Transcription Chat with AI FAQs Transcription Summary 5824 Words, 32321 Characters
English Follow along with audio Add speaker labels Report an issueHi, I'm Robert Siegel, and this is a conversation about politics with, as always, Times Opinion
contributor E.J. Dionne.
Welcome again.
Great to be with you, always.
And joining us for the first time, Tim Carney, columnist for the Washington Examiner and
senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Thank you for joining us.
Thank you.
It's a pleasure to join you guys.
Great to have you.
Great to be with you, Tim.
We are recording on Thursday morning, it is less than a month and a half until Election
Day, a midterm election that will decide whether the Republicans retain control of the House
and the Senate, and also some 36 state governorships are on the ballot, 18 currently held by Democrats,
18 held by Republicans.
In this conversation, the media's reluctant centrality in this election year, and also
the implications of what happens.
This year, on 2028, but we begin by looking at the middle of the country, the country's
midsection, from the Rust Belt to the Farm Belt that stretches as far west as Nebraska,
as far north as the Dakotas, are potential Democratic successes, they're conceivably
omens of a realignment in the middle of the country.
E.J., you've been traveling recently.
Why don't you start?
Yeah.
Trump is dragging down Republicans, even in some of the most Trumpy states.
You know, I was in Indiana for a project on building community, and in Kansas to write
about this surprisingly strong challenge Democrat Adam Hamilton, a Methodist minister, is making
to Republican Senator Roger Marshall.
Hamilton was actually ahead in a recent poll by a couple of points in Kansas, which is
actually a more complicated state than we often acknowledge, but there hasn't been a
Democrat elected to the Senate there since 1932.
So something's happening.
In Kansas, something is really happening.
Several things struck me.
One is, in both Indiana and Kansas, Trump's approval rating is down to 40s.
The farm crisis is a real thing.
You've got the cost of tariffs and how that has made the business life of farmers much
more difficult.
You've got the high cost of fertilizer and diesel fuel as a result of the war in Iran.
And so you've really got a lot of discontent.
And I think one of the other things that's happening is that the cultural issues, they're
there.
Republicans are using them, even though Adam Hamilton is a rather mainstream Methodist.
There's nothing radical about his theology.
They're attacking him as a woke pastor.
You know, if Republicans can't run against a Democrat as anti-religious, they're going
to make him a heretic.
But I think what's really interesting is, if the Democrats are ever going to have a
chance to. To build a durable and substantial enough majority to govern, to pass some of the stuff
they want, they're going to have to end their isolation in the plain states, in the
rural states.
And if they can have breakthroughs in places like Kansas and Iowa nearby, that's going
to be a big deal.
And then the question is, are we in some kind of realignment?
I have an intimation, which I don't fully trust since my intimations have not always
been right.
But an intimation that this era is really at an end, that Trump's behavior in the last
two years has really thrown everything open again.
And I think realignment in the rural states and the plain states would be a sign of a
larger realignment in the country.
Tim?
I think the realignments that have been going on over the last 30 years that Trump accelerated,
there's two sides to look at it.
One is the. upper middle class suburban vote.
So in Kansas, this would be Johnson County.
Right.
Those folks moving from solid Republican, when the country club used to be Republican,
to Democrat.
And then the blue collar working class vote moving from Democrat to Republican.
Those are the main realignments.
The problem for Republicans is, so not so much in Kansas, but you go to other parts of the
upper Midwest, these states that Trump won twice, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan,
how he dominated in Ohio.
A lot of those voters who are showing up for Trump aren't becoming Republicans.
They're just Trump voters.
Remember Sean Trendy after the 2012 Democrats won.
He said the missing white voter.
These guys, they showed up for Ross Perot.
And then they didn't show up again.
Well, guess what?
They showed up for Trump.
When Trump's off the ballot, I don't think they are going to show up.
So that is part of the Great Plains.
But I think that's a bigger problem for Republicans.
Why Democrats look like they're probably going to win.
Sherrod?
Brown is going to win that Senate seat in Ohio.
Why places like Michigan, even with a flawed candidate, Democrats are likely to win that
is because that some portion of that working class voter, and this isn't the religious
right.
These are working class, sort of disaffected, disaffiliated, deinstitutionalized voters.
They're not going to show up when Trump's gone.
So that, I think, is a big realignment.
I do not think Democrats or liberals are going to get the realignment they're hoping for
in some of the what's the matter with Kansas story from the last 20, 30 years of, oh, well,
maybe a lot of.
