The PDB Situation Report | October 10th, 2026: How Hamas' October 7th Attack Changed the Middle East Forever
69m 30s
Three years after the October 7 Hamas attacks, the Middle East has transformed dramatically, with Israel shifting from diplomatic hopes to a hardened defense posture. Internal changes, particularly among young Israelis who have returned to fight, have driven a political realignment toward greater militarization and a rejection of Palestinian statehood. Alex Selsky of the Middle East Forum highlights that intelligence failures stemmed not from lack of data but from a false belief that Hamas sought peace, despite evidence of growing aggression. He also underscores that global anti-Israel narratives are widely manipulated by external actors, particularly Iran and its allies, using misinformation and staged protests. On the U.S. southern border, terrorism-related encounters surged to over 11,000 in the first 11 months of fiscal year 2026—more than triple the prior year—due to enhanced border security, the designation of cartels like MS-13 and Sinaloa as terrorist organizations, and stricter screening protocols. These changes are attributed to a more secure, closed border under the Trump administration, in contrast to the Biden-era open-border policy, which allowed millions of undocumented migrants to enter and overwhelmed enforcement. Art Arthur of the Center for Immigration Studies warns that a return to Democratic policies would likely cause a massive influx of migrants, strain local resources, and cost the federal and state governments trillions over time. The report concludes that both regional and border security dynamics reflect a broader shift toward stronger national defense and vigilance, with long-term implications for U.S. and global stability.
Welcome to the PDB Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world stage.
Coming to you today from my posh wood-paneled office at home on the Boise compound. Yeah,
smells like rich mahogany, leather-bound books. Let's get briefed. First up, this week marks
three years since the October 7th Hamas attacks, and the Middle East has been transformed by years
of war and a widening conflict with Iran. Alex Selsky of the Middle East Forum will join us to
examine how the strategic picture has changed and what lies ahead. Later in the show, federal
officers are reporting a massive surge in terrorism-related encounters at the southern border.
Oh, that sounds good. Art Arthur of the Center for Immigration Studies joins us to break down
what those numbers mean. But first, today's episode of the PDB Situation Report.
This week marked three years since the brutal October 7th attacks when Hamas terrorists
stormed into southern Israel, killing some 1,200 people and taking more than 250 hostages.
Three years later, the Middle East looks dramatically different. Israel has fought
a devastating war in Gaza, battled Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now finds itself confronting Iran
in a broader regional conflict that's drawn in the U.S.
How has the strategic picture in the Middle East changed over the past three years?
Where does Israel stand today following its wars with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran?
And after three years of fighting, well, what comes next? Joining me now is Alex Selsky,
Director of Israel and East Mediterranean Affairs at the Middle East Forum and a reserve major in
the IDF Homefront Command. Alex, thank you very much for taking the time to join us here on the
Situation Report. Thank you, my good Indian Trump, Jerusalem. Thank you for having me.
No, absolutely. Well, here we are three years on from the 7th October, 2023 attacks.
So much has changed in the Middle East. And I know this is going to be a very difficult question
because it's hard to prioritize, but from your perspective, three years on now from those attacks,
how would you assess the most important. The most important changes that have taken place? And again, that's a big playing field,
but I want you to go wherever you'd like to go with this.
Yes. Well, I would like to mention maybe one big change, internal and one external.
And I would like to start from internal. I think that Israelis have changed.
And those who still believed in partnership and negotiations with the Palestinians,
I think were very, very disappointed. You have to understand that those in the area that was
attacked, those in these settlements, Kibbutzim, right? Kibbutz is a kind of, you know, a small
community, communist kind of, right? It was shared and everything was shared between people. And
the people who lived there were the most pro-Palestinian. They were helping Palestinians,
sending,
their clothes to Gaza, taking Palestinian children to Israeli hospitals by their cars. And not only
they were those who were attacked. In many cases, Mike, they were attacked and the intelligence on
their home locations were provided by the families, by the workers that were working in the
Kibbutzim, or by the families that they knew. And the disappointment, this deep disappointment was
true.
It was shocking for them. Now, you know, I, in a way, grew up in this area. I know this area,
I know the people, I know the kind of, you know, their opinions and their living. And I understand
how deep they were disappointed. So I think that Israeli society has shifted toward the
understanding that, unfortunately, justice doesn't provide security. What provides security is
power, military power. And being nice and providing good, you know, doesn't provide security,
definitely not in our area, definitely not with our neighbors. And this shift is very significant,
first of all, because I think the young people understood that they have to fight. And it's not
over. You know, we thought that, many Israelis thought that we are in times of the, you know,
beaches, and sea, and bars, and high tech, and Tel Aviv. You know, if you come to Tel Aviv,
you see California. And we thought that we are in a stage of our development where we don't want to
fight, and we think we should not fight anymore. We want the wars, and we're secure. And this
generation of young people is spoiled, but we discovered that, no, the young people,
you know, people went to the front line. The day after October 7th, people were, many, many young
people were abroad, and American, you are traveling. You know, Israelis love traveling. And
if you travel, I'm sure you hear Hebrew a lot. And, you know, we were just in some few places in,
you know, in Georgia and other places. And it's just amazing. Like, you come to places you don't
imagine you will find Israelis, and you find, and you hear Hebrew. And, you know, it's just amazing.
And people paid five, six, seven thousand dollars to get in a plane, to go back home, to fight,
to fight, to defend your, you know, homeland. And this change is very significant politically,
because it shifts Israeli voter to the right.
