The Future of Palestine: A Conversation With Salam Fayyad

I'm Dan Kurtz-Falen and this is the Foreign Affairs interview. What is amazing to me is that amidst this state of marginalization that has taken place ever since late February when the Iran War started, is basically people lost sighted seems to me of the human condition in Gaza. A lot of how you deal about what needs to happen first whether it's Hamas, this arming or that this arming is growing up with growing but what about that immediately needed intervention to begin to introduce improvements in the livelihood of people. So that to me is really catastrophic. In the nine months since a ceasefire ended full on war in Gaza, the world's attention has in many ways moved on that has been especially true since February with a start of a war elsewhere in the Middle East. But the situation in Gaza remains grim and unsettled and the situation in the West Bank has become increasingly fraught. Meanwhile the way forward for Palestinian politics remains murky while the prospect of any durable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems more remote than ever. Salam Fayaud served as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority from 2007 to 2013 after a long career at the International Monetary Fund. Fayaud is still considered a many capitals including Washington, one of the most effective Palestinian leaders of recent decades, and he has in the past few years laid out a series of proposals including in the pages of foreign affairs, for building a Palestinian state, delivering humane and effective governance in Gaza, and finding a viable way forward for the Palestinian cause. I spoke with Fayaud on July 15th at the Aspen Security Forum. Before we get started, a reminder for any listeners who are not yet subscribers to foreign affairs. For one more week, take advantage of our special promotion. New subscribers can save $10 on an annual subscription, which gets you our bi-monthly print issues, daily essays on our website, our newsletters, and more. Through the end of July, head to foreignafairs.com/july to claim your offer. Again, that's foreignafairs.com/july. Salam, thank you for doing this. You've laid out on our pages on a couple of occasions, your vision and your strategy for Palestine leadership, for Gaza, for the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, but it's been a couple years, and a lot has happened since then, so it's wonderful to have the chance to talk to you. It's almost astonishing how much the Palestinian issue, whether Gaza or the West Bank or the future of the Palestinian movement more broadly, has fallen out of the global discussion since the Gaza ceasefire last year, and especially since the start of the war in Iran and February. So I thought it would be useful to start by hearing your basic explanation, your understanding of where we are. Let's start with Gaza and go back to the ceasefire. What has happened in Gaza since and where does the situation stand now as you see it? A lot has happened by way of getting ready to do something about Gaza, beginning with the ceasefire, which was of course a big deal when it happened, after so many attempts at trying to get there. To find out what the point to have you had the ceasefire was important in the North of itself. Then of course, both the peace came into a picture and the Trump's plan and the security council resolution that enshrined that, and there was a lot of activity, and then of course the Iran war happened, and when that happened that produced a situation where the entire Palestinian issue including Gaza was shoved to the side, and not much on it, you leave through the papers and then I say it's rarely the case. After many, many months of Gaza being in the news headlines and all, it very shortly completely disappeared. Things didn't quite work out the way the plan, Trump plan was promoted as intended to accomplish, and that was even before the war. Some difficulties actually were encountered because going back to the days when the deal was struck, it was obvious that the parties, namely Hamas and Israel, were not really on board with everything that was expected of them. Hamas, for example, question of this armament, Israel's question of withdrawal and all of that. But if you look at the situation since then, Israel's raids never stopped. More than 1,000 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire went into effect. Whereas like a full-scale war in the way that was taking place in Gaza, before this ceasefire kind of stopped, nevertheless, violence still there, and a lot of people continue to do life there, every day. So you have that going on, not much happened by way of improving or beginning to improve on the livelihood of the people, the human condition Gaza, where a lot of people remain without shelter, not to mention food, water, electricity, basic necessities. And what is amazing to me is that amidst this state of marginalization that has taken place ever since late February when the Iran war started, is basically people lost sight, it seems to me, of the human condition in Gaza. A lot of howgel about what needs to happen first, whether it's Hamas, this armament, or this armament, Israel was drawing up the drawing, but what about that immediately needed intervention to begin to introduce improvements in the livelihood of people. So that, to me, is really catastrophic. I mean, that's something that needs to be addressed very quickly. So marginalization, yes, pretty much as the situation in the West Bank was marginalized, by what was going on in Gaza, long before the US, Israel, Iran war started in late February. So a lot of bad things happening in the West