The 2024 Democratic midterm victories in traditionally Republican states like Kansas, Texas, Iowa, and South Carolina fundamentally challenge the longstanding red-blue political map, exposing the fragility of ideological blocs. Democrats won not through ideological purity but by deploying locally rooted, culturally resonant candidates—such as pro-life Democrats, religious leaders, and community advocates—who connected with voters on identity, ethics, and shared values. This success reflects a broader strategy of a “big tent” party that listens to local needs rather than enforcing national ideological lines. At the same time, Donald Trump’s disastrous record—marked by broken promises, war escalation, and abusive policies—undermined Republican credibility and alienated key demographic groups, particularly youth, Hispanic, and minority voters. The election also revealed that voter turnout and realignment are as significant as persuasion, with substantial shifts in identity-based voting patterns. Notably, the rise of candidates like John Ossoff, Abdul El-Sayed, and Adam Hamilton signals a new political energy rooted in moral clarity, virtue-based language, and community service. While some progressive candidates underperformed, the overall trend shows that electoral success hinges on local fit and authenticity. The Democratic Party now faces the task of building durable power by protecting moderate, influential seats and investing in candidates who represent diverse constituencies. The era is shifting from ideological rigidity to pragmatic, inclusive, and morally grounded governance. Meanwhile, the political landscape remains volatile due to economic uncertainty, AI-driven disruptions, and global instability, underscoring the urgency for both parties to adapt. The election’s outcome, though a major win, also exposes the need for long-term strategy, as the realignment of power is not just about winning seats, but about redefining the center of American politics.
The Big Ten is real and the political map is fake.
That is a lesson of the Democrats historic midterm, the blue tsunami that we saw on Tuesday. Democrats won in places nobody thought they had any chance even to compete in a year ago. Kansas, Texas, Iowa, South Carolina. As I record this, it's unclear which party is going to win Mississippi. But let me say that again. It is unclear which party is going to win the Senate seat in Mississippi.
That was.
That was unimaginable three months ago. They won governorships in Ohio, in Texas, in Iowa. This was a win that destroyed the reality of the red-blue map people had come to believe in so firmly. And so we're entering a new era, an era when much is unsettled. The realignment may not be what we thought it was in 2024. The realignment may be a map that is entirely up for grabs from here on out.
Now, Democrats did do this.
on their own, of course. To a very large extent, President Donald Trump did it for them.
And both what he did wrong and what they did right were the same thing. Listening. Trump did not
listen, did not listen to the voters, did not even sometimes listen to himself. He was elected
promising to lower costs, to end wars, to bring order at the border. Instead, he raised costs
through tariffs and through new wars. And he created disorder after closing the border and
sending in masked ICE agents to harass and upend settled communities. Trump at no point pivoted.
He dismissed almost everything that people were angry about. And his party paid the price.
And at the same time, Democrats, who I think their central political failing for years has been
an unwillingness to listen. They listen to themselves as opposed to the voters they need
to win over.
In state after state, district after district, they found people who fit. Josh Turek in Iowa,
Adam Hamilton in Kansas, James Tallarico in Texas. They found seminarians. They found
Paralympians. They found a whole new class of candidates who could put into play a whole new
set of places. And then in some places like North Carolina and Georgia, they just had candidates of
such exceptional quality who understood their status. And they found candidates who were
so well that they won states that should have been purple by 20 points for Roy Cooper, 18 points
for John Ossoff. So there was a tremendous amount to learn from this election and a tremendous
amount that is now possible after it. But to think through both the lessons that we're seeing
already, but then how Democrats and for that matter, Republicans are going to respond to them.
I'm joined here by my revered editor, one of the most beloved characters in our podcast,
cinematic universe. Aaron Reddick is going to turn the tables and interview me. He joins me now.
Aaron, welcome back to the show.
Thank you very much for having me. Let's start with almost a gotcha. Like,
do you have any idea who George McGill is?
I don't.
George McGill is the last Democratic senator in Kansas before,
Adam Hamilton, who won last night. He won in 1932. I was trying to think
of all the different ways of expressing what happened last night. And that's the best.
That's a very good way of doing it.
So everybody looking at this election, all the different constituents of the Democratic Party,
they all got something. The left won some races. The center won some races. Charismatic candidates
were huge.
Uncharismatic candidates also did well.
The Roy Cooper juggernaut.
Roy Cooper plus 20. This has long been the dream. Was there a breakthrough for the big
Democratic Party last night?
Yes. But let me hold that to the side for a minute. Donald Trump asked America
to vote like he was on the ballot, and it did. Trump, of course, had, I think,
the funniest possible reaction to the election, where in the middle of the night he posts on True
Social, "If I had been a Democrat, I would have voted for Donald Trump."
He really did.
If I had been on the ballot, we would have won in a landslide. Thank you for your attention to
this matter, President Donald J. Trump. And people today have been remarking how he doesn't seem very
upset by the election results. And of course not. He does not mind when Republicans lose. And in
fact, Republicans often lose because he intervenes in a way that is likelier to make them lose,
right? Like bringing in Ken Paxton or assuring Ken Paxton's victory in the Texas Republican
primary, pushing for Darlene Graham in South Carolina.
But when Republicans lose when Trump is not on the ballot to Trump, it shows his importance.
And so he, I think, doesn't mind this at all. It is more evidence to him of his essential
winnerdom. What really happened here is Donald Trump has been a terrible, catastrophic president
who has betrayed the mandate he was given by voters. And as he was losing, bleeding public
support, not only never changed course, but he has been a terrible, catastrophic president.
