The podcast discusses the current state and future of the United Nations ahead of the General Assembly opening in New York. Panelists Heather Holbert, Mark Weller, and Suzette Darkazali examine what works and what does not within the UN system. They agree that while the UN is indispensable for humanitarian aid and as a platform for smaller states, its ability to resolve major conflicts is severely limited by great power rivalries and Security Council vetoes. The General Assembly has evolved into a campaigning space where southern states push for action on issues like climate compensation and colonialism, while middle powers increasingly take on mediation roles that the UN once dominated.
The discussion covers the history of US-UN relations, noting Washington's traditional ambivalence and the current administration's transactional approach. Panelists highlight that international law still matters, as states are now more willing to declare violations unlawful, even when powerful nations are involved. On Security Council reform, there is cautious optimism that some Western powers may accept changes to better represent the Global South, though permanent member vetoes remain a major obstacle.
Looking ahead to the General Assembly, key topics include sea level rise, sustainable development goals, pandemic preparedness, Iran, and Gaza. The selection of the next Secretary-General remains uncertain, with no candidate yet securing Security Council majority support. The panel concludes that the UN's effectiveness ultimately depends on the commitment of its member states, and the question now is whether the world can save the UN rather than the reverse.
Hello and welcome back to Independent Thinking, the weekly podcast from Chatham House. I'm
Bronwyn Maddox. This week we're talking about the United Nations. Its General Assembly opens
in New York City next week, Tuesday the 8th of September, unfortunately coinciding with
New York Fashion Week. It does make for absolute gridlock. Then follow two weeks of diplomatic
courtship, deal-making, behind-the-scenes wrangling before the high-level week of debates
begins on Tuesday the 22nd of September. We're going to be talking about what works in the
UN and what doesn't. Of the world's current problems, what can it reasonably try to solve?
What is beyond its remit? And in the world of great powers, if I can put it that way,
what role has the UN seen in the world of great powers? What role has the UN seen in
the world of great powers? We'll also touch on the question of the Secretary General,
the next one. What can that person do and who might it be?
To join me in this, I've got some fantastic guests. Heather Holbert is an Associate Fellow
at our US and North America program and a close-up observer of diplomatic affairs. She
was Special Assistant and Speechwriter to President Bill Clinton, as well as Secretaries
of State Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher, among many other things. Hello, Heather.
Heather Holbert Great to be with you.
Heather Holbert Great to have you with us. And by with us,
you are, in fact, in Washington. I've also got with me, literally, in the studio, Professor
Mark Weller, who is Director of our Global Governance and Security Center with a long
career in international law at Cambridge University and elsewhere. In fact, he is a
former UN mediator. Welcome, Mark. Mark Weller
Hello. Heather Holbert
Very good to have you here. And completing our panel, we've got the Associate Fellow
in our Middle East and North Africa program, who's worked for the UN herself, Suzette
Darkazali. Nice to have you here.
Suzette Darkazali Nice to be with you, Bronwyn.
Heather Holbert Great. So, let's start off with a question.
As I said, what is working and what isn't? Heather.
Suzette Darkazali So, I think we see over the last couple of
years just how important the UN still is to deal, frankly, with crises and problems that the great
powers either can't or don't want to wade into themselves. So, in some ways, in this era of
renewed great power, realist politics, for smaller wars, for disease, for economic opportunity,
for health, one could argue that the UN is more important than ever, although one could not argue
that it's more functional than ever. Heather Holbert
I guess that's what I'm getting at. Mark, what is your take on this?
Mark Well, the UN cannot make up for a lack of agreement between the great powers. So, as we just heard, where the great
powers cannot settle an issue or don't want to be in a cooperative mood, the UN can't make up for it.
The UN has also lost much of its convening power in relation to settling some of the big issues and
problems around the world, this idea of having coalitions of the willing or middle power
alliances settling issues rather than the UN. But the UN remains the only universal place where
those who are not particularly powerful think that their voices can be heard. And that,
I think, increasingly is the role of the UN General Assembly, that it gives an outlet for those who
otherwise do not control things and world affairs. Heather Holbert
And the General Assembly, each country has one vote.