It shifts Israeli voter against the Palestinian state, because nobody will now risk to establish
a Palestinian state next to Jerusalem, right? And to think that another attack can come to Jerusalem,
and, you know, the Palestinian authorities spread from the Negev in the south until the
Galilee in the north. So, Israelis, even those who thought that, you know, it's okay, you know,
we'll give up something, and they will stop, now understand that they will not stop,
and we will not give up. And this change is very significant. And the external change, the big,
the biggest one, I think, is, I really hope to believe that the world understood, and our enemies
understood, that it's not worth raising hands on Jews, even if they miss, and if they fail,
they will go after you, and they will not give up, and they will destroy you. And I think that we are
on our way to destroy Hamas, and we definitely are on our way to destroy Hezbollah. And I hope that
we are on our way also to destroy the Islamic Republic, who is, you know, in fact, the one
that provides all this situation, and others who support him. But we cannot destroy, but we,
I hope, will stop, and we are very determined, and we are very strong, and we're stronger,
and we woke up on October 7th, understanding that we have to fight, and we will fight.
What is the potential for the upcoming elections to change that
position? Because I think in the U.S. sometimes things can get simplified, right? And so,
all those young folks who go out in the streets and wave their free Palestine signs,
and protest against Israel, you know, their number one enemy, their Lex Luthor is Benjamin Netanyahu.
And so, I think in their minds, you know, they, I don't know that they study it much,
but they look at the upcoming election, and they think if Netanyahu can just be moved out,
then things will change. Is that the case, or do you think that Israel will stay the course
in terms of its approach towards these enemies of Israel?
A very good and very important question, Mike. First of all, I want to start from the fact,
that I don't believe, and I think that nobody believes, that all these protesters are genuine.
We understand today very well, and I invite everybody to
visit online the website of the Middle East Forum and read what we produce.
Most of the discourse and most of the protests are not genuine. They're all organized, funded by
external powers, by Iran, by Qatar, backed by Russia, China. And unfortunately,
the political discourse today in America, and partly in Israel, and partly also in Europe,
is not local, is manipulated. And, you know, it was very, very clear that the whole attack
encompasses, and in the media, on Israel, about this genocide lie, which is a lie, Mike,
was orchestrated and pre-prepared. Now, how we can see it very easily, you know, when was
the first protest with a sign with the claim of genocide in Gaza on it on October 8th. You know,
when the Israeli army entered Gaza for ground operation two weeks after. So we understand
that the whole media attack and the whole information warfare attack was very, very
significantly pre-organized and the October 7th was actually a hook on which they started the whole
operation very, very heavily funded. This is one. Second part of your question, I don't believe
that even if it will be a shift in Israeli politics, meaning the opposition will take control,
I don't think that the
major policies, security, economically too, will be changed. Look at the people in the opposition.
Liberman is not different in his security views and in a way, maybe even more
hawkish than Netanyahu. Eisencutt, former chief of staff, you know, he speaks softer in some things.
He speaks softer, but I don't think that he will be really changing major policies.
Bennett, definitely not. Lapid, no. Lapid said we are the newly could. And one of the
interviews I heard him personally a couple, three months ago. So Yair Golan maybe, but he will not be
in a way, in a position and capacity to lead. So I really don't think,
maybe, you know, the change will be more bipartisan approach to American politics,
for example. Maybe it will be more, you know, internally some changes, definitely much more
anti-ultra orthodox policy, but this is internal. And by the way, it's also much more pro-security
position. So I don't really think that it's going to be a change. It's going to be more pro-security.
That if this opposition wins, you will see a major shift in security policies.
Okay. That's very interesting. And to what degree do Israelis, citizens in Tel Aviv and elsewhere
follow US politics? I mean, looking at the midterm elections in the US that are coming up,
is there a concern over what could happen if, for example, the Trump administration,
if the Republicans lose?
Is there a concern over what could happen if, for example, the Republicans lose?
I mean, looking at the midterm elections in the US that are coming up, is there a concern over what could happen if, for example, the Democrats lose?
I mean, looking at the midterm elections in the US that are coming up, is there a concern over what could happen if, for example, the Republicans lose?
closely and understanding sort of the vitriol and the anger, I think, that the progressives within the Democratic Party have towards Israel?
closely and understanding sort of the vitriol and the anger, I think, that the Republicans lose?
Well, I must say, first of all, Israel is very, very, very pro-American people in a way of, you know, we live in America. Okay? We speak English. Our movies are with no dubbing, with no translation on the subtitles.
Joining me once again is Alex Selsky, director of Israel and East Mediterranean Affairs at the Middle East Forum.
He joins us from Jerusalem. Alex, thank you very much for being here on The Situation Report.
Thank you.
Now, this is a tough one, in part because I think the numbers are never accurate.
They never are in a war zone.
But all those that are accusing Israel of genocide, right, they tend to cite the Gaza health ministry, which, of course, is run by Hamas.
And they cite over 70,000 killed during the course of this, after the 7th October attacks.
First of all, do you have any insight into the credibility of that number?
And then second of all, to those that say this is horrendous or they call it genocide or they say it's a disproportionate response,
the 7th October, how do you respond?
What do you say to that?
Unlike, as I already mentioned, very unfortunately, we see that all these claims didn't start after Israel entered with ground operation in Gaza.
All these claims started before the operation.
It just shows us that they didn't really mean to claim something justified.
They just wanted to attack and discredit Israel by any means.
And it was a very grand, very well-funded campaign in media, in social media, on campuses, on every street.
Now, regarding the claim itself, Mike, I am a reserve major in the IDF.
What I do in the army is I speak on the media to Israeli public when the rockets fall to give them the instructions.
I have the home front command to explain them the instructions of the home front command and to keep their resilience strong to keep going during emergency.
And I can tell you from within, you know, I'm almost 50 and I'm in the IDF.
I think this is the organization I'm the longest time in since I was 19, right?
Not every day, you know, reserve is two.
Two, three months a year.
But you live this.
The way the army of Israel tries to do everything, like everything to not hurt those who should not be hurt is outstanding.
I know, you know, Israeli army is people's army.
It's not professional army.
It's my brother.
It's me.
It's my sister.
It's my friends.
It's my family.
It's my friends.
It's not somebody.
It's us.
Okay.
And people, you know, and the Israeli army in a very significant way is based on reserve.
Now, reserve are those who have families, have children.
You, believe me, you will not see people who want to kill.
