What Robert Caro learned about power after studying it for 50 years
1h 1m 10s
Robert Caro, through decades of immersive research, presents a profound portrait of two transformative American leaders—Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses—whose relentless will to achieve monumental public projects shaped modern governance and urban development. Central to their success was an unyielding determination to overcome resistance, whether from property owners, political opponents, or bureaucratic hurdles. Caro highlights how both men began with idealism—Moses seeking accessible beaches for New Yorkers and Johnson striving for civil rights and anti-poverty reforms—but evolved into figures whose personal ambition often outweighed public welfare, leading to controversial decisions like large-scale evictions or unchecked expansion. Despite their flaws, Caro argues that their achievements symbolize a necessary political force: a visionary leader who can push beyond consensus to bring about change. He also stresses that their stories reveal deeper truths about American history, such as the isolation of frontier life that shaped Johnson’s character and the overlooked heroism of ordinary Americans in rural Texas. Caro’s commitment to transparency is evident in his decision to donate his vast archives to the New York Historical Society, ensuring future generations of historians can access raw interviews, notes, and unpublicized material. Ultimately, his work not only chronicles the lives of powerful men but also calls into question what kind of leadership is needed in a democracy today—balancing ambition with accountability, and progress with human dignity.
If you do everything, you'll win.
That is the maxim by which Lyndon Johnson lived his life.
My guest today is Robert Caro.
And over the 50 years that he has spent writing about Lyndon Johnson,
he has lived in the edges of the Texas Hill Country
to understand the poverty and loneliness of Johnson's youth.
He has sifted through millions of documents
in the Senate and presidential libraries of the entire nation.
And he has chased down for interviews
the former goon who helped Johnson steal an election
to the chauffeur who drove him on his first desperate campaign.
In other words, my guest today is a man
who understands Johnson's aphorism,
if you do everything, you'll win.
Mr. Caro, it is such a huge honor to have you on the show.
It's great to be here.
So my first question is just this that I hinted in the introduction.
How much do you see yourself represented
in the American public?
Johnson or in Moses is part of the reason
you're able to write so compellingly about them
that you share some of their qualities.
Well, let me say first, I think I hope they're there.
They are qualities that I don't share.
Among other things, they are so I'll use the word ruthless.
You know, you say that they do anything to win.
That's part of their.
Greatness.
You know, I remember when I started learning about Robert Moses,
I went to the LaGuardia papers, which were in a.
They were kept in the boat basin.
They were stored by the municipal archives,
literally in the 79th Street boat basin on the Hudson River,
three levels down.
There were this row of file cabinets, you know, against the wall.
So I'm sitting there day after day.
I'm sitting there day after day.
Going through these documents and occasionally I'd come across a note
that Robert Moses wrote, and I realized I'm following the same path he was.
So it's fascinating, actually.
Well, obviously not all the qualities, but the quality I'm referring to here is
that just like Johnson or just like Moses, you refuse to take no for an answer.
If somebody says, I won't give you an interview, you don't.
You don't stop there.
You refuse to leave a stone unturned.
And so there is a relentlessness that you share with these subjects.
I'm going to take that as a real, as a compliment.
Yes.
Well, you feel there are certain people that you have to interview.
And if they don't want to give you an interview, you can't, I feel, you can't say no.
Like you say.
I'm going to take that as a compliment.
Lyndon Johnson's first secretary, the one who rode in the car with him on the campaigns.
I said, there's no other human being on earth who knows what Lyndon Johnson is doing
all these hours driving back and forth across Texas.
I don't know what I have to do, but I have to get him to tell me honestly about this thing.
So this raises another question that I wanted to ask you, which is you're interviewing,
you're interviewing all these people, and in many cases, they know, they must know that
it's not good for them to tell you what you want to know.
And in many cases, they tell you, anyways, how do you get people to tell you things
that they know they shouldn't tell you?
You ask terrific questions.
Sometimes you're sitting there and you know this person doesn't want to talk to you about
what you want.
You want to get out from like John Connolly on how Johnson used money to get political
power.
And I'm thinking, but I've been through the notes.
Connolly collected the money and gave it out at Johnson's instructions.
So he's the only guy who can tell me how Johnson did this, you know, how he judged who to give
money to.
Sometimes Johnson would write on a request for money.
If the guy didn't have money, he would write on a request for money.
If the guy asked for $1,500, Johnson would write, okay, $1,500.
Sometimes he'd write $500.
Sometimes he'd write, no.
But sometimes he'd write, no, never.
And I asked Connolly, what did that mean?
He said, this guy was never going to get money from Lyndon Johnson.
So then when you ask why he felt this way about this particular conversation, he said,
that's when the really fascinating stories emerged.
Before we get more into Johnson, I want to first start with Moses.
Sure.
So in the last decade or two, people have been complaining that it's become too hard
and too difficult to build things.
Yes.
Especially for the government to build things.
Yes.
So if you look at the Second Avenue subway, they've been building it for around 50 years.
Yes.
They've opened up a mine.
It's a mile and a half.
Yes.
It costs more than $4 billion.
And people have been saying, we were concerned.
The Power Broker came out.
It was an immensely influential book.
And we were concerned about so much power being centralized and given, delegated to
one person so they could build.
And we wanted to prevent that.
And so we made environmental review and land use review and community boards and litigation.
And people say, well, that's not going to work.
And they say, we've over-corrected.
We've gone too far in the other direction.
What do you think of that?
They also say, Robert, because of all these safeguards, Robert Moses could not operate
in the same way today.
But the fact is, when Robert Moses started, there were also safeguards.
People were also saying, you can't build anything.
This was in the 1920s.
The people were saying, government can't build anything.
