The resilience gap: Are Europe's societies ready for the next crisis?
33m 2s
Resilience in the 21st century is no longer a military-only concept but a comprehensive societal capability to withstand disruptions—from cyberattacks and disinformation to energy crises and conflict. The discussion highlights that resilience hinges on national will, trust in information, and the ability to absorb shocks, both natural and man-made. Experts emphasize that modern threats are deeply rooted in the digital age, where AI, deep fakes, and influence operations target public trust and daily infrastructure. While Finland and Sweden offer inspiring models of whole-of-society preparedness—through civic engagement, alternative supply chains, and inclusive defense training—many Western democracies, including the UK and EU, remain underprepared. Current political reluctance to address these challenges—such as through mandatory civic defense or transparent public messaging—risks leaving societies vulnerable. The proposed European "Erasmus-style civic defense service" aims to foster mutual understanding and shared responsibility across nations, especially in the face of geopolitical threats like those from Russia or China. Ultimately, the path forward requires not only new policies but also a fundamental shift in political will, public discourse, and societal trust, as the current lack of action may result in severe consequences when crises strike.
Hello, and welcome back to Independent Thinking from Chatham House, where every week we take
a deep dive into the current shaping global affairs. I'm Bronwyn Maddox. Today, we're
talking about resilience, that word fashionable even, but on everyone's lips as the world
looks at the age of uncertainty and how to respond to it. Resilience means lots of things,
different things to different people. It can refer to the disruption of infrastructure
and essential services like the recent attacks on French supermarket fridges. It can refer
to fake news, and it can refer to old but still current questions. How prepared are
European countries for the prospect of conflict with Russia? To talk over all this, I'm joined
by three key voices.
The first is from Chatham House. General Sir Richard Barrons is a senior consulting
fellow with our International Security Program, a former commander at UK Joint Forces Command,
and he co-authored the UK's first independently-led strategic defence review in 2025. Welcome
back to the podcast.
Good morning.
Very good to have you here. When you came on board Chatham House, you said we should
be talking a lot more about resilience, so here we are. Isabella Wilkinson is a senior
research fellow in our Digital Society Programme, looking at the geopolitics of global tech,
especially AI, and she's also worked across cybersecurity. Hi, Bella.
Hi, good morning.
And completing our trio, Gregoire Roux is director of our
Europe and Russia and Eurasia programmes, and he's just authored an excellent paper
for us, arguing that Europe needs to focus on the societal foundations of defence as
well as hard military technology. Hi, Gregoire.
Good morning.
So let me start by asking each of you, what resilience means?
So I think it means three really important things. I think at its heart, we're talking
about the strength and unity of national will, of the will of all the constituent parts of
a state to manage disaster, confrontation, and conflict. So it's genuinely a whole-of-society
debate. Secondly, it is absolutely foundational to deterrence. There's no doubt that there's
deterrence unless you can absorb a blow. So resilience is part of how you deter your
opponents from taking you on. And thirdly, it is a combination of what the military do
and then the very much broader and arguably more important totality of what civil society
and industry do in order to combine to provide a truly resilient state.
And you've cast that in quite military terms. Would you include in it the response, say,
to the pandemic?
So I think resilience is about dealing with natural and man-made disaster as a given.
And it's pretty much the same approach that will deal with confrontation and conflict,
although there are clearly going to be nuances, because in confrontation and conflict, somebody's
taking you on. And in a pandemic, that's clearly not the case.
Nella?
I tend to agree that at the core of resilience is preparedness.
And reaction to crisis and shocks. But I would perhaps move our definition away from
the military domain and think more fundamentally about resilience as a state of trust in information.
As we've seen, especially in recent years, trusted, reliable information, trusted, reliable,
safe infrastructure upon which this information is exchanged is at the core of trust and cohesion
in society.
And a recent uptick in attacks in our information space underpin how central trusted information
is to resilience and to many different aspects of it, including, of course, in the military
domain.
