Ust. Oemar Mita, Lc | Q&A : SEPUTAR ZINA | FULL VERSION | Tanya Jawab

Hey, NBN listeners. We're running our 2026 new book's network audience survey, and we'd love just a few minutes of your time. NBN has been bringing you in-depth conversations with authors and scholars for over 15 years. We haven't done a comprehensive audience survey since 2022, and a lot has changed since then. It's time to hear from you again. Here's why we're asking you. We want to understand who's listening, what subjects and podcasts you love most, and where you'd like to see us grow. Your responses help us tell NBN's story to the publishers, libraries, institutions we partner with. When we can show that our listeners are serious readers, lifelong learners, and heavy library users, it opens doors to new partnerships, better resources, and ultimately stronger NBN for everyone. And one more thing. If you leave your email address at the end of the survey, there'll be entered to win a $100 gift card to Bookshop.org, a chance to stock up on books while supporting independent bookstores at the same time. The survey takes just five minutes. Your answers are confidential, and your email will never be shared. Head to newbooksnetwork.com to take the survey today. You really appreciate your support. Now go take the survey. Welcome to the new BookSnetwork. Hello, Salam, and welcome to the new BookSnetwork podcast. I'm your co-host, Shahnaz Hakani. Today I am in conversation with Amir Saimi about his wonderful book that I cannot recommend highly enough, called "Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought in Beyond" A new problem of evil published in 2024 with Oxford University Press. Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought in Beyond, a new problem of evil, is a fascinating and deeply thought provoking book that challenges how we think about Scripture, morality, and divine authority. Saimi tackles what he calls the new problem of evil, a divinely prescribed problem of evil, which is the tension between the commands found in sacred texts, our own moral judgments, and the belief in a morally perfect God. Saimi demonstrates the limits of Scripture first approaches, which is to say that Scripture is given precedence over our own independent moral judgments in cases where the two conflict. He then explores ethics first solutions that allow the believer to take moral reasoning seriously, while also showing that Scriptures injunctions can be understood as legal or social mandates. By tracing the arguments of the Ashadi, the Mothazilis, and other medieval Islamic thinkers and groups and developing alternative solutions, Saimi offers a methodical and historically grounded framework for reconciling moral judgment with Scripture authority. In our conversation today, Amir and I explore how Islamic philosophers like Al Ghazali, Barazi, Al-Farabi, and others navigated the relationship between reason and revelation, and how we might approach morally troubling passages in Scripture today, including through an ethics first approach, and the limitations of even that. We also discuss thick and thin moral concepts, the Moses principle, and what it means to reconcile modern moral sensibilities with ancient texts. Amir shares insights on gendered morality, the ethical significance of the Abraham story, and the broader implications of his work for progressive Muslims and other theists alike. This book is essential reading for readers who might be interested in the ethics of interpretation, in the challenges faced by contemporary religious communities when reinterpreting historical texts, theists who are wrestling with moral dilemmas, and anyone who is interested in the intersection of philosophy, religion, and ethics. This here is my conversation with Amir Saimi about his book Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond a New Problem of Evil. Hi, Salam Amir. Thank you so much for joining me to talk about your new book, Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond a New Problem of Evil. I had so much fun reading it. I was also frustrating a lot of the times because of the different debates along with that, but thank you so much for writing it, and thank you so much for making time to talk to me about it today. Hi, Shahan Naz. I'm very happy to be here, and thank you for reading the book and having me here. Of course, of course. Our first question on this podcast is to invite our authors to tell us a little bit about themselves. Where are you based? Where, how did you begin your journey in Islamic studies and ethics philosophy? What got you here? I was born and raised in Iran, so when I was in college, there was this really big cultural debate about modernity and religion. At the time, society was becoming much more like a mother, and then we have the government and the older generation really that have a more traditional view of Islam. The young generation, me and them, were all caught up in this debate. So I was very much in terms of religion and modernity. But at the time, I was good at math, so I was doing electrical engineering. So I didn't do philosophy at the time. And then I got an author from somebody in France to do a PhD in the English engineering in France. So I wanted to see the place, so I moved to do PhD and engineering. I think my study there since I was always interested in philosophy, I decided that it's enough, like engineering enough. I have to turn the philosophy. So there, very next day after I defended my dissertation, I moved to California to use this and the world to study philosophy. I have been always interested in ethics. In California, I just did like mainstream and I let it take more philosophy. But I remember that I had a friend there called Arash Narogi, so we had like long discussions about religion and modernity. And there was like one particular argument that was always very interesting for me. So I had heard this argument from conservatives like Pete Muslim, Christian, or Jews. So the argument basically is this. Like we are no God. So our epistemic standpoint is very limited. So we don't know the ground scheme of things. Right. So no suppose that God says that you should eat such and such or you should treat women in such and such way or sexual minorities in such and such way. Right. So who are we to judge like God's like directives, right? We don't have access to all the moral packs that God has access to. Right. So maybe from inside from our limited perspective, there is something wrong about those like directives, but again, who are who are we to judge. So let's call this argument the argument from like morally hidden facts. So there are morally hidden facts or they might be there might be more than hidden facts that we don't have access to and God does. And given our limited perspective, we are not in position to question the directives of God as as reflected in in the scripture like the court or the Bible. Right. So this was like an argument that I had often heard from conservatives and I was very much interested in that argument. So I didn't write on that argument when I was doing my PhD in philosophy. I just I wrote my dissertation on made this room and I think more philosophy. But after I defended my dissertation, I thought that I have to write about that that problem. So I'm more out of relation is is my take on on on that on that problem. Thank you so much for that answer because it also and it answers the next question that I was going to ask why why this book and why now etc. You know in in Pakistan this question of it's it's it's really disturbing at like every every few years. Pakistan will enact a law in support of women. So there's one against domestic violence in one state in one of the provinces in Pakistan. And then the response to it was how dare you take away our right to hit women and who and God has given us that like what God has given us that right. And so as I'm reading this book, I'm thinking wow, like there's a huge I mean I know that the Islamic tradition is vast and I know that I will never get through every text. But to read about some of these arguments that these colors have debated these questions, they have asked they have struggled with OK, when do I when is one does a literal interpretation apply, when do I ignore what the text is literally saying. The whole bunch of principles that you talk about that I would love for audience to learn about shortly and I'm reading this and there's such a sense of deep sadness that there are even scholars who are like, no God, you know, this is not what God means or even if God means this we do get to have like we do have power. We do have morality. It's not I love them the most is principle that was such a wonderful take by the way on the most the the mosa and how that story could that story. I've never looked at it so one of my friends recently suggested that it was one of the most powerful ways to read that story. from an ethical standpoint is that, and from a very human standpoint is that we are so human that no matter what happens or innate nature is to ask questions and to not do what, to not give into what seems wrong. And I was like, that is so powerful. So the point, the point that I'm trying to make is that I love to the book. I mean, it feels this wonderful gap of, well, here's, I mean, there are a bunch of morally controversial text passages in