Three years after October 7 | feat. Lt. Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Conricus

(upbeat music) - Good morning, it's Friday, October 9th. The Multi-Front War in the Middle East is now 1,098 days old. I'm your host, Jonathan Schanzer. Glad to be back in this saddle. And a shout out to my excellent FDD colleague, Natalie Icono, for filling in as host while I was on a brief so-jorn degrees. That's a long way of saying, welcome back to the FDD morning brief. Well, Ron's nuclear chief says that the regime is never going to give up its nuclear program. That's a clear challenge to Vice President JD Vance who declared that the regime must end its bid for a nuke. And then there's President Donald Trump, who just announced that he won't take military action against the regime until after the elections in November. I suppose the element of surprise here is key. Meanwhile, the economic sanctions campaign that continues to take a bite after bite after bite of the Iranian economy, well, it looks like it's working. This is pushing the regime towards desperation. It may not look like much of a war right now, but well, winter is coming. The world commemorated the third anniversary of the October 7th attacks on Wednesday. It was a solemn day in Israel and across much of America. But if you asked me yesterday, was an equally important day to mark. October 8th was when the Israelis got up off their backs and took to their knees and then they began to stand again, they began to fight back and then they started to win. October 8th was also the day that the cheerleaders for Jihad and Western countries began to reveal themselves, opening up a different kind of front and a different kind of war. Much like the hot war in the Middle East, this other war continues to this day, the war of ideas, the war between facts and fabrications. It's well understood that the kinetic war grows more complicated by the day. Regional powers are trying to redraw the map of the Middle East, but the other war is no less complicated. The battlefields are not always easy to identify, the gains and losses, well, they're hard to gauge. I would love for all of this to end, all of this fighting. Sadly, at least for now, I don't see an end in sight. They say in the Middle East that the only way out of this is through, that's probably true. And the same holds here, only after the guns fall silent, can we finally maybe see an end to this battle of ideas. The grind continues. No backward steps. This is what the Israelis call the October 8th mentality. Now for your headline, headline one, Israel decided to downgrade the UK's consulate in Jerusalem, but stop short of fully closing the diplomatic post. In case you missed it, this Donnie Brook began after London banned all trade with Israeli settlements in the West Bank. And the Israelis didn't take kindly to that. Closing the consulate, well, that would be kind of a big deal. History making stuff, in fact, because Britain first opened that consulate back in 1838. Yes, this consulate existed over a century before the modern state of Israel was established. But I digress, this thing ain't over. A compromise has been reached for now. Both countries agreed to keep the consulate open, but with a smaller staff and a new name, the UK mission in Jerusalem. Stay tuned. headline two, Taiwan has its sights on $130 billion worth of domestic infrastructure projects. And the government in Taipei wants Saudi Arabia to pitch in. The Taiwanese are asking Riyadh, and in fact, other Gulf states to finance a dozen projects that it has planned, particularly in the tech, transportation, environmental sectors. Taiwan already has a strong economic relationship with Saudi Arabia, and it wants to ramp things up. What I'd like about this is that it gives a chance for the Gulfis to stick it to the Chinese government, which has been helping the Iranian regime by providing it with weapons and intelligence that has targeted these Gulf states for months on end. Is this come up in for Beijing? I gotta hope so. headline three, rumors are swirling that Syria may be gearing up to help Saudi Arabia fight the Houthis. According to the US and Syrian sources, Damascus is considering whether to deploy Syrian troops or other military assistance. Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharah's media advisor denied that Riyadh had asked Damascus to deploy troops. But let's just be clear. If the Syrians do send fighters, this is not just your average army. Barely two years ago, they were fighting under the banner of HTS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, an al-Qaeda affiliate group. So yes, if the Syrian military deploys to Saudi, it's al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. What could possibly go wrong? headline four, Iran allegedly transferred $200 million to his Bala last month to distribute to Lebanese families displaced during the war with Israel. I'm not sure I buy it. So far, civilians have received little to no aid from the terrorist group that dragged Lebanon into a war that ended in disaster. And by the way, it ended in disaster for both Lebanon and for his Bala. Oh, and the Trump administration also believes this entire story is bogus. His Bala, according to the State Department, is trying to quote, save face, end quote. Thanks to Operation Economic Outcast, it's getting harder and harder for Tehran to move money to its proxies. Keep squeezing Bala's. We can see the strategy working, even if we can't quite see a military strategy yet. All right, enough news, enough hot air for me. It's time to get down to business. Today's guest is Jonathan Konrika. He's a retired IDF lieutenant colonel who spent 24 years in uniform, including as a combat commander in Lebanon and Gaza. He went on to become one of the IDF's most recognizable faces during the aftermath of the October 7th attacks. Before that, he was the first Israeli officer ever sent to the United Nations, poor guy. He's currently a senior fellow here at FDD three years since the October 7th attacks. There's no one better, in my view, to help us make sense of where things stand militarily and where they're headed all over the region. So without further ado, let's bring Jonathan onto the show. Welcome back to the FDD Morning Brief, Jonathan Konrika. - Thank you, Jonathan. A pleasure to be back and great to see you back. - Good to have you. Let's do this. We're just gonna go around the horn. I just want everybody to get up to speed on where we are because it's been three years. The headlines keep changing. It's hard to keep up. You kind of feel like you need your head on a swivel here to understand what's happening in this war. So in the true Konrika's fashion, help us break it down. Let's start with Hamas. What's going on in Gaza? How's that front going? - Yeah, that's a tall order, Jonathan. But quick and dirty, Hamas controls what's left of the populated area in Gaza, which is about 40%. Hamas is still in position of a sizable arsenal of weapons. Those weapons, mostly AK-47s, are the key to the future of Gaza. As long as Hamas holds those weapons and refuses to lay them down, no significant change will happen in Gaza. And we will be in the stalemate that we are in until one of two things or maybe three things happen. One, Israel goes in and actually finishes the job and actually defeats Hamas in the proper classical sense of World War II, hands above your head, white flag and you surrender as in unconditional, that would be option one, option two would be Israel, taking a knee and allowing money aid and reconstruction to happen in Gaza, that despite the fact that the first condition of UN Security Council Resolution 2803, otherwise known as the Trump plan, has not been met and isn't going to be met. And that is the demilitarization and the radicalization of the Gaza strip. So if you ask me where things are going, I think we'll see maybe a few more months of relative quiet as both sides prepare. But I do not keep myself and my other fellow Israelis, I think that what is in the cards is additional fighting because the job isn't done when it comes to unfinished business. The job will be done once Hamas sees us to function as a military organization and as the political sovereign over the Gaza strip. And then things can get much better for people in Gaza, for Israelis and for all people concerned. - Yeah, and we are, I mean, I saw something in the Jerusalem post this morning about preparations for a battle for Gaza City. In other words, Hamas still thinks it can win this. And as long as I think that is the case, we're not going to see an end state and that is of course tragic for the people of Gaza who have been moved into this much smaller area of Gaza, the Israelis control everything around it, does not seem like a winning strategy for Hamas, but they still believe somehow that they can win this really remarkable. All right, let's move north, his Bala. They are also weakened significantly, but also still fighting how to things look on that front. - Well, it looks as if the world, the people in Lebanon, Israel, the US, France, and maybe a few Gulf countries, everybody's waiting for the Lebanese government to actually man up and assume the responsibilities that they took upon themselves when they signed a ceasefire agreement with Israel under American guidance and mediation. The ceasefire that says very clearly, the state of Lebanon will become sovereign and the state of Lebanon will take control over southern Lebanon, and it will make sure that his Bala isn't in any way capable of starting trouble war fighting again from Lebanon using Lebanon as a launch pad against Israel. Two pilot areas have been handed over that happened about a month ago. If you haven't heard about it, that is not a bug, that is a design feature. It wasn't successful and the handover wasn't well done, well received by the Lebanese, very below par delivery there. And unfortunately, what we're seeing on the ground is that the