Updating How We Think About Korean Peninsula Security

Hello, welcome to RUSI in London. I'm Philip Shetler-Jones and this is Global Security Briefing, the podcast from RUSI's international security team that provides insights on security developments in and between the regions of the world. In this edition of Global Security Briefing, we're putting events in North and South Korea into the right context and looking for answers to the following core questions. What are the priorities for North Korean foreign and security policy? What are the drivers and implications of North Korea's participation as a belligerent in Russia's war against Ukraine? How is South Korea regarding North Korea's more expansive diplomatic and military activity? And what does it mean for security on the peninsula? And then what effects does all this have on the military balance in Northeast Asia, the US alliance system, and our security in Europe? So aiming to address these questions, I'm pleased to welcome two expert guests to GSB. Sanghoon Seo is a former South Korean diplomat and a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, where his research focuses on nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and East Asian security. His works appeared in publications including our RUSI Journal, also The Diplomat, NBR, with a forthcoming article in the Pacific Review. He's been a senior associate fellow at RUSI, having done a terrific fellowship with us some time ago. So welcome back, Sanghoon. Thank you. And our other guest is Edward Howell. Edward is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of Oxford and the Farris Foundation. His expertise is centered on the international relations and security of East Asia, with a particular focus on North and South Korea and DPRK-US relations. DPRK, of course, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the full formal name, North Korea. He's a non-resident fellow of the ASEAN Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul and previously served as a Korean Foundation fellow at Chatham House. A regular analyst for national and global media, Edward's latest book, A New Axis of Upheaval, North Korea, Russia, China, Iran, will be released in December this year. So welcome to GSB, Edward. Thank you very much, Philip. It's so good to be here. Well, let's set off then. I'll begin with a few framing thoughts. I would say in the past few decades, almost a living memory for my generation, international views on events on the Korean Peninsula were largely framed in terms of two issues, North-South relations and the problem of nuclear proliferation. But developments over the last few years suggest it's probably time to refresh our sense of those priority issues and how they relate to what's happening in the region and beyond. For one thing, North Korea's goal of unification and there is currently no diplomatic process between the Koreas on that issue. Polling suggests there's not much support for unification in the South either. We are recording this podcast on the 10th of September, making yesterday the 78th birthday of North Korea. Having been founded in 1948, it has long passed the USSR as the longest existing socialist state in history and shows no sign of stopping. As for nuclear disarmament, the North has made it clear it has no intention to even discuss the issue. And now that China has joined Russia in dropping the topic, the prospects for international action also look bleak. There is speculation that the Trump administration may even be prepared to give some form of recognition to North Korea as a nuclear state, as part of a package of diplomatic agreements. Japan, as well as the US, is seeking a summit with North Korea at the moment. Meanwhile, North and South Korea are both more prominent participants in events further afield, in particular since Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022. North Korea promoted its security relationship with Russia and sends troops to fight against Ukrainian forces. South Korea is an important supplier of weapon systems to European nations embarking on rearmament. So a fresh take on peninsular issues also should take into account a changing context of US-China relations. In the second Trump term, US security policy in East Asia is based on the principles of erecting a strong denial defence on the first island chain and making allies do more for their own defence. The emphasis on the first island chain raises questions about how a potential Sino-US confrontation over Taiwan would affect Korea. President Trump has called South Korea a model ally. It has also moved some capabilities out of South Korea and is making concessionary gestures to back his calls. So considering all this, if unification and denuclearisation are no longer the main framing issues through which to appreciate the importance of Korean peninsular issues, what should stand in their place? Let's get into the discussion. Edward, if I could turn to you first. Before coming to those issues like the participation in Ukraine, broadly speaking, what would you say are the priorities of North Korea's leadership? Well, when Kim Jong-un came to power in December 2011 following the death of his father and the second North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, the young Kim at the