The PDB Situation Report | September 26th, 2026: Iran’s Economy Is Starting to Fall Apart

Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage. All right, let's get briefed. First up, Washington is tightening the screws on the Iranian regime with new sanctions and, of course, the continuing blockade of Iranian ports. We'll be joined by Mian Naleki of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies to examine the sanctions campaign, the blockade's effectiveness, and what else the U.S. could do as it looks to force change in the Iranian regime. Later in the show, as Washington increases the economic pressure on Tehran, we'll look at the impact that that pressure is having on the Iranian people and whether that strain could translate into new unrest. We'll get an inside look from Ali Reza Jafrizadeh of the National Council of the Resistance of Iran. But first, today's Situation Report Spotlight. Washington is turning up the economic pressure on Iran, and the latest move is aimed at something very visible, keeping Iranian aircraft on the ground. The Treasury Department is warning foreign airports, fuel suppliers, ground handlers, and ticketing companies that servicing sanctioned Iranian carriers could expose them to U.S. penalties. Some countries have already begun restricting flights, while others, including China, well, there's a surprise, are resisting the pressure. The question now is how effective this campaign can be, how much further Washington can push it, and whether Tehran can find enough willing partners to keep its airlines operating. Joining me now is Miad Maleki. He's a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former senior sanctions official at the U.S. Treasury Department. During his time at Treasury, Miad helped oversee sanctions targeting Iran and the network of groups that it supports across the Middle East. And it's quite the network of groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias. Miad, thank you very much for taking the time to join us here on the Situation Report. Thanks for having me. Great to be with you. I appreciate that very much. And let me ask you a question. It's going to sound very simplistic, but I think a lot of people probably think the same way that I do. I pride myself on my simplistic ways. I want to ask you questions about the airline sanctions that have been put into place that Treasury Secretary Scott Besson talked about. But in the world of sanctions, and I realize every situation is somewhat different, but with Iranian regime sanctions, you look at all the different things you could do. And I guess my question is, why don't we just do it all at one time? It seems like there's a never-ending supply of other sanctions that we can layer on, when perhaps when we're talking about an organization like the Iranian regime, maybe we just say, let's just do them all at once. That actually is not a simple question. That's a very nuanced question. And here's my response to that. Sanctions work when they're enforced. These aviation sanctions that you used as an example, these sanctions have been in place for a very long time. What Secretary Besson is doing is bringing the operational aspect of sanctions, the enforcement. Yes, he's expanding the scope of sanctions, the new sanctions that are being added. But the most important part of it is enforcement. And why it's important? Sanctions are not, they don't work when you add a name to the list of sanctions. Sanctions work when compliance officers in companies, when bankers, when CEOs, of corporations that are involved, for example, in this case, in service providing provision of services to aviation companies, catering, those companies, those individuals, they make decisions to stop Iran business. And they make those decisions when they see there is a risk of being sanctioned. So you create that risk by enforcing, by showing them that there is a high level of risk if they get engaged, if they get involved. In bypassing those sanctions. So what Secretary Besson is doing is what, for example, President Biden administration didn't do. President Biden came in, wanted to engage with the Iranian regime for a deal. He didn't enforce sanctions. He didn't remove any sanctions, but he simply just stopped enforcing. And when you stop enforcing, you have sanctions kind of not working anymore. So Iran went from, at the end of the Trump administration, basically exporting around 100,000, 100,000 barrels a day to 2.5 million barrels a day. Sanctions didn't fall. Sanctions were in place. They were just not being enforced. And what Secretary Besson is doing today is really enforcing the sanctions and putting the sanctions to work. Okay. Well, I think that's going to confuse a lot of people who assumed that, yeah, the only reason to have sanctions is if there are consequences, right? Otherwise, they're not really even sanctions. They're just like, they're suggestions. Hey, maybe you don't work with Mohan Air. So it is, I think, a very interesting point that you raised that probably will surprise a lot of people to think that the U.S. is then engaging in this paper exercise of saying that we're sanctioning, and then there are no consequences. Now, if that's the case, and if we're now engaged in sort of the logical step here, which is to say that we are going to follow through on our talk about sanctions, this is a very broad question. And kind of take it wherever you'd like to, but they also only work, would be my understanding, if key nations comply. And the key nation for Iran, of course, China. And China seems to have no interest in worrying about U.S. sanctions on Iran, at least at the present time. And yet we also, as a country or as an administration right now, we seem to have no interest in making that point known to the Chinese regime. It seems like we've been very timid in