What Ukraine Hath Wrought: Lessons for War, If We're Listening
37m 30s
The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped modern warfare, revealing deeper lessons beyond drones and AI. Rather than a technological revolution, it illustrates a systemic reorganization of warfighting, including structural changes in force design, doctrine, and command. The U.S. and NATO militaries still cling to outdated models—such as maneuver dominance and air superiority—without fully adapting to the realities of precision strikes, attrition, and positional warfare. A key issue is the failure of institutional learning: remote analysis and lack of embedded forward observers result in distorted, filtered insights that miss the true nature of combat. The war shows that mass, when properly understood as concentration of capabilities, enables resilience but cannot replace ground forces needed to control terrain. Drones have proven effective as a counter to drones and as a force multiplier, but they create new challenges like prolonged infantry suppression, logistical strain, and isolated operations requiring new training and medical support. Crucially, air power alone cannot defend against large-scale drone attacks, and traditional land forces remain essential. The U.S. risks undermining its global dominance by neglecting these lessons, especially in base protection, logistics, and force structure. The war's prolonged attritional phase—distinct from its early dynamic phase—underscores that future conflicts will not begin as technology-driven but as complex, interdependent battles of positioning, endurance, and strategic resilience. Finally, the U.S. must reevaluate its priorities, investing not just in unmanned systems but in integrated, adaptable, and resilient force structures—like the stand-in force—while learning from both Ukraine’s successes and the strategic missteps of other nations.
You are listening to the War on the Rocks podcast on strategy, defense, and foreign affairs.
My name is Ryan Evans. I'm the founder of War on the Rocks.
In this episode, I speak with my friends Mike Kaufman, Dara Massico, and Amos Fox
about what militaries ought to learn from the war in Ukraine.
Nearly four years of war in Ukraine. We're coming up on the fourth anniversary of the invasion.
And a lot of ink has been spilled about how Ukraine and the war itself has changed the face of warfare,
how we're seeing the future, maybe in many ways.
But I thought it would be worth bringing in some of the smartest people I know on this
as I prepare to hand over the reins of the podcast to step back from the day-to-day,
week-to-week coverage of the war and really reflect on what actually has it taught us.
And is it what we think?
The easy answer is drones.
And AI, right?
But I think there's actually a much more interesting and important set of lessons to take out there.
Looking back at an abstract level over the past four years and what we're absorbing,
what we're seeing, and then reacting to the conversations in the U.S. military and NATO
militaries, it's just really so much cognitive dissonance about what we're seeing play out in
Ukraine with the Russians and the Ukrainians developing things and innovating and putting
things together in new ways. And the conversations that we're trying to hold in the West while not
really ever having any kind of forward observer presence, looking at it very remotely and trying to figure
our way through it.
I would say the big things, Ryan, I agree with you, it's not just drones and AI.
It's just a really fundamental reorganization of core warfighting functions that need to happen.
I think if I was to pick out just a few to start the conversation with, I have seen this two main
arguments that really keep coming up that I feel like indicate that at least here in the United States,
we've not learned what's what's going on here. One is this obsession with maneuver and restoring
maneuver in the way that we wish that we still had it. And that's not to knock maneuver. It's
not to say that it's not important. But I see people focusing on this, like this is the only
problem that the Army and the Marines need to solve. You can have maneuver, you can have tanks,
but there's so much that you need to do to your units to still have them be a part. Like no one
is talking about.
The changes to the structure of units to have drone support and ISR in the unit. No one's talking about
the changes to billets. No one's talking about the high, low mix that you need to have to survive.
So it's like.
I do think some people are talking about these things and there are already some billet changes in the works, but.
Maybe, but it's pretty profound. Mike and I have sat and looked at some of these units that are successfully
doing this in Ukraine, and the changes are significant. Second issue that I think still persists and that is
really, I'm quite concerned about is this concept that, well, we would never fight like Ukraine. And so, like, there's just really not that much that we need to pay attention to. And mostly this is directed towards the Air Force.
And the Army, too.
And the Army, too. The Army tends.
The Army is big into, we wouldn't fight like this.
There's many services that fight into this. And there's almost a concept of, well, we have air superiority and that's going to resolve a lot of our problems, which is a fundamental
misread of how are you going to go after drone teams? How are you? You can't just dump like Army survival on the Air Force in the way that we've been doing. So this is just too
topics, hot button topics that maybe can start the conversation. But there's obviously a lot more to go into.
