The Yom Kippur War: A National Catastrophe

Hey, I'm Norm Weissman and you're listening to Unpacking Israeli History. The podcast that takes a deep dive into some of the most intense, historically fascinating and confusing events in Israeli history. All that in just about 20 minutes. Yala, let's do this. (upbeat music) (upbeat music) (upbeat music) It marked the highest of the highest when everything was perfect. It was almost utopia. But here's the thing. Camelot is a fantasy. It's a myth. It's not real. In life, the second we think were in Camelot. And exactly that moment, we need to pump the brakes. Following Israel's breathtaking and stunning victory in the 1967-60 War, Israel had their Camelot moment. Only a few years after this major war at the peak of Israel's success is where Israel almost lost it all. Let's get into that. It's 1973 in a Jerusalem synagogue. A young man wearing a prayer shawl at Ali rises from his seat when his name is called. He isn't being called to the Torah or to participate in the Yom Kippur service on that October afternoon. His name is being called by a soldier to immediately leave the synagogue and prepare to go to war as Israel's under attack. The young man's father seated next to him and braces him, hugs him, kisses him, and refuses to let go with tear streaming down his face. The rabbi approaches and sends gently to the weeping father, as place is not here today. The father releases his son and the rabbi places his hand on the young man's head to bless him. This story was not an uncommon occurrence during the first hours of the infamous Yom Kippur War between Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Listen, every war is tragic, but for the Israelis, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 is by a wide margin, the most traumatic. Yom Kippur, the David Homan, is the holiest day of the year for Jews. From sundown Yom Kippur even till nightfall the next day, Jews around the world pray in synagogue, repent, and refrain from eating and drinking. In Israel, the roads are empty, the stores are closed, the airport is shuttered, between 60 to 70% of Israeli Jews fast. That's a lot of people. Basically, the country comes to a complete and utter standstill. It is the single most vulnerable day of the year. That was the scene in Israel in the fall of 1973 when the war broke out with sirens blaring across the country, catching the citizens of Israel off guard and unprepared. Let's be clear, in many ways, the Yom Kippur War was a national catastrophe with massive casualties. The war left the young and traumatized nation asking many questions in the aftermath. Was this the first war that Israel lost? The very new country had miraculously won major wars in its short history already, so hearing that Israel may have lost a war was extremely shocking. And another major question I've been thinking about is, what should gold to make ears legacy be? Gold was the prime minister during the time of the war. Should she be considered a hero or a failure? To tackle these questions and understand what really transpired during the Yom Kippur War, let's go back in time to set the stage. Prior to 1973, Egypt and Israel had already fought four wars in a span of about 20 years. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, or also known as Israel's War of Independence, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Sinai War, and the 1967 Sixth-Day War. And don't forget, the lesser known war of attrition during 1969 and 1970s, low-key such an underrated couple of years. During the Sixth-Day War, Israel famously struck first when they saw the Egyptians and Syrians getting ready to rumble, basically ending the war before it began. They conquered East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, tripling the size of the Jewish state in less than a week. Following that defeat, eight Arab heads of state convened at a summit in Sudan where they passed the Cartoum Resolution. Known for its infamous "three-nose". No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel. See what you will about historiography and diversity of perspectives, but this was the first time in history that I'm aware of, where the clear victor of the war was asking to negotiate, and the losers refused. Over the next few years, everything seemed to change. In the aftermath of the Sixth-Day War, and leading up to the Yopki Poor War, Israelis had absorbed a new mindset. A mindset later referred to as the "conceptsia" or an "English the Conception". I've seen many describe Israeli society as one that had bravado and even a sense of invincibility. Israeli citizens, the military, and the government, were absolutely convinced that Arab countries wouldn't dare start another war against Israel. Then the devastation and humiliation from the Sixth-Day War was still too fresh, but maybe this conceptia blinded them. Abraham Rubinovitch, author of the "Best Book on the Yopki Poor War I've Ever Read", it's just so comprehensive, summarize it like this. Israel had fallen victim to its own victory in 1967. Both