And if you just learn history and you understand Jews and you know Judaism and you know the approach to life, you know the Jews.
And if you just learn history and you know the approach to life, you know the Jews.
Not only don't like violence, they are not violent people, historically.
Okay?
So, these claims are so false.
Now, if you just go into these claims really and you start looking at it.
So, how can you trust these numbers to the health department, health ministry?
This is Hamas.
They will say everything, you know, just to understand Hamas and their cruelty.
Go and see, I really, really, really ask every viewer of you, Mike.
Go and see the ceremony of the returning of the bodies of the small children of Biba's family.
They created. They created big black, how do you call it, you know, where you put the bodies in.
And they called small children.
They were children.
One of them, I think, was less than one year.
And they called that they were, you know, they called them soldiers or something.
They lie.
They do propaganda all the time.
That's all they do.
They lie all the time.
And we know about this industry of lie.
And we know.
We know how much of what they show is just false.
We cannot, we cannot, how you believe them, this is one.
And I want to say something else.
But I want to say something else, Mike.
Oh, okay.
Go ahead.
Go ahead.
But I want to say something else.
You know, I can explain to you how they're bad and how we are good and how we try and how they lie.
But I will tell you something very, very different.
You don't want casualties.
Don't raise hands on our children.
If you raise hands on our children, you'll have casualties.
And let, and these times, this era, when Jews were homeless, weak, minority, without any power, that you could beat without paying a price, are over.
If you raise hands on Jews, you'll pay a very significant price.
Don't talk to me, please, about portion, disproportional.
I don't care.
You know now, you don't add Jews.
Don't mess with Jews.
We are very good in science and business and culture.
We are so good in peaceful things.
Do business with us.
You want to fight with us?
That's what you get.
Yeah, I think this, I mean, clearly, I'm not sure how you argue against the notion that if Hamas,
and their Iranian puppet masters and others had not gone into southern Israel and brutalized and killed all those Israeli civilians and families,
yeah, that total number wouldn't be 70,000 or plus or whatever it is, based on the Hamas' own numbers, it would be zero.
So, again, I think there's, and I do agree, I think it's important for people because it's very easy.
And I think in the U.S., in part because there's a lot of people, young people in particular, who don't necessarily feel as if they've got a mission or a purpose or,
a community or whatever.
So, it's very easy to glom on to something, to attach themselves to something.
So, when you get a protest, move like this, you can feel very self-righteous, but you don't have to do anything about,
you don't do anything other than maybe wave a sign or criticize, and you don't do the research.
Now, let me ask you this.
There's been a lot of talk about, and kind of we're taking a little bit of a shift.
There's been a lot of talk about how it happened.
Do you think there's any truth to the idea, to the concept that the Israeli government was essentially lulled into a state of complacency by Hamas?
Meaning, Hamas actually, by design, wanted the Israeli government to think that they were turning over a new leaf.
It was a new day.
They weren't necessarily interested in hostilities.
They wanted to just find a better life.
And so, perhaps that led to. Yeah.
Some complacency?
Mike, you know, we Jews, we want to believe in peace.
And it's very, very easy for us to believe in peace.
I can recommend you many, many books that show how Israelis were shifting very, very fast after signing agreements with our neighbors and thinking of cooperation and travels.
So, yes, for us, it was apparently, and we started, you remember, speaking about the people in the kibbutzim who were so kind and so naive, you know, helping to Palestinians, thinking that, you know, if we help them, they will stop their violence.
And they discovered that it's exactly the opposite, that the hate is so big that they're even ready to kill those.
So, yes, I'm sure that the Israeli leadership, that the Israeli military, you know, as I told you, Israeli military, it's not some professional army.
It's us.
It's us.
It's me.
Okay?
And I have children.
And believe me, I don't want to hurt anybody.
But war is not nice.
And, you know, this hypocrisy that, you know, that everybody can fight, right?
Everybody can fight to defend himself.
I just want to remind. You know, America defended itself and ended the biggest, the bloodiest war on earth in history, the Second World War, not by justice, by two bombs on 250,000 innocent people.
That's how they finished the war with Japan.
And now coming to Israel and saying, you know, how can you fight?
Excuse me.
Why?
Everybody can fight and win, but Jews, no.
Again, please get this idea, finally.
The Jews have the right to live and have the right to have self-determination.
By the way, our country is so small, when you come here, you discover you're fucked.
We want our small room to be a. able to sleep here and to be as we are. And by the way, we did it. After 2,000 years, nobody wanted
us in any place. Everybody expelled us. I came from the former Soviet Union to Israel. And before
that, my family escaped during the Holocaust from Poland. And before that, from Spain to Poland.
I'm not running away anymore. I came back. The family name of my mother is Israel. So no doubt
that I'm from here originally. We are back. And please stop this hypocrisy. Get the idea
that Jews, you know, you cannot demand from Jews more than from all the others. Jews want to live,
Jews will live, and Jews will defend themselves. Yeah, there is a very worrisome sort of
anti-Semitism that's rising in the US, it seems. And sometimes it's masked. You know,
you talk to someone and they'll say,
I'm not anti-Semitic. I'm anti-Zionist. And that's an easy cover for them to say,
well, look, I see. And so they can justify it by trying to say that they're anti-Zionist.
Let me ask you this, though, because again, three years on from 7 October, I know that there has
been a lot of reflection within the government, within the security services, within the military
over just how this happened. And so that's kind of what I'm drilling down on. I just want to know,
what your assessment is, because obviously, look, you know, I spent 20 years in intelligence. And
so it's not, it's not, you know, unfair to say this was an intelligence failure to a degree.
Oh, yes.
I'm curious about what you've seen or your perception of lessons learned in terms of
how it happened. Where was the breakdown?
Three things.
And I want to go from, you know, from big to small. First of all, as I told you, I think that,
you know, this, you know, we call it in Hebrew, like this perception of our neighbors want to
leave. Because we think so, because we want to leave. And they just want to rule. And they love
their children, too.
