Brad Lundy, a veteran long-short equity investor with over 20 years of experience, emphasizes a fundamental, long-term investing approach rooted in sustainable cash flow and recurring earnings. He cautions against overexposure to AI-driven sectors like data centers, where high valuations and uncertain future CapEx spending create significant risk. Despite short-term market volatility—evident in earnings revisions not aligning with stock performance—Lundy believes the market is overreacting, and a five- to ten-year horizon is essential for true value capture. He highlights examples of undervalued, cyclical businesses, such as a UK prepared foods company that recovered from a 20% drop due to guidance misstatements, demonstrating how market noise can create investment opportunities. His strategy prioritizes businesses with strong, predictable earnings, solid management, and moats, especially in defensive sectors like consumer staples and industrial infrastructure. He advocates for a disciplined, diversified portfolio that includes uncorrelated assets to withstand market swings. While AI and tech remain relevant, Lundy stresses that long-term success depends on resilience, not short-term sentiment. Volatility, though painful, is viewed as a key opportunity for active investors who can act quickly and maintain conviction. His process blends deep fundamental analysis with agile decision-making, allowing him to navigate shifting market dynamics while protecting capital. Ultimately, he believes in a balanced portfolio with a strong focus on quality, sustainability, and long-term value—offering a counterpoint to the current trend of short-term, momentum-driven investing.
Hey, and we're live. It is Thursday the 19th of November. It is about 3pm Eastern and
as trading as we speak and we've got with us Brad Lundy joining us from LA. Brad's been
in the long short equity business for over 20 years but started as a or options trader.
And now he's a value guy. It happens to all of us. A partner at Ivory in LA and since 2017
he's been running his own shop, Butler Hall. Brad, welcome to the podcast. Thank you for
having me. Just before we start you guys know the drill. We are going to talk about process
mainly today in long short world but we may we may mention a couple of single names but
we're never ever giving investment advice here. All right. Benny's with us in Austin.
He's at an action packed day. How do you want to pick things off them? Well, it's funny
because I'm in Austin and this tomorrow X conference. It's over now. But when we like
set this up, I'm pretty sure when they set this conference up, which was an unbelievable
speaker list, they were thinking this is going to be this great week for tech. You know,
they're going to have this conference and the ontropic IPO. I mean, Brad, what do you think?
You know, I know, I know you didn't participate but would you thought some of the state of
the AI trade and what anthropic coming out means? Well, I'll preface this is not my area
of expertise. But as I see it today, anthropics traded what 74 or 75 billion of stock and you've
got what a trillion three trillion five market cap. So you only make money if you sell. And
what time will tell as to, you know, what the real cash generation is. Just a couple of
snippets. I mean, you know, interestingly, the the institutional allocations, I mean,
I'm hearing stories that like 60% of the book got zeroed institutionally. What's interesting
is that, and again, this is anecdata, but overseas retail got very heavy fills UK UK retail
brokers were giving 25% fills versus indications, similar story down here in Australia. And this
is exactly what happened on SpaceX, by the way, the the fills, the fills domestically
in the US were much more sort of mid single digits by all accounts. Interesting. I mean, you
certainly saw the movements in the rest of the market pre open, right? Nasdaq up materially
S and P up, right? All of the kind of AI exposure up and second that second anthropic began
trading, you saw pretty swift reversal. No, we'll see. So how have you tackled, how have
you tackled the AI trade, Brad, in the in the last couple of years? I mean, there are
plenty of us and I'm guilty of it as well. I sort of, you know, I miss the I miss the
big moves in semis and memories initially and was, you know, had to stop myself from trying
to fade them. But how have you been playing it? Yeah. So I'll just give you a quick perhaps
background on how we approach public market investing. But as you mentioned, I've been
in business, you know, been more than 20 years. We are a private equity approach to the public
markets. We focus on businesses that generate a sustainable level of cash flow, but we think
we're at an inflection point to demonstrate accelerated growth. So to kind of come full
circle and address your question, we found particularly in the older economy areas of
the market, which is where we spend the bulk of our time. So really attractive investments
at the onset will call it AI discovery, right? So 2023, 2024, and into 2025. And if you
think about businesses that were exposed to the data center cap X and power part of the
market, you weren't placing a pretty, you weren't placing a significant multiple on those
equities at that point in time. So Vista Energy was a very large investment for ours.
We bought it at five times cash flow with an acceleration in demand from AI power, you
know, vertive on the cooling side rate in hindsight, we paid eight times earnings for business
growing, you know, 50 plus percent a year at the onset of it. But the caveat is we were
effectively capturing a free option on the enormous term of AI spending. And as I kind
of rewind, and I look at effectively the overall cap X spend in the market today, we've gone
from, you know, a couple hundred billion in 24 to, I believe, the most recent estimate
I'm using Morgan Stanley is 1.64 trillion approximately in 27. So the reason I'm giving
you these numbers is it's become effectively the crux of the economy. And if you're paying
a real multiple or a market multiple for a business tied to that cap X spending today,
there's a level of risk that I think we're, we're not entirely comfortable with underwriting
at this point in time. So the last thing I will note just on AI as we make a very significant
distinction to goals that are purely tied to the cap X part of the business, meaning
the, the continual 1.6 trillion and presumably growing over time as compared to the recurring
nature, right, of a data center once it's installed, which to me is a far more predictable
and extreme. Point being, I think we're in the two tough to call part of the market bucket
because I think you need to underwrite what cap X is going to be not in 27 or even in
28, but 29, 30 and beyond to really kind of think about the overall appropriate net present
value of those cash flows. And Brad, you know, you were an industrial
PM for a long time and you've been industrialist guy. I mean, maybe talk to that because,
you know, all I hear from people in video's cheap, it's eight times earnings or, you
know, it's like these things are so cheap, Powell industries. Talk about like how you think
about cyclicals and valuations and tops and bottoms and how you approach that.