They're too many.
They're too many blocks.
Nothing's getting built.
We need highways.
It's the age of cars.
Everyone's getting automobiles.
But we have the same old roads.
And nobody can build them because the property owners don't want the roads built through
their land.
Robert Moses comes along, and all of a sudden, those things vanish because he, despite all
the safeguards and everything else, he just builds.
So, doing the power broker, it was just fascinating to me to see how he gets around everything.
But it doesn't matter what it is, he's going to build a beach at Jones Beach.
He sees it one day, he says, "This is the greatest beach I've ever seen.
It's only 27 miles from New York City.
If I can build a road out here, I will give the people of New York City a chance."
He says, "I can build a city, this great beach."
But it seems impossible to build that road because the property owners don't want the
road going through their farms and property.
But he basically says, "I'm going to build it."
And to watch him do it, to overcome each obstacle, there's so many.
And then all of a sudden, it's open, and you have Jones Beach, and you have it accessible
to New York.
It's an act of political democracy.
It's political genius.
And it's also an act of will that I'm going to do it.
That's fascinating to learn about.
And so you think today, if there was a Moses-type figure, they would figure out a way to work
around everything that's been set up?
Well, the answer to that is when Moses was building, they were saying the same thing.
Nobody's ever going to build.
They don't need roads for the automobiles, but they'd have to go through hundreds, dozens
of farms, scores of property.
No one's ever going to be able to do it.
But he comes along and does it.
So today, someone would come along and do it.
This I think is a profound question for democracies, which is, how do we end up in a place which
is not the extremes of democracy?
How do we end up in a place of 50s or 60s Moses but not also where we are now?
So where I live in California, we've spent, I don't know, $15 billion over the last decade.
And we haven't gotten a single new line or a single new mile of railway that those $15
billion have been spent to build.
Whereas a different system, you could say China today is like New York City in the 40s
and 50s, where they have a very Moses-type attitude.
It's like, hey, you know what, we've spent hundreds of thousands of miles of railways
over the last 10, 20 years, but of course, at the cost of similar amounts of displacements
of people and recklessness.
So how do we land in a good spot between either extreme?
I'm not sure there is a good spot.
What you just said is the situation, to build anything on a large scale, you're confronted
with dozens or scores or partnerships
perhaps, hundreds of property owners who don't want it built there. So the question is,
how does anything get built? Then someone comes along and can do it. Now, when Robert Moses
started, it seemed impossible, actually impossible, to build roads out into Long Island
because the road would have to cross scores of properties, most of which the people didn't want
the road coming and had the power to stop them then because he didn't have the power of eminent
domain then. But Moses said, basically, I'm going to build it. And he would find a way
to overcome each difficulty. Now, you say, what am I trying to say by that? Trying to say that
I'm going to build it.
Every once in a while, someone comes along who's sort of a genius, if that's the right word,
at getting big things built for the public. Decades may pass when there's no one like that.
And you say, everything's stalled. Nothing big is ever going to be built again.
And then someone suddenly comes along, and all of a sudden, things get built.
That's the nature of political genius. I happen to be writing about two guys, Lyndon Johnson and Robert
Moses, who, in both cases, Johnson with civil rights and Moses with public works, where people
were saying, you can't do this, but they did it. Correct me if I'm putting words in your mouth,
but if I may attempt an interpretation,
of what you said? Yes.
It sounds like you think we need a little Moses today.
Oh, a great insight. I sometimes wonder about just what you said. And the answer is,
well, I certainly don't want someone who's ruthless and disregarding public opinion
as a Robert Moses. But at the same time, you need someone who's going to find a way to get
things built. And he's going to have to find a way, despite the fact that so many people don't
want it built. A lot of people who haven't read the book have this impression that you think
everything Moses did was bad, and that we need to make sure that we can never have a Moses again.
Yes.
And so it's interesting to hear you say that we need a little Moses again.
Well, when people say to me everything was bad that he did, what I say is, you didn't read the
book. Because certainly the first parts of the book, well, hundreds of pages, are about a young
idealist who sees this great need for recreation, for beaches on Long Island, for the city people,
and is going to get a way to make them accessible.
To people in the city. You say, and it's an act of genius and willpower, the way he does it. And that's
great. Now, does it become, does it evolve into where Moses listens to nobody, and the only thing
that matters is what he wants to get built?
It does evolve into that. He does change. But the young Moses, the idealist, who before he's
building is an expert in civil service, technicalities of civil service, and devotes
all his energies to trying to reform the civil service and make it that people get promoted on
merit instead of political pull. And he works so hard on that. You see a real,
real idealism. And you see an idealism in his early works, you know, when you say, I want to make these
beaches accessible to New York. Now, does that evolve into where I think there ought to be a
highway here, no matter what anybody says, and no matter how many thousands of people are in the way,
like the Crossroads of Jerusalem, but I'll evict them. It does. He changes.
That, to me, is the story of the, a big part of the story of the power broker, how this guy who's
in the beginning, a young idealistic guy who wants to build, to make lives better for people, to give
them access to the ocean, beaches, and all, changes into someone who just wants to build because he thinks
something should be built, no matter what anyone else says. And he's going to do it no matter how
many thousands, hundreds, thousands of people have to evict, no matter how bad an idea it is, like
the Cross Bronx Expressway. People are telling him not to do that before he does it. The minute this
road opens, it's the world's longest traffic jam. Not thousands, but tens of thousands of people were
sent out of their homes by him without any relocation provisions. So you say, in a way, it's a story of
how do you give somebody power without the power in a way hardening, I don't want to use the word corrupting him, but hardening him to anyone who
opposes him, to any opposition.
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Dwarcash.
That's a great question.