deal, which holds tremendous potential for Israel, Lebanon and for the Middle East, looks very challenged and frail at the moment, simply because the Lebanese government hasn't yet crossed that very important rubicon, which says, I am willing to go through, I propose the way you introduce the topic here, I'm willing to go through trouble and not around it in order to reach the destination that we need to go to. What's the destination? Sovereignty and control over Lebanon by the Lebanese government, the elected legitimate Lebanese government and minimizing and eventually, totally shutting down any foreign influence, specifically, Hizballah in southern Lebanon. And Israeli troops are still deployed in southern Lebanon. I don't think that's going to change any time soon, as long as Hizballah is a threat and carries significant capability still to threaten Israel. And as long, and this is the key thing here, the Lebanese government doesn't move forward, take control of a southern Lebanon, confront Hizballah and clear the area. I don't think that we'll find the Israeli politician that'll be willing to sign that he is handing over territory that very likely will be used by jihadi radicals to attack Israel sometime in the future again. So on one hand, there still is hope the Lebanese government can still do what's good for Lebanon for the region and for Israel. But things do not look as if they are energetic now. And I hope that maybe Israeli elections will infuse the Lebanese government with the right level of the vitamin D and whatever else they need in order to actually do what's good for them. I'm usually not naive. So I won't say that I really believe that that is what the Lebanese government will do, but we will hope. And I think Israel has the power to create the conditions for that to happen. - Yeah, I will say, I mean, I agree with your assessment. We're not seeing a lot of bravery on the part of the Lebanese armed forces. They're not doing what's needed. What is interesting, though, is that the Lebanese politicians who are usually actually the most squirrely and the most weak need, they are saying all the right things. They actually want this to happen. And they're not afraid to say that they're willing to engage with the Israeli government on this and that eventually there could be something on the other side of this that looks, well, like peace or normalization or whatever else we want to call it. So I guess I still, I'm not holding my breath, but I am, I don't know, mildly somewhat, I don't know, optimistic. I don't know if that's the right word, but I'm holding out hope. All right, I want to move to probably what is the most complex for Israel, the United States, for the rest of the world. It's the front in Iran. Now, the Israelis are not fighting there. They've been kind of uninvited from the party. Both by the United States and by the Iranians, which is interesting. How is that looking from Israel's vantage point right now? How is the Iran front fairing? - Well, what the Israeli military sees and studies is how the Battle of Hormuz was managed and how it was won by the US. And that's a point that I think not enough people around the world are aware of, contrary to what many so-called military experts and pundits and people with opinions sitting in air conditioned rooms far, far away with no military experience, but with a lot of opinions and big followings. You know who you are when I refer to you. And they made assessments that the US would never, ever be able to get the oil traffic through the strait and that the Iranians had done this masterful chess play and that now the US is stuck without options. Well, it appears that the shoes on the other foot and that the US central command was able to pull off a strategic victory in the sense that today for many days and I would say almost two weeks, the traffic of oil flowing out of the strait of Hormuz from the various Gulf countries, excluding Iran, is back to pre-February levels. And that is a military victory that I think will have strategic benefits for the US, for the world, for the Gulf countries and it will be very increasingly difficult for the Iranian regime. And I think it's so important to stress that issue because most of the international media refuses to reflect on reality as it is. And here at FDD, our experts were the first to call that and to some of them even shaped policy and help behind the scenes. And I think credit is due to the US and to the administration for pulling this off. Now, rather closer to home Israel, Israel is basically saying I dare you. I dare you, Iran. If you fire on us, you know that we will use that opportunity to finish what we started and then were stopped from finishing a few months ago, almost half a year ago. And that is the complete crippling of the Iranian regime and its ability to generate energy, to supply itself and most importantly, continue the pursuit of nuclear weapons. And I would draw a comparison between the situation in