UN Command Korea: Peninsula Security with Lt Gen Winter

Hello, welcome to RUSI in London. I'm Philip Shetler-Jones and this is Global Security Briefing, a podcast from RUSI's international security team that provides insights on security developments in and between the regions of the world. In this edition of Global Security Briefing, we're joined by a special guest, Lieutenant General Winter, Deputy Commander of the United Nations Command, or UNC, in the Republic of Korea since January 2026. Lieutenant General Scott Winter has a distinguished record of service, having held key command and operational appointments including Joint Task Force Commander for the 2019 North Queensland floods, deployments to Timor-Leste, Iraq and Afghanistan. He's also served in liaison roles working with the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Netherlands Department of Defence. Lieutenant General Winter holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of New South Wales, a Master of International Relations from Deakin University, and a Master of Defence and Strategic Studies from King's College here in London. He's also a graduate of the UK Advanced Command and Staff course, where he won the Thales Prize. Lieutenant General Winter, welcome to Global Security Briefing. Thank you so much. It's such a privilege to be here in this incredible building in the middle of London. Thank you. Well, you're very welcome. So I think, why don't we begin with a bit of a history about the UN Command before moving on to some of the contemporary themes. Would that be okay? Yeah, absolutely. The United Nations Command origin story, and that's sort of reflecting on the way in that sometimes, like all superheroes, it's good to understand the origin story to understand where the superpowers come from, because very passionately, I would say that in 1950, when communist North Korea, backed by Soviet Russia and Maoist China, invaded South Korea. Within days, the international community coalesced in order to stand up to that form of aggression. And that has incredible resonance in our world today, that when like-minded countries do come together like they did in 1950, it matters, and it can be incredibly effective. And that United Nations Command coalition that was formed back then had countries from all over the world, NATO countries, obviously, the UK was the second behind the US to deploy forces to the Korean Peninsula. We have Australasia with Australia and New Zealand, North and South America with Canada, Colombia, Southeast Asia with Thailand and the Philippines. And we had Ethiopia in the initial push as well, and South Africa. So it's a really unique coalition. And the fact that we've managed to hold 18 of those member states as active members for the last 76 years is testament to both the commitment of the international community to security on the ground, and the commitment of the international community to security on the Korean Peninsula. But I think it also speaks to the value that each of those nations sees as being part of a framework that has been historically successful, and I would argue is just as relevant today. It's a very unusual case, as you say, to have a mechanism like this, not really set up initially for such a long-term task, and still abiding through all this time and all these changes we've seen in Europe and other parts of the world. The relics of the Cold War coming down, the Berlin Wall. We've been through one or two changes in eras. People talked about the Global War on Terror era, now we're in a new era. So why is it you think that this institution has managed to go on despite all those changes? What do you think motivates all those 18 countries to stay involved? Yeah, that's a great question. And the first thing I'll say there is, clearly each of those 18 member states has its own national interests. And, as a US-led framework, we have to respect each of the different perspectives that those countries bring. But I think at this point in time, my boss, General Xavier Brunson, would hold up his East Up map, which puts the centrality of the Korean Peninsula, its proximity to China, to Russia, to Japan, to the Philippines, and its structure goes all the way to Northern Australia. Geography matters. And geography mattered in 1950, and that geography has not changed. And the centrality, of Korea and its importance to a really consequential theatre, is as relevant today. I think that has probably been what has endured throughout that period of time. Equally, I would say that what the Republic of Korea has done with that hard-won peace sends its own very special message. We've had veterans of the Korean War who've come back to Korea for the very first time, even this year. And it's rare when you get a veteran of a conflict that comes back, looks at the field of battle, and says, "We're not going to be able to do this. We're not going to be able to do this. We're not going to be able to do this." It was worth it. So the miracle on the hand that has been enabled through the establishment of the armistice, the maintenance of the armistice, through the commitment throughout those 73 years since the armistice, that shows what a hard-won peace can do and what it can look like. And I think that in and of itself is a really powerful message that conflicts don't have to be everlasting or enduring, and that with the expenditure of blood and treasure that the United Nations did, for the UK, 1,078 servicemen and women fell through