time, the third North Korean supreme leader, had an ultimate goal, which was for North Korea to be recognised as a de facto nuclear weapon state. This goal has been pursued over the past nearly 15 years and with growing success, which is why it's particularly concerning. I think in addition to recognition as a nuclear weapon state, Kim Jong-un wants sanctions relief. This was a key point of contention when President Donald Trump of the United States and Kim Jong-un met for the second time in Hanoi at a summit that ended in the summer of 2019, inconclusively in February 2019. Just in relation to this recognition as a nuclear weapon state, Kim Jong-un wants not just second strike capability, but a credible second strike capability. He wants to expand the scope and the sophistication of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. And I also think that more than this, that he has a clear goal in mind, which is the removal of the approximately 28,500 US troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, stationed in South Korea, and an end to the US-South Korea alliance. And all of this is connected to the nuclear weapons question. If Kim can gain recognition from the US as a nuclear weapon state, he can then call for an end to sanctions, because these sanctions are tied to the nuclear weapons question. He can then call for a withdrawal of the US presence in South Korea. Thank you, Edward. That's a really helpful way of connecting those issues. There's a logic there. Sangon, what would be your assessment? Thank you, Philip and Edward, for your thoughts. I would take a very similar view. But let me frame it this way. I do not think North Korea's fundamental priority has really changed. It's still the survival and the stability of the regime and keeping power within the Kim dynasty. So nuclear weapons and cooperation with Russia and the pursuit of international acceptance of its nuclear status are ultimately means to that end. So from that perspective, I agree that nuclear weapon is a really important tool that North Korea has been utilizing to consolidate its power. North Korea knows that it cannot match the combined US-South Korea forces. It cannot match the US-South Korea forces. And it can't match the combined US-South Korea forces. It cannot match the combined US-South Korea forces. forces with conventional weapons alone. So nuclear weapons sits at the very center of its military strategy. But they also matter at home because they have become closely associated with military achievement, great power status, and national identity. And that helps reinforce the legitimacy of the regime as well. And the second point regarding the sanctions relief, I would say that maintaining a degree of economic stability is important for Kim Jong-un. And in this aspect, North Korea's economy has grown by roughly 3% a year since 2023. And cooperation with Russia has also brought in additional substantial resources and foreign currency. So that does not necessarily mean ordinary North Koreans are better off. But if the regime has more resources to work with and more rents, it will be a good idea to distribute to key party elites that can still help strengthen its internal stability. So from this perspective, Kim Jong-un's recent record has been a good one, I would say. Interesting. Quite high marks judged in terms of North Korea's own definition of its objectives. Edward, I noticed, speaking of the economy, Russian tourism has become another sort of feature of the U.S. economy. It has become another sort of feature of the U.S. economy. economy. economy. economy. economy. economy. economy. economy. economy. economy. And that's all connected to the new quality of the relationship with Vladimir Putin. Russia, which seems to me to have taken off around the period right after the beginning of the full blown invasion in 2022. One of the most interesting developments, I think, in this recent period is what came as a surprise to many of us, the DPRK has become a participant as a belligerent in Russia's war against Ukraine. But why would you say they took that decision to join the war? And what do you find so far the most important consequences of it? The North Korean regime, in all its three dynastic iterations, has always needed money and cash. And the North Korean regime now, as before, will do anything it can to get access to cash, in addition to the pursuit of enhanced nuclear and missile capabilities. When Kim Jong-un decided to not only send artillery shells, and as of the beginning of this year, 2026, North Korea has sent at least 12 million rounds of artillery to Russia. When Kim Jong-un made that decision to send artillery, then missiles to Russia, then manpower in the form of around about 15,000 North Korean troops to assist the North Korean army, it was a very, very difficult decision to make. And it was a very, very difficult decision to make. And it was a very, very difficult Russia's war against Ukraine. This decision was not made on a whim. You know, when Pyongyang got involved in the war, just after the first year, North Korea's economy was on crutches. North Korea's economy was still under lockdown owing to coronavirus. It was in chronic decline. We must remember that when Kim Jong-un decided to lock down the country in January 2020, owing