But never admitted what was happening at all. And so Donald Trump led his party to defeat or
certainly created the conditions for the party to go to defeat. And then there's a question of what
Democrats did with that, which. Yeah, so what did they do right?
The big tent is real. And the map is fake. So Democrats ran candidates who fit their states
and their districts. And I think it's just really important to center that. I mean,
you know, last year I did this big essay on the show about the need for a big tent Democratic
Party, other people making this argument too, that one of the problems that has emerged over
time in American politics is the parties have become tighter in their ideological and cultural
positioning. And geographical. And that has made them tighter in their geographical positioning
because they're not willing to run candidates who differ as much from the kind of median member of
the party.
And what Democrats did really well here was in the way that they acted with power, right? Hakeem
Jeffries and Chuck Schumer here, they kept things very focused on affordability, on the Iran war.
They didn't get distracted by a lot of other things. And then when they ran candidates, I mean,
they ran people like James Tallarico, sort of leading an almost religious left revival
in Texas against Ken Paxton. Adam Hamilton in Kansas, as you mentioned,
a Methodist megachurch pastor. Adam Hamilton and Scott Kohler,
who's the candidate in Mississippi who looks very much like he may win by like a hundred votes or
something. I mean, we'll see where it plays out. Both of them describe themselves, Hamilton and
Colum, as pro-life Democrats. Now they want to create conditions under which reproductive freedom
is protected, but they ran as pro-life Democrats, right? Because of their Christian faith. Mary
Patola, who ran, you know, what was her slogan in Alaska? Faith, freedom, and fish or something.
So the Democrats did a very good job in this case of picking candidates who fit the state.
And when I say the map is fake, one of the revelations from this election is you really
should not treat states as off the table. People were not talking about Kansas. By the way, Adam
Hamilton is not a Schumer recruiting victory. Adam Hamilton decided to run. And by the way,
shout out to my colleague at Vox and colleague here at the New York Times, Adam Hamilton.
New York Times, Sarah Cliff, whose bombshell story, bombshell investigative work on Roger
Marshall's unbelievably brutal pursuit and persecution of people who are not able to pay
his medical bills was a major, major, major part of that race. And that's a story Sarah Cliff broke
here at the New York Times. Shout out to Sarah. Yeah. I want to throw in a shout out while we're
at it. And that's Howard Dean, right? Because the 50 state strategy is vindicated here, right? I mean,
this is what you're saying, but like there's two reasons. One, you might actually win some of these
states, but also there are going to be talented politicians in these places who can't necessarily
win their state who are still worth having in your coalition. Just being out there and not
writing things off is critically important. Yes. And doing the work to recruit the candidates
and then supporting them. So I think Democrats have sort of treated Florida as not winnable.
And what you saw here, I mean, you know, Nixon's only going to fall a couple points short. Florida
is winnable. If you're going to win, you're going to win. And so I think Democrats are going to
have to build that kind of party strength. You have to look for those people. Now there's like
an interesting question here. You were saying at the beginning that everybody got some of what
they wanted. And that's at least somewhat true. I think it's going to be fascinating to see
what lessons Democrats learn from Michigan, from Maine, and from Florida, which is where they ran
in contested or contestable Senate elections, much more likely than not.
Yeah. And I think it's going to be fascinating to see what lessons they're going to learn from
Maine, it's a little harder to say because they had the whole disaster with Graham Platner.
Susan Collins is actually a quite good candidate because she has a reputation for independence, not totally well-deserved from the other side.
But Jackson's win there looks closer than you would expect given the demographics of Maine, right?
It's not like the John Ossoff plus 18 win in Georgia.
And in Florida, Angie Nixon, you know, a more direct DSA candidate, lost, right?
It's not, you're not looking in Florida at what you're seeing in South Carolina or Mississippi.
I want to push back on that a little bit, right?
Because it sometimes sounds like progressive candidates are just a hindrance to the party.
But without their imagination, without their ideas, that's very important.
And they didn't do as well as the less left candidates, but they didn't do terribly either.
No, I don't think they did terribly.
And I agree with you that whether you're an electoral over-performer.
Is even correlated, really, with whether you are a good or important member of the House or Senate.
A lot of, I think, the most creative members of Congress and the most important members of Congress are safe seat players who are not operating under the constant threat of electoral wipeout.
You know, Elizabeth Warren, I think, is one of the most important.
Senator's has been for some time.
Is not an incredible electoral performer by any means, but is creative and innovative as a policy thinker in a way very, very few of her colleagues are.
I think, and I've said this on the show before, I think Abdul Sayyed is going to be a superstar.
And I agree with something that I think you think, which is that it's very likely he might build margins over time.
The effort to authorize him was grotesque.
And it's part of why when he was on the show, like we focus on in his actual story.
I mean, this is.
He's like an American boy who's a Rhodes Scholar and a doctor and a captain of his football team.
I mean, I found what they tried to do to El-Sayed reprehensible.
And I find El-Sayed to be a very impressive person.
The question of how some of these people will play out in the Senate, you know, or in the House for that matter, is different to me than the question of can you extract any signal in terms of what it means for the Democratic Party to compete in places it has not competed before.
And El-Sayed winning.
By plus seven or eight or whatever it's going to be in a Democratic plus 13 environment is just it's not a totally impressive performance.
Peggy Flanagan in Minnesota.
She wins by about looks like it'll be about nine or 10 right now.
Tennis again, Minnesota Democratic plus 13.
