TSMC Founder Morris Chang

The podcast about great technology companies and the stories and playbooks. Oh, no, you said technology. Now we definitely have a cold opening. All right. I guess I really want us to be about technology companies again. Well, this is a technology company. It's a sign. All right, here we go. Welcome to the spring 2025 season of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts. Today, we have something very special to share with you. After becoming obsessed with semiconductors from our TSMC episode four years ago, David and I wound our way through the rest of the industry, studying fabulous companies like Endesa. NVIDIA and Qualcomm, architecture companies like Arm, and chip design software companies like Synopsys. And as we were thinking, what's next in the world of chips on Acquired, we threw the Hail Mary. We asked friend of the show, Jensen Huang, if he would ask Dr. Morris Chang, the 93-year-old founder of TSMC, if he would be open to an interview with us. It is kind of insane and super cool that Jensen made time to help us with this. It's not like he doesn't have a lot of other things going on. Yes. Well, listeners, it happened. So today's episode is a conversation that we recorded in Taipei last week at Dr. Chang's office. We flew to Taiwan for a 48-hour whirlwind where we spent some time at TSMC's headquarters in Hinshu Science Park, where many of TSMC's fabs are located. Super cool to see. Totally. So conveniently, Dr. Chang just published volume two of his autobiography a couple months ago after a 26-year hiatus from volume one. But inconveniently, it is written in traditional Chinese and not published in the Western world. We managed to get our hands on an unpublished translation of the book to prepare. And what you are about to hear focuses on a few crucial stories from TSMC's history that Dr. Chang shares in his memoir about Apple, NVIDIA, and the birth of the fabless industry. Yes. And big thank you to Karina Bao, who we were lucky to connect with after we set this up, and who has been translating Morris's memoirs with funding from Tyler Cowen and Emergent Ventures. Right now, the memoirs are not published in English, and we will let you know if and when that happens. Yep. All right. Listeners, you can join our email list at acquire.fm slash email. You'll get an email every time a new episode drops once a month. And this is also where we announce past episode corrections, plus a fun little game where we give hints at what the next episode will be. I always have fun writing those. You do. That's a clear David job. So with that, this show is not investment advice. David and I may have investments in the companies that we discuss, and this show is for information. and entertainment purposes only. Please enjoy this conversation with Dr. Morris Chang with some of David and my reflections following its conclusion. We thought as a fun way to start things off would actually be to talk about the man who introduced us. Could you tell us a little bit in your words about your relationship with Jensen and TSMC's special relationship with NVIDIA? Yeah, it started, my relationship with Jensen started with a letter that he sent to me. I think it was 1997. And the letter was sent through the post office, and I received it in Hsinchu. And the letter said that they were NVIDIA, the company that Jensen was the CEO of, was the. It was a small company, but they had developed some really promising chips. But they were looking for a foundry, and they had approached TSMC's San Jose office, but they really got no answer from San Jose. So they had to go to San Jose, and they had to go to San Jose, would I please contact Jensen? Because NVIDIA really wanted to do business with TSMC. So I was going to the U.S. in the next week anyway. So the letter, frankly, raised my curiosity and also. irritated me a little bit because, you know, I had always told our salespeople that we should never be negligent in talking to future customers, even if the customer seems to be a very small one. And at this point, NVIDIA was four years old. They were facing bankruptcy, I think. And they had maybe 50 or 60 employees. So TSMC, I think, at that time, already had a few thousand employees. We had exceeded. I remember we had exceeded the $1 billion in revenue in 1995, and this was 1997. So we were, relatively speaking, we were a pretty big company. Yeah. Which is very impressive. You were yourself only a 10-year-old company doing over a billion dollars in revenue. Yeah, right. So the following week, I went to California, and I called him back without advance notice. I called Jensen. I looked up. I think there was a telephone number on the stationery that he sent me the letter on. Jensen himself picked up the phone, and there was a lot of background noise. So there were, I mean, he was arguing something with his people. But as soon as I introduced myself, I said, this is Morris Stern. He immediately shouted at those people that were making noises. He said, quiet. Morris Stern is calling me. So I then proceeded to make an appointment with him to visit him, to visit NVIDIA the next day or something like that. And that was our first visit, our first meeting. And he immediately impressed me with his articulateness and also impressed me with his optimism. Well, he was also very frank. He told me that NVIDIA was in financial difficulties, but the chip that he wanted now to have foundried was not only the chip, but the chip that he wanted now was not only to save the company, it would also make NVIDIA a major customer of TSMC. I mean, that was, you know, actually quite a bold statement. You know, we were over a billion dollars. And to be a major customer of ours, he would have to produce revenue for us of at least $50 million. In a year, okay? Was that chip the Riva 128? I forgot the number, but it was a very successful chip. Yeah. I don't think it was Riva anything. It was a games chip, of course. It was successful. In fact, his prediction came true. Not only did it solve NVIDIA's financial problems, it prevented it from being bankrupt, you know. Not only did it do that, it also started to make them a major customer of TSMC. Within two or three years, they were, they did become one of the biggest five customers of TSMC. Very successful chip, yeah. So there was a great partnership forged there. TSMC would fab the chips, would manufacture them. NVIDIA would design them. That is true all the way to today at immense scale, but it hasn't always been easy and it hasn't always been perfect. And I want to go to this moment in 2009 on the 40 nanometer node where development was slower than TSMC had hoped and it was costing customers like NVIDIA time and money. Can you share the story of how this came to be and how it was resolved? Well, I, decided to, um, give the CEO job to a potential successor of mine while I will still retain the chairmanship. In Taiwan, usually the chairman is the top man anyway, even though CEO is another person. So the problem you just mentioned happened during the period when someone else was the CEO. Apparently, it was a manufacturing problem. It was also a quality problem. And it was the quality problem that the CEO first reported to me. But the CEO insisted that our people, we had the director of quality, insisted that we were not, TSMC was not at fault. And so on that basis, on the basis of our quality manager's arguments, he had not offered NVIDIA anything. Now, as far as the manufacturing problem was concerned, it was a yield problem. And everybody was suffering from it. And of course, NVIDIA at that time was perhaps the biggest customer of that node, the 40 nanometer node. And a yield problem in the context of this industry is when you are trying to make a bunch of very high quality chips, but you just can't get the percentage that actually work up very high. Something like that, yes. But the problem apparently just continued. And I was, even though I was not the CEO, I was getting a little impatient. And then, of course, some other problems popped up. Other problems than this 40 nanometer NVIDIA problem. So I decided to take the CEO, put his position back. So in 2009, I did that. And there were several priority problems that I had to deal with when I took the CEO job back. And one of them was this continuing problem, continuing argument, controversy with NVIDIA. Anyway, I remember in the first few days after I took back the CEO ship, I called all the major customers, including Jensen. And Qualcomm was, I believe, another one of that. Oh, yeah. Qualcomm was also, yeah. And Qualcomm, the top customers, didn't change very much since then, except for. Maybe one. Apple. Apple, yeah. Apple came later, yeah. And in my call with Jensen, he was still very friendly with me. But he also reminded me in a very serious tone that we had the quality delivery manufacturing manufacturing. He said, "Well, you know, I have a problem "on the 40-nanometer." All right, so I said, "I knew that." And it's one of my priority problems. But give me a couple weeks and I'll get back with you. And as I said, you know, I did have several problems aside from the 40-nanometer manufacturing problem, and the problem with the argument that we were having with NVIDIA. Aside from that, we also had the problem of the pricing was dropping faster than the cost. You know, I mean, you don't want to see that, you know. The gross margin percentage kept dropping, you know. Because you had committed to a schedule of price drops with customers, but you weren't able to drive down your manufacturing costs at the same rate. All right, so that was one problem. Another problem was the immediate one that triggered me to retake the CEO-ship because the previous CEO had laid off. Except he didn't use the term "lay off," you know. He used the bad performance review, the worst performance review people, and there were about 600 or 700 of them, you know. And he laid them off on the basis of their poor performance review. Well, we never did that, you know. I mean, the worst we would do was to put them on, place them on probation for six months. And quite often, you know, at the end of the six months, everybody would go back to his or her old job. And some of them would get transferred because they were in the wrong jobs, you know. So some of them would get transferred. Almost never really fired people, even after the probation period. So under your watch, you never did a layoff, and you never looked at performance reviews, which are meant to help coach people as the means to determine who to lay off. That's right, yeah. And I actually, you know, have told the managers that, you know. But, and, well, in 2.0, or 8, of course, there was a financial crisis. And the semiconductor business, in fact, got affected. And our revenue dropped. Our business dropped pretty seriously. I was not a CEO. I was the chairman. But I just knew that anyone, general manager, any CEO, general manager, without very much experience, what he or she would do in a situation like that. It's kind of a knee-jerk kind of reaction, you know. Oh, he says, oh, this is my test. I got to save, you know, all the money possible. And I got to, you know, lay off people, you know. But this is the semiconductor industry. And Moore's Law means no matter what happens, you will always need people. Well, I know, I know. Well, semiconductor industry. But semiconductor industry people actually think the same way as I described. You know what I mean? They all lay off. They all lay off people, too. I had a lot of experience at Texas Instruments. But at Texas Instruments, I was not a CEO. I was just one of the top managers under the CEO level. And when the company decided to have a layoff, the CEO conferred with the top managers, who included me. And their first reaction was exactly the same. And I'm talking about the 70s, early 70s. They have, you know, the first reaction on who to lay off was exactly the same as what our TSMC CEO did in late 2008, 2009, which was, you know, go by performance. I mean, well. Now, I was the only one at Texas Instruments in the early 70s that said, no, that would not be a credible way of doing it. People would not respect us if we lay off by performance ratings. And why is that? Because it's very subjective. Performance reviews, the performance ratings are done by everyone's own supervisor. So, 700, Worst performing people in the company. And who gave this? 700 people, the bad ratings, 700 supervisors, you know, very subjective. It's not something that people will respect. If in a year you have to hire people back, you have to hire the laid-off people back, then you shouldn't lay off because the layoff, the separation expense, is usually half a year, about half a year. And it takes at least half a year to train a person. So if you need the people back within a year, you shouldn't lay off. So what did you do when you came back as CEO, both about the employment issue and about the customer issue? You mean customer issue being NVIDIA? Yeah. Well, to finish the employment issue, the laid-off employees, as I said, that was. There were 700 of them, 600 or 700 of them, came to my home to demonstrate and protest. Now, the company, TSMC, was pre-warned that hundreds of people would appear in front of my home. So they notified the police department in my district. So the police department said, we're going to send 50, 60 police officers to try to maintain the order. Now, more than 100 protesters appeared. And the neighbors, my neighbors, you know, they had trouble getting in and out. That was only the first time. A month or so later, the problem was still not solved. I was still. I was still not the CEO. So they appeared again. Some were protesters. About 25 of them decided to spend the night, sleep over in the little park that's about a block away from my home. My wife literally didn't sleep that night, you know. She would wake up and went over to that window to take a look to see what was going on. But then, very early, the next morning, my wife, six o'clock, six o'clock the next morning, my wife, you know, got up, and she took one of the bodyguards and went to a neighborhood market and got the Chinese-style breakfast. Chinese bread, you know, fried bread. You know, I don't know whether you ever had it or not. Probably not. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Buns, buns, you know. Yeah, soybean milk, you know. And take enough of that breakfast, enough for 25, 30 people, and back to the park, to the park, and distribute them to the protesters. And, uh, they were thankful, you know. Yeah. And they actually decided to not go to the president's palace, president's mansion. And they told my wife that they would not do that that day. And all this kind of precipitated, you know, my taking back the CEO job. Well, there's another thing, you know. I told the previous CEO before he laid off the 6, 700 people. I said, "If you. " Because I knew, as I said, I knew that it would be his knee-jerk reaction to confront a crisis such as this. Such as the crisis we had. It would be his knee-jerk reaction to lay off. So I said to him, "If you want to lay off, bring her to the board. I'll call a special board meeting." And I knew what I would ask the board to do, you know, which was not to grant the permission. But he decided to circumvent. The CEO, you know, because what he did, he did not consider it to be layoff, you know. It was just punishment for the poor performers. Well, as far as the CEO is concerned, I did keep him. I had more than one nice talk with him. I intended to. And I told him that he was still a potential successor to me. So I kept him at the same job grade. We have job grades. And the same salary and bonus. But he was now the president of New Businesses. And back then, you know, we had high hopes for the so-called New Businesses, which was solar cells and LED. It's the great irony that your core business of manufacturing integrated circuits ended up becoming the largest market opportunity of all. You didn't need any new businesses. Ended up the biggest marketing, biggest market opportunity Why is it so ironic? Well, it's always interesting to me when companies think, "Oh, we should look at other new businesses." When in reality, semiconductors became a $600 billion a year market. And, you know, solar is a small fraction of that. LEDs are a small fraction of that. You were already in the best market. I know. And I knew that. I did not really mean, I did not really think that solar or LED would really replace our integrated circuits business. But I knew the integrated circuits business was going to be great, you know. But at that time, which was 2009, at that time, we also thought that solar and LED was going to be very promising, yeah. But it didn't work. It didn't work out, of course. The solar business could have been pretty good. However, China ruined it. They subsidized the hell out of it. And they now control that business, solar cells. The prices were extremely low. Still low, still low. So it didn't take off. TSMC servers didn't take off. And LED did not take off either because LED, it's not, the market is not as big as solar. However, it's controlled. The patents are controlled by just a few companies. And they wouldn't let the few companies that control the patents of LED will not let up at all. So a few years later, the CEO, there was, put on the new businesses, decided that his new assignment wasn't working out either, so he quit. And he's now running MediaTek, is that correct? He is now a vice chairman and the CEO of MediaTek, yeah. So coming back to this moment in 2009, you offered to rehire, anyone who was laid off that was interested in coming back. And you're setting the new sort of vision and strategy as CEO, or in many ways, returning to the old one. How did you resolve the NVIDIA dispute? Yeah. In the first four or five weeks after I retook the CEO job, I probably spent almost half of the time on how to resolve the problem with NVIDIA. As far as youths were concerned, we were doing our best, because, you know, we had to do it anyway, you know. NVIDIA was just one of the customers. Yeah, not just NVIDIA, but Qualcomm and Intel. And it was a very important node for the nanometer, was a very important node in the progression of Moore's law. I don't know. Only after 40 can we, if we do the 40 well, can we do the 28, 28 was the next one. And I called the salespeople that were in direct, that had been in direct contact with NVIDIA. And of course I called everybody that was somehow involved, somewhat involved in the problem. So it was a matter of money. As far as the progress on the manufacturing lines, I mean we were already doing what we could. I mean it was, as I just said, it wasn't just for NVIDIA. It's for TSMC, you know. But NVIDIA, because they had borne the brunt of the problem, the damage, so it's a matter of money. I worked out a number. I familiarized myself with all aspects of the problem, and then I worked out a number. And I also knew that NVIDIA's customers. The customers were after them, you know. They had demands on NVIDIA too. So I used all the intelligence I could get, and I think it turned out that it was good. So about a month after I retook the CEO job, I sent an email to Jensen. I said, "I'm coming to Silicon Valley next week on this date. I will be at your home at 6 o'clock, and let's have just salad and pizza," which was something that we had had many times in the past. And he immediately sent back an email. He said, "When do we discuss business then?" Did he ask who was going to pay for the pizza and salad? He didn't ask that. So I anticipated that, so I said, "6:30, we'll start having pizza and salad." He said, "8 o'clock sharp, we'll go to your office at your home, and we'll discuss business." So on the point of the date, the day I showed up, and we followed a schedule exactly, you know. 6:30, I showed up. We had a very pleasant pizza and the salad. The thing is that, you know, his wife, Laurie, would make the pizza. The salad and the pizza was delivered from outside. Maybe they made their own pizza too, I forgot. Would not surprise me. Yeah. Anyway, I had had it many times at his home. All right. So at Elkhart's shop, it was I who looked at the watch and said, "Gentsen, why don't we go to your study?" And I gave him the order. The offer. It was on the order of $100 million, right? Yes. More than $100 million, yeah. And I also said, "Our offer is effective 48 hours. If you do not, there is not going to be, we're not going to argue, we're not going to bargain if you don't accept the offer within 48 hours." We have to go to an arbitrator, which was what he had suggested to the previous CEO anyway, that we would go to the arbitrator. But the previous CEO did not even give him a number, you know. The previous CEO gave him zero. You probably don't want to go to arbitration with your best customer. No, no, no. I didn't want to. But, you know, I had to say that. And because, I mean, that number. The number we offered him was arrived at after, as I said, weeks of work on my part. And I thought it was fair to both sides, you know. And did Jensen accept the offer? Yeah. He did, within two days. I think it's an amazing example of a situation where you had strong partnership together for many years. You built this close personal relationship such that you could have an hour-and-a-half family dinner and not talk business. You were able to then come up with a large sum of money, over $100 million, settle. And then since then, there have been many, many, many billions of dollars of business done together. It's a great success of working out your differences. I know. I liked it, too. That's why I included the story. In my autobiography, you know. All right, listeners, now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta. AI has scrambled the whole security picture. It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year, an audit or a static PDF, then everyone would nod and you're done. But in an AI-first world, that doesn't hold up anymore. Yup, your risk surface changes every week now. A vendor turns on an AI feature or someone writes in a new model without telling IT. And your posture is different than it was last week, let alone at your last audit. 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We're huge fans of Vanta over here, and literally hundreds of Acquired listeners have become Vanta customers at their companies over the years. So you can get $1,000 off Vanta at vanta.com/acquired. That's V-A-N-T-A dot com slash acquired for $1,000 off, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. After the 40 nanometer node, after you fixed these problems, as you said, the next node was 28 nanometers. And as we understand your story and the company's story, 28 nanometers is when TSMC really started to take the leadership role at the leading edge in the industry. How did you decide to go commit so hard to 28 nanometers after having had all the problems at 40 nanometers? Well, I had a lot of trouble at TI, my peak job at TI. I was the head of worldwide semiconductors. And TI, of course, had many businesses, defense business, materials and controls, and also their origin, which was geophysical and so on. But TI's semiconductor business was their biggest. And I was the head of that, worldwide semiconductor business. I wanted, at that time, when I was the head of worldwide semiconductors, our R&D budget was 4.8% of revenue, of our revenue. And I thought it was not enough. I just wanted to raise it to 5.5%. 5% of the revenue. But my request was denied every time I raised it. Now, coming back to TSMC, I wanted to set a number, a percentage of revenue number, so we don't have to argue every year how much R&D we should spend. But at about that time, about that time, 2008, 2009, when I came back, I just, you know, I didn't know what to do with it. I didn't know what to do with it. Almost like, at that time, we were running, I think, 6% or 7% a year. But it was negotiated every year between the R&D director and the CEO. So I wanted to stop that. I wanted to make him at ease. He doesn't have to argue. He doesn't have to request every year. So I almost just literally picked a number out of the hat. We've been running 6% or 7% already. So I said, oh, let's pick 8%. 8% regardless of whether there's a recession or not. And that's just 8% of revenue. And that was the best news, if you ask. Our R&D director was, back then, I think, in the second place of R&D. He would tell you, I mean, he has told me many times in the last 10, 15 years, that this was really the best thing that we did for R&D. So they were not concerned. The R&D director was not concerned at all. He was all about having his planned budget cut back, his planned resource, people, allocation cut back, none of that. So he has been working. 