approaching the Chinese Communist Party or Xi Jinping, the Chinese government, and really arguing this point. Or even bringing it up. It seemed like certainly during the summit, President Trump was like, it was a very good meeting. Well, I don't see how you'd have a very good meeting if we're at war with a country, and China is the primary supporter of that nation. I guess what I'm saying is, do you see where these sanctions actually can have a serious impact? I know the blockade's having a great impact, and I apologize for this long rambling question that I'm throwing your way. The blockade's having an obvious impact. But the sanctions themselves, if the key trading partner for Iran is not engaged in that with the U.S., I suppose the question is very cynical, but what's the point? No, that's a really great question and a great point. So yes, China has been always a problem when it comes to our worst adversaries. China was a problem when Biden administration was trying to put pressure on Russians, and China has always been a problem. With Iranians, as a matter of fact, for example, our F-15 that was targeted over Iranian airspace and went down, it was targeted by an Iranian-used shoulder launcher, the surface-to-air missile that is made in China and was given to the Iranians. So it is a problem. And I got to tell you, I don't think it's a problem. I don't think it's a problem. And I got to tell you, it's also very tricky to deal with China. U.S.-China trade is somewhere between $500 to $600 billion. Remember, after Mexico and Canada, China is our closest trade partner. I mean, you look at those numbers and you think we're close friends, we're buddies, we're the best friends. You're looking at the numbers, right? But the reality is China has leveraging that trade partner. And I think it's a problem. to make things painful and difficult for us on a national security front. So I think we do need to look into opportunities to also leverage the level that the Chinese rely on U.S. dollar and U.S. financial system to compel them to stop being a problem for us on a national and foreign policy perspective, national security perspective. Now, I think 70% to 80% of Chinese trade still goes through U.S. dollar and U.S. financial system or is done or transactions are settled using U.S. dollars. So there's a lot of opportunities there for us to push the Chinese to be more aligned or at least not throwing roadblocks where we're trying to address certain issues. Now, Iran and China trade is somewhere between $10 to $12 billion a year. If you add oil to it, Iran's main purchaser of oil is the Chinese. However, the Chinese are not buying Iran's oil as Iranian oil. It goes to China as Malaysian, as Iraqi oil. But the trade with Iran is about $10 to $20 billion a year. The trade with the US is $500 to $600 billion a year. So the Chinese understand that they can't risk their US trade over the Iran trade. And I've heard from Chinese officials that they view Iran's trade more of a liability and problem as opposed to a partnership. So I think we haven't pushed them hard enough. I think there are opportunities to push the Chinese to, at least in this case, not being as problematic as they've been. But also, Iran's decision to close the Strait of Hormuz has been a major annoyance. It really has annoyed the Chinese. So we also have a diplomatic. We have diplomatic opportunities with the Chinese right now to convince them that there would be consequences if they continue to use Iran as a leverage to pressure us. And we are serious about the issue of Iran. I heard that President Trump actually raised this issue in the meetings yesterday. And I think there are probably. What I'm hearing is a lot of behind-the-scenes engagements with the Chinese, the Chinese private sector, putting aside. The slogan that comes out of the Chinese government, the Chinese private sector really care about their access to US dollars. They really care about their US trade. And I think we have the engagement with the government, but engagement with the private sector in China can be very fruitful and helpful in this case. Yeah, I would worry that when you say private sector, there's really not a private sector in China, ultimately. They're not going to act. You're not going to find it. Because it's like when we talk about the concern that some Chinese companies are providing satellite imagery that's helping the Iranian regime target American assets. It's not as if those companies are rogue. They're not acting unilaterally without the tacit understanding or approval of the Chinese government. It's not that sort of system. And so I worry about this notion that perhaps we can be pragmatic with the Chinese government, talk to them about their support system, talk to them about their support to Iran, and then still do business with the private sector and one doesn't affect the other. But going back to your earlier point, you're absolutely correct. And you put it very succinctly. It's very complex dealing with China. Now, I want to jump back into that in just a second. But first, if you'll stay right where you are, we do have to take a quick break, and then we'll be back with more from Miod Malecki of the Defense for Democracies. Miod Malecki : Hey, Mike Baker here with a pro tip for feeling your best. Now, let me ask you a question. Have you ever finished breakfast or lunch or dinner, but then you find yourself reaching for a snack maybe an hour later? It's true. Cravings can take over even when you're trying to eat healthy. And that's exactly why Pendulum Metabolic Daily was designed. 