminded of the great 1882 essay, What is a Nation by
the French philosopher Ernest Renon, where he called a nation a daily referendum.
And even though we don't vote every single day implicitly as citizens of a nation, we all
decide every single day whether we want to continue on together as a nation.
All right.
Let's try to talk more about while in the original sin here and why certain rain makers perceived
opportunities elsewhere.
Is there an equivalent term like Wall Street for the legal in the--
Magic Circle?
Is there like big law?
Yeah.
Is there like a term that sort of like a, what's it like, anyway, whatever, elsewhere in
the legal field, listeners to the Adlots podcast know that a lot of money was made over
the last several years and things like private credit, private equity, et cetera, all kinds
of deal making.
And everything I read seems to point to some like, fateful early decisions in like 2013,
coming out of the great financial crisis, or while sort of like, they sort of missed the
vote on that.
Do you agree with that characterization?
I do.
And I want to be clear.
I don't have any insight knowledge about what I'm going to show you.
No, sure.
Just speaking based on what I've read in news reports, but in terms of the news reports
in your framework.
Yeah.
I think one of the things that people found especially striking and prescient about my framework,
if I can be a little bit im modest for a moment, I specifically predicted that a firm could
collapse even when it had no meaningful debts.
And even when its profits were not just large, but increasing, a firm can collapse basically
whenever its profits are not increasing as quickly as its peers.
In other words, what I call its relative profitability is decreasing.
And that was unambiguously true of while.
While's position in the profits per partner ranking fell from nine in 2020 to I think
20 in 2025.
And I think that the fall was even storker if we go back further in history.
So why did while fall relative to its peers?
And I want to be clear, its profits were still increasing year over year.
Just not as quickly as Kirkland analysis.
So why did while's profitability falter relative to its peers?
I think the answer basically is that it didn't expand and it didn't shrink.
Law is big law.
That's the term that we'll use.
Big law is in the midst of this sorting that actually resembles the sorting we've seen
in many other industries where the middle is getting hollowed out.
And you're seeing this gravitation towards either becoming humongous or becoming really
small.
And while was uncomfortably in the middle.
And that was a deliberate choice.
My understanding is that there was a very powerful rainmaker there named Mike Aiello, whose
departure in September was kind of the final straw that really to mix metaphors here pushed
things over the edge.
Aiello, understandably, in my opinion, wanted to work at a place that wasn't gigantic.
He thought, you know, he was a little bit wistful, like Lloyd Blankfein, about the kind
of smaller familial feel of the old wild gacha, which is why, by the way, the firm he left
for was Krovath, which still has that feel.
But the problem was that while wasn't keeping pace with its competitors, and clients increasingly
want firms that can offer a very large platform with a high degree of specialization.
And that's something you can do if you're like Kirkland or Nelson, you're really gigantic.
It's much harder to do on a smaller platform.
There's only a couple of law firms that manage to stay small in the corporate transactional
space and do really well.
Basically it's Wachtel and Krovath.
But even those firms have been struggling, they've made it work by doing only very, very
premium work on super duper high-end stuff like public company M&A.
But even those firms are experiencing a bunch of poaching, they are under profound pressure
and while just was not strong enough to withstand that.
Yeah, we've seen a similar dynamic in banking as well, right, where clients want, like,
they want the treasury function, they want corporate M&A and everything.
basically offered on a single platform. A lot of people will be listening to this and thinking,
"Well, if so much of the business depends on single individuals or personalities
or rain makers, why don't law firms have non-competes that prevent them from just automatically
leaving the firm and taking all their clients with them?" What's the answer to that question?
The answer is Rule 5.6 of the model rules of professional conduct, which prohibit
a lawyer from signing any agreement that would restrict their right to practice. So that includes
non-competes and similar kinds of agreements. Now to be clear, other countries don't have these rules.
In the United Kingdom, lawyers are free to sign non-competed agreements and law firms generally
require that they do. And my understanding is that they are frequently enforced. Those restrictions
also don't appear in other industries. You can impose those kinds of restrictions in accounting,
in engineering, in management consulting. I would say by the way, Joe, so you'd asked earlier,
what is preventing investors from owning law firms? Well, one answer, and the most commonly
given answer is the one that I gave a moment ago, which is the rules limiting investor. But another
and perhaps more important answer is these rules prohibiting non-competes. And the reason is this,
if your private equity fund looking at investing in a law firm, you're going to pay all these partners
a bunch of cash to buy out their equity interests. And then what are they going to do? They can leave
the next day. And you can't force them to sign an agreement committing not to leave.