Mark Yes. Heather Holbert
Suzette? Suzette I think we need to be also aware of the fact that the UN has more than one function.
It operates in the humanitarian sphere. It also operates in the political sphere. Having worked
for the UN for almost a decade, I think that the UN has more than one function. I think that the UN has more than one
function. I think
I can say with confidence that the success in the humanitarian assistance trumped the success in the
political sphere. The UN continues to be an important convening power. It is the custodian of the
international law, which is very important for peacekeeping and peacemaking. I would just say
that the UN was supposed to work beyond the sum of its old powers of the member states, but
unfortunately, it's restricted.
It's restricted by its member states, given the veto power on the Security Council.
So we are already getting into this point that Heather raised. If its importance is indisputable,
given the number of global problems and the scale of those problems, but its capability to address
those is compromised. In the list of things that work, I do like it when people come back to things
like the agencies it runs, the International Postal Union and the International Telecoms Union,
those things still ticking over. But we wouldn't be having this discussion if it weren't about the
fact that we are not able to solve the really big problems of the world. And so, Mark, picking up your point about it not being able to solve problems if great powers disagree, what does that leave it with?
Well, it's become a kind of campaigning space where the majority of states, often southern states, put forward ideas, compensation for colonialism or for slavery or for environmental damage that has been done by northern states over the past year.
So, these are things which northern states wouldn't necessarily rush to support. But other states are using the vast majority, one state, one vote in the UN General Assembly to try and build up pressure for action, even if they are politically relatively powerless. And over time, there's a process of accretion that people will start to say, well, maybe we have to give in to these pressures. But it's a slow process. And it's not going to resolve a problem instantly.
There are some other issues where we have possible successes. We have the IMO, which is a sort of half paid up member, the International Maritime Organization, which is loosely part of the UN family, although not fully, which is going to deal with maritime shipping and getting to zero CO2 emissions. Issues where the US suddenly has started to fight very hard to frustrate any process and progress.
And we're seeing this in more and more areas, which previously states were willing to have a soft consensus emerging, where suddenly great powers are insisting on their great voice to redetermining the outcome.
Heather, you're sitting in the capital of one of the great powers at the moment, and the US has never been particularly fond of the United Nations. How would you describe the history of that relationship and where it is now?
assembly floor can foster a campaign movement, can try and drum up support.
Have you seen that working to effect?
I have seen that when it comes to the Middle East in particular.
I mean, the UN, to a great extent, shaped the political map of the modern Middle East today.
And the Middle East shaped as well the agenda of the UN.
Just tell us a tiny bit about how, because this history is so easily forgotten.
We start with the unresolved partition plan in 1947, 181.
There was also the armistice lines that were agreed as well between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon.
There was, in 2000, the demarcation line as well between Israel and Lebanon.
And, of course, the other agreements as well that the UN took part in, in the wider Middle East.
And I'm talking about also the MENA region.
It was important in Libya.
It was important in Iraq, beyond the humanitarian assistance when it came to political role.
So, if we look at middle powers' importance,
we can pivot a little bit to the region of the Middle East, for example.
Middle powers in the region of the Middle East had a very important role to play
on Israel-Palestine, on Syria transition, on Lebanon,
and through UN agencies that are based in these areas.
Mark, on the question of peacemaking and dealing with the world's conflicts,
and we're spoiling it for choice as to what we might talk about,
how would you assess it?
We've had this rather upbeat.
positive take from Zezes on humanitarian questions,
some humanitarian questions.
But on resolving conflict, where would you say it has most effect?
It has most effect where we are not watching.
There are many conflicts which are being addressed outside of the public glare
because they are not the kind of conflicts where the great powers are involved.
But even there, one has to admit that. Can you give us some examples?
Well, Sudan would be one which we are not observing, but more should be done.
But even there, one has to admit that the UN is kind of losing a little bit its convening power.
