The Turkish Case

[APPLAUSE] Hello, everyone, and welcome to another episode of the European Student Think Tank podcast. My name is Samina, and today we're joined by Professor Ionis Grigoriadis to talk about Turkey's candidancy to the EU. Mr. Grigoriadis, feel free to introduce yourself. Hello to everybody. My name is Ionis Grigoriadis, and I'm an associate professor in the Department of Political Science, Public Administration, and Building University, Nankara. At the same time, I'm a senior fellow and head of the Turkey Program at the Helaenik Foundation for European and foreign policy in Athens. Really good. Thank you, Mr. Grigoriadis, for being with us today. So let's start off by tackling the candidancy itself. Turkey has remained a candidate for joining the EU ever since 1999. If I'm not mistaken. And since then, it hasn't noted much progress. And even so, later in 2005, European leaders insisted on an open-ended process. What do you think the main reason for this and activity is? And how do you actually think that Turkey joining the EU could benefit both the EU and Turkey? Well, EU-Turkey relations have a very long story. It starts back already in the 1960s. It has ups and downs. And a crucial point, as you mentioned, was the decision of the European Union in 1999 to give Turkey a candidate status for EU membership. That was linked with domestic political developments in Turkey. And of course, the improvement of Greek-Turkey relations, because for many years, Greece used to be using its veto against any improvement of EU-Turkey relations before the bilateral disputes and the Cyprus problem were resolved. But at some point, in the late 1990s, the Greek government makes a fundamental shift. And it considers that bringing Turkey closer to the European Union, given Turkey incentives to become more democratic, more liberal, would eventually facilitate the resolution of Greek-Turkey disputes. And it would eventually also strengthen Greece's position and Cyprus's position when it came to addressing the longstanding disputes between the sides. But this coincided with the rise of a political consensus in Turkey in the late 1990s that Turkey's membership of the European Union was a strategic priority. And Turkey had to go ahead with these reforms, no matter whether the European Union demanded them or not. So it was a good per se. Of course, an external trigger was very, very important. And it is a player role. But there were many politicians in Turkey who were saying, "Pakten, that this is something that we do for our own people, for our own future." So it's not that a concession to the European Union. So there was, let's say, a golden age between 1999 and 2004, whereby reform progressed. And Turkey noted considerable progress in many indices referring to human rights, freedom of expression, economic freedom. And this has had a very important positive effect on the growth of Turkish economy. So there was a kind of boom in Turkish economy because of the optimism that this brought about. A very important detail in this story is the fact that when a new government came to power, and I refer now to the government, which is already almost 20 years in power, by 2002, it was just a newcomer in the Turkish politics. I refer to the government of the justice and development party, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. There was a lot of concern because of the slumest background of the Turkish president, whether he would be committed to the reform or not. But the world witnessed that in the first years, at least, he was keen on proceeding with the reform. So what changes? And we come to this stalemate that you've mentioned. I think there are a number of reasons. On the one hand, the failure to resolve the Cyprus problem has remained a big obstacle in the promotion of the Turkish relations because the hope was that the resolution of the Cyprus problem with coincide with the Cyprus membership of the European Union. So the two things will come together, and this would remove a big thorn in Greek Turkish relations, but also in EU-Turkish relations. This did not happen, unfortunately. But apart from that, I think that both sides eventually lost their strong interest in the partnership. On the one hand, the Turkish government felt stronger, and they felt that they don't need the European Union to achieve economic growth. And they actually realized at some point that they didn't need even the political support of the European Union because, for the first years of the Ag party administration, there was a lot of criticisms-- strong criticism by elements of the Turkish state. So having the European support was something very important for the Ag party administration. Eventually, this receded. Just in developing party felt stronger. They were able to deal with their domestic rivals. And they felt strong enough not to need any European support anymore. On the other hand, there was a very important shift in the public opinion and the public debate in many European countries, which is linked, of course, with the question of migration. And the arrival of thousands or millions of immigrants from different parts of the world. Concerns about European identity, European welfare state system, discussions about integration of immigrants, had a very big hit on EU-Turkish relations because Turkish EU membership was understood as an event that would bring millions of Turkish immigrants to the European continent, like to Western Europe. And this started particularly in France, in my opinion. And this shifted the discussion into a completely different level, where many European countries would say that we are not interested in Turkish food membership, even if Turkey fulfills