to COVID, it was the best sanction ever enforced on North Korea. And getting involved in Russia's war, therefore, came at a very opportunistic moment for Kim. He knew that this could bring benefits. And the North Korea's regime strategy has always been premised around what I call strategic delinquency. behaving badly in order to reap rewards. So what are the consequences of not just artillery, but missiles and manpower? Well, we've already seen one key consequence, which is that this relationship between Russia and North Korea, in my view, is going to outlive the Ukraine war. It is likely going to change if Putin no longer needs troops, but it's going to stay and get stronger and deepen, but also expand. It's going to be on the realm of security. Last year, Russia and North Korea both started to call this relationship an alliance. Pyongyang had called this an alliance ever since the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty in 2024. Russia was initially a little more reluctant to do so. So now the two countries are in what both sides call an invincible alliance. One of the consequences is the fact that both sides are in a situation where they're not going to be able to do anything. And that's because they're not going to be able to do anything. The fact that both sides will continue to benefit. Earlier this year, the Russian defense minister announced that the Kremlin wanted to increase security cooperation with North Korea until 2031. And what is North Korea giving Russia in return? And what's Russia giving North Korea in return? Well, I think in the event of any conclusion to the Ukraine war, North Korea will offer Russia an ample supply of nuclear weapons. tactics. That must be one of the concerns in South Korea. But Sang-hun, could you give us a bit more of a picture about how this is assessed in South Korea. What are the impacts of some of these changes we've mentioned on the North-South dimension of security on the peninsula? So when it comes to military cooperation aspect of North Korea-Russia relations, one of the most important gains is combat experience of North Korean troops. Clausewitz argued that the one thing that can reduce the friction and uncertainty of war is combat experience. And North Korea is now getting that. And its forces are learning about drones, electronic warfare, and how to combine artillery with reconnaissance under real battlefield conditions. And it is also getting a lot of data to improve the accuracy of its ballistic missiles. There are some evidences suggested by the Ukrainian intelligence service that short-range ballistic missiles like KN-23 has been used, in the battlefield. So it is really helping the North Korean military. And when it comes to the inter-Korean relations, North Korea has been redefining the relationship as a two hostile states. For South Korea, this is not simply a security policy issue because it also touches on national identity and constitutional vision. According to the South Korean constitution, it defines the national territory as the entire. Korean Peninsula and makes peaceful unification as a responsibility of the state and the president. The incumbent government in Seoul is putting more emphasis on dialogue. Although it still supports denuclearization, however, it sees a halt or a freeze as the starting point. It is also willing to support U.S.-North Korea talks, even if they move ahead of inter-Korean dialogue, which is slightly different from the more traditional position of South Korea. But it doesn't mean that there is a real consensus on this in South Korea. What the government calls a pragmatic approach also raises a very difficult question. Does this eventually mean accepting permanent division and North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons? So beyond the political and constitutional aspects, a related question worth asking is whether North Korea will continue to use nuclear weapons or not. The question is whether the risk of a military crisis is increasing. It is uncertain whether Kim Jong-un has made a strategic decision to go to war, as argued in a famous 38 North article in 2024. But it does look increasingly plausible that Pyongyang is steadily expanding the military and political options it could use if it sees an opportunity, as shown by its continued nuclear and conventional military buildup, the forward deployment of missile launchers, and its increasingly hostile portrayal of South Korea. So that gives us good reason to remain prepared, even if it does not mean that a full-scale invasion is imminent. So if you want peace, prepare for war. I'd be interested to hear what you make of recent reports that North Korea may be preparing to send an even larger, large contingent of troops — 30,000, I've seen quoted to Russia. Sangon, what do you make of that report? Is it plausible? It's really hard to verify, and there is no credible open source information about that. But it really depends, I think, on what Russia can provide in return. Because the war in Ukraine already has proven very beneficial for North Korea. It broke isolation and reduced over-reliability, so it's very likely that North Korea will continue to be reliant on China and gaining both economic benefits and valuable combat experience. So depending on what Russia can really