every scripture in the world. And to attend that our hands are tied, we just, we can't help, but we have to just do no. We always know it was about interpretation. Interpretation is always connected to power, and it's always connected to politics. So thank you for unpacking this really wonderfully relevant, sadly, a topic. And for writing this book about it and for, I mean, I just, I learned so much. I, like, I'm not a philosophy person at all. So a lot of this stuff, I was like, let me look up what this means. Oh, let me re-read this like, oh, it was, it was really, really fascinating. So thank you for, again, I'm going to keep saying thank you so much for writing the book. So let's do ahead and then talk about some of the main arguments of the book. And we can, for the purpose, you use the, some, some of the specific morally controversial passages you address in the book, we can, we can stick to something like Femet and, you know, that prayer, that's something I'm all that's talking about, but a wife reading, right? If we assume that the planik verse 434's, one interpretation, or the majority interpretation, sadly, is that men can hit their wives, or we can, you know, the cutting of the hands of thieves or, you know, or things for adultery, et cetera. So what, what are, what is, I don't want to say one main argument, because I feel like you've got a bunch of really important arguments here. What are some main arguments? What are the questions, the main questions and the arguments you're addressing, and then tell our audience also about what your approaches to what your methods are for answering those questions. Thank you, Shandas. That was like such a nice review of the project. So look, here, the book is called like a "Morning Theater" in a slow-wicked, thought-and-beautiful, a new problem of even. So let me start with this, like, what is a new problem of even. So at the center of the book is this problem that I call the problem of divinely prescribed even. So the problem of divinely prescribed even is basically attention. It's been three thesis, three propositions. So the first proposition is that scripture, here the co-own, is divine, right? So I called it like the divinity of scripture. So the divinity of scripture says that the co-own is God's more. So this is the first statement. So the second proposition is the existence of seemingly divinely prescribed even. So you give like two exam fails. So there are passages in scripture, again, be it the co-own or the Bible, that at least to our modern year sounds like controversial. As you said, there's this passage in the co-own that seems to permit men sadly to be their wives. There are passages about cutting off the hands as you just mentioned. So it looks that there are, again, there are seemingly prescribed evens. In the sense that there are passages that goes against the modern moral sense. So this is the second statement. And the third statement is that we are not very off with respect to our moral judgment, our like independent moral judgments. So our modern moral judgments are basically reliving. So by moral judgments like modern moral judgments, I mean like the judgments that like men and women are equal and that like no men have like may like no no men have the permission to be their wives. So these are independent moral judgments. And it looks that those judgments are valid. But then it looks that there's a tension between these three three three three propositions. So one way to solve the problem is just to deny that the coround is divine. But this is not made that like a Muslim can do. So in the book I assume that I'm addressing the book to Muslims. So for Muslim, the coround is divine or a believer, the script is divine. So then we have to grant the first statement that is the truth of scripture. So then there are two other statements. So the existence of seemingly prescribed evil and the other one is the reliability of our moral judgments. So one way to get rid of the problem is just to deny that there is any seemingly prescribed evil in the sense that there is no passages in the scripture like it in the coround or hadith or Bible that goes against our moral armors. Right. So I discuss a little bit about like those who favor the solution. So some of the modernist reformers they try to like reinterpret those passages in a way to make them consistent with our modern moral judgments. Right. So basically are like two strategies. So one way is to say that like if we have like the correct understanding of those passages as a matter of fact those passages agree with our moral like sensibilities. Right. So this is like monostratiation. So the other strategies is I call it like contextualization. So a context. So if you want to contextualize you say that look it's true that the coround permits men to be their wives but that's really an improvement on the practices that were culturally dominant at the time. Right. So that was like an improvement. So you have to understand like the meaning of the passage in its context. And in its context that passage is an improvement. Right. So then there are two strategies. So this first strategy is reinterpretation. The second strategy is contextualization. And I wasn't happy with either of those strategies. Right. So there are like a couple of reasons why I didn't find any of those strategies like particular help. As to reinterpretations. If you look at the work of people who who who do that you find that their interpretations are not egalitarian enough. So for the feminist perspective you often find their interpretations not like egalitarian enough. Like for example they say that look okay like the coround permits men to be their wives but this is only in extreme cases. And when again it looks at even in extreme cases it's really bad to do that. Like there is no cases where you wait to do that. Right. So this is like the so the first problem is that when you look at their reinterpretation it doesn't look that they are like successful. If you are like feminist. So another problem is that these texts have been understood for centuries in a certain way. Right. So nobody's modernists come to come and say that like they all those traditionalists got it wrong. So those interpretations are where where where incorrect. But then the question is that why. So what is it about the language that they didn't like the traditionalists didn't understand. Right. And another another I said like you might say that look this this modernist just gives us a possibility for this reinterpretation. But then the question is that look why we should take this possibility because there are these arguments. The argument that I just said they are going from moral and hidden facts that because there what is have this argument they say that look you don't you cannot judge God's from with your like limited intellect. So why we should accept this new interpretations. So this is another problem. So a third problem is the look. If you want to say that. So again, so the first problem is that it looks that their interpretation is not egalitarian. The second problem is that why we should think that all the traditionalists were wrong. And the third problem is that look if you think that at any given time in history you can interpret the text such that you make it consistent with the moral judgments of the time it just means that the text has no meaning of its own right. So to be this say like our moral judgments have changed radically in the last like past centuries. So if you think that at each time in history the the text is consistent with our moral judgment that just means that the text has no meaning of its own right. So this is the other problem. So as to the contextualists as to those who was to contextualize the text, I agree that perhaps there was an unhinged way against women at the time of the Prophet and perhaps the verse that you mentioned wasn't proven on the practices dominant at the time. Yet the question arises that is it ever, even at that time, it's like permitted for a man to beat his wife and it looks that answers no. Like even if you go back to the seven centuries of Arabia, you might think that even back then it's not okay for a man to beat his wife. Like you may not beat your wife's like a period ever. So then if you have that judgment, just the fact that that was not and that just the fact that that verse is an improvement does not make the problem go away. So the problem of divine the prescribed evil like persists in the sense that there is a passage that goes against our our judgments. So then I think that it's not really a good way to deny that there are passages that are more only contrary to it. So reinterpretation is not I think a good solution. So we have to do something else. And the book is really is what else we could do about this problem. I love that. Thank you so so much for everything you just said, especially for for laying out the context of the problem and why the existing. And that's what I meant when I said earlier that it all this really wonderful gap in our understanding of the Quran and one of those is well here's and here's an ethical problem that we have. This is a new problem of evil and how do we best approach this and the many different principles that you talk about that can help us read these verses in a more I want to say ethically more only