It's not a good performance, right?
You shouldn't take a lesson that that's what you want to run right there.
Angie Nixon.
I think that there's a world and I think that DSCC bears some.
Blame for this, but a stronger Florida Democratic Party that picked a candidate who is better suited to Florida in the way that you saw in Kansas or Mississippi and a DSCC that invested more in the state.
I think that was a winnable seat.
And so, you know who you want to blame for that.
I think sort of like both sides deserve some blame, but I don't think that the I don't think there's any reason to look at the results and say it was a brilliant strategic move to run the DSA candidate in Florida.
That.
Isn't what won in Kansas.
It's not what won in Texas.
It's not what won in Georgia.
It's not what might win in Mississippi.
It's not what seems like it will win in Alaska or Iowa for that matter.
And so, you know, you got to hold these things in tension.
Sometimes people take statements about electoral performance as moral statements about the worth of a candidate.
Or the ideas.
Or the ideas.
That's crazy in my view, by the way, I do think we often end up too.
Tight.
On this like moderate to progressive to DSA or whatever it might be scale.
You can have candidates who have like many views all at once.
So Dr.
Annie Andrews in South Carolina, who I mean, the moment you realize the night was really turning was when all of a sudden the Democrats are going to win in South Carolina reflects a terrible candidate in Darlene Graham as well.
Okay.
But South Carolina.
I mean, wow.
I know.
Dr.
Annie Andrews, right?
Both somebody who fits.
South Carolina, but has, I think, if you were grading it on a scale, quite progressive views on health care and progressive views on health care are very popular.
That's also a good issue for Abdul Saad.
So I think sometimes you can get into this thing where people think what you mean by fit the district or fit the state is just to be more moderate.
James Tallarico should correctly be understood as a fairly progressive candidate, but he moved right on oil and gas.
And he also moved right on border.
But he also was a very populous candidate running against billionaires, a very pro building candidate, right?
The sort of populous, abundant synthesis that I think you saw in a lot of different places.
So in my view, there's a lot to learn from a bunch of these candidates, but I do think it is notable if what you would like to see is Democrats building on this success that I don't think the place you want to look for electoral lessons is Abdul Saad.
Is Peggy Flanagan, is Angie Nixon, is Troy Jackson.
And I think Maine has another lesson if you go down.
So the Maine second House district was represented by Jared Golden.
Last three elections.
That is the reddest district represented by a Democrat.
Golden is the most conservative or was the most conservative House Democrat.
And he was tormented by the left for this, including facing a challenge by a more progressive challenger, Matt Dunlap.
And.
And.
And Golden decided to retire.
He was done with it.
He was tired of it.
And now it looks like even in this gigantic wave election, Dunlap is either going to win it incredibly modestly or lose the seat.
Jared Golden was like a most valuable player for the Democrats.
He is a kind of person you want in the party and you should protect.
And there's a lesson in that.
If you want to build power and the Democrats excited about possibly winning Mississippi right now, excited about winning Kansas.
In 2032, you're going to need to try to keep these seats.
You want to build a super majority.
You want to build a durable majority.
That doesn't just mean moderating, but it does mean recognizing that you need these candidates who are right for their states, right for their districts.
And then you need to do everything you can to make their life easy.
Not as was done with Jared Golden, try to like hound them out of office.
I want to rain a little bit on the parade because since Trump.
First came down that escalator, right?
What is that?
June of 2015, everyone on the liberal side, the centrist, the never Trumpers, everyone has been wondering when are the scales going to fall from their eyes?
What will it take?
So what it took is kind of insane, right?
It took an unpopular, unconstitutional, inconclusive war driving up gas prices and crucially diesel.
Gas.
It took taking Latino voters for granted and attacking on immigration and shooting people in the streets.
Like all of that is what was needed to get where we are now.
So like it's obviously a tremendous victory for the Democrats, but it does give me a little bit of pause that it took so much.
I see it as more environmental even than you're describing it there.
So I think at this point.
Internationally, we have enough examples of Trump like politicians, Flavio Bolsonaro came out ahead in the first round of Brazil's presidential election, ended up losing to Lula in the second round.
But there is just no evidence that the Trumpy style or what we think of as the Trumpy style in America.
But what you might think of as like the populist right style worldwide is a turnoff to voters.
What voters don't like is their life getting worse.
Who likes that?
Nobody.
But when you're saying it took so much.
I actually think it didn't take so much.
What you're describing is a chain of very intense events that led to real world consequences for people.
So you could have imagined a world where actually Trump governed much more modestly, but there was a recession.
You can't actually.
Well, but what I'm saying is or maybe a different way of putting it is in 2008, Barack Obama won a very big victory, but the unemployment rate continued to go up.
And so 2010 was a historic wipeout for the Democratic Party.
And that wasn't because Obama's personal style was repulsive to the electorate.
Right.
He won in 2012.
People liked him quite a bit.
It's because fundamentally, if people do not feel their lives are getting better, in fact, they feel they're getting worse.
And sort of another way of saying what you're saying is people felt their lives were getting worse.
And then particular groups, you know, Hispanic Americans saw their lives getting much worse because of the amount of state force Donald Trump and Stephen Miller, who.
Did a lot to lose this election for Republicans was aiming at them and aiming at their communities.
Bobby Polito winning Texas district for the House by 25 points.
Right.
He's an amazing candidate, this very, very well-known singer and just like somebody who has run a fantastic race.
But I remember him getting in.
That was supposed to be a safe Trump district.