those three years of really brutal conflict at a time in the aftermath of World War II when people didn't really want another war. But what it won, I think, is something that all of those nations' member command states today say, "Hey, we're really proud to have been part of this, and this is worth protecting and enduring." That's interesting you said that. Last night, I attended Korea National Day here in London, and there were the family of veterans who've fallen in the war, and also families of those who'd had the chance to go back, and some of them after a very long period. And there was one story that was told about the impression that was made on this veteran that he went back to see a completely different landscape compared to when he was there during the war. The country was destroyed then, and now it's one of the most modern, vibrant democracies and countries in the world. And that was exactly the sentiment that he laid on, which is that that was just- Yeah, absolutely. -just shows that we were right to think this was worth it. This is what we've contributed to preserving. Yeah, and that's inspirational and certainly consistent with what I've seen from so many of our veterans. Again, General Brunson likes to describe the importance of our veterans, who are all getting really old now, which is something that we need to respect as well. But they're that bridge between the battlefields of the past and the hard-won peace that we need to protect today. So when Air Vice-Marshal Marshall, the Chief of Joint Ops, and I, had the opportunity to lay wreaths at the Korean War Memorial just this morning, we see that as respect to the past, but the opportunity to recommit to the importance of this in the future. And that constellation of adversaries that we faced in 1950, the growing relationship between North Korea and Russia is a reminder that security is global. It is not a localized threat. And sadly, that's a timely reminder for us in the United Nations' command of the importance of our mission, not just in a Korean Peninsula sort of sense, but that a stable Korean Peninsula is good for the world. Well, let's go now a bit to the aspect of the history, which I think some of us still find we have to take great care when we comprehend what we mean when we say UN command, because when things were set up, the UN itself was in a different shape. People's Republic of China was not representing China. The operation was given its UN blessing in circumstances where Russia was abstaining from the Security Council. So of course, all these things look quite different now. So if you could explain a bit how the UN command fits in alongside the other major actors on the peninsula and in the region, both in terms of the command and control structures, but also, how is the UN command perceived in Beijing and in Moscow and in Pyongyang nowadays? And I spend a bit of my time explaining the United Nations command and the uniqueness of that brand. And as you say, it was created in 1950 in a very particular point in time, and had a very powerful message from a United Nations perspective when it was raised. But it's a very different time today. The three of the permanent five members who voted to stand it up in 1950 are still members today. And the United Nations command is a brand that is certainly very well understood on the Korean peninsula, and in particular, importantly, by our North Korean neighbors from the perspective of the armistice enforcement, the pillar of the separation of forces and the management of the demilitarized zone that enabled the Republic of Korea to prosper. But it can sometimes be a little bit confusing for some people. You know, they see the United Nations command badge and the flag, and they think somehow it's got some linkages to, you know, contemporary United Nations or peacekeeping, which it doesn't. We operate under a directive from the United States chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we are a U.S.-led multinational headquarters, and part of a tri-command structure. Now, as I sort of explained this, my apologies to the listeners who will know that this probably wouldn't pass any staff college exams, what I'm about to describe, but it is an evolution and something that is fit for purpose on the nominally governed under United States Forces Korea. That's the presence of U.S. forces in Korea. And the third of the tri-command alongside UNC is then the combined forces command, which is a bilateral warfighting headquarters that is stood up in the event of crisis and contingency. Within that, the role of the contemporary United Nations command is twofold. One is the continued sacred mission of ensuring the armistice continues until such a time that we transition to a peace regime. And the second part is really a reflection of the 1953 Washington Declaration, where all those United Nations command member states committed themselves to coming back to the defence of Korea in the event of renewal of hostilities. So the second part of our role as a United Nations command is to coordinate member state contributions in support of the combined forces command. So it's very much a supporting headquarters. Relatively small in this day and age, 13 of those 18 member states have permanent members stationed in Korea. And twice a year, we practice that coordination of member state contributions through our exercise series. And we triple in size as we get supplementation from those member states into the headquarters. And