responsible way. I will say so I noted that you when you're talking about I mean our dudes interpretation of because I agree with you it is not convincing at all that let's reinterpret. I just I was thinking I was like well I've never thought about well let me do something about this like what are what can we do about this so thank you again for feeling for doing this job so that we don't the rest of us don't have to do it but I mean I would when you talking about I mean I would do interpretation you only talk about her interpretation in Quran and women rate the 99 text book the book but she also talks about 434 and wife beating in her 2006 book inside the gender jihad and there she actually says she famously says no to a literal reading of the text and I thought it would be I thought it would have been very helpful to talk to to just it's really like hey she does I mean because as human I mean that these interpreters too like are constantly some of these arguments are older and then they come back and they're like well actually what I said back then that does not lie anymore or know I said about that's that doesn't make sense or that's not enough and so she does grapple with it in her other book in another book of hers inside the gender jihad and I know a lot of conservative Muslims who are like who have you know cancelled her because how dare she say no to the text and then I'm like hold on she doesn't say they're like she said no to the Quran and I was like I was in a space once where a Islamic institute where the men were really really like speaking ill of her and I was like she never says no to the Quran she says no to this I'm a literal and she's not the first to do so they're like they've never read it of course they'd actually they have not read her her work but I just wanted to put it out there that she does she does I continue to engage with the question of an ethical approach to reading the Quran especially the morally controversial passages and I also you know you mentioned like it's I am so I'm so glad you're saying this explicitly that even in the seventh century it wouldn't have been okay for I'm going to hit his wife even in the seventh like why do we just assume like we I think that in our engagements with these scriptures and our attempts to reconcile you know what are our intuitive feelings about the text that there's no way this makes sense there's no way this is ethically right we end up sort of demonizing people before us our ancestors and one of the one of the ways is oh you know back then this was acceptable no it wasn't just because people did it we say that all the time today just because Muslim do it do Muslims do it doesn't mean it's right so if all of us why like this is the fact that Islam could abolish you know polytheism in you know in during the span of the revelation of the Quran in the prophets on lifetime why could we also not have made an effort toward eradicating other social ill or social ill like wife beating like slavery like so many other injustices and it's almost immense what priorities I get it's like oh let's first focus on this problem and then we'll have others but I because it because of the the implications I bet we continue to hit women thinking and truly believing in some people because I was in some of the assumptions that you're making I'm like well I know a lot of Muslims were like women and men aren't equal women men are allowed to be like there's nothing immoral about wife beating right so I was like well even though we can't even assume that most or all modern all Muslims today would believe these assumptions are for in the first place so let's let's let's talk about some of the specific principles or approach before we go like I can say something about like you or you the thing that you said about I mean they've I do it so I like I like I like I walk right so but but I by nature like my my problem by nature is is a like a philosophical problem in the sense that like I say that there is distinction between some passages in scripture and our moral judgments and the divinity of scripture right so as to that like the wife being an example it's just an example so you might say that you can interpret that successfully but then there are other passages as long as there's only one passages like in in the whole Quran or even in even if there's no passage in the Quran let's say in Hadith right there's only one passage in Hadith that goes against our our modern moral judgments then then we have a philosophical problem right so I don't want to be stuck on any particular examples even though I use that example just to to to to to spoke for illustrative purposes right but even if it turns out that I'm wrong on that interpretation that's okay just let's move on to the another example right that's very clear in the book that that like you know you in the in the prologue that I think you give us several different possible different several different areas where we've got a problem and you're also very clear that it's not I'm it's on just the Quran right like there's other scriptures too so even if the Quran doesn't have these problems there's other texts that do exactly you'll have to deal with the problem of this new problem of evil because we you know so yeah maybe one day we welcome to a solution with the prologue you know with 434 or something but then do we've got a whole bunch of other prologues I think it's very least the fact that the Quran you know has explicitly permitted something like slavery in slaving other I think that even if we officially abolish it that will remain a problem in the scripture so yeah I was I wasn't suggesting that it's like you're very very like your point is very clear in the book I just want you know only because when I was reading that I was like I just want to make sure that my listener or listeners know that they're like I mean I would have written other stuff on on that as well and on 434 as well um I yeah so then let's go ahead and talk about some of the specific approaches or theories or or principles um to approaching this specific uh the the the problem of evil um I'll just name it few because you talk about many of these uh very wonderfully I was trying to make note for my own personal like okay in my own spiritual growth also a intimacy which approach would be very very helpful and um so I I've got a long list but let's talk about we can tell what the divine commandment theory we can talk about the scripture first the ethics first um the de-antological moral theory that sequentialism let's we or so you you can go ahead and choose whichever approaches you think here here's one approach to reconciling this problem of um you know our morale our intuitive moral judgment and the core and and what and the divine sure so the book is basically as you said it's divided into two main parts so the first part is called the scripture first uh view so the second part is called like the ethics first view so let's start talking about the scripture first view so basically my uh so I explore the problem of the only first carb evil and there are two responses to to the problem so one the response is the scripture first view the other response is the ethics first view so in the if a scripture first view I argue that this is the response that like the main Islamic figures in the history of Islamic thought have given to to to to to the problem so so let's start with this so there are basically just roughly speaking at least in so far as that uh in so far as I'm interested in the problem there are like basically three or four main camps in the history of Islamic thought so we have the ashurites so we have the motazalites we have like the philosophers and we have the suffice right so I didn't talk about the suffice in the book so I said so it would be it would have been interesting if I if I had talked about suffice but I didn't talk about suffice because it's kind of hard to pinpoint their views there are like the varieties of views out there so I didn't talk about the suffice so let's like set them aside so that there are three remaining groups so there are three remaining groups are like theologians ashurites on the the multicellars and then the philosophers. Just one terminological point here is that theologians are also philosophers. But in the history of Islamic thought, people who belong to the same tradition as Plato and Aristotle laws are called philosophers. So people who do not belong to that traditions are not called philosophers, right? So the asteroids and the multicellars are not philosophers in the sense that they do not belong to the Greek tradition. But like I was saying now Anaveroi's and Alpharabi are philosophers in the sense that they saw their work as the continuation of the Greek philosophy, right? So this is just a use of term. So I'm gonna use the term philosophers to denote those who take themselves to philosophers in the Seraphs long term. So then we have these three main groups. The asteroids, the multicellars and the philosophers. So there is this like rough picture on widely held among historians and philosophers and theologians that there is a, like in the debate between religion and reason, asteroids take sides with religion and the multicellars and the philosophers take sides with reason, right? So this is like a character picture, right? But this is like the