Egyptian presidents Sadat and Syrian president Hafez al-Assad felt their countries had lost their honor and dignity with the defeat of 1967, but Egypt and Syria had different goals in 1973 during the war that they called the "Actober War". Syria's president Al-Assad's goal was to destroy Israel. Egypt felt differently. According to Jahan Sadat, Anwar's wife, Anwar needed one more war in order to win and enter into negotiations from a position of equality. The Egyptians, the most powerful Arab country in the world had been humiliated by tiny Israel multiple times. It was honored that it was at stake for Sadat. Meanwhile, in Israel, top Israeli brass basked in its overconfidence and Sadat played mind games to give Israel an extra false sense of security. Simultaneously, Egypt and Syria prepared to attack. Not only did Israel have signs that war was on the horizon, but they had actual direct warnings. 10 days before the start of the war, Goldemeyer, Israel's prime minister at the time, was tipped off by King Hussein of Jordan that Syria and Egypt were planning a war, but her senior commanders pooh-poohed it. More than that, the Israeli intelligence had a spy nicknamed The Angel, whose real name was Ashraf Marwan, who was a close confidant to Sadat himself and the actual son-in-law of former Egyptian president Nasr. But this information about an attack inexplicably did not make it to Golda. Just a few days before the war, the Israeli military got the sense that the Egyptian army deployed in the Sinai was not just doing good old fashioned military drills, but by the time Israelis took the warning seriously, it was too late. The fantasy of the Konsepsia would come crashing down quicker than anyone could imagine. Okay, so they had warning signs, and they kind of started to figure it all out in the days before. So, many people ask, why did they not preemptively strike like the day in 1967? Why not? It worked well for them then. Well, leading up to the war, Golda Marwan under the advice of her generals and advisors declined to mobilize troops due to military advice, fear of bringing the economy to a halt, and of course, pruning the Konsepsia. Then finally, on Friday, October 5, 1973, the day before the war began, it became clear that Egypt would strike. And the question then became whether Israel should preemptively attack like it did in 1967 or not. The army chief Daniel Elazar suggested an preemptive strike, while the iconic military hero Moshe Dian responded, "No, this is what Dian said. I believe we can complete the call up tomorrow. It's not like in 1967." 1967. The war will begin in the Suez and Golan Heights. It is important that they don't say we started it. Calling all the reserves to duty before one shot has been fired, they'll immediately say we are the aggressors. Mayor Siden with Diane, agreeing that a preemptive attack was very tempting, but unnecessary. These thoughts were of course also influenced by intensive pressure from American President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who demanded that Israel not preempt. This is no small point. Later, Mayor would confess that her intuition told her trouble lay ahead, and she seemed to always trust her intuition, but not here. She still chose to lay back and wait. Once the war began, it became clear to all that Israel was tremendously outnumbered. They faced major losses in the opening days of the war. In fact, half of Israel's casualties came in only the first three days of the war. Sairu Saibah, a Palestinian public intellectual, describes the Palestinian atmosphere as one of exuberance that Sadat's army breached what many thought was Israel's impenetrable bar-level line, which separated Egypt from Israel. The typically cool, calm and confident Moshadeyan was about to go on air on the radio. In front of millions, and declare, there is a possibility we may lose the third temple. Golda Mayor, however, jumped in and did not let that happen. It was bad. The Egyptians blessed through Israel's bar-level line. Within a few hours, even though previously it was thought it could hold for days facing a direct assault. According to Abraham Rabinovitch, the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and the Israelis were really. The start of the war was especially grim as the Egyptians overwhelmed the Israelis, outgunning them 40-1 in ammunition, backed up as 6-1 in manpower. They rolled out 2,000 tanks to Israel's 268. In the north, 40,000 Syrian troops and 1500 tanks stormed the gold on heights, facing off against a mere 177 Israeli tanks. With hundreds of soldiers dying per day, the fear of losing the war and the country became real for Israelis and their government. Fast forward to 2020. We all kind of know at the end of the story. The Israel would figure this thing out. But how? It just seemed to be getting worse. Iraq wanted to get in on the fun and sent 14,000 soldiers leaven on Jordan's party too. I mean, who would not want to get in on the spoils now? But as reserve soldiers were mobilized around the country, Israel began to push back. Dayan