And I watched that happen.
And I'm a young, I'm, whenever I was young, and whatever my age was, I didn't really know what I was doing.
And I watched him lose power.
And I learned enough about him to know how fair this was going to be.
If I could think of a moment.
But there's a moment that this happened.
Yeah.
His office was still up at the Triborough Bridge Authority.
When he was in power, I interviewed him in that office several times.
You felt his power.
You felt outside there were all these people waiting for his decisions, sitting around waiting for his decisions.
As soon as I finished, the secretary would come in with a list of telephone numbers.
He would come in with a list of telephone calls of people who had called asking for, you know, wanting something from him while I was talking to him, right?
By the time I finished, I remember I realized I had one long interview with him.
Maybe it was my last one.
And I realized there had been no calls.
The secretary had nothing to tell him.
So whatever you thought.
Or Moses, you felt the poignance of someone losing.
power yeah um that's that's fascinating that's that's what i was wondering about
yeah you couldn't help feeling sales for him no matter no matter even though you knew
what he had done you couldn't help feeling oh this is in a way tragic
that no one's calling and asking him for a favor anymore yeah
Did he realize that was happening?
I don't think he really, I don't think, in a way, I'm sure he did.
But by that time, he was so, remember, he was so insulated.
He was so, whatever his age was, he was up in the 80s.
He was deaf, you know.
He still had, in his office, at the Triborough headquarters on Randall's Island,
were all these Moses men who were loyal to him
and treated him with the same deference they always had.
He knew he wasn't getting his projects done,
but he felt, I know he felt he was just going to keep pushing like he always did
and he was going to win again.
So the answer to your question is no, I don't think he did ever realize that.
That's fascinating.
Yeah.
In, I think, 62, as you say, he tries to pull a trick on Nelson Rockefeller
that he had pulled on countless previous mayors and governors,
which is to threaten to resign if he didn't get his way.
Yes.
And Rockefeller says, I regretfully accept, and nothing happens.
And that made me wonder as I was reading it,
could all those previous governors,
and mayors who were getting threatened have done the same thing?
Great, great question.
Yeah.
The answer is yes.
Well, you say, could they have done the same thing?
So the easy, the first part, the answer is yes.
They had the power to fire him.
He wasn't an elected official.
But they couldn't, there wasn't really a possibility.
The answer to that is no.
The answer to the question at the bottom is no, they couldn't
because he was simply too popular.
You know, you couldn't fire Robert Moses.
You know, that's like firing some person who was the idol of New York.
But in addition, he had, with his genius,
he had created in all his different posts a chairman of the state power,
chairman of the tribal bridge authority,
parks commissioner,
Long Island parks commissioner,
Jones Beach commissioner.
He had created such an interlocking,
you couldn't fire him from everything
because the terms ended in different ways,
and some you didn't have the power to fire him from,
that he had really made it impossible,
well, almost impossible,
almost impossible because at the end,
if you wanted to do it, Rockefeller did it.
But by that time, cracks had appeared in the armor.
I think for decades, the answer to your question is you couldn't do it.
But then as he got older, cracks appeared in the armor,
and you could if you wanted to brave criticism in all the newspapers
and public criticism and everything else.
You probably could have done it.
Good question.
Which leads into the next question I want to ask you.
So you interviewed him seven times.
And the seventh time you mentioned your awareness of a donation that was made to his commission
by a millionaire whose golf course was spared by the new route for his parkway.
And after that, he didn't talk to you again.
He didn't talk to you again.
If you had gotten an eighth interview with Robert Moses,
what is the one question you would most want to ask him?
Oh, God, what a great,
great question.
Well, you know, off the top of my head,
I think if I only had one question,
to ask him, I think I'd ask him,
did you realize you were changing?
That's a great question you asked.
But that's the answer I'll give for now.
That's something I always would like to have asked him.
Do you think you realized that he was changing?
No.
No.
I think he felt from the beginning that he had this vision for building roads here and their parks here.
That was the best thing to do.
And it was going to get done.
And it should get done.
No matter how many hardships he had to inflict on people,
no matter how many thousands he had to evict,
no matter what he had to do,
he was going to get the roads built.
And you see this increasing,
ruthlessness as utter ruthlessness of him.
If someone stood in his way,
he was going to find a way to remove that person as an obstacle.
I mean,
I'll give you an example of that.
If you want,
there's a politician in the Bronx named Henry Epstein.
Henry Epstein is opposing the cross Bronx expressway.
He's saying to Robert Moses,
you're putting it right through a neighborhood.
Where you have to evict tens of thousands of people.
You can just move it two blocks to the south and you only have to evict a couple of hundred people.
Moses sets out to destroy Epstein and basically does by making it known he's having an affair.
If he can find a weakness in somebody that he has a mistress that he's taking money or something,
he'll use it.
He'll use whatever he has to to get things done.
Uh,
he learns that in my opinion by failing to get things done when he's very young,
he has things that he wants to get done and they don't get done.
And the awareness comes on him and we can see it in the book or in my learning about him.
I try to show how he learns that he has to find what he needs.
Weaknesses in people he has to use it if he if he has a weakness he's going to use it he's going to get things done there's a hardening and increased ruthlessness where the only thing that matters is to get the thing done anyone who stands in his way if you Moses has to destroy him he'll destroy him.
Hmm.
As you say,
you're writing not the history of one man but of an era in America and one of the most interesting things about the power broker is especially in the period in which he's able to accomplish so much so quickly what's happening and you talk about this is the great depression you know he's hiring thousands of architects tens of thousands of linemen for pen and paper.
pennies on the dollar to do big public works for the city.