main picture of these three groups. So like we have the asteroids taking sides with religion in the debate and the multicellars and philosophers taking sides with reason. So there are many things through a body picture. But I argue in the book that when it comes to morality, this picture is mistaken. In the sense that even the multicellars, the philosophers take sides with religion. So this is why I call all of them like at the scripture first theorists. So what I mean by them taking sides with religion is that. So they think that maybe we know something about like general stuff about morality. So there's a debate about how much we know about like general stuff about morality. According to like the asteroid, I'm and my asteroid, I mean, I'll go solid here like people after like, I'll go solid. So according to asteroids, we know like very little about ethics by reason, but according to the multicellars and the philosophers, we know much more about ethics like by reason. But these the knowledge that we have about ethics are about like general things. But when it comes to particular things, so whether or not this action is moral, all groups, the asteroids, the multicellars or the philosophers, they think that we don't have like normal typical, they don't have like knowledge of what is right or wrong. And if there is a conflict between scripture and reason, we should defer to scripture. So even the multicellars say that. So like this, I have like this nice example in the book about like Abdul Jappar about like eating meats, right, like killing of animals. So Abdul Jappar who is like a multicellars, like a reason for the person says that look, it looks to me that there's something wrong about like killing, killing animals, right? It looks to us that there's something wrong about it. But who are we? It's not, it's okay. It must be okay, right? So even when you go to the multicellars, it looks that they are like, when it gets to the particular judgment of what action is right or wrong, they are willing to defer to scripture, right? So that's why I call them scripture first theories. So there is interesting point is that there is one analogy used both by Agrazzoli and the multicellars. So and the analogy is the analogy of a physician. So the prophet is like a physician and we the pre-pale are like the patients, right? And on both, Agrazzoli and the multicellars, I say is that look, in the same way that you defer as a patient, you defer to the knowledge of the physician, when it comes to morality, you have to defer to the knowledge of the prophet. In the same way that you as the normal person, as a patient, you don't question the directives of the physician. You shouldn't question the directive of the prophet. So if there is a, if ever there is a conflict within reason and a scripture, a scripture is going to be. So that's why they are a scripture first theories. And this is that a scripture comes before reason and if there is any conflict, a scripture is always going to it. So the reason is never going to be. So then if you have that view, about all the passages that we have in mind, like slavery, wife, being, and everything, so you have to go with the scripture because again, like the prophet is the physician, we are the patients and we have, we don't have knowledge to questions, like they're very dictative of the prophet. So basically I argue that like contrary to the common, view that the philosophers and the modus lights take side with the reason, with its consummality, like all those discrepancy are going to take side with, with, with, with, with, with, with, with, with the scripture. So this is like the first part of the book. And then we have, so I, so, so, so before we go to the second part of the book. So you know, I read some problems for, for the scripture first series. So like some internal problems for scripture first series. But I don't think that those internal problems are, are important. Like, you know, there are some worries about how do we know that God doesn't lie, like in the scripture, if we are, because this is like it seems to, it seems to be more like a piece of moral knowledge that lying is bad, but if we get morality from God, how do we know that God doesn't lie? So it's like a eternal problem for scripture first series. But at the end of the day, in the book, I say that look, the main problem, at least for us, as Muslims, who kind of buy into modern moral judgments, is not that the scripture first theory is, is incoherent. The problem for us is that we cannot, like three notes are modern moral judgments. It's very hard for us to give up on the belief that slavery is wrong, like ever, right? It's never slavery, it's never like family, right? It's very hard for us to believe that it's ever okay to, for a moment to be one, to one's wife, right? So you said that like some Muslims are willing to take the, the bullet here, as to like wife being, sadly. So in a way, like my book is not addressed to those people, right? Because maybe there's a way to defend their views in the sense that the act view is consistent, but it's just a hard bullet for many of us to buy it. And the other problem that I wanted to raise is that, like, if you buy that, like the, like profit is the physician and God, who are we to judge like God, God's like my, then you have to buy scripture, like wholesale. You have to say something about slavery too, right? You cannot share it here, right? If you think that our knowledge, our intellect is limited and we don't know the growth scheme of things, so then we have to defer to God's, like directives, then on everything you should defer to God, right? That that would include the slavery, right? But that would be a very, like tough bullet to buy it, all right? So this is really the way it's probably for its controversy. So the problem is not that their view is inconsistent, is just that it's hard to accept it, at least for some of us, for some of us, like, like people like me and you. - Yeah, for sure. For sure. What are, what are thick and moral concepts? - Okay. So this, like the debate about like thick moral concepts and thin moral concepts, so that debate is raised between the culture and within the discussion of the more of the, of the more of the lights, more of the philosophy. - Right. - So the more of the lights, more of the philosophers, sorry, the more of the lights think that, look, we have some knowledge of morality. So we know that, I don't know, lying is bad, let's say that, right? Or injustice is bad or what? So they think that we get to know those things by reason. So it's not that reason doesn't say the thing about what morality is, right? So they are willing to accept that we get some knowledge, by reasoning alone about the nature of morality. But that knowledge is like, just let's take the example of injustice is bad, right? I say that like that knowledge is not very substantial. Why? Because the kind of examples that the Muthansolites are offering as the examples of ethical knowledge that we have are expressed in terms of like thick concepts. So one of other thick concepts, thick concepts like injustice or cruelty, right? These are basically moral concepts that are also descriptive, right? Compare like cruelty with like the concept of wrongness or badness. So the concept of wrongness or badness seems to be like these concepts are thin concepts in the sense that they have no descriptive element. But cruelty is a moral concept that also has a descriptive element. So if you say that somebody is cruel, you mean that like maybe that person is violent or something or if it does stuff that are I don't know like gruesome or something, right? So it has like a descriptive element. Whereas badness does not have this descriptive element, right? So then I say that like the examples that the Muthansolites are offering us are like use the thick moral concepts like take this example that injustice is bad. So we know that if you use thick moral concepts, those concepts have like normative element within them, right? So when you say that injustice is bad, the only thing that deals kind of that injustice is is a thick moral concepts and the badness is somehow within that very concepts. So then sure maybe reason alone can find out that justice is bad, but that doesn't to be very substantial knowledge, right? So even the Muthansolites say that we can discover some of morality by reason alone, the examples that they give us are not really like very helpful examples, right? When it gets to like a real important examples or whether or not like say anything animals, it's right? They say that we cannot discover that by reason alone, right? So the thing that we can discover by reason alone is better than justice is wrong or it's bad. But this is not really what we are interested in. We are interested in to see really that we're not that particular action, like the action of wife being is wrong. So then it looks that even though Muthansolites say that reason have some say wealthy at the end of the day on their view, reason doesn't have much to say about what really is interesting for us. That was really helpful in the book where you where you would point out and this is the question of pointing at flaws in their logic and in their explanations, but that something seems like when they seem to be putting scripture first, actually it's a