Bank, and that was not really getting coverage obviously because of the depth of the crisis in Gaza and how more seriously it was, but of course, what was happening was bang. Not only was it very destructive in terms of daily lives of Palestinians who resigned in West Bank, but in terms of the longer term prospects of ever really getting to a situation where Palestinians can at long last live as three people in the country of their own. And when you look at the de facto annexation that has taken place settlement activity, new settlements built, roads constructed, infrastructure, no taboo in the West Bank, by government, there is absolutely clear on its intent, either you comply fully with what they expect to do as a Palestinian, or you have no place in that area, leave or die. So that literally is rhetoric that some Israeli officials on the current government have been using. Do you understand the escalation in settler violence as part of a more or less coordinated drive to get Palestinians out of the West Bank? How do you see that as part of this picture? You know, I was in government, it was started to read this on the head. I mean, there's a lot of hatred there in those acts of violence, and I think I was first to call them acts of terror. And some Israeli officials actually followed suit that was back in, I believe, 2009, 2010, something like that. When like settler started to torch, for example, places of worship, mosques and what have you, burning olive trees and whatnot, and attacking Palestinians, the scale has gone up dramatically over the years, and particularly under the current government. It is almost like a, by definition, the case that this is policy, it seems to me, because settlers do what they do, your, these violent ones, extremists. They're doing what they do with full protection with real army. I mean, there's no question about that. And as I know how to stop these acts of terror, if it really actually wants to. So if that continues to go unabated, that cannot but lead onto the conclusion that it's happening because it represents policy. It is intended to drive Palestinians away from their land, as had happened in many areas in Jordan Valley, in the north and west bank, and all of that. If you have similar situation going on in southern west bank, the Hebron area. So when you listen to what Israel officials are saying about their own vision for future Israel, I will not have you. And see what's happening on the ground. How can you not conclude? But that it's really policy. And it's really all ascribed to settlers who have the stand in the seas full of hate and all of that wanting to see the Palestinians clear the lands for them to take it over. This settler terrorist, as far as fact, is in fact being condoned by Israel's government. It's intended to intimidate and it has taken the form now going beyond, you know, torching places of worship and olive trees and what have you to attacking people and killing them. And all of this goes on with infinity, unfortunately. Trump's leverage, Donald Trump's leverage was a critical factor, if not the critical factor in getting to the ceasefire last October, I believe. Yes, it's really October. It does not seem that Trump has used much leverage or has officially used much leverage since then. Is that impression correct? And you would like the US to do more. How should it be using our leverage? President Trump has demonstrated that he actually can get Israel to do things if he thought they were important enough at certain points in time. There are many examples of this as of fact going back to the first time when the US in June of last year had the Iranian Salish and the message back and forth between Israel and Iran and you know famously when he said just carry it out and in ways that you know, at least publicly. This is the 12-day war. Yes, in a way that we at least publicly are not used to seeing US President act like. There's no question moment that confrontations took place and previous administrations, presidents were frustrated with Israeli actions here and there. But I don't recall ever having seen anything clear out publicly in the way that it did since Trump came on the scene. He used that clearly to bring about the ceasefire, something which if you look at the deal, it's actually virtually identical to the plan that the former president Biden actually wrote the same one. The France was Trump's intervention that made it possible. Since then, you know, now and then President Trump showed signs of being able to influence Israeli actions using a lot of public diplomacy, if you will, the statements, tweets or what have you, things that you'd issue and say all suggested to me of his ability to actually make this France and do things that are going. The extent to which that can happen, I think, is related to two things. One, whether or not he's of a certain view that time has come for this issue to be resolved and getting there for behavior to begin to change in a way that is actually conducive to their change they can place. And secondly, the speed with which he can get out of, you know, the aftermath of the Iran war, the start that he started in the January in the February. So these two things we'll see. How do you understand the current status of Hamas? It has been Israel has gone very aggressively after anyone involved in planning the October 7th attacks, but full disarmament hasn't happened. You know, Hamas still seems to be one of the most important authorities and the half of Gaza that is not under Israeli occupation at that point. What do you understand about where Hamas doesn't have a mass sees its own place at this point? You know, looking at it from afar, I mean, obviously