He won by 25 points.
And that's a guy who I think should be treated in the Democratic Party right now as a star.
And.
In the end, you cannot make people's lives worse.
but conversely, the reason Trump was able to survive in the way he was at other times was
he benefited from like a pretty strong economy for most of his first term. And people remember that
when he ran for his second effort at reelection. Well, and he did better in the first than people
expected in part because he was sending people checks, right? Yeah. This is something that's
worth noting because you know what fell apart was the realignment. Oh my God, the realignment.
Okay. Can I riff for one second? I would love you to riff.
I am a racial realignment skeptic. As you know, I hated it from the beginning. It seemed insane to
me. It was clear that the people who had moved into the Republican column, whether that's young
men or young women, were going to be the ones who were going to be the ones who were going to be
younger black men, Hispanic people as a whole. And I'll say the thing we have to say, which is
that there's a million different kinds of Hispanic, right? I mean, duh. But yet all those groups
surged toward Trump. They have all surged back and staggering numbers. The youth vote was like,
what, plus 30 something. I don't know the exact number, but. Yeah. I'm going to pull up this
number just while I'm saying this because I think it's so striking. So right now I'm looking at
house results at the New York Times. I'm looking at the New York Times. And this can all change a little bit on the margin as, you know, more votes get counted.
But here we're speaking on Wednesday morning. Male voters swung 17 points towards the Democrats.
Voters aged 18 to 29. This is just a crazy number. Swung 32 points towards the Democrats,
32 points. Hispanic voters, 28 points towards the Democrats.
I will say that there's something to be careful with here, which is we don't know how
much of what happened here is persuasion versus turnout. Voters who supported Trump in 2024
just didn't like him enough or didn't care enough to come out in 2026. You can't really see that in
the voting data, right? No, you also can't see, I mean, roughly speaking, 150 million people vote
in these presidential elections, right? And maybe 110, 115, 120 million decide the midterms. So,
yeah, yeah, you can't. And it's definitely not necessarily,
the case that this person changed his mind or her mind. It's often these people showed up or
they didn't, right? The true swing voters are the people in some ways who only vote sometimes,
right? That said, though, two sets of historical examples from midterms, right? Okay, so we have
two, on one side, we have 2006, where the Democrats do extremely well. It is a harbinger of the rise
of the first black president, although very few people realized,
and at the time, he did, David Axelrod did, but, like, it was not conventional wisdom in 2006. I had
just started working here the year before. I would say no one was talking about Barack Obama. Very
few people were talking about Barack Obama, right? And then two years later, he's the president of
the United States. The flip side of that, though, is 1994, Gingrich and co. win the contract with
America. They do change the face of American politics quite a bit, and we're all still paying
the price. Trump is, in many ways, right, the fruit of that.
God, that was terrible, but you know what I'm saying. But they lose to Clinton in 1996.
In 2010, as you alluded to earlier, they, what did Obama say, right? There was a shellacking,
right? But then he won really pretty comfortably in 2012, although uncharacteristically, he was a
president who lost electoral votes the second time he ran, which is actually very unusual, right?
Usually, it's more like Reagan, where you win by a little bit, and then you win by a lot.
So, what do you think about that?
All right. So, just in the modern era, you have wave midterms that lead to the party that won the
midterm, winning the presidency and winning seats in the next election. So, good examples of this
are 06, where Democrats win in the kind of second Bush midterm, and then in 08, they win a super
majority. It's not just that Barack Obama wins in 08. It's Democrats get 60 votes in the Senate.
Yeah. Unpopular war in the Middle East, I might add.
And then, ultimately, a financial crisis, which given,
I mean, there's a lot of shakiness around AI right now, particularly after this election and what
that might mean for Texas data center construction. So, the economy may not be getting better from
here. 2018, big Democratic midterm, they win in 2020. Okay. But 1994, huge Republican midterm,
Bill Clinton wins in 1996. 2010, huge Republican midterm, Barack Obama wins in 2012. Midterms are
not a straight line to victory in the next election. You have to be thoughtful about what you
do, thoughtful about who you run. You have to be thoughtful about who you run. You have to be
thoughtful about how you run. I will say you often do have, to what you were just saying about
Obama, the 06 midterm was this very, like, Americana flag and national security midterm
on the Democratic side. You know, like, a big star to that midterm was Jim Webb, the sort of
Virginia, like, tough-talking Marine. You wouldn't necessarily have seen that going to Barack Obama,
as you were saying. Trump winning in 2016 after the 2012 Republican,
wipeout. One of the big things Republicans believed after 2012 was they had to moderate
on immigration. Then, of course, you end up getting the most nativist president in, you know,
kind of modern America. I don't, I'm not predicting. The idea, though, that this era in politics with
all the fights around Israel and anti-Semitism we're having does seem to be, like, more than any
other recent one, leading to, like, possibly the first Jewish American president in John Ossoff,
if he decides to run. The amount of people who are going to run for president,
the amount of energy around him.
Wow, you heard it here first.
It's not first, right? I mean, this is not a new point, but it is just interesting. I mean,
if you want to talk about a singular star coming out of this election, I'm not saying Ossoff wants
to run for president. From what I hear, he doesn't. He may not really end up having a choice on this
one. He crushed his opponent in Georgia, right? And getting back to the Trump political malpractice
senator because of Donald Trump.
He's a senator because of Donald Trump. He's a senator who has a demonstrated capability to win
in a purple state. By the way, he has coattails. I'm not saying it's just him. And you got to look
here at, like, organizing this is done by Stacey Abrams and, you know, Raphael Warnock as well.