and the Israeli soldiers proved that they were still pretty darn tough. They were starting to push back all the way to Damascus. Dayan reminded everyone that the Syrians must learn that the road from Damascus to Israel is also the road from Israel to Damascus. Nearly a week into the war, President Nixon agreed to send a massive shipment of arms and supplies to Israel. This would be known as Operation Nickelgrass. With new supplies now flowing in, Israeli takes push back against Egypt from the sands of Sinai. By late afternoon that same day, Israel had routed the Egyptians. By the next night, Israel crossed the Suez Canal and soon encircled Egypt's vaunted Third Army. The Israelis then set their sights on the Egyptian capital of Cairo, roughly 60 miles away. The Arab countries were super upset with the Americans for blatantly supporting Israel so they imposed an oil embargo on the Americans and really any country that supported Israel. But two weeks into the war, Israel's confidence was reinstated and the reversal of fortune was pretty much complete. Israeli forces had recapture Mount Kharmon in the North and pushed on until they were only 25 miles from Damascus, Syrian capital. Same day, the United Nations called for an immediate ceasefire. So who won the war? Rubbn Abish answers that Egypt did and he also says Israel did. Yep, as he explains it, the beginning of the war was catastrophic for Israel, but by the end, Israel made an unbelievable comeback. Both Egypt and Israel have claimed victory. From a numbers perspective, it was clearly Israel who got the dub. In dogfights, the Israeli Air Force shot down 432 planes to Israel's 102. The loss of men was tragically high. Arab casualties numbered 8258 dead and almost 20,000 wounded. Though some Israeli estimates of Arab casualties claimed that the real losses were twice that. Israel lost 2,656 soldiers with more than 7,000 wounded. Israel's figure was dramatically lower than the Arab losses, but there's more than 3 times the amount that Israel lost in the 6th day war of 1967. Back to Rubbn Abish, he says that as a military feat, the IDF's performance in the Yom Kippur war dwarfed that of the 6th day war. The victory came from what he calls the deepest layers of the nations being and the will to survive. Ultimately, Israeli soldiers showed their strength and did not flee or surrender. They were within miles of Cairo and Damascus and weren't not for superpower interference? They could have continued their march. However, the Yom Kippur war shattered part of Israel's soul as the loss of invincibility, the massive loss of soldiers and many lingering questions. On the other side of the border, Egypt felt that they had won by not losing the war. Rubbn Abish explains that politically, Egypt's victory was stunning. Egypt no longer felt the humiliation from 67 and began the process of getting the Sinai back, which would happen within a few years. In terms of morale, Egypt was clearly the winner. Sairidu Saibaz take is that the Arabs showed the Israelis were mortals after all. We won by not losing. After the end of the war, Israel's loss of confidence and insleaders was palpable. Moral and Israel was down. Mati Ashkenazi, an IDF commander who fought against the Egyptians during the war, held up a sign in front of Goldemeyer's residence that said, "Grandma, your defense minister is a failure and 3,000 of your grandchildren are dead." Soon after, he had tens of thousands of supporters protesting alongside him. Within a month of the end of the war, a national commission of inquiry called the Agrinot Commission was set up to investigate the failings of the IDF leading up to the war. The biggest question facing the commission and the country was, "Who's fault was it? Who was sublime for the death of 2,656 of the country's finest young men?" Surprisingly, the Agrinot Commission did not find flaws in the conduct of defense minister Moshe Dayan and also commended Prime Minister Goldemeyer's decision-making surrounding the war. The report, which was published in April of 1974, held the Army brass accountable for the numerous failures, but mostly avoided placing blame on the government. Chief of staff Daniel Elazar, General El-Ezaira, and Chief of the Southern Command Shmul Gounen lost their roles and were shamed. Many believed that the politicians were getting an undeserved pass. Goldemeyer soon announced a resignation on April 11, 1974, only nine days after the release of their report. Her reputation as a tough and hard-knosed lioness had been somewhat tarnished or at least tainted within Israel. Goldemeyer's icon in Israel and throughout the world, and for me personally, Goldemeyer is still a huge hero. Even during the Yonky-Pur War, Shishodouzal, decisiveness, and determination that many of her military brass had difficulty showing. Although the Agrinot Commission ended up frustrating thousands of Israelis who were fed up with their leadership, if we take a step back, Israel, in only its 25th year of existence, flex its democratic muscles by holding their military and public