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Mian, thank you very much for sticking with us. We're talking all things sanctions in the Iranian regime, and I'm glad you're here. Talk to me about—without going too far into the weeds, I think it's probably a very technical subject—but talk to me about the difficulty of enforcing sanctions in today's world. Sure. That's, again, another great question. I think here's the challenge. When you get to—when rubber hit the road and you're actually going after enforcement of secondary sanctions—and secondary sanctions means you go and tell foreign countries, foreign partners, foreign governments, meaning non-Iranian, non-Russian, but enablers, facilitators, those who help our adversaries bypass sanctions, those who have touchpoints with U.S. businesses and U.S. financial system—that's where the sanctions work. And when you go after those type of targets with tools like sanctions, there are a couple things that you got to think about. One, what is the goal you want to get out of sanctioning that entity in a way that it would put pressure on your adversary? And how much of that pressure is going to be on the U.S. business? Because remember, every time you use sanctions, you're giving away U.S. business, right, in the interest for the benefit of our national security interest. So we discussed—we discussed the Chinese entities, right? So remember, we have a extremely large interest in the Chinese market manufacturing industry in China. So when we use these tools, how much of that is going to hurt U.S. businesses and U.S. interests versus how much of that is going to be pressure on our adversaries, right? So I think it's appropriate to use sanctions to go after bad actors. But we also—the difficulty here is to measure the effectiveness to see how much of that is going to really pressure the Chinese industry. So I think it's appropriate to use sanctions to go after bad actors, right? So I think it's appropriate to use sanctions to go after bad actors, versus how much of that is going to really deprive U.S. business interests, right? So that's kind of the complexity of using sanctions when it comes to going after very effective targets. And then I guess you have the—all the difficulties involved in the investigative process, right? Because it really is an investigative process to identify how a country is getting around sanctions, right? Because in part, that's—it all goes hand in hand, right? You lay out the sanctions, you explain the consequences and the secondary sanctions for countries that—or groups or companies that decide to work with that sanctioned country. But you've got to be able to gather the evidence that's involved. Right. And then sanctions evaders have become very smart in how they're evading sanctions, whether it is counterfeiting documents, using series of front companies, for example. It does create the cost when sanctions evaders, when Iranians and Russians, instead of putting oil on a tanker, going from the oil terminal to the buyer, they have to do four or five rounds of ship-to-ship transfers. They have to counterfeit documents. They have to go through layers of intermediaries that are corrupt, that are charging commissions. It's black market. So they lose a lot of profit, and that's really a part of the goal of the sanctions, right? It makes those cargoes, those exports less profitable for adversaries. But also going after those intermediaries is very challenging because they're really good at hiding their identities. They're really good at evading our sanctions. So you're absolutely right. And also remember, sanctions are legal tools. You have to establish some—you need to meet some legal threshold that certain entity has, in fact, engaged in bypassing sanctions. You've got to have evidence. You know, we're a country of justice, a very strong judiciary, like, well, we've got to establish some evidence before you can sanction an entity. And it takes time. And in most cases, that activity should have happened already, meaning someone has done something wrong, and then you go after them with sanctions. So sometimes the effectiveness comes after the conduct has already taken place, yet it cut them off from the financial institutions and it has some serious effects. Yeah. And you raise a very good point, which is that, look, the Iranians certainly have been doing this for a long time in terms of understanding how to get around U.S. sanctions, right? And they've become relatively sophisticated. The Russians likewise, particularly since Putin's invasion in 2022. And the relationship between the Iranians and the Russians is such that they're sharing that knowledge, right? It's like one fraudster helping another, you know, and to commit more fraud. And it is. It's from an investigative point of view. It's a very tough thing to do because they're constantly shifting and adjusting. We've talked on the PDB before about the sort of the Russian networks and how they evade the sanctions. And obviously the Iranians have been engaged in the same thing. Let me take just a little bit of a turn. Talk to me about your thoughts, how you view the blockade, the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports. Talk to me about your perspective on that, how effective it's been, and what do you think is going to be the next step in the way that the U.S. is going to move forward? Well, you know, I think the U.S. is going to be the next step in the way that the U.S. I think the U.S. is going to move something. Absolutely. So I think blockade is something we've never had with the Iranian regime. We always had a robust set of sanctions, some other foreign policy tools that we have deployed to degrade the Iranian regime's ability to generate revenue and procure weapon systems and boost this nuclear program. But the blockade is very unique in a way that we've never had such a physical disruptive tool being deployed against this adversary. Now, a couple of things. So one, at the beginning of when there were talks about the naval blockade, my thoughts were the blockade is going to be somewhere