But Keisha Lance Bottoms won for governor in Georgia. I mean, we've been talking here about
House and Senate, but Democrats won the governorship in Texas, right? Rob Sand won easily in Iowa. I mean, there are a lot of big gubernatorial pickups here. I think I saw a number
floating around on Twitter yesterday. I think, can we call X Twitter again? Is that part of the
election? I saw a number floating around on Twitter yesterday. The Democrats now control
the governorships in states worth 392 electoral votes, which is just huge, right? And so, you
know, I think it's a really important moment in the way he has being able to be as dominant in the
attention economy as he has been, but maintain a kind of highly message-disciplined approach,
like straddle the divide where, you know, both Hassan Piker and Matt Iglesias will talk up
John Ossoff to you, like I've been talking him up for a long time. The guy is just demonstrating an
incredible amount of political skill. And, you know, in terms of these sort of weird ways that
American politics often leads to not the person you would have expected from narrative a couple
years before, he just has a, there's a lot of energy around him at the moment. I guess I'll say
that. Yeah. I mean, there were so many remarkable things about last night, right? I mean, it became
temporarily illegal to talk about identity and of course wasn't actually illegal, but you know
what I'm saying? Like we weren't supposed to talk about that. But the result of that is actually
quite striking in identity terms, right? We have,
the first openly gay male Senator. We have the first Muslim Senator. We're going to have the
first black female governor. We have a man with spina bifida who's going to be a Senator. We have,
there's Native American first. It's like an amazing array that, you know, 1976 Democratic
Party is like, woohoo. So what do you make of that contrast that people ran, they didn't run on it,
but they won with it? I don't find that surprising.
It just was never the case, even though some people took this as like a lesson of 2024,
that candidates who are women don't perform well. Candidates who are black don't perform well.
Candidates who are Native American don't perform well. What didn't perform well was candidates
taking very unpopular positions. Some of them, though, by the way, not all of them tied to
race and gender and identity. But, you know, you look at Barack Obama,
Obama is by far the most popular political figure in America, has been for a long time. You know,
at the same time, people were saying that, well, this goes to show you a woman can't win
in the Rust Belt. It's like you had a woman governor in Michigan. You know, we just had,
like, obviously, Amy Klobuchar win in Minnesota last night. And so this was always,
people were conflating wrongly the identity of candidates with identity politics.
And what you see here is that that just was incorrect. And,
You have
of these candidates who are just like running really, really strong races, right? Josh Turek,
who the, you know, the Paralympian with spina bifida just ran a really strong race. But by the
way, Josh Turek was somebody who one reason that there was excitement about him running
was in Iowa in the state, I think it was state senator. He ran in a district where he had to
learn how to appeal to Trump voters. I would say like the heuristic you often want is does
this candidate have a record of appealing to the kind of voter they're going to need to win?
And Democrats ran a bunch of people like that, and they did a really good job.
So we talked a lot about how they should campaign and how they succeeded in campaigning,
but how should they govern? Which would, if you're Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer,
and by the way, shout out to New York, last shout out, New York in control of the House
and the Senate. Very weird. Yeah. And by the way, also Christian Gillibrand
and New York Senator was leading the DSCC this cycle and sort of leading that project. And New
York has like the country's most famous mayor and Mamdani and AOC. I mean, the New Yorkization.
And he, of course, the president. The New Yorkization and the president.
But he wants to be from Florida. He can be from Florida.
Democrats have three like broad things we're gonna have to balance, right? One is what I'd
call resistance, which is fighting Trump, investigating Trump, holding Trump and the
Trump administration, Trump family accountable, sending him bills that are going to lead to
contrast that the public can see, right? That's, I think.
He said he was going to be Mr. Vito.
Mr. Vito. You know, Ed Markey said they're going to need to cut down trees for all the subpoenas
that are going to be offered, which I'm not sure is the most helpful comment from
one of the senators from Massachusetts.
And environmentally unsound.
Yeah, for a big environmentalist. But then there is actually getting things done. So,
you know, you have this big permitting bill that's going to get voted on.
But I think there's interest. And you're hearing people talk about doing things on A.I.
regulation. You know, you can imagine things potentially on immigration, at least around
the corners of it because now it's hurt both parties.
Now it's hurt both parties. But that doesn't mean they'll be able to do it. Right. I'm
just saying that there is a bucket of how much do you work with the other side and even
work with Donald Trump to get things done. And I mean, after 2018, there were things
that got done. And particularly once you got into the pandemic period. I mean, there was
huge agreements between, you know, the Nancy Pelosi led House and Donald Trump.
And then there is what I would think of as like power building and agenda setting, which
is not so much what you pass through the House or the Senate, but beginning to hammer out,
say, what is the Democratic position look like on health care reform that they would
bring into a 2028 and then 2029, you know, first campaign and then governing agenda?
What is the Democratic position on regulation?
How do Democrats in general begin to create a sense of what the center of the party,
not like the centrists in the party, but the center of the party believes?
And I think you're going to see a lot of work done on, say, Medicare for more policies,
which are going to unite the sort of more moderate and the more like left parts of the
party. I think you're going to see a lot on AI, a lot beginning to be thought through
on sort of, you know, pre-K and other forms of child care. So how they balance it and
how they balance the first two, you know, confrontation and compromise. That's going
to be a lot of the a lot of the work.
