Warrior Culture – MAJGEN Chris Smith

Welcome to the cove podcast, your stop for PME on The Go. Okay ladies and gentlemen, welcome back to the cove podcast. On this episode, we're going to talk to Major General Chris Smith, who's the Deputy Chief of the Australian Army, about warrior culture. Before we do that though, I'm just going to a little selfish plug for the last episode for you as also, but go back if you haven't listened to the decision-making and planning process episode on, basically, it sounds very process-driven, but we're going into a lot of detail on how decisions are made and how you should be making decisions, little bit of about bringing back some intuition into the decision-making process, but also Major General Chris, who had a heavy hand in the DMPP and the development of has done a cove talk on exactly that topic. So go back if you haven't listened to it and have a listen. Oh, sorry, welcome sir. Glad to be here. On this episode, we're going to move from sort of decision-making to more who we are as soldiers and officers and talk about the warrior culture. It's sort of underlings of sort of talk and a lot of talk about who we are, and I mean, the DSR talks to workforce, retention and recruitment and the like, but we're sort of more on the side of who we are as soldiers and officers, so straight away sort of what the culture, sort of who we are as people, aren't we as people I suppose. Am I just start by sort of talking about, well, I think this is important at the moment. I think the big thing at the moment is, and I think most people listening will know that Pete Hegseth, the new secretary of defence in the United States, has given warrior culture. I think he's got sort of top three priorities and it's one of them, you know, that sense that it's something that's been neglected in the United States. I think also that it has been a thing that's been simmering away in the army for a long time, and I think that, I think as a result, there's been a vacuum left because people like me, senior leaders or generals, have sort of left the space vacant and haven't been describing what it ought to be. Now, I imagine some listeners might not like the term warrior culture or whatever, but the point is that it exists, and whether you call it a good culture, a soldierly culture, whatever, it all largely means the same thing, and it is really important. And I know also, as we speak, that, you know, there's still a sort of a simmering nasty taste in the mouth from even the then CDF's decisions around symbology that somewhat goes to this particular topic. And I think that in the aftermath of that, that we've sort of seen your leaders have left at vacant, and I think that that's a mistake, and so look, I, your invitation to talk on the topic, I think is very important, and hopefully I can help sort of set the scene. And look, what I'm trying to do here is invoke a conversation in the army that sort of brings it to the fore, and we can help actually discuss and form what we think the right warrior culture is, going potentially into the next war, because I think there was that sort of cognitive resonance or disconnect between, like being told that we couldn't use symbols that would otherwise describe what we do as a function. You know, romanticised, some animated too heavily and all that sort of stuff, so then versus being told to do that in real life, I suppose that disconnect between what's expected of us, when society asks us to, you know, warfight, and then subsequently being told that we can allow us to display that. Look, I think if we begin at that point, because I know that this is heavily on the minds of many, in the army and many veterans, look, I think that General Campbell was acting in good faith and his intent was spot on. It was to address a connection between some symbology and behaviours that resulted in war crimes. But I think that the lack of conversation after sort of potentially undid some of the goodness, because of course there are symbols like the death's head, which has been associated with very well-performing, longstanding regiments in the British army, for example, you know, and I think that it's right that given that the core of our business is violence and being good at what we do is actually killing people and being able to do it very efficiently, that the idea of symbology that relates to death and violence is actually quite natural. So I think that potentially we ended up, I don't think intentionally sort of bringing all of those things together, and I think that that might have been part of the sort of negative reaction among our troops and in the veterans community. So I think that what we need to do now is to sort of have a discussion about it and be happy to have it. It shouldn't actually be a big deal and actually work out where the right point is. Yeah, and provide those examples, I suppose, because it is easy in the absence of a role model or a specific culture that we can get around and stuff, too. It's easy to identify people, certain figures and stuff that we think are warriors and born to kill and stuff like that, when in reality, I suppose we come back to the profession argument. We do our job for the government, not subsequently born war fighters and stuff. I don't know if you agree. Precisely. Precisely. I think that's the point. If we continue on this symbology theme, I think that we would all understand that there were some symbols. And I think the classic one out of the Afghanistan period was the Punisher, the cartoon character and its connection. I mean, I've been reading recently the book, Alpha, the story of Eddie Gallagher, sorry. The essence of that book is talks about a rogue individual, his effect on the rest of his team. I think that Punisher's symbology was broadly used and connected to the author talks about a sort of a pirate attitude. I think that that's the kind of thing that we need to correct for. But then, of course, there is the more formalized. I think to sort of bring this to where we need to, if I can begin with a metaphor, because I think, you know, we all agree that we ought to have a warrior culture. The question is, which is a good one, and which is a bad one, and I think sort of helping us visualize, you know, using a sort of a metaphor for it is helpful. I think it's very easy to get attracted to stylistic ideas of warrior or hollywood ideas of warrior. And by the way, this isn't you. You know, I might read a quote from a book written by Sydney Jari called 18, which is quite a famous book. It used to be mandatory reading it done true many years ago. He wrote it, I think, in the late '60s or early '70s. And even he talks about this particular problem there from television imagery and so on and what a warrior should be. But if I can use the, as the example where we sort of frame our discussion, the beginning scene of the movie Gladiator, and you know, you've got two