in the Persian Gulf and is going to really block off Iran's oil terminals. What happened, the blockade line was placed outside the Strait of Hormuz, which made the oil extraction. But it gave Iranians some time to use their assets in the Persian Gulf freely to not have to drop the oil extraction because the naval blockade goes in place. It doesn't allow Iranians to send oil out of the Strait of Hormuz and it wouldn't allow them to bring imports through the Strait of Hormuz. And that's about $435 million a day in trade that is gone. With oil extraction, it took some time. But now they have dropped the oil extraction to probably somewhere between 1.2, 1.3 million barrels a day. And that is the amount they can refine domestically. Otherwise, they have probably shutting their wells and the extraction level has been dropped to a point that if they want to take it back up to 4 million barrels a day, it's going to probably take months, if not years. So that has caused a serious damage in the long term. But in the day-to-day economic activities, they're losing $435 million in trade. And it has accelerated the effect of sanctions. Now, and the reason that I'm saying it's going to keep getting worse for them every day is because during the last year or two years of the Biden administration, and then when the blockade, before the blockade was imposed, and when there was a pause in the blockade, Iranians managed to get a lot of oil out of the Strait of Hormuz. So they had around $130 million, $160 million barrels of oil sitting in international waters outside the blockade. That has now been dropped to somewhere close to 20 to 25 million barrels. And that's because Chinese keeps buying some of that oil. Now, the Chinese are only buying close to like 300,000 to 400,000 barrels a day. So they're buying less. And their only buyers in China are the already sanctioned refiners that are buying Iranian oil. We talk about this a lot. We talk about how much is moving through the Strait, how much has gotten through, what the Chinese are buying, what they're not able to do, what the Russians are doing. How accurate, from your perspective and your experience, how accurate, how credible are these numbers that we're throwing out there when we talk about levels of production and what's getting moved? So the level of production are pretty accurate. The reason for that is because we see the contracts, like how much they're actually promising to buyers. And the satellite images or companies are monitoring the movement of tankers out of the Strait of Hormuz, but also the tankers are getting filled up at Iran's Khark Island, the main oil terminal. So those numbers are accurate. The numbers when it comes to export, import, those numbers are, we rely on Central Bank of Iran's own numbers, but these are not numbers that they would mess around with. These are numbers that we can probably take as closer to the reality. It's a dictatorship. They control the information. They own the information. We just work with what we can get out of the Central Bank data. And also, we're talking about China as the key partner. And there, of course, there's a significant lack of transparency there in terms of what they're doing. Last question. Are you, where, I don't want to have you, well, of course, I do want to have you. Do you, and to you, are you hopeful about where this is going? Do you think that there is the potential for a, whatever you want to call it, regime change because of unrest in the country? Do you think we're going to end up with the same regime and just concessions given in order to get this straight open so, you know, the gas prices drop and people forget about it before the U.S. elections? Where are you on all of this from your own point of view? From your own personal perspective? Sure. I mean, that's a million dollar question, but here's the way I'm looking at it. If you look at the economic situation in Iran, the current situation the Iranian regime is in right now, you have a naval blockade. You don't have an ongoing conflict or war, meaning the economy is up and running. So you have a market demand that is going up. The inflation rate is going up significantly, 80 percent, 90 percent inflation rate, food inflation rate of 300 percent. No oil being exported. No imports are coming through. And the domestic manufacturing has been targeted during the war and it's been on the decline. So if you look at those economic numbers, it's a collapsed economy. It's an economy that is like a ticking bomb. So any minute, something could trigger an uprising in Iran. But look at this. Very quickly, Iran, this regime had to deal with the eight year war in the 80s, Iran-Iraq war. They've learned how to manage the economy that is dealing with a war and is under a lot of pressure. These guys are also revolutionaries. They know how to avoid or deter a revolution. They came out of the revolution. Their thoughts, they're terrorist militias. These guys are good at avoiding a revolution. So it's going to be very challenging for the Iranians to topple this regime. But at the end of the day, it's going to be very challenging for the Iranians to topple regime. But at the same time, every year, every two years, we have uprisings in Iran that come very close to starting a political transition there. So putting all of that together and the gap that exists between the regime and its people, it's hard to believe that this regime is going to be in place for much longer, but it's probably going to take some time before the Iranians can can be united in a way to actually take over the government. I think the pressure by the U.S. government right now today is working very well. I think it really has crippled the government's ability to collect taxes that it needs, revenue from oil that it needs. It's printing a lot of real Iranian currency so