The new Alliance of Sahel States and the future of Africa’s legacy institutions

By 2050 one in four people in the world will be African. The choices that we make now across Africa will shape the world's collective future. These are the stories, the trends, and the issues we face in the present that will define the coming decades. Welcome to the Afro-Politan. I'm your host, Catherine and Zuki. Three West African countries, Mali, Niger, and Bukina Faso, have finalized their exit from the economic community of West African states or ECOS. Another thing that they have in common, all three countries are under military rule after coups that took place in recent years. On today's episode we're examining why these countries have exited their regional block and whether this marks a crisis point for the region. To answer these questions I'm joined by Beverly O'Ching, a security analyst specializing in the Sahel and Global Power competition in Africa. She is also a senior associate with the CSIS Africa program. Bev, welcome. Thank you so much, Catherine. It's so cool to have you here. To start off, Bev, Mali, Niger, and Bukina Faso have chosen to exit ECOS but before we get to why they have left, could you just give us an overview of the state of politics in these three countries? I mean as you pointed out, there are all countries that are under military rule and military coups started off in Mali in 2020 and then there were two in Bukina Faso in 2022 and then there was the final one in Niger in July 2023 and these military governments removed elected civilian leaders partly because they were facing unprecedented security crisis. Our militants from Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are operating in this region and even just extending their influence beyond the three countries but also because of a widespread sentiment and protest about alleged hurt governance by the civilian governments. There had been an election in Mali in 2020 in legislative election which was contested the opposition leaders even abducted by militants and then in Bukina Faso there had been a presidential election and this did not take place in parts of the East and the North because of the insurgency. In Niger even though it was during much better in terms of managing militancy there were concerns about corruption within the government, favoritism as well as mismanagement of the insurgency. So they're not about to relinquish power in the next year or two. In fact, just as we're talking, Niger decided to extend military rule by at least five years. Mali they've extended to about 2027 and in Bukina Faso until 2029. They have been very opaque about plans to hold elections that would allow civilians to come back to power and critics tend to face repression. So in Mali various activists who had actually mobilized against the civilian government which led to the coup have either been detained or arrested or forced into exile. In Bukina Faso there's been reports of people being forcefully conscripted because of criticizing the government, the transitional government's management of the militancy and in Niger many allies of the former president Mohamed Basoum have either been detained or forced into exile because they cannot speak up against the military rulers. There are some efforts towards infresivity but in most instances it tends to be people who favor those military governments. So even those national consultations where they talk about extending military rule, most of people taking part are activists, movements, politicians who are aligned with the military rulers. So the possibility of having a more robust political process is almost nonexistent at least in the coming years for these three countries. You know this tight grip with which these military leaders are ruling with stands in really sharp contrast to the strong wave of support that they have received. There has been particularly strong support for Abraham Traore of Bukina Faso who is currently the youngest leader in the world and you know all three leaders have branded themselves as anti-colonial pan-African leaders. You know casting themselves as throwing off the neo-colonial West and charting a new path home. Given all these things, given how unaccommodating these rulers are to criticism and the tight grip with which they're running their countries, are they actually popular in their countries and is this anti-colonial rhetoric reflected in their actual governance, the sort of day-to-day running of these countries? I mean I will say when the coups took place they were met with a lot of euphoria because people were already disgruntled with the civilian governments which was seen to be too Western leaning, too dependent on the West especially for security support. France had been one of the biggest players in the region. They had deployed troops as far back as 2013. They were initially successful against militants then later on the insurgency continued to spread by 2015 it was in Boquina Faso and Indonesia and then by 2019 it was in countries like Berlin and Togo and Northern Codivua and so when these militaries took power they were already in the front line and they were facing the worst of the insurgency which they used to justify taking power and they received support because there's away the militancy it's not distant for people these are their brother sisters who are being sent to the front line and so the military intervening feels like a reset of that process. One of the first things these military governments have done is security reforms and this is all in name so initially it was calling for French and other Western forces to leave on the back of protests that had been taking place against the presence of French and Western forces and that way they gained resonance with the public and people felt that they were representing their ideals. The nationalist policies have now moved to the economic sector and for them the mining industries the biggest so Nizier Uranium Boquina Faso Mali with gold and now Lithium with Mali and because they were able to now get rid of the Western security apparatus they have now moved to put policies that would allow them to extract more