lot more deeper than that or when they seem to be putting reason first, it's still there's still like scriptures, you know, it's still scripture sometimes first. And it was the that was the inconsistency in these in the traditions engagement with you know with this debate with this issue, we're really fascinating to look at. And I mean I just it raised way too many questions in my mind, but I am still wondering like how so when is you mentioned in the Muslim's relationship with the Greek philosophers, which oh my god, I just have to say this out loud because I think it all all the time. You know how Muslim the specific conservative group of Muslims will often say things like you can't imitate the West or you know you can't you can't bar out like if something is not you know for Muslim tradition, then it's not valid Islamically, etc, etc. That it can't be our sources of Islamic can't be from the non-Muslim text traditions except the Muslim traditions are the Muslim tradition is filled with like these philosophers and theologians are they're constantly taking stuff from the Greek philosophers somehow at some point we put a stop to it and say okay that's allowed only up until this point or it's only like for these guys if a feminist a Muslim feminist takes the tiniest thing from the Western feminist movement that doesn't 100% reconcile with a very conservative sexist idea of not to suggest that the two are synonymous but if it doesn't record you know if it doesn't align with a very specific idea of Islam then the Muslim feminists aren't we trusted because so I and it's I but but I completely agree with what it was and it was very nice for this. It's frustrating like as a Muslim feminist oh no you know you can't that we can't rely on that or your methods are flawed. Well this color like we translated my answer because I must announce a strong translated Greek material of course they're going to be influenced by that right? Like who decides so at what point we in yeah I just have very strong opinions on that but I do I do I do want to say what like I want to ask then how what even though of course the Greek philosophers aren't we're not only are they not working with the Quran they're not working with religion with monetism etc how do still they are our muslim scholars end up drawing from the Greek philosophers to be able to work through this problem in in of you know scripture first or revelation first or revelation or reason or did this debate of revelation and reason how are they? What kinds of arguments do they or how is the Greek tradition helping them if at all or how are they responding to the Greek tradition? So good so excellent questions so look as it's like people like Al-Kundi Al-Farabi they were just amazed when they found like those like Greek texts like they saw that like this there's this like vast like body of knowledge they didn't know anything about so they knew about like the Quran and the the more specialized and the experts and stuff like not the experts like the motorized experts come in a little later right but they didn't know anything about these Greek philosophers and they read like Aristotle and they were just stunned by that but then they have this problem that look like the Quran is a source of knowledge but then also I started to be a source of knowledge too but then looks very different so what should be true about that right so then they try to like like they so they have this reconciliation project right to reconcile like the Quran and Islam with its good philosophy so so so basically they wanted to meet in in half way right they make Aristotle a little bit like like a Muslim on the one hand and on the other hand they have like a more secular understanding of of of of of of of of of of of of the Quran right so that that's kind of nice like the whole reconciliation project except the project is hard to reconcile reason with with with religion and that's kind of nice I don't love that but when it comes to morality I think so sadly this the things that they say about like the conflict between science and religion they wouldn't say about the conflict between morality and religion right it's curious why so when it comes to the I don't like the question of theory let's say right so they go with philosophers right when it comes to the question of metaphysics they go with like philosophers and science right they say that like we have to interpret the Quran like to make it consistent it the science of the time right but when it comes to morality they they they does not say so it's curious why they they they don't they don't do the same thing right so in the book I argue that like maybe the reason is that they have this conception of the afterlife right so the afterlife is like our ultimate goal and they have this like very peculiar understanding of the afterlife so they understand the afterlife as where we have all the knowledge of the world right so basically heaven is where you become like a philosopher you know everything right so for them the like the supreme pleasure is the pleasure of doing doing it all right so then our goal is to go to heaven basically to become a philosopher to know it all right so so but then in order to know everything we have to study we have to do philosophy right so this is dirty but then it looks that they didn't kill like they think that like if they go the ultimate value is knowledge then ethics is just a branch of like metaphysics right so then we have to do metaphysics so who is an ethical person the one who knows a lot about philosophy right and who knows about philosophy the person who has like a thorough study of science and everything so they so you know as far of this is that in order for you to know what to do like to have an ethical knowledge you have to study like metaphysics geometry like geography and all the sciences of the time then if you have that conception that like ethics is basically philosophy and philosophy is basically science then who has the final say like the philosophers and for them the philosopher is like the greatest philosopher is the prophet right so then me and you are like intuitions do not count like if my have the intuition that the slavery is wrong, it doesn't count. Because we don't know all, we don't have the all the knowledge, right? Who doesn't have all the knowledge? Like the profit, right? So an ethics is nothing other than like, like my husband's got knowledge. So therefore, at the end of the day, again, we have to defer to the profit. So I guess that the really unfortunate event in the story of Islamic philosophy is that they don't see value in doing ethics because they think that ethics is nothing but like we have ethics and science. Well, you know that if the only person, if the only ethical person in the world that only person is going to be ethical is a philosopher or is a prophet, then not only if we assume that all men are, all prophets are men, then and of course, you know, philosophy is for being men and only men having access to ethics and not just any men like very upper class, you know, a specific kind of men having access to, you know, or the resources to be able to become philosophers, which inherently then by that definition, women can never be ethical. And the thing is explicit, even even even only the white men, right? He says that like the black men does, they do not have knowledge, right? They are not rational, right? Only the white men have knowledge. Yeah, oh yeah, absolutely. And and Zahra Ayubi's book, Gendered Morality, is, I mean, which I recently just revisited for a lecture that I was giving and it is, I mean, like, yeah, and you know, one of the folks who talks about Isol Hazali, like, it's he's, they're pretty explicit sometimes that, well, this is the kind of people who cannot do this and they cannot have access to ethics. They don't have access to ethics. Yeah, yeah, I think I like it's only, I mean, the the the the supremacist ideas is sexist, classist ideas like how on earth is this ethically acceptable and how on earth are these or moral guides in in a religious tradition? The case, on a human level, I can't like, I, it's it breaks my heart that these are people that, you know, were supposed to look up that I'm supposed to look up to like, no, thank you. I don't, I, it's ironic that how they're, to me, they're some of the most unethical people. Um, all of that to say, when so there was a really interesting and lovely discussion and incredibly enlightening discussion in the book about when, you know, the scholars ideas of when we can depart from a literal meaning of the text, when can we offer a non literal meaning and when is a called on not not really meaning what it seems to be saying what was and that's up we can apply that to whether slavery or or or not we can just give it a generic idea of what that debate is like. Okay, so but before like answering that that that specific question, can tell you like say a little bit about the second part of the book because that also helped me to understand. So the second part of the book, which is like really the part that I was most interested in, is is called like the ethics first view. So right. So the ethics first view is basically the view that ethics comes before scripture. So our understanding of scripture must be informed by our independent moral judgments. Right. So then