And so I wonder how big a part of Moses's early achievements is just that the government,
because of the Great Depression, could compete with the private sector for the top talent
and for lots and lots of labor working 24-7 through the winter, moving fast.
Yeah, yes. And the answer to your question is that played a big role, because he needed
architects for something. I don't remember what it is. It's in the power broker. And they lined
up on Fifth Avenue thousands of out-of-work architects that he could hire for very low wages,
but more than the wages.
They were available, you know, because they didn't have anything to do. He was able to hire
so many people and hire and fire them in a ruthless way, you know, making the workmen work
hard. You know, he could just fire them. It was the Depression. They didn't have other jobs to go
to. I think that was, he used that, yes.
Mm-hmm. So as somebody who. Who has studied urban development so deeply, here is one thing I'm curious about. You look
at the things that were built at the beginning of the last century or before the beginning of
the last century you know grand central station and all the beautiful architecture in new york
versus the things that are built in the second half of the century they look a lot less beautiful
yeah and the earlier more beautiful things were built by a much poorer country yeah what what
changed why were able to build more beautiful things before one thing that changed is you had
all these out of work artisans who could we'll just say uh carve stonework on buildings like
my apartment is on the 15th floor of an apartment house uh across the street is a building that's
15 stories or 16 stories high and you say look at all the
beautiful things that are built in the first half of the century and you say look at all the
carving that's done in the stonework of that building up on the roof i said the only person
who can see it is the people in my apartment and the people in the apartment next to someone
someone was willing to spend that money because the builders who built that could hire
skilled people at such low wages that they could make them uh do the decorations to make a
building beautiful up on
building beautiful up on
building beautiful up on floors that nobody is going to see
floors that nobody is going to see
floors that nobody is going to see going to see them because people came
going to see them because people came
going to see them because people came cheap
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airlock i want to ask you about johnson now
i want to ask you about johnson now
i want to ask you about johnson now okay
okay
okay master the senate
master the senate
master the senate you make
you make
you make two points about how johnson is
two points about how johnson is
two points about how johnson is effective or at least this is the way i
effective or at least this is the way i
effective or at least this is the way i read it
read it
read it one is that he is very persuasive if
one is that he is very persuasive if
one is that he is very persuasive if you're talking to him yes the other is
you're talking to him yes the other is
you're talking to him yes the other is he's put himself in a position
he's put himself in a position
he's put himself in a position of leverage such that he has things to
of leverage such that he has things to
of leverage such that he has things to promise you
promise you
promise you or things to threaten you with so it's
or things to threaten you with so it's
or things to threaten you with so it's not that he's convinced you of anything
not that he's convinced you of anything
not that he's convinced you of anything but you know that you need his favor
but you know that you need his favor
but you know that you need his favor if you want to be successful exactly
if you want to be successful exactly
if you want to be successful exactly and of the two i'm curious which was
and of the two i'm curious which was
and of the two i'm curious which was really the source of his power
really the source of his power
really the source of his power his leverage or his persuasion
his leverage or his persuasion
his leverage or his persuasion behind his persuasion
behind his persuasion
behind his persuasion was the power when you were talking to
was the power when you were talking to
was the power when you were talking to him if he asked something of you
him if he asked something of you
him if he asked something of you you knew he had the power behind him
you knew he had the power behind him
you knew he had the power behind him to give you or deny you things that you
to give you or deny you things that you
to give you or deny you things that you wanted
wanted
wanted say he's asking a senator something
say he's asking a senator something
say he's asking a senator something for a vote on a specific issue the
for a vote on a specific issue the
for a vote on a specific issue the senator might not agree with him i
senator might not agree with him i
senator might not agree with him i don't want to give him the vote
don't want to give him the vote
don't want to give him the vote but he would know he wants committee
but he would know he wants committee
but he would know he wants committee a committee assignment johnson has the
a committee assignment johnson has the
a committee assignment johnson has the power to give him that or not
power to give him that or not
power to give him that or not or he would know he wants a specific law
or he would know he wants a specific law
or he would know he wants a specific law and johnson has the power to get that
and johnson has the power to get that
and johnson has the power to get that law passed or not
law passed or not
law passed or not so behind everything when johnson is
so behind everything when johnson is
so behind everything when johnson is talking to you
talking to you
talking to you and he puts his arm around you and he
and he puts his arm around you and he
and he puts his arm around you and he leans into you
leans into you
leans into you it's not just the force of his
it's not just the force of his
it's not just the force of his personality that he's bringing to bear on
personality that he's bringing to bear on
personality that he's bringing to bear on you behind that personality you know
you behind that personality you know
you behind that personality you know he has the power to do things to you or
he has the power to do things to you or
he has the power to do things to you or for you
for you
for you that you better be aware of
that you better be aware of
that you better be aware of means of ascent the book about the
means of ascent the book about the
means of ascent the book about the election with coke stevenson
election with coke stevenson
election with coke stevenson the 1948 senate election yes
the 1948 senate election yes
the 48th senate election yes that is my favorite book perhaps ever
that is my favorite book perhaps ever
that is my favorite book perhaps ever and you paint such a compelling
and you paint such a compelling
and you paint such a compelling portrait of this um person coke
portrait of this um person coke
portrait of this um person coke stevenson
stevenson
stevenson you know governor of texas they call the
you know governor of texas they call the
you know governor of texas they call the mr texas yes as you were writing his
mr texas yes as you were writing his
mr texas yes as you were writing his profile
profile
profile and writing this book did part of you
and writing this book did part of you
and writing this book did part of you wish that he had won the senate
wish that he had won the senate
wish that he had won the senate election
you couldn't help uh and that's
you couldn't help feel you well
you couldn't help feel you well
you couldn't help feel you well i'll answer you directly the answer is yes
i'll answer you directly the answer is yes
i'll answer you directly the answer is yes i think coke stevenson although he
i think coke stevenson although he
i think coke stevenson although he was an idealist
was an idealist
was an idealist he knew how to get things done when he
he knew how to get things done when he
he knew how to get things done when he was governor of texas he really
was governor of texas he really
was governor of texas he really accomplished things okay
accomplished things okay
accomplished things okay i think if he went to the senate he
i think if he went to the senate he
i think if he went to the senate he would have been a great senator and
would have been a great senator and