It's now groups of friends or other coalitions of states that get together with powerful NGOs
and others to try and address these issues.
But nevertheless, it's surprising if you look at the agenda of the Security Council
on how many issues, even in this time of huge tension between great powers,
they managed to agree resolutions and take approaches and move things forward.
That is surprising and that is positive.
But we haven't had any UN-led major breakthrough on peace in the last 20 years,
which I say with some regret, having been a UN mediator.
And I think there's a shift towards either states like Norway traditionally,
now places like Turkey or Qatar that are willing to invest significant resources
and long-term presence on the ground to try and resolve difficult conflicts,
something which not all states are willing to do.
And where the UN might not be best placed to be active.
And those seem to be the developments that count.
But in the end, even the US, remember the Board of Peace,
for that, in the end, they needed the agreement of the UN Security Council
to give it the authority that the board claims to have.
The other thing that we saw was that the Gaza peace plan, the 20 points,
emerged on the fringes of the opening of the General Assembly.
So you've mentioned a couple of the places.
So the UN recently did manage to reach agreement, and Haiti is another one.
What about the 1990s? There were quite a lot of successes then.
This was the end of the Cold War, when some of the actual Cold War conflicts were being resolved,
like Angola, Mozambique, where we had the great powers intervening against one another.
We had Central America.
We had a significant number of transitions, Namibia, Cambodia.
But then we also already had on the horizon the next series of disasters,
Rwanda and Bosnia, when suddenly a different kind of genocidal,
ethnic cleansing type of conflict arose, which the UN wasn't prepared to deal with.
And since then, we haven't had a great number of successes we can point to.
Heather, we're dodging around this question of the Security Council in the middle of it,
and we've been talking extensively about the General Assembly, one country, one vote,
and not about the Security Council set up after the Second World War
with the rest of the apparatus.
That is very different, and that is,
where some of the deadlocks come.
What is your sense of whether the pressure that has been there for years
for reform of this, for including more countries in the world,
is that going to go anywhere, given the US, for one, isn't very keen on it?
I am a pessimist on this question.
There are others who are more optimistic,
and there are always policy entrepreneurs with new and interesting plans
for how one could reform it.
But it's my view that, actually,
as Mark said, some of the more interesting developments are
the countries of the General Assembly figuring out how to work around the Security Council
and how to bring subjects to the General Assembly
and have discussions and resolutions,
even where the Security Council issues the veto.
So my somewhat pessimistic prediction is that
the arrangements on the Security Council won't change
until they afford less advantage than they currently do.
Power will have to equalize a bit, and we're still not there.
But, as I say, others are more optimistic than that.
Yes, I have to say, I'm not one of them.
Mark, and please feel free to declare any optimism you feel on this,
but I would love your view on what it does to international law
if the Security Council is not operational.
First of all, on UN reform, I have noticed a slight hint of optimism.
Some of the Western powers that previously said it would never happen
are now appreciating that if they want to have the UN,
in the midterm, there has to be some sort of reform.
And they are accepting that the South is not appropriately represented
and exciting new ideas about not giving any new state the veto,
but maybe together they could have a veto
or some other things are being put forward.
International law doesn't need to be centrally enforced
by the Security Council, although it helps.
But what it does need is the courage of all the individual states
to use the General Assembly.
Other bodies to declare a violation when it has happened.
That's the way that you stop a precedent forming
that undermines international law as a whole.
And we saw in the UN Security Council, even the Western powers,
the UK, saying Iran is too complicated.
We can't form a view whether it's lawful or not.
Same with Venezuela.
I was just going to ask you about Venezuela.
That was unlawful too, and nobody dared to say it
until some weeks later when states actually were reflecting on,
is it worth preserving the rules of the system?
And it took them a little while to realize that, yes,
even if we have to upset the US, we are willing to defend the rules.
And that has now happened since really March, April,
that states are more clear in saying, no, you can't have Greenland,
you can't invade this or that state.