it can continue to pay salaries, so it doesn't have to cut salaries, so it doesn't have to trigger uprising, but it can't print gasoline. It's going to run out of gasoline very soon. That might be a triggering factor for significant pressure domestically. And also the real is almost worthless at this point. And if they get to the point where they can't pay the security personnel and the militia and IRGC, low level, mid-level, that's when you could start to see some opportunity. But you're right, it's an enormously heavy lift to ask people who don't have the guns to go back out on the streets against a very repressive regime that just finished slaughtering thousands of citizens earlier in the year. So I do worry. It's a little bit like the Michigan candidate for Senate, Syed, was asked about, you know, do you denounce the IRGC or do you, you know, how do you, you know, how do you respond to concerns about what the Iranian people are going through? And his point was, well, I support democracies everywhere. I don't think the U.S. had any right to get involved. You know, what happens to the Iranian people should be left to the Iranian people. And I'm thinking, well, yeah, that's a, that's a great, you know, say nothing statement when you're talking about a people that have been under the, the, you know, the regime there and have seen what they're willing to do to people when they come out in the streets and protest. Didn't mean to disappear down that rabbit hole, Mian. I do want to say thank you very, very much. Thank you very much for taking time. I hope you'll come back again because I got, I got seven more pages of questions I was going to throw your way, but we are out of time. Would love to be back. Excellent. Thank you very much, sir. Really appreciate it. Look forward to the next time. Mian Malekhi of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Well, all right, coming up next, while Iran is undergoing economic pressure from abroad, the bigger question, as we just alluded to, may be what happens inside the country as inflation, unemployment, and public frustration. Continue to build. We'll be joined by Ali Reza Jafazadeh. He's with the National Council of Resistance of Iran for more on that. So please stick around. Hey, Mike Baker here. The President's Daily Brief is brought to you by Maud. Now, Maud prescribes a once or twice daily modafinil drink that can keep you energized, focused, and alert. And that all sounds extremely good, doesn't it? Look, here's the deal. Caffeine energy drinks block what's known as adenosine, right? It's a chemical that makes you feel tired. It builds up, and when caffeine wears off, well, here comes the crash. Modafinil works differently. It engages pathways in your brain, dopamine, norepinephrine, histamine, orexin, to achieve energy and alertness for 10 to 12 hours. Modafinil was invented in the 70s. And since then, it's been used by pilots, soldiers, astronauts, really anyone in high stakes situations for concentration and alertness. Visit mod.com, that's mod, M-O-D, mod.com for a free consultation and you get 10% off your first order plus free shipping with the promo code PDB. That's promo code PDB at mod.com. See their website for important safety information and I want to thank MOD for sponsoring the PDB. As sanctions continue to squeeze Iran from the outside, the pressure inside the country is building. Iranian officials have acknowledged serious economic problems. Well, how gracious of them, including currency instability, inflation and unemployment. The government has also moved to raise fuel prices for the heavier users. That's a politically sensitive step in a country where previous gas increases have helped trigger unrest. For more on this, I want to turn to a great friend of the show, Elie Reza Jafrazadeh, Deputy Director of the Washington Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Elie Reza, great to see you again. Always a pleasure, Mark. Great to be on your show. Thank you. Thank you very much. You've been busy. I understand you've been traveling. Yes, I was actually, I just came back from New York and we had a very eventful two-day major, rally across from the United Nations. The first rally was on the first day of the General Assembly, just to coincide with the beginning of it where all the world leaders were there. The message was very clear, telling the world leaders that Iran is not recognized by its regime, rather by its people, that Pazeshkian and the regime do not represent, the people of Iran. They represent a repressive regime that kills its own people, massacres, supports terrorism in the region, spends all the money and resources of the country on developing nuclear weapons, a missile program that undermines not only the interests of the people of Iran, but the rest of the world. And that it shouldn't be like that. There is an alternative and that alternative is actually the people of Iran and the organized resistance, fighting for freedom for four decades, over four decades. And it has a very clear leadership. Mrs. Rajavi introduced a 10-point platform for the future of Iran that corroborates with all the international norms, a clear roadmap for change in Iran. There's a powerful network inside Iran. All the world needs to do is to look at Iran through the prism of its people, not the regime. Yeah, yeah. It's easier said than done since people really don't get much of a voice. Now, it is remarkable when you think about we're in this direct conflict with Iran. And here in UN General Assembly Week, which by the way, is the worst time to be in New York, is Mosul Bezeshkin, right? Is the president of this country that we're in a direct conflict with. And here he comes, allowed to address the. the assembly. And everyone dutifully, you know, sits and listens. They also have a framed picture of Qasem Soleimani