Trump-Xi Summit Outcomes for Southeast Asia with Amb. Edgard Kagan

[MUSIC] Welcome back to Southeast Asia Radio. This episode will impact some of the latest developments happening in the region. We'll also cover a range of news from the Indonesian export controls to global health updates, as well as new investments in AI. Today's Thursday, June 4, 2026. This week, Greg and Alina were joined by Ambassador Edgard Kagan to talk about the impacts of the Trump She meeting on Southeast Asia. But before that, let's cover some headlines. [MUSIC] Let's kick things off with Indonesia, where a series of economic developments dominated headlines over the past month. That's right. This past month, the Indonesian Rupiah fell to a record low of around 17,800 Rupiah against the US dollar, despite several monetary interventions. The depreciation has become a flashpoint for public debate, drawing criticism from lawmakers and prompting widespread discussion across Indonesian social media. But it's important to note that the currency weakness reflects both external and domestic pressures, rising global oil prices, uncertainty stemming from conflict in the Middle East, and a stronger US dollar have weighed on emerging market currencies across the board. Indonesia has also been facing growing investor concerns over policy and predictability, government spending plans, and questions surrounding institutional independence. Indonesia's central bank has been significantly increasing currency market interventions. Even as foreign exchange reserves have declined by roughly $10 billion this year. President Prabowo has largely sought to reassure the public, arguing that ordinary Indonesians are insulated from exchange rate volatility, because most daily transactions are conducted in Rupiah rather than dollars. The currency pressure comes at a particularly sensitive moment, because Prabowo's administration is simultaneously pursuing ambitious economic and fiscal objectives. In an address to parliament on May 20, the president outlined the target of 5.8 to 6.5% economic growth by 2027, while aiming to reduce the fiscal deficit between 1.8 and 2.4% of GDP. Wow, it seems like achieving both goals will be challenging. Previously, international ratings agencies have already downgraded Indonesia's outlook from stable to negative. Siding concerns about policy credibility and the sustainability of government spending. Furthermore, investors earn especially concerned about Prabowo's flagship programs, including the multi-billion dollar free school meal initiative that requires substantial fiscal resources. To help finance those ambitions, the government has intensified efforts to recover state assets linked to corruption, illegal land use, and forced-dream violations. About 10 trillion Rupiah has already been transferred back, while President Prabowo claims that hundreds of trillions more could potentially be recovered in the coming years. But perhaps the most consequential development is Jakarta's decision to dramatically expand state control over commodity exports in response to the weakening Rupiah and increasingly constrained fiscal space. Indonesia is the world's largest exporter of palm oil and thermal coal, and under the proposed system, exports of palm oil, coal, and thorough lois, would be routed through a new state-controlled trading entity operating under the Dunantara Sovereign Wealth Fund structure. The government argues that the move is necessary to combat under-invoicing and transfer pricing practices that allegedly allowed exporters to under-report the true value of shipments and shift profits overseas. The transition is already underway. Companies have until September 1, 2026, to adapt with a three-month implementation period that began on June 1. However, critics warn that the proposal could fundamentally reshape Indonesia's export economy. Business groups, commodity producers, and farmer organizations have raised concerns that it could create monopolistic behavior, increase bureaucracy, disrupt existing contracts, and introduce new opportunities for political favoritism. Industry representatives have also questioned whether the new institution possesses the operational capacity to manage tens of billions of dollars in commodity exports. The stakes are significant because Indonesia's resource exports remain a major part of the national economy. Any disruption to coal or palm oil exports would not only affect domestic revenues, but could also ripple through global commodity markets. It seems like the administration is pursuing a more interventionist economic model, one that relies on stronger state involvement in strategic sectors. Whether these measures succeed in boosting growth and strengthening Indonesia's fiscal position, or instead deepen concerns about market intervention and investor confidence, this will likely be one of the most important economic stories to watch for in Southeast Asia over the coming months. Let's move on to the topic of health, where several Southeast Asian states have begun to respond to the global outbreak of several viruses, particularly the Ebola virus in Africa and the Andy's Hanta virus outbreak, which began in the Dutch expedition cruise ship, the MV Hondius. On May 16th, the World Health Organization declared the Ebola outbreak as an emergency of international concern. While the recent strain of Ebola, known as the Boondibugi O virus, is much harder to transmit compared to other viruses like COVID, it currently has no vaccine. As of this recording, there have been close to 300 confirmed cases of Ebola and 43 confirmed deaths. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand have implemented increased surveillance for incoming and outgoing travelers coming from Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ebola's main hot spots. In the May 26th, Thailand announced it will mandate a 21-day quarantine for all travelers coming from the region, becoming the first country in the world to do so. Despite no reported cases, public anxiety remains high. A couple days after the mandate, the Thai government shot down false reports claiming that the virus reached the country. According to its anti-fake new center, the claim was its most widely circulated piece of misinformation in its latest review. Turning to the Hanta virus, Southeast Asia was particularly on high alert after two Singaporean passengers were confirmed to be aboard the MV Hondius. They were on the same flight as one of the confirmed cases who later passed away in South Africa. However, both passengers tested negative after an extended quarantine in Singapore. While health experts say chances of the virus spreading into the region are low, some are still taking precautionary steps. Authorities in Bali, for example, have increased their surveillance of the Hanta virus, closely monitoring all entry gates around the island. Despite the recent global frenzy, Hanta virus is not a new disease in Indonesia, though there are no new cases directly connected to the outbreak on the MV Hondius so far. Indonesia had 23 confirmed cases of the sole virus strain between 2024 and 2026. Safe to say global health remains a priority for the region, as countries look to implement more precautionary measures to ensure the safety of their citizens. Let's hope those efforts are enough to prevent and contain the spread of these viruses. Finally, we turn to the Philippines, where the United States is working with the Philippine government to create a new economic security zone. The US, under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg, announced the two countries will reach a deal on the zone sooner rather than later, with a two-year window to work out specific arrangements. On May 18th, Helberg also visited the site in the Philippines, along with representatives from over 12 American companies. Current plans look to establish a 4,000-acre AI native industrial hub in the Luzon Economic corridor, or LEC. The site will support manufacturing and sectors such as semiconductors, electronics, and critical minerals. The hub falls under a previous deal, signed last April, where the Philippines officially joined the US's growing technological supply alliance, known as Paxilica. The signing made the Philippines the 13th member of the group, joining Singapore as the second country from Southeast Asia. For Washington, the hub would help reduce its reliance on Chinese supply chains, especially when it comes to critical technologies. For Manila, it is yet another welcome investment toward its development, as well as a demonstration of the US's bipartisan commitment toward developing the LEC. Despite positive progress, there remains some issues the two partners still need to work out. The Philippines rejected the US's request for a diplomatic community to US personnel at the AI hub, stating there will be no special treatment. After news outlets initially reported that the site will operate under US common law. Experts believed that the proposal for immunity was meant to assure global investors that their investments would be protected under US jurisdiction. When asked about the issue, Helberg stated that while both countries will continue to negotiate terms, they still share the goal of ensuring investors protection. Still, efforts to invest in the AI hub and the greater LEC not only demonstrate the trend towards trade and supply chain diversification, but also the growing consensus that the Philippines is a key US economic and security partner in the Indo-Pacific. Originally a trilateral infrastructure initiative spearheaded by the US, the Philippines, and Japan back in 2024, the LEC is slated to connect three main ports and two international airports across four cities on the zone. Along with investments from eight other countries, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The hub is expected to rake in over 100 billion and create over a million jobs for the local economy. And with that, those were our headlines. Welcome back everybody. As always, I am Greg Poling with CSIS, John. by Alina Nor, non-resignant with the Carnegie Endowment, usually in Singapore, now across the causeway in Malaysia. Hey Alina. Woohoo! Great to be on again. That was a well-placed woohoo, and I really appreciate it. Today, as promised, two weeks ago, when we talked about Japan, we're finally going to talk about China and the Trumpsie summit and the reaction to the big Trumpsie summit from around the Indo-Pacific. And to do that, we have brought on a long time friend of both of ours and now a colleague of mine, Ambassador Edgar Cagan, who is the senior advisor and Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, but who's