I'm not close to what's going on and all reporting and what have you reading between the lines, sometimes reading the lines themselves. It was always clear to me that you know, Hamas was not really on board. They were kind of casualed into through the mediators, you know, tear-cricketer others each up to course to move in the direction of accepting the Trump plan as a species of moving forward. And they have several concerns giving up governance in Gaza. Now, on the question of governance in Gaza to an un-Hamas entity, at least as a matter of statements and publicly made by Hamas officials, they all along since the early days of war expressed willingness to surrender governance in Gaza. Governance is a big word and it includes among other things security and certainly arms. So if they were willing to give up governance to an un-Hamas entity or an un-Hamas to an un-Hamas controlled entity, I'm not sure the extent to which they were willing to accept this argument, part of it, given the extent to which that is linked very much as a matter of constitution to who they are as an organization, their own ideology and all of that. So it was clear to me that they gradually kind of went along to make that happen. And the same thing can be said about Israel and Netanyahu and all of that. It's not that they were really keen to embrace everything that was in the plan and all of that. There was a lot of back and forth. If you recall and getting the plan kind of right enough for it to pass, but getting beyond the initial phase of saying, guess we agree. And against the backdrop of what we all know or the reluctance on the part of Hamas to kind of accept it as it was. I'm not going to say anything, but Israel here, the same can be said about Israel. These issues tend to come back to Hantyu when you put together a plan. You're keyed up and you're really focused completely on getting something over the hump. But unless you follow it up by something really concrete to kind of move forward, then those issues that in the first instance were stumbling blocks would rear their head again, back into the realm of things that actually influence the trajectory of things in the most negative ways. And that's what we are now. Hamas, of course, when they present their reaction to a plan, they don't say, you know, as a matter of constitution, we can't accept this. What they say is, you know, we have a deal to which we are a party. Yes, but the deal has not been respected by Israel continues to assassinate people. There are continues to mount trades on Gaza, the humanitarian conditions, human condition Gaza has not improved and the least. So all of these things are happening and all of that. How do you expect us to hold our end of the bargain when that's true. And I have a lot of sympathy with that. But is that really the underlying reason, whether or not moving? I think to move forward, one needs to understand, you know, where Hamas is on this issue really and try to address it. Among other things, I just mentioned to you, Hamas has said to kind of rationalize their reluctance to move forward in the question of governance. They said, we're willing to actually deal with the question of this argument. In the context of an agreed tool Palestinian authority. Now, it seems to me that that's something important, something to try to capitalize on. If you are in the realm of working in the realm of diplomacy, you're not trying to, you look for an opening like this and see, like, what do you mean by this? Is there an opening here? That part of it happens to align with something that I've advocated for myself. Since the very beginning, we were including in that piece, which you referenced at the outset and for enough years. Before we get to the Palestinian authority, the PA piece of this, I'm just, there's one other piece of Gaza governance that I'm curious to hear you take on in the ceasefire plan and in the aftermath, there's this kind of vision of, you know, technocratic, non-Amas, non-PA governance. Does that have any traction? Is that anything? To be quite honest with you, let me just, if I may, you know, go back to the genesis of this. I mean, this goes back to the very early days of the war shortly, after October 7th. First time for me to hear about something like this as a possible idea in terms of what happens posturing Gaza, post-war governance arrangement of Gaza. And the idea was precisely this to have a committee of technocrats from Gaza, civil society types, so not have you who have no people with no factual affiliation take over and become the address, political others for Gaza. Now, when I heard about this first, which was literally a few days after October 7th, no more than a week after October 7th, you know, I reacted to it in almost like a very angry way. The minute I heard about it, this was coming from Israeli officials from international wants from Americans. I first heard about it from a US official as a matter of fact. It's like asking my viewers, like, what do you think if something like this would happen? And I remember it was October in 2023 when the happened, literally a few days after October 7th, I recall reacting to it angrily. And I was asked, like, why are you reacting to it this way? I said, well, the reason for this is a simple, to me, this presumes that the author in Gaza, only the author in Gaza, Gaza will be a Hamas list or free of Hamas affluence. And that's a tall order. It's impossible to achieve. And in the process of trying to get there, tens of thousands of prisoners are going to kill. There's no question that there's no way that I can begin to see this essential blue to get to the objective of addressing, and fundamentally