then a big part of what we do is continue to fly those flags proudly under one flag, as we say, under that one UN flag that those 18 member state flags. And an example, I guess, of the enduring commitment is once a month, General Brunson and I will meet with the member state ambassadors of those 18 member states. You know, I don't think that happens as, you know, as a board of governors for any other coalition framework anywhere in the world. And I think that brings a great dynamic and an appreciation that United Nations command really does sit at that political military interface. And for me, it's our ability to harness the combined willpower of those 18 member states. So that's our superpower that we got in our origin story. Let's take those one at a time then, if we may. So on the first one, supporting the implementation of the armistice, what does that involve in terms of your day-to-day activities? Yeah, so we have an enduring presence through our security battalion up in the joint security area, which is a combined security battalion, US and Korean soldiers that make that and alongside our military armistice commission team, the day-to-day is conducting inspections, ensuring compliance with the armistice, both on our side and on the North Korean side. We have active communications with the Korean People's Army twice a day. So that line of communication is absolutely critical to ensure there is no misunderstandings. It might just be routine messaging. Other times it's de-conflicting firefighting, but also in the event of an incident, it's our ability to very rapidly open communications and de-escalate. That's a dialogue being absolutely critical. Where there is an accusation of an armistice violation by either side, our teams will go and conduct those inspections. And I think really importantly, to also acknowledge the role of the neutral nation supervisory commission. So on the southern side, that is made up of Swedish and Swiss officers who provide another independent view on these things. Previously, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the North provided that function. They were frozen out literally and figuratively by the North some years ago, but Poland continues to play a very active role in that as well. So that multinational brokering, that ability to continue to provide international willpower in that part of the world, very carefully, very deliberately through the incredible dedication and commitment of member state members to all those duties. Sometimes when the armistice has, you know, people think maybe it's not relevant, but for me, the fact that it's gone so well is through the discipline and dedication of those members that I'm very proud to see every day. And then on the second role you describe, the convening of the bigger multilateral family, you mentioned, and I was surprised to be reminded, 18 nations. Can you just go through that so people get a sense of how geographically widespread this community is? Yeah. So if we look at Australia and New Zealand, Australia, New Zealand, and again, those countries are all part of the Commonwealth Occupying Forces in Japan. And hence, by being forward deployed, they're able to get there quickly. And there's an enduring lesson for today as well. Thailand and the Philippines, fantastic to have that Southeast Asian regional flavor, and that brings it immediate proximity. Canada, you know, our North American friends, Colombia, South America, and then if we look at the NATO presence in Scandinavian countries of Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, Germany is a great story because they rejoined UNC just two years ago. If anyone wants a lesson for people seeing the contemporary continued relevance of the United Nations command, that the country would rejoin and want to have that presence in that region. And countries as far flung as South Africa that continue to be actively engaged as an important part of that overall framework. I think you would be hard pressed to find a family as diverse as that. And people talk about the strength in diversity. And I really mean that in this case, because having the longevity and that continued relevance of those nations showing an active interest, whether it's through the ambassadorial representation or the 13 member states who have provided permanent positions into the headquarters, that sends a message. When you go to a country and you see that diversity of uniforms, it brings different perspectives. It brings a different way of looking at the problem. It brings understanding of what it means when North Korea provides troops into a conflict in Europe. So it helps us to understand that as well. And I think the fact that we have NATO members that come in with expertise on Russia to help us understand what some of those things mean, what is North Korea learning, that helps us be better. For our immediate mission as well. Yeah. So it's really over every continent of the world, which is perhaps unique. It is. And I would say in the contemporary security environment, alliance frameworks have been under pressure. There has been significant developments. We have alternate world viewpoints that are sort of being pressed and things are under pressure. And my response to that as a military professional has spent my entire life working and fighting coalitions in the United Nations. And I think we need to double down on these sort of frameworks. I think the coalescing of NATO in response to the Russian actions