There's probably four big things. So the first is the precision paradox, which I've written about and talked about quite a bit. But the idea that precision is going to solve all our
problems. We've seen that precision solves problems, but also creates many more problems. A lot of the positional warfighting that you see going on as a result of precision. The other part of that is that campaigning, the idea of campaigns still matters. And this goes along with the precision
paradox concept is we, you know, we embrace this idea of going back to air power theory, this idea that precision was the solution to everything. And we've started thinking, we've replaced the idea of campaigns with kill chains and kill webs and targeting as opposed to military operations through campaigning and going and building a plan from A to Z and not building strike packages as the path to victory. So that's another one, we've forgotten the importance of campaigns, but the war has shown that campaigning
is still quite significant and something that we need to keep in mind.
The way that the war in Iran shaped up in the early weeks was sort of the apogee of what you described. It's kind of like the death of campaigning where, you know, Mike Horowitz, we had him on a great episode yesterday on whether this is a revolution, military affairs or not, and whether that even matters. He described this as in some ways a great accomplishment, which he's right. It is like that we struck these thousands of targets in a very short span of days. But to me, it just showed that, well, what about the use of force to obtain political aims? Like, where was the connection between the two?
Between the tactics and the strategy, where was the campaign that CENTCOM and the Secretary of Defense were supposed to plan? Seems like it was completely missing in action.
Yeah, and that gets to one of my other points is this idea that control still matters. Control of territory helps drive the connection between the use of force and political objectives. And sometimes that matters more than it does in other times. And I think that that's something that needs to be further explored in greater detail as well. The last two things are mass still matters, to your point, Dara.
Yeah, the drones are great and all this technology is great.
So you don't mean precise mass, like as in drones, you mean mass as people?
I mean physical mass, right, right.
People and equipment on the ground.
Yes, absolutely. My assessment, that's one of the big problems with the war in Ukraine is that Russia has the mass, Ukraine does not have the mass, and Russia's ability to hold terrain is really the sticking point that's not allowing Ukraine to connect their military operations with their political outcomes.
Again, I hate being that guy, but Dara brought it up, so I will. But attrition matters as much as we want to put our head in the sand or pretend like it doesn't. It matters. Part of war in general is it doesn't matter how you want to fight. It matters how you're going to have to fight. And attrition still matters because inevitably you're going to get sucked into it, especially if you try and rely on precision strike, which then causes people to go high, go underground, fight in ways, urban areas, fight in ways to try and offset those technological advantages or just that the fact that they're getting hit from above.
And by virtue of that, you're going to have to be able to mass probably on the ground and fight attritionally whether you want to or not.
Okay, let me add to a few of these. I think there's going to be solid areas of agreement overlap here. First, what I think we have seen in this war, and I want to be clear, the first request for me is always, are we seeing lessons? Because there are two contexts I'm always aware of. Every war has its own particular context. There are lots of dead branches on the tree of evolution of military technology. Sometimes you see a technology that might be decisive in one war.
For example, Bayraktar II drone in the Gorna Karabakh war, and it proves largely irrelevant in the next war. You see, even if drones somehow define aspects of both wars. And so the context is important. You know, a different war between different powers in a different jar. If you let's say U.S. versus China in the Pacific might have a context that just operates very differently. And the second one is phasing of the war. I want to highlight this as well. That's how we try to separate observations from lessons because, you know, wars tend to have a bit of an arc to them. And the initial period of war is often very dynamic, the reconciliation.
And then the war doesn't end there. There are these kind of prolonged positional traditional phases, higher density of forces, prepared defenses. What's interesting about this war is we often think of it now, because it's been going on for so long, as kind of a drones plus artillery plus traditional capabilities war. But this war didn't start this way. Actually, drones initially start as just ISR spotting for artillery between two structurally artillery oriented land forces. Then they begin to do light bombing. And then first person view drones emerge early.
Early on in 2023. But they're not a defining element until the very end of really summer of 23. So actually, for the first year and a half, the period of more intense dynamic fighting, offensives, counteroffensives, wars are not defining. Drones are not defining an element of this war. They begin to shut down mobility around August, September of 2023. The reason I say that sometimes before we get to the here are answers on lessons learned, we have to look at this and say, the truth is, we actually don't know, one, what the opening phase of the next war is going to look like.
Two, we think we saw it in this war, but actually we didn't. This war didn't open this way. This is like air power shows up later in World War One, let's say as, I mean, it's always there, but I'm trying to say this is like, or the tank or something else. It shows up later in the war. And guess what? It shows up not in its very mature iteration either. You're not 100% sure how it's going to look from this conflict to the next. And people often make the mistake of porting what they observed as the latter part of a conventional war. You know, this kind of positional fight.
That's routinized. It's very hard to breach defenses. She would decide. So the other thing you say, I think the opening phase of the next war will look like the last phase of the last war I saw. And it's probably not going to be it.
Two, we think we saw it in this war. And guess what? And guess what? who prefer precise masks.
- Mike and I just had this debate yesterday
with Stacey jumping in too, 'cause she uses
Well, not attributable mass, she uses-
Affordable?