So the best solution you have is to give them equity in the MSO and require them to forfeit that
if they leave because that's not a restriction on the law's right to practice. That's a forfeiture
condition on an equity stake in an unrelated business, in like a distinct business. It works pretty
well, but whether it works well enough is going to be one of the central questions of the new
private equity boom in law firms. Okay. While it didn't grow as fast, it wasn't aggressive enough,
et cetera. Maybe it was a little bit too conservative going back a couple of decades.
Couldn't that have been rational from the perspective of senior lawyers at the time, some of these
decisions, maybe some of whom have retired by now. So it's like, we go back to like 2010. They're like,
you know, we don't need to like go super crazy on the private equity, private credit deal making
stuff. We think, and you know, we're going to like trim some of our ranks and so forth. And maybe
that set the seeds for their destruction in 2026. But if I'm maybe they retired in 2021, that seems
like a big a, especially now again, like thinking about future investment or AI, et cetera, this sort
of like inter temporal relationship of the lawyers and how long they're going to actually stay there.
And how much they care about what the firm is going to look like in 20 years.
Yeah. So look, it's hard to know the future law firms face the same uncertainty in business
decision making, but every other kind of business does. And let me say there's lots of firms that
took the path that while took. But most of them have since changed course. A good example is
catwalleter. Okay. Catwalleter's a, the full name of catwalleter was catwalleter Wickersham and Taft,
Taft being the former president and Chief Justice of the United States. It was a very, very prestigious
and Yale law professor I might add. A very, very prestigious firm that was for a time extremely
profitable. But like while it didn't grow, and it eventually very recently had to find refuge in
a merger with a much less prestigious firm. Hogan looked at apologies to all the people at catwalleter
in Hogan, but Hogan doesn't have the history that catwalleter had. And so, so the point is to say
while was not crazy in pursuing the strategy, however, it was crazy and hanging on to it for a little
too long. But you asked a deeper question, Joe, also, which was, are the partners of the present
or past willing to invest for the future? Yeah. And the answer is, well, not necessarily. So,
I'm working on a new project that I recently put online about a concept that I call generational
conflict. Generational conflict is a problem in many kinds of businesses that don't have what I
call permanent equity. So, let's imagine General Motors or Microsoft. When you buy a share of stock
in General Motors or Microsoft, it lasts forever. It lasts as long as the firm does. And so, even if
I'm going to sell my shares in Microsoft next week, I'm still happy for Microsoft to incur costs
today in order to build technology that we yield profits 10 years from now because the price at which
I sell next week will reflect the buyer's expectations about what will happen 10 years from now.
The share lasts indefinitely. And therefore, prices paid in a market for those shares will reflect
the value of the indefinite future. Well, not so in a law firm. When I retire from a law firm,
whether that's Krovath or Covington and Burling, my shares simply disappear. They're extinguished.
Nobody buys them back from me. They're just gone. And so, if I'm a 31-year-old partner and you're
a 61-year-old partner, I'm going to be a lot more interested in the future of the firm than you are.
And there's not really an elegant way to get you to care about the future because when you retire
two years from now, the value of any investment you made in the firm is going to be gone.
This also goes back to partner incentives, right, where if all of their compensation is based
on bringing in clients and none of it is based on nurturing the next generation of talent,
like no one is actually going to be paying attention to that. Like, there are some great
senior lawyers out there who will mentor junior associates, but they seem to be few and far
between. That's right. So, this problem of generational conflict, it's not just between the old
and the young. It's also between the people who are here now and will also be here tomorrow,
and the people who are here now but might leave tomorrow. And, you know, as the pace of
lateral movement has picked up, the generational conflict between present and future has become
much more intense. And it feeds back into everything that happens at a firm, including compensation.
If I can leave it any time, it's hard to pay me anything other than my market value. So, again,
turning to hotel and Kravath, they both had lockstep compensation periods for a long time.
And under lockstep system lawyers get paid the same based on their seniority rather than their
productivity. Well, system like that creates winners and losers. And the losers, the people who
are getting underpaid are likely to leave. And so, the pressure of lateral movement basically forces
the firm into what you kill system. And even broader way to think about it, to return to your
analogy about nations, Joe, is to say, it really is like nations where people can come in and out
as well. If you overtax billionaires in California, for example, they will leave. And if you pay
really generous health care subsidies and poverty related transfers, a lot of people who are in
need of that assistance will come in. And you get the same thing in law firms, right? If you
make transfers from the successful partners to the less successful ones, you'll get fewer successful
partners and more unsuccessful ones. We've talked about this briefly on a couple of episodes
in the past, but since we're talking about it again now, this whole thing of like big star lateral
hires where like one firm spends a lot of money to poach a rainmaker from this is a fairly new thing.
Like right in the history of sort of big law, this is a relatively recent phenomenon.