would have been a great senator and accomplished things
accomplished things
accomplished things so you wish that he had
so you wish that he had
so you wish that he had um
um
um won
won
won uh you you feel
uh you you feel
uh you you feel the tragedy
the tragedy
the tragedy that he lost
that he lost
that he lost because of the way he lost you know
because of the way he lost you know
because of the way he lost you know the things about coke stevens and he
the things about coke stevens and he
the things about coke stevens and he really didn't
really didn't
really didn't realize someone could do all the things
realize someone could do all the things
realize someone could do all the things to him
to him
to him and in the election that lynn that's
and in the election that lynn that's
and in the election that lynn that's lyndon johnson did he didn't come to
lyndon johnson did he didn't come to
lyndon johnson did he didn't come to grips with that
grips with that
grips with that suppose that
suppose that
suppose that kennedy wins in 60
kennedy wins in 60
kennedy wins in 60 but johnson
but johnson
but johnson refuses the vice presidency
refuses the vice presidency
refuses the vice presidency so he's still a majority leader
so he's still a majority leader
so he's still a majority leader how different do you think
how different do you think
how different do you think the bills
the bills
the bills that kennedy would pass under johnson's
that kennedy would pass under johnson's
that kennedy would pass under johnson's majority leader
majority leader
majority leader would be from the laws that johnson as
would be from the laws that johnson as
would be from the laws that johnson as president
president
president was eventually able to pass that is to
was eventually able to pass that is to
was eventually able to pass that is to say the things that happened in 64 and
say the things that happened in 64 and
say the things that happened in 64 and 63 and 65
63 and 65
63 and 65 would they have just happened earlier no
would they have just happened earlier no
would they have just happened earlier no because kennedy
because kennedy
because kennedy kennedy did not have
kennedy did not have
kennedy did not have the overriding desire
the overriding desire
the overriding desire to change america
to change america
to change america we see no john kennedy was utterly
we see no john kennedy was utterly
we see no john kennedy was utterly charming
charming
charming he was a good president he was good in
he was a good president he was good in
he was a good president he was good in foreign policy where johnson certainly
foreign policy where johnson certainly
foreign policy where johnson certainly was not
was not
was not but what he did not have
but what he did not have
but what he did not have was this
vision this desire to change america
vision this desire to change america
vision this desire to change america that lyndon johnson had lyndon johnson
that lyndon johnson had lyndon johnson
that lyndon johnson had lyndon johnson comes back
comes back
comes back
comes back from his year teaching the poor kids in
from his year teaching the poor kids in
from his year teaching the poor kids in cthulhu
cthulhu
cthulhu determined to change the education system
determined to change the education system
determined to change the education system to help poor people more
to help poor people more
to help poor people more to do all these other things to help poor
to do all these other things to help poor
to do all these other things to help poor poor people
poor people
poor people that determination is something that's
that determination is something that's
that determination is something that's really unique
really unique
really unique it's what made him domestically such a
it's what made him domestically such a
it's what made him domestically such a great president that we have all these
great president that we have all these
great president that we have all these civil rights laws these anti-poverty laws
civil rights laws these anti-poverty laws
civil rights laws these anti-poverty laws that we wouldn't have had without
that we wouldn't have had without
that we wouldn't have had without lyndon johnson
lyndon johnson
lyndon johnson his presidency ends in tragedy because of
his presidency ends in tragedy because of
his presidency ends in tragedy because of foreign policy because of vietnam
foreign policy because of vietnam
foreign policy because of vietnam but he has this this ideal this
but he has this this this ideal this
but he has this this this ideal this desire to get things done
desire to get things done
desire to get things done to help people in america
to help people in america
to help people in america that's almost unique you say
that's almost unique you say
that's almost unique you say he's
he's
he's gee he's determined to do this you know
gee he's determined to do this you know
gee he's determined to do this you know he's going to find a way to do it
he's going to find a way to do it
he's going to find a way to do it you watch him doing it um
you watch him doing it um
you watch him doing it um then you say he was doing it
then you say he was doing it
then you say he was doing it when he
when he
when he his attention turns to vietnam
his attention turns to vietnam
his attention turns to vietnam and everything falls apart
and everything falls apart
and everything falls apart and he makes it you know it's all
his presidency is ruined
his presidency is ruined
his presidency is ruined the things he started out to do
the things he started out to do
the things he started out to do domestically don't get done in the way
domestically don't get done in the way
domestically don't get done in the way he would have done them
he would have done them
he would have done them but he starts out in
but he starts out in
but he starts out in after the election with the education
after the election with the education
after the election with the education laws with the anti-poverty bills
laws with the anti-poverty bills
laws with the anti-poverty bills to change the country and he's on his
to change the country and he's on his
to change the country and he's on his way to doing it
way to doing it
way to doing it that's the great tragedy of johnson and
that's the great tragedy of johnson and
that's the great tragedy of johnson and vietnam
vietnam if i can ask about that and it's okay if
if i can ask about that and it's okay if
if i can ask about that and it's okay if you don't want to talk about this
you don't want to talk about this
you don't want to talk about this because it's in the next book
because it's in the next book
because it's in the next book um but if you're willing to talk about
um but if you're willing to talk about
um but if you're willing to talk about it
it
it fundamentally why did johnson
fundamentally why did johnson
fundamentally why did johnson keep escalating even when oh you know
keep escalating even when oh you know
keep escalating even when oh you know the answer to your question is i'm still
the answer to your question is i'm still
the answer to your question is i'm still trying to figure that out right now so
trying to figure that out right now so
trying to figure that out right now so i'm not gonna that's right that's fine
i'm not gonna that's right that's fine
i'm not gonna that's right that's fine because that's quite a mystery you know
because that's quite a mystery you know
because that's quite a mystery you know okay
okay
okay one of the things that's true of both
one of the things that's true of both
one of the things that's true of both johnson and moses
johnson and moses
johnson and moses is this inexhaustible energy you know
is this inexhaustible energy you know
is this inexhaustible energy you know working 16 hours a day sometimes even
working 16 hours a day sometimes even
working 16 hours a day sometimes even more than that
more than that
more than that and i wonder how much you think that is
and i wonder how much you think that is the fact that they had a different
the fact that they had a different
the fact that they had a different constitution that they were just
constitution that they were just
constitution that they were just had different reserves of energy or do
had different reserves of energy or do
had different reserves of energy or do you think it was just
you think it was just
you think it was just their will was so strong i think it's
their will was so strong i think it's
their will was so strong i think it's just their will
I mean, a lot of people have their energy.