offer, North Korea can consider that decision seriously. Some people also think a large number of returning soldiers with combat experience having seen a bit more of the world than they would normally living in North Korea could have a destabilizing effect. Well, that makes sense, but one of the North Korean systems that enables this dictatorship to continue is to sever communications among and between the residents. So I'm not really sure if those soldiers can really share what they saw in the battlefield freely with other people, and that will have not a significant impact on the stability of the North Korean regime. In my opinion, rather, I think North Korea is using this experience as an opportunity to strengthen its narrative that NATO is invading our friend Russia, and South Korea is also a friend of the United States and NATO. So South Korea, too, is our enemy. So it is also being used as a tool to strengthen its narratives on the hostile Western powers and autonomous struggle to defend ourselves, etc. So what soldiers can really tell about their experiences will be limited and framed by the regime's perspective. Edward, what do you think? I agree with Sang-hun. I think we cannot rule out the possibility of more North Korean troops being deployed. The deployment of troops in terms of the initial 10,000 to 11,000 sent in October 2024 was as clear a signal as Kim Jong-un could possibly send to Russia that North Korea was going all in as a participant in this war in order to reap rewards in return. It comes to what North Korea has been getting in return in terms of military and missile technology, what's particularly concerning is we know what Kim Jong-un wants, but obviously we don't know what he has been getting. That said, it's unlikely that Russia will have provided and will be providing North Korea with A-plus grade technology, but B-plus grade technology will be far superior to any of the Soviet legacy systems currently in North Korea's possession. And I agree with Sang-hun's point with respect to reunification of the Korean peninsula. South Korean politics is very polarized, even within the current world. We have a much more left-leaning and progressive Democratic Party under the president, Lee Jae-myung. I think one of the key questions in terms of South Korea is its alliance with the United States at a time when North Korea is forging new allies and new friends. I mean, beyond Russia, North Korea has reached out to Belarus, to Vietnam, to Laos. Okay, Minsk is not Moscow. Minsk is nowhere near as important to Pyongyang as it is to South Korea. It's a very, very important part of the country. And, of course, that relationship also goes back to the history of the nuclear proliferation story. And so it's quite impressive, the picture you paint, about the extent of North Korea's diplomatic development with not just China and Russia, which everyone talks about, but beyond. What do you think, Edward, this does for the stability of the North-South? As Sangin described, it's quite hard for the government to let go of these long-term. understanding principles about denuclearization, and constitutionally they're quite fixed on the principle about unification of the country. So what is the prospect, you think, in the next few years, or will it take longer to get off those sort of historically rooted principles and have a policy which deals with North Korea as it is, rather than as they would like it to be? Well, Philip, this was something that William Perry thought. said in his review of U.S. policy towards North Korea in 1998, when he said we must look at North Korea as it is, not as we wish it to be. I think two points. Firstly, even though North Korea has abandoned the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under its own control, and this is very significant, as Sangin mentioned, it has not abandoned the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under its own control under times of war. Peaceful reunification may be ruled out, but not under times of war. And the North has been very explicit in mentioning this. It has said it will subjugate, annex, reclaim South Korean territory, and it has not ruled out the offensive usage of nuclear weapons in this regard. So the issue of unification, I think, is still very much present. On denuclearization, even though in my view North Korea is unlikely ever to give up its nuclear weapons, I think it would be extremely foolish to abandon denuclearization as a long-term goal. Both on the part of South Korea and on the part of the U.S. In the interim term, the question is, what do we do? Do we try and deal with North Korea? Korea akin to how the U.S. tried to deal with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and consider moratoria on missile testing, limits or caps on the types and numbers of missiles? Do we consider arms reduction? All of these measures, whilst plausible, rely on North Korea coming back to the negotiating table. And I think even though a summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un in the future is actually more likely than I would have said six months ago, and it might happen, I think any explicit statement on the part of the West, on the part of the U.S. and South Korea saying that denuclearization has been abandoned in favor of arms