Welcome back to Southeast Asia Radio.
On this episode, we'll cover the latest happenings in Southeast Asia.
We'll unpack the latest fallout from US trade measures and tariff investigations across
Southeast Asia and look into Chinese engagements with countries across the region.
We'll also bring you updates on evolving diplomacy among the Maycon countries, as well as
a series of high-profile anti-corruption arrests and investigations in Indonesia and the
Philippines.
Today's Thursday, June 18th, 2026. This week, Greg and Elina were joined by Leahy on
Kip to discuss tall-length visits throughout Southeast Asia.
Before that, let's start with the headlines.
First up, let's talk about trade and tariffs.
Chaffet, can you update us on the United States' trade representatives, recent investigations,
and any resulting impacts for Southeast Asia?
So on June 2nd, the USTR found 60 countries failed to effectively curb trade on goods made
with forced labor, thus creating what Ambassador Jamison Greer called an "unlevel playing field".
As a result, the Trump administration has proposed imposing double digit tariffs on imports
from those countries, including seven from Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam.
The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have been threatened with a 12.5% tariff
for unfair trading practices while Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia face a possible 10%.
The latter faced lower rates because they either imposed a forced labor import prohibition
or committed to do so in their respective reciprocal trade agreement.
The lower tariff rates imposed on countries with trade agreements may motivate more to
speed up ongoing trade negotiations with the US, particularly Thailand and Vietnam.
Vietnam has particularly faced scrutiny into its growing economy as it holds one of the
largest trade deficits for the US due to the former surge in exports.
On May 30th, the USTR opened another investigation into the country's persistent failure in handling
intellectual property rights.
Results from the investigation could lead to additional tariffs or other trade measures.
Zooming out, the Section 301 investigations throw a significant wrench into trade relations
between Southeast Asia and Washington.
Uses within the region on only dispute the findings, but also seek clarity on how the
new proposed tariffs will impact ongoing trade negotiations or finalize trade agreements.
Experts believe the proposed Section 301 tariffs are President Trump's way of replacing
the previous reciprocal tariffs that were struck down by the Supreme Court in February.
However, whether Washington can practically implement them remains to be seen.
The new tariffs are subject to public comments and review, followed by several hearings on
proposed actions scheduled for July 7th.
For now, all the region and its economies can do is wait and see how tariffs play out
and whether the Trump administration can successfully implement its protectionist trade
policy.
Shifting toward regional diplomacy, those within the make-hung have been quite proactive
in engaging with their regional partners.
Let's start with Myanmar, where President Myanmar unclean recently wrapped up a major
visit to India.
That's right.
On May 30th, Myanmar unclean embarked on a five-day visit to New Delhi, where he met
with Indian Prime Minister Modi to discuss Myanmar's political situation and bilateral trade,
connectivity and border security.
The trip marked Myanmar's first official foreign visit since becoming President in April.
This visit comes as part of his growing efforts to re-engage the region and normalize diplomatic
ties five years after he took power in a military coup.
India wasn't the only country he visited.
On June 15th, Myanmar unclean arrived in China for toxic President Xi Jinping.
It seems like China has emerged as one of Myanmar's most important international partners
beside India, providing political support and economic engagement at a time when many Western
countries continue to impose sanctions.
In fact, during the visit, both sides emphasize strengthening trade ties and expanding what
Beijing calls a comprehensive strategic partnership.
Speaking of China, Myanmar is not the only make-on-country that engage with Beijing this past
weeks.
Tell us more, Jeff.
In June 2nd and 6th, Mao's President Tong Lentzizolet had an official state visit to Hangzhou
China.
The trip resulted in a signing of 32 cooperation agreements covering everything from trade
and finance, to energy, agriculture, digital technology, artificial intelligence and security
cooperation.
Vien Chen and Beijing also issued a joint statement committing to what they describe as
an all-weather community with a shared future in a new era, language that reflects the increasingly
close nature of their relationship.
The timing is important as well.
The visit coincided with the fifth anniversary of the China-Law Railway, one of the flagship
projects under China's belt and road initiative.
Beyond transportation, Chinese officials increasingly view the railway as the foundation
for broader cooperation in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, digital commerce,
advanced manufacturing and clean energy.
China's infrastructure ambitions in Southeast Asia don't stop there.
Last month, Beijing also announced that the massive Penglu Canal project has entered its
final phase for construction and could begin trial operations as early as September 2026.