You know, when you see Robert Moses sleeping very little,
showing that he'd do anything to get his way, to get things done.
Being tired of something doesn't even seem to figure into the equation.
Sometimes I'm looking at, you know, I can't remember one off the top of my head,
and you say, he's making this call, and Johnson's making this call at 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning.
He's up making these calls to get his way.
In fact, there's a funny anecdote.
One senator, Johnson calls him at 5 a.m. to ask him for his vote on something,
and the senator says, oh, Lyndon, I was just lying here waiting for your call.
So it's their will.
I want to ask you a little bit about writing biography now.
Okay.
One question I have is you spend five years, ten years writing a single book,
and through that process, maybe your editor and your wife are the only people who have seen the manuscript.
So how do you make sure you're on the right track?
Because, you know, you have to wait so long.
From when you start to when you get public feedback.
How do you make sure that everything's going to hang together and you're pursuing the message the way you want to?
Well, part of your question is how do you be sure you're on the right track?
The answer to that is you're not.
Okay.
But how do you try to stay on the right track?
I do have a device for that.
Before I start a book,
I learned this.
I learned it the hard way with The Power Broker because I didn't do it with The Power Broker.
Before I start a book,
I think through what I want the book to be, the whole book.
People say, you mean you think it through to the end?
Well, the answer is yes.
And then you say, well, what is this book about?
I said that that's sometimes for a long time before I start writing.
When I'm thinking about the book,
just ask,
I'm asking myself in one way or another,
what is this book about?
You got to get it down to one sentence.
You say, well, you can't get it down to one sentence.
Then you say, yeah, but Bob, you learned you better get it down to one sentence.
Or three years from now, you're going to be writing and you're going to be saying,
what am I trying to do?
So before I start a book,
I try to get it down to, I said a sentence,
or at most a paragraph and say,
really, what is this book about?
And I try to make everything hang together around that point.
Back in August,
my sponsor, Jane Street,
released the design files for a mystery chip
and challenged my audience to figure out its true purpose.
The challenge is over,
and Jane Street has released a blog post
highlighting some of their favorite submissions.
They also revealed the ASIC's purpose.
I won't spoil it here,
but if you're curious,
I've linked to it in the show notes.
Anish, who helped design the puzzle,
walked me through some of the best write-ups.
I think my favorite submission was probably this insane visualization
made by Kjartan Vandriel and Leander Post,
who started by showing in 3D
how a chip is made from standard cells,
how all of the metal layers fit together
to actually comprise the logic of the chip,
and then showed each component of our puzzle design,
what it does and how they reverse engineered it,
before then showing how it all fits back together,
into the puzzle.
Don't worry if you missed this challenge.
There's a new one live right now.
So the goal with this new challenge
is we want people to design a hardware protocol emulator chip
that can be used to analyze and emulate
different communication protocols.
And as a bonus,
we're going to pay to fabricate our favorite submissions,
and you'll actually get your chip back,
mounted on a board,
ready for you to test in real life.
The competition is open till January 18th.
Go to janestreet.com slash thwarkash to get started.
A lot of your books you've written
before we had digital archives and the internet
and all the resources that made available.
How much of a difference have those resources made?
Well, they're making a big difference right now.
The book I'm doing now, I'm writing about Vietnam.
Let's say I want to do a battle.
I want to write in detail.
Well, this just happened.
I want to write about it.
I picked a battle that I wanted to do in detail.
It's called the Battle of the Yangtze Valley.
Nobody's written about it in detail.
But I could go to my computer,
and I could look up where are the oral histories
from soldiers who fought in that battle,
and you just, what colleges are the oral histories at?
What documents are available?
I don't know, but I think there are a lot of them.
I think there are a lot of them.
I think there are a lot of them,
and there are a lot of them that you can look up.
I think there are a lot of them that you can look up.
The way I am, I would look at the documents anyway.
I think things would go faster now.
But I think about what you just asked.
but I don't think it would have gone any faster.
I can't quite tell you why, but certainly you could find the documents faster.
But finding them is a small thing compared to reading them, you know.
A question just occurs to me, and I'm curious to get your answer.
If we were able to time travel back to 75, and I could tell Robert Kuro then that this new three volumes on Lyndon Johnson he's about to embark on will take more than 40 years.