on their desk there in the General Assembly and talk about someone who had a lot of blood on his hands. So it is a very bizarre dynamic. Absolutely. It's really bizarre because, you know, United Nations, as the name says, it has to be about the nations. It's not just regimes. It's not about united regimes or united governments. And then yet you have the. consistently over the past few decades, you have the leaders of the Iranian regime coming to the UN while they have presided over massacre and killings and threatening the rest of the world. And then they get at the podium, they start, you know, giving lessons, preaching to the rest of the world about human rights, about, you know, peace, and all of that. And that's why, you know, we felt it very important to once again gather in front of the UN as Pazeshkian was speaking. You know, there were thousands of Iranian resistance supporters right across the UN chanting, you know, down with terrorist regime of ruling Iran and calling change, change, change, regime change in Iran by the people. So they were basically. Do any of those images, Ali Reza, do any of those images get into Iran? Do the people of Iran, do they have the opportunity to see what's happening? As an example, I mean, I know they can't turn on the TV and watch it, but still. Right, yes. You know, what we did on both days, we had the live feed into Iran and there's a satellite TV, it's called Iran in TV, and they beam into Iran extensively and people are watching it. Of course, you know, it's banned, but a lot of people watch banned programs, but also it was available live on social media. A lot of media covered it, like Fox had several reports about this, CBS News had it, and, you know, some of those gets into Iran. And so people find ways of getting that message that, you know, Pazeshkian is not what he says, that he was rejected by the people, that people are talking about him, that people are talking about the alternative, about the future, not about the current theocracy or the past dictatorship of the Shah. And that message was very delivered very, very clearly, but it's not enough because, you know, so long as the mullahs are in power, they would try to use everything available to them. That's why our effort has to be doubled and everything, you know, we do on social media and other places, we need to spread the word. Yeah. I want to talk to you about the, about the economic conditions inside the country. But, you know, I just, as we wrap up the kind of the look at what happened at the UN, I, my personal feeling is that the UN is a fairly feckless organization. It takes up a lot of space and rarely actually at the end of the day accomplishes a lot of meaningful activity. You do need people talking, you need diplomatic channels, all of that, I get it. But the UN as an organization has always just struck me as this enormously immovable, feckless organization. It would have to be done. It would have to have a little more credibility, I think, if all those same people who self-righteously stormed out when Netanyahu was about to speak would have done the same thing with Pozeshkin, you know, in protest of the regime's slaughter of thousands and thousands of their own citizens earlier in the year. Well, interestingly, Mark, you know, the UN has, you know, different organizations, bodies, they have fact-finding missions. Some of their own, you know, reports as recently as just this past month, plus so many other reports came out by the United Nations saying that the Iran regime was involved in the massacre of, you know, thousands upon thousands of political prisoners in 1988. Not only that, they said it amounted to crimes against humanity and even genocide. They also talked about the massacre this year in 20, 2026 in January. All of that. And yet, you know, when it comes to those reports that are there, but when it comes to the whole organization or the member states, they just go their own way. That's why I think it's so important to get the voices out, to have the voices of the people to be heard. Because if you just leave it to those countries or the institutions, it will not go anywhere. And that's why I think those two days were extremely important to get the message out. And we got it. We got very good coverage, but it's never enough. Did you get any sense that there was any feedback? Have you heard any feedback? I don't necessarily mean direct feedback, but have there been any statements from the Iranian regime over the two days that you were there? Well, you know, Pesachkan himself addressed the UN saying that Iran is being attacked by terrorists. And, of course, you know, they're referring to those who are fighting the Iranian regime over the years. And every time they attack it, the Iranian media attacked us saying that, you know, the terrorists and agents of other countries were demonstrating across from the UN. These are not agents of other countries or terrorists. I remember the very first rally that I participated across from the UN, I was much younger at the time. That was '40. Six years ago, in 1981, that we had the first rally in front of the UN when the killings had started. And every single year, all throughout this period, with the exception of one year because of COVID, the people gathered in front of the UN. You know, our movement, NCRI, was involved in galvanizing everybody, just keeping the voice, you know, repeating about the killings in Iran, but also the desire of the people. for change. When you have that level of continuity over different administrations, different circumstances, continuing protesting and calling for change and democracy, this is the true voice of the people of Iran, not those ruthless mullahs. And the real terrorists are those who are ruling the country. Yeah, no, it is. The lack of self-awareness and of irony of the