in Ukraine is a great lesson in that regard. And equally, my sort of travel here to the UK is to thank the UK for their continued commitment to United Nations command, but also to ensure that we are representing what the member states need, what those interests are, and make sure that as the ones flying that one flag, that we're doing so in a way that continues to be relevant. And reflects the willpower of the member states. In terms of the mission that goes with that, the PACOM commander, Admiral Paparo, has a really elegant way of helping to understand deterrence. He describes it in terms of that combination of hard power capability, willpower, and the adversary's understanding of those two. And you look at what a coalition such as United Nations command does in that regard, it brings additional capability. It brings international willpower of the many. And that's extremely important. That's extremely strong. And we talked about that UNC brand. The UNC brand is well understood by regional players. I think that's really an interesting case in a period where connections, diplomatic and others with North Korea have really been cut away or withered away from many countries. You used to still have this very practical daily link. So they respect the value of the institution of UN command. But going more widely, as you say, multilateral approaches for deterrence and security are often criticized as block formation or countries ganging up. Somehow, though, it seems like UN commands had a pass on that. I don't hear or see communications from countries that usually voice these kind of objections to multilateral military formations like Asian NATO. I don't really see that coming your way. Am I missing something or do you think there's a reason why you're not a target for that? Perhaps that is part of a United Nations command success is that it's managed to speak quietly but carry a big stick. And I think that there's a lesson there in terms of how we are most effective. Bellicose rhetoric isn't always the best way to go. I don't think we need to thump our chests as a framework because it is a well-established and well-understood brand. And I also think it's diversity of representation. I think it'd be pretty brave to throw rocks at a framework that includes such a diversity of nations because somewhere you're going to bump into someone and say, well, actually. Yeah, you've got BRICS members, Northern South, Southeast Asia. But all coalescing around where there is common ground. I think that, for me, is the presence of a number of those nations as real richness to this framework. Now, coalitions are never easy. It was the great Winston Churchill who said that anything worse than fighting in coalitions, is fighting outside ones. And the principle of coalition operations is always univariate. effort versus unity of command but in my experience it is worth it trying to pull together any form of coalition framework once a conflict has begun as we've seen even in recent times incredibly difficult in which case the alternative is that you know we invest in these frameworks particularly something like a united nations command which given its location and its membership has enormous potential for the future. Could you describe to us how it would look if this was activated in the scenario of a major breach of the armistice where these countries would be called upon to come back as you put it how would that work how would it look what would be your role? Yeah I think the first thing that we would look to do is by ensuring that we are communicating extremely closely and effectively as a community and as a community of people. I think the first thing that we would look to do is by ensuring that we are communicating extremely closely and effectively with those 18 member states is to bring the willpower and the messaging of those 18 member states to bear in order to de-escalate. Okay so this is on the diplomatic level? Absolutely de-escalate and the return to armistice so we have a framework that we can go back to so rather than you know just seeing vertical escalation being inevitable the first role of UNC and General Brunson says this all the time the first line of defense of the armistice is United Nations. It's our troops on the ground there it's our ability to communicate and de-escalate and the trusted framework that we have in the event of some sort of contingency to be able to message and bring that back to bear and to do that through 18 member state capitals is going to be more effective than one or two so that's our first sort of piece there. Now if there is further escalation and that was not to be successful then our role of UNC as a supporting headquarters and framework is understand what the needs of the Combined Forces Command and our Korean hosts might be. And sorry Combined Forces Command refers to South Korea and USA is that right? That's correct so General Brunson here is a challenge of wearing three hats he is the Combined Forces Commander the US Forces Korea Command as well as United Nations Command. His first hat is that UN Command hat of course so initial phase that's the one he's been wearing if he then has to also put on his Combined Forces Command. The second hat is that UN Command hat in the event of further escalation then the role of UNC then becomes to synchronize and coordinate those supporting functions. Now we need to think pretty imaginatively about what that can look like. It might be the tangible force elements