8% and so it has been like that. And that is what propelled our R&D. That is what propelled our R&D effort. In this period in 2010, it wasn't just ramping the R&D budget. It was also the capital expenditures. You had had almost a decade of $2 to $2.5 billion spent building the fabs every year. And in 2010, you ramped that to almost $6 billion. What was it about the competitive environment, the 28-nanometer node, that caused you to push all your chips in on that? Yeah, I think it was kind of a mutual feeding. You know, as I settled the R&D budget at 8% of revenue, I mean, to the satisfaction of the R&D people, they began to have big ideas, you know. They began to be telling me, you know, 28 is going to be the term they use. And they have used it several times. But the first term, the first time I heard them using it is the 28. 28 is going to be the sweet spot. It's just like a tennis racket, you know. You hit the ball. With the sweet spot of your racket. Do you play tennis? I have played tennis. Not well. Good. I was like you, you know. Like 40 years ago, I was like you. I don't play anymore. But, you know, so I know the feeling of hitting the ball in the sweet spot. 28 nanometers is the sweet spot. And so I said, why? He gave me a lot of technical reasons. You know, 20 nanometers. So I decided that I would believe him. And he now had the resources to push it, to do it as fast as he could. So, you know, now the capital spending. Now, of course, back then we had already built up a pretty good infrastructure. Organizational infrastructure. We had a pretty good market forecasting group. And I had set up the business development department, which was like a marketing department. You know, we always had a pretty strong sales effort. But to me, sales effort is just, you know, the tactical side with the customers. Marketing is the strategic side to the outside world now. Now, from all these inputs, the marketing, the business development department, which, as I said, was our strategic marketing group, and from the technical, from the R&D side, that 28 was going to be a sweet spot. I decided that, and I quote Shakespeare in my autobiography, that there's a tide in the affairs of man, which taken at its flood leads on to fortune. You know, I decided that. This was, 28 nanometers was going to be our tide. Yeah. Our next tide anyway. There will be others. Seven nanometers was another, was the next sweet spot, the R&D people told me. And again, you know, reminded myself of Shakespeare, you know. Taking at the flood. Taking at the flood, yeah. So, I mean, that took, that, however, you know. I mean, setting the R&D at 8% of, did not invite any opposition from the board. But suddenly, increasing capital spending, threefold, I think, did invite a lot of questions from the board. Our practice in the board meetings, because back then, or even now, most of the directors are from overseas. U.S. and England. And we would email the agenda to them two weeks before a board meeting. Then, the night before the board meeting, I would invite the independent directors to dinner. And that dinner, the conversation at that dinner was not on record. So, the independent directors, actually, more, three-quarters of our directors were independent, are independent. They were independent directors. Anyway, so, in the night before, and the evening before the meeting, they had the opportunity to ask me questions, if they had any. But, on this matter of vastly increased capital spending, they didn't even wait until they got to that dinner. So, it was effectively betting a huge amount of the company's cash on this node, this process, this generation. Yeah. And so, they called the chief, the general counsel. The general counsel is also the secretary to the board. Yeah. They called him, at that time, it was an American. The general counsel was an American. And so, we want to talk to the chairman. We don't like this idea at all. Anyway, so, I talked to them on the phone about a week or so before the board meeting. And, all right, you know, this is something that, of course, I told them what I have now just, I told you, inputs from market forecast, inputs from our R&D, inputs from our business department, the new business department. And, of course, you know, they didn't believe it. You really can't convince anybody on something like this. So, at the end, I had to say, "Well, look, I heard you, but I am still the guy that's responding. responsible for the operation of the company. So you need to let me go ahead with this one. So they were satisfied with that. And what was the result? What happened around this era of 28 nanometer that created so much demand? Oh, I think you know the result. That was good. And that was the smartphone era coincided with 28 nanometer. Yeah, yeah. When the business development group was looking at this, and you were looking at this, did you see how big smartphones were going to become and the immense opportunity that that would unlock for you? No, I didn't. Maybe the business development guy, that was another interesting story. Yeah, maybe he knew. Maybe he, or at least I now hope, and I of course hoped at that time too, that he had. A more detailed visibility than I did. But I, I mean, of course, this was not the only, it was not the only input, you know. I had a few other advisors too, yeah. So that takes us to Apple. Could you share with us how you end up meeting Apple? Yeah. But before we, before we do that, let me offer how we made CC, actually, the business development director. Ah, the current CEO. The current CEO, the current chairman and CEO. Yeah. When Rick was the CEO between, 2005 and 2009, he had split operations into two groups. Advanced technology and mainstream technology. And CC was the head of the mainstream. Actually, really, I should say, the lesser one, okay. And Mark Liu was the head of the advanced. And each group had a small business development section. Maybe 30 or 40 people each. All right. So I came back to be the CEO. And I, I never, I never thought the split up of two groups was a good idea anyway. In fact, back in 1996, the president, he was not a CEO, but he was the president. We didn't have the CEO title back in 1996. But the president, who was an American, he was the president of the United States. And he was the president of the United States. now. Take Qualcomm. I'm quite sure that they use, you know, the most advanced and even Apple, I think, they use. Yeah, if you think about all the chips in an iPhone, you know, The A16 Pro is built on the leading edge, but there are many, many other chips in there. Yeah, right. So you combine to one business development organization, 80-ish people. Yeah. We had Mark Liu in charge of the advanced and C.C. Wei in charge of the. The question is, you know, who's going to be in charge of what, you know? The combined. Or you need only one for the combined operations. You need only one person. The truth is that we had a lot of operational talents, you know? Operations meaning manufacturing and taking the developed technology from R&D, you know, and converting it into mass production. We had a lot of talents there. But business development or marketing, yeah. And neither. Neither Mark nor C.C. had any real previous experience in marketing business development. So that was my main worry. You know, we need. We combine the two groups. We need a combined operations. We need a business development manager. But even more importantly, in my mind, we needed a combined market business development manager. So I first offered the marketing business development job to the guy who was in the bigger. He was in the bigger job, advanced technology, Mark. And I explained to him that I did not think he had had any significant marketing experience in the past. And this would. This new job, if he takes it, would give him the opportunity of. Of being a profession in that area. But he declined it. He said, my goodness, I have 10,000 people reporting to me now. You want me to take a job that has only 60, 70 people in it? That was the end of that conversation. And your goal was for him to become a well-rounded executive. Yeah. in hopes of. in hopes of leading the company after he sort of did that tour of duty. And I explained to him that, yeah. Not to mention, it's a very important 60 or 70 people. They're responsible for finding all the next business. I know, I know, I know. Actually, back in my mind, I was thinking of the time when Kissinger was Nixon's national security advisor. And somebody else, whose name I have even forgotten, was the Secretary of State. And Kissinger, you know, probably had a couple hundred people reporting to him. Whereas the Secretary of State, you know, had thousands of people all over the world reporting to him. And who had more power? You know, Kissinger. Certainly not the name who you've forgotten. Yeah. And before this period, you were doing the business development and marketing for the company, right? Yeah. You were the one finding the NVIDIAs, the Jensen's, the Broadcoms, the next great customers and great markets for you. That's right. That's right. I was. You were always on a plane meeting with the current top 15 customers and trying to find the next top 15. Yeah. Except for those four years when I was not the CEO. Hmm. Yeah. But you were right. I was on the plane most of the time visiting customers. And that was my pleasure. Yeah. I really liked it. Well, anyway. So, I then, of course, offered the business development job to C.C. And he accepted it. I mean, I thought he accepted it even delightfully, you know. Yeah. And he's now the chairman and CEO. The CEO of TSMC. Yeah. So, this had just happened. And you came home from a board meeting, we understand, one evening. That's right. The board meeting had ended. And it was 6 o'clock or later. And I went home. This was Taipei. We had our business. We had our board meetings back at that time in, in fact, here in the, or you have, you ever seen our, you ever seen my conference room? Yes, right. Yeah. Across the hall. Yeah. Yeah. Right. Yeah. We had all our board meetings in Taipei in that conference room. Anyway, it was 6.30 also when I got home. And I think my wife knew. And I think my wife knew that I would not be home until around 6.30. Because as soon as I, she actually, she met me at the door, which wasn't very often, you know. But this time she had something to tell me. That's why she met me at the door. She said, Terry Gao called in the afternoon. And said he was home. And she was coming to dinner. And who is Terry Gao for listeners? Terry Gao is a relative, is actually a second cousin of Sophie's. Sophie's my wife. And they share the same grandparents. That's what makes them second cousins, I think. Yeah. Yeah. And for our Western listeners who this won't be obvious to, Terry Gao is the founder and CEO of Foxconn. Right. But Terry Gao is a second cousin of Sophie's. And he's also, he was also at that time the chairman of. Hon Hai, which. Hon Hai, Hon Hai, yeah. Foxconn to American listeners. The name slipped my mind for a second, yeah. Hon Hai. Which is a. A very important supplier to Apple. And a pretty big company. And in fact, Terry Gao is reputed to be one of the richest men in Taiwan. And she said, Sophie is lovely. But she doesn't know. Too much of my business. I don't think she understood the significance of Terry Gao coming to dinner, bringing a vice president from Apple. I don't think she quite understood, quite very. She didn't really. She wasn't very interested either in the significance of that. And you had been trying for months, strategizing with the business development team. How do we go win Apple's business? The smart. The iPhone seems to be working. Yeah. I've been strategizing. Well, strategizing is probably too strong a word. I mean, just thinking. Thinking also knowing that we just can't do anything. We can't do anything about it. Apple is a very close-mouthed company. If you try to talk to them, if you offer your service, they will just tell you to go away. They will come to see you when they are ready. That's what I knew about Apple even then. And I know the same thing now. Yeah. All right. All right. So, 8 o'clock. Now, Sophie did know that I would not be home until after 6 o'clock. So, she had told Terry that. And Terry had set the time of arrival, of their arrival at 8 o'clock. So, 8 o'clock was a bit late for my delivery. number 30. I said, what the heck, we'll wait. All right, so they showed up. I didn't ask her. Sophie just said, a vice president. And I just thought to myself, it wouldn't be just an ordinary vice president. Yeah, so, because, you know, there was no reason for Terry to just bring any Apple vice president to my home. It must be something special. It must be someone special for TSMC, you know. All right, so Jeff Williams came. He was not just a vice president. He was the