most recent gig at the end of a long career at the State Department was as the ambassador to Malaysia. Edgar, thanks so much for joining us. Thank you so much, Greg, for having me. Thanks, Alina. It's great to be in touch with you again, even if it's a very long distance. As I said earlier, I am very jealous of the fact that you're in Malaysia and I'm not. The Edgar really wanted the Southeast Asian job at CSIS, but he wasn't willing to knock me off to get it. So he took the lesser position of Freeman Chair in China Studies. Not that he might never-- I never-- --care about China that much, you know. I would never ever think that I could even possibly follow in your footsteps, Greg. You are unique and too valued. So I went, yeah, it's true. I went to the much easier direction. My mother always told me I was unique and I appreciate that. I'm not sure she meant it in the same way. But-- Edgar, I don't think that we need to go over TikTok of the summit. I'm sure that almost all of our listeners were following it. But to clarify, President Trump and presidency finally met for a summit in China, which was previously delayed earlier in the year because of the US War and Iran. They met on May 14, '15, wall-to-wall coverage. But so I know you've probably done a hundred podcasting interviews over the last couple of weeks about the summit. What's your now probably well-rehearsed version of the takeaways? So I think that one of the things that I've been struck by is how the tone has changed since the summit. And first of all, on some of the analysis, and I'll be frank, I mean, my takeaways now are different than they were immediately afterward. And I think part of that is just the benefit of getting a chance to think. But also talking to friends in the region and trying to understand where this leaves us. To me, the most significant thing is that Donald Trump, the president who in 2016 actively campaigned on the idea that the US relationship with China needed changes. In 2017, started talking to that effect. In 2018, introduced the tariffs on China, which I think have had a very significant effect on the relationship. Now, nine, eight years later, depending on where you consider the starting point to be, is saying that actually we need a stable relationship with China. This follows a lot of drama last year. And I think that to me, the real lesson on this is the power that it has coming from Trump because he was seen as the person who initiated. It's fair to say that I think there's a fairly broad consensus in Washington now on the ideas that he put forth in 2017. And as I've said, the fact that today, he more confrontation relationship and is looking for a stable relationship that brings benefits to the American people, I think that's quite a significant change. And in many ways, I think that that sort of takes precedence over everything else that has come out of it. That's not to say the other things are not important. And I think that you can see in both countries, some curiosity about what does this mean, how will this be implemented? But also, I think a sense that the leaders actually really do mean that they want a more stable and a more predictable relationship. And that I think is quite powerful. And go now that we've switched spaces in your weapon Washington and I'm in Malaysia where he used to be. What have you heard from friends in the region about expectations for US-China relations post the Trump she meeting? I mean, you mentioned that your views have changed slightly. Have you noticed any kind of expectations changing in the region? - I think the region by and large is nervous. My view is the region looks at US-China relations with a kind of Goldilocks principle, which is it doesn't want the relationship to be too hostile and confrontational in a way that potentially leads to conflict or even if it doesn't get to that point, puts pressure on countries to take steps that suggest that they're supporting or opposing one side or the other. But the region also doesn't want the relationship to be too good. I think that's particularly true in Southeast Asia, but it's also true in Japan and Korea and Taiwan. And I think also to some degree, I suspect in the Pacific. And my sense is that the region worries that this has veered too much towards a G2. Like, we're gonna get along. Everything, the US and China are gonna work together, et cetera, et cetera. I think that's an exaggeration, but I think that the region is quite nervous because while on one hand, they were scared that the meetings might go badly and lead to a worsened bilateral relationship between the US and China. This is maybe a little bit too good. And the truth is that there's probably no region in the world that's benefited from US-China competition more than Southeast Asia. And so I think people are nervous about what the lessening of that competition might mean. - So, Edgar, that Goldilocks principle you were aiming at. I mean, that's been particularly true amid the tariff travails that our friends South Asia are having, where first, there was a lot of concern that when the US and China were piling triple-digit tariff on each other, it was going to wreck global trade and regional supply chains. But now I think that the concern, particularly among those like Vietnam, who have benefited the most from the diversion of exports to the