And, you know, the Jews, again, you know, we came back after 2000 years of diaspora. And after a few
wars, Israelis wanted to really think that, you know, everything is normal. And they believed
that our neighbors want the same, but they didn't. Now, if you drill in into the exactly the situation
of two things, first of all, it was a policy of the government of Netanyahu, to keep Hamas as a terror
organization on our southern border, in order to prevent establishment of the Palestinian state,
because he believed and justified belief that while the Palestinian movement is split, and while
one of them is identified as a terror organization, the world will not let them have a state. This is
true. But Hamas grew up too much and became too strong and too threatening. Now, today, the common
perception is that Israel had to fight Hamas and disarm Hamas, at least with the rockets.
and missiles, rockets, that can strengthen Israeli civilians in the Gaza war in 2014.
And Israel didn't do that. Why?
Because of the price of life of soldiers that we apparently had to pay.
And this is first.
So the policy was having Hamas geopolitically assuming that it will serve Israel.
And we know today that Latynia had this policy backed by other partners in the government.
And the second is, as I told you, this perception backed by our desire to believe that our neighbors love their children too.
I think that in terms of intelligence, the army, the Shintz,
had the information.
The problem was not collecting the intelligence.
The problem was to translate the data into intention.
Intelligence is not only about data, but knowing, you can know that your neighbor has a gun.
But do you really believe that he will use it?
So we today understand that when your neighbor has a gun and he tells you that he will use it, believe him.
And prevent him.
So this, I think, the problem was not the intelligence.
The problem was that the people who had the intelligence didn't believe that Hamas would really strike.
Because, you know, Hamas is weak.
We will beat him.
You know, how come they can do that?
How come they would do that?
And Hamas, by the way, did smartly everything during a few years before.
So, you know, to make us very.
And think that they really won't just rule.
And by the way, the life in Gaza prior to October 7th was very, very good.
If you just look at the standard of living in Gaza before October 7th, it was higher than you think.
It was not, you know, as Palestinians like to claim that it was, you know, a closed, you know, closed, isolated.
A community with nothing entering in a prison, right?
It was not prison.
It was thriving place.
By the way, one of the most beautiful beaches in the world are in Gaza.
Okay.
And Israelis looked at that and thought, okay, they want to leave.
But again, we don't want, we don't, I don't want to generalize all the Gazans, right?
And definitely not all the Gazans support Hamas.
And many, many of them exactly like in many other Muslim countries.
Are forced to support Hamas because they don't have other choice.
Like, you know, speaking of journalists in Gaza, you know, you cannot be journalist in Gaza.
You can be just someone that serves Hamas.
Otherwise you will be killed brutally.
Okay.
Think about Taliban in Afghanistan.
This is not so far from that.
So that's, that's the real problem.
And I think we woke up and we understand today that, you know, if your neighbor has a gun and he tells you that you want to use it, believe him.
Yeah, I, the, the, the, the situation you're describing from an intelligence perspective is not unlike 9-11 in the U.S.
We are collecting intelligence.
Part of the problem was it wasn't being shared.
So nobody was really collecting intelligence from various elements.
It was all being siloed and nobody was looking at the bigger picture.
Part of it also, I think what you're describing is the way that intelligence,
collected by whomever, Mulsad, Shinbad, can be manipulated by a government's agenda or by a desire of a government to go a certain direction.
So sometimes the intelligence is missed.
Sometimes it's ignored.
Sometimes it's manipulated.
And yeah, listen, Alex, this has been fascinating.
We haven't even gotten into the discussion about Iran.
So, you know, that means that you have to join the situation report again.
If you will, Adly, Mike.
Excellent.
Listen, thank you, Alex.
Very, very good to have you here on the show.
Middle East Forum from Jerusalem.
A lot of complex issues there.
You know, 20, 25 minutes, 30 minutes doesn't give us time to do much but scratch the surface.
But I think it's extremely important to get perspective from somebody like that sitting in Jerusalem with the IDF.
And you can agree.
You can disagree.
But you still have to listen.
And that's the way that you legitimately form an educated thought.
There.
Now I can climb off my soapbox.
Coming up next, more than 11,000 terrorism-related encounters and southern border ports of entry.
And a surprising explanation for why those numbers are climbing.
Art Arthur, you know him.
He's a friend of the situation report.
He's with the Center for Immigration Studies.
He joins us to dig into the details.
Stay with us.
Hey, Mike Baker here with a very important message about watching out for and safeguarding and protecting your family's future.
Look, it's not a pleasant thought.
I get that.
But it is an important one.
If you're the provider for your family, well, what happens if you're no longer around?
Look, things happen.
Life can change quickly.
You know that.
But you need to ensure that you can provide for your family even when you're gone.
That's why I want to talk to you about Ethos Life Insurance.
That's Ethos.
E-T-H-O-S.
What I like about Ethos is how simple they make the whole process.
Everything is done 100% online.
You get a quote in seconds.
You can apply in minutes and potentially get same-day coverage.
There's no medical exam.
You just answer a few simple health questions online.
Ethos offers coverage.
Coverage amounts up to $3 million, and some policies are as low as $30 a month.
They also have a 4.8 out of 5 star rating on Trustpilot with over 4,000 reviews.
Take 10 minutes to get covered today with life insurance through Ethos.
Get your free quote at ethos.com slash pdb.
That's ethos, E-T-H-O-S, ethos.com slash pdb.
Application times and rates may vary.
The Trustpilot rating is as of 8-1-2026.
Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report.
A remarkable new statistic from the southern border is raising questions about
who is trying to enter the U.S. and how effectively we're catching them.
According to Customs and Border Protection, CBP,
officers at southwest border courts of entry recorded more than 11,000
terrorism-related encounters during the first 11 months of the fiscal year.
Let me repeat that.
11,000 terrorism-related encounters
during the first 11 months of the fiscal year.
That's more than triple the previous year's total.
But there's an important distinction here.
These encounters don't necessarily involve known terrorists.