all the criteria. Of course, Turkey, by that time, has stopped fulfilling the criteria. It was getting distant from the path of democratic consolidation and liberal reform. But the message that many European countries sent is that even if you do everything right, you don't have a chance of membership because you are too big, you are too sort of populated, you're Muslim, you are a trouble for Europe. So this disappointed, committed Turks to the European integration process, those who saw that European integration was a chance for Turkey's democratization. But also, I gave a stronger voice to those people that said that Europe is racist, a Europe is orientalist, they will never accept us as we are. So let's follow our own path in international politics. Let's be a regional power, or even a global power. And in the end of the day, the European Union needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the European Union. So that was the argument, but let the situation where it is today, whereby there is a stalemate, there is no really interest in the process by any side. But no side goes as far as to cancel the process. And that's important. Maybe both sides may consider that things may change dramatically sometime in the future, so that the progress achieved is not wasted because if the process is canceled now, we have to start from scratch and imagine how the European Union operates, you need again, unanimity, you need many agreements for the process to come where it is today. That's very interesting. And I feel like this situation of both parties not wanting to take a step further and move is more relevant right now than ever, because I think it's important to consider that Turkey has remained neutral when it comes to the war in Ukraine right now. It has even been characterized, if I remember correctly, as an unfathomable ally in NATO, by a member of the US Senate for a relations committee. And I really think that Turkey's relations with Russia given, especially Turkey's economic situation right now, is very important for Turkey and, on the other hand, keeping Turkey from expanding more in the region is also very important for the USA as well. So do you think that the war in Ukraine has affected the situation more, has made it even more inactive, like has blocked the process? - Well, the war in Ukraine has highlighted some trends that were there already for years, and I kind of alluded to them in my previous comment when I said that Turkey feels that it doesn't need the European Union anymore. One can make an argument about Turkey not needing the West anymore. So Turkey tries to take a distance from the West. One of the most essential decisions that the Turkish government made in the beginning of the Cold War was to take the West inside, a joint NATO, a joint of a joint American military and diplomatic support against the Soviet Union. But this is something that's openly discussed in Turkey today, and this has to do, of course, with the choices of the foreign policy choice of the current government, whereby there is a lot of disagreement. between Turkey and the United States on a number of fronts. But it also has to do with the sort of choices of strategic choices of the Turkish government to give you like an example. Turkey, yesterday, was present in the Shanghai Cooperation Council meeting in Uzbekistan, which is an organization that tries to provide a counterweight to some degree to the West, right, or to NATO or to the European Union. So Turkey's presence there shows that Turkey wants to have all its cards open. And I think that the war in Ukraine has also provided such an opportunity. Turkey's relations with Russia have become very complex and multi-level. And it seems to be understood as an opportunity for the Turkish government. So for example, Turkey has so far played this neutral role that has accrued a lot of benefits and a lot of wealth from the fact that all Russians normally travel through Istanbul to the world or to the fact that many companies from Russia have moved to Turkey and so on. Of course, since there is an international embargo regime against Russia, the day that may go harsher, it is likely that Turkey's position is going to be considered. Because in a way one can argue that Turkish companies help bypass some of the embargo rules of international community. Of course, by that time, I suspect that there will be new negotiations and new discussions that are going to lead us to a new date of a first, of course, depending very much on how the war is going on the ground as well. All right, so I think there are a lot of benefits right now for both parties to keep the conversation silent in a way. But what are the benefits for Turkey to join the EU and, respectively, for the EU to have Turkey in its reforms? I will refer to the general conversation that was dominant about 20 years ago. I don't think that the basic elements have changed, although the politics have changed a lot. Turkey, by joining the European Union, would have a unique opportunity to consolidate its democratic institutions, to improve the quality of its governance, to become a better homeland for its citizens on all levels. It would also gain access to one of the biggest markets in the world. And it would underline a very important promise for peace and prosperity because let's not forget that this is what the European Integration Project has been about. And this is what it has offered to all its members, right? So we tend to forget how common wars were in Europe until the European economic community was introduced. So we normally focus on the downsides of the project and on the upsides. So for the European Union, Turkey would comprise a major strategic boost. It would