based on what is deployed forward in the region through our various campaigning efforts that are going on across the Indo-Pacific. It may be harnessing the information domain to be able to counter misinformation to avoid a widening of the conversation. It may be a conflict through that international action. It may be in some of those non-standard domains such as cyber and space where the tyranny of distance enables us to act you know relatively quickly in support of a contingency on the peninsula. And it needs to be those mechanisms whereby we can potentially provide material support and in a parallel example to what's occurred with the conflict in the Ukraine. And in that regard what we haven't mentioned yet is I think the real jewel in the crown. The crown of the United Nations Command. United Nations Command Rear. A status of forces agreement with the incredible support of the government of Japan that enables us to get forces and equipment and material prepositioned quickly in the event of a crisis. And in that regard the other thing that UNC offers is you know true operational depth to the Korean Peninsula and to General Brunson with his many hats. Yeah I think it may be worth saying a bit more about the extraordinary importance of the UN Command. I think it's a very important point. I think it's a very important of UN rear in Japan because I imagine when you exercise or you prepare to move large amounts of military equipment if it gets to that there are lots of diplomatic, legal, logistical, regulatory issues that have to be solved or hopefully you don't have to solve them on the day because you've cleared the way. Can you tell us a bit more about what is so irreplaceable about the Japan dimension? Yeah so at present say it clearly has the historical basis that the United Nations Command was originally commanded from Japan. General MacArthur that's where he was in his command position at the outbreak of the Korean War. So it has a very strong historical basis but the geography is irreplaceable in that regard and so the infrastructure that the United States and Japan have in terms of you know ports and airfields and bases in Japan is really critical in the event of any sort of regional contingency and important for the United Nations. So I think it's a very important point. I think it's a very important point and it's a deterrent posture as well. So for United Nations Command nine of the member states signatories to that SOFA and we exercise it regularly bringing in maritime domain awareness platforms and the like that come in under General Brunson's authority quite routinely which enables us to ensure that we are doing so in a really respectful manner for the government of Japan who are incredibly grateful for their very enthusiastic support for us doing that. Indeed I think Japan is a great example of the government that has seen the value in multilateralism writ large and in our engagements with them that they see you know the UNC presence in UNC as a really important part of that and yeah important in other contingencies as well you know if the requirement for forms of evacuation and that goes everything from a natural disaster through to a contingency our ability to very rapidly you know access some of those bases through the stewardship of the SOFA. It's a really valuable part of what we do. I think as well that in a part of the world where cooperation is so important our ability to support increased bilateral collaboration between Korea and Japan through that is certainly an area that we'd like to explore further in the future. Well I think we've covered a lot of the history so let's turn a bit more to recent contemporary issues. What do you think are the most important factors which are different now under your command than either back when UNC was set up or in the period where we had a very different atmosphere in terms of talks with North Korea, six-party talks about denuclearization, much more opening. I mean here at RUSI we used to have a visiting fellow from North Korea at one stage. We don't have that now but what do you think people ought to understand about the landscape that faces you in doing your duty today? You know I think the first significant change that has impacted us in recent times in 2024 North Korea made their declaration of two hostile states and more recently have changed their constitution to reflect that. Interestingly enough if you go online you can see that they're actually doctoring some historical photos so they put lines in between the two Koreas as if that's what they're always after. So interesting for those students of revisionist history there so they have a look at some of those things. But you know a very clear statement by North Korea followed by the constitutional change that for North Korea really doesn't look at the idea of reunification at all. Their activities increasingly reflect that we see North Korea that you know whether it's through its cryptocurrency, cybercrime, other efforts to circumvent the sanctions regime that was put in place. They're reasonably confident in this sort of post-COVID environment that come from their own skin as a separate state and that creates a number of dilemmas not least of which for the Republic of Korea in terms of how might it respond to that. So that's a significant change in the dynamic and obviously that's occurred alongside the commitment of North Korean material and troops to the war in Ukraine. The growing multifaceted relationship