control, that really does legitimize North Korea as a nuclear powerhouse. Which, as I mentioned earlier, is one of Kim Jong-un's ultimate goals. So there's a very difficult balance here between the reality of the situation, which is a nuclear North Korea that is never going to give up its nuclear weapons. And what do we do with this? How do we live with this situation? And on the other hand, not being seen to concede to North Korea, to appease North Korea actively, in the way that, makes the situation even worse. That's a very interesting observation you make about North Korea's carefully articulated conditions for unification. If they say in time of war, then they're prepared to act by force to unify the peninsula. That raises a question of how do we define a time of war? In a way, North Korea is involved in a war already with Russia. There could also be a time of war in the region of Northeast Asia, if there was a clash over Taiwan, for instance. So can I just go a little bit deeper on that? What do you think their understanding is of a time of war? And do you think they're just using this sort of rather open, vague expression to give themselves freedom to choose when to act and put the rest of us on the back foot? Well, the official statement by Kim Jong-un at the time, was in the case of any conflict on the Korean peninsula, particularly a conflict on the peninsula initiated by South Korea. And by that, we can also infer the United States. The key thing here is what Sang-hun mentioned earlier, this idea of the hostile policy. North Korea has, for decades, been extremely elusive and ambiguous in defining just what is within the realm of this U.S. hostile policy, which it basically says is anything that it deals with. This is anything that it deems to constitute an act that overthrows or that tries to overthrow the ruling regime and what's outside the realm of the hostile policy. This is deliberate because it shows that the North wants to be in control and place any form of economic sanction, verbal criticism, military exercise, and such like in this basket of a hostile policy. The basket of the hostile policy is constantly expanding because North Korea is the one who determines just what it comprises. And I think this is something that is part and parcel of Pyongyang's strategy. It was part and parcel of Pyongyang's strategy before it acquired nuclear weapons. Now that it's got nuclear weapons, it's even more central. Sang-hun, what do you think about how this condition for forceful unification is understood? And what's the response in South Korea to that? Well, there are several conditions that North Korea might need. To really take an advantageous line, as Edward pointed out at the beginning of today's discussions, it is important for North Korea that U.S. forces in South Korea is withdrawn. If that really takes place, or at least there is a significant disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea, that will be a great opportunity for North Korea to try to annex South Korea by force. There are some other aspects to consider as well, which is nuclear weapons. Currently, it is estimated by an institution like CIPRI that North Korea has about 60 nuclear weapons. And we are not really sure about the exact number of nuclear warheads it has, but they need to really make sure that it has credible second-strike capability, like Edward said. And according to recent IEA assessments, North Korea has recently expanded its fissile material production in the Yongbyon area. And it will give North Korea additional capacity to produce about four to six nuclear warheads per year, which is combined to the existing capability. It may produce about 16 to 20 nuclear weapons a year. That means within 10 years, it will possess as many nuclear warheads as the U.K. or France, at which point it will get a more diversified and more credible second-strike capability. Although we are not really sure if its ICBMs are trustworthy in terms of re-entry capacity, so it can threaten the U.S. homeland. But the very possibility of its capacity to strike the United States homeland raises a fundamental question about the credibility of the nuclear warheads. And that is why we are considering the possibility of a second-strike capability, which can be detrimental to the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance. So again, this leads to potential divergence between the alliance, which may weaken the alliance, so which will in the end give North Korea a greater opportunity. Another aspect I think we need to consider is overall geopolitical situations. So there is a war going on in Ukraine, and the Middle East situation is not resolved fully. And there are some speculations that Russia might want to expand its war to the Baltic States. And adding to that, if there is another contingency in Northeast Asia, the U.S. ability to support South Korea, if North Korea invades South Korea, will be significantly affected. So it will give a strategic opportunity for North Korea, which is concerning. A lot of people noticed when the United States withdrew some parts of the missile defense system, I think, in South Korea, reduced a number of ground troops in the region as well. The U.S. official policy is based on this idea of deterrence on the first island chain. I've