And the Trump administration's decision to designate major drug cartels as terrorist organizations,
well, that helps explain the surge.
So let's find out what's really behind these numbers.
Joining me now is the resident fellow in law and policy at the Center for Immigration Studies,
a good friend of the show.
Well, Ard, thank you very much for coming back on the Situation Report.
Thanks so much for having me today, Mike.
Absolutely.
Well, let's tuck into these numbers.
What do you think accounts for the surge that we're seeing at the southwest border
in terrorism suspects coming across the border?
Yeah, actually, it's a great question because there's no one single factor.
There are a number of very important factors,
and they all actually favor the Trump administration.
The first one is that in the first 11 months of FY 2026,
we saw 11,283 terrorism-related encounters at the southwest border ports.
Now, that's up from 80 in 2023, 52 in 2024.
And the reason, the first reason for that is that the land between the ports of entry,
that 1,954-mile open. Yeah. and border is now secure.
It's secure in a way that it wasn't under the Biden administration.
Border Patrol agents have gone from apprehending more than 100,000 illegal migrants per month
to arresting fewer than 100,000 illegal migrants in the first 11 months of FY 2026.
So this is the most secure border in U.S. history.
The president has talked about it.
Tom Homan has said it, but I've actually busted the numbers, Mike, and I can assure you that
it is more difficult to get into the United States through the Rio Grande, through the Sonoran Desert today than it ever has been in U.S. history.
And that's a credit to the president, to Tom Homan, the border czar, but especially to an unsung hero, Rodney Scott, who's the CBP commissioner.
So prior to Trump, too, during Biden, Biden won, Biden, what we saw were, you know, so many migrants coming across the border,
the vast majority of whom gave themselves up that they overwhelmed Border Patrol agents.
And that created what is called controllable gaps along that border.
So smugglers would send large numbers of women with children or families up to the border.
A large number of Border Patrol agents would.
They would have to convene on that spot where they had come over.
And all of the other parts of that sector were then open for smugglers to bring in drugs, to bring in criminals and to bring in potential terrorists.
So that was a field day for the bad guys at the southwest border.
And they were running it and they were running it in such a way that it advantaged all of the bad actors that you could imagine.
Because that's not the case.
Today, because that border is locked down, those criminals, those smugglers, those cartel members and those potential terrorists might have to now make the riskier run through the ports of entry.
There are a series of ports of entry, eight major ones and a number of minor ones along that border.
And when they go to those ports of entry, even if they have legal documents to get into the United States, they're going to be stopped by a CBP officer.
That's CBP.
The CBP officer is going to ask them questions about why they're coming, what their intentions are in coming to the United States.
And they're also going to be subject to a lot of other not intrusive inspections.
They're going to be dogs that are going to be going around looking for drugs, for weapons, for cash.
There are going to be cameras everywhere watching the responses of the people who go to that port of entry.
So I think the reason that we're in the way that sort of the way that a.
An efficient, non-dysfunctional border security operation should be run.
Yeah, I can't, you know, I can't put it in better words than that.
And this is the sort of border that the 9-11 Commission report back in 2003 recommended that we have that, you know, they describe those ports of entry as checkpoints that people have to go through where we could assess what their intentions are.
So first you had the open border.
Now you've got a closed border.
And the open border, people didn't have to take the risk at the ports.
Now they do.
That's factor number one.
Factor number two is the fact that in early 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated two gangs, Trend de Aragua and MS-13, and a group of cartels, mostly Mexican cartels, including Sinaloa, CNJG.
And the Gulf cartel as terrorist organizations, significant government designated terrorists.
And now that they have that designation, when one of those cartel members or an associate shows up at the port, the port officer now has greater authority to stop that person from coming into the United States.
Put those two factors together, the greater border security and the expanded definition of terrorist organization.
And you're going to get to 11,283 Afro-Hero encounters at the Southwest border ports in 11 months.
Now, it seems like I just one thought that occurred to me as you were as you were finishing that comment was you said that because they identified TDA and MS-13 and some of the cartels as terrorist organizations, that they now had more ability to stop them.
And you would have thought even without that, that if we.
If we had in their databases that they were a member of a cartel or MS-13 or TDA, that would have stopped them.
We wouldn't have needed to have them designated as terrorist organizations.
Right. But if you think about it, when they're not designated as terrorist organizations, then you need cold, hard evidence to keep them out of the United States.
Simply, well, you know, I knew a guy who knew a guy and well, you know, I'm not a bad guy myself.
I I just have a lot of.
Friends who have some unusual hobbies now that they're designated now that they have the intelligence, they could actually send them to what we call secondary inspection, that little room in the back of the port where they go through all of your belongings and everything that you own.
And so heightened scrutiny is a key aspect of that expanded designation.
But it's still it has to depend on what's in the database.
Right. So there has to be something that flags an individual.
Even before.
Before this known terrorist or this terrorist organization designation, it would have had to have been something in the database that would flag them as a, you know, potential cartel member or member of MS-13.
And I guess my point is, I understand what you're saying, and I think it's logical.
It certainly makes sense and accounts for the rise in numbers.
I'm just thinking, you know, logic would dictate that if you had even likely, you know, a member of a cartel or that.
You know, are you really going to struggle with the idea of, oh, no, we've got to get, you know, 100 percent proof here.
We've got to get full evidence or we're just going to turn them back.
And I would argue that we're being, you know, overly gracious to say that, well, there's a real there's a good chance that they're a cartel member, but we don't know for sure.
So we're going to let him go through because he didn't have anything in his belongings.
I guess I don't know. Maybe I'm just being a churlish art.
I don't know.
Yeah, well, you know, it is interesting.
Because there was a lot of overly graciousness under the Biden administration.
And, you know, this is probably a term that was probably a tertiary reason why the terrorist encounters were so low under Biden.
In addition to all of those legitimate travelers who came in through the ports, the people that had proper documents and had everything in order.
The Biden administration, and you plainly remember this, allowed up to one thousand four hundred and fifty.