between North Korea and Russia which is to the mutual benefit of both those parties and should be of significant concern to North Korea. So those things change the dynamic and even from a threat perspective you know North Korea that is getting exposed to techniques, procedures and technology to do with unmanned systems. That's clearly something that we are keenly aware of within the tri-command and aware of our need to ensure that the capabilities resident in the peninsula between coalition partners is able to you know counterbalance and overmatch that. I'm confident it does but it's an example that it's not. A threat posture that has stood still it's one that will continue to evolve and one that we need to look at very carefully and again that's where it's great to have a UNC membership to include NATO nations that are very keenly involved in supporting the Ukraine. So the lessons that are being learned are immediately transferable between theatres as well. So that immediacy I would say is very significant. The other thing we spoke you know briefly about you know Japan and their sort of emphasis on multilateralism. I think the other thing that's changing in a good way across the region is that security framework in the Indo-Pacific that were perhaps previously characterized with the United States at the centre with treaty ally spokes out to Japan, Korea, Thailand, Philippines and Australia. Now we see increased cooperation between Japan and Australia, Japan the Philippines, Thailand and the Philippines and that sort of thickening of the web is I think a really positive development regionally in terms of the stronger mini multi-lab relationships that we see across the region and one that has relevance and resonance for united nations command with so many of those countries being involved in those mini frameworks as well so i like to increasingly think of united nations command going forward as a crucible of collaboration an environment by which you know through the representation that is there we can have those discussions about where those opportunities for additional collaboration are and really great to you know work with the koreans to create opportunities for them to be part of you know a number of those activities as well yeah and that's rare in the world to have that kind of a platform for exchange but it's probably even more rare in east asia west pacific region do you think there is a potential there or maybe it already happens to some extent not just to have those 18 countries who were if you like on the south korean side during the war in the 50s but also have some way of connecting with the koreans and the koreans and the koreans and the koreans and the connecting across to the north korean side or you know the russia and china side as well to go that one step further in reassurance and defusing misunderstandings correcting when sometimes people's suspicions you know elevated too high absolutely i think anything we can do to build opportunities for dialogue absolutely critical and i'm very fortunate for example to have on the neutral nations and supervisory commission the swedes who have maintained ambassador in the north and we've been able to learn personally learned enormous a lot from my swedish colleagues about north korea which has helped my understanding and those things that we understand and can demystify helps build those opportunities for dialogue and understanding our sacred mission is one of deterrence that the world can ill afford another regional conflict let alone one you know in northeast asia so everything that we do should be based on that deterrence and deterrence and deterrence and deterrence and deterrence and i think you're very right to point that out that a multilateral framework certainly isn't just about ganging up and bullying others it's to have those different perspectives and those opportunities for other nations within that framework that said well have we thought about this here's another channel that we might sort of look and i would like to you know in my time continue to develop those opportunities to practice our ability to look at options for de-escalation to return to an armistice to enable those opportunities for dialogue you know it's important that we exercise the full range of our multi-domain capabilities but i think it's equally important that we look at our ability to manage crisis and you know unc's role in de-escalation and return to armistice and doing that with that harnessing the power of our member states to do so i'd like to understand that a bit better when you say return to armistice the implication is current status is not well described by armistice i mean i don't know what the better term would be as you say there's been very intriguing developments with the north koreans making a constitutional change to no longer insist on unification of the peninsula as i understand it the south korean republic of korea still do have that ambition written into their constitution but what do you think we should understand by that what's the thinking on the north korean side is there a prospect there for them to move as you put it back to armistice but maybe even a step further which is towards a more stable long-term comprehensive peace agreement and normal relations with the neighbors i think that's what we all need to be aiming towards armistice was only ever meant to be temporary and if i talk about return to armistice that would again an armistice that means that