It is. I mean, it's really is this enormous thing? Like was it just not the norm that this was
done and then someone broke the norm? Like what is it now such that this has become a more prevalent
phenomenon than it used to be? It's a hard question to answer convincingly because I think
ultimately it was a norms thing. There was no hard obstacle to it. Yeah. There was nothing
in 1975 preventing a partner from leaving Kravath and moving to Kirkland and Ellis. There's nothing
preventing that. And yet they just didn't do it. They just didn't do it until really the last 20
years. And with every passing year, the volume of lateral partner movement increases. I mean,
the firm that really started the action was Kirkland and Ellis. They were the first ones to do this
kind of poaching at a really large scale. And they did it very well. I should say there are
substantial business risks to doing that kind of poaching. Okay. When you interview a lawyer
to move to your firm, you ask the lawyer how much business she has and she's going to say,
oh, I generated gazillion dollars a year. But both professional ethics rules and that lawyer's
fiduciary duties to their current firm prevent them from actually talking to their clients and
asking if they'll be willing to move. Also, if the lawyer's current firm found out that they were
shopping around, that lawyer might get fired. So you basically don't know. The lawyer says I'm
bringing an X amount, but you don't really know. And I think for a long time, people were just
skittish about hiring under those conditions. But people have overcome their fears and they're now
willing to make big bets. On the norms question, let me just say one other thing, which is that I really
feel like law firms are kind of a microcosm of modernity. You know, they really are like nations
in the sense that they have one person, one vote rules. They have systems of redistribution.
People relate to them in a variety of ways. They want not just money, but also satisfying
social lives, a nice working space, right? They have multiplicitous demands of this organization.
They relate to people are conflicted in how they vote to it. They're voting on their own compensation
in a sense in the same way that we vote on our own tax.
implicitly by electing the people who will establish them.
So a lot of the problems of public governance
also creep in to law firm governance
and replicate themselves in weird ways.
And so what I would say about norms is just that
in the same way, all of human life has become more calculated,
more self-interest seeking, more formal, and more commercial,
less familial, less communal, less traditional.
That's happened at law firms.
And so a cravat there used to be.
I don't know if there still is this tradition
wherein the partners of cravat would be the paul bearers
at a partner's future funeral.
Like an illustrative example of the tradition
that attached to these organizations.
But that's all fading away.
And when it does, people act on the basis
of self-interest seeking and money.
There's nothing wrong with that.
It's just a very modern way of thinking about human relations.
Joe doesn't like the term peak capitalism,
but it's very peak capitalism.
Come on.
If the peak could get higher still, that's right.
That's true.
It's true.
[MUSIC PLAYING]
Who doesn't love screaming like a maniac
over a rookie card on their couch?
Introducing Rips on Underdog.
Open digital packs, starting at just five bucks
and reveal real collectible cards, football, basketball,
Pokemon, and more.
Keep your card and have it shipped home,
or sell it back instantly at 100% of fair market value.
Download Underdog and get five free Rips packs
when you deposit $5.
Real Rips, Real Cards, Real Cash, only on Underdog.
Unleash your dog.
18+ terms apply.
[MUSIC PLAYING]
This is the Bloomberg Market Minute.
Brought to you by Comcast Business.
The market's faced plenty of challenges this year,
rising energy costs, higher interest rates,
pushback to massive artificial intelligence spending.
But through it all, stocks keep breaking records,
and some analysts think they still
can with a focus on the fundamentals.
Ernance has been good and continues to be good.
And while we might be past the peak in Ernance growth,
we're not past the peak in Ernance level.
But others like Miller-Tayback strategist
Matt Mailey say those challenges could eventually
lead to a downturn.
Whenever we see a significant rise in bond yields like we have,
and a significant rise in oil prices like we have,
the stock market always, or pretty much always,
ignores it for a while.
And Wall Street may be starting to take notice.
A recent city group index shows more analysts cut
rather than raise their earnings forecasts for corporate America
for the first time in more than five months.
That was the Bloomberg Market Minute.
One partner powering 90% of the Fortune 500
and millions of small businesses.
When you add it all up, no one does business
like Comcast Business.
Running a small business takes everything you've got.
But with Chase for Business, you're not alone.
They bring together local support and a broad range of resources
to more than 7 million customers.
With a deep understanding of your day-to-day needs,
they provide products and guidance built to help you thrive.
Right now, earn $500 when you open a new,
Chase Business Complete Checking account
for new business-checking customers with qualifying activities.
Offer expires January 21st, 2027.
Chase Business Complete Checking has the flexible tools you need
to accept payments, make deposits,
and manage your finances with confidence.
Learn more at Chase.com/podcastbizoffer.
Chase, make more of what's yours.
Fees may apply to Chase Business Complete Checking accounts.