Affordable mass.
Yeah.
I think the word mass is wrong here at all costs.
Correct.
And I agree with you.
Actually, so Ryan and I agree on this.
I want to explain why.
So to me, what's most interesting is not the attributes of a capability, it is how it is
used.
It is about employment.
That is much more interesting.
And to me, mass precision, mass does not mean lots of stuff.
It is now in our community a standard word for just many things, but it's not what it's
meant to convey.
It means the concentration of these capabilities at a decisive point on the battlefield.
That is what massing means.
Mass is not just many.
And mass precision is about the effect you get on the battlefield from the concentration
of these capabilities together with sensors, together with the data layer and network to
enable this way of fighting.
What I think at least we can see in the context of Russia-Ukraine war is that while mass precision
can logically offset a numerically superior force.
And in the Ukrainian case.
And in the case of Ukraine, it's not just about mass precision, it's about mass precision
over time.
It's about mass precision over time.
with an incredible low density of forces, okay?
That's the reality.
So it's compensating for that on the defense.
And maybe some people theorize it,
it might be able to do a lot more for you
on the offense as well,
but offense is much harder than defense.
That said, it still does not allow you
to actually control terrain.
It allows you to deny control to your opponent.
You still need boots on the ground.
you still need people, you still need to conduct an offensive operation in order to take control
of terrain. Just drones by themselves can deny it to the enemy. It's not enough to get you the
rest of these things. Yeah, I just want to come in for a second when we talk about forced employment
and how critical it is. And I think that's maybe one of the greatest vulnerabilities that we have
here in the United States military when we think about the evolution of conflict. From my perspective
about the war in Ukraine. There tends to be, because we don't have forward observers, we don't,
and I'm not saying we don't have people in Ukraine, but being in Kyiv is not being a forward
observer. That's not being embedded and observing lessons and how Ukrainians fight. We are really
missing something, really missing something incredible as an organization from not having
that. So instead, we get this, you know, remote or received knowledge that's been filtered a few
times by the time it comes back into our system. And we, instead of spending time thinking or
emphasizing what's the problem, what are the forced employment requirements, we have selected
into what's the technology that I need? Give me the technology, and then I'll figure out how I'm
going to use it. And there's really something, there's a lot of texture missing. And, you know,
Mike, you do field research all the time in Ukraine, and you're bringing back so much of
this knowledge into our system, but you're one person. The system has really missed out something
here. And this is a very big concern for me. We rely on a small group of admittedly very
talented military analysts sort of doing this freelancing, going to the battlefield every
quarter has been hugely damaging for our institutions. But you have to institutionalize
the knowledge. I mean, you have to have forward observers. You have to have a, in my opinion,
a centralized learning center at probably the chairman level to direct it. We have people
doing things in multiple services, multiple command and commands, but it's also disjointed
and they don't really work this out together in the same place. So this is an issue for me.
Part of that too, I think, is the way Mike would look at the problem in Ukraine is going to be a
little bit different than the way folks from the military are going to look at the problem. And
the lessons they're going to pull are going to be a little bit different because the work that you
do is just a bit different than what the military does and needs. And so it does, I think, miss out
probably, you know, Mike, you do great work and everybody appreciates you going and pulling these
lessons, not lessons necessarily, but your observations and bringing that information
back to us. But the military would be far better served. I mean, hell, the ship sailed at this
point almost. Let me sharpen this for you because you were still at Futures Command earlier in the
war. Yeah. And you were looking, watching the army try to grapple with these problems. So what
did you observe over time? A lot of it really was tech driven. It was, let's see the tech and what
it's doing because we were getting so much top-down integrate tech into everything that
you're doing at Futures Command. And so a lot of the tech drove the concepts that we were working
on and the lessons that we were looking at and pulling from Ukraine were tied to what is tech
doing for us, not how is war as a whole concept evolving. And so it really did become that.
And then also part of it too was like the first rule of Fight Club. You don't talk about Fight
club, there was a lot of, you don't talk about Russia, Ukraine going on as part of that as well.
So it was interesting because you're trying to integrate some of these lessons, but not actually
identifying who they were pinned against and for, as you worked on developing the concept.
I want to go back to the conversation on what we may or may not see as real trends on warfare
from this war. Because at the end of the day, we have to learn from the wars we see.
This is the largest conventional war, certainly the largest conventional land war. So to not
not look at the lessons from this as the kind of misdelegates in the room, right?
One thing that I saw is that forces are going to have a serious problem concentrating on the
offense and the defense, and that's going to have to be earned somehow. You're going to have to have
a plan for that. And if you want to operate as a formation, as a combined arms formation,
you have to have a clear vision for how you're going to concentrate your forces,
how they're going to move to the point of contact, and then what's going to happen after that.