right where the question of post-war governance in Gaza. The other reason why I didn't think it made sense, but this is fundamentally why I thought the idea was not good idea. The other reason why is that obviously in the minds of those who are thinking about post-war governance in Gaza, they were thinking in political terms. They were thinking for an alternative political alternative to Hamas in Gaza. Now, to me, it doesn't add up. You know, committed of individuals, you put together a group of people like this. It's not by definition a political entity. It's not going to be nor is it going to be seen at the outset as a political home for people to gravitate to in Gaza. So there was a problem with it also this way, but my bigger problem with it was what I just said to you that it really presumed that Hamas was not going to be around the after in Gaza. And that assumption was through. So years later, after many rounds of negotiations that involved discussions between among Palestinian factions, Arab mediation, Egyptian mediation and not have you, people somehow gravitated back to the model of having a committee of technocrats from Gaza addressing the needs of Gaza to administer Gaza thereafter. Now, where are we on this? This goes back to October last year. The committee is still sitting in Cairo, not able to even show up in Gaza for variety of reasons. I suppose that call with the US official elicited the blueprint that you laid out in foreign affairs. And I think it was a couple of weeks after the attack. Yeah, that involved bringing in some Hamas members, you know, those who were not directly involved in in planning the October 7 attacks. It also meant changing the nature of Palestinian authority leadership. How would you update that now? Given our number. Yeah, I will. But just one last word on the question of committee unknown. When it happened after the ceasefire, I was supportive of idea because I'm a very pragmatic person. So I was supportive of it. Even if I had all of the hesitation, all that I had an alternative, which to this day, I believe is far superior to anything that has been done so far and could be the answer to the state of stalemate, if you will, that's what I'm in right now. Because looking at the situation as it stands, not wishfully, but as it stands, there's no question that the Trump plan has told for a variety of reasons. Yes, see latest version of Gulf War is effective. of the destruction, but also because of these structural issues that actually were there from the very beginning and stood in the way of smooth implementation, not that any plan can be expected to be implemented smoothly. So, yeah, past the immediate anger and being taken back by anyone thinking about the Committee of the Tacno Classic over in Gaza, I thought to myself just, why don't I just sit down and come up with an alternative? And that was basically what under the piece that you published for me in foreign affairs in late October of 2023 and the basic idea was that it's political. This is something that's been with me for a long period of time, long before the top of seven. And honestly, believe it, had we put ourselves on a path of unity before maybe October seven would never have happened? Of Palestine, you knew? Yeah, and to this day, I believe, unless that's really starting point of conversation moving forward for us Palestinians, we're never going to put ourselves on a path of empowerment that actually is built on the idea of assuming full agency in the act of our liberation. That's key to me. And I thought, okay, here we are, what has just begun? How can we really do something that could bring this work to an end quickly before a lot of people are killed and all of that? We do the thing that's really overdone. Unified Palestinian, uh, polity, which came fractured in a very, very bad way in, in mid-2007, uh, uh, upon the violent power by Hamas and Gaza, you need to find a way for political accommodation. I mean, human nature is what it is. But in the end, people need to look for ways in which, uh, there is political accommodation. That's when you can lay the foundation for a stable equilibrium. So I thought, like it or not, here we are, uh, we like other people, do nothing the same. We do not wear the same clothes. We do not think that the same thing about our cause, how's going to be resolved, what kind of ideology, what kind of organizing principles should guide us on the path of liberation, I don't know the, why should we be singled out, among all people around the world for the expectation of when it comes to something as fundamental as how we think about the way to liberation, uh, to be uniform in our own thinking in the world. Can we find the way in which somehow we can deal with this pluralism, if you will, in an effective way, something that can serve our cause and objective. And the answer to that question to me was a Palestinian authority that after years of decline in its legitimacy and standing for worthy reasons that I wanted to in that piece, among any other, many other, uh, contributions that I have made, uh, that that personality needs to be re-induced, needs to be made into something that's the product of national consensus. How do you do that? It was not a question of really picking a choosing few people from us or anything like that. It involved thinking about the entire structure of our body politic. There is the PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization. That's supposed to be home for our Palestinians. But over time it became home to, uh, uh, part of us, not, not all of us, particularly after the failure of Oslo to deliver on the promise of statehood and all of that's why. Now we cannot ignore