from the natural resources and put pressure on predominantly Western operators. This is also gained some public resonance because the feeling is we are doing this for ourselves to be able to build our economies to be able to build our infrastructure to be able to fund our militaries and that's what allowed them to have a sense of popularity. But at the same time the voices of discontent or of criticism are side-lined or they are forced to have to leave or they're not given room so it's often very difficult to be able to get a different perspective aside from widespread support. When you see the protests taking place for instance against ECOS when they were imposing sanctions against Mali, Nizier and Boquina Faso it felt as if it was very national it was taking place in different parts of those countries so there was a feeling that these militaries are legitimized by these protests but the fact that they've not been able to hold elections yet I mean Mali had a constitutional referendum but so far nothing beyond that but they're lack of commitment towards democratic reforms in particular or institutional reforms that are not just bending on nationalist principles is part of the underlying reason for the fragility of their leadership despite what feels like widespread support. Yeah and I want to pull on that thread of ECOS and the protests against it. Why have Mali, Nizier and Boquina Faso made the move to exit ECOS? So when the military coup took place initially in Mali in 2020 ECOS of course the first action was to suspend it and then when another coup within a coup took place in 2021 because the Mali military ruler was unhappy that the transitional government had sidelined some of his allies in the new cabinet and so his choice was to remove them. They imposed very heavy economic sanctions there was a trade embargo the borders were closed and the line that kept running up until the point where the Nizier coup happened were these are in humane illegal sanctions. It felt like that was the point where the acrimony really built up. Now the coups in Boquina Faso in Nizier may not have necessarily been inspired or influenced by Mali because these are countries that were already with militaries predisposed towards intervention and so they had their own military coups and they sort of aligned themselves towards this idea that ECOS is to blame because before the coups happened there had been protests against governments there had been a feeling of marginalization there had been electoral processes that were called into question. And ECOS's big role has always been beyond just economic integration but ensuring that governments and individuals who are in charge obey the rule of law that they obey the charter which promotes democracy and promotes proper governance. So there was a perception of a failure of ECOS to meet its own charter and so when ECOS took this action against the military rulers and then eventually in Nizier they wanted to militarily intervene against the military coup. They gave the Junta a seven-day deadline to return presuming to power. They refused and they started now to activate a force that would then intervene in Nizier. There was a lot of opposition within the ECOS countries in Nigeria for instance where the northern region they have a lot of filial connections with Nizier. In Kodivwa there was some disquiet about that because relations were already quite poor with Mali and Bukina Faso. In Benin as well in Togo there wasn't unity around that intervention but because ECOS had become the enemy for the military rulers they opted to form what they were then calling their lines of Sahel states. It was meant to be a military force to counter an ECOS intervention but also to protect the military rulers from any form of what they termed interference by external actors including ECOS, France and other Western partners who were seen to be supporting ECOS's stance on sanctions and military intervention. Yeah and I just really want to underline why this is a important moment. Could you just tell us a little bit about why ECOS is actually a really important regional organization and is the exit of these three countries a crisis moment for ECOS and the region you know writ large. I would imagine for example that it's harder to coordinate a security response to violent extremism in the Sahel without these three states. I mean definitely so ECOS has since it was formed in the 70s been the stabilizer of West Africa it had about 11 member states. Mauritania had been a member before they left over differences about sort of streamlining the monetary value but it has over the years been the stabilizer of West Africa. If you think about the civil war in Sierra Leone or in Liberia or even some of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau, ECOS through its political intervention as well as sometimes military intervention has been able to stop the region from essentially fracturing but the ECOS today is a very different ECOS from the ECOS I hear about in the 90s for instance where they were almost a very hegemonic power and their center was obviously still as Nigeria. Over the years Nigeria has been challenged by internal issues security issues being the primary ones there is various insurgencies across the country and even politically in terms of representation. When Tinoobu the current Nigerian president came to power his rhetoric was that who's have no place in ECOS but at the time he was speaking it felt like it was too late you know Mali happened everyone kind of saw it was coming in 2020 then Burkina Faso happened twice and then everyone really didn't see that Niger was also at a risk of a similar intervention given its history as well despite the fact that Bazum himself had been perceived as the stabilizer for the Sahel with the western contingents going there. So ECOS has promoted regional integration largely through the economy and through economic cooperation whereby you can move across the region you can trade across the region it can work across the region quite freely of course there are some handicaps here and there but at the same time it also been the political voice of reason when it comes