clear differences in ways of war. You know, on the one hand is the Roman legions under Maximus, and you get a, you know, most of us are attuned to how the Romans fought, you know, it wasn't for the individual and it wasn't for the status of the individual. It was about winning battles, it was the combination of different arms, there was a discipline to it. There was a lot of training and teamwork, and the employment of different weapons and fighting for the man next to you. You know, I think all of that, and even the uniformity and so on, gives you a sense maybe of the ideal warrior culture for a modern army, in one sense, if invigoratively. But I think, you know, the juxtaposition, of course, is the German tribe against no discipline, no particular, every individual sort of fighting for themselves. As you know, in many of these sort of groupings, the people fight for their own status and their long-term reputation. But of course, the battle goes exactly as you would expect it, you know, the modern, well-armed, disciplined Roman force, you know, annihilates this particular German tribe and all of their rogue, difference and so on. I think that that's the kind of thing we have to wrestle with, and it's a constant thing that we wrestle with. But if you were to ask me which one of those best represents the kind of culture for a modern army, I'd say that it's certainly not the German tribe. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We're more so on that on the side of military services, service to the country, or like of the greater purpose that's beyond ourselves and our own motives, as opposed to spot on. Yeah, I think you can lose that when you're like, I just need to be as fit as I can and look like this absolute warrior and I was born to do this and stuff, it's when in actual fact you need to rest him like with society and the like, but we're there for a profession. And that's spot on, that's quite astute because it, and this becomes the challenge of, you know, we, at the very beginning through, you know, our initial initiation process, the centre piece of it is that we express our loyalty effectively to the Australian people and to the government and in doing so, you know, that's the sort of difference. Where I think some of these more stylistic and sort of Hollywood ideas is that and quite understandably, you know, it's a romantic thing, but they tend to centre on the individual and they tend to centre on a, you know, a sort of rogue individual that sort of works against the system, the system, you know, the problem and quite often has a strange loyalty or almost rejects sort of that sense of loyalty to the state and the purpose for which the organisation exists or even the cause that they're fighting for. You know, that's the sort of thing that's problematic. Of course, it's very influential, you know, and I, you know, I'm not, I'm out of touch and old and, you know, not the bloke I used to be, but I can still remember the appeal of that idea, even as a young, as a cadet or as a young platoon commander, it's very attractive. Because I think it's easy to assimilate with an individual as in a role model, as an individual to be like, I know what, and sometimes it's all quantitative metrics, like he's incredibly fast, incredibly fit, incredibly tall, like she is absolutely jet, like intelligent, also a weapon, you know what I mean. So it's incredibly easy to assimilate with an individual, but that's not the, that will only carry you so far, I suppose. No, quite right. Quite right. And, and look, I don't need to go through the countless historical examples, but armies that win battles and, you know, armed forces and nations that win wars are those that that subjugate the individual for the sake of the team, but more importantly the mission or the cause for which you're fighting, and subjugating it to the extent that you're willing to give your life this sense of unlimited liability for others, but for the cause and the nation. You know, in a real sense, armies that win are those where the individuals, you know, puts themselves at the bottom of the pile, that's that sense of selflessness. That's the, that's the idea of duty. And you know, these are the terms and ideas that I think would fit with a, will do fit with the warrior culture that we seek to have. Yeah, yeah. We're just about to go through an episode of Mill and Bay, but like our first success in the Pacific, I'll see the turning point, but one of the, one of the heroes of some of the stories in Mill and Bay was that the individual that would, like, as the tanks, primitive tanks, as they move through with their, they would move through without their lights on and illuminate their lights, obviously, from the Japanese. And then the Australians that would crawl up and get as close to the tank as they can and use the sticky bombs, which were probably not sufficient at the time, but they were described as no physical attributes, no, there's nothing about how they look as a person or how strong they are. It's not idealistic, like we do these days, talking about people creeping up on tanks and being absolute, amazing human beings and decisive action, I suppose, in that sense, achieving decisive action on their own. Yeah. I agree. So the act is what's important. Yeah. And I think another good example, in fact, you just reminded me is, is the Australian, it's the first AIF, if we describe the Australian Army in the first World War, people will lean immediately to things like, you know, the, the larykin idea and that, you know, the collection of things that sort of defined ANZAC in the aftermath of the war, you know, around what been and others had written. But the truth is that the success of the Australian Army, which was at its peak in 1918, was a function of its professionalism. You know, it had gone from the sort of barely trained amateurs of Gallipoli in 1915. And through years and years of fighting produced a general like Monash, and a recognition that success on the battlefield was a function of professional competence, understanding of logistics, weapons, capabilities, weapon effects, you know, the coordination and movement of troops with the effect of weapons, the professionalisation of a staff, a staff that does lots of work and, you know, a good staff with a, with a good commander can, can help carry the day and, and so on. You know, that, you know, the first AIF in 1918 was so successful as a function of getting to that point. It was, you know, it's, it's funny that in the aftermath, you know, it wasn't that we reflect on. No, it's the more romantic ideas, but we can, of course, that that's somewhat quite, quite natural. Yeah, the rosy ratchet section. Yeah. You go to it. Yeah. No, absolutely. Yeah. But when you talk about like those, I suppose, wearing uniform, we sort of, sometimes it was, and I know you released a directive last year about wearing uniform, or not a