chief operating officer of Apple. Apple. Apple. Apple. Apple. Apple. And, you know, Jeff was a pretty straightforward person. He didn't spend much time in ordinary chit-chats. There wasn't the same pizza and salad period before. No, it wasn't. But it wasn't formal either. You know, my wife Sophie just added, we have a cook. You know, we had a cook. And a pretty good cook. So, Sophie just told the cook to add a few dishes. She's a Chinese cook. She doesn't do any Western food. And, you know, Terry obviously, she grew up on Chinese food. And I would imagine that the Apple would be a good choice. The guy that he bought would also like Chinese food. Anyway, so she just asked the cook to cook a few more dishes. But, you know, it wasn't important. The food was not important. Either the quantity or the quality was not important. Because almost Jeff, almost immediately, he started his pitch, you know. Almost as soon as he sat down to dinner. And what is the pitch from someone like Jeff Williams like? We would like you to foundry our waivers. Something like that. Pretty straightforward. I mean, so I listened. That night, I think, Jeff, talked maybe 80 percent. And I talked 20 percent. If you don't count the relative to relative talk between Sophie and Terry, you know, which was not very much either. And Jeff had proposed economic terms at this first dinner, right? No. Nothing so concrete. Okay. He did say that we would let you have 40 percent gross margin. And I think, well, I didn't say anything. I didn't answer him. I didn't respond to that. But our margin at that time was already 45 percent. And I was trying to put it up to 50 percent. It was a, we announced effort in the company to push the gross margin. And I had that effort for many years after I came back to be the CEO. And I really didn't even succeed even at my retirement. Now, of course, what happened later was that there was COVID and so on. And also, we began to have leadership, technology leadership. So, our margin, you know, jumped up to over 50 percent. But when I retired, it was still short of 50 percent. Slightly short of 50 percent. I was almost there when I retired. And in technology leadership, you're saying that around this time, the 28 nanometer node, you were. You're talking about 2010? Yes. You were still among a select few at the leading edge, but there was fierce competition. Whereas once you got to seven nanometers or so, that's when you really. Well, you are neglecting. I think when you said that, you were neglecting Intel. Yeah. At 28 nanometers, we were very definitely the leader among foundries. Yeah. And maybe among a few other companies, such as Texas Instruments and so on. But not Intel. Okay. And Apple was considering Intel. No. Apple was not actively considering Intel. That came later. Later. Yeah. But, you know, I'm quite sure we'll have time to cover that. Yeah. Well, take us there now. So after November of 2010, you had the initial conversation with Jeff Williams. Yeah. He said that he would let us at 40 percent. And my thought was, my goodness, you know, we're already at 45 percent, you know. But I also thought that he was trying to to be generous when he said that he would let us at 40 percent. And I also thought to myself, well, now it's not this dinner. It's not the time to go into a pricing discussion. We have a lot of other things to discuss. Anyway, so I said, no, we were about to go into production or we were almost in production with 28 nanometers at that time. The initial stage, anyway, 28. So I said, I thought it was going to be 28. 28? No. What, what node do you want? 20, he said. Now, that was a surprise to me. And frankly, it was also a disappointment because the most slow progression after 28 was going to be 16. Now, Apple, Jeff Williams wanted 20. A half step. A half step. But half step, a half step is a detour, you know. You, you, we had to, we, we would have to, my thought at the dinner there was that we would have to spend effort on the 20. Which, of course, would help us on the natural next node which was 16. But, still, it was a detour from 28, you know. From 28, if we had, if we could go directly to, if R&D would directly go to 16, it would be less time than, you know, first do 20 and then, you know. The point is that back then, R&D did not have enough resources to do two nodes at the same time. Later, we did. Later, we did. So, you have this conundrum where this is right after you had just spent $6 billion in CapEx the previous year going all in on 28 nanometers. You're asking Apple, which could be your biggest customer ever, this is for 28, right? And you hear back, no, we want you to go do something that you're not planning on spending any money on and have this huge distraction and you're, of course, left with this question, is it worth it to land Apple as a customer? It wasn't that serious. Because, when we figured it out, a very big market for 28 and therefore, when we planned to increase vastly our capital spending, we didn't have Apple in mind. We didn't include Apple. Apple came strictly as a present surprise. Anyway, for the company in total, but not for 28. I see. 28, 28, yeah. We didn't have, we didn't include Apple in our 28 planning. But, It's still the question of are you willing to go do this huge distraction and spend on the order of $10 billion over the next few years doing 20 nanometer for Apple when you weren't planning on doing 20 nanometer at all? That's right. That is where our connection with Goldman Sachs came in. Remember, I planted a lot of seeds when I ran TSMC. I knew that one of these days we would probably need top-level investment bank advice. So we established a good relationship with Goldman Sachs very early in our existence. I was, in fact, a board director of Goldman Sachs. Did you know that? Yes. Yeah. We did. We established the ADR with Goldman Sachs, which opened up a good relationship with Goldman Sachs. It was your New York public listing of the stock. Yeah. ADR is American Deposit Receipts. It's New York. It's a separate market. In fact, right now, the. TSMC price, ADR price, has a 20% premium over. Really? Yeah. However, you need TSMC board permission to convert your shares to ADR. Otherwise, you'd be able to arbitrage? Yeah. We don't want that. So, as I said, as I was saying. The board has to approve any conversion of ordinary Taiwan TSMC stock to ADR. And the board does not give such permission. Easily, anyway. Okay. Yeah. So you had planted this seed with Goldman Sachs when you knew you would need them. Right. This was very early in our history. Now, we need funds. I mean, this Apple thing came after we had already decided to increase capital spending. And now, you know, Apple requires even more capital spending. And. We have to figure out where the cash is going to come from. So, you know, there were several possibilities, of course. We're paying a dividend, not a very big dividend back then, but a modest dividend. We could cut that dividend. And then we also could sell. We could sell stocks, you know, new stock offering, either in Taiwan or in the U.S. We have the ADRs, you know. Or we can borrow money, you know, corporate bonds, you know. Or you could only fill part of Apple's order. Right. And, in fact, we did that. I, you know. Well, we first. We first did our financial planning. And we decided not to cut dividend. We decided not to sell new stock. We decided to just borrow. And this was also with consultation with Goldman Sachs. We chose borrowing. Okay. How much? I looked at the numbers. And just as you said, I decided to take half of what Apple said. What Apple said they needed. Is this common, by the way? It seems like it would be in a customer's interest to come to you and say, I need to buy zillions of chips from you. I need all your wafers because they have no skin in the game of you spending all the money. I know. I know. Well, back in the 90s, in the first, let's say, 15 years, first 10, 12, 15 years of our existence, we were short of capacity almost all the time. And what you just said happened all the time, you know. And so we figured out that we will require a deposit from. And we'll even confiscate the deposit if the time comes for him to take the wafers and he doesn't, you know. And everybody delights in the word confiscate. It was first used by me. I told the salespeople in San Jose, I said, tell the customer. We need a deposit from them because, you know, just as you said, it's our money and it's only their words, you know. They may not want the wafers when the time comes. And I told the salesman, tell the customer they will confiscate the deposit. And, ah, the salesman never heard anything like that before, you know. And so they were. They were, they were, you know, in uproar, in happiness, you know. I mean, now, you know, they could actually stand up and tell the customer that we might even confiscate your money. But of course, it really, we never confiscated any money. No, it did happen quite often. Particularly in the 2000, we had, I think it was called an internet recession, I think, yeah. Because internet was, you know, people were starting companies called pets.com or something, you know. Yeah. It was. Anyway. So we had the recession, you know. Which trickled all the way back to semiconductors. TSMC's revenues, it was four years after the dot-com bubble, before they were back at the. Dot-com, yeah, dot-com, dot-com. At those rates. Yeah. Yeah. It was almost four years, yeah. I remember it recovered only in 2003, yeah. It started in 2000, no? It started in 2001. The first quarter of 2001, and it recovered in the third quarter of 2003. So it was three years. Yeah. Wow. Three years. 01, 02, the third, fourth quarter of 03. Three years. Anyway, the customer, quite a few customers had placed deposits to anticipate normal good times. During those years. And we did build the plant. In fact, we bought, we purchased, or I should say, yeah, we bought a couple of other companies. And so their plants, their fabs became ours. And the customer didn't need the wafers anymore. They didn't need the outputs of those fabs anymore. And we didn't confiscate their deposits, but we let them delay, you know, demand, yeah. Right. And eventually, every one of them, they all used up their deposits. But, you know, that would come, you know. And so then back to, at this point, early. In 2011, with Apple, you go to them and say, we are prepared to serve half the number that you told us. Well, first, of course, the new, or relatively new, business development director, C.C., he had the privilege of first telling the lower-level purchasing people, at that point. He got a response back, you must be crazy, you know. So C.C. did not comment on that. At least he said he didn't comment on that. He brought it back to me. And then I went to Apple myself and talked to Jeff Williams. So I said to him, we have to issue corporate bonds. I think I used the word prudent. After all the prudent financial planning, we decided that we would take half of what you asked for. He was very quiet about it. He only made one suggestion. He said, well, I think you can. Eliminate your dividend. You know, your shareholders will understand that. I said, well, no, I don't think I'll. Well, the fact is, I had looked into that. I mean, that's also a reason for, you know, having high-level consulting advice. About one-third of our investors, shareholders, are very. seriously interested in the dividends. So if we do what Jeff Williams said, our stock is going to drop like hell, you know. Trigger a sell-off. Right. Anyway, but when I talked to Jeff Williams, and I went to see him in, what's the place? Cupertino. Cupertino. Yeah, Cupertino. I mean, he was, he took it fairly willingly, you know. No big problem at all. The only suggestion that he made was the elimination of dividend, you know. And I said, no. And he then let it just lie there, you know. Okay. But then, then the issue was settled. I mean, how much demand we would take and how we would get. We still had to borrow billions of dollars, even with half of the demand. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow. If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team and deploying them is no longer the hard part. Yeah. The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making. AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern. Like, the risks are real. Exactly. 