to inter-regional conflict as well as internal political crisis but at this point with the Sahel deciding to leave it's beyond the crisis point for ECOS it feels as if it's a complete failure of all the steps that could have been taken much earlier to stop a situation whereby a group of countries decide to chart their own path and do not really have any institution to hold them to account for their actions that sense of accountability is probably the biggest loss for the regional institution. Of course for the Sahel countries they still have another bigger regional block that they're part of the West African Monetary Union which is largely francophone and these are three francophone countries so they can still bank on that for economic stability but in terms of political legitimacy and in terms of even having more diplomatic standing it might be fraught even though the exit was soft because given the kinds of statements that had been flying around since 2020 between say Marley and ECOS then eventually the Sahel and ECOS it felt as if we were building towards an acrimonious exit whereby they may forcefully close borders whereby they might mobilize military forces to face each other off but the choice to keep the borders open and the choice to still have dialogue even if the Sahel military rulers have rejected an extension of their exit means that there could still be a sort of peaceful coexistence but I suppose for ECOS taking those as points for when is the point where you do raise an issue one thing going back to the issue around militancy and the terrorism crisis one of the criticisms that Marley Buchanan Faso and Niger raised when they formed the AES is that ECOS was putting in all the effort to mobilize a counter-cool force but they have spent years not putting together counter-terror force they had been waiting for Western intervention for France's intervention yet this is an insurgency that is now affecting member states and it's going to continue affecting member states for years to come ECOS seems to be softening they have said that they want to put resources towards a counter-terror force but whether they will have the coordination of the Sahel especially with the tensions between not just them and the Sahel as a bloc but say Nijan Benin the border has been closed for now nearly two years now are Marley Cordivoire Buchanan Faso are at odds with each other which means it undermines cooperation which would then stabilize even just that tri-border region between them it makes it quite difficult to engage the Sahel in military intervention in the long run given the kind of fractures of scene over the years yeah is there a sense of regret amongst ECOS members for the approach that was taken which was to impose sanctions to threaten military intervention in the case of Nijan because I imagine it's a particularly difficult situation where on one hand ECOS has this legacy of being a stabilizing force in the region and to accept one who is to essentially de facto legitimize all of them right but I do wonder if there's some introspection happening now amongst member states us whether they did the right thing yet I think so because of the sort of recalibration on how to deal with the Sahel the sanctions have to be there because they are part of the process for responding to what they would term undemocratic takeover of power on constitutional change of power because that is part of the ECOS charter there are guidelines on how to deal with that I think what ECOS might lack is guidelines on how to deal with the things that then predispose these conscious military coups so outside the Sahel you have guinea which is now in its fourth year of military rule and it felt like a bit of an anomaly but obviously does have its own history of instability and it came much much later because guinea had a wave of protest from 2019 alpha conduit then president wanted to change the constitution to allow himself to run for a fourth term and there had been you know this group of the FNDC that had formed itself to defend the constitution and then there had been issues around the arrests the detentions of activists the fact that echo our statements felt very detached from what was really happening they would say things like we're hoping for an amicable solution people were dying in protests there was a feeling that they should have intervened a bit more mediated more or called out the president explicitly around the actions do its security forces which to some extent echo us heads of states have to protect each other but also there's the bit where you may have to call people to account which is a very difficult line to straddle now that happened the constitutional change alpha conduit was reelected a coup happened much later on it felt like echoes was caught off guard but I think anyone watching would have seen that that was happening and I was in between Marley itself because Marley had had its coup in May and so echoes still trying to deal with that and then something else happens in September that year and they're not sure and then in January you have another coup in Regina like there was scrambling over that period and what kind of response at some point I felt like the statements were just a copy based of let's change the country and condemn the military take over you know ex-country yes yes like any other country yeah Guinea-Bissau for instance is currently in a constitutional crisis and it's one of those countries that it's hard to keep up with the number of military coups attempted and successful that have happened but it is a scenario that is likely and the president has delayed the election fairly significantly this has happened before in 2019 when Vaz was in power and despite that I mean echo us did have a force in the country when there was an attempted coup in I think February 2023 but it feels as if some of the mechanisms towards addressing political grievances and calling out political issues and socio-economic grievances that are likely to turn into these unconstitutional changes of power are not sufficient so sometimes it feels like a bit of a leader's club on the other hand the introspection has come from the fact