The only other thing I'll say, though, is that when I look at the next two years,
I think a lot is going to go sideways and it's hard to predict exactly what. But the economy
looks very shaky to me, given how much is built on an AI capex boom, which could very, very,
very easily collapse into a market correction. You have the Iran war, right, which could explode
into something completely different. Or, you know, Israel could launch a gigantic round of new
attacks. There have been talk about, you know, would Iran use chemical weapons? I mean, there's
all kinds of ways that could go sideways, even more so than it already has. There's
Russia, Ukraine. There's AI, not from the economic standpoint, but, you know, rogue
swarms of AIs hacking into China. There's China and Taiwan. There's Donald Trump's
health. He's a 80-year-old who's, you know, very, you know, increasingly discursive and
all over the place. There's all the corruption around him. There is so much that is unknown.
You know what it makes me think of?
What?
It makes me think of the first line of the Shelley poem, England in 1819. Let's see if I could do it
right. It's an old, mad, despised, and dying king. That's the beginning. You know, princes,
dregs of the dull earth. I could go on. But that poem actually speaks to what we're talking about,
because at the end of it, he asks, you know, goes through how horrible the Senate is,
but then at the end of it, he asks, you know, what's the glorious phantom that's going to come
from this, right? Which is what we're talking about. And also, just Trump's personality,
I don't know what to call it, because I'm not a doctor and I wouldn't, if I were, I wouldn't say,
but there's some kind of disintegration going on, I guess, or a man not in super great contact with
reality to begin with.
You don't feel like the reflecting pool speech was a crazy argument Republicans needed?
I just, I'm like, if you look at the world in a sort of historical,
and literary frame, as I tend to, right, the anxiety is, and you just outlined it well,
that this is 1912, this is 1913, this is 1914.
This is 06.
And these things are all converging on us, right? And then the president is not, let's just say,
he is not adaptable, right? He's not, and you, as you pointed out earlier, he doesn't react to
events. He doesn't even seem to know they happened in the way that other people experience reality.
And so that is unlikely to go super well.
Yeah. And his staffing,
is not going to get better in the lame duck period of his second term. And some of these people might
get shuffled out, as some of them have, like Kristi Noem. But the people who come in are not,
Trump is not going to suddenly surround himself with a team of rivals. He's not going to suddenly
begin listening to people's advice. And so what you tend to have in the second, you know,
particularly in the second term, particularly in the back half of it, is an exhausted staff,
less able to challenge the boss. As you say, the boss is,
more erratic, more mad. He is not obsessed with Republicans winning in 2028. He does not want to
lose control. And so the more Republicans try to win in 2028. On your theory, he would like them to lose.
I think he would. In part.
I think he would prefer them to lose while embracing him. Yeah. than to win while running away from him.
Yeah.
I don't think there's any doubt about that.
To get to your point about investigation and corruption, there will be people who say,
let it all go. Don't impeach him again. Don't do this. Don't do that. We have to govern, right? But
here's the problem with that. First of all, there's the level of the corruption and incompetence and
just grotesque, grotesque behavior, just staggering, like the amazing stuff that they did.
They destroyed, I mean, huge agencies that USAID and the Department of Education and the
Consumer Protection, I mean, all of that. It's just, right? There's that, there's the immigration,
there's all these things. So what do you think they should do on the investigation corruption front?
I don't think anybody in the party is saying don't investigate. I mean, I've not. I think
there's going to be. Don't impeach. They are saying that.
Let's hold impeachment aside because they're not going to impeach right now, right? That's not
their first day plan. What they've been planning for is investigation.
And the challenge you're going to face on investigation is actually how target rich
the environment is. The resources of Congress are significant, but the amount of corruption,
malfeasance, lawbreaking, et cetera, in the Trump administration is like so vast.
In order to make anything stick, you need to focus on things people, like a couple of things people
can begin to hold in their minds. It's one reason John Ossoff has been better at making the corruption
than a lot of others. He tends to focus on one small thing at a time, right? It allows you to
kind of conceptualize a whole and a part. The way I hope they will do it as an organizing threat,
at least at the beginning, not because it'll be the most emotionally satisfying or even
important, but because I think it actually reflects like what the American people are
interested in is I want them to follow the money. I want to know who bought what from the Trump
administration, who gave what to the Trump administration, things like the Qatari jet,
how much do we not know?
How much did the Trump family get? What contracts went into Trump family hands during all this?
What's going on with Jared Kushner's fund? I would love to know real details on that Jared
Kushner fund that has seemed to be so popular among Gulf state funders.
It's surprisingly popular, yes.
And on the flip, right, not just like who bought what, but what did they get? And then
where has the money been going for the Trump family and for Trump associates?
Right. As you've been getting hosed at the pump and in the grocery store and like, you know,
when you're trying to buy a home, how many billions of dollars has he made exactly? And
not just him, Don Jr., Eric, right? All their friends and family, Steve Witkoff's son.
Right.
What's going on with all the crypto, right? There is so much money that has been moving around
to me, like that is the place to start. But as you were kind of suggesting too, there's all these
other questions.
about what laws were broken in different agencies.
And I'm not saying they can't do that too, but they're going to have to choose what to focus on first.
Well, and which things to try to put back, right? Do you just try to reopen the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau? What do you do there?
Well, maybe we're spending a moment on what happened to the Doge co-chairs, right? Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, who I think together, like Vivek lost the Ohio governorship to Amy Acton, running one of the most grim and disreputable campaigns in history.
Oh, I thought you were going to say the ad, because that was the worst thing ever.