The religious voters will come over to our side.
I think they're put off by Trump's self-dealing and lack of morality.
But I think that that is a pipe dream.
If Dems think they're going to pick up a lot of the church going white vote.
I broadly agree with a lot of what you said, but I think there are a couple of fundamental
things that are happening.
First, it's very important.
You raise this conversion of middle class, upper middle class, suburban voters to the
Democrats.
I think that's a problem.
That's a.
Deep problem that I don't know how Republicans solve in the long run, unless the Democrats
go as far left as Republicans say they are.
But I don't think they're going there.
But on the working class, cultural politics works when economic issues either kind of
reinforce that, that the Trump realignment is anger over culture, but also anger over
economics.
I think the big Trump problem is that he's thrown.
Away a lot of the advantage he had with working class voters on economic issues because he
really hasn't done anything for them.
In fact, if anything, their situation is is at best the same and probably worse than it
was.
And I think there's a kind of alienation there.
Doesn't mean they're all going to run and embrace Democrats.
But I think this year it's a problem for turnout.
Yeah.
And not just among the Trump voters who only vote in presidential.
So I think a larger turnout problem.
But I think it also.
It also puts them up for grabs in a way they haven't been for about 10 years.
And I think there's a lesson here that Democrats could learn from you were talking about the
farm problem that so many times when Democrats say, well, these working class or poor people
in the in the foothills of Kentucky, why don't they support us?
We're the ones who are giving them all these government benefits and Republicans are pulling
it back.
I think in Washington, it's easy to miss how unsatisfying that is.
Oh, we're going to outlaw your job working in a coal mine, but we're going to give you
more government benefits.
That's never worked for the Democrats.
But that's exactly what Trump is trying today.
Oh, we're going to we're going to mess up your ability to sell your crops, but we'll make
it up for you with big checks.
Yes, you can get people to line up behind you on stage and support that.
But that's ultimately unsatisfying.
So the irony is Trump is playing what I've often seen as Democratic politics is government's
going to get in your way and then try to make it up to you with a check.
Fact check.
Those mines largely went away, as you know, from technological change.
Well, because of fracking.
Yes.
Yes.
And but the other thing is.
Because, yes, I think people, if you give them a choice, want a job rather than a government
benefit.
That's clearly the case.
And I think the language Democrats are using now reflects that a lot more.
But I also think on health care in particular, those voters are very aware that they may
not like Obamacare when it's called Obamacare, but they know that the Affordable Care Act
and Medicaid are central to their ability to survive.
And I think one of the interesting things about this election is whether those issues,
will stick.
One of the reasons Andy Beshear got elected and reelected was some backlash on on against
Republicans who want to cut those benefits.
So, yeah, a job is better than government benefits.
But some government benefits are really important to these voters.
I have a question about two states in the in the region we're talking about broadly,
Ohio and and Iowa.
I kind of understand how the Democrats.
Lost Ohio, I thought I think I do, having seen the the destroyed industrials system
of that of that state and the decline of union power and whatever else I don't understand
how Iowa became so far out of reach for the Democrats, the state that used to send Tom
Harkin and John Culver to the to the Senate.
Is there an Iowa I'm missing here, EJ?
What?
First, they do have some things importantly in common that explain why they lost Ohio.
It explains both big realignments away from the Democrats.
We think of Ohio in terms of Youngstown and all those industrial jobs.
But there are parts of Iowa, places in Iowa, Waterloo, Dubuque, Clinton, Ottumwa, a place
like that where they suffered some of the same decline in industrial kind of jobs.
So there's something in common there.
There's also something in common in the fact that both have a high number of white voters
without college.
degrees and those voters have been a big
realigning force in favor of the Republican Party. But I think in Iowa, you have a couple
of other things that are going on. Rural areas are even more important. Des Moines is an important
metro, but it's not, it doesn't compare with Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus. And so it's a
more rural state. Rural polarization has been a real deal in the last 10 or 15 years. And I'm
stealing in a way from Tim's work in this area. So I will kick it over to Tim to pick it up from
there. Well, so there's a big thing. One, Barack Obama in 2008, when he was running, famously was
asked why he has trouble with sort of the working class rural voter. And he says, well, these people,
they're clinging to their guns and their Bibles a little bit bitterly. I'm not quoting him precisely,
but clinging, bitter, guns, Bibles were part of that. That reflected a sort of a disdain from the
Democratic elite.