And Gregoire, what about you? What did you take resilience to mean when you were writing
this recent paper?
The way I approached the paper very much started with the etymology of the word coming from
the Latin verb "servire," which means jumping, springing.
And re-resilience would mean re-jumping, re-springing, conveying the idea of an upward movement.
And building on what Richard and Isabella have said, I think you cannot jump again
if you have lost your elasticity.
And for a society, elasticity depends on a wide variety of factors that are both psychological
— I think Isabella is very right that trust is absolutely capital — and this is what
I believe in Europe at the moment we are.
And the rest is very much, I would say, the characteristic of an economy today, of a market
economy.
So fundamental infrastructure, energy, obviously, and economic resilience, which is also crucial.
And for the more traditional security aspect, there is very little to add to the seven pillars
that NATO has unveiled that covers transportation systems, continuity of government and infrastructure.
So I would really look at the seven pillars.
Look at all that system together.
But what drove much of my approach is what I call the Finnish model.
I'm sure we'll get to talk about it later in the discussion that Richard actually hinted
at, which is what the Finns call a whole-of-society model.
Not just the Finns, the Swedes are also doing it very well, which means that every single
citizen is embedded in the resilience and preparedness framework.
Thanks for that.
And we will indeed do that.
Indeed, come on to that.
I want to dig in a bit more to the threats because we've got a huge range already.
And Gregoire, you've brought us into the economic domain as well, where we've had, in terms
of recent shocks, both Trump's tariffs and what is called China's shock 2.0, the wave
of intense technological competition.
So let's look at the source of the urgency, why people are talking about this now because
of the nature of threats.
Again, Richard, what is new about the threats that we are facing now?
So I think there are two things that are new.
The first is we live in this new era of state-level confrontation and conflict on the burning
platform of the one planet that we have, and it all feels more zero-sum and existential
than it did for more than a generation of the comfortable post-Cold War era.
So that's new.
But I think what most people are focusing on is we're talking about confrontation and
conflict in the digital age.
The 21st century.
And the digital age has provided all this technology, which now drives how we live and
work and play, and indeed how we fight.
So data and AI and robotics and autonomy and new materials and quantum and access to space,
all of this.
And those things are enabling us to lead the lives that we have now.
But they have also created an enormous array of, in the jargon, attack services, ways which
an opponent can threaten.
So I think we can think about bearing down on our daily national life.
And for me, this is the heart of the debate.
And that's why it touches on, yes, of course, information.
The cognitive domain, I think, is foundational.
But also how we get our power, our water, our food, our telecoms, how we arrange our
transport, how we do our banking, how we communicate.
These are all elements of the digital age that we live in.
Bella, how do you approach this question of why we're talking about all this now?
In the past few years in particular, we've seen some remarkable changes to what experts
call the threat landscape when it comes to resilience, and I think specifically threats
to information resilience.
And here I'm thinking of influence, operations, interference, disinformation, misinformation.
Experts over at the Counter Disinformation Network in their most recent State of Manipulation
report noted that AI is increasingly the tool, target, and referee.
And I like that characterization.
We never want to overstate the impact of increasingly powerful AI in targeting or degrading resilience.
But increasingly, and especially thinking about influence operations, it is playing
a role.
It is coming into the spotlight, both in the tools and techniques that threat actors are
using to achieve their objectives, perhaps impersonation, the use of deep fakes, or even
generative engine optimization.
So from a technical perspective, these changes in the threat landscape are the tools that
the threat landscape strikes much concern, as is our lack of preparedness for it.
Greg, what is your take on the urgency?
And also, as you look over particularly Europe and the UK, are all countries equally worried
about this?
Well, I would take a step back and zoom out a little and look at what has shaped
Europe and actually policy and political integration for the past 15 years.
We've seen a series of crises that have actually defined Europe.
We've seen a series of crises that have actually defined what Europe is today.
So starting with the financial and debt crisis, followed by migration crisis, followed by
the pandemic that followed Brexit itself, then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and
in the background, the acceleration of the impact of climate change.