never been very clear where the Korean Peninsula sits in relation to the first island chain. Is it understood to be part of it? Edward, do you know the normal interpretation of that? So if we go back historically, we go back to a statement made by Dina Akshason in 1950, who was President Harry Truman's, one of his administration. Akshason made clear that the Korean Peninsula was outside of the U.S.'s defense perimeter. This was particularly concerning at the time. And we've seen a revival of interest in this speech, particularly given, as Sang-hoon mentioned, the potential for the U.S. defense. I think the big question here is what happens in a Taiwan contingency. If there's a Taiwan contingency, and the United States needs to redeploy some of the troops stationed in South Korea as part of this doctrine of strategic flexibility, will North Korea use that as an opportunity to provoke the South, on the grounds that there is a power vacuum? I think this dual contingency is something we need to pay attention to. Secondly, when it comes to the U.S.-South Korean alliance, it's not just in South Korea's, in particular, interest to keep this alliance going. It's in the U.S.'s interest, very much so as well. And when you mentioned earlier, Philip, this removal of parts of the missile defense system, and THAAD system, and the redeployment of some patriots earlier this year to the Middle East, this was a big victory for North Korea and China. I think they were both grinning away because this highlights that the United States cannot be everywhere, in all places, at all times. And any fraying of the U.S. relationship with South Korea, and also the U.S. alliance with Japan as well, will be viewed by North Korea, and by China, and by Russia, as a victory. I also see economic relations currently between South Korea and the United States are going through some difficulties. As part of the Trump administration's broader approach to use of tariffs, and demands for large sums of money to invest in the U.S. economy. I'd like to hear your thoughts about that, and how much concern there is among people in South Korea about the durability of these U.S. commitment? So not much information has been released publicly available between how the negotiation regarding the trade agreement or how much investment South Korea has to make in the U.S. It's not well known, but what signals it signifies is important because it can really affect the durability and strength of the alliance because sometimes it is regarded as a factor that stirs anti-Americanism in South Korea. And there are other thorny issues as well, like the transfer of operational control. And like we just discussed, the withdrawal of U.S. strategic assets to the Middle East, that makes a really question combined together, South Koreans, about how much commitment the U.S. has really to defend South Korea. And historically, the Korean War, as Edward mentioned, by the statement made by Dean Acheson, was very traumatic that South Korea was once deserted by the United States. So sometimes it is recalled by those people who do not really support the alliance as an evidence that the U.S. can just leave us at any time. So managing these complex issues across different sectors is becoming more important at this point. I think in addition to Sung-Hoon's useful points there is the fact of the reality, which is we do not live in the post-Second World War world in which the United States was instrumental with the Marshall Plan, with transforming Japan from its status as one of the West's primary enemies to one of the staunchest U.S. allies. We do not live in that world anymore. And the modern-day alliances rely, and particularly South Korea, on the U.S. and its allies. And so I think that's the reality of the modern-day alliance. And I think that we need to remember that in order for the U.S.-South Korea alliance to continue long beyond the current government in the United States, I think we need to remember that in order for the U.S.-South Korea alliance to continue long beyond the current government in the United States, I think we need to There are some sensitive issues when it comes to domestic politics. So President Lee Jae-myung, when it comes to the trilateral cooperation, also has mentioned that we need to consider that and be realistic, which means that a more soft institutionalization of that corporation can be beneficial not only for South Korea, but for the U.S. and Japan as well. But when it comes to those trade commitment requirements or anything else that might affect the strength of the alliance, I think we really need to separate those two aspects of the relationship. So while South Korea and Japan are finding their way to closer relations and we have adjustment of the U.S. alliance framework in the region and balancing between Europe and Asia, there's also an interesting story. There's a story on the other side, if you like. Edward, you've written a book about the axis of which North Korea is a member. What's your quick take on how seriously should we be taking this? What sort of adjustment should we be prepared to make if this axis is actually going to be durable and significant for us? Well, for me, the most important part of this axis is it's not a formal alliance. And that means we should take the