Second, Dara started off with this great point. Warfare is about being able to scale the things
you need to do. And to integrate new technologies requires major adaptations on force structure,
organizational capacity, and acquiring the enabling technologies, not just the capability
itself. And people miss this part of the Russia-Ukraine war. At least right now, drone
warfare is very manpower intensive. It requires very significant allocation of manpower. And what
people don't understand is that Russia and Ukraine did not buy drones and start to fly drones. They
made a strategic decision to allocate manpower from maneuver formations towards a new type of
support fire and ISR formation that also then later end up doing air defense and other functions
within the force. And we allocate logistical support to that mission as well from just
traditional artillery fires and the other things logistics were busy doing, allocate organizational
capacity, and then also have the enabling technologies to try to fight this way at scale.
But there's a big difference between Hizballah using some fiber optic cable drones against IDF
and thousands of thousands of personnel as a new part of a force structure fighting this way.
I think that that's what a lot of folks miss too, is they think it's, when you talk about drones,
they think it's like one dude and a drone out there doing it all, and they don't understand
the connective tissue. And it's the same thing with any formation in an armed force or in the
army in particular. I was an armor officer. It's not just the tank or the tank and the crew. It's
a massive amount of everything that connects that thing to be able to go do what it does.
And when folks talk about drones, I really do think that in their mind, it's just a person.
And if it's an FPV drone, a person sitting there with a joystick and a headset on, flying it, and they completely overlook that huge amount of connective tissue that makes that whole process work.
Just to kind of stay on this thread, I think it was when we were talking about maybe the lack of learning and absorbing lessons, going into the run-up to Operation Epic Fury was kind of distressing to watch for those of us who've been engaged in learning from this war.
We may have talked about this in a previous podcast, but, you know, just, you know, thanks to commercial imagery, I think, from China being released on a daily basis in the run up of that war.
Just watching us stack squadron upon squadron of high value assets on top of each other in our bases in the Middle East, knowing that they had some air defenses, but they had basically no drone defense.
You know, we're lucky, to be honest, that Iran did not take the shot at that point because we weren't dispersed.
We had no hardened C2, like people couldn't go underground.
And this was stated after the fact by, I think, the ARSENT commander, maybe in an interview.
I mean, they learned the lessons too late, but all of these lessons were available for four years.
The other part of that, too, is all those bases in the Middle East have been there for 20 years, 25 years.
So identifying where they were, that was not hard.
No, not at all.
And then the other thing, too, with the bunkers on those bases, I've been on many of those bases.
It's legit just like a concrete barrier that you would go hide under when rockets would come in.
And that was rockets back in the old days when it was, you know, Katushas, 107 millimeter Katushas being fired at you by Shia militia groups, not these massive Shahid drones and whatnot.
Or multiple drones just stalking you, an individual.
Absolutely.
And so does that leave us now?
This may sound like I'm being really critical of our system, and I am because I care about it and I want it to do the best.
But how, I guess, you've watched the Russians and the Ukrainians harden their bases for four years with hardened structures, digging underground, dispersing personnel, putting up drone nets, putting up decoys, and none of that was done in the run up to this. I mean, that was a choice. It was a choice to do nothing. Yes, it was.
and but now the air force says okay like we need to prioritize base force protection four years
later okay so all right at least you're doing it what else are we not doing and maybe that's a
question for the group that we should be accelerating what areas are we still vulnerable in
i want to shift the conversation maybe tease the ammo set a bit too on this topic of you know
warfare always involves maneuver elements attrition elements it's not discrete strategies
these are characteristics, right? And positional aspects as well. I think that certainly mass
precision, at least right now, lends itself towards emphasizing the traditional character of war.
Because this amount of ISR and recon fire, recon strike capability with this level of
concentration and density will make maneuvering in basic mobility very challenging. It will also
be easier to execute and more reliable for the force that adopts this technology than trying to
do a combined arms maneuver, and it will create real challenges because first, it's
on land warfare, but it's also increasingly being
adapted and experimented with by Russian and Korean forces on offense as well.
There's a second question, which is, we need to address the importance of air
power and our militaries and our doctrine, both from a standpoint of air
superiority being seen as a decisive enabler for ground force maneuver, and
also air power as a principal means of air defense, Dara, this gets to what
you said, because part of the reason we don't have a lot of point defense,
part of the reason we don't have a lot of air defense in our ground force
structure, because we assume that air power has got it.
And one of the challenges I see from mass precision is twofold.
The first one, it is now an open question, could we end up on a future
scenario where air power is delivering low class air superiority, but guess
what, they haven't solved for the problem that the adversary with effective
employment of these capabilities and tactics of scale has a substantial
degree of fire control over our forces, and we are not able to combine
on this maneuver.