So all of that makes for, I think, a strong argument for Europe to be able to absorb shocks
without necessarily turning its back on what makes Europe a better country.
And I think that's what we're going to see.
I think that's what we're going to see.
movement within the European Union, and of course, the importance of sustainability and a society
that actually cares about the long-term impact of its economic and industrial decisions. All of that,
I would say, is what could somehow define or at least characterize what it means to be European.
And it's clear that since especially the pandemic, we've seen that we are much weaker than we
thought, and that what until now had been allowing us to live our everyday life from energy to
medication, we realize that we're actually dependent on others. And we have been crippled
by dependencies, period. There's no interdependency when it comes to energy relations with Russia,
now energy relations or security relations with the U.S. We are dependent. And I think the question
of resilience asks a broader question of,
what do we Europeans want to be able to do on our own so that the way we react and try to adapt
whenever a crisis emerges is shaped by our own interests? Richard, let's go back to what the
nature of threats are. I mean, we've been describing a huge range of things. How do you
go about advising a country on how to prepare against all this? You're one of the co-authors
of the Strategic Defense Review, which set out to do just that. So I think there are two important
things. The first is for governments and the societies they represent to accept and understand
the nature of the world that we live in. We may not have wanted it or chosen it, but we now live
in a world where the U.K. and many other countries can be singled out by big powers around the world
and indeed lesser powers around the world for confrontation and conflict. This can choose us
even if we would prefer that it didn't happen. And so it can't just be denied or ignored.
Secondly, there has to be a clear understanding that when we talk about confrontation and
conflict, some things have never changed. It is still a matter of a battle of wills.
And if it is badly handled and it turns into war, then the nature of war hasn't changed and it will
be as terrible as you see playing out in Ukraine and in many other places. So we then have to
address if war is a battle of wills, what are the instruments that can be applied here? Because war
has always been. about all levers of available power over the whole of human history. And some of these things
remain military, but we're in a new military age dominated by things like ballistic and cruise
missiles and combat aircraft and increasingly long-range precision drones. So geography in the
military space has become irrelevant and all militaries are in the biggest transformation
for 150 years. So that's one dimension, which is transform your military so that they can
deter for war in the 21st century. And then this second aspect, the one that I think we're talking
most about today, is that if your objective is to break the will of another country, then you're
unlikely to start with their armed forces. You're going to start by those things that
sustain daily national life. And we have talked about power and water and telecoms and food and
information. And so you'd use a combination of, of course, cyber attack to remove those things.
But also disruption and money and influence. And then the thing that Bella has been talking about,
which is this cognitive aspect that we live in a world where most adults, 87% in the UK,
carry a smartphone. And their relationship with their smartphone appears to be quite unquestioning.
And in many cases, people trust their phone more than they trust their government or their
employers. And so when we talk about resilience in our time, there's the military dimension,
then all the sort of cyber and digital.
aspects. And then there is this vital cognitive flank. And all of those things together
constitute how you make war in the 21st century, and therefore how you have to be resilient when
you think about it. So Bella, how do we go about, how does the government go about getting people
to distinguish between real information, including the information the government might want to be
giving on exactly this topic, and fake news, disinformation, and so on that comes through?
I mean, it's remarkable.
It's an incredibly difficult challenge. You know, research suggests that in an information space,
which is increasingly saturated with deep fakes and inauthentic information, many audiences may
be able to tell the difference between an authentic piece of content and a fabricated or an inauthentic
piece of content. But the underlying issue is that they might not care. And so what we're seeing are
these traditional tools that we use to build information resilience,
such as fact checking, and calling out something if it's fake news, becoming ineffective,
because some audiences are happy to consume and reshare information that they know is inauthentic,
because it feels right, or because it feels true. And this creates a puzzle in response. And it
means that governments, societies overall, on the front line of dealing with kind of these
innovative information threats, need to get in touch with the government, and they need to get
need to get incredibly creative. This underlines the importance of what experts call a life cycle
in touch with the government, and they need to get in touch with the government, and they need to
response to information resilience. It is not enough to just detect inauthentic content. It's
not enough to watermark if something is AI generated. You have to accompany these with
resilience building measures at other parts of the life cycle. So in prevention, building up,
for example, media and AI literacy in communities in multiple languages in different contexts who
get in touch with the government, and they need to
incredibly old tactic. Find a local grievance, exploit it and amplify it as part of a broader
influence campaign or influence operation targeting an election that the Kremlin has, you know, been
doing for four decades at this point.