Towards people who want to live a lifestyle that's not shared by part of the Democratic elite.
And just for the evangelical vote, which is, I divide into two different camps,
the evangelicals who go to church and the evangelicals who don't.
That's really important.
That latter camp, that's the Trump core. But then the conservative, the people who voted for Ted
Cruz, those are the evangelicals who go to church. You know, Cruz tied Trump in the 2016 Iowa caucuses.
And it really showed that.
You beat him, actually.
Yes. And it really showed that these were sort of two different conservative bases. So a sort of
disaffected, alienated populist base and what we traditionally call the religious right. And that
religious right is just harder for the Democrats to reach when you've got the national party. I
mean, the Biden administration and Biden wasn't some crazy culture warrior. They changed documents
to say chest feeding and birthing people instead of breastfeeding.
I mean, if you're a conservative, you've got to be a conservative, you've got to be a conservative,
you've got to be a conservative, you've got to be a conservative, you've got to be a conservative.
That's going to turn off people who, you know, are just regular church going people in the middle
of America who might not even be 100 percent pro-life. They might not even care so much about
the cultural issues. They just want somebody who seems sort of normal. And I think that is part of
Iowa. And if Democrats want to win that place back, you know, they're going to run candidates
in those places who are more moderate. Can those people distance themselves from the national
leadership or can the national leadership and the Democratic Party?
Dial down the culture warring.
I always thought there was a terrible irony about that Obama comment, because I don't think any
Democrat has given as comprehensive a speech about religion that showed enormous respect
for religious people and actually called out liberals for disrespecting religious people
than Barack Obama. His is famous for those of us who followed it. His 2006 call to renewal speech,
which a lot of my conservative religious friends,
read that speech and say, hey, that's really good. And Obama in 2008 actually bumped up his share
of the white evangelical vote a little bit. He still lost it like Democrats do.
But it was he made a breakthrough there. But that comment and the the sense that,
you know, is the alienation between these two constituencies is kind of a push pull thing,
because for an awful lot of liberals, including some religious liberals, the dominance of the
of a hard religious right on the conservative on the conservative religious side has really turned
off a lot of people. You wonder, are those struggles going to abate a bit going forward?
You've got Democrats and again, Republicans are trying to say they're not real Christians,
but you've got a lot of Democrats running this year, Hamilton and Kansas, notably,
you know, who themselves are genuinely religious. I visited his, you know, his effectively a
megachurch. And boy, did this look like any other megachurch that I have seen a lot of Jesus,
a lot of the Lord's prayer, as well as some social justice talk. I don't know if this is going to
abate soon, but I'm wondering if the ice is melting at least a little bit.
I mean, what I've seen in the church across the country is mainline and left of center churches
are shrinking. Well, the ones that are growing are going to be ones that are more conservative.
Let's move on to the media. Something very remarkable has happened. It happened when
the credentials were pulled for CNN, MSNOW and Politico. They were banned from the White House
and the media backed them up.
And there was a lawsuit and the media carried the day. A federal district court judge said
those credentials were improperly lifted. How big a deal was this that the big media acted
in concert? It was an overreach. Trump shouldn't have done this. He made it clear in his own
comments. This is one of the things I would hate to be Donald Trump's lawyer because some people
are like, it's national security. He's like, no, it's because they're horrible and they attack me
too much, basically.
And so that silliness made it easy for a Trump appointed judge, Timothy J. Kelly, to say, no,
you're not allowed to pull their credentials for the content of what they report. Not to say that
the White House doesn't have control over, but this is an inappropriate restriction on free
press. And I do think the uniformity of the press is good and interesting. And I'm going to praise
Fox News for getting on board with this, especially because I remember a few years
ago when you had people on CNN who were trying to sort of de-platform Fox News, saying, well,
they were basically lobbying Oliver Darcy, who's a very successful media reporter, but he thought
that the January 6th attacks had meant that Fox News had gone too far and they were trying to get
cable carriers to drop Fox. So you didn't have the uniformity there. And to go back in history,
Obama sent out some of his surrogates in 2009, including Rahm Emanuel, to say Fox is not a news
outlet. It's just an opinion outlet. And this was to set the stage. But they didn't throw them out
of the White House. They started to. They started to. They said a Treasury briefing. They said we're
not going to allow them. And at that point, again, all of the media lined up behind Fox and said,
no, you can't kick us out. So there is precedent to this media uniformity standing up against the
White House when they do this. Just on the history there. First, nothing like what Trump did has
either in a Republican or a Democratic administration. This wholesale, all three of
these, you know, MSNOW, CNN and Politico, you're out. In the Obama case, yes, there was one briefing
by a Treasury official where Fox was left off the list. The Obama people say, you know, they didn't
ask to be invited. But as soon as they heard from the other networks, they put them back in. But
they never banned Fox News from the White House like this. So I think it's this is really a case,
pardon me, for a false equivalence. I'm not saying what Trump did with comparing with what any other
administration did before. I am really interested in the fact that Trump seems to be weakening and
people seem to be more willing to stand up to him strongly. I don't think there was the same
kind of response when the AP was, of course, banned because it wouldn't use the Gulf of America.