that the Sahel has not backed down on his decision to leave and there's no way to hold them accountable it makes it hard to hold say Guinea accountable for its extended transition because what if they join the AES and even for countries that still have democratic leaders concerns like in Benin where no one can talk about the presidential election that's coming up or in toggle where the presidential system was changed to extend the president's stain power and he's a negotiator for echo us it puts them in a very difficult place in terms of calling people to account but they are reflecting on this the fact that they want to have a counter-terror force even if it feels too late is a recognition that this insurgency will affect them the fact that they are still opening doors to the Sahel despite the years of acrimony is a demonstration that sometimes being tough is not always the best way to deal with a crisis you know i want to zoom back into those three countries Niger looking a fast so that formed this alliance of Sahel states how's that AES coming along right like is it an organization that is adequately funded and is it robust enough to tackle the collective security crisis in this region because correct me if i'm wrong this seems like a really big detour from the regional politics of the 21st century it's quite rare right to have you know a block leaving an organization like echo us forming their own you know splint organization and then actually trying to recruit other states right they're trying to get cad in for example right right and so you know the AES feels like a organization that if successful perhaps is actually a model for countries that aren't that happy in their regional blocks but you know back to the original question like how is it shaping up as an organization i mean it started off obviously as a sort of counter like a military force that would counter echo us if they military intervene and then they coalesce around protecting each other from being held accountable by echo us so politically aligned they are military rulers they have had transitions that have been extended over a period of time which sort of allows them to sort of run the show for at least the next five to six years but then they've also started having these very serious concrete steps towards becoming a fully fledged regional alliance some things feel very symbolic but for the most part that there's sorts of things that build institutions and build credibility so they launched a passport for instance which would allow you to if you're a citizen of Marley but you can't possibly share you get your biometric passport with an AES symbol of I think an acacia tree it is like the sunset and the flag which is launched has a similar sort of insignia it's green which feels hopeful considering right yeah and then you have the tree as well and you have the confederation of the lines are held states they have joint news bulletin so every day if you watch i'm state TV on Marley we can have us only share they have a segment specifically for news about the AES really it could be about military operations it could be about you know like launching a clinic it could be about ministerial meetings but it's about this shared identity and when they were forming there were protests of course in support of this formation the flags of Marley Bukinifaso and Niger are seen flying in the three countries in very prominent areas within the capitals and part of it is also posturing towards this identity there was a festival in central Marley at the start of february where the culture ministers from the three countries were really promoting this idea of they have individual identities of course but they're bringing them together to celebrate this union of togetherness in an area that has always faced a lot of militant violence because the archive the group is active it was you know within a 20 kilometer range there have been attacks there by the militant group but it's a brave face to demonstrate that despite the insurgency we are still celebrating our art our culture our identity they're planning to form a sort of regional force it feels almost like an inheritor a successor of what used to be the G5 Sahel so it'll be a five thousand strong force troops from Marley Bukinifaso and Niger they've already been doing joint military exercises they're not as effective but it is a step for them because they also realize they have to take responsibility having now pushed out some of their former allies and they have to demonstrate that I mean everyone has been seen the AES as a sort of Russian front stabilizer of the region but ultimately it is also about these governments showing that they are proactive about this identity they've had lots of joint ministerial meetings they plan to form an investment bank possibly will be funded by some of their more eager partners it could be China it could be Russia it could be Turkey so they're all of these steps they're making to demonstrate that we are an effective alliance you've had echoes all these are that they have their own breakdowns and you know some level of degeneration but we have all of these things and you can come and do business with us of course instability is a big thing when there was the most credible report of a core attempt in Bukinifaso in June 2024 Marley sent in special forces to intervene and I think sometimes when when I think about that incident I think a lot about how the AES is sometimes really heavily pinned on these three men Gianni Goita and Tauri and should something happen to one of them I wonder what the unity of the AES actually will be whether they will have to keep on intervening whenever there's some form of instability whether if let's say there was another military coup in Niger they'd be happy to just carry on with the weather comes into power that's the bit that sometimes feels like a blind spot but they are really forging forward with this one identity I really want to hone in on that tension that you're describing between the stated politics of these leaders as pan-African sort of visionary leaders and the lived reality of these being military hunters right and that tension is visible