directive, but you encouraged wearing uniform on aircraft and during public transport, because you're like, let's claw back some of that, you know, identity that we have, that we are professionals and people should be proud and I think domestic operations helped that a lot, because people would see, and all went down to Tasmania and heard COVID assist. And it was amazing to see the population, like really, like, reinforce. It's not our primary job, and obviously we've, there's been a little bit of conjecture about that afterwards. But more so, like, the, the idea that we shouldn't sort of get into that tall, poppy thing why you wearing uniform in public and all that. So the stuff and embracing that symbolism that is our uniform and, and being proud of who we are. But then an extension of that, I suppose that's what the episode's about, but embracing the fact that we do do things that society does not expect of anyone else. Yeah, so really that, that was more out of concern that we weren't connecting with broader Australia as much as we should, you know, the, the army exists in, you know, all over the country, but, but really concentrated in a few particular places. We know, for example, that there's a growing tendency here, as it is in the United States, for those who join the army to, you know, to have a tendency, I'm not sure that the extent of the waiting to come from places where there is a stronger presence, so people know what the army is, or to have family members or some connection of family friend or something that's been in the services. And there's a concern that, look, what can we do to sort of make this more normalised, because there is a concern that we don't want to be some particular special class separate from, from, from Australia, so this was a way of encouraging us to get back and amongst the, you know, seem to be normal and, and amongst other Australians. But I think what it also goes to is that because since the end of the Second World War, we've had, and of course, with the, with the exception of conscription during Vietnam, we've largely had an all-volunteer force, that's been the core of it. And it's actually, you know, the number of Australians that put on a uniform and serve is really quite, quite small, that it's easy for us to forget too that, as, as, I think, the recent CGS in the, in the UK, General Sanders said, the old adage that regular army start wars, but citizen armies finish them. On the basis that, you know, war is never as short as that you would hope, the, what army you start with, as, as, say, for example, the British Expeditionary Force was in the First World War, is quickly largely destroyed. And it's the recruits that come through, the, the citizens that are rapidly trained form the bulk of the army that then goes on to endure the war and to, and to win it. We, we have to also keep that fact in mind, so the, the extent that we sort of perpetuate that idea that, that the regular army we have today is the one that would carry us through the next war, and, and then, doesn't, then, doesn't connect with Australians and to the extent that we're not having conversations like this around, you know, the, the very important but difficult business of, of war and, you know, even to the, this minor extent of wearing a uniform and you're traveling on plane just to make a connection, you know, that, I think that that's, that's very, that's very important. I suppose that people thing, and we were, extension of that, is this worry culture, but the people thing is like, I mean, a lot of organisation has been a tendency in our private sector to describe organisations as, as people, organisations, people first, you know, I mean, like, and defence has a tendency to do that as well in terms of like, you know, as, like I said, the workforce, as it's described in the DSR, retention, recruiting, keeping people, career management is saying it's like, you know, keep people a little cost potentially and, like, allow people to choose their own path, it was the idea that we're, if we also take that approach that, where people first organisations, it's incredibly difficult, it is easy to forget the mission, right? So the fact that we're here to do a unique role and it is a profession and we are, I suppose, warriors to use your analogy at the start, that's what we're here for, you know, to, to get in there and get it done. I agree. So, and this is a really important discussion. So when I worked in the Pentagon, General Joe Dunford was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had a saying, priority does not mean exclusivity. So when we have discussions about what comes first, people, teams or mission, of course it, it's easy to pull apart if you over-simplify it because nothing's a priority. There's the other odd thing that, that, you know, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. And I imagine when people make the statement, hey, we're all about people first, of course it's well-intended. You would, of course, want to send that message to the people that in your organisation. But it's like so many things, it can work oddly counterproductively. And the idea of joining the army is to serve. And we serve a very, very noble purpose, which is the defence of the nation and the people in the nation and its interest, you know, that comes first. And to some extent, the process of bringing somebody into the army is a process of taking away that sense of self-identity and its importance and saying, look, in this organisation, the self somewhat comes last, you know. And as a general thing, the service to the nation comes first, that your purpose, your mate and your team and others come second. And we expect that you might risk your life to go and save others. And you come last. The odd thing about that is that that particular mixture is actually very good for people. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That they have a high purpose, sort of, exactly. Exactly. And so it's, I do worry sometimes, and of course, it's well-intended, but loose statements of, hey, where are people first organisation actually runs counter to the, well, to the good of what the organisation's for, but actually works against individuals, because it works against the, that neat logic and people derive an enormous amount of benefit. And if they have a clear sense of purpose, then that's exactly right. And so I've got a first-year division here, so, and it's the same thing. They come to you with certain requests and they're like, well, I really want to do this. I was like, that might have worked at DFR. Now you're in the organisation, we've gone through and we read the charter, the ad for charter of it. You know, and you talked about inculcation of an ideal that is high, like a higher purpose. It starts to be the point that you're trying to teach him to go down the route of, no, you need to pay attention to what the organisation needs