that. I mean, it's inconvenient for, for us not to be all, uh, subscribing to the platform of the one organization that's supposed to represent all of us. It's nothing convenient. It's, it's, it's a major problem. But we need to find a way to deal with it. And, and my suggestion was to try to actually make it inclusive. Find a way to really make it home for everybody again. Uh, and, and this involved, uh, coming up with ideas about, uh, bringing all people around the table at the level of the PLO, not the Palestinian Authority. There is a distinction. Personal authorities are entities that came into being as a product of the Oslo courts back in 1994. That's when it was created. But the PLO predated it. PLO is, uh, the umbrella organization for all of us. But it seems to be home for the majority of us and progressively so since late, uh, with 90s when, when Oslo failed to deliver on the proper state, uh, so my proposal going back to October, actually even before I wrote for, for for, and I'm going back to 2015, a similar piece saying you, you bring Hamas to the upper, actual, the PLO, it has to be a part of this, but somehow there is a problem with platform. Hamas does not subscribe to the platform PLO and PLO president of the US and executive committee PLO as it stood did not want to alter the platform that made it possible for them to enter to the, uh, the Oslo courts and so that is this problem. And that's about equipment non-violence. What is that? It was about recognizing the right of the state to be right to exist at peace and security. And second is actually commitment to non-violence and, uh, and I think there are ways to do this. And I actually laid that out on more than one, okay, but the fun going back to the other, the fundamental approach to try to deal with this issue was to actually bring Hamas into that PLO thing and PLO is led by something called executive committee. And over going back to every 2000s, in dialogue that took place, national dialogue that took place, with, if you to find a way to Hamas to be included, you know, this goes back to the days of our left president as a rung for and the person who led the PLO's delegation to those negotiations in Cairo was none other than current president, a better self. That dialogue created something's work, unified leadership framework. What is that unified leadership framework? Unified leadership framework is the executive committee of the PLO as it exists today, as it existed then, as it continues to exist today. Plus, the secretary's general of the factions that are not included in the PLO since kind of broader umbrella. So the idea was to activate something that I did not invent myself. It was always there to dust it off and activate it and we get it to do something meaningful. What is the main mission? What is the main test of this money in the piece that I actually wrote for planar faith? To consent to a government that's not factional, to run Gaza and West Bank for transitional periods, length of which to be agreed in negotiations and to get on with it and send the government to Gaza immediately. This government for both Gaza and West Bank is agreed to by the PLO as expanded within this unified leadership framework and this role function for that body at this at that juncture, at that point in time. All they need to do is to agree to a government of national consensus, to consent to a non-factional government, one that is not made up of Hamas or by Hamas, one that's not made up by any other faction. And to agree to it and let it run the affairs of Palestinian people both in Gaza and West Bank for transitional periods. And always to be underpinned by commitment to non-violence and with the idea. How much of a problem is President Abbas? The idea of trying to unify Palestinian unity through the PLO and then have a transitional period underpinned by commitment to non-violence and to end with national elections where you know faction of the revolunals would be allowed to compete and all of that after a period of stabilization, opening a political space and all. It's something that I personally discussed with President Abbas last time I did so I was back in 2021. So I suspect that there was not really going to be to a king all it. Events since then actually proved near right on this and as evidenced by the fact that all factions, all Palestinian factions including Fatah Hamas, they met in Beijing in July of 2024 after President then President Biden rolled out his peace plan for Gaza. They met in July. By the way that unified the leadership framework. The last time it had met was in July of 2023 right before in Al-Alamin in Egypt and it didn't do anything. They just basically issued a statement and all of that stuff. But they met again not as unified leadership framework because the President was not there. All factions met in Beijing in July 2024 and guess what? They agreed essentially to you know the ideas that I have just described to you to really get this unified leadership framework to consent to a national consensus government as you call that and they all signed off a document that said this is what we want to have them. So Hamas can really move from saying we're open to something and you know in the world the politics you know the difference between somebody says I want something to happen I'm open to something. It's a big distance between two. So they signaled willing not to be there part of an agreement that said we want to do this. So did Fatah by the way the son of that agreement all other factions. Now you ask me about President Abbas's position. All I know is that the step that needed to follow that agreement did not happen. The step that needed to follow