The $500 offer is available for new business-checking accounts
with qualifying activities through 1-21-2027.
Eligibility and qualification requirements must be met.
Additional restrictions may apply.
Please speak with a business banker for more information.
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA.
Member, FDIC.
I just want to go back to the sort of classic theory of ownership stuff.
I mentioned in the beginning, we do have some investor-owned law firms.
And there's a famous example that you talk about in your paper.
An investor-owned law firm that came very, very close to collapse.
But because they didn't have the partnership model,
they ended up being able to restructure and sort of emerge
from the bankruptcy process more or less in one piece.
Can you talk about how that difference in ownership structure
actually played in that example?
Yes, so the firm was called Slater in Gordon.
It was a conventional partner-owned law firm in Australia
that went public and listed on a stock exchange
when Australia changed its rules about lawyer ownership back in the 90s.
And after going public in Australia,
you use the capital it raised to acquire other firms
in both Australia and the UK.
And it eventually listed in the UK as well.
So it was basically just an investor-owned business.
And it had so much capital and so much ability to raise it
that it eventually did kind of add-on acquisitions
of related businesses that weren't law firms.
And acquired a business called, "If I remember correctly,
"Quindel," which was a medical services firm
as well as a legal services firm for people
who'd been in car accidents.
The idea was somebody gets in a car accident
and will represent you as a lawyer and treat your whiplash.
Well, "Quindel," it turned out, was just a fraud.
The accounting of the books had been cooked.
I'm shocked.
So Slater in Gordon realizes that it's massively overpaid
for this asset that now has to be worth a fraction
of its accounting value.
So it was just insolvent in the same way
an auto parts manufacturer would be insolvent
if it made a bad acquisition.
All right, so what happened was
the firm went to the hedge funds that had lent it money.
It went to the banks, the lent it money,
and said, "We got to do a workout."
They wiped away the equity.
They turned the junior debt into equity.
They split the business between its Australian and UK pieces
and they kept operating.
And the question is, and they're still in,
they're both still in business today.
Why didn't that collapse in the way the wildgots shall collapse?
Well, the answer is because the lawyers weren't owners of the firm.
Their pay did not decline when the business became less profitable.
They didn't face any risk of liability.
They were like the pilots at Delta Airlines
or the factory workers at General Motors,
both of whom continued working for those businesses
when they went bankrupt because they continued to get paid.
The key difference in an investor on firm
is that investors can't pull back their money.
In an investor on firm, you can sell your shares,
but you can't take back the chunk of the company's assets
that correspond to your interest.
So, Slater and Gordon was able to say to its equity holders,
"You're wiped out. Go away."
And they just did.
But the money stayed inside the firm.
Now, imagine if wildgots shall tried that.
Imagine if it said to the equity holders,
"You're wiped out."
The creditors of the firm now own the firm.
What would those equity holders do?
They would go to Kravath.
Yeah.
Because their partners are the firm.
They can just walk away.
So, what happened?
So, actually, just for including me,
like in the last several weeks.
So, the company collapses.
Is there something called wild, still?
What is the wind down, look like?
Is there a last lawyer who leaves?
Like somebody who I said to her,
you know, someone's got to be the last lawyer
to find a job somewhere else?
How does it actually. What's the actual good night process?
It's going to be fascinating to watch so unfold.
So, let me first of all say, I think that not surprisingly
for a firm that does bankruptcy for a living,
wildgots actually handled the wind down remarkably well.
You know, the best decision they made
was to wind the thing down quickly.
Remember fraudulent transfer liability?
Fraudulent transfer liability
commences the moment the firm becomes insolven
and it ends the moment the firm winds up.
And it's really hard to say
when a law firm becomes insolven,
not least because they have very few dots.
But in many other collapse firms,
that period has lasted six months, eight months.
So, doing in the buff, it was something like eight or nine months.
And so, by calling an end quickly,
while basically avoided a bunch of fraudulent transfer liability
for its partners.
So, what they're doing now is winding up the firm.
There's a few lawyers still left at the firm.
They need a place to continue representing their clients.
Their clients have ongoing needs that need to be serviced.
And to the extent people still at while are continuing to represent clients,
the fees for those representations are all going to go into while.
But all of the cash, including the fees that are brought in over the next few months,
all of that's going to get eaten up by creditors.
Now, while didn't have a lot of financial debts,
that is, they didn't have bank borrowings.
But it still has lots of creditors who have claims on the firm.
The biggest category by far is going to be the landlords.
Now, people often say, well, you know,
landlords rent doesn't account for that big of a chunk of law firms revenues.
That's true month to month.
But if there's 10 years outstanding on that lease,
on the General Motors building, on 5th Avenue and 59th Street,
the landlord can probably make a claim for all 10 years of it today.