Facially illegal aliens, people who didn't have any documents or any right to enter the United States to download the CBP one app to make an appointment at the ports of entry and to show up daily.
One thousand four hundred and fifty daily.
show up at those eight major ports to be inspected by an immigration officer. Now, again, they didn't
have any right to come into the country, but the Biden administration essentially gave them the
right to be inspected. And if that officer didn't find anything in the course of that inspection,
primary and secondary, they then paroled those individuals into the United States.
That put a huge strain, Mike, on the inspectors at the ports. Today, they see a lot of people
that they see every day. They see a lot of constant travelers, school kids, and things like
that. But they see some unusual individuals. They're now in a better position to send those
people to secondary to inspect them to a higher degree than back in the days under Biden when they
had to preserve all of that space, all of that manpower, and all of those resources to take a
look at people who plainly didn't have any right to be in the United States to begin with. So,
yeah, the border's an interesting place, Mike. I know you've been there. And the line between
the normal and the abnormal is pretty thin down there. Now, they're in a better position to parse
that line, to find the abnormal, the really abnormal, and to keep those people out of the
United States or refer them for prosecution. Yeah. No, that makes sense. I've got some
questions. I want to kind of cross in a different direction, maybe,
and start talking a little bit about ICE operations because, obviously, it consumed
the headlines for a period of time, particularly with the shootings. And it's fading now. It's not
an issue. It's not an issue, it seems, to the most part, leading into the midterm elections.
But before I can ask you those questions, Art, I need to take a quick break. So, if you could stay
right where you are, we'll be back with more from Art Arthur here on the PDB Situation Report. Stay
with us.
Joining me once again is Art Arthur of the
Center for Immigration Studies. Art, thanks very much for sticking around. Would have been awkward
if you'd just gotten up and laughed in between our segments. But let's talk about ICE operations
for just a minute, if we could. Obviously, one could argue that they had an optics problem
in the early stages of their operations to try to round up illegal immigrants.
The whole concept was we're going to go after those with criminal backgrounds, criminal activity.
And I think you had bipartisan support for that. People are saying, sure, let's round up anybody
who's got criminal activities who's not here legally, and that's fine. And then I think it
started to head south and clearly shooting U.S. citizens, you know, that didn't help to make ICE
his case. Where are we now with ICE operations at this stage?
Right now, ICE is making, according to what it says, official numbers haven't come out,
is making about 50,000 to 55,000 arrests of aliens who are removable from the United States,
illegal aliens, if you will, each month. That is a tremendous number. Just to put that number
into context, Mike, the high watermark for immigration arrests in the United States was
about 4,000.
Around 2008 to 2010, we were running a pretty good clip at that point. The Obama administration
imposed a lot of restrictions and then more restrictions on ICE officers. So by the end of
2016, right before Trump took office the first time, they were only making about 64,000 arrests
in a given year. Today, we're up to 55,000 per month, and they've been running operations like
that for the last four months.
But you touch on a very important point, and that is, you don't, you know, see the videos,
you don't see the flashbang grenades, you don't see officers wrestling with people in the street
the way that you used to. And the reason is that, you know, when after the shooting of Alex Freddie
in Minneapolis, President Trump went to Border Czar Tom Homan, a guy who has experience in
immigration enforcement going back to 1980.
1984 to actually quarterback that. Prior to that, Kristi Noem, the then DHS secretary,
Greg Bovino, who was Border Patrol chief from the El Centro sector of the Border Patrol,
were in charge of those operations. Homan is a guy who's been doing this for a long
time. And remember, he was a high-ranking officer under the Obama administration. He
knows how to do this at a policy level.
And was, and, sorry, Ari, sorry for interrupting. I just wanted to point out that he was a high-ranking officer under the Obama administration. I just wanted to point out, and was awarded, commended by the Obama administration.
Yes, when he was the executive associate director of ICE in charge of enforcement of removal operations, exactly what we're talking about right now, he left that position with a presidential meritorious award for all of the work that he had done.
And, you know, and I think that that's really the difference.
The secret sauce.
The secret sauce right now that we didn't have before is Tom Homan. He's a guy who knows the job, knows how to do it politically properly, and, you know, knows how to get it done without making a big show of it.
What do you make of, what's your assessment of the databases, right? Because so much of this depends on the information that they have access to, right?
And you pointed it out earlier, the problem with the application process to come into the country for,
those who had no documentation, and, you know, in all honesty, look, they were stretched so thin that people would just come down to the border, they'd give a name, you know, maybe they get a, you know, an appointment date down in the future.
But you didn't really know what the validity or the credibility of the information that was being provided by the individual looking to cross the border.
But, so, how do you assess the quality of the information?
How do you assess the quality of the information that is in the databases that allows them to pursue individuals?
You know, that's an excellent question, because we use the word garbage in, garbage out when we talk about computers.
But the same thing is true when you talk about vetting and screening.
A lot of individuals who come to the United States, you know, even with visas, there's only so much we can know about those individuals.
But if they've come into the United States illegally. We literally know nothing about those individuals, aside from any touches we refer to it in the United States with a law enforcement agency, or what those individuals decide to tell us.
Fortunately, the, you know, ever since September 11th, and especially under the Trump administration, they've been gathering that evidence from around various government databases.
You yourself have worked in the intelligence field, and you can remember.
The old days of stovepiping, when agencies would gather up their own intelligence, hold it close to their heart, not share it with anybody else, and use it to their own ends.
So, they're starting to, you know, grind down those walls that existed between the FBI and the CIA and the NSA, and even within departments themselves, even within DOJ, FBI, even within DHS.
So, breaking that information down. We could talk for two hours about all of the work that they're doing to consolidate that information, but, you know, when you're talking about the border, you're talking about the tech system, the old treasury enforcement computerized system.
We have a lot of intelligence databases that flow into that, and agents and officers have access, who have access, can get some higher-level information.
That was definitely a big defect of the Biden administration.