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So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates. And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company. But the question is, who's managing them all? So if you're. If you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely, at scale, go check out servicenow.com slash acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you. So this really was, especially after the investment in 28 nanometers that depleted your reserves, this is a bet-the-company move. You're taking on a bunch of debt to go build the fabs to make this happen. But yeah, I don't know. Bet-the-company, but I didn't think I would lose, you know. You sound like Jensen. That's exactly what Jensen said. And so, all right. But I think that the financial discussion with Apple had already happened when Apple, when Jeff Williams called me in February of 2-0, we're talking about 2-0-11 now. I said, it was a very short conversation. Well, said, we need to pause our discussions for two months because the, the highest level of Intel has approached Tim Cook and has asked Tim Cook to consider Intel. And at this time, Intel was the major supplier for all Macs. Apple's Mac line was all Intel. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That wasn't an issue, of course. I mean, in February of 2-0-11, Jeff Williams was talking about the iPhone, yeah. But they had a close existing relationship. Yeah, yeah. I don't know what relationship they really have, you know. Well, it must be close, you know what I mean. So, that was all he said. I wasn't all that worried. Because in 2-0-11, Intel was no longer a name that you would, when you hear it, you would stand up and bow, you know. Interesting. I mean, heck, you know, in the 90s, in the late, 20th century, I mean, they were a name in semiconductors. When you hear it, of course, I'm exaggerating the situation. Moore's Law, I mean, it's their Intel. Yeah, Intel, you know. If you hear their name, if you hear that they're in competition with you, you know, my goodness, you'll be trembling with fear, you know. I mean, this is why you started TSMC as a pure play foundry business, because you didn't want to compete. Head-to-head, you said we should not be an integrated design manufacturer of the design of the chips and the manufacturing. We have to compete on a different vector because we'll never catch Intel. Well, I didn't say that we'll never catch Intel. Because, look where we are in 2025. Okay, yeah. Anyway, so I, of course, had to accept Jeff Williams' request. All right. But again, you know, as I just told you, I wasn't all that worried because, you know, I reviewed in my mind all the characteristics that Apple is looking for in a supplier, you know, technology at that time. We thought we were almost at par with Intel, almost. In fact, I thought we were, I think I thought we were at par with Intel at that time. Manufacturing, I thought we were better than Intel. And customer trust. We thought that our customers trusted us more than Intel's customers. trusted Intel. So, I wasn't too worried. But then, indeed, and I also thought that when Jeff Williams told me the highest level of Intel, I thought he was talking about somebody like Andy Grove, who was retired, of course. But it turned out that he was only talking about the CEO of Intel at that time. Ha, ha, ha. yeah but I knew that only later would that have been Bob Swan or Paul Ottolini no it was the Italian guy Ottolini Paul Ottolini got it yeah so today Intel doesn't make the chips in the iPhone what happened and in fact TSMC makes all of Apple's chips yeah all right I wasn't too worried but you know it still was in my mind so a month passed I think it was about the middle of February when Jeff called to tell me to pause for two months so almost exactly a month later March middle of March sometime I decided that I would pay them a visit and ask them what's going on you know any progress so I emailed Jeff and asked for an appointment I said I was coming to the Silicon Valley anyway which was pretty normal and I will stop in at your place on such and such a day is that okay and Jeff replied by saying that yeah come here but I won't be here I have asked Tim Cook to see you I mean this freedom Jeff's freedom of delegating his boss to see a visitor it was a privilege that I seldom had in my career you know yeah normally someone says someone on my team will see you not my boss will see you I know I know it was usually that way it was usually the other way but in this case it was Jeff S well anyway so I showed up and Tim was very nice to me and took me to lunch to the cafeteria I guess where there was a lot of food we each picked our food and carried our tray back to his office you know and anyway he told me there's nothing to worry about because Intel just does not know how to be a factory that's a very short but a very satisfactory answer to me yeah what is your interpretation of the meaning behind that statement I was explaining to you you know we had on technology on manufacturing and subconsciously I think I interpreted Jeff's explanation to me to be the third one customer trust you know I mean they were always very superior you know Intel before this Apple thing Apple and we before Apple became our customer I knew a lot of Intel's customers in Taiwan you know all the PC makers are Intel's customers they none of them liked Intel none of them yeah Intel always acted like they were the only guy they were the only guy you know for the microprocessors yeah and that's for their microprocessors but here we're talking about the foundry business where TSMC at their extreme core does not compete with customers and even if Intel is trying to do business in good faith they do have the conflict where they also design chips which is competing with Apple's chip designers or Nvidia's chip designers or any other yeah but I really don't think Tim meant that I think Tim meant that the customer asks a lot of things we have learned to respond to every request some of them were crazy some of them were some of them were irrational we are to respond to each request courteously which we do you know Intel has never done that yeah yeah Intel I mean I said that I knew a lot of customers of Intel's here in Taiwan and none of them they all wished that there were another supplier none of them either trusted Intel or liked Intel so to finish the Apple story the short answer is it worked on 20 nanometer were there any trade-offs where did pursuing 20 nanometer and spending the billions of dollars cost TSMC in any way well it might have cost but yeah the story certainly does not end here all right so I mean there was pricing you know every everything was not easy pricing you know and Jeff came himself and we talked about pricing and we of course we had done our homework also on the cost and what kind of price we would accept but Jeff came and he told us just a number you know well he gave us his reasoning and he had to make his component costs meet a certain goal also yeah but anyway that was settled and Jeff said ah and when the pricing was settled I said let's go out to dinner go to a Taipei three star restaurant for dinner and Jeff jokingly said ah if you didn't like the pricing we will be we probably could be going to a McDonald's which was never in my mind but he said that could you tell us a little more about what goes into considerations around pricing I imagine things like the yields you think you'll be able to get hugely impact that sure the cost yeah but the main the main thing that goes into pricing of course is the cost and then the second thing is of course whether your desired price will be accepted by the customer you know one thing that has occurred to me is TSMC now gets mid 50% gross margins call it 55 57 higher than your time but many of your customers have 70 80 percent gross margins yeah TSMC is creating a lot of value the designer is creating a lot of value how do you sort of sort out who gets to capture the value well I don't get the privilege of sorting it out now you know CC way I think has the pressure and the duty of sorting that out yeah well I mean as a general principle you know you try to find a kind of middle ground which is different for every CEO even though every CEO who wants to protect his reputation every CEO says ah I worry about the long range but in truth not everyone does so it's a very personal how to sort these things out I think it's a very personal issue now for a lot of CEOs there's really no choice you have to as a supplier you have to accept a certain price if it's a commodity particularly you know we have not finished with Apple yet yeah please let's finish Apple yeah now I think you were asking whether there was any trade-offs trade-offs well the trade-off there was a pretty significant serious trade-off and that was a detour that I said you know we took at that time back in the 2011 2012 time we our R&D was not strong enough to do two nodes at the same time now we are but back then we weren't so the trade-off of accepting the the 20-node technology was that we delayed our 16-node development. And then Samsung came up with the 16. They had lost the 20 business, you know. So they went ahead of us in the 16 nanometer development. Because they got to skip 20. Yeah, because they didn't get the 20, okay. They need to develop 20. So I got a shock. I mean, it was a real shock when I heard that Apple had placed their first orders of 16 with Samsung. Now, that was a real shock. We invested so much, even though we took only half of their original demand. It was still tens of billions of dollars, I think. And we were counting on it being at least 80-90% of the equipment being converted to 16. And now, if Apple went to Samsung for the 16, where did that leave us? Do you understand what I'm saying? Oh, yes, yeah. It sounds horrible. I would feel like I got tricked. Well, I wouldn't say that, okay. But I was really shocked. So I emailed Jeff Williams right away, and I said, "You know, we invested in all this equipment, and we were—" "Complete." "Complete." "Complete." counting on you to take the 16 from us. But now, you know, we found out you were buying 16, the first 16, anyway, from Samsung. So Jeff replied immediately, "Don't worry. I'll be here. I'll be there. I'll be in Hsinchu next week." And explained to you. So that made me, that relieved me a little, but certainly not completely. But next week, he did show up, and he explained to us. He said, "Well, you know, as soon as you're ready, with your 16, we'll buy from you. We'll buy all of you. The needs from you, when you're ready." Now, of course, that completely relieves me, because that's what we're supposed to do anyway, you know? So indeed, what he said was true. We developed, we had our own 16, about half a year later, and most of, Apple's 16 nanometer requirements still belonged to us, yeah, most, yeah. I can imagine the shock that you must have had. At the same time, this also, again, just illustrates the brilliance of TSMC and the pure play foundry business model. Samsung is Apple's chief competitor. Yeah, I know. I know. I know. It was, I said in the autobiography, you know, I mean, sitting in Hsinchu, being in the foundry business, I actually see a lot of things before they actually happen. So let me tell you the IBM Qualcomm story. Yeah, please. Now, Qualcomm, we consider Qualcomm to be a prime candidate to be our customer. We really wanted Qualcomm because we knew they were a technology house. What year was this? This was way back, you know, when we started in the 90s anyway, yeah. And they were part of that initial wave of fabless companies. Yes. They started, Irwin Jacobs started Qualcomm actually before I started TSMC. TSMC started in 87. Qualcomm, I think, was a few years before that. Yeah. So we, in the 90s, early 90s, all the way. Up to 97, maybe, 96, 97, all the way up to the latter part of the 90s. We wanted Qualcomm to be a customer. And, you know, I saw their operations repeat. That's what they call. That's what our customers call their purchasing people. Operations VP, operations senior VP. And I saw him often. And he was always pretty polite. But he gave us very little business. And I also knew that his foundry, his main foundry, was IBM. Now, sometimes. I'm in the later 90s. I forgot whether it was 97 or 98. Suddenly, he started. First, he started to tell me that he would use us now. He didn't even tell me who our competitor was, who our competitor had been. But I kind of knew that it was IBM from other sources of intelligence. And our business with Qualcomm, the business that Qualcomm gave us, pretty rapidly increased after that, after 97, 98 period. So, I immediately knew that IBM, semiconductor, was