Well, that's going to be more than enough to eat up whatever cash is left inside that firm.
So, even though the partners of while are not going to face a bunch of liability,
things are not going to be happy for them.
Law firm partner compensation is ordinarily spread out unevenly across the year.
Every month or every quarter, they'll get paid a little bit of money.
But then they'll get a big chunk,
amounting to like 50 or 60 percent of their total annual compensation
around mid-January when the books for the prior year have been settled.
What this means, in effect,
is that the partners of while God shall work for 10 months out of the year.
[BLANK_AUDIO]
and they're never going to see the 50% of their compensation for that period that would have been
paid to them in January. That's all going to get eaten up by creditors. So it's kind of sad
for the partners of Wild Godshall. Yeah, that's a rough year. I genuinely feel bad for them.
A big question is whether the firm's going to file for bankruptcy. They've said they don't intend
to and I think they probably won't have to. The reason is the bankruptcy is fundamentally a solution
to a collective action problem. You have a lot of creditors who need to work together to
recover on the debts and you need one person who can represent them. The collective action
problem at Wild Godshall is not going to be as acute as it was at many other law firms such as
Dewey and LeBuff, for example, because first off, there aren't going to be many creditors.
There'll be a few landlords basically and there aren't going to be that many debts for it to
collect upon because the partners aren't likely to be liable. Like in Dewey, you needed a bankruptcy
to trust you to go out and sue each one of the partners. And famously, there were a few partners
at Dewey who declared a personal bankruptcy as a result of this liability. But we don't need anyone
to do that process of collection at Wild Godshall because the partners aren't going to be liable.
Yeah, we're recording this on November 10th and there's a new story just across the Bloomberg
now saying that the Wild partners have voted to dissolve the firm and they've named their
wine down committee. So I guess they'll be making some decisions soon. But I hadn't realized this,
but like the ultimate injury added to insult, the woman who was going to lead the firm as executive
partner Ramona Nee, I didn't realize she's been hired by Kirkland Ellis. So she said she didn't
want to, but she didn't want to take on the executive partnership and things kind of spiraled from
there. You know, I have to say the moment that I thought, wow, the end is near for Wild Godshall,
I knew that they were in trouble for since mid-Summer basically. But the moment when I thought
it's inevitable, it was when I found out that Ramona Nee was not going to be the chair of the firm
and that there was a debate about whether she had known that for several months before disclosing
it to the rest of the partners. You know, a law firm collapse is kind of like a bank rent. It's a
crisis of confidence. Franklin Delano Roosevelt said we have nothing to fear but fear itself and what
he meant was the fear that propels bank runs is itself a thing to fear. And I think a big part of
Wild's problems, which I didn't describe earlier is that in addition to having unfavorable economics,
it had by all accounts of pretty toxic governance culture. And when Ramona Nee, when that news about
her came out, I thought whatever faith was left in the management of this firm is going to be gone.
And people are not going to have any reason to stay other than money.
Well, can you talk a little bit more about that because when I think about law firms, again,
much like banks, all of these companies or partnerships, they like to talk about the importance
of culture, including the client first and we're all one big family. But then when you look at
what's been going on recently with some of these lateral hires, with the way some partners treat
junior associates and stuff like that, is their culture left at a lot of these firms?
Lesson less. Lesson less. I mean, again, law firms are microcosms of modernity. There's
loneliness, crisis for a reason. We all love to talk about how much we value our families and yet
we so often move away from them. We have fewer children. We have less close relationships
with our siblings and our parents. And yeah, I think law firms are finding it harder and harder
and harder to sustain. The way I think about it is that families are places of what my Yale
University Sociology colleague, Nick Kristakis, calls mild hierarchy. He describes mild hierarchy
as the default mode of organization in every small to medium-sized group of human beings.
Well, that's what feels like a family, like dad and mom are sort of in charge, but like,
you know, eventually the kids will take care of them and they sort of have obligations to the kids.
Law firms could feel like that in the days of lockstep compensation, but like now that you can
fire brother and now that sister can leave, it feels less like a family, or maybe in some weird
way, it feels more like a family now that there's all these new stories about children cutting off
their parents, right? It's a modern family. It's a very disconnected one.
Yeah, this is a very deep conversation. As you mentioned, and I've heard about and maybe
we'll do an episode at some point about some of these like AI native law firms, and I know there's
some efforts, like you mentioned Arizona or other maybe like an investor bag. People are trying
different models and so forth. And actually, speaking of Kirk on Ellis, and AI, it was a story
earlier that they were going to build their own AI model, et cetera, and have their own fine-tune
model in house. I'm just curious from your perspective, from this sort of the generational warfare
framework that you characterize AI, et cetera, like can you give us some thoughts on like whether you
think that for some of these big legacy firms, they're going to successfully a make investments
that will just like sort of kind of come out of the senior partners pocket in a way. They might
never, they might not be long and around long enough to see the fruits. And actually, like sort of
like navigate a transition to some meaningfully different type of economics.