according to this view, look, we have our modern moral judgments. Right. And then a scripture in whatever we want to have, like whatever we want to do with the scripture ultimately must conform to to our independent moral moral moral judgments. But then the question is why. So why we have to rely on our ethical judgments. So in the book, I suggested that there are two ways to go with this ethics first view. So one way is the one that you mentioned like earlier in your introduction of the book is the story of the Moses and Heder. So in the story of the Moses and Heder, so I'm sure that many of listeners know this story, but I'm going to repeat it anyway. So we have this guy, Heder. So Heder is divine. He knows everything. And Moses, like come across this person. Moses knows that this person Heder is divine. Right. Moses knows that this person knows everything. So then Moses is like, look, can I follow you so that you can teach me stuff? Like, and Heder says, don't know, like, you are not patient enough. Just don't come. Like you don't have patient to follow me. Right. And the Moses says, no, no, no, like I you would find the patient, right. Let's just let me follow you. Right. And Heder says, okay, so let's go. So they go on the journey. So there are like three stories in the Quran, right. I'm just going to talk about the first story. So they go on a journey together and they stumble upon a boat, like in the dock, right. And then Heder says, look, Moses, you have to make a hole in that boat. Right. And Moses says, look, this boat belongs to this like Paul Piffel. This is the only, this is the boat is the only way for them to make their living. So I'm not going to make a hole in the boat. It's just very even thing for for us to do. This is the, their, their winds of like living their life, right. And and Heder says, okay, so you are not like that. But I said, what are they totally right? So then the story, even the Moses knows that like Heder is like this divine person. Still he cannot get himself to do what he was asked to do like making a hole in the boat, right. And the question is why. So what was the reasoning of of Moses? So why can't he make a hole in the boat, right. So I in the book I said, don't look there like Moses has two options either he should make a hole in the boat or he he shouldn't, right. So there are two options like making a hole or not making a hole. And then there are two cases either Heder is right. And later in the story, we know that Heder is right. Like it tells us that there is this king who are coming to see the boats and if he's, if the king sees that the boats have a hole in it, he's not going to see it. But if he, if the boat is intact, the king is going to see it. So it would be better for those poor people to have a hole in the boat, right. So later in the story, we knew that Heder was right. But from the, but Moses didn't do that, right. So from the perspective of Moses, so I their Heder is right or is wrong, right. So Moses has no idea like what's going on. He has no knowledge of what's going to happen, right. So he said, look, if Moses makes a hole in the boat and the river is right, then nothing bad happens to Moses. Heder, he does what he had, he has to do right. But then there are two bad options from Moses. Suppose that he makes a hole in the boat. But for whatever reason, Heder is wrong. Maybe he wanted to test Moses, maybe he didn't mean it, or maybe he wasn't like this really divine person that Moses thought he was, right. So there's like a small likelihood that that Heder is wrong. But if Heder is wrong and Moses makes a hole, then Moses has known like a serious wrong thing. He was, he's like a serious wrong doing, right. It's very bad for Moses. He has committed a very bad actions, right. So this is both bad option for Moses. The other bad option for Moses is that he doesn't make a hole in the boat and Heder is right, right. So this is also bad, because if Heder is right and Moses disobeys, Heder then Moses has done something wrong. But Moses doesn't know how wrong his action would be in that case, right. He has no idea that how seriously wrong this action would be, right. So then we have this torture. On the one hand, he, if he might do something that is serious wrong, on the other hand, he might do something that is wrong, but he has no idea how much that is wrong, like to what extent it is wrong, right. So I said in the books that this is like the Moses principle that you mentioned in the beginning. Now look, if you have these two options, so the best way for you is just to be able to run this. In the sense that go with the option that has the chance that you are not a serious wrong doing, right. So again, on Moses knows that if he makes a hole and Heder is wrong, he would be a serious wrong doing, but he doesn't know what happens if he doesn't make a hole, like suppose that he doesn't make a hole. It might be that Heder would do it itself, it might be that nothing bad happens, or like we have no idea, like Moses has no idea what's going to happen. So I said that like when you are like those two, like your action or destructions, it's better to be the wise rightness. And in the story we see that Moses disobeys, like, And the Quran does not condemn Moses. Like the Quran has nothing but praises for Moses. So it looks that even the Quran thinks that there is something good at praiseworthy with going with your own moral judgments. And this is like my first ethics first solution that look, we don't know what's going on. Even if we don't know what's going on as a matter of fact, it is always better like rational speaking to go with your own judgment. So if we apply that to the problem of divinely prescribed even, so maybe we don't know what's going on with those passages, like the passage is about wife meeting, like cutting off hands, so maybe we don't know what's going on. But maybe we are in the Moses-like situation. If we are in the, that just the consequence of beating your wife is just so bad, that it would be safer, more speaking for you, just to go with your own judgment. So this is like the first ethics solution. So this is like a Moses solution. Be like Moses. Do what Moses did in that situation, which means go against a scripture. Like in the story is like headers, like directives, right? So I think that you have a much better chance of being on the right if you do what Moses did. Again, you might suspend judgment on what is wrong, wrong, right? So maybe we don't know. Maybe only God knows what is wrong, right? But at least when it comes to our practical life, rational speaking, it's better to go with our own judgment. So this was my first solution. So the second solution was that maybe we know what's wrong in right hand wrong. So and I have like it, I have like an argument that at least under certain plausible conceptions of ethics, we have knowledge of what's wrong, right? And we know that the slavery is wrong. And we know that beating wives are wrong, right? It's not like just we know as a matter of like that thing can change that knowledge, right? So and the book and argue that like morally hidden facts are not relevant to our moral knowledge, in the sense that even if there are some hidden facts, if we cannot have access to those hidden facts, they are irrelevant to what we should do. So in the sense that so the second solution says that we know what we have to do. It's just that it's a stronger than the first solution. In the first solution Moses maybe doesn't know what is like right or wrong, but still he has to go with his conscience. And the second solution is that no, we know it's right or wrong, right? We know that slavery is wrong, we know that beating wives is wrong, right? But then we get to your question that suppose that we know it's right or wrong, right? And our moral judgment are reliable. Then what to do with our text, right? We have this text which seems to prescribe the things that we know is wrong. So it's got the line. So what's going on here? Shall we continue or you want to ask a question? No, no, that's all good. And you're welcome to continue if you would like to. I was going to ask you questions about the Moses principle and the more the ethics first, basically the second half of the book, the second part of the book. And the Brian Hemstori as well. Because you talk about how the ethics and ethics first approach makes the text redundant, right? And you're you make this point. I learned you just said it. You said it here in the interview as well. And then you have a really wonderful discussion to help us work through this. You're going to talk about the moral function of the scripture. Well, it's going to help you if you could talk about the moral function. Then like if you're keeping in mind, especially that in some of the work that I do, ethical Muslims Muslims who are trying to work through these issues, then what what when they come across this argument, I feel like they would find it really helpful. So if you could talk about the function. So exactly. But just before that, so like I say, I suggest that like what to do with those passages. I said that like I said basically what Fazl Rahman has said before. So I just developed what he has said that look, we have to make a distinction between legal interpretation of the text and moral interpretation of the text. Right. So