leadership accountable. Let's sum this up. Although it may be hard to believe, the Yonky-Pur War was actually the last time Israel fought a war against a sovereign nation's standing army. That's right. The rest of Israel's direct wars, of which unfortunately, there have been a few, of all been fought against the Palestinians, or various terror groups. The 1982 Lebanon War was fought against the PLO, the second Lebanon War against Hezbollah, the various wars in Gaza against Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In effect, the Yonky-Pur War was in some ways the transition from the Arab-Israeli conflict to more of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I don't believe it's too strong to say the Yonky-Pur War demoralized Israeli society. Many Israeli assumptions concerning land, peace, and war were completely shattered. Although As always, Israelis had reason to be confident in their soldiers. once again, they had less confidence in their leadership, and their hope for the possibility of peace in the region had been almost entirely eradicated. The hope of a last war ended with the Yom Kippur War. Its famous Israeli archaeologist and soldier Yigalia D noted after the conflict, "This was the first war in which fathers and sons have been in action together. We never thought that would happen. We, the fathers, fought in order that our sons would not have to go to war." The realization that the IDF was not invincible and the coming to terms with massive loss was a pain that was difficult to swallow for Israelis. But an important one for a country and nation was coming into its own. A more positive realization that Israel made during and after the Yom Kippur War was the importance of its friendship with America. A more sour note, Goldemeyer was disturbed that after years of building bridges and relationships with African countries, none of them came to Israel's defense. France, more or less supported the Arab countries in the British, even trained Egyptian helicopter pilots. It became abundantly clear during the Yom Kippur War that America stood alone as Israel's number one ally. Abraham Rubinov had said it best, "The Yom Kippur War marked a major turning point in the Israel Arab confrontation, a terrible war with a perfect ending." Why? By restoring pride to the Egyptians, Sadat had the street cred to eventually begin diplomatic relations with Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to visit the Jewish state in November of 1977. During the 1978 Camp David Accords, it wasn't long before President Anwar Sadat. Prime Minister Manachem Began, an American President Jimmy Carter, were standing on the White House lawn, shaking hands, smiling for the cameras, and signing the treaty for Israeli Egyptian peace, which still holds to this day. Here are your five fast facts. Number one, Egypt's objective in the Yom Kippur War was to regain its honor after its humiliating defeat in the Sixth Day War. Number two, at the beginning of the war, Israel's very existence wasn't questioned, but by the end, Israeli tanks were within kilometers of Cairo and Damascus. Number three, their American-Israeli relationship was cemented in stone, as America was the only country to really come through for Israel with arms shittments during the war. Number four, the war led to the eventual negotiations and peace treaty. Number three, between Israel and Egypt. Number five, even though Golden Mayor wasn't officially blamed for the failures of the Yom Kippur War, she ultimately resigned as a result of it. Those are the facts, but here is one and only lesson as I see. When I close my eyes every Yom Kippur, I imagine young men leaving the city garden, putting down their prayer books, and picking up a gun. I imagine the vulnerability of the only Jewish state. I imagine. What if Israel lost this war? I imagine a world in which there is no Jewish state. Then I pause and remember that the line between life and death, failure and success, victory and defeat is much finer than we might think. Life can be frail. Life can feel vulnerable. Let's appreciate what we have, and let's be grateful. With that, thanks for listening to another episode of Unpacking Israeli History. Make sure to subscribe wherever you get your podcasts, and leave us a rating if you enjoyed listening. If you have any questions, comments or just want to talk Israeli history, shoot me an email at [email protected] and love to hear from you. In next week's episode, we'll be talking about the first in Tvada, and no, it's likely not the one you're thinking of. That's the second in Tvada. In this episode, we'll talk about how they were so very different and why that matters. This podcast comes from Unpacked, a division of Open Door Media. I'm your host, Noam Weisman. Our producer is Rachel Casner, research and writing by Avi Pozen, additional research and writing by Akiva Potak, Yitzbrilyant Alicia Stein, Benjamin Elterman, Orrin Pelik, and Ellie Lichten, edited by Robert Perra. Unpacking Israeli History is generously sponsored by Larry and Andrea Gill. [BLANK_AUDIO]