for example with the formation of the AES which you know initially was an effort for them to retain power and sort of form this mini-nato style collective wear yes one is invaded always right right and now it's broadening into this organization that is generating legitimacy using culture arts and so on even when it comes to the notion of decolonization right they deploy a lot of rhetoric like we are these decolonial leaders we are shaking off the west and echo us as a puppet of the west but I really struggle with that tension because I'm not entirely sure how the decolonial rhetoric has materially improved lives in that region like I don't know what you think about that I understand yeah no that really makes sense because I suppose we're very used to getting sad portraits from the Sahel of people who have been deeply affected by the insurgencies the lost loved ones or lost livelihoods entirely or lost their homes people who have been displaced forced to flee people who are also living in fear because you're either caught between militant groups who will likely exploit you kill you or you are caught with an army which is often accused of right abuses and this is the representation of the states that you know and for the most part there are certain campaigns that are made to seem as if things are okay so in Bukina Faso for instance there's been this big campaign around agriculture and food production and empowering people buying it enabling them to grow their food so chari was handing out tractors to people for instance so there's the way the government sort of deploys tractors to rural areas so people are able to till their farms and so on and it helps with just ensuring that these collective food security there's other efforts which feel sometimes more destabilizing than stabilizing and I think about the various militia groups that operate in Bukina Faso they're called the volunteers the defense of the fatherland they existed even before these military rulers came to power and even civilian governments sort of co-opted them within the security apparatus they are built on patriotism you are fighting for your fatherland you are fighting for your life you're fighting for your people in Marley you have the dogon militia who have been linked to the military rulers in Niger they were less open about it but there are some pro-government militias within the teleberry region and those are seen as efforts towards protecting the country towards making it more secure even though in many instances it does lead to more unrest and more deaths in Marley again with this whole campaign around the mining sector recently they opened what is now the biggest Lithium mine in West Africa and Goeta was present of course the inauguration and he talked about how they are getting Marleyans to be trained to be able to do mechanical operations because they want to get to a point and it's something that the mining minister has said we want our gold to shine for us we want our minerals to shine for us that gains resonance in Bukina Faso when the military ruler was threatening to withdraw mining permits because they're not receiving support for the insurgency that also gained resonance because people feel that these resources should benefit them people will still appeal for government supports when they are in distress which sometimes demonstrates just how much trust they still have in the government partly out of choices but also because that is the only thing that will defend you when the French have gone when the UN has gone when all of the western forces that were helping your armies have gone you have your government there's a sense of resilience I suppose also from that the fact that people will still take part in nationalist campaigns and rhetoric but also there are groups that are disenfranchised there are armed movements in Marley that have taken up arms again in a calling for the independence of the North so we're back to 2012 only worse in Niger in the Agadés region there are armed groups that are targeting the oil pipeline so it's also somewhat sabotaging what should be the economic you know framework for this government to actually grow in Bukina Faso less so but of course there's the concern that if you have a very powerful parallel military force you do have the risk of civil war so it's a very mixed bag of what the outlook could be for these countries but I suppose ultimately the military rulers have to sometimes demonstrate that it is worth it this is for you even though for the most part it doesn't always look that way yeah oh gosh and to complexify this even further you know at the Marley Nisier Bukina Faso level we have a lot of instability driven by violent extremism the instability that is brought about by a military coup right and this you know so you have that layer and then you have the West African region that is fracturing in some sense and that now you have you know splint organizations and and so on it that's the second layer of instability but then the third layer is sort of global politics writ large back to your earlier point about all of these foreign players in the region Russia right through Wagner now known as afkakor has been training militaries in this region but also acting as sort of a regime protection force right so you have Russia which is continuously growing its presence in the region and then now with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria Russia is looking to relocate its military assets to Libya which borders Nisier yeah so you have one sort of player there France has essentially been kicked out of the region and for all of the complaints about Ponsafik and they are many a lot very legitimate this is a foreign power that have left with their resources and then you have the US which is very quickly withdrawing from Africa essentially with the end of USAID and NBC reporting this week that President Trump is considering dismantling the US Africa command which again has been kicked out of or is not present really in Nisier Mali and Afaso but they were a pretty important intelligence partner yeah and then again there are a lot of critiques many of them valid about you know US