We take it on acceptable levels of attrition because air power has air
superiority, good news, okay?
Bad news, air superiority is not delivering the effects it was supposed
to deliver.
Yeah, and it will last for very short periods of time.
Yeah.
And the second part to that is air power is not able to do air defense
against these capabilities being employed at this scale because it would, it
needs to be substantially adapted, let's say, but we can now see that air
power by itself, if you said, listen, not a big deal that Russia's procuring
over 120,000 large one-way attack drones this year because air power is
something, okay?
It's clear that this is not the answer.
It's not the answer for our forces by itself.
Yeah.
From my position, as I look at this, I think that when we think about the
different forms of fire.
You have to think about where you're at in the phase of an operation, the
phase of a campaign, and right now we're fully enmeshed in the, the forces
have converged on one another and they've been converged for years at this
point, and when you have two forces converged on one another, you're
basically stuck in this cycle of positional and attritional fighting.
Maneuver only exists in that initial phase where forces are converging.
And if you can, and again, it, it depends on which level you're talking
about, right, because this is the other part, people will be like, well, my
platoon was doing maneuver.
I'm like, dude, I'm not talking about platoons, right?
We're talking about the war.
So when you have that initial phase, when it's transitioned from the movement phase,
where forces are moving to an objective, whether that's a city or one another.
Character of what's going on changes and it becomes attritional.
And that's why I say we have to be fully, especially as Americans, like
we're fundamentally expeditionary.
We're always moving from point a to point B and trying to accomplish something at
point B while during that movement from point a to point B.
You can do maneuver all day long.
If you've got the capability, the situation allows for it.
But once you get to B, all of that's going to change and you have to be prepared.
You have to be built and resourced at scale to do attritional fighting.
And that's where I think we missed the mark in terms of understanding.
And we keep talking about, we've got to find ways to restore maneuver.
We're not restoring maneuver, especially in some sort of static front.
Uh, you have to find ways to restore mobility.
When we think about transparent battlefield concept and how theoretically, if everything can
be seen, everything can be targeted, everything can be killed.
Those are the things that we have to start really addressing.
And I've equated it to the idea of right now, land forces essentially are operating
like an M and M without a hard candy shell, right?
And so these land forces are melting in our, what is it melting in our
hands before we can get them in our mouth.
We have to think about how to get the hard candy shell back on land forces.
And we don't have that as part of that.
We also have to make sure that we're not overcompensating with the
idea of drones and precision mass at the expense.
Of the land force, going back to the idea of control, if you've sold off all your land
forces to get all these drones, but the other side has bought drones and land force, you've
created a strategic vulnerability in your military to where now you've got a hollowed
out forest to where if they can tie up your drones, they're able to operate on the ground,
basically unencumbered.
And then that gets back to the problem.
Then where I think Ukraine finds itself, we've got all these great drones, but we're
lacking the land force to go in and push these forces out and then hold that ground.
And so we have to think about how we're going to get the land force out and push those forces out and then hold that ground against any sort of, you know, big picture counterattack.
I think part of the conversation on drones that gets missed is that it was never just drones and it's never been just drones in the Russia-Ukraine war.
It is a combination of extensive mining, offensive and defensive mining.
Yes, sometimes using drones as the key means, for sure.
Traditional artillery, which doesn't get used that much, but imposes a real dynamic on the battlefield, prevents force concentrations.
It creates a secondary dilemma for any attacking force.
And if you were to just eliminate artillery, let's say it did
exist in either force structure and all you had was point damage from drones, you would see a fairly different approach.
Suddenly, you would see the ability for larger scale offensive operations, even with just dismounted infantry, being a real problem for a drone force.
Obviously, also prepared defenses, which really have a significant shaping effect that creates a serious challenge.
So what drones are doing in effect is they're being a huge force multiplier to traditional challenges on land warfare.
That's why, you know, I consistently argue that you cannot have just the force of drones and you still have to have, you know, infantry, arm artillery.
You can't have just infantry, arm artillery.
between these a force should never optimize itself either against just one capability now
last point is drones have proven at least in this war to be one of the principal counters to drones
today there is another world war analogy which is most of the fights between drones kind of look
like World War I aerial battles with interception, nets, guns on the drones, various types of
systems, but they're sort of, essentially drones are counter to themselves. And so it's
clear that one force could optimize itself against another force if all that force had
was just drones that they were employing, that you don't want to go in this direction
either. But do you understand how these things combine and then how we can integrate those
capabilities into the way our force fights today?
One brief addition to this concept of thinking about what drones have done, just think about everything that we've learned about what drones have done as a tool of suppression and what that does to infantry on the ground. And this is not a point that I make. I want to attribute this. I was just in Sweden giving maybe some insights into our trip in Ukraine.