And so if you believe my story about general conflict, you would predict as I do, that although
AI will transform the practice of law, very little AI technology will be developed by law firms.
Because it's really hard for the partners of today to incur a big expense for the benefit of
the partners of five years from now, because the partners of today and the partners of five years
from now will be different. People will enter, people will exit. Okay, but that doesn't mean that
law firms never invest at all. They invest in branding, they invest in the training of associates,
they invest in the renovation of office space. They've always made investments just not really
big ones. And I predict that's how investment in AI will unfold. They will make investments just
not really big ones. A nice illustration is law firms renovate office space. They don't buy
office space. Law firms will renovate AI. They won't buy or develop AI. They will rent it.
They'll pay licensing fees to third party providers. Now, let's talk about Kirkland and Latham,
both of which have announced large investments in AI technology. Why are they able to do this?
First off, the investments aren't that big in the scheme of those firms revenues. I'm shooting
from the hip here a little bit, but it's no accident that those two firms are the largest law firms
by revenue in the world, because they're the ones that can handle a big investment. So Kirkland's
revenues are something like 10 billion a year. And they are, they've announced that they're going to
make a $500 million investment over a period of five years. Well, if we assume Kirkland continues
the same growth trajectory of revenue growth that it's been on over those five years, it'll probably
earn something like $80 million. Well, $500 million in the context of $80 billion is not that much.
Like, the partners might just shrug and say, yeah, okay, fine, you're taking one percent of my
compensation to benefit the partners at five years from now. That's okay, especially because a
lot of those partners will be partners five years from now. The other thing is they're pacing it
over five years so that they can align the incurring of an expense with the earning of the revenue,
right? As they develop this technology, it will bring in more revenue and they will
haste the development of the technology to coincide with the earning of the revenue. The other
thing I would say about it is and apologies to the Kirkland and Ellis people listening to this
podcast, they say it's going to be $500 million. Who's keeping track? Like, what is the AI
investment? I don't really know. They have an incentive to expansively characterize a lot of what
they do as an AI investment. So the bottom line is it's a relatively modest investment spread out
over a long period of time that will coincide with the earning of revenues. Yeah, it's not like
their outside shareholders are going to call them up on it and be like, you said 500 million. Okay,
so just to wrap all of this up, a lot of people will hear us talking about the sudden collapse
of a large law firm and think, okay, so what? Poor lawyers, right? Like the last thing the world needs
is another law firm. Why should people care about this particular topic? The frailties of the
big law business model. Well, let me first explain why people do care. It's the wreck on the side
of the road. You can't look away. Okay, true. Other than Schadenfreude. Or just, or just
rubber neck. Yeah. Okay. I don't know. That's true. That's true, but for lawyers, there's a lot of
Schadenfreude. Yeah. Let's ask why people should care. Yeah. Okay. I think there's a few reasons.
One is it has happened to many other firms. We haven't talked about this, but this has happened to
dozens of firms. In my paper, I studied three dozen firms. In the years since I published the paper,
there's been more being a McCutchens, Strick and Strick and Levant, there will be more. I promise you,
there will be more. The other is that what's happening at law firms is diagnostic of what's
happening in the legal industry generally. It's tremendous pressure on profitability, such that if you
don't keep up, you're in the dog house. Huge amounts of lateral partner movement. Also law
firms is microcosms of modernity. Yeah. I also think that what happens in law firms is consistent
with what happens in other kinds of what I call impermanent equity businesses. There's lots of
businesses where equity interests don't last forever. Mutual
funds and hedge funds, when you redeem your interest terminates, mutual insurance companies,
which are sort of owned by their policy holders.
If you stop renewing your policy, you're no longer an equity holder, they experience some
of the same problems as law firms.
Hedge funds, for example, are famously vulnerable to runs, just like wildgots, all.
So I study organizations broadly.
I write about investment funds, about law firms, about marriage even, and I find law firms
is an interesting laboratory in which to study themes in organization.
Maybe here's the biggest one of all.
This central ideological struggle of the Cold War between United States and Soviet Union
was whether the means of production would be owned by investors, that is, say, capitalists
or by workers.
And what law firms illustrate is some of the perils and promise of worker ownership.
It's the path not taken by industry more generally.
All right.
John Morley, thank you so much for coming on all thoughts.
Really appreciate it.
Truly a pleasure.
So, Joe, I thought that was an absolutely fascinating conversation, and I do feel like
I need to emphasize just how prescient John's paper actually was.