I mean, as a general comment, the most attractive industrials over the last 30 years, one would
really need to deploy capital in the periods in which their multiples are actually very
high, but they are under earning, meaning a $10 stock used to do two dollars in cash flow
and is now doing 10 cents. But the next cycle might do $3. You'd want to buy it when it's
at that trough. We'll call it $45 a share when the earnings are largely nonexistent.
You tell me what AI cap X spending is for the next decade and I can probably create
a reasonable assessment of the valuation of the video, but I really think that's up
in the air. And we've moved from hyperscalers spending their cash flow and cash generation
from their core businesses to private market funding to debt funding and see where the
credit market is kind of willing to lend in the next couple years. So we have a, we'll
call it more of a neutral stance at this point and it really be very clear. We're not necessarily
bearish on AI for society. In fact, we're very bullish, but like your comment on what
cycles look like, when earnings go up 100 X, you need to be really wary of paying 10 times
that multiple.
Can we pause there, Brad? In your excitement about AI for society, that's quite a pregnant
statement right there. Excited in what way? Look, at the end of the day, we've now gotten
to a point where I can replace a entry-level analyst for $1,000 a month with AI. And
I'm saying an entry-level analyst because that's really digging up rudimentary data, historical
filings, market data, projections, et cetera. So there is value here to society. The question
is, am I willing to spend 10 X that or 20 X that in time? And we'll see. So I listened
to, there was an interview earlier this week from one of the large well-known tech investors
who was euphoric on the fact that, right, basically the cost to create AI-based tokens are declining
at this 90% rate, but pricing in the short term is going up. I don't know if that's sustainable
long-term. We know costs are going down. The question is, what is that pricing in time?
I'm kind of of the view that the real benefit is going to be society. And it's unclear
to me that there's a singular company at this point in time that will effectively have
that, we'll call it revenue share of the next internet, right, to use the 90s analogy.
I mean, who's going to be the next Brad Lundy if you're entry level guy as a bot, right?
I mean, you're speaking to the state of decline of the act of management industry. So most
individuals that were trained in the 90s and into the early part of this century have
effectively moved on to other careers or they've gone and started their own shops such
as myself or their platforms. And the next generation, I think, is non-existent at this
point in time from an active management perspective. And you're feeling that today in the public
markets. So, you know, if you think about it, when I began in this industry, I was taught
the price you were paying is the most important determining factor in time. And valuation
was an enormous component of how we thought about capital allocation. So when a stock was
10 times earnings and something went wrong and it dropped 20 percent, all of a sudden
it was, you know, 12 percent for cashier yield or 8 times earnings. And you double up that
position and it would lure a bunch of other activities.
managers. And while I, you'd have a stock that doubles over the next year. Today, something
goes wrong and that stock at 10 times earnings goes down 20%. It garners negative momentum
factors, gets booted out of the indices, right? Platforms, right? They really can't hold
that declining, right? Share price, accident. And it may go to drop 70 to 80 or 90% before
it's eventual resumption of paramarket value. So if you think about the way, this is at least
my opinion, you think about the way one should allocate capital in this period of time is
almost anything can happen with respect to market pricing in the short term. But you really
need to invest with that longer cycle, right? A five to 10-year time horizon to capture that.
And it makes it a challenge on risk management, but also a gift if you're willing to structure
a portfolio that can seek to take advantage of it. When you say five to 10 years, right? I
think that the market is even sooner than that. I think looking out nine months to 18 months
now is even enough that everybody's been efficient in the factors and there's the LLMs and the
arbitrage on the short term is just so intense, but nobody can really hold the positions
to your point. So like, I feel like the number one determinant of success now is your ability
to hold a position. Like, can you eat the ball and do you have the liability structure to
do that in the way the markets evolve? I mean, is that kind of how you're thinking? I mean,
that would seem long to me, but like, what do you think about that?
Ultimately, that's how we think about it. But when we're allocating capital on a portfolio
level, we have, I'd say, a broader level of diversification and we'll say smaller position
sizing that allows us to see those investments through. So on a portfolio level, we actually
exhibit very low volatility, but when you peel back the onion, there are stocks left and
right that have 50 plus percent drawdowns. And if you're able to really take advantage
of that, it's certainly a gift.
So we're not going to talk about your returns, but just in terms of how you structure yourself
from a long short perspective, how many positions, what kind of net growth, what net growth leverage
would you be running on that?
Yeah, so we have 30 to 40 longs. We generally are 100 long, call it 60 short. It's probably
a good way to think about it.
Our capital allocation is driven by, we'll call it capital at risk as opposed to purely
expected return. So we really try to seek to limit losses on the long side to really
about 150 basis points per position. So if you have something that has 50 percent
downside, right in theory, you would max out at about a 3% portfolio position. And that
allows us to really enable, I'd say, much greater volatility on a single security name,
or even a sector level as well. You made an interesting point, Ben, which kind of speaks
to the huge volatility and the ability to withstand it.
When I started in the business, it was extremely attractive to find a business at a 10% free
cashier yield. Today, it is not too much of a challenge to find businesses with 20% pre-cashier
yields. But what's most important is you need someone else to buy that stock, or you
need that cash return to shareholders. And what we found is just simply finding a dramatically
undervalued equity that is generating enormous amounts of cash flow, unless it's actually
being returned preferably through share references. You really lack that timing mechanism to
self-correct. So if you find a double in itself corrects in a year, fantastic, if it takes
five years, right, it's not a great return, at least from my perspective. So ultimately,
that is in kind of the deep value part of the market. We're trying to identify businesses
that have that inflection point at growth, where it may grow from 3% to growing at 10
to 15, but then also this acceleration of cash return so that you can kind of really
withstand that volatility. And if you're getting it, right, be a call in a private market
type distribution.
Interesting. I mean, one of the things I've certainly noticed and, you know, at heart when
it comes to stocks, I'm much more of a value guy than a momentum guy for sure. But in
the old days, it used to be used to be able to sort of tolerate some kind of negative earnings
revisions sort of in the short term. But, you know, writing that out right now, particularly
in technical businesses is just almost impossible because, you know, it flashes up as an ideal
short for all of the platforms as you call them. And, you know, living through that is,
is, you know, is real drawdown pain. So if you, here's an interesting thing. If you look
at the last six months in the market, companies, particularly tied to the AI data center part
of the market, have seen actually very substantial earnings beats and guidance raises, right?