Instead of the Gulf of Mexico at the beginning of his administration, you didn't see this kind
of solidarity. No, we are not going to let the administration intimidate us with universities
or lawyers early on. And the fact that at this moment, the networks immediately, I mean,
there was really very little pause. And I agree, it's important that Fox News joined this
effort. But you see them all pushing back because this is so outrageous.
And a footnote here, this is Iowa Day on our conversation. Trump sued the Des Moines Register
because of their poll in 2024 showing that Trump was in trouble in this state. It turned out he
wasn't. And Lord knows if we got sued for poll mistakes, the courts would be tied up forever.
A judge threw that out on Wednesday, which is a good thing. But think about the intimidation,
the president himself suing.
About a poll, basically to push back against the Des Moines Register.
Speaking as someone who's a fierce defender of the media, I don't have the optimism you do that
there's a positive change here. First of all, I think the press has been pretty consistent.
You remember it was earlier in this term that the Pentagon issued its rules. And there you had,
again, instant, immediate people saying, we're not going to follow these rules,
including my colleagues at the Washington Examiner. There wasn't much of a debate about it.
What I think the underlying problem here is that the public's distrust of our industry
on both the left and the right public has been growing. The public more and more is having
trouble trusting us as the authority that they did in the past. So that's where I don't share
your optimism. I would like to think that the administration and the next administration won't
try to attack the press in this way. I don't think any administration is going to do what Trump did.
I think that I'm not going to report here because I don't see any evidence yet that the public
is swinging back massively toward the media.
But I do think this administration, because of some of the corruption issues that have
been raised and other things that people wanted to know about the botching of the planning
for this war in Iran, I think there is, you know, whereas before the sort of general I
don't like the media sentiment, you know, prevailed or Trump could use it.
I think he can use that less and less because the media is reporting stuff that people want
to know about the administration's failures.
I guess the question here is, is it the behavior of the media that stands out or is the offense
so egregious that it doesn't require enormous courage for the for the media to protest?
I agree with E.J.
I was not trying to state an equivalence, but to say there it was more of a difference
in degree what Trump did than what Obama did.
But that's not.
That's not to say it's a small degree.
It is a large difference of degree.
I called it the reluctant centrality of the media because I think people in the news
business generally want to cover the news.
Most of them don't want to cover the people who cover the news.
A hundred percent.
And you know what?
I mean, I've heard from a lot of progressives and Democrats that, you know, Trump doesn't
want us talking about tariffs.
He doesn't want us talking about Iran.
He doesn't want us talking about prices.
And, you know, let's attack the media because it will get.
Time in on the media sort of pushing aside those stories.
I have no idea if this is intentional with Donald Trump.
It could just be he was really mad.
Someday there's talk that he just saw some clips and decided, I think it's but it does
have that effect.
I think what you're saying is truer than you're even stating it.
And over the years, his counterpart has not been Hillary or Biden or Kamala so much as
it's been the news media.
And when I go around the country and talk to the people we were talking about earlier,
working class, middle America, white voters, and I say, what has he delivered for you?
A lot of it comes down to, well, he stood up against the the people who don't like us.
And so that meme online that Trump posted of Trump punching CNN in the head.
Remember, this is this ridiculous video repurposing one of his WWF appearances.
And to some extent, that's what he sees his job as doing.
Yeah.
Less than governing, it's attacking, it's punching CNN in the face.
I'm going to take us to consideration of the future for a few minutes now.
I remember years ago, Theodore White wrote the famous Making of the President book, starting
with the 1960 election, right up until the 1980 election.