separation of forces and the physical and mental space to enable dialogue the armistice is a fascinating document and framework and has an incredible success story but certainly never designed the last 73 plus years when you read the armistice documentation it's the language of weeks and months it was something that created that separation of forces it is what it says on the tin it's a military demarcation line so demilitarized zone separation of forces you know two kilometers either side of that mdl in order to create space for dialogue for a lasting peace and the armistice still allows for that and ideally we get to that point where we enable the north and south korea to have that space for dialogue to negotiate a lasting peace there's some complex political hurdles that might need to be overcome in that regard that that's you know unc's responsibility to continue to fight to create space for that but yeah that i think is what we all are working towards ultimately is that opportunity for a lasting peace and dialogue not just in the you know the korean peninsula but what that would mean for the wider region for those who are the way that that term armistice is very deliberate still in fact there is a state of conflict you know resident on the peninsula and when people do come and visit and we sort of bring them and we show them the reality of the demilitarized zone it's a tough environment still remains one of the most dangerous bits of ground anywhere in the world and the reality is we've got on the south korean side and some fantastic young 21 22 year old conscripts you know doing really tough duty up there and i take my hat off to the work they do in a really really tough environment but certainly i see my role was looking to protect them but you know continue to set those conditions so that they have a enduring peace you know somewhere down the track and hopefully not too far we had a very sad reminder recently where there was a mine incident resulting in casualties on the south korean side what should we take from that i mean as you say it is a reminder that it's a dangerous environment but is it also in some ways unstable i mean what causes this kind of incident to happen after having a static line for so many years yeah i think you're right to say it's a reminder of just what a dangerous space the demilitarized zone continues to be that particular incident remains under investigation so i won't speak to that directly but it shows the requirement for incredible careful diligent planning and commitment for any of the activities that we conduct in that space the need for transparency that hence the importance of our communication with the kpa through the lines of communication that we keep open that's korean people's army right that's the army of the north yeah so the korean people's army that we speak to twice a day we talk through these we report these incidents with them straight away we investigate them and should they end up being violations you know we communicate that in the in the firmest possible manner as well so it's a really tough area it continues to evolve largely due to those sort of political changes that we refer to but my response from a united nations command perspective is to double down on the importance of us being careful and transparent and robust in our planning and transparent in our communications to avoid any incident occurring in the first place but where it does occur that there isn't an escalation or something is seen as a provocation so yeah it's a timely reminder of what is one of the most dangerous places on the earth i mean here in the uk a lot of the discussion about defense is drawing on what we see happening in ukraine especially things that look very different like extensive use of uncruised systems for strike and reconnaissance how have those technological advances in warfare affected your job yeah i think professionally we look you know very carefully not just in ukraine even more recently with the middle east looking at the role of drones the importance of layered integrated air and missile defense being very much to the fore so i guess what i'm saying is we do look very carefully at it and look at the applicable lessons not every lesson is directly applicable so we need to be careful that we don't universally think that we apply things from one leader to another but certainly i think not just the role of uncrewed systems but i think the other reminder i take from ukraine is that while the character of war evolves the nature of war as brutal and bloody and violent and something that is to be avoided is something that needs with the forefront of our minds the other lesson i take from ukraine is that deterrence can fail so to and you know our response to what we see in ukraine is we need to ensure that we are integrating the lessons that we are conducting our training that we are building the interoperability you know there's so important between allies and partners in our part of the world and particularly with our korean counterparts so that we are as ready as possible to avoid not being ready if deterrence fails and to ensure that we are as ready as possible to avoid not being ready if deterrence fails to put our young men and women in the best possible situation in the event that the conflict does occur in the 50s when these agreements that un command was based on were set up we didn't have drones we didn't have some of these technologies is there an opportunity there to on the basis