How do you think 40-something-year-old Robert Curo would have reacted to that?
Would he have been happy?
Would he have been afraid?
He asked terrific questions.
Well, you know, the realization came to me when I was thinking about Johnson.
You know, the power, I'll give you a long answer,
but this is the accurate answer.
I had to cut so much out of the Power Broker,
and I cut out so much stuff that shouldn't have been cut out,
that I didn't, like I gave Bob Gottlieb, my editor,
a manuscript that was 1,050,000 words long.
And the most they could fit in,
And he really worked at this into one volume, because I was determined that it would only be one volume, with 700 pages, or about 700,000 words, instead of 1,050,000 words, which meant we had to cut 350,000 words.
And he has said, I cut a lot of the best stuff I ever read.
And I felt a lot of the stuff that I cut out, it's tragic that no one knows it.
To this day, people, they ask me about things.
I said, oh, I wrote that.
And then they said, well, no one ever read it.
But the way I am, I don't know that it would have changed anything.
Because as I'm writing the book, I'm saying, oh, this is too long.
This is going to be too long.
I'm going to have to cut so much.
But I don't seem to have the ability not to write the stuff that I think should be written,
even though I know so much of it is going to have to be cut.
Well, speaking of which, you have in the other room here cabinets and cabinets of notes on interviews, notes as you're working, things which have never been published before.
Eventually, historians, other historians will be able to study those notes and those documents that you have compiled over your career.
Yes.
What is it that you hope they do with it?
what is what is it that you hope what kind of scholarship do you hope uh you know i cut out
so much stuff from the books that i wish people knew okay i mean sometimes or you're reading
something and you're saying oh if i had written about that and the newspapers wouldn't be covering
it the same way there'd be a different understanding of it i'll give you an easy
example, Sam Rayburn. Now, I have a brief chapter on Rayburn in my books, but Rayburn is a great
American history. There's no good biography of Sam Rayburn. Yet he controlled, he ran the House
of Representatives. He passed so many of Roosevelt's bills and other bills. He did so much
for America that it's a tragedy for me that nobody knows it. And the material to know it
is in those cabinets, okay? And there's a lot, there happened to be a lot of examples of things
I've said, whoa, that didn't make your stuff into the books, but they're there. Like I have hundreds
of interviews, you know. I think I have 700 interviews for the power broker alone.
The notes for those interviews are in the file cabinets, detailed, you know, the detailed typed
up notes. So the material there. There's a lot there that I think would help people understand how New York evolved the
way it did. And with Johnson, a lot, well, I'm writing about it now, things that happened
under his presidency. There's more understanding of it, and it's not going to make its way
into my books, but they're going to be there.
That's why I gave my archives.
Yeah.
Yeah.
That's why I gave my archives to the New York Historical Society. Now, I have to say, I was offered a lot more money by other places, okay? I took a lot less money, a great deal less money, an amount that mattered a lot to me. Because I wanted them to be easily accessible. I wanted them to be in New York, you know, I didn't want them to be at the University of Texas where you have to fly, you know.
Fly down there. I wanted to be in New York. The material is there for a lot of stuff that I never got to put in my books. But it's there if somebody wants it. I'll give you an example. I wrote so much more, and I have so much, I interviewed so many senators, so many assistants to senators to try and write about the Senate.
And then I had to cut out or not write and even go into the vast, I don't want to say 90%, but I don't really know what percent, of what I learned is not in the books, but they are in the file cabinets. So they are there for someone to look at. That's why my archives are in New York.
It's great to know that that research will pay dividends through many generations of scholars.
Well, how so?
It will not be possible to interview the folks you interviewed in the 70s and 80s and 60s again.
Yes.
This makes me wonder, you know, in order to paint a picture of the era that you're writing about, and the eras which shaped Moses and Johnson, you talk about, in The Power Broker, the Gold Coast in New York and the tenements and the Johnson biographies, you talk about what the hill country was like when the frontier was being settled.
Yes.
And one thing that's interesting is that even if Johnson had not become president, it would still be fascinating, the story of what was happening in the hill country.
And so, you know, it's an odd thought, but it makes me wonder if you could spend 10 years or 20 years writing the biography of a totally ordinary person, because in doing so, you'd still, a lot of what was true about Johnson would have still been fascinating, even if his career didn't end up where it did.
The example that you give of what was the hill country like, you know, we see all these Western movies and all, but when I started to learn about the people who settled Johnson's city, Lyndon Johnson's ancestors, but only the generation before him, or most two generations before him, you say, God, is this fascinating?
What it was like, what was it like?
I mean, I wanted to do this book.
What was it like to take your family and move them to the frontier, to move them on one level to Indian country, where you might find your family massacred one day, and even deal with all these other difficulties and all?
That's sort of in my books, because people, in my notes, because when I was talking to people, they would talk about their grandfathers, or what their grandfathers told them, you know.
And when I'm talking to them about Johnson, I'm learning all about what life was like in that era.
I'd say, what an amazing, amazing story this is.
And you say, well, the. There's a lot of books on it.
I happen to think there's not enough.
What's also so amazing is just how different of a country. You know, you think about Johnson growing up in Johnson City, in this tiny little lonely town, and even then being on a ranch that is tens of miles away from the city, versus America in the 60s.
You know, it's such a different place.
Yeah.
And I wonder if Johnson. If Johnson ever felt some shock of how different his upbringing was from the country he was leading.
Oh, the answer is yes.
He was very aware of the frontier, of what his grandfather, you know, the land, what it was like.
See, when he grew up in Johnson City, in the outskirts, on the Johnson Ranch, which, after all, was 18 miles.
Beyond Johnson City.
What it was like to grow up on a ranch like that.