That is actually unlawful, rather than saying,
oh, it's too complicated to say what it is.
We all knew it was unlawful, and they are now saying that.
And what happens after that?
After saying that, when you say defend this principle,
actually to what point?
Because famously, this does not have a force behind it.
It does have a force behind it in the sense that it stops
this new practice from hardening into being the new law.
It will be seen as a violation of the law.
And as long as you reject the violations
and determine that they are violations, that is a positive thing.
Of course, it still hurts the credibility of the legal system.
If we have a situation. If we have a situation that the one or other quite powerful state
can persistently violate even the more fundamental rules of the system
and nothing ever happens to them,
that is a kind of new development which started with Russia and Ukraine,
where the southern state suddenly said,
this is a legal order we are not that invested in.
It's a problem between Europe and the Russians.
It's not a global challenge.
And we need to get back to the sense that these rules
are something extremely important that are in the interest
of all states.
And we have noticed that actually we are getting there.
The atmosphere changed tremendously.
Previously, some of the southern states thought that the so-called
rules-based order is a Western imperialist conspiracy
to hold them down.
Now, after the Donro doctrine has been pronounced,
they actually see that an embeddedness of their international lives
and international law is essential to retain their independence
and try to defend it against powerful states,
be it the U.S. and the American people,
China in relation to its neighbors,
or Russia in relation to what they call their near abroad.
So, do you think this kind of pressure,
particularly from southern states and smaller states,
is going to lead to reform somewhere in the U.N. system,
even the Security Council?
So, I'm also slightly optimistic, like Mark, on this front,
because there are some workable proposals as well
that are being submitted for the U.N. reform.
I also want to add that in the last two and a half years,
I think the alternative of not having the U.N.
has been quite astonishing,
with no platform for voiceless states
to also be part of shaping international agenda.
So, with all that in mind,
I think there are more efforts being pushed forward
to try and maintain this global system,
this international framework
that everybody actually can take part of.
It depends.
Now, I think that's one of the reasons
why the UN General Assembly,
this coming one is going to be very important
because the assumption has always been that
UN can save the world. I think now the question would become, can the world save the UN? Will
there be any political empowerment of the UN by its member states? Because at the end of the day,
the UN is as strong as the commitment of its member states. And it's been the British position
for a long time to back Security Council reform, though it was said in the private corridors of
the Foreign Office, of course, we back it because we don't think it will happen. But that is years
ago, I should say, and Britain yet to be tested, but very likely is wholeheartedly going to push
for this. So as the General Assembly starts, let's have a look at what is on the agenda. Mark?
Well, there's sea level rise, which is quite a specific issue, where a small number of entirely
powerless states, Pacific Island states, are affected by the risk of literally disappearing.
And the international system has actually moved towards accepting that even if you lose your
entire state territory, going down,
under the sea, you're still a state, which is an interesting development.
That is fascinating.
That is actually something which one wouldn't necessarily have thought about.
International law requires you in order to be a state to have territory. Here the answer is,
if you lose your territory, you still remain a state and the system will provide for you somehow.
So that is one of the topics where actually something new has developed, which is in the
interest of the powerless, the victims of developments in nature and in man-made
environment.
There are crises. There are the sustainable development goals, where I think out of all
of them, only one looks like it's kind of on track towards being met.
This is after how many years?
This is after a decade or so. And that is problematic, given that we see that in all
of the states that traditionally had funds and money to spend on programs of this kind,
that there isn't, as it were, a market for giving lots of resources. And then we have the WHO and
the attempt to have a pandemic agreement, which was meant to give greater equity if we ever have
another situation like COVID, that it's not just the rich states that have the vaccines.
And again, that will be a little bit of a test case to see whether this kind of solidarity still
exists. And the UN is one of the few fora, I think, where arguments like this can come to the fore.
And then there's the use of the General Assembly to ask for advisor opinions in the ICJ.
Interesting.
Interesting.
International Court of Justice to push states to pay compensation for environmental damage and
other things, which they wouldn't normally agree to. And that's also an interesting,
and for northern states, slightly dangerous development.