that agreement was for the President to convene because he is the person the one person who has convening power over that unified leadership framework to convene that unified leadership framework for it to actually do that and agree to a consensus government. He did not do that. I mean that to me more than anything else regardless of statements made here and there suggest to me that he was not really for that much. By the way I can say this sadly also about some regional actors. There was not really that much enthusiasm and so the thing continued to go on and the work continued until there was a ceasefire and then we you know went back to the idea of it's there it sits there so you asked me like how do we move forward given all of what happened. You have come up with all of these ideas, there is a board of peace, there is a committee, there is a. But there is no question that the effort has stored in some way. And to move forward, just keep the committee, keep everything. But get on with this other second act, along with everything that you have done. Get on with the act of having one government, one Palestinian government that's not made up of factions for Gaza and the West Bank to begin to address the needs of people, to be the face of Palestinian people in Gaza and West Bank, to the world also, which by the way is also consistent with what is in that plan about at some point the Palestinian authority being put on a path of getting us to self-determination and all of that. After they say it's reform, that's not something I agree with, but the way, question, reform, what we really need is politically configuration in the way that I've. You think the Palestinian Authority is beyond salvation? I honestly believe. The way it's constituted politically right now is not reformable. Not that if it could really undertake reforms in the technological sense, supposed to improve financial management, for example, security management or what have you, that that is something that is. You know, not needed or anything like that. To the contrary, it is needed and something that can and should be pursued. But in the way, the Palestinian Authority is constituted right now, and it has been for quite a number of years. And I'm not actually speaking without really getting too much detail. I think that's really dead end. But beyond that, even if it's not even if the PAI did not really have these structural problems that I have in mind when it's not reformable. Even if we have to become, like, as well managed as Finland, would that really by itself be enough to make the Palestinian Authority product of national consensus, thus able to show up in Gaza? My answer is no. You know what I say? But it is quite striking that President Abbas, who is the president of Palestinian Authority, has the, you know, some degree of legitimacy that hasn't had an election in a very long time, is 91 years old, but still has that position, has not been a forceful leader for the Palestinian and national movement globally through this entire period. I mean, that just seems like a vacuum there. You know, it is in some way, and it's most regrettable. Like when you as the main address for Palestinian people, as a home for Palestinian people, you're going back to October 7th and say, "Not me, I have nothing to do, the Sats Hamas and the Sats, etc. etc." You don't really set yourself up rightly to assume leadership in the most dramatically needed way at the moment. You are the address. You should really grab that bulwadi horns and assert yourself and presence and speak for the people and then go beyond, like the complaints and all of that. I think everybody on board said, "This is what we need to do." You'd find that people would respond positively to that, but that did not happen. I mean, basically, the PA, the senator authority decided to sit this one out in some way. And that kind of created a lot of void. And that created a situation where something which President Abbas did not want to see happen. I'm sure, and PLO, the president of authority, all of the negotiations actually took place on behalf of Gaza, took place effective. The Sats Hamas, which is kind of really something, that's just not how we're supposed to be led. We're supposed to be led by a unified Palestinian politician, whether it's in Gaza or the Roosevelt or in Spain. Our national cause is about nothing short of liberation, nothing short of being able to live as free people with the country of our own. That requires that kind of leadership. That was missing. It was not exercised. And we're paying for it right now. People return to my conversation with Salam Fayoud after a short break. I wanted to zoom out before we close and just talk a bit about how we move forward on the situation more broadly. I mean, one striking feature of the international debate here has been the push for recognition and the decide to recognize the state of Palestine by, I don't know how many governments at this point are the last few years. Is that helpful, is that meaningful, is that moving forward in any way? Going back to the days when there was such a drive back in 2011 that culminated in 2012 with us being granted status of anonymous states in the United Nations. I was a historical man who was, but you were prime minister at the time. I was prime minister at the time, but I really had my doubt about the efficacy of that whole approach to getting us to what we needed to do. I was always guided by what brought us closer to rendezvous with freedom. And I was afraid that actually when we got something like this, it would look like we got something meaningful, real materially. So on the past liberation, but something that's really actually