So generally speaking, if earnings estimates are too low and they're going up over time,
stocks have a high degree of correlation in it. Here we are, right, in November of 26.
And the last five months has actually been the opposite, right? The data center trade
has completely broken down, despite the fact that earnings revisions are moving higher
and higher and higher. And if you think about that, it really brings into question the
crux of why many individuals own these stocks. And then why you're actually seeing for selling
wind stocks are not going up despite positive earnings revisions. And the last time you
really saw stuff like this, right, is in, it really predates kind of huge unwinds, right?
Dotcom, bubble oriented periods of time as well. But it brings back a bigger question. If
you're taking a five year plus investment horizon, you shouldn't be focused on what earnings
are going to do in the next three months or six months. But if you can get the next three
to six years correctly, right, you really got this unique investment opportunity. Yeah, go
ahead. Isn't this isn't this unique to the sort of tech data center AI build out? Because
I tell you what, if you try, try and hold it, try holding a, a cyclical stock with negative
earnings revisions right now. Well, so generally I agree with you. And, and you know, in the
call it small and mid cap part of the market, it's been, I mean, we're really in a bear market
at this point in time from an equity perspective. But there are signs of life. So if you look
at, right, I'll maybe paint a couple areas of the market. If you look at housing exposed
right businesses that sell into renovations or furniture, et cetera, these stocks have
actually done reasonably well over the last couple months, despite the fact that the housing
market is not in a great position, right? Higher rates have really stalled the market.
The ability for renovations or way down pool demand, right? As a good reference point,
it's 35% below normalized levels today. So hence, earnings are terrible for this industry.
And yet, right, some of these stocks really starting in September begin to go up on negative
earnings revisions, which is it's an interesting data point. And it kind of shows, perhaps, right,
markets kind of over-correct, right, to the downside. So if you can find a business that
is extremely undervalued over a five-year, 10-year horizon, who cares what the next 12 months
of cash flow is? And, you know, the last time I saw this, it's really highlighted, is
think about Q3 and Q4 of 2020, right? What were the hottest parts of the market? It was
stay-at-home, right? Sass-driven companies showing accelerated KPIs. It was the, you know,
the meal kit businesses, the Pelotons of the world. They were absolutely crushing earnings.
And yet, was that really a good indication of long-term cash flow and long-term intrinsic
value? No, quite the opposite. So I really think the market's going way too far in terms
of trying to identify with the value of the next three or six months of earnings, when,
in reality, most people should be fundamental investors looking at the cash generation
over time, as opposed to what the short-term market market is.
I mean, it could just be, it could just be the cell site is wrong on the numbers, Brad.
It's as simple as that. Perhaps. I mean, with respect to AI, the market
is telling you that CapEx is going to come down at this point. Yeah, that's what I think.
That's what he's telling you. Time will tell, but, you know, if it does come down and
earnings start to decline, many of these AI exposed businesses don't trade at ten times
earnings. They trade at 50 times, right? Kind of pre-U4 at CapEx earnings, and their margins
are two, three X normalized levels. That's a really precarious situation to be in.
So what we try to do is ask ourselves, assume a stock goes down 20% to 30%, how will you
react? And if the answer is, right, you're not likely to hold it, and you're likely to trigger
permanent capital loss, you probably shouldn't be in there anyway.
Now, we live in, you know, the public markets, there's imperfect information, things change
all the time, but, you know, we want stability in our businesses and an ability to predict
cash flow over a longer period of time with relative certainty.
You know, Brad, I want to ask you something, you know, I've recently wrote an essay called
The Cause of Barbell and how the evolution of active management has been.
How is it to be one of the guys in the middle when everybody went to the pod shop or they
went to the passive and now stocks just bounce around like pinballs, you know, when you're
running a book, I mean, you know, how it used to be guys would make markets, you know,
you've talked about valuation was important, there's just air gaps now all over.
Like, how do you deal with that as a manager?
I think speed of the decision-making process matters more perhaps than prior periods.
So I think going from identifying an investment, diligence and investment, sizing that position
can take a substantial period of time.
But if you're given a 30% air gap in a stock and your process is, you know, two thirds
complete, you have to make a decision without the perfect information.
So I think the market is perhaps adjusted over time where you need to act more swiftly
with a little bit less information, perhaps prior to five or 10 or even 20 years ago.
So that's something we've kind of tried to, you know, take into account is it's better
to buy something down 20, 30, 40%, then finish the work and miss that opportunity.
And the benefit, right, it's really illustrated is, as I mentioned, there are very few people
putting value and price as their kind of core investment decisions.
In fact, we live with a world where passive and non-fundamental factors are major drivers
in the market.
So we want to be in a position to arbitrage that and to really arbitrage that, you need
to act quickly and you need to have conviction, but you need to be cognizant that obviously
you may not have 100% of the tax in that point of time.
The classic invest then investigate.
Exactly.
So we try to do things incrementally, but when things really line up, we want to get
very aggressive very quickly.
And that's the art of being a portfolio manager or an investor, right, you know, like tactical
aggression and being able to curb your emotions, you know, and eat some pain at times, but
like, right?
I mean, it's a very humbling business.
But I will say, we have this true luxury in the public markets that if you want liquidity,
you have it instantaneously.
So managers make mistakes and we have an ability to change our mind, adjust the portfolio
in a manner that is not really afforded to those on the private side.
And that's something I think is incredibly valuable with respect to sustainable alpha generation
in time.
Do you think that money will come back from private equity and private credit into the
public markets?
I know you've been involved in some of that stuff and you were kind of bullish and you got
me bullish on KKR a long time ago, who was a great stock.
Do you think that we're at the peak of that or do you think that those things will continue
on?
What's your view on that space?
I mean, the alternative asset manager space has been an incredible growth market in time
with substantial organic, right, fundraising that has been really impressive.
Look, I think private credit has issues and part of the structural challenge with private
credit is if you have a, your returns really have a limit on the upside.