In so many ways, it was different, and it formed your character in a different way.
Loneliness is a big. Loneliness is a big deal.
I wrote a. And then I had to cut it down to, like, three pages on his mother, on how lonely she was.
What it was like for people to settle their farms and ranches where there was nobody around you.
I think I have a line where, you know, she could walk out in the afternoon, walk up on a hill, and there was nothing to see but more hills.
And there were no other houses near there.
I, myself, was shocked.
Sometimes you would go to see, to interview an elder.
I was trying to interview.
I would interview everybody who grew up with Lyndon Johnson.
So they were elderly people, okay?
So you'd call an elderly woman, and she'd say, you go, you drive out of Austin, 22 miles, and you'll come to a, look on your left, you'll find a cattle course, cattle guard.
You turn, and there's a dirt road there.
You turn left on the dirt road and. 22 miles to more farm.
And you say, I drove 22 miles.
I didn't pass another house.
I didn't pass another person.
And this woman is living there all her life.
So I don't think, and with all the wonderful books that have been written, I'm not sure that America understands the heroism of just being, forgetting Indians and races.
Just being the loneliness of what life was like for these people.
So I want to close on that, on loneliness, because obviously you're not living in a ranch in the middle of nowhere.
You're living in New York City.
But you and Ina have together basically been working alone for so long.
How has loneliness. Affected your work, and also your life?
Oh, great question.
Well, a lot.
Let me think how I can say this.
Well, you know, I come here in the morning.
I turn off my telephone.
I'm not going to talk to anybody all day.
I'm a friendly guy.
Sometimes that very fact is hard, as a matter of fact, you know.
You'd like to pick up the phone and chat with somebody, but you say, I'm concentrating on the book, you know.
I can't do that.
It's going to break the concentration, you know.
Well, that sounds like such a phony thing.
But you say, I can't really do that.
I'm trying to think about this other thing.
And I think it's impacted my entire life.
People don't, some people understand,
but some people don't understand that you don't call them back.
You know, I mean, if people call me,
I'm not going to call them back till the end of the day.
So I have friends who understand that.
But a lot of people don't understand that.
So that's a fact of my life.
Robert Caro, I can't tell you how much of an honor it's been.
For six years that I've had this podcast,
people will ask me, you know,
who is the person you most want to have on
that you haven't had on the podcast?
And every single time I've said Robert Caro.
And so it's a huge.
It's a huge, huge honor.
Thank you so much for doing this.
It was a terrific interview.
Thank you very much.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Robert Caro shares a relentless, uncompromising drive with both Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses, refusing to accept "no" and persisting through every obstacle.
Caro’s deep research—spanning decades, interviews, and millions of documents—reveals how both figures achieved massive public projects despite resistance and skepticism.
Both Johnson and Moses began as idealists committed to public good, but over time evolved into figures who prioritized project completion over public opposition, demonstrating a moral hardening.
Caro emphasizes that while Moses and Johnson were not perfect, their ability to overcome systemic barriers reflects a rare political genius, not just ruthlessness.
The legacy of their work raises enduring questions about how democracies balance progress with public consent and environmental accountability.
Caro believes that modern society still needs a "Moses" to build large-scale public infrastructure, even if it must operate within today’s complex safeguards.
He notes the emotional tragedy of power figures losing influence—like Moses, who was no longer called upon due to diminished public trust.
Caro’s archives, made publicly accessible, preserve untold stories of overlooked figures like Sam Rayburn, ensuring future scholars can uncover deeper historical truths.
Summary:
Robert Caro, through decades of immersive research, presents a profound portrait of two transformative American leaders—Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses—whose relentless will to achieve monumental public projects shaped modern governance and urban development. Central to their success was an unyielding determination to overcome resistance, whether from property owners, political opponents, or bureaucratic hurdles. Caro highlights how both men began with idealism—Moses seeking accessible beaches for New Yorkers and Johnson striving for civil rights and anti-poverty reforms—but evolved into figures whose personal ambition often outweighed public welfare, leading to controversial decisions like large-scale evictions or unchecked expansion.
Despite their flaws, Caro argues that their achievements symbolize a necessary political force: a visionary leader who can push beyond consensus to bring about change. He also stresses that their stories reveal deeper truths about American history, such as the isolation of frontier life that shaped Johnson’s character and the overlooked heroism of ordinary Americans in rural Texas. Caro’s commitment to transparency is evident in his decision to donate his vast archives to the New York Historical Society, ensuring future generations of historians can access raw interviews, notes, and unpublicized material.
Ultimately, his work not only chronicles the lives of powerful men but also calls into question what kind of leadership is needed in a democracy today—balancing ambition with accountability, and progress with human dignity.
FAQs
I share their relentlessness and will to achieve, refusing to stop when faced with resistance. I'm driven to find answers, even when others might say no, just as Johnson and Moses did to build their projects.
By building trust through persistent, thoughtful questioning. When someone like John Connolly shares details about Johnson’s use of money, it's often because the deeper context and personal stakes reveal truths they’re willing to share.
No, he didn’t realize it himself. Early in his career, he was an idealist focused on public access and reform. Over time, he became more determined to build, even if it meant evicting people or ignoring opposition.
Yes, we need someone with the vision and will to build big things, even when systems and opposition stand in the way. But it must be balanced — not ruthless, but effective, with public good at heart.
It provided a surplus of underemployed labor and architects. Moses could hire thousands at low wages, giving him the manpower and flexibility to move quickly and build rapidly during that era.
Johnson had an unyielding drive to improve American life through civil rights and anti-poverty policies. His focus on domestic progress was powerful, but his escalation in Vietnam ultimately undermined that legacy.
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