out of you and how it can benefit the organisation, not yourself. And I say organisation more broadly. I'm talking about the more broader purpose rather than the organisation itself. Absolutely. So I suppose that's the greater purpose thing and some people want to be told, no, as well. It's the thing like everyone thinks, oh, if you don't, I think you spoke at certain points about killing people with kindness or being too kind to people. They want to be told, no, and told exactly what they need to do because it's for the greater purpose. If we move from that, though, I'm interested in segway, it's being told exactly what you should do. It's not that simplistic, but I suppose if we go back to that warrior culture, so we've got greater purpose now and we come back to the warrior culture, if we're not to look at individuals for that selfish sort of motivation of how you should look and behave and all that sort of stuff. What does warrior culture, if we're embracing it and we're getting after it and we're trying to get into and embrace the profession of arms and doing our job, which is killing on the battlefield. What does it look like? So what does the warrior culture look like? Look, number one, it needs to be a culture that can win battles and by extension win wars. So it needs to be a culture that gets you through a battle, hopefully having won it, but equally can get you through a battle having lost it and then have the right mindset to go and fight the next one, if need be, and then through a number of battles to survive and win a war. That's a big deal, but I'll sort of hint, I'll sort of quote from Sydney Jarrion a minute that'll give you a sense of that sort of moderate some of the more obvious features that you might think that you need good warrior culture. So it needs to get troops through all of them, so it needs, in other words, to be able to sustain morale and sustain fighting spirit. But equally, it needs to imbue the troops and I mean this for all troops, not just infantry trimming or those at the forward edge of the battle area, needs to imbue you with the ability to kill. And that is the essence of winning battles and wars, and whereas there was, you know, there was ever any doubt about that, which there shouldn't have been, but I'm sure that there are people that will listen to this now and think in listening that I'm some kind of warm going, but looking at what's happening on battlefields around the world, and if not the lessons even out of our own experiences in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban, that the essence of war is violence. I mean, Klauswitz tells us this, you know, and he goes to sort of, he almost pleads to understand that that particular aspect of war gives it its special features, you know, there's nothing else like it, but if you go in without understanding its implications, it has consequences. And that particular feature of war doesn't just affect those in the war. I mean, this was the whole point of Thucydides' description of the Peloponnesian Wars was to describe the consequence of all of those wars on the corruption of Athens and then it's eventually its fall. I mean, that's the point. So the culture must address that. But of course, what we, we, is particularly on our mind is that if it does that alone without some regulation or mitigating factors, you know, then you just end up with anarchy or murderers or, you know, it has to, the warrior culture has to be a noble one. I mean, I've been trying to think of a good word there, but I think a noble one. One that acts from the essence of the country it derives. What the expectations of Australians would be of those that go and fight in its name? And is that sort of the why you encourage people to assimilate with society in terms of wearing uniform or being, you know, identical is because, you look, I suppose you can pick up those expectations of society when you understand why they send you to do those things or what their expectations are, I suppose. Yeah. No, absolutely. That's part of it. I think, and part of it must be then loyalty. You know, that strong sense of loyalty to the people represented by the government and then to the cause as we go and fight for it. And even, you know, even to the extent that the individual serving may not believe in the particular cause, this particular warrior culture must have the individual put that to the side and that the sense of loyalty is to act consistent with the lawful directions of the government, regardless of what you believe, has to be part of it. That sort of defines a professional versus somebody, you know, who is rogue to go back to that sort of example we gave earlier. So there needs to be a connection to the state and there needs to be, therefore, an obedience to the lawful orders of a chain of command, of a professional body of leaders, officers that are giving that direction. That is an essential feature because, of course, if you don't have that, then you just have everybody choosing to do whatever they like and how they like and thinking that they know better. Nothing with that must be a form of discipline and that discipline has many faces. One face is the kind of discipline that you see in that reference point I gave at the start that, you know, the Roman legions up against the tribe, the discipline to risk your own life for the cause, your discipline to stand in the face of the enemy, the risk I suppose to stand up and fire knowing that you might be killed in order to allow another to take a bound, the discipline and courage for you to risk your life to go and save the life of one of your team, but to perhaps even more importantly, at the direction of your officers representing the state to risk your life for the particular victory and the particular objective and that objective might just be to go and seize a hill to provide flank security for the rest of the organisation, but knowing that that lawful order ought to be fulfilled to the fullest extent and that might cost your life. These are sort of the harder, edged things that go with what it is for a good warrior culture and the kind of warrior culture we're after, but of course, at the heart of it, I think where the challenge sits is this, is around ideas of aggression and of course for any army to carry the day, there absolutely needs to be aggression and we've sort of trained it over the years and people will have their views as to how effective it is, but on bayonet training and bayonet assault courses and there's other mechanisms now, you know, our combatives and so on, all important, but controlled aggression is important for those familiar, you know, the story of Achilles is largely, you know, and Hector is actually, you know, a story of the difference between the brooding, rogue, individual, uncontrolled aggression of Achilles and so on versus the sort of the discipline, noble family oriented but still very capable