in the end would end up being worse than a placebo. And something would really make us feel accomplished in something or not. From the very beginning, and I really argued strongly when I was prime minister, I used to attend the P.L.O. executive committee meetings as an observer that we really need to rethink this whole approach. And I was not really sure that there was going to bring us closer to end of occupation, that if anything, that I thought that the reality of occupation was going to get progressively worse, following some fallagas, that's exactly what happened. That's not my attitude toward recognition of Palestinian state to general speaking. I mean, I break it down into three phases. This one is that followed the famous speech given by Oudley, the rest of Arifat in Algiers, which he declared the established one to state to Palestine back in 1988. Thereafter, a lot of countries recognized us out of sympathy with the president, and I have nothing but full appreciation for the global south, of course Arab countries, Boston countries, African countries, Latin America countries, Asian countries, they did it out of sympathy with us. And they're just not something I take lightly at war. And that was this mid phase that I just described to you in 2012. The most recent round, that is something that I really thought was the product a lot more of leaders in countries addressing their own political needs in post October 7 and all trying to placate their own domestic audiences and all. It was cynical, in some instances, most of them others. And the classic example of where I was actually totally annoyed by the way it was done was by British Prime Minister when he actually is on record, they can check me out on this and if I'm wrong, please correct me because today they are on pay and buy it. All countries Britain here as Prime Minister says, unless Israel does A, B and C, the right kingdom is going to recognize state to Palestine, making it sound like state to Palestine is punishment to Israel. And that just really unbelievably unhelpful and constructive and offensive in every way. So you have that, to tell you the truth, I'm not very happy about that. It's not that I'm opposed to any kind of recognition. Instead what I think should happen is for us to put our sense on the path of that the goal of which is to secure recognition of our right, our right to a sovereign state. On the territory of Israel occupied in 1967 and its entirety, there is a big difference between the two. The difference between saying we recognize you as a state without defining what that means. There is a big difference between that and the entire Palestinian political project being anchored on trying to secure recognition of our right, our right to a state, sovereign state on the territory of Israel occupied in 1967 and its entirety. With that actually, consider thing, the cornerstone of any meaningful political process going forward. Now, Israel, I'm going to recognize our right to anything as a people, I doubt it, not in the near future, much less so to a right to a state on any part of what's back, especially what's back of any kind, minus sovereignty, whatever. That's not going to happen. It's not. But how about trying to really put ourselves on path of diplomatic effort in at getting this recognition enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolution? That to me is as good. It's something that not any Israeli government can have a veto over. And the regional mention, I'm curious about your views of the Abrahamic Wars. Has that been net positive or negative for the Palestinian government? You know, I think the entire effort needs to be recalibrated. It's not simply an act of let's expand the the accords and see what is required to expand them and hold. Let's just really look at the core of the, so if you go back to the rationale behind the course beyond that which is declared, you know, integrated Israel and the region, prosperity for all and everything else, that somehow presume that, you know, personal issue, long viewed as a core issue and all of that to be dealt with, what's going to be dealt with? Well, it was that. I don't blame the Abrahamic Wars per se. For that, I mean, we're on that path of destruction anyway. But we are where we are. I mean, to think that just by themselves that that path is going to pull that wagon for any sustainable, the period that I am not sure. So I'm all for, you know, going back to the basics and in so far as we are concerned, we need to, it has to start with us. That's the thing. That's what's missing. You know, like when we look around to Arab countries, we talk about Abrahamic Wars. We're critical of Abrahamic Wars. We're for this. We're against that. But what are we really for in terms of not only saying that we want to access our universal determination, which was obviously something that we all should enlist to do. But how would going to get there. I think it's really up to us to say, given all we know about the lay of the land, where we are, the complications, the depths of the whole we are in, how about if we begin to dig out of this, first stop digging, how about we start to emerge from this, by saying the past to freedom, as far as we're concerned, begins with securing international recognition of our right to establish a state on the territory of the occupied Basel. And you know, incrementally, I think we are on whether that promises delivery. That's something that could, and is that for all the reasons that it looks fanciful or delusional at this point, that is ultimately something that resembles the two state solution of older, is that a different formula? You know, I think definitely could end up