The ad, for people who didn't follow this, where he had an add-on from her estranged mother.
Who said Amy Acton is a liar, and what she was suggesting Amy Acton lied about was being sexually abused by her stepfather, of which there was quite good evidence. Grotesque. Like, just reprehensible behavior. Ramaswamy's already on track to lose that election, but, you know, he's lost it, and. Yeah, he should be drummed out of public life, no question.
So then, and then Elon Musk. It's only $500 million.
I mean, for him, it's like nothing.
What are you talking about?
But it's not just that money didn't do anything.
Or it doesn't appear to have done very much.
A huge amount of it was spent in Texas, and there is nowhere, there is nowhere in the country that Republicans collapsed like they did in Texas.
If you do this for a living, right, the dream of blue Texas has, or really what appeared to be at first the fantasy of blue Texas has been alive and well for decades.
Yeah.
And now it's here.
Alive and unwell for decades.
Alive and unwell.
The fantasy was alive.
Yeah, the fantasy was alive.
But here it is.
But hopes kept getting dashed.
But Musk spent a tremendous amount of money, a large amount of that money, certainly plurality that went into Texas specifically.
And I'm not sure it, I would go further than it bought him nothing.
I think it. No, it hurt.
It hurt, right?
People don't like their elections being bought.
There were two forms of one-man rule on the ballot, right?
Trump's and his, and they both got crushed.
And Musk has moved himself and a lot of his corporations to Texas.
So the question of Musk is going to be a very interesting one.
Going forward.
The, yeah, I mean, there's a lot to say about Musk.
I hope that this means that when you verge or maybe more than verge on, you know, white supremacy or certainly white dominance as your central idea that you'll fail.
Like, I hope that's true.
And replacement of human beings.
Might also not be hugely popular.
Also not great, right?
The AI centers are huge.
They're a big electoral issue, right?
That elites are maybe not focused on as much as they should be.
I mean, I think they're pretty focused on this election.
I mean, they, like the amount that Democrats ran on that.
I mean, Sherrod Brown running against Husted in Ohio ran heavily on data centers.
Hinojosa in Texas ran aggressively on data centers.
Abdul Syed ran on data centers.
I mean, so there were dozens of data center moratoriums on the ballot.
And I think so far, every single one of them, except for one, has won.
The exception that proves the rule.
So, a little inside baseball.
You came to the New York Times the week of January 6th, 2021.
You and I had already met, obviously.
Yeah, but my first week at the Times.
Right, but your first week at the Times was January 6th.
That was effectively the down payment on the second Trump term.
It also made this even more the Trump era than it might have been.
But is this finally the beginning of the end of Trumpism?
It's definitely the beginning of the end of Trump, right?
He's out in two years, no matter what.
But is it?
So, there's no Trumpism.
There was only ever Trump.
Which is to say that the work that various right-wing intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals tried to do.
Emphasis on pseudo.
To paint a coherence around Donald Trump's impulses.
And extract from that, what he was going to try to do with the tariff, say, right?
What a highly structured tariff regime during manufacturing back to America would look like.
That was a failure.
Donald Trump's tariffs were insane.
Trump is an end of the neocon, Middle East meddling era in foreign policy.
A failure.
Trump did not agree with you.
That was not Trumpism.
Over and over and over and over again, there have been these efforts to say what Trumpism is.
But Trump himself would not hold to any of them.
And so, one reason all of this collapsed.
And one reason I think the infighting of it on the right is ultimately going to be so vicious.
Is because you're still going to have the real Trumpism has never been tried people.
You already saw this happening on.
It was happening last night.
Last night, yeah.
The MAGA people were all like.
The neocons did this to us.
The neocons brought the rain.
Who were the neocons?
It was Trump.
Yeah.
Marco Rubio didn't get you into Iran.
It was Donald Trump himself.
It was Benjamin Netanyahu who got into Iran.
That wasn't Bill Kristol.
You kidding me?
It's ridiculous.
J.D. Vance is going to presumably run for president as a human sacrifice.
To say this is what Trumpism could have been.
Trumpism, right, without the war.
This is his whole view, right, that J.D. Vance could have been the intellectual nerve center of the Trump administration.
He wasn't in the end.
But maybe he'll run as that.
The problem is nobody actually thinks Vance-ism, which is what that really is.
Is appealing.
J.D. Vance was not a electoral juggernaut in Ohio when he ran.
He underperformed terribly.
And he's not popular now.
And so the movement is going to be to try to figure out, like, what can come after.
And that jockeying, particularly outside of the House and the Senate, is already going to begin.
And the key thing is Trump cares about his control.
He doesn't care about his ideology.
Trump wants fealty.
He doesn't want consistency.
Or coherence.
He's not an ideas guy.
And so in that way, like, he wants to keep his family out of jail.
Keep their profits right.
But everybody knows it to be true.
The Republican Party all knows it to be true.
You don't think he's home reading Patrick Deneen?
I don't think he's home reading Patrick Deneen.
Yeah.
Okay.
Before we go, I want to ask you something.
So I was on my way here.
I was texting with a friend of mine who's, well, she's a historian.
And she was saying, I was telling her what I was doing.
And she was like, okay, but don't, you know, as my mother always used to say, don't gloat.
And, you know, I don't want to gloat.
But I do want to focus on something.
People that we are very glad to see the end of who lost last night.
So I'm going to go first.
And that is Susan Collins.
She has the mask of the moderate, right?
And she did.
When things were close, she was the most likely senator to vote.