If you read it now, it's sort of line by line, what seems to have happened at wildgots
show.
I do think the question of how to institutionalize some of those client relationships
at law firms is a fascinating one.
And we like to say on the show that incentives matter, right?
And it just seems really hard to get partners to sort of release their death grip on the
big clients if the thing they're paid for is bringing that relationship in.
These are definitely some of my favorite conversations that we have, like corporate structure conversations
because again, it's, you know, the versions of this that we could have talking about multi-strategy
hedge funds, et cetera, and the degree to which they're, and, you know, I'm thinking also
back to some of our conversations with Scott Bogg at Green Hill about investment banking
and the degree to which there is such thing as like franchise value beyond what the
Rainmaker brings in and so forth.
But as you say, the prescience of his paper is that you could have a company that is growing
that is not spiraling in any business sense whatsoever that is actually improving profit
every single year, but because they're not improving as fast as their neighbor, that
is still enough.
So Pete Capitalism stuff, right?
Where like the only thing that matters is the relative gains, not the absolute gains.
Yeah.
I really am a sucker for all of that, like, this is the crisis of modernity stuff, you know,
the, like the idea that like, okay, you go back like a hundred years, or a hundred
years, fifty years, whatever.
And maybe there was such a thing as like a law firm culture or a family or whatever.
And these things, like, you know, when maybe it gives me some perspective, like when
someone like Lloyd Blankfine is sad about the department, no, like when he's sad about
the end of the partnership model, is he really sad about the end of the partnership model,
or is he really sad about just like when it was a smaller organization that felt more
like a family and a club than a big company?
Because that's like, you know what I'm saying?
So you get sad, it's like, oh, I missed when we were a partnership.
Or are you just sad that you missed when it was like small and clumpy and had idiosyncratic
culture?
Yeah.
And now just a sort of like a big corporation.
Yeah.
The problem is you can't slap a compensation number on like how well someone fits into
a culture or how much they like boost the culture, right?
It's much easier to do it by the amount of revenue they bring in.
If any one of us dies, I think the other odds people should be the Paul Bears.
I think we should even think God, let's knock on wood, nothing happens to anyone on
the team for a long time.
Are we making a promise?
Yeah.
We should institute that.
That's what we do.
And we do a ton team too.
Just while we're talking about funeral arrangements, I want to do a ton team.
Yeah.
The last one of us to survive gets $600.
I'm going to bury some treasure in the Bloomberg offices and the last one alive gets
it.
All right.
On that happy note.
Shall we leave it there?
Let's leave it there.
It's been another episode of The Odd Lots Podcast.
I'm Tracy Alley.
You can follow me at Tracy Alley.
And I'm Joe Wyzenthal.
You can follow me at the stalwart.
Follow our producers, Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Arman, Dash O'Bennett at Dashbot, Kale
Brooks and Kale Brooks and Kevin Luzano at Kevin Lloyd, Luzano.
And you can chat about all of these topics 24/7 in our discord, discord.gg/odlots.
And for more odd-lots content, you can check out our daily newsletter, which you can find
at Bloomberg.com/odlots.
And if you enjoyed this conversation, if you like it when we talk about law firms as dysfunctional
modern families, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
And if you're watching on video and you enjoyed the conversation, then please like or leave
a comment or better yet.
Subscribe.
And remember, if you're a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely
add free.
All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple podcasts and follow the instructions
there.
Thanks for joining.
[Music]
[Games on a break, instead of doomscrolling, try RIPS on Underdog.
RIP real player cards worth real money right there in the app.
It's instant cash in the palm of your hand.
Buy a digital pack, rip it open on your phone, and reveal a real physical card.
Football, basketball, Pokemon, yes, Pokemon, and more.
The best part?
Pack started just $5.
And if you pull something, you don't want to let go of just yet.
Have it shipped straight to your door.
With the cash, sell it back instantly at 100% of its fair market value.
No listing, no negotiating, no stranger asking if you'll trade it for a used jet ski.
Even though jet skis are super sick.
Best part?
There are some serious grails in the mix.
With maximum card values reaching up to $125,000 depending on your pack tier.
You can also check the live odds and see what you could pull before your rip.
And what other cards are being pulled by fans.
Download Underdog and get in on the chase.
With 5 free rips packs when you deposit $5, real rips, real cards, real cash.
Only on Underdog, unleash your dog, 18+ terms apply top grails are extremely rare.
If you listen to financial news, you know a lot of time to spend thinking about what's
next.
The next opportunity, the next investment, the next move.
But sometimes what matters most is being ready for what you never saw coming.
For more than 75 years, Cincinnati Insurance has worked with independent agents to help
protect businesses, homes, valuables, and more.