of the connections that you've got and this multilateral community that you've got to advance sort of discussions on bringing mechanisms of communication and communication mechanisms into the agreements so that when new risk arises from misunderstandings, use of drones over the boundary, that that might call for new approaches or new agreements? Yeah, look, it's certainly something that we spend a lot of time working on and actively looking at how we manage, and I'll use the example of cyber. There is clearly no mention in the armistice of cyber. In 1950, we struggled to find anyone outside of the science fiction community that was talking about that. So if that's not in there, how do cyber gray zone activities affect something like the armistice and what would constitute an armistice violation? Now, I think we've got some good work and understanding such that if something can constitute a hostile act, whether that's in the cyber domain or through an artillery action, then we can characterize something as a violation of the armistice. But that's something we need to work to ensure that all parties to the armistice have a common understanding. And that's not just something that we've determined where we are, and that we've got work to do in that regard to ensure, as you say, our understanding of that is consistent and that we have mechanisms to address them when they occur. And gray zone tactics writ large, I think, are a real challenge for all of us and certainly on the peninsula as well. Disinformation, cyber attacks are very real challenges. However, the multinational framework that's represented by something like the Armistice Act and something like UNC is a powerful platform to push back against those things. Much easier to do that collectively than if you're being isolated by one malicious actor. Yeah, I suppose that's a great advantage that you're immune really from the charge of just representing a small group of nations with a particular ideological or policy preference that you're representing a much broader range. But just because we've already run into your time. And you've been very kind, spending time at RUSI, talking to us and answering all the questions. I just wanted to come to a last one, which is, if you think of the difference that you would like to make under the terms of your command, under the period of your command, what would you like to push forward and advance before you hand over to your successor? Yeah, look, time marches on very quickly. It feels like yesterday when I got there in January, and so having come from U.S. Army Pacific, it's something I've been thinking about a lot and for a long time. It really is ensuring that we have a framework where we can truly harness the potential represented by that coalition framework, that we move beyond the sense that it is some sort of historical vestige and something that is real with looking. But there is a framework that is doing good within the Korean Peninsula. Now, I think the practical mechanisms I'd like to do in that regard is really, really honing down on those key functions that we think we need to be able to provide in 2026 in a headquarters that really does need to be able to work in the information domain. I think it needs to work in the new domains of cyber and space. And I think it needs to have really strong linkages with our Korean hosts and counterparts so that we are providing something complementary that helps them to buy down risk, that we are of use to our Korean counterparts. And they look to us when they know that there is additional support that they can provide from that multilateral framework. And that's all confidence building measures. So another year and a bit or so to continue to do that. I think the last thing I would like to say on that is I first went to Korea as a more junior officer on one of these exercises as supplementary staff into the United Nations Command headquarters. That planted a real seed for me. And what I really am passionate about is getting young officers out from each of the United Nations Command member states to get them exposed to a great country that is the contemporary thriving democracy of the Republic of Korea. It's a great professional development environment. It's a great battle lab to learn about all those things that we've discussed today. And I'd like to get more people exposed to that. So I'm really keen that through our exercise series that we bring people out. They get to see Korea. They get to see a great coalition. They get to see a great coalition framework. And then we also have a great bench of people who understand the problem set. And one of them can take my position in a couple of years' time. Great. Well, I'm hoping that there will be people among RUSI's listeners on the global security briefing that will hear that and respond to it. This has to bring us to the end of today's discussion with our special guest, Lieutenant General Winter from UN Command Korea. I'd like to thank General Scott Winter very much himself. Also thank the Embassy of Japan for their generous. Ongoing support to our Indo-Pacific program. Global Security Briefing is available on all major podcast platforms. Please like and subscribe. For further information about the work of the International Security Studies team at RUSI, please follow us on X@ISS_RUSI and find out more about the ISS team's research on the RUSI website. But for now, it's goodbye from me, Philip Shetler-Jones at RUSI in London. Thank you.