I remember him once saying that after the midterms before a presidential election, the
hands are dealt.
That's what he would make of the of the coming midterms.
And that's what he would make of the midterm election, pursuing that, that image, who stands
to come out of the midterms with a strong hand for 2028, whose hand might be weakened
by whatever the result could be.
I think that Trump has left the most wide open Republican field in some ways than ever
before.
And I don't just mean politically.
I mean, ideologically, the debate is going to, there, there was a consensus in the Republican
Party that lasted extraordinarily long.
It was basically still the Ronald Reagan consensus in the 2012 election.
The Republicans in that primary were fighting over being Reagan's heir.
And then Trump came in and he blew it all up.
What, what conservatism came to fill that gap?
Nothing coherent.
It was a cult of personality.
So now that he's leaving, before we even look at who the candidates are, I think it's a
really exciting time to be a conservative and to debate over what conservatism means.
Because it can't mean the same thing in 2026 that it meant in 1984.
So then on the personalities, I think the shellacking that all three of us expect Republicans
to take, I think that's got to hurt J.D.
Vance, because I think it has to highlight how closeness to Trump is a negative.
Despite all of those stories by the hostile, evil press that seem to draw some, some distance
between Vance and, uh, and, and the policies of his boss.
I, I think Vance just simply cannot criticize Trump because you might be surprised to hear
this.
Trump doesn't have a deep loyalty to anybody and that he will get thoroughly stabbed.
J.D.
Will, if he criticizes Donald and that the, some of these guys who have some distance,
even Marco Rubio serving in the Trump administration, I think he can run and try to stay silent
on Trump in the way that say, I think of Glenn Youngkin winning in Virginia with that sort
of thing.
Does Marco get to keep?
Venezuela was, it was a, it was a big win.
Marco gets to keep all his jobs, I think.
But the, uh, I, I, there are conservatives who say there needs to be somebody not attached
to Trump because of Trump's sort of drag on the party.
I just think the, the only guy who's really going to suffer from this is going to be J.D.
Vance.
You know, I, I was, when I was in Indiana, I, I ran into a lot of wonderful local Republican
politicians.
And one of the things I sense is.
And these, these aren't liberals or traditional moderates are pretty conservative, but there
is an exhaustion among them too.
Um, you know, in one case, at least, you know, he wasn't averse to Democrats winning because
he wants the party to be shaken up, uh, wants to move forward.
And so sometimes I think that we in the media and, uh, and, um, you know, and, and people
who analyze politics for a living make things more ideological than they actually are.
For people on the ground for workaday politicians, I say that with respect, you know, I think
that's true.
When we talk about the left of the democratic party, I think there's truth to that, uh,
for the right of the Republican party.
And I think there are a Republicans out there who simply want something that looks more
normal, uh, than any, which would be anything more normal than this.
Exactly.
And that, um, you know, uh, the, the world being what it is, we will have some ideological
fighting.
the Republican Party among, you know, obviously identifiable camps, you know, the complicated
Trump camp, conservative nationalism, sort of the Reagan comeback camp. Can there be a new
Reagan conservatism, a more ideological camp? Most moderate Republicans are now Democrats,
so you won't really have that camp. But I think there will be a call for somebody not on our
lists yet, or, you know, some of the people that Tim named, because I just think there were
Republicans who say, gosh, it would be nice to have normal politics again. But let me, Tim, let me ask
you, and what you're saying is that there really isn't, there's Donald Trump, but there really
isn't, in MAGA, a Trumpism that can be defined. I would think there is this aggressive anti-immigrant
policy, and there is the
tariff, the approach to tariffs is the most important instrument of economic policy.
Those are real approaches.
Yes, but part of the way I look at what, why Trump was able to take over the Republican Party is that,
again, go back to 2015. Both parties before that point, on the question of sort of nationalism
versus internationalism, the elites of both parties were internationalists. They were pretty
interventionists.
I mean, you had the Iraq war, you go back, Bosnia, H.W., Barack Obama did his Libya war,
interventionists on war. Pretty basically free trade, and pretty close to, not open borders,
but let's get a lot of immigrants in here while enforcing the law. And I think a huge swath of
the public was not aligned with the elites of either party. Huge swath of the public thought
there was too much immigration, was skeptical of free trade, and was very skeptical of this sort of
humanitarian interventionism that we were doing. And Trump was the only guy who would stand up on
either stage and be a nationalist. And then the Biden administration comes in and does basically
an open borders experiment, and the Democrats have learned from that. So I think actually both
parties on immigration are going to be a lot more restrictionist than the Democrats were recently,
or than either party was in the past. So I do agree that the,
to the degree that MAGA is a coherent policy, it's be a little more nationalists at least,
especially on immigration, and be a lot less internationalists.