So if you have a specific impairment that does wipe out or materially negatively impact
your value in a certain lending capacity, it's very hard to capture that up or to true
that up.
I think ultimately it's a part of the market with perhaps subpar returns for a period
of time, but it's not the existential crisis that perhaps people thought six or 12 months
ago.
On the private side, we'll see, I mean, when you see Anthropic coming public and SpaceX
coming public, I think a lot of that stuff is going to recycle back into the private
markets as it's monetized, but there's a whole swap of more legacy PE investments just
hoping for monetization that may not occur.
So I think it depends in the specific area that you're focused on.
But to me, you need to get a really significant return to lock up capital for a decade, particularly
on the private markets that commensurate for that risk.
So time will tell.
The other question, right, is we've had public market investing, if you bought the S&P,
you bought the NASDAQ, it has been an incredible risk adjusted product over the course of the
last 10 or 20 years.
And if that continues fantastic, but there has been a bit of a, a bit of a consolidation
with respect to the contributors of the S&P over the course of the last five years, where
you know, Google Meta, right, Amazon had businesses that were somewhat different and have
effectively compressed into one thematic bet, which I really think is AI at this point.
So that's created.
I'd say a level of concentration risk in the broad index, which you will see might have
some challenges in time.
So what could change that brings people back to active management?
If that does not turn out to be a great return on capital, meaning AI data center
effects, you have a major problem in that part of the market.
You will see substantial losses in that part of the market.
And you know, some of these will call it undiscovered gems and that one to $25 billion market
cap space that we traffic in might be just incredible investment opportunities with out,
right, with, you know, very different correlation.
The one thing is just a follow up, you may have seen stats, but there, there's been really
a tracking from Goldman on the percentage of names in the S&P 500 that are inversely
correlated to the S&P on a daily basis.
Yeah.
You know, it's a basic guys.
Yeah.
Exactly.
Right.
So, you know, we saw this in '99 and oh, there was a huge swath about 15% of the market that
would actually go up when the market went down, right, so call it 75 names in the S&P.
That got upwards of 20% over kind of the Q2 period of time.
And then in September was about 40%, which is staggered, right, in the history of public
tracking, there has never been a period where 200 names in the S&P are inversely correlated.
And that's actually, to me, is incredible because it means you're going to establish a great
set of investments that have no correlation to the market, and I think it's probably
an omen at once to come.
Yeah, I think, you know, it's really an issue of time, Brad, right?
I mean, as you say, the S&P and the triple cues have been such an amazing, you know, free
beta product for so long.
I think, to be honest, allocators probably need two to three years of schooling before
they look elsewhere, right?
So it's, you know, and the drawdown, I mean, people have got so used to making 12% a year
in US large cap stocks.
You know, I think it will take longer than you think for people to change their mind
on strategy.
I think that's an accurate assessment.
If you look at 2022, right, that, the market was down materially, those in kind of the
tech, you know, part of the world were substantially underperformed.
And again, it came roaring back.
So I think that's an accurate depiction.
The interesting thing is, compared today's market to that period of time, you now have
read the entrance of mega cap companies, right, SpaceX and today, Anthropic, that are
now public, right?
And so the top 10 companies in the world are actually rapidly changing at this point in
time.
And it could create some greater volatility than perhaps, right, historical periods.
But I agree.
I think you need two to three years of what's called subpar returns, where ironically
selling trigger selling.
Yeah, and, you know, Brad, we've all been in the game for a long time.
There is this dynamic of, you have to bet 41 years old to have seen a bear market if you're
on the street at this point.
So there's a lot of guys who are never seeing what a bear market looks like.
And you know that they say that the guys you're buying the dip in a bear market eventually
will be selling the rip as the new sellers, right, I mean, they're the new supply.
So if we are in a bear market now, it could create some interesting opportunities because
you don't have the market participants have seen this plus the passive component of it.
It's interesting.
Some might take issue with your comments of never seeing a bear market.
I would tend to agree with you that 2020 does not truly constitute a bear market when
you have enormous economic expansion.
But the other thing, and this perhaps supports your comment, is that the declines have been
enormous in very condensed periods of time, when the market does turn lower.
So think of tariff day, you know, I guess we're beginning of April of last year.
It dropped very materially, think of 2020 how quickly it dropped, and then immediately
following that enormous recovery.
So those that have been allocating capital over the last 10 years have been effectively
reinforced positively to buy significantly in those drops because you come back so quickly.
And to your point, if you were around in 2008, that was a period where I was managing
capital as well as a portfolio manager, it extended for a prolonged period of time with
many headfakes.
And interestingly, this is probably the first time where I'm not saying it will happen,
but you could see a very significant recession if AI-capic spending drops materially.
And that's, you think about it over the last 10 years, there hasn't been a singular
driver that has really been the catapult upwards of the economy.
And it's effectively our entire GDP growth.
And as now, equity fuel, debt fuel, etc.
What happens if we end up going from 1.6 trillion in 27 to a trillion in 29?
It doesn't sound like a terrible number, but it actually could be quite challenging
for not only the S&P, but an enormous part of America.
Yeah, and I think that that's a good point.
One of the things that I've read and talked about is when you have a system like the circular
funding thing or just an expanding bubble, you need to keep growing because if it just
stalls, then it actually starts to implode on itself, right?
So if we have a situation where now rates are a lot higher, credit spreads are a lot higher,
and conviction is lower, now we have a political regime shift.
I mean, it's a lot, and we lost the central banker and most important player in AI.
You know, it's a tough, it's a tough race, I guess, right?
And look, I don't want you to misinterpret that I'm a bear.
I'm just highlighting the risk associated with it, but rewind, right?
Do you remember all the controversy about Tesla and whether Elon was going to be able to
generate cashflow, right?
You go back, he was sleeping in the plants, you know, putting in the hours, and ultimately
he achieved it and the company went from cash burning to cash generation.
If you fast forward to today, SpaceX, right, is now ramping their capex by the hundreds
of billions, and at least pulling off of Bloomberg currently, there's 150 billion of estimated
cash burn next year that needs to be debt financed, right?