Gregoire, you are from France, so you've lived in many places, including Russia.
Are the French elections, the presidential elections next year, something that Russia
has a keen interest in because the candidate at the moment ahead in the polls, Marine Le Pen,
is less hostile to Russia, sometimes seeming prepared to embrace it, but certainly not
as supportive of Ukraine as President Macron has been?
Is there a sense that Russian fake news may disrupt this election?
Yes, very much so. And I think Isabella has summarized very sharply the kind of a playbook
that the Kremlin likes to use now. I think what we'll get to see now is a kind of an upgrade,
if I may say so, of the methodology. They will, of course, still resort to very easy
disinformation campaign online, with their usual troll farms, using TikTok and social media. And
And the more young people you can target, the faster fake news gets to spread.
But there were also, and we've seen that in the last few days, when Sergei Lavrov, Russia's
foreign minister, reacted to that information that France has actually had in Ukraine for
the past six months, engineers from the French army in Ukraine to help the Ukrainians maintain
the military equipment that France has sent.
What we'll get to see is messages sent from the Russian authorities aim not so much at
the government as to the people, trying to make them understand that it is not in their
interest to keep supporting Ukraine because that would lead to an uncontrollable kind
of escalation with Russia.
And that example is concrete.
So Lavrov said, we now know that there are French soldiers in Ukraine, and therefore
it's impossible for us not to treat France as a co-belligerent, and the French people need to
understand that this will have repercussions. Obviously, Lavrov did what we call the strict
minimum, because he's known that for a long time. By the way, France is not the only country who
sent engineers. Britain has done the same. But it's a cheap investment. A few words that immediately
spread. So what we saw on the following day was Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the hard-left leader,
who in the polls is closely behind Marine Le Pen and who, if the elections were held today,
might end up in the second round and face Marine Le Pen in the second round of election,
said, you see what Sergei Lavrov has said, France shouldn't become curbeligerent, so
we should really stop that kind of close support, especially of Ukraine. So the point here is to
show that this would not replace the usual disinformation campaign. It will continue and
even intensify. But they will also resort to a kind of a higher level messaging, if you will,
because they know they have useful relays. And Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France, Alisa Weidel,
the AFD is the far right alternative for Germany. And Germany and I could go on like that in pretty
much every single European country. Richard, we're talking about Russia.
There are other countries too. Yes, there are. So I think the things that are common,
Whether we're talking about the challenge to narratives in the UK from Russia or China or Iran or even perhaps North Korea, is that they all absolutely understand.
is that they all absolutely understand
And there's a way, as Bella's described, of propagating these messages very effectively.
The thing that I think we should focus more attention on is we understand these techniques
and we can see them being applied to us, and yet it seems that very many people will go
with it.
And one of the extraordinary features of our time, whether we're having a conversation
about the relationship between Europe and Russia or between Europe and China, is that
many people have taken a view about how this should go.
And almost regardless of what happens or what contrary opinions are put to them, they maintain
their position.
And this seems to account for some of the polarization we're seeing in the UK and European
politics.
So part of this information problem in the information age is simply an aspect of how
we as a species actually function.
And it is really difficult.
And I think quite dangerous.
Can you give me examples of countries preparing for these shocks well?
So I think there are excellent models in Europe, and I wouldn't distinguish between Finland
and Sweden, but I would say they are the two poster childs.