The canal will connect China's inland provinces directly to the Gulf of Tonkin, significantly
shortening transport routes to Southeast Asia and global shipping lanes.
From Beijing's perspective, the project is strategically important because ASEAN has
become China's largest export market.
But before we're moving away from Chinese engagements in Southeast Asia, there is one
more important development that we need to cover.
One notable development was an anti-drug cooperation initiative involving China, Vietnam,
Wales and Myanmar.
The four countries agreed to launch a three-month joint crackdown targeting narcotic trafficking
networks operating across the Golden Triangle region, one of the world's largest sources
of synthetic drugs.
The campaign will involve coordinated border operations, intelligence sharing, joint
investigations, and even the possible deployment of liaison officers to support cross-border
investigations.
While anti-drug cooperation is not new, the initiative reflects China's growing role
as a security actor in mainland Southeast Asia.
It also demonstrates that Beijing's engagement in the region increasingly extends beyond economics
and infrastructure into law enforcement and security cooperation.
Totally.
But China is not the only one that lately has been engaging the region.
Many Southeast Asian countries are simultaneously expanding their relationships with other regional
actors too.
There is a broader regional desire to diversify diplomatic, economic, and security relationships.
In Singapore, for instance, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan met with Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi in Beijing last month, where both sides discussed strengthening cooperation
in areas such as digital technologies, green development, and supply chain resilience.
At the same time, Singapore continues to maintain close relations with the United States,
asian partners, and other major powers.
Most governments are pursuing what could be described as a hedging strategy.
They continue to engage China because of its enormous economic importance, while simultaneously
strengthening ties with neighboring countries and other external partners.
Well, for now, competition between major powers continues to shape the Indo-Pacific, that
balancing act is likely to remain one of the most defining features of Southeast Asian
diplomacy in the years ahead.
Before we wrap up, let's turn to anti-corruption developments in the region, where several high-profile
cases made headlines this month.
Indonesia was at the center of the story.
Within just a few days, authorities arrested multiple senior officials, including the
deputy minister of Immigration Affairs, Onjun Fourth, and the former head of President
Prabowo Zubian to his flagship free school meals program, Onjun Third.
The immigration case involves allegations of a systemic extortion scheme linked to residence
permits of foreign nationals, while the free meals program is being investigated over
procurement irregularities and governance concerns.
Their arrests are particularly significant because this school meal program is one of
President Prabowo's signature policies.
The program was already facing scrutiny due to the implementation challenges and food safety
incidents, and the corruption allegations have added another layer of controversy.
Meanwhile in the Philippines, Senator Jose Jingué Estrada was detained on June 1 after
being charged in connection with a major Graf scandal involving alleged kick-backs from
flood control projects.
The case is politically significant, not only because Estrada is a sitting Senator, but
also because he is the son of former Philippine President Joseph Estrada, who himself was convicted
of plunder.
This scandal has reignited public concerns about corruption and accountability in government.
And with that, those were our headlines.
Welcome back, folks, as always, I am Greg Poling with CSIS joined by Alina Nor, who is
non-resident with the Carnegie Endowment, normally in Singapore last week in Malaysia this week
in Indonesia.
Hey, Alina.
As always, good to be back on, hey, Greg.
I mean, I am impressed by your travel, but also it's a lot easier when you're in Singapore
to pop around to KL and Jakarta.
It puts those of us based in DC at a slight disadvantage.
What's the point of being in Southeast Asia if I'm not Southeast Asian?
That's a good point.
And our guest for this episode is Lei Honghap.
Lei Honghap is with the ICS Institute for South Asia Studies, where he's a senior fellow
and a coordinator of the Vietnam Studies program, also in Singapore.
And I just learned before we started recording that despite Alina being in Singapore, you
in here have not connected.
Which?
This is true.
Not judging, but it's not that big of a city state.
We'll have to correct that.
Yeah.
So, we've brought him on to talk about Vietnam.
And I think the trigger for this, for us internally, was General Secretary Tolum's speech
at Shangri-La.
Kind of got us thinking about how big a role Vietnam under now, the authoritarian president
until um, is playing on the regional and global stuff.
stage and that it had just kind of been too long since we've done a Vietnam dedicated episode.
So there's a lot of ground to cover, but I think since that was the impetus for this,
let me start with Shangri-La.
So it was, I think, noteworthy that that tolong was asked to give the keynote.