I'm just putting this in the context, $150 billion, right?
Give or take, relative to the panic and myopic focus that he received at Tesla, which was
over a couple billion dollars a few years ago.
And I'm just illustrating that because it highlights the magnitude in which the scale
is changed, and then think about that, right?
If that debt is not financed and that money is or not spent, right?
The trickle effect throughout the economy is absolutely astronomical.
So time will tell, but I'd say buckle up one way or another.
Absolutely.
And again, you also are doing this to come back into an inelastic market.
You know, our friend of the show, Mike Green, talks about that, and I know you know him
as well.
And the pod shops are all levered long, so it makes it just, it's going to be a lot of
whips on along the way.
It's going to be like being in a hurricane, I guess, would be the best analogy.
Look, ultimately there's two things that will happen.
Either the returns will show up, and the, you know, trillion six of CapEx turns out to
be an incredible investment, or it will not.
And both have, you know, substantial, we'll call it, volatile outcomes.
So from our vantage point, we just would rather not play in that when there are really high
quality businesses trading it, very depressed multiples that we think we can generate a
great return irrespective of macro environment.
I just, it's very unique what's occurring today, and obviously the AI stuff gets the bulk
of the attention for good reason.
What do you think about bonds here?
You know, it's, we grew up in a world where you had to compare, you know, your equity
return potential versus rates, and then, and then we had this period where, you know,
whatever those called tina, the tina effect.
And now we have rates again, but it doesn't seem like people want bonds.
I mean, do you consider that in your process where you're like, Hey, look, I can get positive
carry, which actually has an embedded put option on AI, because if they, as you said, if
AI fails, S and P fails, we know rates are going to go down, right?
Yeah.
So, well, if you think about the risk-free rate today and, and then that relative to
the return, we think we're getting in, in equity securities, for us, it's, it's still
too large of a gap to think about allocating to what we'll call it credit or bonds.
I think it's different if you're relying on a company trading at 20 to 25 times earnings
because the implied rate spread is actually inverted.
So we're really focused on that 15, 20% cash flow yield.
We're, for us, a 4% 10 year rate treasury versus a 5% versus a 6% isn't that material to
the long-term investment outcome, but it, look, it's something that we are watching because
it impacts the cost of capital and the financing and the equity flow through.
So we have probably made a more cognizant decision within our portfolio to focus on what
we'll call it reduced or lower-levard companies because the uncertainty of the credit environment
and interest rates in time can really have a material impact on a levered equity, particularly
when refinancing comes.
So, Brad, I mean, in terms of, you know, we've talked about, we've talked a lot about
sectors where we're wary right now and you touched on a little bit about some of these
sort of what I call the housing derivative stocks with the housing market.
Let's be clear kind of on its arse right now.
I mean, do you often, would you say this is dangerously early or which other places should
be, should people be hungry?
No, we're on.
I don't think we're dangerously early at this point.
A lot of the housing exposed stocks are down 50 plus percent from their peaks.
Many of them actually have great balance sheets, real, right, recurring businesses.
And again, I do want to bifurcate, if you are purely tied to a new home build, there's
a much greater level of sensitivity, but a lot of these housing companies are actually
tied to the recurring nature of remodels, et cetera.
And while 2026 looks worse than your average downturn, it's really a deferral of remodels
as opposed to really that, you know, sensitivity of new builds.
So I use that example earlier in this podcast that, you know, if you look at pool deliveries
in the United States, I think we're kind of just below 60,000 in the US.
The historical, we'll call it 25 year average of replacement stock would suggest that we're
probably about 35% below normalized levels, right?
What was the number in, what was the number during COVID, didn't that get it wrong?
It was, I think, it peaked at 117,000.
Okay.
So it just, it just clawed forward.
It's like sort of RVs, right, it clawed forward all of that demand.
Exactly.
And ironically, we're sure some RV companies in 2020, but at the end of the day, I've pulled
forward a dramatic amount of demand, that led to a gap in earnings in the subsequent
couple of years, but ultimately, there's very long-term attractive demographics of individuals
moving to warmer states, right, greater land pool, right, you know, solutions.
And you should at least see a recovery to that normalized level in time.
What I, as a cyclical, right, investor, what we've seen is often when you underproduce
for a long enough period of time, you actually get the overproduction, right, you know, thereafter.
So, well, I think 117,000 units installed is a pretty aggressive number.
It would not surprise me if in three or four years from now, we see a number above that
normalized level, right, to appropriately catch up.
So I think that area is somewhat interesting.
We've found more investments actually on the consumer staples side and defensive cash flow
streams.
And part of this is, if you think about some of the cross-currents in that part of the
market, you've seen GLP ones have been very damaging to these equities.
And for very good reason, right, caloric consumption is in decline.
You've also seen, right, private-label penetration, right, which has been somewhat destructive.
And then, obviously, right, huge moves up in, we'll call it inflationary costs, whether
it's gasoline, right, labor insurance, et cetera, is really pressure the lower end consumer
that relies on a lot of these staples.
But we've found, as there are companies where we can buy businesses at six to eight times
cash flow that we think are under-earning, right, but have a far more recurring earnings
stream associated with that.
And then just to be clear, these are not the staples at the top of the XLP or the top
of the. Absolutely not.
Because those guys. No.
No.
So, essentially, we have an investment in the UK, it's a prepared foods company.
if you've found out.
Think about it, right?
If you go into Whole Foods in the US
and you go to the hot and prepared food sections,
you'll now see salads and sushi rolls.
Well, five, 10 years ago, you saw chicken nuggets, right?
And the quality of products that you're now seeing
in supermarkets is very attractive
where you're seeing a big reallocation of shelf space
away from other conventional products
into prepared foods because effectively
the supermarkets get a dramatic step up in sales per foot.
So the specific company we have an investment in
is trading at 10 times earnings.
It's growing at earnings at 15, 20%.
It is 25% salad exposed, right?
This is very health-oriented
and they're gaining share in a market
that isn't showing right any growth.
And my point is, right?