You could probably remember that there were watch-listed aliens who were apprehended at the southwest border.
We knew they were watch-listed, and yet they were released.
In fact, in one high-profile situation, that person was released, and TSA ended up flagging them when they attempted to get on a commercial airliner in the United States.
That's how bad it was.
The Trump administration isn't playing that game anymore.
Now, again, you know, bureaucrats are going to bureaucrat.
And, you know. Breaking down those walls is always a challenge.
But, you know, the president does have good people at the office of the director of national intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mark Wade Mullen, for whatever else you think about him, you know, is a pretty even-tempered guy who wants to get things done.
So, you know, you have the right team in place.
We have the intelligence that we need.
Really, the key part, and you could probably speak to this.
Better than I could, is getting that intelligence, the officer in the field in real time, so that they can use it, so that it can become what we call actionable.
Yeah.
Yeah, I think a part of this is also, I mean, we've seen it over the. Well, it's been increasing over the past, you could argue, 20 years.
But the importance of whatever private, public sector cooperation and coordination, because there are some situations, I think this would be one of them, where you could. argue the government agencies are just overwhelmed or they can't move fast enough.
or they don't have the ability to improve or adjust the databases and the flow of information.
So I think that comes into it to some degree, I would expect, with an operation like this.
But I am concerned only because for years now, we really haven't known with any specificity who's been coming across the board.
And from a national security perspective, yeah, that's an issue.
And I know some people roll their eyes and they go, you're just being a spook.
But if anybody thinks the cartels, the adversaries that we have overseas, terrorist organizations, China with their espionage concerns,
if anybody thinks that people weren't looking at the border situation and how open it was and didn't take advantage of it during that period of time,
I don't know how to explain that mindset.
It's either naive or willfully ignorant.
Yeah, and let me quantify exactly what you're describing.
We know that during the four years of the Biden administration, there were two million gotaways.
Now, when we talk about the border, we generally talk about it in terms of apprehension.
Those are the people we caught.
The two million gotaways are individuals who we don't know who they are, but we know how many came over.
We can, you know, we have.
We have cameras, we have sensors, we have aerostats.
We could identify when somebody's entered that we haven't caught.
Two million people came into the United States that way.
And in March 2024, then Border Patrol, Biden's Border Patrol chief, Jason Owen, said those were the people that kept them up at night.
What did they have to hide?
You know, what was their intention in coming to the United States?
Why didn't they let themselves be known?
Because under the Biden administration, if you got caught, if you were simply a legal alien,
the odds are you were going to get released.
These people went to great, great trouble and paid a lot of money to ensure that they could make it into the interior of the United States without being caught.
Again, you want to know why there are 11,283, you know, terrorism related encounters at the southwest border ports?
Look no further.
A lot of those people are people who would have paid a coyote to bring them in the back door, bring them all the way up to the 10 or the 20.
So that they could, you know, get on a highway and just blend into the United States.
Those days are over, at least for now.
Last question, Art.
Might be mindful of time, but set up a scenario.
Midterm elections show up.
Let's say that it's a bad day for Republicans.
Well, I guess in today's world, it's got to be like a bad couple of weeks.
It depends on how long it takes to count the votes.
So they lose the House, possibly the Senate.
Now, we have, you know, a year and a half or so of dysfunction in D.C., all sorts of blocks and, you know, efforts to go after Trump.
And I guess looking towards the presidential election, I guess where I'm going with this question is, do you think that, you know, if the election goes south for the Republicans and then they lose the White House in 28, that we'll see a change in the border again?
Without a doubt.
You know, this border is the way that it is because of Donald Trump's will.
If a president, you know, AOC, a President Newsom, you know, takes office, Kamala Harris takes office, what we're going to see is a return to the policies that we've had in the past.
We're going to see, you know, all these poor people.
They're just coming to the United States for a better life.
They're all asleep.
They're all asylum seekers.
We need to release them into the United States.
And you're going to see a mad rush on the border.
We're going to be back to keep in mind, Mike, those Biden border numbers were double, triple whatever we'd seen in any four year period in the past.
So if you could imagine Biden and then you turbocharge it because there's a lot of pent up demand, you know, throughout the Americas and, you know, in Africa and Asia and even further abroad, there are a lot of people who want to come to the United States.
They just can't come now.
If you take off all of the governors that you have on the system, leave that border wide open, vilify Border Patrol agents, disband ICE, there's not going to be any enforcement.
And you're probably going to see 20 to 30 million people out of the United States in a four year period.
Have there been any credible numbers?
You know, I lied.
I said that was the last question.
But now I just thought, let me throw this one at you.
And you may not have the answer, but that means you have to come back.
Have you seen a credible number in terms of the cost to U.S. taxpayers, to the federal government, the state governments for the immigration policies of the Biden administration?
I mean, I'm not I'm not like taking a hard political position.
I'm just saying, what was the cost to having an open border for that period of time?
Here comes the second question.
The sad part, Mike, the meter is still running on that cost.
Reuters reported in the middle of 2024 that more than 500,000 migrant children had entered the United States.
This is just one data point.
I could give you a lot more.
500,000 school age migrant children entering the United States and attending U.S. schools times $20,000 per pupil per year is $10 billion per year.
And that's not money that the federal government has.
The federal government's paying by and large.
They do help subsidize the local schools, but not much.
Most of that money comes out of property taxes and local sales taxes.
Anybody who pays a property tax bill is really paying to fund their local school.
So, you know, in Iowa, in Michigan, in, you know, Washington state, people are paying hundreds of dollars extra to educate just those children.
Then you talk about the Medicaid costs.
Now, remember, most.
People who are here illegally, Cubans and Haitians accepted for reasons that I can't quite understand are not immediately eligible for Medicaid.
But what they are eligible for is emergency medical treatment and active labor act and Paula treatment, what we call emergency Medicaid.
That runs into the tens of billions of dollars because most of those migrants use that as their primary care physician.
My kid's got a near ache.
He's going to the emergency room.