And they come here regularly and set out these models, and they go away baffled that
they fall on stony ground because culturally we are not in that space.
And are there lessons we should take from Ukraine specifically?
Yes, absolutely.
In Ukraine, we're. reminded that war is a whole of society, and it requires the mobilization of industry
and civil society, not just the armed forces.
And war has no safety net, and it has no time limit.
This is year five.
These are all things we need to take to heart.
I would draw your attention to a frontline state like Moldova, you know, with a hugely
important election in September last year, and a total onslaught of Russia-backed and
Russia-linked influence opportunities.
They emerged through this trial with great success.
They received a lot of foreign support from the UK government, and Burnham did mention
this in his speech at the UN.
But civil society, grassroots efforts on the ground, helped tackle this very much whole
of society threat.
And so I think there's a great deal of kind of lessons learning how to do more on resilience
with less.
But of course, the fight is not half over.
In 2027, we have some eye-wateringly complex elections.
What do you think is the right thing to do to prepare for Krakow?
Well, I won't be very original, because it's also at the heart of my paper.
But Finland is obviously the strongest example, particularly, I think, in its preparation
for interruptions to essential supplies and not just military attack.
And there was a concrete example a couple of years ago when a connector gas pipeline
between Finland and Estonia ended up being out of operation.
It actually remained unavailable for nearly six months.
And what?
What Finland did is that it maintained gas supplies through its LNG terminals by having
developed alternative import routes.
So that, I think, is an excellent example.
And we could also look to the past, because I think resilience only makes sense if you
show you're able to face a crisis.
When Switzerland received intelligence that the Nazis had planned for an invasion in spite
of the neutrality, their general, one of the few times when they elected a general,
had planned for a very clear strategy to fight in the mountains.
And so knowing what kind of warfare you're also facing is exactly where the French failed
in 1940.
Let's swing around to the question of what countries should now do.
And I'm particularly thinking of the UK and Europe.
And Richard, may I start with you?
If we could swing around to the harder threats, the military threats, if you like, what do
you think the UK and Europe should now do?
From my perspective, what needs to be done is very clear.
And the first thing is to acknowledge the true state of the world we live in.
And from a defence perspective, that would accept that the bar for deterrence, and we
are about deterrence, is much, much higher than it has been for more than 40 years.
And secondly, we're nowhere near that bar because we have the armed forces that we elected to have in a
different time in the post-Cold War era.
So there's an enormous gap to close.
So our struggle is how do we close this gap?
And there are two dimensions to this, one which is relatively easy, which is to accept we're
talking about war in the 21st century.
So we're about transforming how you do defence.
And that's pretty well articulated in things like the 25 Defence Review.
And you see it playing out in the wars in Iran and in Ukraine.
The challenge that we have is that we're not going to be able to do anything about it.
The challenge that we have is the clock, which is left to our own devices, given the state of
the UK economy and our own preferences.
We would like to take really quite a long time, more than 10 years, to reset our military
deterrence for the world that we live in.
And yet, because the clock in Europe is probably owned by a combination of what Russia decides
to do and America decides not to do, and in the case perhaps of China, the way its technology
is advancing makes it really difficult.
I think it's really clear that by no later than the end of the 2030s, there's a benchmark
there that if you don't keep up with it, then you'll not really be able to deter, no matter
how. You're talking about their military technology.
So I'm talking about, well, actually, this is technology that spans AI and space and
robotics.
And so, yes, of course, it's military, but it covers everything else as well.
So the challenge we have is that we know what we need to do.
No shortage of good ideas.
We actually are pretty clear on how quickly we should do this.
But in order to do it, we've got to make very different choices about how we spend our
money.
And given that we don't have a growing economy and money is tight and we don't want to tax
or borrow anymore, what we are confronting, or rather not confronting, is that we'd have
to give things up that we like, so aspects of health and welfare, in order to put more
money into defense sooner, even if we do as I think we should do, which is draw the private
sector much more into this field.