They haven't had any explosive diarrhea problems then.
No, they've not.
But what's interesting and maybe I'll illustrate this
'cause it highlights when you're trafficking
in these kind of one to $25 billion market gap spaces,
crazy things can happen.
So this company has had such a successful strategy
that they went out and they bought the number two competitor
and they merged and that deal closed,
I don't know, five months into the year or something like that.
And when they reported, they updated guidance.
But their guidance didn't include, right?
The full year of both businesses,
well, the estimates on Bloomberg, right?
Reflected both of them.
So anyway, long story short,
is it created the appearance that this stock missed guidance
and it literally dropped 20% over three of period of time.
And ironically, the business was going great.
If you read the press release, right?
From that announcement,
they talk about share gains and successful integration
and they ended up raising guidance
the next quarter and the following after that,
despite what appeared to be this disaster.
And I'm giving you this illustration
because it's not uncommon to see a 20% move
over something that is not fundamental.
In fact, it's the opposite and it provides a gift.
So if you can actually take advantage of that
in which we did, you can get some great returns.
And ironically, as the market has gotten a little bit more
concerned over AI stuff,
this specific security is at the high of the years
and has not only recovered where it was,
but it's substantially expanded.
So I think there's a lot of evidence.
Generally, how much time have you spent
in overseas markets?
I mean, the UK is full of strong free cash
for a yield stories right now.
Yeah, and I want to caveat,
we look for areas where you have growth, right?
And the reason I gave this example
is I think there is a great secular growth story
of effectively taking share from the,
call it Chipotle is in the world
by selling a superior product at half the price.
So that creates a growing business
in what might not be perceived to be a growth industry.
With respect to the UK, you're right.
It's littered with,
it would be generous to call them great businesses.
Littered with low valuation, low growth businesses
with poor return on capital.
To answer your question, most of what we do is in the US,
call it 80% give or take.
We are 100% developed markets.
As I come from an accounting background,
came into the long short equity business
in the post and run era.
So accounting to me is a very important part of our process.
And if you can't rely on gap or IFRS accounting
and interact with your management teams,
you may make mistakes when things go wrong.
So we generally tend to focus on that.
So for us, it's really US,
and then we'll call it Western Europe.
- Okay, then you're on me.
So, yep.
- I'll ask a question.
Well, Ben figures out his audio.
The, so yeah, I mean, the UK market, I obviously,
I'm originally a Brit,
although I'm now an Australian citizen as well,
but the, you know, the, the FTSE 250,
you know, the mid cap index in the UK
is just getting hollowed out.
How, I want to talk about M&A,
particularly in the, in the market in which you traffic.
How often are you finding yourself in a situation
where you do all this work underwriting, you know,
what you see is a potential sort of double or triple,
only to get taken out for a 30% merger premium, M&A.
- It has not happened as much as you think.
So for us, it really hasn't been a major driver.
That said, we have found that attempted M&A
often is a good, what we'll call it, indication of value.
So part of our process on identifying businesses,
we really try to find industries undergoing change,
we document what we believe to be the winners and losers,
but really, this is a business about time allocation.
And often you have an event where an unsolicited acquisition
that pops out of nowhere, that bids fails,
and it's really a good indication
that one should perhaps allocate time.
So we had an investment many years back
in a French skin care, I'd call it European skin care brand
locksitane.
- I was involved, that was a good one, buddy.
I appreciate that.
- It, you know, at the time,
prior to us making an investment,
it looked relatively attractive at about half the valuation
of, we'll call it, you know, global skin care businesses.
It was a, you know, low growth,
but high cash generated global business,
but probably not where you would want exposure to
in terms of organic growth long-term.
- And they list it in Hong Kong or something crazy.
- Exactly, yeah, I remember exactly.
- That's correct.
So one of the reasons for this immense discount
is it was listed in Hong Kong
in the heyday of Hong Kong valuations.
- Yeah, I was there.
- Exactly.
And ultimately became this relic orphan equity
trading in an immense discount.
But what really, what was interesting,
and this is, you know,
kind of comes full circle,
is the controlling shareholder
ended up, you know, engaging with the company
to try to acquire it.
And if you think about someone
that has effectively controlled the company
for, you know, a substantial period of time,
all of a sudden wanting to take a private,
it's an indication that perhaps something interesting
is taking place under the hood.
And lo and behold, they had a business called Soldation Arrow,
which was effectively majority owned underneath the hood.
There was one of the better growth stories out there at the time
and it grown from 100 million revenues,
paying 100 million in a matter of several years
with 20% operating margins,
and was this just explosive growth at the time
that there was really under followed.
So I'm giving you that example
because that attempt or news
that the controlling shareholder wanted to acquire the company,
which then subsequently broke down,
was really a good flag of saying,
"Hey, you know what, maybe there's something here."
And in reality, there truly was.
So I'd say we tend to look a lot at events.
So, you know, bring you full back to the UK.
There's a company Fever Tree,
which, if you're a gin consumer,
I'm peaking to see if Ben's drinking a Fever Tree now.
- No, no, no, no, this is a soda, turmeric soda.
- Okay.
Well, Fever Tree is, you know--
- Same idea.
- Yeah, premium mixers for alcohol
and you have dominant share in the UK market
that has had some challenges rolling into the US market.
And Cours, right, or Tab,
went and acquired a significant portion of the equity
of Fever Tree.
And they've taken over US distribution
in an effort to reinvigorate it.
And I'm bringing this up because, again,
it was a transaction.
Why would a well-established bottle and company
acquire a significant stake in another one?
Right, it makes a statement
of the potential opportunity there, right?
So we tend to look at data points such as that
as an area of time allocation.
- And then when you think about like stories
that you like that aren't working, right?
That's one of the great challenges, right?
Is the price right or am I right, right?
Because that's how you end up being a bag holder, right?
You think you're right and the market's wrong.
Talk about that and like where the anchor comes from
and when it is that you decide to let go.
'Cause I think that's one of the great challenges
of a fundamental investor.
- Yeah, so for my vantage point,
it really comes down to conviction.