presence there but there's a lot going on in the international system right now and it feels like we're in a moment where the quote unquote liberal international order or at least the pretense of it is leaving as naked transactionalism is becoming the you know modus operandi and to sum this all together you know in this moment of multiple layers of instability it seems to me that this is a moment that would require solidarity and strengthen numbers like regional bodies like a strong echo us that could not only collectively act to address insecurity in the Sahel but also act as like a barrier or a bulwark against predatory behavior from foreign states and so I wonder if these three countries that I remove themselves from echo us are they in a weaker position to engage with the international system writ large right is the fact that they are isolated in some sense making it harder for them to form a stronger contingency to negotiate right to like engage in the system that is becoming increasingly transactional because we've seen right now the worst case scenario right now is Sedan where you have quite a number of foreign players in the region and in the case of let's say the Afghokor and Sedan those are sort of gold for protection play right so that's like the worst example of this transactionalism right so it's a lot to throw at you but as somebody who studies the space what do you think about the alliance of the Sahel states as an entity in this global shifts that are happening I mean it's funny because I suppose it's because of those global shifts that that is happening if you think about even just some of the now rhetoric you know someone like the US president saying he can take this territory of that territory the current insurgency in East India Congo is a result of Ronda the fact that echo us could split in the way it has and that one side is seen as a Russian sort of you know like a miniature Russia and then you have one side that is seen as the west it's kind of the result of that to some extent the world turned away from some of the crisis taking place and so everyone is allowed to do whatever they wanted the coin rally happened when Trump was in power for his first time COVID was also happening there was so many things putting pressure there and the military intervened and already there was a weak global system to even call it out in a weaker echo us to really call it out right and I feel like they took advantage of that space over the years especially to now consolidate this alliance which yes as a result of internal crisis is very fragile and will need a lot of support beyond just its usual allies to become fully flies I think echo us could still play a role even if it feels transactional in being able to ensure that there's open doors they still economic support and they still collaboration and coordination between them rather than acrimony right the African Union itself because thinking back to the summit that just took place right against all of this the global backdrop with Ukraine with Gaza with the US and USAID and not really having a consolidated statement on what their plan will be for the next year and not that it's not expected I mean I was disappointed but I suppose I didn't really expect much for them to say we are seeing that these global shifts and we feel that we may need to now reflect on do we now promote the Africa free trade agreement how do we improve cohesion how do we improve interregional trade if a goa is gone what do we do in terms of our own interactions with either the EU we have South African the G20 how do we leverage that there was nothing of that sort it was still we're going set up a credit union because we're not happy with how the West Republic is not like wow that's very good so all of this is happening against that the Sahel will still need support and whether that support is towards you know altruistic or Russia's intentions altruistic it's very hard to tell the change over from Wagner to Africa core has sort of led to a slight shift with how Russia wants to engage they don't really want to be from what I can tell as aggressive as the Wagner group was you know sort of banding themselves on social media as that lifesavers and you know African Sahara adventures no the Africa core wants to train the militaries whether that would be effective is another question altogether because they also don't have the kind of resources that the US and France used to have which was underutilized ultimately because some of the disgruntlement within the militaries in the Sahel is they were being asked to train with sticks you know that these militaries were not going out to the front line with them in the way that they should have and so the insurgency got worse under their watch so they're trying to take control because these are their countries of their territories they can get weapons now more directly from China from Turkey from the Russia in the way that they were not quite getting from the US of course there's the caveat around human rights and so on but they are trying to make sure that that aggressively is working for them they flaunt drones every so often that they've received for air support which is what they need to be able to observe and have intelligence around militant movements which is where they had been for a long time handicapped it may not stabilize in the next two or three years it will take a lot of work and a lot of support and a lot of self-reflection from probably African institutions but what point do they recognize the AES and give them the support they need to now become fully fledged institutions and perhaps through that encourage a democratic process but for you to criticize I suppose the lack of democracy against all of this crisis I suppose for the Sahel military rulers feels very misplaced and they've been able to exploit that to a point where now they've splintered and they can call for their own independence so imagine who else will be able to call for their own independence because they're not happy with how their regional block is trying to hold them to account that's the probably the worrying precedent and even just you know this is off topic but