US moving out of China, moving to Vietnam, the concern is, well, what if we now get undercut by Beijing? That was particularly sharpened when Vietnam on Friday had another 301 investigation. It's third 301 investigation in as many months launched against it for IP, a lack of IP protections and counter-fitting, which obviously Vietnam has a problem with counter-fitting, but not as big as China's. And yet, China's not a country of special concern. Vietnam is, I mean, do you think that that is the concern from regional partners is hyperbolic or is there any realistic chance that the US-China relationship over the next eight years could improve to the point that it actually does start to eat away at those advantages, those marginal benefits that South East Asian exporters have had over the Chinese counterparts since Trump won. So I think that there's already concern. I mean, the practical differential right now was actually only about 10% in the sense that China is at 30% and while right now things are sort of in a bay. And the expectation is that when the lieu of 301 and 232 investigations are done, that it'll probably end up that tariff levels and will be more or less the level that had been set before. But I think the big problem is that a 10% differential may not be enough to give significant advantage to Southeast Asian exporters. So I think that this is actually fairly significant and the worry is that that differential could get smaller in China's favor as a result of things coming from the summit. Now, I think there's a bunch of reasons why that might not be the case. But I think the more interesting question is, is China competitive vis-a-vis Southeast Asia with a 10% or a half different? And I think of the answer is yes. And it's particularly a problem for those who come to the market that's more driven by labor costs. And Vietnese essentially things were driven by labor costs. Malaysia ended up being one of the big benefits of the day in terms of getting additional investment and seeing greater exports to the US because that was more driven by sort of the broader ecosystem surrounding technology rather than just labor costs. So my guess is that for those who sit at the end of the market where labor costs differentials are a big issue, then I think that only 10% differential may start to cause some strain. So we're recording this as Jangolai dialogue was just wrapped up. And Piedexa beach seems to emulate this stabilization in relations between both Beijing and Washington. But what do we go from here? What's next? Is it just this maintenance of stable relations or are we moving towards something else that's more positive or that's more unpredictable? I've seen some commentary from Washington that maybe this state of affairs is not so ideal in the long term. Let's retake it, Kurt. I think first of all, it's really important to recognize that we've had summits going back a long time where there seem to be agreements, there seem to be positive relationship, there seem to be understandings. And what has tended to happen is that elements of both governments have taken steps which the other side has seen as sort of either undermining the consensus or being in direct opposition to the consensus. So I think it's premature to start to worry that, hey, the US and China are going to suddenly fundamentally change the nature of the relationship. I think the significant to what we've seen is the fact that President Trump is open to that possibility. So I think what's going to matter is are both leaders able to crack the whip on their systems. And we know on both sides, it's hard even when the White House for Drone on High is sending a clear message to get everyone to actually repeat that message. So I think that's one thing to watch. And the other thing to watch is going to be, what happens on the trade front? If there's a perception that the tariff deferentials are actually getting smaller in a way that favors China, I think that will cause friction. Because I think that one of the reasons that most countries were willing to live with US tariff levels was because they, in relative terms, they were still coming out significantly ahead of their major competitors. If that's not the case, I think you can expect to see more pushback from countries in the region and around the world. And then last of all, I think that a big question is going to be, how does actual US presence, operations, day-to-day posture in the region change, if at all? I mean, my suspicion is that you're not going to see significant changes in US military deployments. I mean, I think that's going to see significant changes in travel by senior officials. You're going to see a continued support for countries in the region, via Japan, via Korea, via Southeast Asia, via India. And so I think that that will be how the region will look and assess this. But I think we have to be very clear. There's nervousness. I mean, a year ago, even six months ago, there was concern that the Trump administration was being too confrontational with China. And now there is, I think, concern that the Trump administration is swinging too much in the other direction. And that leads to worry about will the US continue to be there in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea, in the straight Taiwan, in the now-yellow sea, in a way that countries