That just means. Changing some rules.
So the resilience dilemma is not about knowing what to do.
It's not about understanding the risks that we face, because they're very well articulated.
It's finding the will politically and societally to move decisively and fast enough by imposing
hard choices on ourselves.
And we appear to be not incapable of doing that, because I think we've chosen not to
do it.
And that, for me, is the tragedy that will bite us hard.
in the future.
Which brings us back to politics and those choices.
Grégoire, you wrote the paper I referred to at the beginning of this conversation about
what you call an Erasmus scheme, like the shared student scheme of Europe, for resilience.
Can you tell us what you meant by that?
So the central proposal is a compulsory civic defense service in a circle coalition of willing
countries in Europe.
And by Europe, I mean EU plus. UK, Norway, and any interested European country that would be organized nationally, so rooted
in the national reality of defense and security, but with a mandatory period in another participating
European country on the model of Erasmus plus.
So it would connect the practical preparedness with actually a wider ambition, helping Europeans
understand which. For me, it's crucial at the moment when we look at the declining interest of many Europeans
in the fate of Ukraine, or at least in supporting Ukraine any longer, helping Europeans understand
why the security of another country, possibly far away, so if you're Spanish and talk about
Poland, for instance, does actually matter to your own security.
So let me make it clear.
I'm not recommending that participants take part in military operations.
It's mostly training.
A sentence I use in the paper is: "Erasmus helped generations of Europeans learn together."
And I'm advocating for something that would help Europeans prepare together.
So just to be clear, are you recommending compulsory national service?
Yes, I am.
In Europe, you don't have compulsory.
And to be honest, the reason why I really wanted to push for this is that when I saw that President Macron came up with his idea of a
voluntary service that in the end would only concern 10,000 people, Chancellor Metz had the same idea, you realize, based also on what Richard said about scarce resources, we could achieve more and spend less.
So it should be compulsory.
Otherwise, it's always the same.
All those who are already convinced are joining, and those who are either not interested or not convinced do not join.
So universality does matter.
You put it very well.
Bela, would you join a voluntary service?
It's a question that I think is probably on the minds of a lot of folks after hearing narratives about, you know, the potential of service.
Listen, I think that the underlying issue here is one of public messaging.
Resilience, as we've heard, starts at the individual and community level.
And there's a great deal of work for governments to do to go to the individual and community level and say, listen, if we want to build resilience, for example, against information threats that shake the very foundations of our democracy,
it starts here.
We're working at the upper echelons of policymaking, for example.
UK government has just launched a new dedicated unit on disinformation, the National Centre for
Information Defence. But a huge part of building state capacity, credibility and the whole of
society resilience is public messaging to explain to the kind of grassroots level and really the
front lines of these resilience challenges, what is happening, how it's being costed and why we all
need to be pushing in the same direction. Richard, as we begin to bring this to the end, National
Service? I don't think there is in the UK any political or societal will to contemplate National
Service. And that's because I think we are in a sort of unspoken conspiracy where today's political
leaders almost across the house, they can see this world, but they, I think, have taken the
position that telling people about it regularly and firmly would be alarmist. And indeed,
they're not.
They're not even sure what they as political leaders should do about it. This is well outside
the comfort zone of their experience, training and education. But they don't sense any appetite
for it. So this isn't like Sweden or Finland or a Nordic or Baltic country where the population
get this and just expect to be led. I think in the UK, the population by and large is happier in
denial and is worried by many, many other things, welfare, government services, cost of living,
all of that stuff. And we're
probably respond badly if they were told by their government, yes, yes, yes, that's all important.
But now we're going to do resilience and defense better. So if you have political leaders that
aren't up for leading, and a civil society that isn't ready to be led in this zone,
then conversations about conscription will simply die. And where I think we are more likely to be
in the world that we actually live in, is that because we have chosen to act in this way,
we are now relying on, to some degree, the goodwill of our friends to protect us. And we know that's
declining. And more and more, we're relying on the goodwill of our enemies to leave us alone.