even looking at what the DRC is doing they came to EAC the East African community because they were probably not happy with how the economic community of Central African States was not really addressing the insurgency or the southern African development community so you can also just go and pick and choose whichever regional block you want to join but at some point there's a breakdown Sudan left you got the intergovernmental authority and development because they weren't happy with comments they made about the war now that's the sort of thing we're seeing that's becoming a lot more commonplace rather than institutions as semblance of stability and accountability let's just play that scenario out right so you've got the AES Mali Nijir Bukinafaso who've sort of left on their own I am so fascinated by your thinking about this that the AES is a response to a factoring and a global order that has not paid attention to the crisis that's happening in this region for over a decade now you've got Sudan rightly as you said leaving EGAD and then the DRC joining the EAC the Rwandan backed M23 has taken over Goma and huge chunks of the North Cuba region so yeah just playing the scenario out what happens in an Africa that is splintered institutionally right that doesn't really have these hegemonic regional powers or when I think of hegemon I think of you know saddick they're sort of underpinned by South Africa well Ekkoas was sort of you know pinned down by Nijir and so on EAC again contentious but Kenya is a strong like economic entity in the region so what happens like if we play the scenario out what does that look like for a continent to have smaller and smaller and smaller and I mean hopefully not isolated but certainly smaller entities as time goes on I suppose it becomes much harder to even address interregional issues so DR Congo is a result of two very large regional blocks by either market share or influence not being able to address a conflict that has gone on for years of course you know beyond them the Sahel is a result of Ekkoas not quite knowing what steps to take at what point to be able to either call out or recalibrate their engagement the Sahel and then it just means that any other issues of tensions that arise even between different parties so I think a lot about Nijir and Benin no one not even China has been able to resolve that despite the fact that China is the biggest stakeholder in the crude oil sector it makes it very hard it sometimes just sort of freezes a conflict for some time when if there's no full blown war the repercussions are you have no way of coordinating say security operations you have no way of cooperating economically you undermine the charters around integration good naveliness even just international relations in and of themselves beyond what these institutions represent and I suppose it just means that these institutions just become a name you know there's been a lot of reflection for instance about the African Union given that now they've had the transition of leadership and whether the last few years in particular because all of these have happened between say 2019 up until now that's been a huge institutional failure on the African Union as a way of then reflecting how it is that it trickles down to other regional institutions and also goes back to the structure of the AU itself whereby I'd like to say the European Union where the European Union leader can call out specifically and do the AU doesn't quite work that way there's a lot of politeness around how you interact with the different countries you know Chad is not a coup but Mali is a coup Gabon is sort of a coup but Bukina Faso is a coup you know there's all those double standards of course they're different internal issues that would drive why you would categorize this and that like that but I suppose the fact that it's hard enough to hold these institutions accountable based on their own charters and credentials right which then means if you're not able to do that then what really is the point of all of this integration you can choose Chad your own you can decide to leave a block because you've been sanctioned you can decide to no longer take part in meetings you can decide to close your border with your neighbor for a prolonged period of time I don't know if this has been a thing that has happened before I'm really not sure in terms of history I was gonna I was actually gonna use that as my next question which is you know I think about the decision that was made in the mid 1990s to reform what was previously the organization of African unity into the African Union and part of the drivers of that were the failures the deep failures of them OAU to actually respond to crises on the continent the rondon genocide is just one example right that this approach of non-intervention which is very well intentioned in the post colonial period led to things like the rondon genocide led to a lot of massacres led to repeat coups and so on and the organization looked at itself and said we have failed our mandate to be this institution that can fight for the rights of everyday people that can rally together African nations and form this united it failed right they sat down they said fine we're gonna become the African Union yes and so I wonder if this story of you know splintering institutions is really an indictment of the institutions themselves like the African Union because I think a lot about not only these coups right but I actually think a lot about and SARS and SARS protests in 2020 and we were all you know online people were learning how to use bitcoin to send money to the people protesting and it was anti- you know police brutality protest but just asking for more accountability and I remember people were just tweeting at the African Union right they were like the African Union chairman the left most of hockey saying please right like this organization that could stand for the well-being of Africans and actually the second which kind of made me sad the second person that was being tweeted at the most was Beyonce which does not make you so sad right she had just released this line king remember and people a lot of African artists