want. And look, Alina, I mean, you know, I've disagreed about this over the years. I think this highlights one of the real problems that particularly Southeast Asia has, which is most countries in Southeast Asia really want to see a strong and assertive US presence in the region. They're willing to put up with issues having to do with unhappiness on some economic policies in order to maintain that. What they don't want is to see the US suddenly becoming too close with China. And at the same time, most countries aren't willing to take a particularly strong stance in support of the US, with the obvious exception of Singapore, which obviously offers presence and access, and that the Philippines, which has seen a significant change in its approach in under the Marcos government. But I mean, part of the problem is that countries in Southeast Asia want the US to be out front, standing up against coercion against China, but they don't want to be seen supporting it too much. And a closer US-China relationship puts that strategy very much in jeopardy. So, Egger, I don't know if it's even pushed back, but maybe ask you to kind of examine that, which I largely agree with, or at least historically have, but in the context of Southeast Asia's shifting views of the US under the Second Trump administration. Because I think if we look at speeches, for instance, by senior Singaporean officials, what we would find is a lot of rhetoric that suggests that the US and China are both predatory powers. Predatory in different ways, and the US primarily as an economic and kind of a diplomatic predatory power now, not a direct military threat that we China is, but that resumption that the US as frustrating as it is is more often than not a force for good. It has been significantly undermined. Do you think that that influences those threat perceptions now about what happens if the US and China get too close? I think that it does, but I think the reality is, and this is part of the conundrum. Singapore's deeply frustrated with what it sees as the US basically dismantling key elements of the Fulacra better term rules-based order. And share some of those concerns. Reality though, is that as much as Singapore thinks that, oh, a plague on blasts visible and less assertive in the South China Sea, I think what they would like is for the US to behave much more in the ways that the US has traditionally behaved, and they're clearly frustrated at that change. I think the big issue is that every country in Southeast Asia, and this include was closest to China, would still very much like to see a strong US presence in the region, both military and economic. They'd like to see more diplomatic link engagement. I think all of them share frustrations with elements of Trump administration's policy. But in no case, does that frustration with the US lead to think like, you know what, we're better off if the US just takes up, it takes its toys and goes home. And I think that this is sort of the problem is that it was kind of taken for granted that there was fundamental friction between the US and China. But I don't think anyone really had on their bingo cards for 2026 that Donald Trump and Xi Jinping would make a serious effort at detente. And now that that happens, I think people are kind of scrambling to figure out how to deal with it. I don't know. Greg, both of you, I think, are probably betting better touch with the region right now than I am. But that's certainly my perspective. I think there's also this concern that what some may perceive to be temporary with the Trump administration may not eventually turn out to be the case. But there has been this fundamental shift in the US's perception vis-a-vis the rest of the world. And I don't know if you share this assessment at God, but I think certainly some in Southeast Asia do. And that might shape and change the way the region views the United States and its relationship with China. But assuming that things indeed are stable for a while, I wonder what the view is like in Washington about how the US expects Southeast Asia to conduct its relations with you have any views on that? I do, but they're not that coherent. I think the reason is that a lot of official Washington and both in the administration, but I would say in Congress, in the sort of think tank world, in the business world, are still scrambling to figure out what this means, what the idea of better US-China relations mean. And the result, I don't think they've really done a whole lot of sort of thinking beyond that. And also it's worth keeping in mind that the Iran conflict also sucks up a lot of bandwidth. I think in the end, what the Washington believes is that the US bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia are extremely important. I think there's a very broad consensus on Southeast Asia's importance to the United States and to the global economy. And that that's going to grow in coming years. I think that there's concern about how the region has positioned itself vis-a-vis China and particularly on South China Sea. I think in general, and this is true pretty much across the political spectrum. There's a sense of disappointment that ASEAN has been so unwilling/unable to do more when one of its members has been directly coerced by China. And I think that in Southeast Asia, there's a perception that