maybe of those passages, we could have an legal understanding of those passages. Right. Those passages were laws of the time. Right. And I explain in the book with like two examples, like take the examples of how you can be axon and the other example is about the general commissions of the ethics of war. I explain that why sometimes God has reason to legislate that is morally suboptimal. Right. In this is that. So I'm going to explain about that. But let me get to your question. Then maybe we could discuss why God sometimes has, sometimes has laws that are morally suboptimal. Right. But look, let's suppose that let's suppose that those passages are just legal laws of the time. And God has reasons to legislate those laws. And the question arises that what is the function, like moral function of a description. And I think that there are, I think that scripture, let it coround, can extend our moral knowledge. But how? I think that look, this is this is the way that I think about scripture and morality, like the function of scripture. Look, suppose that like you and I are friends, right. And I value our relations, right. So I want to be a good friend. So if I want to be a good friend of you, I have to do what you want from me. Like if you want like this gift for your birthday, I have to buy like that gift for you, right. In order to show that I value our friendship. So the fact that I have to value our friendship is a moral requirement. Discover, discoverable by reason alone. But how can I value our friendship depends on your desire, but vicious, right. So the same applies to God, right. I know by reason alone that God, if I see God as a friend or as a creator, that I have to value my relationship with God, right. But how can I value my relationship with God? In order to value my relationship with God, I have to know what God wants in the same way that I in order to value my friendship with you, I have to know what you know you want, right. So then if God wants me to say pray or fast or whatever, then this is a way for me to value my, this is like a moral requirement for me to do that. Like making prayer would be a moral requirement. In the sense that like if you think that God is your friend and you want to value your friendship, like morality tells you that you have to value your friendship. And then God says that in order to value your friendship, you have to display. Right. So in that way, like the Quran is going to extend our like, like, our morality. So then we have this moral rule that we have to pray. So let me give you another example. So the Quran says that you have to take care of like, even a sublime like the people, like the immigrants. Right. So everybody like we know by reasons that we have to take care of immigrants. Right. So we don't need God to say that. But here's a thing. Our obligations to help like immigrants are limited. We don't have an obligation to go over an above like the call of duty. Right. So like to help everybody. So it's just, we have just a limit that like, it's good to help immigrants. But we don't need to do everything for that. But not suppose that I know an immigrant who is a friend of you, Shana. Like this is like your neighbor or your sister. Right. So in general, my requirement to help immigrants are limited. Right. But if I do that, that particular person used to tell me, Shana, that look, this is my sister, go help her. And it looks that because of my friendship with you, then I have like a strong duty to hold that, that, that, that, because it's your sister. And then it's God says that this is my like creature. This is the immigrant. So this is like I love that person. They go help her. Go help her. Then it looks that I have a strong year duty to go. And I have the immigrants. Why? Again, because not only I have a moral duty on my own to help those people, but they are also God's friends. And I am also God. They are God's friends and I'm God's friends. So that seems that God can strengthen or do these to help others. Right. So this is a way that like scripture has a function. Like moral function. Like you know, like you, you know, believe in the scripture, they do not have as strong duty, as we do as Muslims to have the immigrants. Yeah. Thank you so much for articulating that. No, and that's that's from the sections that I found very, very helpful because I too had never thought about. Well, I mean, I hadn't thought about. Because it comes up a couple of times, ethics first, that if we are going to just keep re-interpreting scriptures to align with our contemporary ethical standards and moral compass, then what even is the function of the script? And I had, again, the things that this book did for me, it was incredibly fulfilling intellectual and spiritual and emotional in all of these ways. And one of those ways was like, "Oh, I feel a lot more equipped to be able to have these conversations in a way that I think people would find that I may not like it or is defined connected, so thank you." I did want to say the most responsible, like, I just, I, again, loved it. One of the things that I get away from the most responsible was precisely that, well, most is then, because he didn't know why Hitler is doing the things that he, that he is doing or is requiring, because he doesn't know what the reasons are, therefore, that's not, Mousa is not ethically or morally obligated to agree, right? And so, in other words, then, for, when I read the Quranic verse, Quranic verse, verse, verse, verse, verse, four, because Allah doesn't tell me why if we assume it means to hit your eyes, I can't read God's mind, therefore, I'm not, I'm actually not committing a wrong by not hitting my wife if I was a husband. And so, it was, I mean, again, a lot of these principles were just so incredibly helpful or. And in fact, Mousa is praiseworthy and God praises Mousa, like Mousa is a favorite character in the whole Quran. Like, God has nothing but praises for him, right? So, he is praise for the, for exactly disobeying, like, Hitler, right? For relying on his own judgment. There is no condemnation at all for Moses, that's the story. And even in this story, it's like, he, it is, it is Mousa who, he's like, okay, fine, if I, if I, if I ask you one more question, if I question you one more time, then you can, you know, then I can, then I don't have to, like, I will leave. And it's, it's a he's the one who's the agent who's like, yep, okay, I asked you many questions, I want to leave now. And I think it, and the way that he responds to Hitler, when Hitler is like, didn't I know you were going to be impatient? I told you you were going to be impatient. And Mousa's response is like, stop, stop talking to me like that. It's really beautiful. I mean, I love that story. And I love Mousa. Like, I mean, he's my person who would get in the, in the, in the plan and the indifference tradition as well. But I, yes, I, and I, especially, and then I loved that you also talk about Ibrahim's story, right? Because I think that is, we all know that if anybody today had a dream to go and kill their child, nobody would think that is acceptable. And somehow in Ibrahim's story, we're like, yep, nobody is questioning it. And all in it's like, oh, wow, he's such a patient and such a persevere. He has so much perseverance. And it's like, well, what impact did that have on the child? Like, I mean, it matters whose perspective we're reading this story from. But I, so I really appreciated and valued that discussion. I, when you're talking about how the scholars, you know, they're like, oh, he, you know, he, he knew he wasn't going to do it. And he knew he knew he wasn't going to have to do it. And that he knew it was a test. And that it was a test. I have so many questions about that for like for the traditional for any camp, who says, oh, it is about a test because one. So if Ibrahim knows deep inside that this is just a test. And in the Bible, it's very clear he knows it's a test because in the in the in the in the general story, he tells his, his servants, you know, his people are accompanying him with, with his hop with Isaac. He says, you guys wait here. We'll be right back. Or there is a whole bunch of other suggestions in the text to that make it clear that this guy knows Allah is not going to make him go through with it in the end. So is it really a test? And then I think I had students who asked me that hold on. If he knows deep inside, then he's not actually going to go through with this. Then is it really like what is it? Like that is it really a test? Like is it? Would it be? Would it be a real test? Like if, if he knew, oh, God, he's God is making me do this. And I really don't want to do it. But I must do it. Like that's not what we, that's not that what we get in the in the story. But I, you know, and also like what does it mean for something to be a test? So I mean, ethically speaking, right? Like it can we then say, can we then apply that to slavery to a Quran for to 434 to all of the sexist and the other part and any, any potentially violent, any seemingly violent passages in any scripture? Can we then say, oh, this is just a test done. In fact, Satya Shaf actually says precisely that this is that this is a lot testing our limits here. Are we going to go through with this and hit our right? It's still like, it's like this question of like, oh, it was