Iranian regime complaining and calling their resistance terrorists is really, you know, it's just, again, another indication of they are living in an alternative world. Ali Reza, I want to talk, I want to pivot over to the economy and what it's doing internally inside the country and its impact on the population. But, but first, we do have to take a quick break. So. Stick around. We'll be back with more from Ali Reza Jafrizadeh and the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Stick with us. Joining us once again is Ali Reza Jafrizadeh. He's the deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Ali Reza, let's, let's talk about the economic conditions inside Iran. We've touched on it before in the past, but now, since we last talked, obviously the blockade of Iran. Ali Reza, let's talk about the economic conditions inside Iran. afraid of is that what if, and it's not what if, when this whole thing is going to turn into a major uprising, the way we saw, for instance, in January of this year, that people didn't just settle for that. They started, you know, getting confrontational with Revolutionary Guard, chanting slogans day and night against the regime, not just about their wages and not about economic demands. Quickly, all of that could turn into major political demands, which is regime change. Let me interrupt you there, Ali Reza, because I think it's, I agree with you, I mean, in theory, right? Yes, all of this pressure building and building and building, right? We saw it earlier in the year. Of course, we also saw the regime's response. And in that time, you know, the situation has gotten worse. So in theory, you'd say, okay, fine, the people are going to, at a certain point, just lose it and get back out on the streets, regardless of what they know will likely be the response from the regime. Are you worried that that could be off in the future? And yet it seems like the closer we get, and I know President Trump has said repeatedly, he doesn't care about the midterm elections, and that's fine. You know, you can say that all you want. Voters care about what the price of gas is, right? And so, and there's a lot of, you know, politicians who are concerned. And President Trump understands if he loses in the midterm elections, this whole dynamic changes, right? He's going to be facing two years of impeachment attempts by the Democrats. It's going to be much harder for him to engage in any sort of unilateral military activity. And so, you know, it's fine to say that you don't care about the elections. You know, I think that's it. I think the reality, is different. So are you worried because there's all this talk now about, oh, we've restarted negotiations. And it feels like there's a real desire, right, on the part of the White House to get this over with. And the Iranians are talking about, fine, we could open the Strait of Hormuz, and it would only take us a few days to do that. But we're going to need you to lift the blockade on the Iranian ports. I mean, you know, we're going to need you to lift the blockade on the Iranian ports. I mean, we're going to need you to lift the blockade on the Iranian ports. And then, of course, they're going to crow at the end of that and say, look, we defeated America. Well, exactly as you said, you know, the mullahs are masters of portraying their weakness as their strength. They're going around boasting that, you know, look where we haven't been overthrown. Therefore, you know, we managed to resist the United States, to resist the attacks and all of that. But one thing that they cannot hide and they cannot boast about is their internal situation. That's why I keep coming back to this point. The Achilles heel of the Iranian regime is inside Iran. You know, they can talk, you know, that we fire missiles and, you know, attacking ships, but none of that is going to improve the economy. None of that is going to improve the condition of the people. None of that is going to make the people of Iran friends of the mullahs. That's why no matter what they do, the internal situation is increasingly getting worse. And I think that's what needs to be understood, whether it's the White House or the capitals in Europe, that this regime is vulnerable internally. If anyone wants to have leverage against Iran, they have to have leverage against Iran. The leverage is inside Iran and the vulnerability of the regime and on the other side, those who are trying to overthrow this regime. That's why the regime constantly demands foreign capitals don't get close to the organized opposition, don't even get close to the MEK. That's actually MEK, how it was designated, you know, decades ago. They had to fight for 15 years to get off the list. And, you know, all of the pressure that is built, on the organized opposition, as a result of the regime using that and, you know, leveraging and all of that. You need to reverse that. You need to show the Iranian regime that the outside world are not going to be intimidated by their terrorism, by their promises, all of that, because they have violated all of that in the past. So if they want to sit down and negotiate, that's fine. What are the terms of the negotiations? What is it that they're holding the regime accountable? That's why I think it's so important for the outside world, especially the White House, to realize the one leverage that needs to be taken into consideration is the people of Iran, the vulnerability of the regime inside Iran, and the desire, strong desire of the people to bring about change. You know, we have never asked for arms or boots on the ground or money, none of that. Well, let me, let me ask you this. So, so I would say, you know, we have never asked for arms or boots on the ground or money, none of that. So, so I would assume you're in favor of maintaining the blockade and maintaining the