And I was reflecting on all the things that we were told about how infantry have to stay in their positions for so long because of the suppression and how it impacts how they have to do so much telemedicine, how food and water and supplies are supplied this way, how they kind of operate alone in their foxholes for extended periods of time.
And a Swedish officer listened to this and reflected on it and said, so basically infantry should start to be trained almost like rangers because they are there alone or not alone, but they're essentially alone because no one can get to them.
You're not going to do casualty evacuation from a helicopter.
They are alone and they have to treat themselves alone.
Sometimes there's no medics.
And that's a really fundamental shift.
That's a PME issue.
That's a training issue.
And there's all sorts of these little lessons from combat medicine to logistics that I just haven't, I haven't seen us take that on board.
And I get, you know, not wanting, no one wants to be locked down in a foxhole in a position for months or years.
But if we're fighting the Russians, someone's going to be doing that.
Someone has to hold the territory.
One of the big things, Darren, GWAT, right, was the idea of the golden hour.
And no matter what you did.
You just call it GWAT? I've always said GWAT.
GWAT.
What's going on now?
I can call it whatever I want.
Are you chewing cotton now?
Hey, I'm from Indiana, so it comes out the way it comes out, all right?
But GWAT, Brian, it was one of the big things.
Like when you planned any kind of operation, it had to have medical support tied into it.
And medical support with helicopter casualty evacuation is part of that.
Now, obviously, the availability of that depended on the situation, of course.
But it was never this idea that coming out of all the reporting from Ukraine is, you know,
The way that the front is so dispersed with individual positions and just a few people in these positions spread across this vast front where they really are just out there.
But it is also a consequence of what you pointed to before, which is Ukraine's manning deficiencies and which have been their biggest strategic liability since the war began.
Well, like you said, it's also the conditions imposed by these effects, which is neither side being able to effectively solve for the problem of how to get force concentration and play that force of scale again on the ground.
And part of that's interaction of the battlefield conditions.
Part of that's also the degradation of force quality over time when you get to this latter part of the war, why I am wary and encourage people to think through the difference between seeing what two forces look like about two years into a conventional war versus what they look like on day one and saying, all right, let's port the lessons from the last, you know, two years of this war rather than the opening.
The reason I say that is, it's always interaction of kind of three things: obviously issues
with force quality, battlefield conditions, and also conscious choices in what militaries
choose as essentially their solution to the problem.
But the reason Russians can't do it is they chose to specialize in smaller, smaller-scale
infantry assault, infiltration, and they essentially overly optimized an approach that increasingly
became combat inefficient.
It interacted with the battlefield conditions being imposed by the Ukrainian defense, but
It got them down the path that is going to take them a while to come back from, right?
That is, they overinvested in one particular way of trying to fight.
And I think that, and they failed to invest in restoring force quality to do things differently
or better than the way they're doing them now.
Last issue I want to ask you about, we're all, I think, plainly dissatisfied with how
our own country is institutionally learned from this war.
Are there countries out there that are doing a better job than us in adapting to this new
era?
I think North Korea is making big moves on how they organize their forces based on drone
warfare and other things that they've directly experienced in Russia.
I worry that China will take smarter lessons about what from this war is applicable for
their contingencies, which geographically are very different, but nonetheless, there's
utility in it versus our folks who basically look at the map and say, there's land here
and that's an ocean.
businesses on a lot of these capabilities
are actually quite, quite further than you think.
- Mike, I think China's a good one.
because in my assessment, I think that they're looking at some of these problems.
They talk about the hard candy shell and how we're all up in arms about how the fact that we land forces can't move.
If I was China, I would assume that they're looking at that because when you think about what are they going to do in Taiwan,
they're probably going to occupy it.
And then they're going to figure out how to move on the battlefield under all these drones and precision strike that everybody is investing in.
So in my mind, I think that they may have already solved that problem.
This idea of how do you operate on a transparent battlefield with land forces to continue to control terrain and maintain mobility?
Maybe I'm being overly optimistic.
I have to turn the question inside out, Ryan.
I think a lot of people are learning bad lessons because they're over-investing in this idea that drones are going to save the world and protect democracy and all these different ideas.
One of the things, and I say that too, I was at a conference in London back in April or May,
and this British general got up and he had this app and he was connected to something that talked about,
all the drone strikes that were going on.
And he started off by saying, okay, today they've conducted X, Y, and Z number of strikes and they've killed X number of Russians.
And then when he finished his presentation, he pulled it back out and he was like,
and now they've done, you know, whatever, 15 more and killed X more.
And during the Q&A, I was like, what's the point?
What's the relevance of what you're saying?
Is that getting Zelensky any closer to his policy objectives?