and, you know, Hector who capable of killing a lot of people, that I think that that's a useful point, but if I might now just read this short passage from Jerry because I think it's good and he, you know, I think he was writing this in the early 70 and he says, and just for people's background, he commanded a platoon from, I think, maybe sort of a month after D-Day through Europe was involved in the, was involved in Arnhem and then fought all the way through to Germany in the end of the war, so his experience is about as much as most in the Second World War and he says, "Look like most, I would no doubt have suggested only masculine qualities like aggression, physical stamina, a hunting instinct and a competitive nature, you know, were what was most important. How wrong I would have been. I would now suggest the following. Firstly, sufferance without which one could not survive. Secondly, a quiet mind which enables a soldier to live in harmony with his fellows through all sorts of difficulties and sometimes under dreadful conditions. As in a closed, monastic existence, there is simply no room for the assertive or acrimonious. Thirdly, but no less important, a sense of the ridiculous which helps a soldier surmount the unacceptable. Add to these a reasonable standard of physical fitness and a dedicated professional competence and you have a soldier for all seasons. None of the NCOs or soldiers who made 18-per-turn what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some by any standard were heroes. I think that is a great quote because what it does is he brings us back to earth. In his story, he also talks about aggression in a different way. And he suggests that his experience in World War II was that sort of romantic aggressive mindset existed back from the front. So, infantrymen like him that were sort of in constant contact with the enemy learned a certain respect for the enemy and risking being killed, having seen your own being killed and then dealing with the bodies of those you've killed. Certainly, humbles sort of naive aggressiveness. He says, hey look in his book, that's sort of existed with us for about a month. And then we realized how naive and silly that is. What is reflecting sort of there is a sense of a more mature idea of what a soldier is. You know, it's better to persevere and to be able to live well with others. That sense of sufferance. Then he sort of disparaging the idea of naive mature sense of aggression. And interestingly, at the end of the book he talks about, he's writing, you know, what 30 years after the war, but he's reflecting on, you know, the age of television and what was happening in the 70s. And he says that he was dismayed at the time about the over, over aggression in the raw Marines and the parachute regiment at the time. And if you remember, this was the period of time of Northern Ireland, bloody Sunday and so on. And I think what he sort of says, look maybe, maybe I can understand it in those forces that are largely designed for raiding and sort of go into battle, come back out, maybe because, you know, you're not constantly confronted with the enemy that you need that heightened sense of aggression to be able to go in and come back out and do what you need to do. But certainly his sense was that it was sort of a thing that existed in those most inexperienced in combat. I think that that's an interesting that quite goes through individual characteristics, which we've talked about before. And then it goes through more broadly. No, no, that's not like, it's the broader purpose, but also the acts, like as you said before, heroic acts. And look, I think that some people listening might think that an example from a platoon commander from his experience in Europe in 1944-45 might not have any relevance to the circumstances we have today. And I imagine particularly those who might have had experience fighting ISIS or through Afghanistan and Iraq might say, well, that's not representative of modern warfare. But I think the point is that the kind of warfare that we're expecting and what preparing the army for is more similar to the experience of 1944-45, if not in Europe, certainly the Australian experience in the Pacific. And I think it absolutely has relevance. And I think it was a podcast last year by the US Army, Sergeant Major of the Army, sort of he went at this and described. And for what it's worth, I think it might be worth including, you know, his quote. I have a fair amount of combat, maybe a little more than the average individual. I've never been to war. Not war, like we're talking about, large-scale combat operations with a near peer. And if you haven't watched the Pacific series lately, you know the difference between going to combat and then coming back and going to the KBR gym and the KBR chow hall and salsa night on a Wednesday. That is not war. I'm sort of glad we waved the quote in there because it took talking about someone who has risen to the highest of the enlisted ranks in the US Army. Special forces and as experienced a significant amount of combat, but still admitting that he's never seen war, like sort of what, I suppose, the US Army is preparing for and subsequently us. But then that was my next question, which was, if we take it from the individual and our greater purpose and then look at the enemy, I suppose the most notable, you know, commanders in the past or historic figures on the battlespace were those that had an extremely good appreciation of the enemy. So as it's not just about us, it's that, you know, you talked about noeivity, like to think that you can just step over and completely ignore the fact that they're, you know, primitive or can't hold their own ground and stuff like that. It hasn't really worked in the past. You said about a month, you know, they thought like that and eventually it was an extreme appreciation. I suppose we'd look from the enemy's perspective. What are your thoughts on? I suppose how much we should appreciate and sort of look at what, how should we look at the enemy? No doubt that some empathy with your enemy is essential because it helps you understand how he'll fight and helps you understand how you can get the better of him. That's the, I think that that's the first thing. But I think that as you, and I think, you know, referencing here and this is a, and this is a hard point. That's why I'm sort of struggling to think about it because what I don't want to do is to to give a sense that what Jerry's talking about is it because I don't think that the experience of the second AIF fighting the Japanese was quite the same. And, you know, when, when sort of the stories were coming back and then the experience of the troops was, you know, the Japanese that would literally fight to the last man or, you know, hold a grenade under their belly and take their own life, but take the lives of a few others, largely when the, when the thing was done