in trouble. Because, I mean, they had their own fabs and so on. But their main business was really supplying to Qualcomm and a few other very small companies, very small, fabulous companies. So, I immediately knew IBM was in trouble because they were losing Qualcomm. All right. So, the next step that IBM took was not a surprise to me. The next step they took was to ask us, TSMC, to co-develop the next, next generation of technology, which is 0.13 micron, 130 nanometer, okay, in 1999. And since I anticipated that, it was no problem at all for us to refuse the. And in fact, even if I didn't anticipate that, we would never, never have accepted that kind of an offer, co-development. And, you know, the first thing we did was we decided that we would never accept that kind of an offer. And, you know, that was the first thing we did. And, you know, that was the first thing we did was we decided that we would never accept that kind of an offer, co-development. I mean, IBM was still, you know, they still consider themselves to be the senior partner in any partnership they established. The senior partner. So, we were, the company that co-developed something with them would send its engineers to IBM, you know. And when we do that, we'll lose our ability to, to develop, you know, we'll lose our ability to, to develop, you know, our own process. We'll have to depend on this co-development thing, you know. And the co-development thing is going to have a lot of difficulties, you know. Oh, heck, you know. Our people, you know, will be in a different culture. So, we declined, without having to think about it at all, we declined the IBM offer. And IBM, in fact, was quite, quite angry, you know. I mean, they thought we were still, a small Taiwan backward place, you know, Taiwan company, and they are a big IPA. So they immediately went to UMC, and UMC accepted, only to regret seriously their acceptance a few years later. And UMC, at that point in time, was it fair to call it a peer of TSMC here in Taiwan in terms of volume and size? Not by 1999. They were already smaller? Smaller. They were smaller already, yeah. That's what I meant when I said that sitting here at the foundry, I mean, I can see some things like this IBM thing. This might be a good time to go back to the learning curve because, you know, speaking about the importance of owning your own technology and process at the leading edge and controlling your own destiny, you developed the learning curve. I really did not develop. I certainly did not initiate it. I think I had a role at TI. I had a role in refining it to the point where a semiconductor company can use it effectively. That's my role. So how would you explain it to a novice? Well, explaining the learning curve theory is simple. But one would be foolish if one just takes the simple explanation and thinks that that's all it is. The simple explanation of learning curve is that as you make more of one thing, anything, actually it started with refrigerators and cars, you know. If a company makes more cars, then its cost per car, unit cost, goes down. That's why it's also called experience curve. You gain more experience, you become more efficient. That's the simple explanation. But if one just takes, that simple explanation and thinks that's all it is about, then you really haven't learned anything at all. All right. Anyway, the learning curve. Well, Bruce Henderson, who is now considered the father, the father of strategies. Founded Boston Consulting Group. Yeah, he was the founder of Boston Consulting Group. And now, you know, I mean, there's a branch in business economics that's called competitive strategy. Yeah, something competitive strategy, I guess. And Michael Porter was at one time considered a big figure in this competitive strategy. I mean, he wrote three or four books, you know, big books, you know, 700 pages, you know, I have all of them. His original competitive strategy memo, I think it's like 20 pages, is still some of the best business writing, you know. It's the best business writing ever. Who's? Michael Porter. Oh. Well, good. Who was a director of TSC at one point, right? Right. Yeah, yeah. And I had a story about him in my autobiography too, which, because of time, we probably won't go into. Not Michael Porter. But Bruce Henderson, we will talk about him. He was, he is now considered to be father of the competitive, competitive strategy. He came to Texas Instruments one day in, I think, around 1970. Or I should say, he first called the TI CEO, Mark Sheppard, and told him that Boston Consulting Group, he had founded the Boston Consulting Group, and he had founded the Boston Consulting Group, and he had founded the Boston Consulting Group, and we have BCG has an experience curve theory that would benefit semiconductor industry. And TI was the largest company in the semiconductor industry then. And would Mark Shepard like a presentation of this theory? Mark Shepard said yes. So Bruce Henderson brought Bill Bang, you probably know that name, with him and came to Dallas and made a presentation. And Mark Shepard invited him. The CEO, the COO and me to attend the presentation. And it was a very eloquent presentation because, you know, Bruce Henderson was a very eloquent man. And Bill Bang was on the side, apparently Bruce Henderson's protégé. Anyway, Mark Shepard was impressed. And he decided that TI would work with BCG on this learning curve theory. And Bruce Henderson then assigned Bill Bang to work most of the time at TI, you know, most of my, like, three days a week. And Mark Shepard assigned me as TI's guy. So Bill Bang and I became partners. And I assigned Bill Bang a small office very close to my office at TI. in semiconductor manufacturing. But one day, after a couple of years, Bill Bang came to me in Dallas and said, you are the first one I tell this to outside the Boston Consulting Group. I am leaving Boston Consulting Group to start my own consulting company. So I said, why? I said, you know, obviously Bruce Henderson thinks very highly of you. And Bill Bang said, yes, but there is the world's imperative. That's the first time I heard that term, you know, world's imperative. He meant for him personally. Yeah, for him personally. Well, anyway, that was that. All right, listeners, now is a great time to talk about a new partner of ours here on Acquired, Legora, the agentic operating system that is redefining how the world's best legal teams work. Yep. It's sort of obvious that AI is going to completely change the legal industry. I bet most of you listening have dropped a contract into some sort of AI chatbot out there. Legora took that insight and asked the question, what if you really built something with that power from the ground up for the legal industry? So the founders did exactly what great founders do, operate with obsessive customer focus. They embedded inside a massive law firm for months. They sat with the lawyers just watching how the work really gets done. And that's how you get features that customers love, like tabular review, where you drop in a folder of hundreds of contracts and it pulls every key term into a grid a lawyer can actually work with. Legora's bet here is interesting, since it lets each lawyer handle more complex, any given person can increase the quality of their work and do higher value work. And this means that the pie can grow even as each individual task takes less time. And they recently launched Legora Agent, offering greater intelligence and performance. The agent lets lawyers set an objective. Then it can handle the planning and the execution and delivery of the final product. Legal teams get to maintain full control and transparency since they're still involved where judgment is required. And Legora works where you, already work, you can use it within Microsoft Word while redlining or drafting. The early Legora numbers essentially speak for themselves. When they have a head to head pilot with their top competitor, they win 70% of the time. Legora now has over 100,000 lawyers on the platform from 1,200 legal teams in 50 countries. And crazily, they went from 1 million to 100 million in ARR in about 18 months. Truly insane numbers. And that is the real test. Plenty of things demo well, but the question is whether a busy associate actually reaches for it during crunch time, or whether a partner trusts it before going into a conversation with a major client. If your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're a law firm or you're in-house at a company, you can learn more at legora.com slash acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. As our time comes toward a close, one question David and I wanted to ask you is, how do you think the legacy is essentially the only trillion dollar company in the world, not on the west coast of the United States? It is this incredibly important thing in the world. It's this unlikely success of grand scale. Unlikely in your opinion? I mean, you started it when you were 56. Yeah. There are many things. I'm not going to argue with you, okay? I merely ask as a point of curiosity. I didn't realize, I didn't think it was that unlikely. Well, it did exceed my expectations. TSMCs, size and importance exceeded my expectations, but not by an order of magnitude. But wasn't the original plan to stop building after Fab 2? No, that was never. That was only. The very initial plan. Okay. Yeah. We were never going to stop there, you know. I mean, we were just talking about learning curve. You know that, you know. How could we plan to. If I didn't know anything about learning curve, I would say, yeah, maybe we'll stop after 2 perhaps, you know. But I was a serious student of learning curve, and I would never stop at just 2 perhaps. Here's why I say unlikely success. There were so many reasons why the original incarnation of TSMC was kind of a bad business. Fabless was not a thing yet. And so all of your initial customers were the integrated device manufacturers, the Intels of the world. And you were taking their worst, you know, excess. You were their second source supplier for manufacturing on the stuff that they didn't want to make on their own. Did you see Fabless coming? Or was that a very lucky thing? No. I saw it coming. And in fact, I just had dinner, oh, two months ago. At dinner with the first guy, Gordon Campbell. Gordy Campbell. Have you heard his name? Anyway, Gordy Campbell came to see me in general instrument. In my. My final months at general instrument, he came to see me. He did not know that I was leaving. Frankly, I did not know when I saw him that I was leaving yet. But the reason he came to see me at general instrument was that he wanted the funding. He wanted investment from general instrument. $50 million, he said. He wanted to start a new company. $50 million. So I said, do you have a business plan? No. It's all in my head. So I said, well, I need at least a business plan. I mean, I have to go to the board of general instrument. So he said, all right. I'll send it to you within three weeks. Three weeks later, there was no business plan. And I was interested because I knew that he had the. Good reputation of starting companies. So I called him. And he said, ah, Morris, I'm sorry I didn't send you anything because I don't need you anymore. I said, how come? He said, I don't need $50 million more. Need anymore. I need only $5 million. And $5 million, I can gather up. Easily. I said, why do you need only $5 million? He said, I'm not going to build a fab. See? That was the start for me. That there will be fabulous companies. Another guy came to general instrument and said, he. Had already started a company, which was called Atmel. A-T-M-E-L. And they did not have any fabs. And this guy wanted the general instrument to make the wafers for them. And back then, general instrument, you know, had empty fabs. So I said, I told the semiconductor manager of general instrument, I said, go ahead. Work with him. Don Valentine? Yeah. Who I'm sure you knew. Yeah, I knew him. Yeah. He had a great, great quote when asked about starting Sequoia. And he said, well, I had an advantage. I knew the future. And it sounds like you knew the future, too. Well, at least I had the glimpse of it, you know. And, yeah. So, Atmel, you know, and they were still. I mean, Atmel, he wanted the fab to be run his way. Now, of course, the general instrument semiconductor manager wanted to run the fab his way, you know. I mean, general instrument owned the fab anyway, for heaven's sake, you know. So that was just a very early situation in which the difficulty