grouping of these four countries, but particularly North Korea, Russia, and Japan, China, more seriously and not less seriously. Because there's no constitution, there's no clubhouse, but all of these countries are members of this club. I think, firstly, the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific as theaters of war are fully interconnected now. So what has previously been seen as Europe's problem or East Asia's problem, I think to categorize conflict, conflicts in this way, at this present time, is inaccurate. Secondly, I think on the part of Great Britain, we need a much clearer China policy and China strategy. I do not think we have one. And I think Beijing is basically using its global economic coercion to compel its economic partners to avoid any kind of actions that it might deem to be critical of China. But I think we need a much stronger China policy here in Britain and on the part of other countries as well. Because ultimately, we're not just dealing with the individual threats from North Korea or Russia or China at the moment. We are, and we look to continue to be, dealing with these individual threats and these countries working together to undermine international order. Sanger, what's your assessment of the axis? Well, I would largely agree with what Edward just mentioned. In the past, I had a slightly different view about the usefulness of the terminology "crank" because traditionally, North Korea has been oscillating between Moscow and Beijing. And by naming them as a solid group, there is a danger that it might consolidate them even more and make us blind about internal dynamics that might lead to diversions between those authoritarian states. But as of now, due to institutionalization of that relationship, as evidenced by continued high-level exchanges and continued cooperation, not only in military domains, but also in economic sectors, "crank" looks stronger than it used to be. To the contrary, our challenge is that we are not as united or coordinated as we used to be. Although we often discuss and talk about the convergence of the securities in the Indo-Pacific and the European theater, NATO state, for instance. Recently in Canada, where Hanwha was competing against the German-Norwegian TKMS platform for the Petrol Submarine Project, the NATO interoperability was playing an important factor, which made Hanwha lose the deal. And in the case of the Polish submarine competition as well, it lost to the Swedish platform because of the same factor. So I think forging a common security identity is not there yet. It is more of a goal that we continue to really need to build. Great. Well, it's time to sum up, but I'd like to ask both of you one last question. If you agree the topics unification, denuclearization should be retired, what might we put in their place? As a sort of shorthand to understand what to look at about what happens on the peninsula and what the meanings of North and South Korea's international diplomacy really bring to our understanding of not just the region's security, but these patterns of global order. Edward, would you like to start? I think denuclearization should be retained as a long-term goal. We should not give North Korea a carte blanche, but we need to think about how we deal with an ever- clear North Korea in the interim. Right. So keep denuclearization not just as a goal, but as a defining issue that we should pay most attention to when we look at the Korean peninsula. Sang-gun, what do you make of that? Although the prospects for peaceful unification or complete denuclearization do not look very promising at the moment, just as tactics without strategy are something to be avoided, I would agree. And as a Korean, I think the vision of unification and denuclearization can still remain a long-term strategic vision for the Korean peninsula. Thanks. Edward, did you want to add anything to this question about, there's a distinction, I think, isn't there, between saying it's an important issue, but should it be the sort of framing issue that we start from when we look at what's happening there? I think we cannot overlook the fact that North Korea, as Sang-gun mentioned, if we do not do anything about North Korea, by 2013, North Korea will have the same number of nuclear warheads as the United Kingdom. That is particularly concerning. I must also add that obviously the North Korea problem is multifaceted. We've got a whole human rights problem that continues to be increasingly egregious, which is also very much linked to questions of security as well. Fantastic. Well, this has to bring us, unfortunately, to the end of today's discussion. And I'd like to thank this week's guests, Edward Howell and Sang-gun Se-ok. I'd also like to thank the Embassy of Japan for their generous support. Thank you. Thank you for their generous ongoing support to RUSI's Indo-Pacific program. Global Security Briefing is available on all major podcast platforms. Please find it, like and subscribe. For further information about the work of the International Security Studies team at RUSI, please follow us on X at ISS underscore RUSI and find out more about the ISS team's research on the RUSI website. But for now, it's goodbye from me, Philip Shatner-Jones at RUSI. I'm Philip Shatner-Jones, and I'll see you in London.