or the, of course, the obvious, the bayonetting of prisoners and so on, you know, that has a, that has an effect. A long lasting effect. Yeah, and that has an effect then on how you fight and how you treat them. So I don't, you know, we can't, we can't minimise that. And, and there's a risk here that in, in reading that section, that I inadvertently bind to a different kind of romantic view of what it is and certainly not doing that. I suppose though, you know, the challenge there is, and this, this is sort of at the heart of leadership and so on is, and even the way the institutions developed is, is that, you know, when, when you engage in that kind of thing, it really doesn't have a much of a role to play, whether you win battles and wars, but it certainly has a role to play in your relative, the risk of moral injury and what you carry with you for the rest of your life. There's a certain, and, and it also, probably goes to expectations of, of how we fight and then to how the war ends. How you, if you get involved in that kind of thing, it has implications for those. This sort of goes to the, to that point of a greater sort of sense of nobility. I'm not trying to diminish it because it's, it's hard. And we all, there's, there's an infinite number of stories in the, around this in the, in the heat of battle, but discipline and the role of officers and the role of non-commissioned officers in those moments of keeping control as essential. And, and, and, and it would be, so those moments are extremely difficult, but that's why war is difficult, and while we spend so much time training in an emphasising the quality of leadership, but also that, that matter of discipline. And I think it goes to the preservation of a, of a force and its capacity to continue fighting, and it's, it's morale and mindset. You know, there's no, there's no shortage of examples. When you start to go down that path, it becomes utterly destructive. And there, the, you know, this is the idea of the corrupting effect of war on people and groups over, over extended periods of time. What about, when, when we talk about, so showing some restraint, obviously at a, you know, Japanese being and in people on the tracks off the ball, like obviously shows no tactical advantage, but where it leaves long-term scarring in, in those individuals. But if we talk about, so showing constraint, I suppose the Marines have this, and it's come up on a couple of ethics and so it's like, they have this thing that restrains them somewhat. And like, I suppose you don't want to exercise too much empathy when you're in the act, because it can make it flinch or pull back. And the idea is, like you said before, you need to be willing to sacrifice yourself for the benefit of others, even if it is, you can't understand or it is some minuscule in your mind. But the Marines have this thing where it's like, you know, Marines don't do that. So it's an act that someone does and then come back to the broader society and, you know, it's like Marines don't do that. I suppose how do we exercise that constraint when we are talking about, you know, killing and the like? I suppose how do we, can we do the same and say that we don't do that? Yes, I think we can. Now look, I wasn't familiar with that saying that the Marines, but of course, we ought to be able to say the same. I don't, to be frank with you, I don't think it needs much special training. People know what's right and wrong. You know, if you know it and you do it, you know, that's the point. There was a, a Marine Colonel with the First Division, you know, in the amphibrol back, God, 2011, 2012, I think, or maybe even before. And he used to use David Grossman's little anecdote to talk about who you are and who you're not in from his book on killing, which is still quite good, although some of the evidence is now disputed, the SLA Marshall stuff sort of bit disputed, but he talks about, you know, it's a gross oversimplification, but it makes a point that in the world there are wolves, sheep and sheep dogs, you know, and if you're serving and he'd use the Marines as the example, you know, you're a sheep dog, you're about protecting the sheep from the wolves. And it takes no degree of imagination to understand what qualities go with being the sheep dog. But it's a useful story because he would say, but if you start doing this kind of thing, this kind of thing, this kind of thing, you're no longer a sheep dog. That's what wolves do. You're a wolf. Yeah. And you no longer belong to the team. You're now the enemy, and we, you know, I think there's some, I think there's some utility in that simple idea that how you look, we're sheep dogs. We're not wolves. But to understand that in war, that drift towards becoming a wolf is always ever present and understanding what the mechanisms are, you know, and I've sort of written about this in the past, understanding what the mechanisms are that stop you from slipping over to being a fundamental to leadership and a, you know, a good institution that carries a good warrior culture. And I think that it's a vice versa and to put it back in a balance. I think that sheep dog thing is dog's sheep dog still bite, I suppose. Exactly. Yeah. So, yes, we don't want to err on the side of caution, but I'm sorry, err on the side of fanarchy or becoming a wolf, but also that sheep dog's bite. We're here to do a job. And that purpose is the most important thing, I suppose. Suppose that the purpose or why we're here and understanding, and I think you've been very full right for here, you've come, you've been very honest about, you know, what we do as a job and why we're here. But also, everything is that showing restraint. I think your analogy before was really good because you were talking about how we inculcate people into the military and we changed them from civilians into, you know, military professionals. One of those things is bang at a salt course. Like you talk about the height of aggression, getting in there, doing something you would never have done before and actually stabbing enemy basically, but then at night, reading out the soldiers code in the hallway, didn't I mean? So, you know, the greater purpose. So that, that restraint, I suppose, understand the civil expectation and the fact that you all, you won't have to return back to civil and society at some point, and those expectations. Yes. And understand, I suppose we talk a lot about the enemy and slipping, I suppose, into tendencies that would otherwise. Because some people would definitely argue that some of those, you know, I understand you talked about, in my example, was bayonetting in rebel, you know, slipping into that, having moral scars. But it's a vice versa. Sometimes it does constrain what we can and can't do those rules and what we know to be true. It's difficult. We're always too and implying it. Yeah. Yeah. It is difficult. I'm not sure. You know, this