I wonder if you have thoughts on what that signals for Vietnam's kind of role as a regional
kind of power player now.
And I'm also curious if you could pick apart the speech a little bit, because the headlines
focused on tolong's statements about the three crises facing the region and the globe,
the crisis of international order, the crisis of development models, a crisis of strategic
trust.
That all sounds very good, but they're all somewhat vague when you just hear them as headlines.
So what exactly does that mean from Hanoi's perspective?
Okay, first of all, thank you very much for having me.
It was my pleasure to join you and Elena in this episode.
So now we are discussing Vietnam and tolong's regional tour.
I think this is a good time to discuss Vietnam and its foreign policy, because as we all know,
last week, he was in Singapore to deliver the keynote to the Shangri-La, dialogue, and
then he went on to visit the Philippines and before that, he visited Thailand as well.
So a very, very proactive foreign policy approach, and just two days ago, Vietnam convened
the Asian Future Forum, where Vietnam hosted four foreign leaders, including the Thai, the
Cambodian, the Lao Prime Minister, as well as the Prime Minister of Timoraste.
So Vietnam is trying to become more proactive in this foreign policy, and there are good
reasons for Vietnam to do so.
But before we discuss such issues, we can look back on tolong's performance at the Shangri-La
dialogue and what it means for Vietnam's foreign policy.
So look, I think the speech itself was very substantive, obviously more so than I expected.
Tolong later, what he called the three foundational classes, as you mentioned, that converging
at the same time, first a crisis of the international order, second a crisis of development models,
and third a crisis of strategic trust.
So I think it's a pretty sharp diagnosis.
He's basically saying that the rules are being followed.
The old development playbook isn't working anymore, and countries don't trust each other
enough to manage their differences before they blow up.
So for Vietnamese foreign policy speech that I think is usually direct, now let's focus
on some other things as you suggested.
On the such an issue, which is major concern for Vietnam, I think everyone in the room
was waiting for his comments on this, and obviously he didn't dodge it.
He named An Cross and said clearly that Vietnam will protect a sovereign rise in accordance
with international law.
That's not, I think, so groundbreaking as a position, but the fact that he said it from
that Shangri-La podium in that room with Chinese defense officials present, takes a degree
of confidence.
He was essentially using the worst much security forum to anchor Vietnam's legal position
in front of a global audience.
Other than the search and I see issue, I think what really caught my attention was how
much time he spent on emerging technologies such as AI in defense, autonomous systems,
undersea cables, information manipulation, and this information, this is not something you
normally hear from Vietnamese leader at this level.
It suggests that Hanoi is thinking beyond the traditional maritime security framing
and starting to grapple with the next generation of strategic risks.
And it also positions Vietnam as a credible voice on tech governance, not just as a developing
country asking for investment but also a country with a view on how these technologies should
be regulated.
Beyond this, I think the big picture implementation is the fact that Turlem is using multilateral
stages like the FCRD to build Vietnam's brand as a principled, rules-based, generally non-aligned
media power, that's not a new foreign policy direction for Vietnam, the foreign policy doctrine
of diversification and multilateralization, non-alignment has been around for decades.
But the visibility and ambition of the Shangri-La platform takes it to a new level, I would say.
The question everyone is asking should be will the rhetoric be matched with real institutional
commitments, like more mediation efforts, more multilateral initiatives, more willingness
to actually lead rather than just indoors.
And I think that's where Vietnam's, as well as Turlem's, credibility will ultimately
be tested.
But overall, I think his performance at the Shangri-La dialogue has been very good, very
impressive and we should look forward to more contributions from Vietnam to, you know,
peace, stability and development in the future.
He had just picked up on that last point, this foreign policy buildup of Hanoi has been
going on for a number of years.
What do you think is the main driver or what are the main drivers for the range of comprehensive
strategic partnerships, for example, that Vietnam has been signing, not only with ASEAN
neighbors, but also with more regional and major players in the region and beyond?
Is there a symbol or a signification of Vietnam coming of age on the international stage?
And you alluded to, this is something that is going to continue building.
So how much of an activist foreign policy, if you will, will we continue to see from Hanoi
now?
Well, I think there are three drivers that I have observed so far.
I think the first driver comes from Turlem himself.
He has been the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam since August 2024.
So less than two years ago, and since April, he has also been Vietnam's president.
What is noteworthy about him is the fact that he has been able to consolidate his power
within Vietnam.