And it's what I mentioned earlier.
If you buy a stock, assume it goes down 20% immediately
and assume something negative comes out,
what are you gonna do?
How are you gonna react?
And if you think about it, right?
If that stock drops 20% and you have that conviction
and you are right to take advantage of it,
you have a gift of an investment opportunity.
So for us, we tend to look at businesses
where we have a high degree of confidence
in the sustainable earnings power of that business.
And, right, we're unlikely to get shaken up by that.
So to give you a comment, you asked,
what other areas are we looking at?
The consumer space, right?
And retail actually has some incredibly interesting
opportunities, that area has been decimated.
But I don't necessarily have the conviction
in certain consumer products, right?
Retail products because they're fat-oriented
and it's harder to predict over time.
So while they look attractive,
it's harder to get that conviction.
We think, if you look at parts of the market
and the industrial space that are recurring in nature,
we have a high degree of comfort.
And if you think about longer term drivers,
We've seen immense onshoreing in the U.S.,
we've seen immense building of data centers
that actually need replacement products.
Once they're up and running,
where even if CapEx goes to zero,
you've got a great earning stream,
those are types of things we get a lot of comfort in.
U.S. natural gas, as a reference point,
is a growth market long-term.
We have LNG exports, effectively to the world,
that have been heightened in terms of our security concern
in recent quarters.
If you have businesses that are tied to that,
that's actually a pretty good place to be
over along the longer period of time.
Well, it may not get the attention.
So it comes down to, where is the earnings power,
what you're looking at,
and do you have conviction in that business
to really allocate capital?
Yeah, and experience helps too, right?
Like that, you know, we're in the AI world context.
So the biggest mistakes I've made in my career
are ones where I have not appropriately recognized,
we'll call it a business or industry tailwind
that is moved to a headwind.
And if you think about that,
it didn't matter how cheap stocks,
you know, exposed to the coal industry were in 2011,
you were pretty screwed, right?
Allocating any capital that had part of the market.
So we're very sensitive to,
is the industry healthy?
Is it growing? Is this a business that has a moat?
Do you have a strong return on capital
where you get a real claim on that growth over time?
And really, those are the foundations associated
with where we try to spend our time in Allocate Capital.
And do you, let me ask you this,
and then I'll let Rupert just real quick.
Like, when you think about volatility,
do you think of volatility as your friend or your enemy?
Like, because, you know, there's two schools of thought.
There's a school of thought of, hey, volatility is great
because I get more opportunities.
But, you know, if you're invested,
you know, it also means that it makes it more challenging.
So, how do you think about that?
Well, I think one needs to deemphasize
market to market returns on a monthly basis
and really think about where the puck is going
over the next couple of years.
So, to answer your question directly,
volatility is a gift.
Anybody who says it isn't is just simply wrong.
Would you rather have a stock the most 5% a year
or a stock the moves are at 100% right, give or take?
That creates enormous opportunity.
And it goes back to what we were discussing earlier,
which is you need to be able to take advantage of that volatility.
And to do so, you need core fundamental analysis.
But you also need to understand that you don't have the time
often allotted to really spend months of diligence
to really allocate on an incredible investment.
If you wait long enough, others figure it out,
it reprises quickly.
So, that's the one thing I would caveat is focus on core fundamentals,
focus on the next couple of years of earnings, right?
And make sure you're able to embrace that volatility over time.
And that's why we're very careful
with how we size positions based on capital at risk,
based on various sectors.
So, that you would do see volatility
such as what we're seeing this week,
we're able to take advantage of it.
Yeah, I wanted to talk about capital allocation
on the corporate side, because as a mid cap,
as a small and mid cap, value long short guy,
there aren't many of you, right?
And as you mentioned, you need people to agree with you later.
And so, part of the equation is often,
I actually need the management team on side.
I need the CFO gobbling up stock for this idea to work.
How many sort of, what sort of percentage of your long trades
are to a certain extent reliant on active capital allocation
by the corporate?
Well, I guess there's probably two ways to answer it.
We put a enormous premium over the capital allocation decisions
of our management teams. So, most of our holdings
are returning cash with shared buybacks, dividends, etc.
And those that are not, we have a high degree of confidence
that the capital investment, right, from that cash flow generated,
is a far more superior return, right,
to what we'll call repurchasing shares of this juncture.
In my opinion, the most toxic outcomes are misallocation of capital.
So, we put a big premium on insider ownership
is management doing the right thing.
And then we make a big point of actually communicating directly
with our companies, often behind the scenes
through friendly exchanges.
But we want to make sure we're an advocate
and a supporter of the company.
But also, we want to remind them that they have a fiduciary duty
to shareholders to maximize our returns of the time.
So, particularly in that call it market cap arena
that we traffic in,
there is an enormous amount of misallocation of capital.
And it can be, I'll give you a great public example over time.
I'm going to highlight how old I am.
But if you go back to 2006 and you look at the chemical business,
Dow Chemical was really one of the leaders in the world.
And at the time, they looked at this huge growth coming out of Asia
and said chemical demand is going to be astronomical
over the course of the next 10 years.
We need to spend billions of dollars
and build ethylene crackers globally to cater to this demand.
And long story short, as they allocated capital
into the peak of the market,
misestimated the level of demand.
And in 2008-2009, they were on the verge of bankruptcy.
And equity holders were severely impacted by that decision.
So, it really is probably one of the most integral components
of how you think about how returns come over time.
Yeah.
Okay, well, Brad, we're just approaching the top of the hour.
As I look over to my right, yeah,
ants holding sort of 97, 98.
Off the highs of the day, but pretty respectable.
But it seems that that success has come at the expense of pretty much
over every other queues of the market.
Yes, with the indices down almost 2%.
And it's not a pretty day out there.
Thank you so much for joining us this afternoon.
We'll get you back soon.
I'm going to go digging for sort of UK salad makers right now.
I think I've got a, I think I've got an idea.
First of all, I know we're wrapping up.
But if you're owning a business like that,
the economy, the AI CapEx, it's not relevant.
And I'm not saying one should not have real capital exposed
to the sexy parts of the economy, right?