the Philippines have made their bed now off to sleep in it. But I think from a Washington perspective, there's a real concern about if Southeast Asia can't even agree on this, then what reason do we have to expect that they'll be able to agree on other things? But I think that the relationships right now are still very heavily geared towards the economic side. And I think that there is a concern that one of the unintended consequences, perhaps, of a detente with China, is going to be making it harder to try and push for technical security on AI, on the cooperation on 5G, on export controls, which I think has been a point of friction between the US and Southeast Asia over the years. And where it felt like last year, Southeast Asia was taking steps, grudgingly in some cases, to try and do more to address U.S. concerns. And my sense is, and this is not particularly sophisticated, I'm talking to some people, but I don't feel it's enough to be really confident. My sense is there's real concern that Southeast Asia is now no longer going to be willing to be that supportive because the perception is that the U.S. doesn't care about that as much anymore. One of the continued frustrations with the administration that I hear from South Asian counterparts is they really don't understand how decisions are being made. They don't know who they're supposed to talk to. There's often controversy. The Econ team has been sharpened in the lead up to enduring the summit, where a lot of the people that's most Southeast Asian counterparts assumed were going to be the most important people in the administration seem to be the ones most on the outside of the decision making. And Bridge, Colby is one obvious example, but not the only one. All of our partners spent years hearing certain presumptions about the bilateral consensus on China and that this would be an administration filled with China hawks. I worry that that has now led to an inverse problem, which is now the assumption that everything that Donald Trump himself says is both doable and is going to be a lasting shift in U.S. policy and that whipsaw could be problematic. So I wonder how you think about the breakdown of the normal sausage making process in Washington and how that throws a spanner in the works for our relationships with partners in the region. I think it's a very good point. I think this is a source of frustration. It's not just Southeast Asia. I think it's pretty much everyone who deals with the administration, certainly who has stakes on China policy. I think has been very surprised. I think they've been a little bit less surprised if they've been paying attention since Busan. But I think the reality is the administration is filled with China hawks, but it turns out that the guy in charge, who I think you may disagree, but as I would argue, probably a stronger voice in the running day to day policy than in most other administrations, just because he's tried so hard to insist that he's the voice that matters, turns out he has different views. Now, again, this gets into the question of, is this a long term shift? Is this a temporary shift? I think after Busan, there was a feeling that there was a temporary truce that was basically about trying to deal with rare earths and critical minerals on one hand. And at the same time, you blessed offering some respite from the idea of just now. non-stop new tariffs on China. I think now there's a sense that actually, the president is comfortable with the relationship as it is now, and I think it's worth keeping in mind that the economic relationship has shifted dramatically. If you go back to 2018 when the tariffs first started, what's really remarkable is we've seen a tremendous change in the first, the growth of Chinese exports to the US. But I mean, last year, 2025, Chinese exports to the US went down by $100 billion. So I think that the administration and the president may feel that, okay, now we're to more sustainable long-term point. The problem is they haven't worked at all to try and develop any kind of consensus on this with allies and partners. Frankly, they've done almost nothing within the sort of US body politic. And I think that friends in Southeast Asia look at the US and they can see that there's broad support on the Congress for a tougher approach on economic relations with China, that there's broad support in Congress for the idea that China is a serious competitor and that the US is locked in a very serious competition with China. And so friends look at this from the outside and think we don't know how long this policy will last and even the Chinese themselves have made fairly clear that they're not sure where things will be when President Trump leaves office. So I think that this creates uncertainty and I think that it's very clearly a missed opportunity. I think that if the president had gone to allies and partners at the beginning of the administration and said, "Look, we want to compete with China "but we want to do it in a way that's less confrontational." There might have been some countries that weren't thrilled with that. But I think that most would have thought, "Yeah, that's not about approach." The problem is the way it's been done and the lack of preparation and consultation, the fact that countries don't know who to go to, but also in many cases, the people that they've