position it in some crucial regions of the planet, the use of Turkey's strategic position, so the blocks in the middle east, in the Mediterranean. And it would also, with Turkish special links with certain regions of the world, could give the European Union a certain advantage in that respect. Turkey is also a very vibrant economy at this moment. And the demographically dynamic country. So in that respect, it would help the European Union address some of the concerns that have been dominant in European politics for many, many years. So it would be of course not an easy task to integrate a country with such a big population and with a lower GDP per capita compared to the European average. But having said that, this is not something impossible to tackle. Of course, there were a lot of concerns for the voting power that Turkey would acquire in the European Union if it were to become a full member. Why? Because Turkey right now has the second biggest population in Europe soon is going to be the biggest by surpassing Germany, right? But if somebody would like to be seriously discussing Turkey's EU membership, one could consider, for example, adding additional criteria in EU voting. Already there are criteria referring to population of member states. So when we talk about qualified majority voting in the European Union today, we talk about number of states and the population there present. To mitigate Turkey's potential extraordinary weight in European voting, one could add the third parameter, which is contribution to EU GDP per capita or per capita income. So in a sense, countries that are not contributing to the European budget but their net recipients maybe would have a slightly weaker role, slightly weaker vote in deciding issues about the future of the European Union. Such a decision would immediately weaken Turkey's dominant position in voting. So I'm just giving an example. This of course can meet with criticism, sort of there, but they might be counterarguments. But I would just like to say that if there is a will, there is a way to mitigate this disproportionate presence of Turkey in EU decision-making process, if we assume at some point that it will become a full member, which of course right now it's very far from reality because at best we talk about a special relationship, which of course is interesting because a special relationship focuses mainly on issues of security, like dealing with migration, for example, dealing with the crisis in the Middle East or the Caucasus and so on. But what is missing is that Europe gives up on Turkey's democratization. So Europe turns a blind eye to the democratic box-lining. So it doesn't care so much about the state of human rights, state of freedoms, and because it kind of gives up on the prospect of Turkey's democratization. But considers that Turkey is, for example, very important in order to tackle the migration questions. So a more pragmatic and instrumentalist approach prevails in their relationship and of course this serves the interests of both sides. In the short term, but high undermines this greatest strategic dimension of Turkey's human membership, which I try to clarify in the beginning of my comment. So this comment actually is linked to the next question I wanted to ask you about the political criteria and how given this new pragmatic approach that EU is following, really human rights violations such as, for example, the Turkish government's denial of the Armenian genocide, which was declared as a non-illigal action by the European Court of Human Rights, has not really been an issue or has been in a way dismissed by the EU. Do you think though that it should be considered as opposed to the political criteria? There are a number of issues that can be understood in terms of sort of opposition to fundamental human principles and values, but there are others which are considered to be legal obligations. So their situation is a bit clearer and particularly when it comes to the Council of Europe. So Turkey has been under pressure in the Council of Europe, especially because of the case of Osman Cavala, to deliver some answers and it has failed for many like more than one. So it is under investigation, Turkey right now is under investigation to support whether it has violated fundamental principles of membership of the Council of Europe. So the problem is there. The problem on the other hand though, as I said, since their relationship became more cynical and pragmatic, it seems that the European governments are willing not to raise these issues with intensity and strength that one had anticipated because they expect Turkey or the Turkish government to be more accurate to help the European Union with a number of other burning issues for the European public. And as I said, the EU Turkey refugee agreement is a very good example. To give you an example, think of how there is some strong contradiction that appears there. On the one hand, the European Union considers Turkey a safe country to send immigrants back. So whenever there is this agreement for immigrants to come to Greek islands, they are supposed to return back and then an immigrant from Turkey or refugee from Turkey ship to a European country. But on the other hand, when it comes to Turkish dissidents in Europe, the European course has really acknowledged that Turkey is not a safe country. So you don't send people back to Turkey to be tried because the real afloat doesn't apply. So but right now the European Union says that Turkey is a safe country, real afloat country when it comes to Syrian or Afghan immigrants or refugees, but doesn't say the same when journalists from Turkey is prosecuted in Turkey and the journalist escapes to France or