Here's the problem for MAGA. One, tariffs, the way Trump did them, are discredited. I know
Democrats, you know, and I grew up in a mill town, where I grew up, protectionism was not a bad word.
So there was a constituency for tariffs, and there still is to some degree. But tariffs,
the way Trump has done them, he is utterly discredited.
He has discredited this, and many, many Republican constituencies, particularly farmers,
a lot, large parts of business, really don't like tariffs. Immigration, he has spoiled it. I think
that, yes, people wanted the border tightened up. They did not want these inhumane roundups that are
taking citizens, uncitizens, legal, you know, people, you know, people who are here illegally,
but have broken no laws, that people don't like this. So he has taken two of the biggest
MAGA issues off the table. And then there's a third, which is non-interventionism. No wars in
the Middle East, and here we are in Iran. So you wonder what is left of this. You know, this MAGA
flag is in tatters.
Can you have a Trumpism without Trump? And I think J.D. Vance is the one who's trying to say we're going to re-industrialize. And this is a real popular message. If you can go to Pennsylvania where 50 years ago guys were living the good life, working at these steel mills and say, we're going to rebuild these steel mills, that would be a massive winner. You know, my understanding of economics is such that you can't do that.
And Trump's terrorists haven't done what they were supposed to in this respect.
They weren't even targeted to do that. They were targeted to bring people to the table because his favorite thing to do is negotiate and demand things from his counterparty.
But so I think J.D. Vance will try to make an ideologically coherent re-industrialization nationalism. Can he pull that off and make it coherent is one question. Will that be a political winner is another. I don't have your answer.
Well, on that note, it's.
Time for the well, the way the way we end all of these conversations, which is for each of us to recall some recent source of joy in their lives.
I'm not a big fan of the Kansas City Chiefs. To some extent, they're becoming the new Patriots for me, which is the titan we all have to root against.
I am an ardent. I knew we disagreed on this. I'm a Patriots fan.
But when Travis Kelsey scored his first touchdown of the season to see his wife.
Much more successful as as a as an artist, as a as a businesswoman to see her be filled with wifely pride and point at her ring and say, that's my husband.
This was an amazingly wholesome moment where she has her slightly underachieving husband compared to her.
But yet his success, his touchdown was her touchdown. This is a great, wholesome understanding of marriage where there is no his and hers. Everything is joined in one.
God, Tim is marriage.
Counselor, I can say being in the greater Kansas City area, boy, did I fully understand why they call it a kingdom.
I saw more more more of my home shirts than I'll ever see in my life.
You know, a lot of times when we do joy, it's about a nonpolitical public things and not our jobs.
But the last week for me, it is about what the blessing of what I get to do.
And I just want to talk very briefly about my visit to Madison, Indiana, this town in southern Indiana.
You know, I was invited by a group called Capital, which does a lot of work on building community and on loneliness and social isolation.
And I got to meet just extraordinary people in this town who are involved in voluntary efforts across the board.
You know, try taking formerly incarcerated people, getting them jobs, helping isolated elderly people, coaches, school teachers.
And you felt like, you know, Madison is not a perfect town.
And there was great acknowledgement of the problems they had not solved.
But A, to see those people doing their work and B, to have work myself where you get a chance to explore places you've never been and meet people who can teach you stuff.
That's a real source of joy.
You're here.
I have to say I on Monday night, I was I was fully hoping to be able to report the joy that I would experience in watching the New York Giants.
I mean, play a creditable game against a really good team, Los Angeles.
I'm sorry, Robert.
With their very good young quarterback.
And instead, by by halftime, he and his best receiver were both injured.
They were down a couple of touchdowns.
There would be no joy there.
So I'm I'm reduced to a pretty ample joy that had preceded that on Monday evening, which was breaking the Yom Kippur fast with my congregation and feeling a sense of spiritual cleansing.
That.
Comes for me every year around around the Day of Atonement.
That was a source of joy.
Amen.
Amen.
Tim Carney, E.J. Dionne.