Yes. Expensive, anyway, in prospect, if they ever agree to it. Heather,
what are you particularly looking at?
There's a couple of other issues in addition to Mark's amazing list. One is the very strange
phenomenon that President Xi will be
in the United States to see President Trump, but will not come up to New York for the General
Assembly, which is an interesting set of signs all by itself. Second, you will have President
Trump coming up to give a speech in an election year at a moment where he is perceived to be at
a severe, or his party is perceived to be at a severe disadvantage. And we've seen in the past
that he's used the speech at the General Assembly as a platform to, you know, to, you know, to, you
know, to attempt to reach out to his voters domestically. So I would expect to see some of
that, which means fireworks and commentary that is perhaps counter to the spirit of the United
Nations, as we've seen at some times in the past. But I also wonder, and I think Suzette is going to
be the expert on this, I wonder whether there will be some attempts to pull out some new big
deal of some sort, particularly around the Iran
Strait of Hormuz, Lebanon and Gaza conflicts, in order for Trump to manufacture himself a win
in New York of whatever reality and duration. So those are the things I'm looking for. Plus,
I should say, Washington has not yet declared itself in the manner of who the US favors to be
the next Secretary General. And it's always possible that could come to the fore.
That is interesting. We're coming on to that in just a moment. And I'm indeed coming to Suzette
in just a moment. But why do you think,
Suzette, that the U.S. presidency is not going?
Yes, I also find that fascinating, particularly since in a number of ways, China is very much
acting as if this is its moment at the United Nations, and this is its moment to set itself up
as the defender of the rules-based system. But it's, I think, important to notice that China
won't be the same kind of core state at the United Nations that the U.S. was for better in some ways,
for worse in others.
And, of course, Putin hasn't come to New York in some years either. And I do wonder whether she is
in some ways signaling that he is too large a leader for that stage.
That is a really interesting point. We've got dangling over us the question whether the United
Nations does stay in New York, particularly given the U.S.'s ambivalence about it. But it is there
for the moment. Suzette, what are you looking at? I'm looking at two things. One is the
funding of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance, humanitarian organization have been
overstretched, overwhelmed, underfunded, and that really affected their work and their ability to
deliver. So I'll be looking to see how funding will play out, given that the U.S. has slashed
a big chunk of the funding. The second thing is, as Heather mentioned, Iran and Gaza. I expect them
to top the agenda of the U.N., especially now that France is the president of the Security
Council. And I hear that President Macron is really looking forward to re-energize the whole
two-state momentum that he tried to promote in the last U.N. General Assembly with Saudi Arabia,
with the New York Declaration. And also given that this is Macron's last high-level
meeting in the General Assembly, because his term ends in 2027. So let's keep an eye,
we'll keep an eye on that, on President Trump as well. He might also portray some progress on,
the Gaza plan, also on what they're doing on Iran for the midterm purposes. We may hear some
statements about the ISF, the International Stabilization Force, that is in U.N. Resolution
2803. But of course, we all need to be cautious that not all statements mean that they're going
to be translated on the ground in a fashion that puts forward that progress. Also, we'll be looking
at the regional powers as well, Saudi Arabia, given that it has a new alliance now, the Mecca
Turkey and Pakistan, how is that going to be translated into dealings on the ground? And
there's also Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel. Is he going to be arrested when he gets
into New York? Is he definitely going? Well, it's still wait to be seen whether he goes or not.
And whether he doesn't go, what does he say why he is not going, which also sends a strong message.
Just to remind us why there is a question about him being arrested.
Because if the International Criminal Court has arrest warrants against him,
but the U.S. does not respect these, I'm looking at Mark.