and people are like well Beyonce should say something which I mean for me breaks my heart right that this this one woman I mean don't even get me started but I wonder if this is a story of the failures of organizations like the African Union to actually live up to what they were supposed to be I wonder if these fractures are an indictment of these organizations to respond to crises on the continent because as you rightly pointed out it seemed like Equas had a more robust response to coups and they did to you know years of violent extremism so I'm curious what you think I suppose those are the set of circumstances because it could be a generational thing whereby younger people I suppose we've grown to the lot more democracy openness accountability to some extent you know things are open you can open the internet and find almost anything and you expect that standard from big institutions you will call them out and you will tweet them and you will you know even pick out quotes from their chart and say this says this you cannot I think in total there was a thing about changing the electoral law or the constitution within months of the election and that was you know circulating a bit how can you allow an electoral process to take place as Equas you have this clause that says you cannot change that significant law within xyz months of the election but this is happening and the slowness of response which goes back to bureaucracy and just how institutions and respectability the average age of echo as leaders I can't know of the top of my head but I suppose the Senegalese president is the youngest fire and then you have everyone else who's slightly older and established and you know you go through a longer process before you respond to something you're worried about stepping on someone's toes when you join these institutions there is a level of sovereignty you're giving up you sign a charter because you will all behave according to what this charter says and younger people want things to be addressed as soon as they emerge you're changing the constitution how can you do that we are against it we are protesting against it let's have some discourse let's have a meaningful mediation process when I go back to Marlene 2019 2021 of the things that came up from the process movement was Equas did not understand the aspirations of Marlene's that's a very strong indictment in the sense that it seemed as if they had no credibility to be driving the mediation process they did not understand that people weren't happy with the civilian leader then he brought him back our cater same thing in Guinea and to some extent the same thing in the other two countries and these military rulers are of that age you know they're like in their side from Niger which is a bit of an anomaly they're like below their 40s so they are of that tweeting tiktok sort of generation and they will speak back at you and tell you you represent the West you are not quick enough to respond to the insurgency so you cannot come here and tell me that I should be held accountable for seizing power I am trying to address a situation that has not been addressed over the years so I guess responsiveness is what people want from institutions action not just words or rhetoric it's something that actually does change our lives and I think I sometimes feel that sense of frustration like when I was waiting for the AU to say something and I was like oh god it's a credit institution we're losing aid guys oh we're gonna come up with new credit rating models we're not gonna get aid people have lost jobs the health sector will collapse education might collapse but you know and even the leaders themselves the things that they say I think the Kenyan president when Trump said something about transgender and he was like Kenya only recognizes men and women and everyone was like no ways this coming from you know no yeah yeah yeah what we're gonna do gender politics in the middle like bigger things we don't even have the representation yet right right according to the constitution so it feels misplaced and I think a lot of what in these institutions sometimes end up addressing might feel misplaced when you think about the wider issues that are coming apart but democracy about representation about leadership about accountability so yeah it's probably stemming from that so this is probably the first regional block of the TikTok generation or whatever the last quick thought I have is I actually as you're talking I'm wondering if it's not an exclusively African phenomenon I think the United Nations is going through a particularly tough time with their failure to really resolve the Israel Gaza crisis war the Ukraine Russia war and really their inability to be an effective mediator in so many of these ongoing crises NATO right is splintering right now so actually I wonder if this is just a global phenomenon where you do have young people that want responsive institutions and some of them like somebody wants to describe the UN as an institution that's meant to move slow that's meant to you know and gender discourse and so on so I wonder if it's global you know this moment probably is I mean with the UN they'll have the you know we are deeply concerned about something and it doesn't really feel like it's moving anything in any direction things are blowing up beyond proportion but it's just this very you know very same statement for every single crisis and conflict and it just tells you institutionalism can be such a problem even when you want to do good for the world so many ropes you have to jump so it's always been transactional actually it's always been transactional that's such a cool place to stop this Bev oh my gosh one of the coolest people I know thank you so much for joining the Afro-Politan thank you for supporting the podcast this has been so fascinating and so good and hopefully you'll come back and we can just talk some more and thank you to Gina for do sir for being so patient with us thank you thank you for tuning in to the Afro-Politan please subscribe to the Afro-Politan wherever you listen to your podcasts this podcast is produced by Sarah Baker and our music is by Wunderchild