sanctions and the economic pressure as opposed to what appears to be this, this potential effort or this, it's always, it's sort of a false start. We've seen a lot of false starts with the negotiations over the many months, but so I, it, it, it sounds like what you're saying is just give the economic pressure time, and you may then get that result that you're talking about in terms of the civil unrest. Well, you know, certainly the building pressure on the regime is important, economic pressure, because at the end of the day, it's the pressure on the IRGC limiting their resources. But that's not enough, because at the same time, you need to recognize the right of the people of Iran to overthrow this regime. You need to recognize. But what does that mean, Ali Reza? What does that mean when you say you need to recognize the rights of the people? Because I think a lot of nations have said, you know, we'd love to see, you know, the people have a better opportunity, you know, to be self-determining and all that. But when you say it, what does that mean? Well, it means that, you know, when the regime starts executing, the very same freedom fighters who are fighting and compromising against the regime, the very same freedom fighters who are fighting and fighting and compromising against the regime, the very same freedom fighters who are fighting and compromising against the regime, the very same freedom fighters who are confronting the revolutionary guards, you need to speak up. You need to have outrage. You need to hold the regime accountable. You need to tell the Iranian regime that even if for every single freedom fighter that they have executed since at least this March of this year, there is a price that Tehran has to pay. That's how you defend those who are fighting the regime. You stand on their side. You hold the regime accountable for hurting them, for imprisoning them, for executing them. That hasn't been there. You know, how many times you have seen condemnation of the execution of political prisoners in Iran or the, you know, the other means of repression executing the rest of the population. There has to be a lot of pressure built on it. Where is the accountability? The UN report came out saying that Iran was involved in the suppression and the massacre of people in January. What price did Tehran pay for it? Nothing. You know, what price they're paying for their terrorism? Nothing. That's why I think it's important. Accountability is the other side of, you know, recognizing the right of the people to resist and stand up against the Iran regime. Let me ask you one last question, being mindful of time. It's a bit of a pivot, I admit, but I'm very keen to get your perspective. The Houthis, and their escalation, you know, they kind of kicked off this renewed aggression offensive against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. What's your perspective on the relationship between the Iranians and the Houthis? Well, the Houthis are really the product of the years of cultivation and work and development of the Iranian regime. The whole movement, the way it is now the organization, the whole funding, the structure were basically created by the Iranian regime when they had the founders in Iran like almost 30 years ago, training them and then eventually funding them, helping creating their units, whether it was like naval units. We put out a detailed press conference right here in Washington about five years ago about how the regime had created naval, you know, force naval units by the Houthis that they can operate on their own in the region, in the waterways and all of those things. We predicted all of that. We showed like where they were being trained in Iran, specific location they were being trained, what kind of training they were going through, all of that. And now it's not a surprise for us. So if you want to really curb the activities of the Houthis, you have to curb the Iranian regime. And that's why I think it all boils down that if you want to see peace in the region, we have to see a change by the people of Iran in Iran. There's no other shortcut. There's no other way. At the end of the day, that's what it boils down to. Yeah. No, I couldn't agree with you more. I think you want a short, mid, long-term stability in the region. You want a better opportunity for the Iranian people. You want a more prosperous region. That all means this regime at some point has to disappear because otherwise they're not going to change their stripes, I would argue. And listen, Ali Reza, I wish we had more time, but we don't. So that means you got to come back next time. Absolutely. I'm always very happy to be on your show. Really appreciate the opportunity. Thank you so much. That's great. Listen, have a very good weekend, Ali Reza. We'll talk soon. Sure. Thank you. Take care. Well, that is all the time we have for this week's PDB Situation. I know. I know. Somewhere off there in the distance, you can hear a sad trombone. If you have any questions or comments, just reach out to me at pdbathefirsttv.com. You know what happens every week. Carl the Mailman drops off another sack of your mail, postcards, and your Western Union telegrams. Actually, the little guy with the hat shows up with the telegrams. That's an old reference, isn't it? And we sit down, we dump all those cards onto the rich mahogany conference table. And the entire team, including our above average interns, we select the best questions and comments, put them together in an Ask Me Anything episode, and we put that on the internets, the webs thing, whatever it is that Al Gore created. So what all that means is keep your cards and letters coming. That was a long way to get to that point, wasn't it? It's like taking forever to get to the punchline of a joke. All right. 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