It's got to cover that.
I said.
About three years ago, toward the end of Biden, that it would take a trillion dollars in a decade before the United States was able to undo all of the damage that the that the Biden border did.
And I stand by that figure.
Trillion dollars.
All right.
Well, I'm not good at math, but that's that's a whole lot of fat stacks.
Art, listen, as always, if anybody can make a discussion about immigration, delightful.
Well, it's you.
So I want to thank you for coming back.
On a situation report, Matt.
And I hope that when we call again, you'll you'll pick up the phone and say yes, because we'd love to have you back on.
I always love being here, Mike, and I like the extended format.
It gives us more time to really get into the numbers and, you know, not to not to preach or, you know, to sing to the choir.
But, you know, you're a great host.
And now you really do present this in a good way.
South America.
What's going on?
It's true.
Well, thank you.
I.
I have nothing, if not underdressed today.
Let's let's put it that way.
Well, thank you very much.
I'll hopefully see you soon.
Thanks again, Mike.
All right.
Well, there you go.
Art Arthur of the Center for Immigration Studies.
That's all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report.
I know.
Don't be sad.
We will be back next week.
That's very exciting.
And you're making a whole clip.
My week is safe.
If you have any questions or comments, maybe you got a humorous anecdote.
Well, just send them on at PDB at the first TV.
Dot com.
Highlight of every week, of course, at the PDB headquarters.
Secret compound is when Carl Mailman somehow finds our secret compound and drops off another sack filled to the brim with your postcards and e-mails and faxes.
And every course, every month, our amazing team, including our well above average intern team.
They all gather around our big conference table and they choose the best ones or just the most interesting ones.
And we put them into a episode that we.
We call.
Ask me anything.
Finally, to listen to the podcast of the show, add free.
We could do that.
It is very simple.
Just become a premium member of the president's daily brief by visiting PDB premium dot com.
Not Mike Baker.
And until next time, stay informed.
Stay safe.
Stay cool.
Thank you.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Three years after the October 7 Hamas attacks, the Middle East has undergone significant shifts, with Israeli society moving toward a stronger emphasis on military security over diplomacy and peace efforts.
Internal Israeli sentiment has hardened, especially among young people who have willingly returned to defend their country, leading to a political realignment toward right-wing, security-focused policies.
The strategic landscape now includes a broader regional conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, with Israel asserting that the world has learned that attacking Jews carries severe consequences.
Global anti-Semitism and political manipulation, particularly through organized protests backed by Iran, Qatar, and Russia, are seen as efforts to discredit Israel and fuel anti-Zionist sentiment.
Intelligence failures were not due to data collection but to misjudging Hamas’s intent—believing they were seeking peace rather than striking, despite evidence of growing capabilities.
The U.S. southern border has seen a sharp rise in terrorism-related encounters due to tighter border security, expanded terrorist designations for cartels, and improved screening at ports of entry.
Under the Biden administration, lax enforcement and open-border policies allowed large numbers of undocumented migrants to enter, leading to strain on border agents and increased risks for national security.
A return to open immigration policies under a Democratic administration would likely reverse current security gains and lead to a surge in illegal crossings and associated costs, estimated at trillions over a decade.
Summary:
Three years after the October 7 Hamas attacks, the Middle East has transformed dramatically, with Israel shifting from diplomatic hopes to a hardened defense posture. Internal changes, particularly among young Israelis who have returned to fight, have driven a political realignment toward greater militarization and a rejection of Palestinian statehood. Alex Selsky of the Middle East Forum highlights that intelligence failures stemmed not from lack of data but from a false belief that Hamas sought peace, despite evidence of growing aggression.
He also underscores that global anti-Israel narratives are widely manipulated by external actors, particularly Iran and its allies, using misinformation and staged protests. S. southern border, terrorism-related encounters surged to over 11,000 in the first 11 months of fiscal year 2026—more than triple the prior year—due to enhanced border security, the designation of cartels like MS-13 and Sinaloa as terrorist organizations, and stricter screening protocols.
These changes are attributed to a more secure, closed border under the Trump administration, in contrast to the Biden-era open-border policy, which allowed millions of undocumented migrants to enter and overwhelmed enforcement. Art Arthur of the Center for Immigration Studies warns that a return to Democratic policies would likely cause a massive influx of migrants, strain local resources, and cost the federal and state governments trillions over time. S.
and global stability.
FAQs
Israelis have shifted politically toward a stronger defense posture, rejecting past hopes for peace with Palestinians. The public now sees military power as essential for security, especially after the October 7th attacks. Additionally, the regional threat from Iran and Hezbollah has intensified, and the international community appears to understand that aggression against Israel will be met with strong retaliation.
Israel has successfully degraded Hamas and Hezbollah through military action, and is now focused on countering Iran's regional influence. While Israel has not fully destroyed these groups, it has significantly reduced their capabilities, and the country remains determined to defend itself against future attacks.
No significant change in Israel's security policies is expected, even if opposition parties gain power. Key figures like Lieberman and Lapid maintain hawkish views on security. The shift in Israeli politics is more internal and pro-security than a reversal of policy toward the Palestinian issue.
The surge is due to a more secure border, with fewer illegal crossings through remote desert areas. Smugglers now face increased scrutiny at official ports of entry, where travelers are questioned, inspected, and subject to secondary checks, especially if linked to known criminal groups like MS-13 or Sinaloa Cartel.
It allows border officers to stop and investigate individuals linked to these groups more effectively. This expanded definition enables heightened scrutiny, including secondary inspections, and helps identify potential threats that might have previously gone undetected.
The failure was not in collecting intelligence, but in interpreting it. Israeli officials underestimated Hamas's intent, believing they were a weak, isolated group with no desire for violence. They failed to recognize that Hamas had a clear military strategy and that its actions were a deliberate escalation.
Chat with AI
Loading...
Pro features
Go deeper with this episode
Unlock creator-grade tools that turn any transcript into show notes and subtitle files.