And if they don't do that, then the way out of this for the UK is that nothing will change
until we feel the fear, until events drive us to change. And when that day comes, if that day comes,
we may find it's a very steep hill to climb. On that note, we are going to have to wrap up
here. Thank you very much to my trio of guests, General Sir Richard Barrons.
Thank you very much.
Isabella Wilkinson.
Great to be here.
Grégoire Ruse.
Happy to be here.
Very good to have you all. Everyone listening, thank you very much indeed for joining. Don't
forget to sign on every Friday and follow our work on chathamhouse.org and get some
of our wonderful Christmas presents from the Chatham House shop. See you next week.
Bye.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Resilience encompasses national will, societal unity, and the ability to absorb shocks, both in conflict and crises like pandemics.
In the digital age, threats to resilience include disinformation, AI-driven manipulation, and attacks on essential infrastructure like energy, water, and telecoms.
A "whole-of-society" approach to resilience—seen in Finland and Sweden—is critical, embedding citizens in preparedness and building trust through shared civic experience.
Modern warfare is a battle of wills, targeting everyday systems and cognitive trust, not just military forces, with information and perception playing a central role.
Europe faces urgent challenges due to interdependence, climate change, and geopolitical tensions, requiring stronger domestic resilience and coordinated response mechanisms.
The Finnish model demonstrates how resilience can be achieved through proactive planning, such as maintaining alternative supply routes during energy disruptions.
Political and societal inertia in the UK and EU—especially resistance to public messaging and national service—undermines collective preparedness.
A proposed European "Erasmus-style civic defense service" could strengthen cross-national understanding and shared responsibility for security and resilience.
Summary:
Resilience in the 21st century is no longer a military-only concept but a comprehensive societal capability to withstand disruptions—from cyberattacks and disinformation to energy crises and conflict. The discussion highlights that resilience hinges on national will, trust in information, and the ability to absorb shocks, both natural and man-made. Experts emphasize that modern threats are deeply rooted in the digital age, where AI, deep fakes, and influence operations target public trust and daily infrastructure.
While Finland and Sweden offer inspiring models of whole-of-society preparedness—through civic engagement, alternative supply chains, and inclusive defense training—many Western democracies, including the UK and EU, remain underprepared. Current political reluctance to address these challenges—such as through mandatory civic defense or transparent public messaging—risks leaving societies vulnerable. The proposed European "Erasmus-style civic defense service" aims to foster mutual understanding and shared responsibility across nations, especially in the face of geopolitical threats like those from Russia or China.
Ultimately, the path forward requires not only new policies but also a fundamental shift in political will, public discourse, and societal trust, as the current lack of action may result in severe consequences when crises strike.
FAQs
Resilience refers to a nation's ability to withstand and recover from shocks, including military conflict, natural disasters, and cyberattacks. It involves the strength of national will, trust in information, and the capacity of civil society and infrastructure to function under pressure.
Digital technology enables new attack vectors such as AI-driven disinformation, deep fakes, and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. These tools allow adversaries to disrupt daily life, erode public trust, and influence political outcomes in ways that were previously impossible.
Europe faces a series of overlapping crises—financial, migration, pandemic, and Ukraine conflict—that have exposed vulnerabilities in energy, supply chains, and societal trust. These events highlight the need for greater preparedness to absorb shocks independently.
Trust in reliable information is foundational to societal cohesion. When citizens are exposed to misinformation or disinformation, especially through social media, it undermines public confidence in institutions and weakens democratic resilience.
Finland and Sweden exemplify a 'whole-of-society' approach where citizens are actively engaged in preparedness. This includes robust civil defense, alternative supply routes, and public awareness, which help build both economic and societal resilience.
Yes, a proposed solution is a mandatory civic defense service modeled on Erasmus, where Europeans serve in each other’s countries. This would build cross-national understanding and solidarity, helping people see how the security of one nation affects all.
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