There are world-class businesses right at the top of the S&B.
But I do think it is complimentary and a creative over time to have
right different we'll call it irons in the fire.
And that type of business works for you year in and year out,
irrespective of the economy.
So if Anthropic crushes it with their investments,
and it turns out to be a 10-bag over time, fantastic.
It still does not mean that this other UK company
right can't perform as well.
And it's nice to have, we'll call it,
things that are uncorrelated from a portfolio allocation.
Listen, I completely agree.
And Staples at a reasonable price make a ton of sense.
It's just that all of the Staples that have household names,
you know, are at stupid multiples.
We've been really wary of anything tied to snack foods
and tied to private label.
We'll call it, you know, penetration issues.
So I wholeheartedly agree, and I wouldn't interpret my comments
to suggest we are significantly long.
This is a sector.
It's that when you see carnage across a sector,
it creates opportunities for, we'll call it,
best-in-class executors that perhaps
are not facing the same challenges.
The other thing just to my last point on diversification,
there are a lot of funds that were up massively,
right, through mid-year.
And now we're down on the year, right,
in light of the AI dynamics, right?
Hopefully in time, those returns will be fantastic.
But from our vantage point, we want diversification
so that we can act from a position of strength
when volatility really kicks in.
And time will tell what occurs in the next year or two or three,
but we want to ensure that we're not over our skis
from any risk management perspective
so that we can really capture those,
we'll call it generational investment opportunities,
when given that opportunity.
And why don't you let everybody know where they can find you
to maybe be involved in the generational opportunity?
You know, we are pretty behind the scenes and quiet.
So we have a general investment email,
but we're not on Twitter.
We're not probably like many of your other, you know,
many of your other, you know, podcasters.
So, you know, irbutlerallcapital.com is a good way to solicit.
- Great. - We'll put that in the show notes
because I didn't get that right.
I didn't hear that completely clearly.
I are at Butler Hall Capital, did you say?
- Yep. - Perfect.
All right, Brad, listen, thanks so much for joining us.
Have you won again soon?
And with that, it's Brad, Benny and the Squirrel,
and we're out.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Brad Lundy’s long-short equity approach focuses on businesses with sustainable cash flow and long-term growth potential, particularly in recurring, cyclical sectors like data center infrastructure and consumer staples.
He expresses caution about AI-driven capital expenditure due to uncertainty in long-term spending projections, emphasizing that current valuations expose significant risk if CapEx declines significantly.
The market’s volatility and short-term mispricing—such as earnings revisions not aligning with stock performance—highlight the need for a long-term, fundamental perspective over short-term momentum.
A key strategy involves identifying undervalued, high-cash-flow businesses with strong recurring earnings, such as a UK prepared foods company that merged and saw a 20% drop due to guidance misalignment, later recovering and growing.
Capital allocation is guided by conviction in earnings power, management integrity, and long-term industry fundamentals, with a strong preference for companies with strong return on capital and moats.
Volatility is seen as a gift, enabling opportunities to capture value during downturns, especially when combined with disciplined risk management and position sizing.
Active management is necessary in a market dominated by passive investing and short-term trends, requiring swift decisions with incomplete information to act before opportunities vanish.
Diversification across uncorrelated sectors—like housing remodels and consumer staples—is critical to weather macro volatility and capture long-term, resilient returns.
Summary:
Brad Lundy, a veteran long-short equity investor with over 20 years of experience, emphasizes a fundamental, long-term investing approach rooted in sustainable cash flow and recurring earnings. He cautions against overexposure to AI-driven sectors like data centers, where high valuations and uncertain future CapEx spending create significant risk. Despite short-term market volatility—evident in earnings revisions not aligning with stock performance—Lundy believes the market is overreacting, and a five- to ten-year horizon is essential for true value capture.
He highlights examples of undervalued, cyclical businesses, such as a UK prepared foods company that recovered from a 20% drop due to guidance misstatements, demonstrating how market noise can create investment opportunities. His strategy prioritizes businesses with strong, predictable earnings, solid management, and moats, especially in defensive sectors like consumer staples and industrial infrastructure. He advocates for a disciplined, diversified portfolio that includes uncorrelated assets to withstand market swings.
While AI and tech remain relevant, Lundy stresses that long-term success depends on resilience, not short-term sentiment. Volatility, though painful, is viewed as a key opportunity for active investors who can act quickly and maintain conviction. His process blends deep fundamental analysis with agile decision-making, allowing him to navigate shifting market dynamics while protecting capital.
Ultimately, he believes in a balanced portfolio with a strong focus on quality, sustainability, and long-term value—offering a counterpoint to the current trend of short-term, momentum-driven investing.
FAQs
Brad focuses on businesses with sustainable cash flow and long-term growth potential tied to AI, particularly in data center and power infrastructure. He avoids high multiples in AI-capex exposure due to uncertainty in long-term spending, emphasizing predictable, recurring earnings over speculative growth.
Brad believes the market is in a 'tough to call' phase because long-term AI spending is uncertain. He warns against paying high multiples for businesses tied to capex, stressing that valuation must account for spending beyond 2027–2030, not just near-term expectations.
Brad views volatility as a gift, not a risk. His portfolio is structured with 30–40 long positions and 60 short positions, with strict limits on long-side drawdowns (around 150 basis points per position). This allows him to take advantage of short-term market swings while maintaining long-term stability.
Brad favors recurring, defensive businesses with strong cash flow, such as consumer staples and industrial products. He highlights UK-based prepared food companies and U.S. natural gas exporters as examples of sectors with resilient earnings and low correlation to market cycles.
Brad sees unsolicited acquisition attempts or failed bids as key indicators of undervaluation. For example, a controlling shareholder trying to buy a company at a discount may signal hidden growth potential, as seen in the case of a skin care brand that later revealed a high-growth subsidiary.
Brad believes active management is essential to identify mispricings and uncorrelated opportunities. He emphasizes speed, conviction, and fundamental analysis, noting that the market now rewards investors who can act quickly with limited information to capture volatility and generate alpha.
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