And he is now Vietnam's most powerful politician in decades.
That consolidation of power is necessary for Vietnam's growth and development territory
he would argue.
But obviously, there are also concerns about the consolidation of power and concerns about
the fact that with too much power in his hands, if he makes mistakes, that will be a disaster
for not only Vietnam, but also the regime itself.
So obviously, he may be encouraged to demonstrate his strong performance, not only domestic
and foreign policy, and we should note that Vietnam has recently upgraded his relationship
with many countries to the highest level of comprehensive strategic partnership.
And many of those CSPs were achieved within the past two years since it came to power.
And the recent episodes at the Shangla dialogue, the fact that he stepped up to claim the podium
and to project himself as the global face of Vietnam.
So on who he's trying to advance, Vietnam's interests overseas, I think can help him drag
on his political reputation, his legitimacy, and thereby protecting his rule at home.
So that's the first driver.
The second driver, I think, is about his domestic agenda of turning Vietnam into a high income
developed economy by 2045 and to achieve that goal, domestic resources are not enough.
And Vietnam needs to mobilize international resources in terms of market access, investment,
capital inflows, and technologies to upgrade the economy.
So I think he wants to strengthen ties with the major partners, including in Southeast Asia,
perhaps partly to realize his domestic agenda, domestic economic agenda.
He needs to get more investment, more technologies from those partners to upgrade Vietnam's economy.
So that's why I think he has been very deliberate in choosing the right partners to upgrade
ties with, including the US, Japan, Korea, Australia, India, European countries.
And now the most important countries in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines.
The third driver, I think, is
about geopolitics. So in the context of increasing global uncertainties, geopolitical
turbulences generated by US changing foreign policy, the conflicts in Ukraine, and in the
Middle East, the disruption of global supply chains, I think he sees the benefits of proactive
foreign policy, proactive diplomacy to hatch against those risks.
So Vietnam, for example, needs to diversify its trade in investment ties with various
partners to reduce its reliance on, for example, investments from a small number of countries
ought to reduce its reliance on the USS, the largest spot market, or to reduce its vulnerabilities,
vis-a-vis China, given the fact that China is the largest source of imports for Vietnam.
So he is trying to reach out to as many countries as possible to reduce Vietnam's vulnerabilities
in the terms of uncertainties that we are witnessing at the moment.
So I think all these factors look together to encourage to all of them and Vietnam to pursue
a more proactive foreign policy, and obviously this has resulted in a series of upgrades of Vietnam's
battle relations over the past two years that we have since so far.
When it comes to managing the tensions between the US and China and the disruptions of both,
the narrative in Washington for the last, let's say, year or so has been that Toulomb has
been overseeing a recalibration of Hanoi's relationship with Beijing, which we've mainly
seen play out with diplomatic visits and a bevy of economic and tech agreements cooperation
signed between the two sides, and that that is partially a reaction to the instability
caused by the Trump administration.
But the speech at Shangri-La seemed to wag the finger at both, Beijing and Washington.
All three of those threats could presumably be originating from either.
And as you said, Toulomb did take the time to highlight Vietnam's South China Sea claims,
and we've gotten more and more reporting about the increasing on the water tensions, even
though they're not talking about in public between China and Vietnam around both countries'
current island building efforts.
So how do you think about where we really place Vietnam's current or Toulomb's current
balance of his relationship with China and his balance of his relationship with the US,
both of which are very difficult in different ways?
Well, Vietnam's long-standing position of foreign policy approaches to maintain a delicate
balance between the major powers, not just the US and China, but also other major powers
such as Russia, India, Japan, etc.
But obviously, balancing between the US and China is the most challenging and the most
important challenge for Vietnam, given the weight of these two powers and how important
they are to Vietnam's security and prosperity.
I would say that over the past decade, this balancing act has been becoming more and
more tricky for Vietnam.
On the one hand, we have seen China become more assertive, especially in the South China
Sea.
And on the other hand, the US and the Trump administrations have become more unpredictable,
more of a source of instability for the global order.
So Vietnam obviously has concerns about the behaviour and the foreign policy approach for
both the US and China.
And that's why I think Toulomb has mentioned, or as you said, working his figures at
both powers in a subtle way.
I think both countries are responsible for many problems in the world that we have seen
in recent years.
But for Vietnam, I think even when Vietnam is not very happy with what has been happening
in global geopolitics so far, I think Vietnam is also careful in how to frame the context
and how it should deal with the US and China.