and the advantage of running a foundry business, already appeared, you know. The difficulty was, you know, you have to satisfy a lot of customers, you know. And everyone, you know, wanted the fab to be run his way, you know. But you can only run fab one way, you know, which will satisfy more or less all the customers. And the advantage, of course, is you have a lot of customers, you know. Well, we can't thank you enough, Dr. Chang. Thanks. Dr. Chang, thank you. All right. Very good. It was my pleasure. Even though it's the first time in a long, long time that I have talked so long. We appreciate it. Thank you for doing it with us. Well, David and I are coming at you now from our home studios back in Seattle and San Francisco. And we wanted to do a little postgame on that interview. A little bit of analysis, kind of our conclusions, the things that are still sitting with us a few days later after we've crossed the ocean. And, David, this felt essential to me because it felt like we were just recording history there with Morris. I didn't want to interrupt him to try to, like, make a business model point. Or it just kind of felt like we should let him talk and then we could do our part after. Yeah, totally. And, fortunately, we have a model for doing analysis. We have a model for doing analysis at the end of story, which is our playbook. So, let's do it. Okay. So, the first thing that I can't shake that just keeps sitting with me is this idea that is genius in hindsight of not competing with your customers being the dedicated, pure play foundry, which we actually saw in the TSMC Museum of Innovation. They have Morris' original pitch, like his original slide deck. His original business plan that he pitched to the Taiwanese government. The government and then to investors. There's, like, two different versions of this extremely simple pitch deck. And one of the bullet points that's right in there of be a dedicated, pure play foundry. At the time, I get the sense it was actually much more about what can we win at versus what will be the most important and valuable semiconductor company in the world in the future. Right. At the time, they didn't have the capabilities, certainly not TSMC, and it didn't exist. In Taiwan, to be able to design chips and products. So, like, it was impossible for them to compete with customers. This was all they could do. Right. It crossed Morris' mind for sure. Hey, we could compete with Intel. But then he scrapped that. I get the sense because the thing that they were good at was this manufacturing angle. And it's almost like an accident of history. The pure play foundry ended up being the best way to do this. I guess best as evaluated on market cap versus other foundries and integrated data. Device manufacturers such as Intel. Well, and best that, like, this is the path that has led them to being essentially alone operating at the leading edge. Like, they have surpassed technology-wise all of the other integrated, you know, integrated and quasi-integrated chip foundries out there. Yeah, I guess that's my first thing is this. You can connect the dots looking backwards, as Steve Jobs said in that famous quote, but forwards is difficult. This. This primarily, I think, was the main reason why TSMC has worked so well. That they don't compete with customers. They are truly the only foundry at the leading edge that does not in any way compete with their customers. They don't have their own end product division. They don't design their own chips. It is truly they only serve their customers and they do not compete at any other part of the value chain with them. Right. Okay. So if you're asking yourself, how did the world arrange itself in this way such that you could have a truly, a trillion-dollar company that doesn't do any design, that doesn't do any architecture, that doesn't do any EDA tools like cadence or synopsis? So they're, you know, they're not NVIDIA. They're not ARM. They're not cadence synopsis. They're not ASML. Like, they're not their own equipment vendor. So what enabled this? One of the things that I think is underappreciated, and we didn't talk that much about with Morris, but the rise of ARM. If you try to play forward a world where Intel and the x86 architecture had maintained its dominance, you wouldn't have had this window, this opportunity for the value chain to sort of rearrange itself. But the fact that there was an architecture, as we talked about on our ACQ2 episode with Rene from ARM, this architecture that became dominant in phones and then computers and then servers and, you know, now is coupled up. And with all these AI chips, you open the door to have a dedicated foundry for ARM chips in a way where if it had stayed x86, it's not like you could start a new foundry for all the fabulous x86 companies. For the longest time, Intel was the only x86 company. And then AMD, of course, is the second source. And AMD is a TSMC customer. So that's sort of the one edge case. It's like, well, there is AMD that designs x86 chips that TSMC manufactures. But that's not, like, the common case. The way it would have gone in an x86-dominated world, it would have been fully integrated Intel. Yeah, I mean, one super straightforward and enormous example of this just is Apple. Like, if ARM hadn't become such a viable CPU architecture platform and Apple hadn't standardized, you know, their Apple Silicon on ARM, probably Intel would be making all of the chips that go into your iPhone, all the leading chips. All the leading chips that go into your iPhone. Like, they already had the Intel relationship. Macs were running on x86 Intel chips. Yeah, you have to keep peeling the onion because this, of course, supposes that Intel actually could have gotten their act together and made a chip for mobile phones that was performant. But maybe all the baggage from x86 actually prevented them from structurally doing that. It wasn't like a competency thing. It never could have happened that x86 could, you know, run on phones. Yeah. I think all this is true. But if ARM hadn't existed, like, there would have been nowhere else for this vector of innovation to go. Right. The point that we're driving at here is this world where there's a standalone architecture company, there's a standalone big manufacturing company, there are standalone EDA companies, there are standalone designers, you know, Apple, NVIDIA. In a large part, that's due to ARM. Yes. And ARM and TSMC are sort of, like, coupled at the hip. And ARM is a big part of history of when this, how this came to be. In fact, didn't you find that a bunch of these were started within 12 months of each other? Yes, totally. The mid to late 80s were, like, an absolute golden period for all these companies getting started. Not only TSMC, ARM, Synopsys, Cadence, and ASML all founded right within a couple years of each other. Which brings us to Hinshew Science Park. Going there in person, we talked about this on our original TSMC episode, that, you know, even if you wanted to, you couldn't airlift TSMC and this capability out of Taiwan and recreate it somewhere else. Yeah, we talked about that as if we knew it in sort of an abstract way. This was very different driving around the science park feeling it in a physical way. The entire ecosystem. It's like if Silicon Valley were all in one, you know, kind of government-sponsored, you know, industrial park, which it sort of was. It was Silicon Valley, you know, as we talked about in our Lockheed Martin episode. Oh, the early Lockheed Martin. Lockheed, yeah. Yeah, the early Lockheed years. But that's what it's like today. It's all right there. It's not just TSMC that's there. It's all of their partners. It's all of their customers. You know, we're driving by and this is a Cadence building there, and that's a Synopsys building there, and that's an ARM building there. There's Qualcomm. There's MediaTek right there, headquartered right there. Right across the street, the craziest thing to me, we saw there are two universities that are just like there. In the science park. Yes. That are cranking out PhDs every year that are just getting absorbed right there in the ecosystem. I mean, this would be like if there were two universities on the NVIDIA campus. The thing that really jumped out to me is you always hear people talk about how integrated this ecosystem is with each other. That, you know, Synopsys has to be closely tied with TSMC to understand what the next, what the next node will look like so that they can make it easy for people who are using Synopsys' tools to design chips to, you know, actually manufacture using TSMC's process. You kind of get the sense of, oh, I see, because they all are walking across the street to each other and having this extremely close communication. Not to mention, David, both of our flight experiences kind of felt like, oh, these are a bunch of chip design fabulous companies that are making the pilgrimage over to Taiwan to, you know, meet with people in this ecosystem. My plane felt like the semiconductor version of the tech buses that go from, you know, San Francisco down to Silicon Valley every day. I mean, the backpacks that I saw on the plane, like there's a Google backpack, there's an Amazon backpack, there's an Arm backpack, there's a Marvell backpack. Yeah, which does raise the point of this Arizona fab and the sort of outside of Taiwan fabs, you know, why is TSMC doing it? Because it's not their leading edge, it's not big volumes. It's not leveraging this really close geographic ecosystem that they have in, I believe there's three science parks in Taiwan. We saw the original, but there's one that's even bigger. I think it's the Tainan one in the south. But it just kind of becomes clear that it's, there are customers and government reasons to build fabs in other countries, but. You're not going to be able to recreate the magic of. that ecosystem like physically instantiated right there. Yeah, it would take decades to recreate the ecosystem that they have in the science parks which is you know funny on that front uh you and i were saying as we were driving around there this has got to be the single most successful government-funded industry initiative of all time like anywhere in the world at least to spur innovation with this particular of a mandate totally the land-grant universities here in america but like this was like a uh like a a rifle shot like you know we are going to spur semiconductor industry innovation in this industrial park in this location and it worked and there you have one of the 10 most valuable companies in the world and the only uh i guess one of two uh trillion dollar companies that are not on the west coast of the united states i would say it worked yeah it it worked it worked and the scale too we drove by a construction company and we drove by a construction company and we drove by a site where it looked like a quarter of the building was done this is where they're making the two nanometer process which presumably will be in the the next iphone um it's not like anyone said anything about that but it geez i wonder after five nanometer and then three uh n3e and n3p when they have this two nanometer process i wonder what they're going to make on that lots of nvidia gpus and lots of iphone chips massive building phase one was open which i think is a quarter of the building but then there's three other phases uh for this uh two nanometer facility that are not even you know ready for prime time yet but i think they're actually doing the small production runs getting ready to ramp in the second half of this year on the two nanometer process like you said the scale of the physical buildings of these fabs smacked me in the face i felt like i was looking at a sphinx in egypt i mean like it's huge it's like many football fields of sphinx and i'm like oh my god i'm like oh my god i'm like oh my god i'm like oh size like you know just per phase of the fab these are enormous buildings yep okay so back to things i've been noodling on since the uh conversation with dr chang i felt a little bit bad for saying hey your original business plan was kind of a bad one that basically taking the excess capacity from intel and other idms and giving them a place to manufacture their least critical least leading edge least interesting chips uh but that is true i mean he he believed that fabless was going to be a thing but for the first i don't know at least five years the only real business that they had was idms who were willing to say how cheap can you give me some of your manufacturing capacity