Germany and then there is an extradition case against him. And he says that please don't extradite me to Turkey because Turkey is not a root of low country anymore. I will be exposed to unfair and illegal treatment. So there are a lot of contradictions that play there. So given all of these contradictions, could you derive as a consequence that you might deliberately turn its back on tackling Turkey's democratic backsliding in order to be able to better argue their opposition towards Turkey joining the EU? And what is reason for many EU voices and public debates that make it seem like they you has given up in a sense on Turkey. Well I think it's a mutually reinforcing trend. The Turkish government has given up on any meaningful reforms things have become worse over the last decade and becoming significantly worse day by day. On the other hand, issues like migration, economic crisis, like this conflicts in Ukraine, in Syria, in Libya, that are affecting and threatening European economic and diplomatic interests. They also highlight Turkey's growing regional role because Turkey appears to be and that's I think very important to remember that as Turkey has grown more going to lateral list in the last couple of years, it appears willing to project military force beyond its borders which is something that very few European countries if at all are willing to do. And this has to do of course with the domestic political environment of this country and the fact that for example, okay, Europe may have an interest in Libya, economic or but Europe is not going to send troops in Libya to impose peace or kind of solve the problem. Syria is a similar situation. Europe has a clear position on the Assad regime and the need for regime change but on the other hand it doesn't engage in Syria in a way that can really produce a new regime or a meaningful new result. While Turkey does this and this gives Turkey some sort of stronger voice and which is something that the European countries are not able to ignore and of course in the case of Ukraine as well. Turkey has maintained this very extraordinary and very sensitive position speaking to both sides trying to play the role of the mediator with limited success so far but on the other hand it is a country that has a direct channel of communication with both sides which is something quite rare as we speak right now. Very few countries have this capability whether this is going to mean anything is another thing but Turkey appears to be willing to play on the highest level of regional politics and strategies. Okay that's also very interesting and let's talk about Greece for a second. I think Greece is rolling this situation is very critical because Greece is very strategically important for the US to keep Turkey's power in the region in a controlled. So do you think that actually Greece is being used as a tool by the USA for eliminating Turkey's power in the region? This is a common argument that has been phrased by many Turkish politicians that dates back of course it has roots in the Turkish national narratives and discourses in the late Ottoman Empire well the sort of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is linked to it's betrayal by the minorities Greek Armenian, Jewish, Kurdish and the role of states like Greece states that were independent already in the sort of try to limit the size of the next territories of the Ottoman Empire benefiting from its decline. So there's a discourse like this that I consider to be not accurate it's kind of very biased and very directed towards the domestic political audience. It is true though that the US Greek relations have improved greatly over the last couple of years and this is due to two reasons first the Greek government and the number of Greek governments and not just the current one have decided to invest on a stronger and deeper US Greek relationship that troubles different fields and topics including the military and energy cooperation. On the other hand Turkey US relations have deteriorated for reasons independent of Greece so like the level of trust in US Turkey relations has gone lower and lower and this can create it in my purely window of opportunity for Greece to film the gap that this decline of US Turkey relations has left on the regional level. What this doesn't have to do with Greece becoming an instrument in US foreign policy against Turkey Greece has its own independence over and foreign policy here's its own interest and to the extent that this interests are considered to be identical with those of the United States they can go ahead and deepen their cooperation. The problem is on the Turkish side for many years US and Turkish interests have not be considered to be identical. Actually sometimes the discourse that you highlighted that the US is undermining Turkish interests has become a dominant one. So how can you be alive with somebody who is supposedly undermining your fundamental national interest? So I would say that the Greek foreign policy has delivered significant results over the last couple of years which are to stay and this is not something that a Turkey which is a full member of NATO and sort of like committed alive is going to be concerned about or should be concerned about. I think it's also important to mention here recently a poll was done in the Turkish people about whether or not they considered the Greeks as enemies. And there's a big contrast between the Turkish governments especially Erdogan's provocative rhetoric and overall a bit of aggressive if I must say rhetoric and the Turkish public opinion. I think this is a very interesting fact because right now it's a pre-election period and the fact that Erdogan is using this rhetoric which