with that for sure, because if you listen to what I have just said about our right to establish it where on the territory of Israel occupied the 967 and the center of the city, that's West Bank, gas, including Jerusalem. That's what we'll be talking about. And that's the original conception of the modern version of two states solution. But you know, post Oslo, post 1988, special post 1988, the position of the PLO representing all Palestinians was possessed in this. And by the way, you know, my, what I'm really saying about the need for our right to stay to on the territory of occupied the 967 being recognized, it's not that outlandish. I mean, it says something fanciful, not a reference to that in particular. But we go back to the origin formulation of Oslo, of course. You know, everybody says declaration mutual recognition. There's nothing mutual about that declaration. The PLO acting on behalf of all Palestinians, recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist, not recognize Israel or its existence. It's recognized, it's right to exist to be the security. So around really talking about fundamentally, it's about, you know, basically closing that circle, squaring that circle. Again, we started with that. Why don't we make it completely reciprocal? So somebody's going back to the North Star, yeah, that's also a good one. Yeah. If people are talking about two states solution, let's start with that. Let's start by redressing this as a matter that actually happened back in the 19th century. And you know, had we had the state by end of the 90s, I would not be saying what I'm saying today. It didn't happen. So there is a structural flow. Let's fix it. Now, I said to you myself, it's fanciful to expect any government in Israel for all kinds of ideological reasons to concede that kind of regulation. Too many, too many were not even a fetal. You know, I'm saying with any national rights for us to have a right to any territory, particularly was back is not something that I can really expect. That's why I'm suggesting this work around this work around to go through the United Nations Security Council as well. We personally should consider that adequate as a basis for resuming a serious political process with Israel. And do you think Palestinian public opinion would shift as well? I think with adequate transparency and beginning to really actually act in a manner that, discernibly, means something positive for people, providing that horizon so far as freedom is concerned. But most importantly, beginning with here and now, doing the most basic of things that any responsible and responsive government is expected to do visibly to people, to serve their interests, to have their welfare. You know, it's not so. That's basically what we need to, if you start with that, that's when you begin to build legitimacy. That's what I really actually call legitimacy that derives from delivery. Trying to end this on something like an optimistic note, you know, if you imagine good leadership, you imagine the use of leverage by regional capitals, Washington, perhaps a change in leadership in Israel and a Palestinian government that can build this kind of legitimacy and shift the politics within, within the West Bank of Gaza, where, let's say in five years, where might that lead us? What's what's kind of plausible, but optimistic scenario there? I think at the minimum, if all of these things, if all of these factors actually materialize, we definitely will be in much better place than we are right now. We will have begun to deal with the most terrible humanitarian conditions in Gaza. We will have begun to actually inspire people, give them some sense of hope, about better tomorrow for sure. And hopefully, people begin to say, "Later the end of the tunnel," but I cannot really overstate the importance of delivery in the meantime. That's what's really important, it's one thing to talk about reconstruction and all of that, but it's another to begin with, you know, simple tasks of delivering on that. However, however modestly that effort can begin with. In making daily life, you know, incrementally build on it and be transparent, but your objectives are to above all, government for the people. We're not going to real government of by the people of our nine, but government for the people is the very least any responsible leadership should deliver to its own people. That's basic minimum. If that is something to be expected to any government around who is most certainly something that should be expected to personally leadership in the government, for our people under oppressive occupation, there is intended to make itself permanent. So there's no question that is it all other and it doesn't require that kind of leadership, openness, transparency, responsiveness, delivery in the best possible sense of word. So, Salam, thank you for the pieces you've done in foreign affairs over the years laying out some elements of this. We'll hope to have more bring those up to date soon, but for now, thank you so much for doing this today as well. Thank you, thank you Dan, for having me. Thank you. Thank you for listening. You can find the articles that we discussed on today's show at foreignaffairs.com. This episode of the Foreign Affairs interview was produced by Rachel Powell and Konnishkler R. Our audio engineer is Todd Yeager, with audio help from Christopher Cook. Original music is by Robin Hilton, special thanks as well to Arena Hogan. Make sure you subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts, and if you like what you heard, please take a minute to rate and review it. We release a new show every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning in.