The U.S. is not a member of the International Criminal Court and actively tries to undermine it,
which is very unusual. They have adopted sanctions against some of the senior members of the court
as individuals. And they would very strongly oppose an attempt by the mayor of New York
to arrest some. But we had similar events here in the U.K. where the odd Israeli foreign minister,
when visiting here, sort of campaigners tried to have them arrested and dragged in front of both
streets magistrates. And that hasn't been successful. It would be an amazing contest
of power between Mr. Trump and the mayor of New York if he, the mayor of New York,
sends the police force to arrest Mr. Netanyahu and his security detail might object to it.
It would indeed, Heather.
I would just make the point that merely by the mayor of New York raising the possibility,
number one, shows you how much the political climate in the United States, the
has changed in terms of views of Israel, but also that in some ways just raising the concern
is by itself a win. And as Zizette suggests, makes it, I think, somewhat more likely that
Netanyahu does not come, which the mayor of New York will then be able to claim as a victory.
In addition to that, I would also note that the location of the headquarters,
the U.N. headquarters in the U.S., has also implications on who can access the U.N. General
Assembly, who can attend the meetings and who can't. If the United States puts restrictions
on certain actors to come into the United States, they will not be able to participate in the
United Nations in the meetings. For example, in the U.N. General Assembly in 2025, the Palestinian
authority, representatives of the Palestinian authorities were not allowed to come into the
United States and were therefore prevented from attending the high-level meetings. The same
to my understanding that now the same restrictions apply for this year, too. There hasn't been
any change in policy in allowing the representatives of Palestinian
authority representatives to come into the United States to participate in this year's meetings.
So let's go to the question of who will become the next Secretary General after Antonio Guterres'
second term expires at the end of December. Who and how much does it matter to Zizette?
ZIZETTE:
Still none of
of the eight candidates managed to secure a majority
in the Security Council. There's no front runner at the moment, which means that there might be a
deadlock and there's still the option, the possibility of new candidates to emerge.
It does matter because the more the UN Security Council is fragmented or unable
to come together to a decision, I think the persona of the person who is in the helm of
the organization matters in terms of how he or she will end up using the tools at their disposals
to re-engage with the UN, to re-engage or rebuild the organizations and make it relevant again
to peacekeeping. Mark, and you have interviewed some of the candidates here in a kind of hostings
on the Chatham House stage. Yes, we had chats with a few of them who came through Chatham House
and we saw very different visions. We saw the
ultimate goal of the UN Security Council, which is to make sure that the people who are
dealmaker behind the scenes who would say, I don't want to be too visionary because that will
make it difficult to work with the great powers. And then we saw the opposite, the sense that the
UN is in crisis. Unless we offer a new vision that brings people along the UN, we might as well forget
about it. So neither of those two, I fear, will raise the support of the permanent five members
in the Security Council who have to support in order to be successful. There have been a few
incoming candidates and there might be even more. And there is a sense that in the end,
there might be some sort of backroom deal between the great five powers that they find a consensus
candidate. And the hope of all is that it will definitely be a woman and the Latin Americans
try to insist that it ought to be a Latin American. But beyond that, it's still pretty open,
unusually at this late stage in the game. So of all the jobs open to Keir Starmer,
as he looks for a big role in the international, he's struck out on two counts.
Heather. What hasn't emerged yet is any sense of who Washington or Beijing's favorite candidate is,
which suggests that A, each is holding back to try to understand who the other's favorite candidate
is. And B, as both Mark and Suzette said, leaves the door open for new and surprising candidates
to come in at the last minute. So I wouldn't be surprised at all if we see some fireworks around
September. There's at least one candidate that has been campaigning hard to be the choice of
Washington, Raphael Grossi. Heather. Who runs the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear
watchdog. But his being Argentine has raised questions of the Falklands, a topic that Britain
is having more discussion about, or at least it's in the news more than you might think.