So on the Vietnam Express, it's concerns about the behaviour of the two great powers.
Vietnam is also very keen to work with these two powers to arrest their concerns and to
strengthen ties with both of them.
Some people may argue that over the past two years or so Vietnam has been moving a bit
closer to the Chinese side.
But I think this should be put in context.
One thing we can point out is that before Toulomb visited China in April, he made a trip
to the US to attend the inaugural meeting of the border piece and to have a meeting with
Trump at the White House.
So the fact that Toulomb met with both Trump and sit in peace within the space of two
months tells us a lot about Vietnam's tremendous efforts to manage ties with both the US and
China.
Vietnam shrinks a bit to one of the two powers I think is temporary fix.
It is not a permanent choice of Vietnam.
The best interest of Vietnam remains to maintain a balance between the two great powers.
And I think it will remain so for the years to come, including the years under Toulomb's
leadership and no matter what happens, Vietnam will still value its relationships.
Both the two great powers.
So I think we should not rid too much into specific foreign policy moves done by Hanoi.
We should look at the picture of how Vietnam is positioning itself between the two powers
over a longer term and look at the core interests of Vietnam.
What we will define Vietnam's foreign policy approach towards the great powers.
And that remains peace, stability and development.
And for that purpose, Vietnam needs both the US and China as well as the other major
powers and partners.
I hear you mentioned that it is a little unusual to hear Vietnamese leader speaking about
technological advances and priorities on the world stage and Toulomb brought that to
the table at Shangri-La.
There are commentators who are watching very closely and with a very interested eye as
to how Southeast Asian nations will balance this great power competition that you were
talking about in the technological space.
Partly because there is already this concentration of power not just at the state level between China
and the US, but also because of the concentration of power amongst the industry players.
And so I wonder if you might be able to shed any light on whether Vietnam sees a role
for itself as a regional convener of sorts for ASEAN to band together and figure out ways
to navigate this competition in the tech space even as different ASEAN countries are challenging
and competing among themselves for tech access and the latest advances in AI and other emerging
technologies.
Well, I think technologies, especially in the defense areas of an evolving space and we
need to watch more and to see how things developing and what they mean for the region, including
Southeast Asian countries and their national defense.
The fact that Tulam mentioned those emerging technologies like AI defense, autonomous systems,
undersea cables, etc, reveals his awareness of how important it is to have proper governance
framework for these emerging technologies to deal with the potential consequences that
these technologies may generate for the region.
But to be honest, this game is mainly played by the major powers.
The US and China are still the two key players that shake the system and how technologies
develop and deploy it in real life and how they should be governed.
Other countries like Vietnam and its ASEAN peers may want to have a role to play, may
want to be able to shape the system and to shape the rules of the games.
But I would say that they have rather limited capacity to pursue this goal.
That said, we should not dismiss the agency of countries like Vietnam and ASEAN partners.
In fact, ASEAN, for example, has introduced, has adopted a guideline on AI governance for
the region and most countries in the region are also pursuing these technologies to upgrade
their economy.
In the case of Vietnam, Vietnam has also identified science, technology, innovation and digitalization
as a new growth driver.
So they are paying more and more attention to this area.
So obviously they have good reason.
and good motivations to be more active in this area.
The key issue, as you mentioned,
is how they can coordinate among themselves
to have a big voice in shaping the global governance framework
for these technologies.
But obviously, working among themselves is not enough.
They need to reach out to the major powers
and to try to engage them as early as effectively as possible.
I believe the major powers in the clean China and the US
have also an interest in working with smaller partners
like Vietnam and its assemblies to promote certain technologies
and to check the relevant governance framework
that will become susceptible to all parties.
Because both the US and China want to recruit allies
or followers in their own systems.
So they need the support of these partners.
And that's why I think,
although their roles may be limited,
they should not be too pessimistic
and they should continue to work together among themselves
and with the major powers to shape the outcomes
that they want to see.
- All right, we are going to leave the conversation there.
I think that we're not gonna get a better summation
of, I guess, what Toulon was trying to say
in his speech and what perhaps Vietnam's
emerging role as a, at least future
if not current middle power might look like.
So for now, yeah, thank you so much for joining us.
Alina, as always, thank you.
Thanks to all of you for listening.
We will be back in two weeks
with the next episode of Southeast Asia Radio.
- Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Greg.
Thank you, Alina.
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