And then the comment back was, well, I don't think about strategy.
And I'm like, bro, you're a general.
You should be thinking about strategy.
So I think that we're learning a lot of bad lessons.
We're getting caught up in a task completion bias when we think about how drones and precision strike help,
help us on the battlefield and help us fight wars and win wars.
And I think that we're probably walking away from this with a lot of bad lessons that are going to serve us poorly,
probably have served us poorly in Iran when we think about that.
Moving down the road into, because inevitably we'll find ourselves in another conflict here soon, I'm sure.
A friend of mine who would prefer to remain unnamed.
So I will leave him unnamed likes to make this observation is that the risk is as we take these, as you call them, the most bad lessons which are based off of countries who are weaker, fighting a stronger opponent.
We are not that party and we risk giving up what actually makes us the stronger party in some way.
So we of course, there needs to be more adaptation.
Of course, there needs to be more adoption of unmanned systems.
But it can't be done without giving up the things that actually do make the U.S.
military as powerful as it is.
Well.
And on that point, I mean, our our global power projection capability, that is the basis of our military dominance.
And what has been revealed from OEF was was really bad story for that.
You have to have credible bases that you can project and that you can operate from.
We offset with suboptimal ways of clearing people off the base before this started.
I get it. You have to do that.
But it was that the most optimal decision.
We found a logistics pathway very far away because we couldn't operate out of the Middle East.
I mean, we have to keep everything supplied at some cost to aircraft carriers.
We have really exposed our basis of being vulnerable to asymmetric capabilities.
We haven't really grappled with what that means.
Not talking about the damages is not helping.
The American people deserve better than that.
Now that we haven't talked about how hard we got hit.
How hard we got hit in the Middle East is a disservice.
Is a disservice.
Right. And, you know, and again, this sounds critical because I need us to do better and I believe that we can.
Just was it last week in the UK, there was a drone threat against was it Fairford?
And we just had to we had to loft all the bombers and get them out of there because we didn't have the ability to detect drones.
This capability exists in Ukraine.
Our government is a partner of Ukraine and understands how the pieces come together.
And yet our government is not doing this for our own bases.
Like someone make it make sense.
I mean, the order started finally coming in after the war had already started, but it was too late for that.
Mike, I'll give you the final word, then we'll close out some of the lessons inherently very depending
on whose force you're talking about.
If it's us, we're an expeditionary power, but our fights are away games on behalf of our allies.
That's what we expect to be the cause of the war.
So the lessons for us naturally might be a bit different than they would be, let's say, for the proximate country.
And for them, I think there is a real concern they have to consider for the Estonians of the world or the Taiwan's of the world, which is they have to be the stand on force.
If you look at what happened in Russia, Ukraine, or if you look at our war with Iran, the stand on force has some obvious problems they have to solve for if they intend to survive as a stand on force for a very long time.
Second, we have issues to solve for if we intend to logistically enable our power projection to get to them, because now it's going to be a lot more challenging.
Third, since we anticipate that the first thing we'll be able to move and the fastest thing we'll be able to move that provides the best combination of mobility and firepower on the battlefield is air power, we need to look at that actually first.
I hate to say this, and Amos, you know it's not because I don't spend my time with the army, because I think a lot of lessons from the land war for army folks.
But the first thing we need to look at is air power.
The first thing we move to the European land theater is actually air power in the event of a contingency there.
And then the question we need to ask is, what do we need to do to further adapt and evolve our traditional advantages, okay, to make sure it delivers the things we're willing to deliver?
And the last example I'll give you is, yeah, it's not about getting rid of what makes us great, but let's say good looking what makes us great.
The problem with armor today is on the battlefield.
I was in a discussion about a week ago, I said, is not that there's any problem with tanks.
It's a basic question of optimization, current armor optimization.
It goes back to 1980s, the main battle tanks from the Cold War.
If I showed you the evolution of the tank from 1945 to 1985, and the generations of armor evolution, okay?
Now let me show you the armor evolution from 1985 to 2025, the next 40 years.
We're actually all pretty much driving tanks from 1980s.
Yeah, they've had upgrades and whatnot, but I'm sorry.
Actually, almost all of us, and by all of us, I mean United States, British, Germans, Russia are all on 1980s platforms.
They might be the umpteenth variant of it.
You're going to get this armor guy going here.
No, no, no.
No, no, no.
Are you with me?
Are you with you?
Yeah, I published an article on this.
This was one of the key points in an article I published recently, and it got the armor community quite pissed off.
Who are you to question our tank?
And the updates, the updates, air quotes that we've made to it.
I made the same point.
Like, dude, this is like 40-year-old technology at best.
I just want to say, I think the stand-in force is the, without a doubt in my mind at least,
the most valuable operational concept that's been introduced by U.S. military service in over a generation.