and it's not strategic at all but here you go here's some revenue this is a major difference in intel's fab strategy versus tsmc intel is constantly taking their existing fab footprint and repurposing it and upgrading it for the leading edge which you know on the one hand is great it's utilizing their assets you know for the most valuable highest valuable products on the other hand though they then lose the manufacturing capabilities for older process node generations and it's not like demand goes away for those chips and those products it does it just does slowly it does slowly yeah and i mean like replacement parts is a great example of that and i think it's a great example of that and i think it's a great example like you know there are technology systems and products you know manufacturing things even automobiles built 10 20 30 years ago that have specific chips that were made with old process technology that when they break and they need replacing like you need those exact same chips so this is the business that tsmc started in right so that is the fundamental philosophical difference is i i think fab so fab one belonged to itry the the government uh where morris was president of that organization before taking the the helmet tsmc uh fabs two and three were the first tsmc specific fabs that they built and they're still running from the late 80s and in addition to the old replacement parts there are still applications for older nodes if you're in this this world of you know 40 nanometers and up and you know one micron and i don't know all the names of the previous generation and i don't know all the names of the previous generation but the the less high resolution etching on silicon uh cmos sensors are great examples of that the the cameras that we're talking into right now that have these great sony sensors uh those don't require a two nanometer process but they do require etching the same way that you would etch a chip and so that's a specialty use case of tsmc's older fabs which by the way on an accounting basis are fully depreciated so they're almost like free to run right right all the capital expenditure now there's maintenance capex that needs to go into it of course but like the initial capex yes fully depreciated you're just getting like essentially very very high margin dollars out of those old fabs right and it's not that it's a better or worse decision than what intel has historically decided to do but it is a different one intel is going to keep closing the old stuff so they can own a smaller footprint and keep all the equipment and everything focused on making the latest and greatest just not what tlc is does totally totally but that point of i'm obsessed with this idea that uh it was funny that morris went on the record and said no i knew i knew fabulous was coming and he had a couple great anecdotes about that which is funny because in older interviews sometimes he goes oh the timing was a little lucky on when fabulous happened but uh i think he even said to jensen uh in the first few years of tsmc growth wasn't very high because we were waiting for the customers to emerge but it really is this idea that he saw the future he made a bet and he did kind of a crappy business to build up competency capability volume capacity yeah exactly to build up literal fabs right to be there when the fabulous revolution happened and i don't know you know i i think he yeah i think he was within 12 months of when he thought it would happen but it is crazy that when especially in his memoir you're reading the story about the early customers year five year six year seven the majority of the business is still not fabulous it's someone else's you know worst orders which that actually gets to the heart of learning curve pricing that we spoke about with morris we brought it up sort of like tangentially with him but it's probably worth dwelling on what is the learning curve yeah the i mean the core insight of the learning curve from bcg bill bain and bain and morris that they all developed together which by the way how crazy is it the founders of bcg and bain are the ones who sort of co-developed this or at least named it and formalized it with morris when he was at ti totally the insight is that like the goal that you are playing for is to be the largest volume player kind of at the end of the game so if you take that as a given of like if we get to be the largest volume player this is a fixed cost business this is a economies business we can spread that fixed cost over the maximum number of customers how do we get to the maximum number of customers in the early stages of the game where it's more competitive we accelerate the pricing to where we think it will get to at the end of the game so that's why doing these price cuts and also starting low with your prices like you can even start unprofitable with your prices in the early days in a given no generation because the goal is crowd out the competition become the industry dominant number one player get all the customers once you aggregate that demand yeah then you get the scale and then you can get the economies of scale pricing but just like get to that as fast as possible is the name of the game yeah it works backwards from it actually involves a lot of market sizing at maturity on this node what do we think demand will be for you know call it 40 nanometer how many orders of individual chips will there be in 40 nanometer okay well to have the cheapest price for customers we need to do the biggest ordering and so then it's just a matter of like how fast can we get into volume production yeah everyone sort of intuitively grasps this oh economies of scale but the implications across your whole business your pricing strategy the way like strategic finance how do you when do you decide to take the time to take the time to take the time to take the time to take on debt when do you not when do you decide to take on more shareholders it's this incredible orchestration to make it happen you know it's almost costco like in the ballet that has to go into this right i mean the example from apple we are about to go get the absolute whale customer and we have to balance taking on all of their order which the learning curve would tell you you you want to get the deepest down the learning curve possible we should go take all their order but you all that kind of exposes you to existential risk in your business when you're not you know within spitting distance of doing that volume on your own so is it really worth betting the entire company you got to be so precise and accurate in your forecasting of the ultimate market demand which means the ultimate demand for your customers products which in the apple case means ultimately forecasting accurately how many customers are going to buy the next generation iphone in order to run your business right or in nvidia's case how big is ai going to be you know these are this is kind of a crazy thing for manufacturer to have to do to have that uh crystal ball into the end market um markets you know the end their customers markets but they really do need to make bets on how big those markets are going to be yep because if you're off by five ten percent that's going to tank your entire profitability for that node generation which is going to tank your free cash flow which is going to mean you can't play the game in the next turn to this point though if you actually are good at all of this and you you are good at forecasting and the execution is flawless once you internalize the learning curve the story of tsmc goes from one where it's surprising and unlikely and it becomes an inevitability of course the company that is taking on all the orders to have the lowest prices right of course this will be the end state of this industry is going to be the end state of the industry and it's going to be the end state of the industry and it's going to be the end state of the industry and it's going to be the end state of the industry of, you know. it being 2025, how are we talking about this? On the plane, on the way over to Taipei, I finally watched Everything Everywhere All at Once for the first time. I can't believe I hadn't seen it before, but you know, two kids under three and a half, not a lot of time for movies. It's so good. It's so good. I think this was your carve out when it came out a couple of years ago. Just so, so, so good. Truly enjoyed it. Lived up to the hype. Deserves every award that it won. All right. Well, we've got some thank yous to folks who helped us prepare for this episode. So first to Art DeGias, the co-founder and executive chair of Synopsys, had a great conversation with us. Well, first publicly with Sassine Ghazi, the current CEO of Synopsys on an ACQ2 episode a little while back. And then we chatted to prep for this episode and basically asked the question, what should we be asking Dr. Chang about? We got some similar notes from Renee Haas, who is the CEO of Arm. Great conversation with Sir Peter Bonfield, a current TSMC board member and former CEO of British Telecom. David, I know you've got a few also. Also to Wally Rines, the former CEO of Mentor Graphics. Wally is a legend in the semiconductor industry, almost on par with Dr. Chang. They were contemporaries at TI back in the day. And to John Bathgate and Britton Johns from NZS Capital, our go-to, folks on anything semiconductors. I think they were more excited, even more excited than we were, that we were doing this, that we got to talk to them about it. Yes. Also past acquired guests. I think that episode holds up really well, where we did semiconductor and complexity theory with them. Totally. And actually, John is the one originally who explained to me how EUV lasers work, which is still one of the most impressive accomplishments in human history. To John from the Asianometry YouTube channel. This is just an example. Thank you. Thank you. Incredible channel, all about semiconductors and about how all of this stuff works. I learned so much about CMOS sensors, about how they make the actual silicon wafers themselves. That's a sophisticated process before the etching even starts. He's just got some awesome, awesome videos on the Asianometry YouTube channel. And he very kindly bought David and I dinner and hung out with us the night before the interview, which was very fun to do in Taipei. Very fun. And also to Tim Culpin, a former Bloomberg journalist who now has a sub stack called Culpium. Also gave us some great topics to chat about. And lastly, as always, to Arvind Navaratnam at Worldly Partners. He did a great, great write up on TSMC that he'll be posting publicly right before we post this episode. So you all can see it. It was great last minute prep for me after reading the memoir to get someone else's take on what makes this company so special. And some of the stats that we threw out in, our playbook came straight out of his write up. So if you want more and kind of a more analytical view of how did TSMC become TSMC, he's got a great study on that that we'll link to in the show notes. So if you like this episode, go check out other Semiconductor episodes. NVIDIA, we've got four of them at this point. One of them is an interview with Jensen. And then we've got the whole history of the company across three different episodes. We did a great live episode several years ago on Qualcomm, which I think is a great episode. I think it's a great episode. I think it's a sleeper pick. That's right. That's right. Total sleeper pick. Amazing story. Erwin Jacobs, one of the greatest entrepreneurs in American history. Yes. And our diving into how CDMA works was one of the most fun technical explanations I've ever done on an Acquired episode. So if you want to understand how all of our cell phones work, go check out the Qualcomm episode. Or of course, if you did not last week, listen to the TSMC remastered episode. I don't know how you got this far without listening to that, but you should. You should go listen to that. After this episode, check out ACQ2. We've been talking about this episode with Synopsys. There's one with Rene Haas from Arm Holdings that we did. It's our most recent episode. So it's spectacular. And if you're interested in semis, go check that out. Come talk about this episode with us in the Slack, acquired.fm slash slack. And if you want to know when a future episode drops, you can find out, sign up at acquired.fm slash email, and you'll also get episode corrections and hints at what the next episode will be. So with that, listeners, we'll see you next time. We'll see you next time.