question of constraint around, you know, the rules of war. I'm not sure that they really do constrain. You know, you, you know, you know, in the moment when, you know, who you should be shooting and who you shouldn't. I'm not, I'm not entirely convinced of that. Although, although, you know, quite rightly, people would point at me and say, well, your, your experience is, you know, it's probably not the kind of experience that really had you in that moment. I'm happy to accept that, that, you know, that really pulled into that moment where you really had to make a choice. I'm happy to admit that. But what do you, what do you think about, like, sorry to interrupt your point? But what do you think about that? There's these relativism, so relativism, I like it with, my war was this experience and your war was this experience and therefore I have more justification. Like, it's a wild argument from, from those that, because I mean, postmodernists do that sort of thing and we talk about individual, individual, you know, every single perspective matters and, you know, you have an experience that I don't have or mine is more important than yours. What do you think about that, though, more broadly? Oh, no, I don't, don't buy that, don't buy that logic at all. We wouldn't be able to discuss anything or reason our way around anything. I mean, you know, I certainly do worry that, you know, that that sort of postmodernist attitude and that sense that lived experience is more important than reason. I challenge that entirely. And so certainly, you know, and, you know, I sort of make that observation to give a nod to the fact that some experience does matter. But no, I'm not, I'm not so sure. Look, I, these are, these are hard questions. I think if I might venture and this is, this is, this is difficult and it might be potentially more difficult for others than it is, certainly for, for me. But when, if I can just relate a story and it's difficult because I'm going to talk about somebody who's passed away and doesn't have the chance to, you know, to sort of defend the position, but I don't think that they need to, there's reasons for this. But when, when we went to Rwanda in 1995, we were issued an order of the day, ten bullet points. And the tenth bullet point was there's nothing here worth dying for. Now, now as a general point, I think many people can realise the problem when you say that because nobody can guarantee in, you know, even in that, which was expected to be quite a peaceful mission. But of course, we ended up with the Kabeo massacre within about two or three months there. You can't know that. So if somebody loses their life, you, how do you give it meaning when you've said there was nothing here? You know, there's a problem there. There's a, there's a problem to the extent then that idea that this goes to warrior culture. These are the sort of hard questions about how do you set it up so that you can kill but still maintain some humanity. But other, but other problems it causes. The mandate for Unamiya 2 actually obliged the force to act to save lives of the innocent. Separately, there was a sense from the, in the UN, but those in, you know, the, the, the contributing nations about which was political. Not, not in, I don't say that in a bad way. It was political and war is political. And these kinds of things are about allowing the government, the new government that had sort of won its position by victory in the previous war when the massacre had happened. The, the scope to exercise what it needed to do. Now, it sort of met its match at Kabeo when, you know, the Rwandan people's army started to massacre the people in the camp in front of our own troops. And the order was, hey, don't, don't shoot back. And, and this one, and I was not there during that moment. So, so this is again easy for me to say. And I imagine there's a whole bunch of potentially blokes that I know, the listening to this. I don't know how, how those sort of take this, but, but I can, but it does imagine it weighs heavily on the minds of those who were there to wonder whether, was that right? Should we have fought back, you know, there was a sense that will have, you know, that the, the number of UN troops there were so overwhelmed by the number of the RPA that, the sense that they would have all been killed, what was, you know, in fulfilling that obligation, what they have, you know, what, what that have been the thought and the consequence. These are, these are the really hard questions. And that's why I struggled to talk about it because it's, it's, you know, I imagine it's very sensitive to a number of people, but, but that's what I think weighs on many minds around that. You know, I imagine that the mind would be, well, maybe if we did, it might have made a, it could have made a difference. But I imagine for many just, just, you know, watching, and many of the RPA were taunting our blokes by literally smiling at them while they, while they're killing somebody, you know, and, and yet our guys, you know, did their best to restrain themselves on the basis of an order, but, but I think that we ought to ask the question. I mean, I ask it, you know, to what extent was that, was that right? And I give, I had no intention of giving that example. It sort of just sort of came up because it fit where we're talking, but, but it is useful because this goes to the heart of what it is to be a, to be a soldier, following orders, the implications of getting those orders wrong, you know, acting rightly. And when you don't act rightly, what the implications are for potentially for people afterwards. And, and even when you might actually make the right decision, you know, still it, you can wrestle with it for the rest of your life. You know, that, that, that, that's, that's what this is about. That, and I suppose to sort of bring it full circle. That's why we ought to be very wary of anything that's, um, stylized or superficial or sort of overly sentimental or romanticized or, or it's what we, it's what we want to do, or simplistic, because these matters are really, really serious, you know, and, and, and, and, and we ought to, you know, question when, when an individual seems to be more interested in how they appear and coming up with a certain sort of call or warrior appearance, we ought to, as a professional army, be very wary of that, because they're, they're the signs that suggest, hey, something, something they write here, you know, it, it shows a disrespect for the business we're in. Just say, hey, remember what we're in here, you know, that, I think that that, if, you know, as one, one measure or one sense of what a good warrior culture ought to be, I think that that's one, one, one mechanism. And I suppose that, rather than, like, Marines don't do this, it's, remember why we're here, sort of thing like we, and who we represent, that legacy thing does come through, isn't it? Like, the