Because planning for the future isn't only about knowing what's next.
It's about making sure you're ready for what you can't predict.
Let Cincinnati Insurance make your bad day better.
Find an independent agent at CINFIN.com.
Most meeting note takers get the easy words right, and the important ones are wrong.
The client's name, the acronym, Whisper Flow Note taker, is built to get the hard words
right.
It takes notes on any meeting platform, Zoom, Google Meet, Teams, even WhatsApp calls, keeps
every meeting searchable, and connects to clot or chat GPT so you can ask, "What did
we agree to last Tuesday?"
For big business, AI opened up a world of promise, but that world of promise turned into a
world of pain, cost spiraling data trapped, security, and governance risks multiplying,
and ROI out of reach.
That's why enterprises turned to Boomi to connect data, apps, and AI, helping them operate
securely, efficiently, and at scale.
Boomi turns a world of AI pain into a world of AI gain.
As Boomi says, we got you, head to boomi.com.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Law firms are predominantly partnerships due to historical, regulatory, and economic factors, with ownership by lawyers being reinforced by state ethics rules.
The "rainmaker" model—where individual partners generate client relationships—creates instability, as their departure leads to revenue loss and cost pressures that spiral into a partner-run crisis.
Partners face significant financial risks in bankruptcy due to fraudulent transfer liability, as their profit distributions are treated as asset giveaways rather than wages.
Investor-owned law firms, like Slater & Gordon, can survive collapses better because employees aren’t liable and continue receiving pay, unlike partner-owned firms where ownership and liability are tied.
The partnership model fosters generational conflict and short-term thinking, as partners have no long-term stake; their equity vanishes upon retirement, undermining long-term investment in the firm.
Regulatory barriers, particularly non-compete prohibitions, prevent investors from fully owning law firms, limiting structural innovation and stability.
The collapse of firms like While Godshall highlights systemic vulnerabilities in the partnership model, including poor governance, toxic culture, and rapid lateral movement of high-value partners.
AI and new ownership models may offer solutions by reducing reliance on individual rainmakers and enabling more efficient, scalable, and resilient legal operations.
Summary:
The collapse of a major law firm like While Godshall reveals deep structural flaws in the traditional law firm partnership model. Rooted in history and legal ethics, this model allows only lawyers to own firms, creating a system where individual partners—especially "rain makers"—can generate massive client relationships, but their departure triggers a cascade of financial and operational damage. When a key partner leaves, the firm loses revenue but cannot easily cut costs, leading to declining profits and reduced partner compensation.
Crucially, remaining partners face significant liability in bankruptcy due to fraudulent transfer laws, as their profit distributions are treated as asset transfers. In contrast, investor-owned firms like Slater & Gordon avoid such collapse by allowing employees to remain employed during downturns and enabling financial restructuring. The partnership model also suffers from generational conflict: partners have no long-term stake, leading to short-term thinking and a lack of investment in future growth.
Lateral hiring and rising competition further intensify instability, as firms increasingly poach top talent. These dynamics suggest that the traditional model is unsustainable in a modern, AI-driven, and rapidly evolving legal landscape. New ownership structures—like those enabled by investor participation or AI-powered operations—could offer more resilient, equitable, and future-proof alternatives.
The case of While Godshall serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of over-reliance on individual talent and the need for systemic reform in legal business governance.
FAQs
Most big law firms are partnerships due to historical precedent, regulatory rules requiring lawyer ownership, and the economic model where lawyer productivity is easily measurable. These factors make worker ownership more sustainable than investor ownership in a law firm setting.
When a major partner leaves, the firm loses revenue and faces fixed costs like leases and pensions. Remaining partners see reduced profits, which leads to lower compensation. Additionally, partners may face liability claims in bankruptcy due to distributions made during insolvency.
The rainmaker model ties client loyalty to individual partners, not the firm. When a key partner leaves, clients follow, causing revenue loss. This triggers a chain reaction where other partners may leave, leading to a 'partner run' and potential firm collapse.
State bar rules, specifically Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit non-lawyer ownership. These rules prevent investors from owning law firms, though exceptions exist in a few states like Arizona and Utah. The rules are designed to protect the legal profession’s integrity.
Fraudulent transfer liability allows creditors to reclaim profits distributed to partners before a firm goes bankrupt. Since partners are owners, not employees, their profit distributions are treated as transfers that can be clawed back, creating significant financial risk.
Partners are incentivized to maximize client acquisition, often at the expense of firm-wide stability. The 'eat what you kill' system rewards individual success, leading to lateral moves and undermining client loyalty to the firm as a whole.
Chat with AI
Loading...
Pro features
Go deeper with this episode
Unlock creator-grade tools that turn any transcript into show notes and subtitle files.