He's interesting because, of course, he's a well-known quantity in the UN system, but also a
Washington may have the additional value as being perceived as being close to Javier Millet,
the right-wing leader of Argentina, who's a close ally of Trump. And I guarantee that no one in
Washington was thinking about the Falklands, but it's early days. And so I do think the fact that
it's clear that he's perceived as an ally of Trump may very well doom his candidacy, but it'll be
fascinating. So finally, as we draw to
a close, does it matter who runs the UN? I mean, that's the one big point which I always
try to make, and I don't know whether I managed this time, which is that the UN is not a world
government that solves the problems of the world. The UN is a forum where all the governments of
the world can sit together and decide what they can decide. But if they are unable to decide,
it's not the UN that has failed. It is the governments of the world that have
proven unable to address major challenges. Heather. We are
going to have to wrap up and simply wait to see which candidates emerge, but we will be bringing
you as Chatham House very much in detail what is happening in the coming weeks at the UN and in
the various conflicts that we've mentioned as well. A huge thank you to my guests, Mark Weller.
Thank you.
Suzette D'Arcazali.
Thank you.
And Heather Halbert.
Wonderful to be here.
That's all from us this week from Independent Thinking. We'll be back next Friday. Do look
at ChathamHouse.org for the huge amount of work that my colleagues have done.
Colleagues are doing events, reports, commentary on the world,
and the world is not quiet at the moment. See you next week.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The UN remains important for addressing crises the great powers cannot or will not handle, though its functionality is compromised by great power disagreements and Security Council vetoes.
The General Assembly has become a campaigning space where smaller and southern states build pressure on issues like climate compensation and colonialism, even if progress is slow.
Humanitarian work through UN agencies is generally more successful than political conflict resolution, where the UN has not achieved a major peace breakthrough in over 20 years.
Security Council reform is unlikely in the near term, though some Western powers are showing cautious openness to better representation for the Global South.
The upcoming General Assembly will focus on sea level rise, sustainable development goals, pandemic agreements, Iran, Gaza, and the selection of the next Secretary-General.
Summary:
The podcast discusses the current state and future of the United Nations ahead of the General Assembly opening in New York. Panelists Heather Holbert, Mark Weller, and Suzette Darkazali examine what works and what does not within the UN system. They agree that while the UN is indispensable for humanitarian aid and as a platform for smaller states, its ability to resolve major conflicts is severely limited by great power rivalries and Security Council vetoes. The General Assembly has evolved into a campaigning space where southern states push for action on issues like climate compensation and colonialism, while middle powers increasingly take on mediation roles that the UN once dominated.
The discussion covers the history of US-UN relations, noting Washington's traditional ambivalence and the current administration's transactional approach. Panelists highlight that international law still matters, as states are now more willing to declare violations unlawful, even when powerful nations are involved. On Security Council reform, there is cautious optimism that some Western powers may accept changes to better represent the Global South, though permanent member vetoes remain a major obstacle.
Looking ahead to the General Assembly, key topics include sea level rise, sustainable development goals, pandemic preparedness, Iran, and Gaza. The selection of the next Secretary-General remains uncertain, with no candidate yet securing Security Council majority support. The panel concludes that the UN's effectiveness ultimately depends on the commitment of its member states, and the question now is whether the world can save the UN rather than the reverse.
FAQs
The General Assembly opens on Tuesday, September 8th in New York City, and the high-level week of debates begins on Tuesday, September 22nd.
The UN cannot make up for a lack of agreement between the great powers. Where the great powers cannot or will not cooperate, the UN cannot force a solution, but it remains a universal forum where less powerful states can make their voices heard.
The International Criminal Court has arrest warrants against him, but the United States is not a member of the ICC and actively opposes it. The mayor of New York has raised the possibility of arrest, making it less likely Netanyahu will attend.
Key issues include sea level rise, the sustainable development goals, a possible pandemic agreement through the WHO, and efforts to use the General Assembly to seek advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice on environmental damage compensation.
There is some cautious optimism because Western powers are beginning to accept that the Global South is not appropriately represented. However, any new permanent members are unlikely to receive individual veto power, and reform will require significant political will.
No candidate has yet secured a majority in the Security Council, and there is no clear frontrunner. It matters because the Secretary-General's leadership can shape how the UN re-engages with member states and rebuilds its relevance in peacekeeping and other areas.
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