fact that, um, you talked about romanticizing the Ands acts and the Aussie larykin and stuff, but more broadly, it does, like, it's broader than just us, I suppose. Yeah, you know, things like we don't do this, that's not us, or even in this case, hey, you know, should we just stand by here? Or what, what ought we do? I mean, these are the really the sort of the profound questions, but they're the ones that all, you know, you'll intuitively know the, the right answer, I think. And I think we, we sort of define what, or trying to define what, um, the warrior culture is, you know, and it's a complex difficult, we talked about layers and then having a little bit of restraint, your awesome analogy about, um, shape dogs, shape and, um, and wolves as well. Um, but I think it's really easy to define what it's not. Um, I think the, there's been a sort of shift in, I mean, we just got taken, uh, all of our combat equipment office, um, and then given back to zero, CT zero has a combat belt, a, um, a battle bra and a 9672 hour medium assault back. Yeah. But I think a lot of people lost their equipment. So they started to dive bags with the only thing or black bags with the only thing they carried out of it, and then it starts to hang over into that, to the army of like, we, we need to deploy with dive bags or, or, or, or cargo like, um, black, black, black bags. I suppose, have you seen that follow on from like the deficiencies and, and like, not to dismiss the COVID, uh, issues with supply? Have you seen that issue, like permeate throughout the, uh, uh, army? Yep. I have. And I've, you know, spoken quite a lot of the army over the last 12 months. And this has been voiced. I do think that some of our thinking about equipping, and this is particularly for the army reserve, I've got that loud and clear, um, it sort of comes from a backward looking view or an expectation that our recent experience of war will be our, our future experience. And that is a concern because, you know, you, you're, you know, the way we equip the way we speak to our troops, um, the sort of stuff we put in glossy brochures and so on is what really sends a message of where you are. And, and certainly I've got the message that, um, that that doesn't sort of resonate with the kind of stuff that we've been, um, talking about today. Look, the, the other concern I have, and I've traveled to in the last 12 months and spoken to almost every school in the army, um, with the exception, I think of the School of Infantry of all of them is, um, is, um, a concern that we've, with a focus, and this might be unfair, but, but, but, and it's, and it's certainly the right thing to do. But, but in the process of sort of focusing on an efficiency, um, you know, to get soldiers through training and into, into units for collective training, that we, we sort of focus too much on skills. Um, we lost sight of the social conditioning aspect of, of our schools, particularly our initial schools. And I know that for certain schools, and I think signals is a good example for, for many courses where, um, there's just these no field phase. And so, so, so we, we're sort of practicing things, but not, um, in the conditions or circumstances that we would find ourselves if, if we're, if we're fighting. So, so I do, I do see that, and I do worry, and I, but look, I, um, but having said that, we're addressing it. And I'll, I suppose that's the message I want to pass on. Yeah, I just like individual circumstances. Oh, sorry, experiences with like, we deployed as, um, as a company size element to, um, team all less day for a mobile training team to teach the, um, FFTL, uh, offices, how to do command post operations and the like. But the, um, we're in the bush. Um, part of the warning order had like a phase of the operation that was definitely field training. And it was very explicit. Um, and we get two caterers attached, fly over from the, um, east coast, and both of them, the basically the only sort of green thing they had was a toothbrush and, or argue that it wasn't, um, like fluorescent green is not right, the right top of green. And there's, it happened in conversation with the men like, there's field training in, um, exercise on, on the, you know, we go into team all, and there's a field training component. Like, what, what were you thinking? And they're like, oh, we don't normally go field. So we, we just, we didn't bring any staff and then bring their troops Argentine and, and then, or cigarettes or loots being attached to like battle groups and then coming, like empty handed, like two hands empty. It's like, where is your weapon? Do you know what I mean? And so we don't carry weapons. It's like, I get that you have a technical task, but you are going to be in absolute fear. Um, that, uh, yeah. You know, that's, that's utterly unacceptable. And, and, and the, and, but the, the, you know, if, if there is a cause or a blame, it's it's with people like me. You know, we, we, we've somehow allowed a context to develop that, that allows that to, to, and, and, and even if you, even just looking at sort of recent experience or, or even past experience that might, might be similar to the kind of war we might expect to fight next. And I think I've mentioned this in previous podcasts that, that all of this advance in technology is not, is not each on its own changing warfare to be a more technical event. It provides a new context that, that has the unwitting effect of making combat much harder, much closer, um, less decisive. Um, and it looks, you know, um, much like the kind of warfare that, uh, we were doing in, on the west and front in sort of 1915 to sort of 1917, 1818. So, so I think, you know, that, the implication of this is that soldiers are first and foremost soldiers. And, and, and your, your trade or your particular era of expertise or skill is secondary. Everybody has to fight and everybody needs to go in, um, to the next war with a, with a sense that they, they might have to fight and that, that they will at some stage be close to death. So, all of the things that we've been discussing applies to every soldier, not just, not just a particular few. Yeah. This serves as that, I suppose, hard, hard reset on the warrior culture, I suppose. Absolutely. On that note, that's an absolutely awesome point to leave the episode, but talking about, um, so bringing back a warrior culture and really having a good understanding of who we are and what we do, um, getting an appreciation for the enemy, obviously, going broader than just the individual characteristics and thinking about who we actually are and what we do. Thank you so much for your time, sir. Thanks, Todd. Enjoy it again. Thanks. Thanks for listening to the cove podcast. Explore our channel for more great audio PME content. Also visit us at cove.armie.gov.au for hundreds of additional resources. The cove, the learning home of the Australian profession of arms.