Lebanon, Hezbollah, the situation in Gaza, Hamas. And most importantly, really the center of gravity of jihad and terrorist activity in the world, the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is progress on every front, but it is unfinished business. And it's unfinished business at an industrial scale at a wholesale scale. And Israel, I think, is prepped ready, as far as I know, without going into classified detail, the levels of armaments and what we need, both offensive and defensive, is satisfactory. And Israel now feels that it has the tools and the capabilities needed in order to engage when necessary. And it's much more waiting for political guidance. And you know, you're referred to President Trump's statements, which caused me to raise an eyebrow before. Why would he telegraph his intentions? If it isn't, perhaps, to set the stage for a surprise. Who knows? But at the end of the day, I think the most important component is what's out of the public eye. And that's currently clandestine operations done by the organizations to do that kind of stuff. And the real center of gravity will be how many weapons and how many substantial tools have been provided and are being provided to the relevant people in Iran so that when the will and opportunities there, the regime will be able to actually be challenged by the Iranian people. And that's a question that a lot of people, you know, we ask ourselves. I don't think that anybody-- Not knowable, right? I mean, we just-- we can't know. And we shouldn't. But I do think it's fascinating that the Iranians seem to be weary of attacking Israel after all of this time and all of the bluster that just won't strike knowing that Israel will go in and drop the hammer. And I do think that that is killing. But in the meantime, yes, I do see the oil flowing. The Battle of Firmuz is more or less one. But still, I think, as you say, a lot of unfinished business here, this thing is not over. And it's not easy. I mean, I think, you know, with all due deference to Donald Trump, this is not a one battle, not by a long shot. So even though, you know, one front may be more neutralized, we've got many more to go. All right, speaking of another front, the Houthis. Not too long ago, they were attacking the Israelis, firing ballistic missiles and drones. That's gone quiet. They've decided to wage battles closer to home. They're going after the Saudis. They're going after Bobo Mandab. Are the Israelis going to have to tackle the Houthis again? I think, eventually, yes, if the only scenario where that doesn't happen is if the Iranian regime falls before. But eventually, they've proven to be quite significant enemies and quite a significant nuisance to Israel, firing ballistic missiles and drones. They've killed Israeli civilians. They've caused significant damage and disruption to civilian life. And they continue to possess those capabilities. And definitely the ideology that claims death to Israel, death to America, and destruction of the Jews. Israel gets two mentions in their flag and the US gets only one. And that shows you the real intention. So eventually, Israel, I think, will have to deal with the Houthis. Currently, they are busy elsewhere. And it's fascinating to see, I mean, from an Israeli perspective, it's frustrating to see a nation state with the capabilities like Saudi Arabia, not being able to apply the necessary military skills and energy in order to defeat them. I think they'd be wise to learn lessons from Israel. There are strict limitations to what you can achieve using Air Force only. And the Saudis do not possess even remotely close to the aerial capabilities that Israel has. And therefore, their abilities are limited. that I think that if, you know, winning War is about a battle of wills, and also your willingness to endure hardship and casualties. And if you don't have that, then the prospects are winning, they become very limited. I think there's an opportunity that eventually will present itself fully here for Israel to name a high price to the Saudis in exchange for Israeli involvement, assistance, intel, perhaps other things, and hopefully that will be beneficial after these ready elections. I think that's a car that Israel will probably pay, but the Israel remains ready and poised. And again, you know, you make the right distinction here, both the source, the Iranian regime and the Houthis, for whatever reason, have deferred from firing at Israel, perhaps knowing that Israel is, how to say it lightly, itching to get back into action and something that they, neither the Houthis nor Iran, are willing and interested in doing it. Yeah, I mean, certainly I think they recognize Israel's brews in for a fight. The question is whether they're planning something that looks like, well, more of a surprise. And I do think that these are really deep. Yeah, the surprise here could be a ground maneuver, even though the Houthis are about almost 2,000 miles away, which is a long distance, it's the