just a test. Like again, we applied it. Why? How do we decide what something is a test and how do we how do we decide? Then some, you know, what happens if we actually apply that? Or can we say that about our treatment of LGBTQ people? Like on and on a lot of deep inside actually wants us to allow them to marry, right? If for those of us who are hit or sexual lawmakers, it's allow us to make sure that everybody has equal access to marriage, et cetera. But this is a test. God is testing us to see if like, what the hell? Where does this end? I mean, really, really fascinating stuff. Yeah. Is there anything else that you would like to share with us? Maybe a theme or a topic? Because I know there's so much that we didn't cover, but I mean, incredibly fascinating book. It's very helpful, very fulfilling for me. I'll be done with cover the story of the hey, hey, but let's just let's just let's just let's talk a little bit about the story of hey, because I think that's concept like helpful for for for for for listeners, right? So this is like hey, the Yaksan is really an interesting story. So, you know, we have this story of this person who is raised by a dear. Like we have this island and we have this decade by the way for whatever reason, he's alone, all alone in this island, he's raised by a dear, and he learned everything by himself. And then he's like incredibly, incredibly smart. And then he again, he learns everything like all the principles of philosophy, right? Interestingly, in the book, he thinks that like we shouldn't kill animals and we should be vegans, right? Like he and he has like worries about like properties and stuff, right? So this has these are his his convictions. And then there is another island. So in the other island, there are people living there and they have this true prophet and they living according to the teachings of that prophet. So one day one person like a good person from that island called Upsal comes to high island. All these these persons have in the the island. So they beat and they develop a language in order to be able to talk to each other and upsal upon this person has a like very illuminating, right? So basically, Upsal finds that high knows everything, right? And then Upsal talks up like tells high about his own island and he says that we have this prophet, the prophet says this and that, right? And high says that like like do your prophet seems to be a good guy, they like his teachings, but I'm positive with like some stuff that he's saying. Like for example, about like eating stuff, he doesn't seem to be right on the eating stuff or about like property stuff. He doesn't seem to be right on that thing to and looks that it permits you to indulge too much in in pleasure and those kind of stuff. So there are like these things that worries me. Like your prophet is really good, but there are these things that I think that I'm I'm puzzled about like why he said those kinds of things, right? And then Upsal says, look, you are a good leader. Just come to our island and help our people to know like real knowledge, right? So then they go together to Upsal's island and I try to teach like real knowledge to those people, right? And people hate, hey, so they did test, hey, they think that his teachings are absurd and that there is like there is like a chaos in the island and they find the teachings of hey of heart, right? And then high finds the look, I cannot help those people like these people are like so corrupt that they cannot learn the real truth and the prophet knew that. So that's why that the prophet told them that you could eat such and such, right? So because he couldn't help those people in any other way, right? So in order to have for them to have like a peaceful life, they need to have some wrong teaching. So then I understand that some of those teachings even though Etychic speaking is like some of those teachings even though Etychic speaking is armistake and are best for those people, right? Help them to have like a peaceful life, right? And this is basically this, I think that this is basically this applies to our time to that look. You might think that given the situation in the cemetery of your view, there was no way for the prophet to say that the slave is wrong or you shouldn't beat your wife or whatever. So then he legislated those laws in order for like to improve them, let's say that. That doesn't make those laws like morally correct. But that just shows that sometimes the prophet might have some reason to legislate. slave morally suboptimal law. So these are the only laws that he could have legislated to help those people to have moral development. Again, so according to my solution, so you don't need to say that the teachings of the prophet at the time was morally optimal. You might say that they were morally suboptimal but God had reasons to legislate those legislations to be destroyed. So this is what I want to say about the problem of prescribed event. Look, those passages, you might say they're like, God really didn't mean that it's moral to be your wife. It just says that in that time it is legal for like a man to be his wife. And it's always immoral to be your wife. And now that we make some progress, like moral progress, we have to change those laws. So the laws that are morally suboptimal needs to change to be their laws. This was the way that I tried to solve the tension between these three propositions. Thank you. That is a very, very helpful articulation of the issue and of how you've reconciled it. I have a friend and we often ask, it's ethical, sorry, it's Islamic but it's ethical or it's unique but it's ethical and I'm just trying to develop his views in the more modern language. Yeah, well, thank you so much for this conversation. The last question that we ask our authors is if there's anything that they're currently working on that our readers or listeners can look forward to, any book that you're working toward any, what is your current research or if you're taking a break, which is I totally believe in taking a break and you don't have to be productive all the time. No, no, actually I'm working on several, like a couple of projects. One of them is in a way like a continuation of this book. So look, I grew up in a disorder called culture like in Iran. I mean, it was a strike, but a marginal phase of morality in the culture. Just think about the top-ranked figures of the tradition, because only I've seen other ways. So they produce a vast philosophical system in which world philosophy occupies only a minor and often like a peripheral place. So, and the question is that why? Why these like important figures like Alexander Zaliyab is in other ways? They didn't take more philosophy as seriously as they should have done that. If you look at the work of like a kindness, you see that he has written a lot about like more philosophy, but you don't see the same in in in Avicina or Avirois, right? But even if you look at the culture, you see like the dominance of legal thinking in in the culture and the equation of sharia with morality, right? So it looks that like like Muhammad al-Kunsa is that the Islamic thought is marked by, so I'm quoting like flight from ethical concern, right? So basically Islamic culture is dominated by by sharia thinking and not by ethical thinking. So this is my observation, right? If you think that my observation is right, then the question is why? So why is it that like moral philosophy has such a peripheral role, even in the works of I mean like top-ranked figures like Avicina and Avirois? And why is it that in our culture are so like Islamic cultures are so obsessed with the sharia as opposed to moral thinking, right? So so I have like a couple of suggestions that why is it's why that is the case, but this is a really project to explain that why morality has such a marginal place in the history of Islamic thought as well as our culture today. That's that's a really exciting project and that's a great question to explore as well. I'm thinking again, I get like as my parents always say, you know, and I think a lot of Muslims agree like just because Muslims are doing something doesn't mean it's actually Muslim and everybody exactly. Many, many majority Muslim societies are very corrupt and there's a lack of ethic. It's very it's very prominent. Like I think Muslims themselves a lot of Muslims themselves see that as well. So there'd be a great question to explore. Exactly. So the project is really to develop a very head of Islam in which ethics has much more important place that it does in the works of like say, I've ever seen or I'm either is. Yeah, that's fascinating. Yeah, thank you for working on that as well. Alright, I mean, well, this was a really fantastic interview. I'm so grateful for your time and for your ability and willingness to talk to us about your book and again, congratulations on the book and thank you for writing it and I look forward to your future work. Thank you very much, Hannah. And thank you for having me. It was like such a good conversation with you. Alright, so that was my conversation with Amir Sayyimi about his book Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought in Beyond. A new problem of evil published in 2024 with Oxford University Press. Thank you so much for tuning in and I'll see you for the next conversation soon. Salam.