been going to have been telling them, this is what we're going to do. And suddenly it looks like we're doing something very different. So yeah, that creates a lot of uncertainty and a lot of confusion. - Oh, and it's squeezed in one last question for me, at least for me. - Yeah. - Great, okay, good. So we have about three more mics, right, before President Xi travels to the US on President Trump's invitation. Does this give us enough time for all the preparation to take place that's been missing and that you've been talking about, Edgar, and if so, what's your reading of the tea leaves for the September meeting? - So I think there's enough time. If you really wanted to, you wanted to prioritize that, you could do it. I mean, doesn't see this as a terrible mistake. You can argue that, okay, people are annoyed with the cost is manageable. I'm not going to take a position on that. I mean, actually, I will take it. I think it's a mistake. I think that whatever we do, we're better off if we're coordinating closely with our friends in the region and globally as well. But I think that there's enough time to do what needs to be done, regardless of what it is that you want to do between now and September, in part because there's pretty clear signals about what the president wants at least. I think that the real question is going to be, when you read the Secretary Hegseth speech in Shabra-Law, and you see the reaction from the region, you gotta go back a pretty long way for the reaction to an American Secretary of Defense or now Secretary of Wars, speech is the Americans are being too soft. And my sense, and you would know better than I do, in a way, because you're in Malaysia right now. My sense is the region is very worried because it comes across, like Hegseth speech, was basically, it did mention Taiwan. It came across as a bunch of sort of platitudes about we're not going to write checks anymore, but we're partners, et cetera, et cetera. And it didn't really give a clear sense of US willingness to compete. But also, like, there's questions. What exactly was the US view on East China Sea and South China Sea? And my colleague Henrietta Levine, who you both know, has said, and I think quite eloquently, that even if there's no chance that raising it with the Chinese will change their behavior, the region wants to see that an American president raises it with a German Xi Jinping because it signals some continuity in seriousness to the US policy. I think that the risk here is that people start to worry that the president doesn't care. The US doesn't care. And my sense is that that's not true. I actually believe that there's still a fairly broad consensus on Taiwan, even within the administration. But the worrying thing is if the signals that the administration is sending lead China to be overconfident that the administration doesn't really care that much about issues that the US has cared about in the past. Particularly South China Sea, East China Sea, cross-strates, and that that leads to a more aggressive Chinese approach. Now, I'll be frank, I think this could happen regardless of whether I'm to go to this race. I said, I think that in some ways, the interesting thing is going to be, does Xi Jinping's desire to keep this going? Lead him and the people around him to exert more control over Chinese military and security and paramilitary forces to try and make sure that they're not pushing the envelope or does it lead them to say, oh, everything's fine, and we'll see more and more aggressive approach. That's what's undercut, a number of exchanges over the past decade, going back or longer, going back to President Obama's discussions on with Xi in 2013, 2014, 2015, and then the sense that Xi would say one thing, but the actual Chinese actions at Xi, or in some cases, on the ground, or in some cases, building the ground for the facts, went in totally different direction. So that's a concern for me, and I think it's something that the administration hopefully will hear from enough quarters that they'll try and course correct a little bit. I really wish that we had time to pick apart the dissonance between, say, the South China-Senese Chinese language from Secretary Hegs' versus Secretary Rubio at the Quad-Far-Mine Ministers Meeting versus the President, versus our actions on the water, but we're already way over time. So I'm going to hold that for a future episode. For now, I'm going to thank Edgard for his time, and as always, thank you, Alina, and thanks especially to all the listeners, we will be back in two weeks with the next episode of Southeast Asia Radio. - Thank you so much. Thanks for having me, and it's great to speak with both of you. - Thanks, Edgard. (upbeat music) - Thanks for joining us for this episode of Southeast Asia Radio. - We'd appreciate any feedback, hot takes or burning questions. So hit us up at S.E.A. Radio at CsIS.org. - And if you liked this episode, give us a five-star rating on Apple podcasts, or a Spotify, or whatever streaming platform that you listen to us on. - David Lottfi is our producer, and our intern's is Shapati Afatara and Lois Renuel. Our hosts today were Greg Pulling and Alina Norr, and our guest was Ambassador Edgard Kagan. My name is Jaffa Kitson, - And I'm Lauren Maya. - And we'll see you soon for another episode of Southeast Asia Radio. (upbeat music)