And it's a shame that since General Berger came up on it, we haven't came up with it and sought to implement it and made a lot of progress.
And the new commandant has as well, but not, I mean, he's not the new commandant anymore.
He's just kind of your left, I guess.
But it's a shame that that hasn't been a better resourced and more joint effort with more velocities to realize the vision of the stand-in force,
because I think it will be tremendously important in whatever the next war is.
And for allies, as I said, the lessons are naturally different because they are the stand-in force, voluntary or involuntary.
And if they're a much smaller military, they naturally.
We have to take slightly different lessons.
And hopefully we are both talking to each other.
So the lessons they're taking and lessons we are taking as the military that might come reinforce them or, you know,
be the expeditionary power that has to use their logistics, their territory, that they actually come together.
We're not having two completely separate conversations.
And we didn't both look at this war and come up with totally different impressions of implications in these wars.
Thank you so much for listening to this episode of the War on the Rocks podcast.
Also check out our membership program at warontherocks.com slash membership.
Stay safe and stay healthy.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The war in Ukraine has revealed a fundamental reorganization of warfighting functions, moving beyond drones and AI to emphasize structural, organizational, and doctrinal changes.
There is a critical disconnect in U.S. and NATO military thinking, where forces still rely on outdated concepts like maneuver and air superiority without adapting to the realities of precision, attrition, and positional warfare.
The "precision paradox" shows that precision strike creates new battlefield challenges, such as static, attritional fighting and reduced mobility, undermining traditional campaign theory and long-term strategic goals.
Mass, as a concept, means concentration of capabilities at decisive points—not just quantity—highlighting the need for integrated employment of drones, sensors, and ground forces to achieve battlefield dominance.
A major institutional failure is the lack of forward observers and embedded learning, leading to filtered, delayed, and incomplete understanding of how Ukrainians actually fight and adapt.
Air power alone is insufficient; both air defense and ground force resilience are compromised by over-reliance on air superiority and failure to prepare for drone-based threats.
The war’s evolution shows that early phases are often misinterpreted as defining the future of conflict, when in fact the most critical lessons come from prolonged, attritional phases of positional warfare.
The U.S. military risks losing strategic flexibility by over-investing in drone-centric models while neglecting essential land force capabilities, base protection, and traditional doctrines like maneuver and campaign planning.
Summary:
The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped modern warfare, revealing deeper lessons beyond drones and AI. Rather than a technological revolution, it illustrates a systemic reorganization of warfighting, including structural changes in force design, doctrine, and command. S.
and NATO militaries still cling to outdated models—such as maneuver dominance and air superiority—without fully adapting to the realities of precision strikes, attrition, and positional warfare. A key issue is the failure of institutional learning: remote analysis and lack of embedded forward observers result in distorted, filtered insights that miss the true nature of combat. The war shows that mass, when properly understood as concentration of capabilities, enables resilience but cannot replace ground forces needed to control terrain.
Drones have proven effective as a counter to drones and as a force multiplier, but they create new challenges like prolonged infantry suppression, logistical strain, and isolated operations requiring new training and medical support. Crucially, air power alone cannot defend against large-scale drone attacks, and traditional land forces remain essential. S.
risks undermining its global dominance by neglecting these lessons, especially in base protection, logistics, and force structure. The war's prolonged attritional phase—distinct from its early dynamic phase—underscores that future conflicts will not begin as technology-driven but as complex, interdependent battles of positioning, endurance, and strategic resilience. S.
must reevaluate its priorities, investing not just in unmanned systems but in integrated, adaptable, and resilient force structures—like the stand-in force—while learning from both Ukraine’s successes and the strategic missteps of other nations.
FAQs
The war has revealed a fundamental reorganization of warfighting functions, including the need for better integration of drone support, changes in unit structure, and a renewed emphasis on campaigns and terrain control over isolated precision strikes.
Military leaders often focus solely on restoring maneuver with tanks and forces, but overlook critical changes like drone-enabled ISR, new billets, and high-low mix structures needed to survive in modern hybrid warfare.
No — the war shows that air superiority is not a reliable guarantee, as adversaries can use drones and precision fire to disrupt operations and degrade air defense, making ground force resilience essential.
The precision paradox means that while precision strikes solve some problems, they also create others, like increased positional warfare and attrition, by forcing forces underground or into urban areas to evade detection.
Drones have drastically altered battlefield dynamics by enabling intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, but they require massive human and organizational support, and cannot replace the need for ground forces to hold and control territory.
Mass is not just about quantity but about the concentration of capabilities — such as sensors, data, and firepower — at decisive points. In Ukraine, mass precision has compensated for lack of manpower but does not allow full control of terrain.
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