Iranian, it's a length of the Saudi Peninsula. It wouldn't be too difficult, it would be, it would be hard, but not complex for the Houthis to make that way. And without, you know, devouring any, or showing any military secrets here, we could do with enhancing our South Eastern border. The Houthis know that, Israel knows that, and that is something that in terms of surprises, I think the Houthis have been dreaming up for a while, and I hope that Israel will be able to foil that if that becomes more real. Yeah, I mean, I have, by the way, heard that there may be Houthis finding their way to Jordan by air routes, and that could be something to just watch for. All right, we got about two or three minutes left. I want to just ask you, the West Bank, Judea and Samaria, it is complicated, right? You got not just Palestinian terrorists, and you got the idea of going in there and arresting them and disrupting and finding weapons and all sorts of other infrastructure, but you've also got some extremists on the Israeli side making this extremely complicated, in just, I don't know, 90 seconds, try to break it down for us. Yeah, the bottom line is that I think my country isn't really governing and isn't living up to its own expectations in terms of law enforcement and law and order. And of course, the level of violence when you compare the amount of attacks perpetrated by Arabs versus those perpetrated by Jews, there's no comparison. It's the exactly inverse picture that you get if you look at international media, you would think exactly the opposite, but the facts on the ground and the numbers are very clear. It's Arab violence against Jews that is the strong dominating force, but Israelis are blamed for the violence. The problem here is that I think we aren't governing well enough and we're not controlling the area, and various elements, fringe elements in Israeli society are doing things that in my mind are inexcusable. They need to stop on the state of Israel needs to get a handle on what's going on before this becomes, goes from being a tactical problem and bad press to really a threat to our national security. And we're still in that level, IDF and ISA are successful in dismantling significant and complex terror attacks and I am very happy to enjoy that shield of protection from those organizations, but the trouble here is more related to police and the political environment in Israel. And I really hope Israel improves on that. All right, last question for you, real quick, because we've got to start to wrap up here, but how's Israel holding up? Three years after October 7th, what's the morale like, what's the sense on the ground? How are Israelis looking at, well, the horizon, their future? Well, Jonathan, we're in elections and as you know in America, when there's elections, animosity, toxicity and bad vibes, they tend to get a boost and that's unfortunate, but that is part of the diplomatic game, so I want to factor that out for a second. I'll say that three years on, if I factor out all the nasty stuff related to elections and politicians trying to get elected, if I look at the youth, if I look at civil society, if I look at the more unedited parts of Israeli society, I think we're doing well, even very well, lots of volunteering, strong patriotism, lots of positivity, especially amongst the young. And in Israel, that has been defeating the odds, whatever the odds were, whether they were economical, military or political. And Israelis, I think, are bruised and battered by the fact that we feel abandoned by so many democracies cast out and basically thrown under the bus by some of the countries that we thought were allies and friends in the free world. That's a rude awakening, but Israelis, I think, are shrugging that off and starting to look elsewhere, hoping to build other relations and to continue to prosper, to be strong, to work hard and to be successful in our country. So hopefully the elections go well, hopefully we'll have a sound, a Zionistic and moderate government in Israel that will care for the majority of Israeli needs, and then perhaps bring some hope, political hope, diplomatic hope to Israel in the region. I'm positive, and I think we have an excellent future ahead. All right, we'll leave it there. What a thank you, Jonathan Kunrigas, for joining us today on the FDD Morning Brief. Thank you, Jonathan. All right, time to shut it all down for this week, folks. If you want to be the most well-informed person at all your weekend social gatherings, then you know what to do. Head on over to FDD.org for some super smart analysis from our super smart experts. And take a scroll through FDD socials if you've got attention deficits. The same smart stuff in a smaller package. And yes, you can head on over to FDD.org/inbass to support our work. Every donation is tax deductible and highly appreciated. Catch you all in 72 hours, folks. Until then, enjoy your weekend. I'm Jonathan Schanzer, as always, signing off for FDD. [MUSIC PLAYING]