is completely opposed to the public opinion's opinion basically. What do you think this is happening? Well they have been a number of surveys you may be referring to the metropole questions that were released a few days ago but we at the Lea Mab have had a joint survey with Stumble Policy Center. We have three waves surveys and we're going to have a fourth one pretty soon and there we have highlighted the fact that at the public opinion level the relationship looks much more moderate and cool and calm compared to high level of statements between prime ministers of foreign ministers and so on and so forth. So we see their discrepancy. In our survey there was a clear majority of Greeks and Turks who said that this fish can only be resolved should only be resolved by diplomatic and peaceful meet. It was like almost 60% and this was the result in all waves so it's not just one off when we got the same result again. But let me highlight a fundamental difference between the two countries. In the last couple of years Turkey has been very present in the Greek public discourse in a very disproportionate and sort of in my opinion even bizarre level so there is a lot of interest about what Turkey happens in Turkey, what Erdogan does, what he says and so on and so forth. And normally the information that is sort of channel tends to confirm the like media bias about this. So you get more provocative statements, more sort of aggressive points and so on and so forth. Until recently this was not the case in Turkey. So the coverage about Greece and about Greek politicians and Greek statements was very limited as the Turkish political agenda was consisting of other subjects. It will be the Kurdish question Syria like Russia or Crane but now of course and most importantly the state of the economy, domestic politics which are also very polarized and very sort of verbally violent. So this sort of level of aggression exists also on domestic level so it's not just happening only on the international relation. In recent weeks and I would say maybe since the spring maybe the recent months we do see a like a very remarkable increase of the tension and the sort of the level of aggressive comments by Turkish politicians including the Turkish president against Greece which of course is a matter of major concern. Although we see that the Turkish public doesn't seem to buy this at least for the time being. So they don't think that this is something that it's meant seriously they may think that this is a way to deflect attention from the situation of the local of the Turkish economy and the sort of the failure of the government to address some fundamental political and social problems in the country. On the other hand of course it also helps build this narrative that I refer to in the beginning of my answer that is the world is against Turkey and the West is against Turkey and the United States against Turkey increases an instrument. It's a tool in a campaign or a conspiracy against the Turkish government which is likely to become a sort of a theme in the upcoming election campaign because not for don't forget that at the latest in June there will be a presidential parliamentary election in Turkey where all these themes are going to be reinforced and sort of stronger phrase. I think it's also important to note that what do you think the Turkish public opinion thinks of joining the EU? Do you think most part of Turkey is pro- European? Well they have been a lot of surveys on this situation has changed over the years. There was a lot of support in the good years. Then when there was this moment of ambition and sort of, I would all say arrogance that Turkey can be very successful even without the year without anybody. There was a fall in this. According recent years, there has been a stronger support because many Turks understood that for Turkey to become democratic, it needs to have a relationship with the European Union. So if they want to see their country democracy, this is the only way for this to happen. Otherwise, the country will fall into the autocratic sort of model, like the central leisure, the Shanghai Cooperation Council, sort of group of countries. But on the other hand, there is also pessimism. So most of the Turkish public opinion would respond today that yes, we would like to see Turkey part of the EU, but we know that this is not going to happen. So at the same time, they declare the preference, but they also realize that this is not realistic. So for the most part, I think that right now, we can both agree that it's best for both parties for the situation to remain as it is and maybe in the future, who knows what the future could hold, but right now, I think there are benefits for both parties. Well, what that both sides have agreed to do is to let the situation stagnant as it is, opening the possibility in the future that with a new government, with a new state of affairs in the European Union, with a new government in Turkey, there will be renewed interest in restarting the accession process. But this of course means that both sides will have addressed some of their fundamental political problems, which I kind of tried to explain as reasons for the decline of the process. So theoretically, it's possible, but it would require fundamental political change on the ground. I agree. I think this is the most realistic way to look at it, and possibly in the future, as you mentioned, some reform could be made. Okay, so I think with that, we can finish this conversation with the future aspect. Mr. Rilorialis, thank you so much for joining us. You were very insightful. You gave us perspective on the whole situation. You're a very welcome, Mr. Melissa. My pleasure. [BLANK_AUDIO]