Thank you both very much.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
© transcript Emily Beynon
Podcast Summary Short Detailed
Key Points: Trump's declining approval ratings in key rural states like Kansas and Indiana signal growing discontent among working-class and farm communities due to economic pressures like tariffs and fuel costs. Democratic prospects in the Midwest—especially in Kansas and Iowa—are gaining traction as a result of cultural and economic realignments, including disaffiliated working-class voters who feel alienated by Trump’s policies. The Republican Party is experiencing deep ideological fragmentation after Trump’s presidency, with no coherent alternative to his "MAGA" platform, particularly on immigration, tariffs, and foreign policy. A significant shift in media behavior occurred when major outlets challenged the White House’s attempt to revoke their credentials, demonstrating increased resistance to political intimidation and a growing media uniformity in defending press freedom. Rural voters, especially white, non-college-educated populations, remain pivotal in political realignment, but are increasingly drawn to moderate, non-cult-of-personality candidates who project normalcy and economic pragmatism. Democrats may win key races not because of a surge in religious voters, but due to their ability to address economic anxieties, such as job security and agricultural hardship, while avoiding overt cultural confrontation. The post-Trump political landscape offers unprecedented opportunity for conservative debate, with potential for a new, ideologically grounded conservatism focused on re-industrialization and national sovereignty. Media skepticism and public distrust of journalism persist, even as institutional resistance to political pressure strengthens, suggesting that trust in the press remains fragile despite recent standoffs. Summary: The upcoming midterms present a pivotal moment for American politics, particularly in the rural and midwestern states, where economic hardship, cultural alienation, and political fatigue are reshaping voter behavior. Trump’s declining popularity in traditionally Republican areas like Kansas and Indiana reflects widespread dissatisfaction with his economic policies—especially tariffs and farm-related costs—while also highlighting the failure of his cultural messaging to resonate with disaffected working-class voters. J.
Dionne and Tim Carney observe a deepening realignment where rural white, non-college-educated voters are shifting from conservative to Democratic support, not due to ideological conversion, but because of economic grievances and a desire for more moderate, trustworthy leadership. The Republican Party now lacks a unifying ideology, with Trump’s legacy discrediting key MAGA pillars like protectionist trade and aggressive immigration policy. Meanwhile, media resistance to executive overreach—most notably the backlash against the White House’s credential revocation—demonstrates a growing, though fragile, consensus on press freedom.
The future of conservative politics may lie in a new, pragmatic nationalism focused on re-industrialization and economic stability, rather than personality-driven populism. While Democrats stand to gain ground in key battlegrounds, their success depends on addressing economic realities rather than cultural battles. Ultimately, the midterms signal not just a shift in electoral outcomes but a broader realignment in how voters perceive governance, with trust in institutions and economic fairness emerging as central issues.
FAQs What factors are contributing to potential Democratic gains in rural and midwestern states like Kansas and Iowa? › Farm crises, high costs of fertilizer and diesel, and economic dissatisfaction from tariffs are key drivers. Additionally, working-class voters are disaffected by Trump's lack of economic progress, and a shift in cultural politics is making moderate, religious candidates like Adam Hamilton more appealing.
How has Trump's political behavior affected the Republican Party's ideological direction? › Trump's tenure disrupted the long-standing Republican consensus, replacing it with a cult of personality. This has left a vacuum where the party now faces a redefinition of conservatism, with debates emerging around nationalism, tariffs, and non-interventionism.
Is there a realignment happening in the rural and plain states, and what does it mean for future elections? › Yes, there are signs of realignment, especially in states like Kansas and Iowa, where Democratic candidates are gaining ground. This could signal a broader shift in rural voter behavior, potentially reshaping the balance of power in future elections.
Why are working-class voters disengaged from Trump and more open to Democratic candidates? › These voters feel alienated by Trump's failure to deliver on economic promises, such as farm support or job creation. They also value stability and are less concerned with cultural issues, making them more receptive to moderate, non-polarizing candidates.
What role does media behavior play in the current political climate? › The media has shown increasing unity in resisting executive intimidation, such as when credentials were pulled by the White House. This reflects a broader trend of media independence, though public trust in the press remains low on both sides.
Can Trumpism survive without Donald Trump in the political landscape? › No, Trumpism is fragmented and discredited on key issues like tariffs and immigration. While nationalist themes remain, Trump's specific policies have damaged credibility, making a sustainable, coherent alternative difficult for future candidates.