Against Republicans.
But that's still 15, 16, 17 percent, right?
Most of the time, she voted with them.
And she was the chief enabler of the destruction of women's right to choose because of the change in the court.
And I'm very, very happy to see her go.
Who are you happy to see go?
I think that the.
Place where I am happiest to see politicians and political tactics fail.
Is when they front load unabashed cruelty.
And I think that describes Ken Paxton in Texas.
Definitely.
And an immorality.
I think there's a world where he ran a much more honorable campaign than this, but it's not the world he ended up living in.
Vivek Ramaswamy in Ohio.
I think Roger Marshall in Kansas in the way that he like the incredibly.
Cruel interest he like.
Imposed upon his own patients or the 18 percent interest rates he had.
And the flip.
And the flip of that, because I think more about who I'm happy won than who I'm happy lost.
The flip of that is I am.
Really interested.
And optimistic.
About this rise of a religious left, this revival of a religious left and a moralistic.
Left right.
A left that is interested and able to speak in a language of virtue.
James Teller Rico, Adam Hamilton, Abdul El-Sayed and John Ossoff.
Ossoff is really good at speaking in a biblical cadence thick with language of virtue.
I think one of the giant opportunities in politics right now is to rebuild a politics.
It is explicitly moral within the moral wreckage of Donald Trump.
Yeah, it's a thermostatic response to their depravity and immorality, right?
And so I am quite interested in the candidates who are figuring out how to do that.
And I particularly think the Teller Rico, Hamilton, El-Sayed, Ossoff like group there.
Yeah.
Has that moral language in a way relatively few of the others do.
Let's give it a name.
You always like to give things a name, right?
We'll call it the love thy neighbor coalition.
And we'll call it a day, I think, yeah.
Aaron Redica, thank you very much.
Thanks a lot, Ezra.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The 2024 Democratic midterms shattered the traditional red-blue political map, with wins in Kansas, Texas, Iowa, and South Carolina—states once considered safe for Republicans.
Democrats succeeded by running candidates who authentically reflected local values, such as pro-life Democrats like Adam Hamilton and James Tallarico, who resonated with voters through faith, community, and policy alignment.
The election revealed that the Democratic Party’s “big tent” strategy—embracing diverse candidates across ideological and demographic lines—is not just viable but essential for winning in previously uncompetitive states.
Trump’s unrelenting policies, including tariffs, war escalation, and aggressive immigration enforcement, eroded public trust and alienated key voter groups, ultimately contributing to his party’s losses.
The rise of morally grounded, virtue-driven candidates like John Ossoff, Abdul El-Sayed, and Josh Turek signals a new political energy rooted in ethical leadership and community values.
Despite some progressive candidates underperforming, the overall electoral success underscores that winning depends on local fit, not ideological purity, and that strong, inclusive outreach is critical.
Events like the collapse of Trump-backed campaigns in Texas and Ohio highlight that financial largesse alone cannot secure victory, especially when voters reject corruption and misleading messaging.
The election marks a turning point where both parties must reevaluate strategy, with Democrats focusing on sustainable power-building, moral clarity, and coalition-building across diverse constituencies.
Summary:
The 2024 Democratic midterm victories in traditionally Republican states like Kansas, Texas, Iowa, and South Carolina fundamentally challenge the longstanding red-blue political map, exposing the fragility of ideological blocs. Democrats won not through ideological purity but by deploying locally rooted, culturally resonant candidates—such as pro-life Democrats, religious leaders, and community advocates—who connected with voters on identity, ethics, and shared values. This success reflects a broader strategy of a “big tent” party that listens to local needs rather than enforcing national ideological lines.
At the same time, Donald Trump’s disastrous record—marked by broken promises, war escalation, and abusive policies—undermined Republican credibility and alienated key demographic groups, particularly youth, Hispanic, and minority voters. The election also revealed that voter turnout and realignment are as significant as persuasion, with substantial shifts in identity-based voting patterns. Notably, the rise of candidates like John Ossoff, Abdul El-Sayed, and Adam Hamilton signals a new political energy rooted in moral clarity, virtue-based language, and community service.
While some progressive candidates underperformed, the overall trend shows that electoral success hinges on local fit and authenticity. The Democratic Party now faces the task of building durable power by protecting moderate, influential seats and investing in candidates who represent diverse constituencies. The era is shifting from ideological rigidity to pragmatic, inclusive, and morally grounded governance.
Meanwhile, the political landscape remains volatile due to economic uncertainty, AI-driven disruptions, and global instability, underscoring the urgency for both parties to adapt. The election’s outcome, though a major win, also exposes the need for long-term strategy, as the realignment of power is not just about winning seats, but about redefining the center of American politics.
FAQs
It means Democrats successfully ran diverse candidates who resonated with local voters, showing that states like Kansas, Texas, and Iowa are not beyond reach and that the traditional red-blue map is no longer reliable.
By running candidates who aligned with local values—such as pro-life Democrats like Adam Hamilton or James Tallarico—who resonated with voters and demonstrated that party strength can be built in previously 'red' areas.
His policies—like tariffs, border crackdowns, and military actions—alienated voters, leading to a significant loss of support, which created the conditions for Democrats to gain ground in key states.
Their performance was not a sign of failure, but rather a reflection of the need for candidates who are well-suited to local political dynamics, not just ideologically progressive.
It represents a new wave of candidates—like Adam Hamilton or John Ossoff—using moral and virtue-based language to appeal to voters, offering a strong contrast to Trump’s policies and building a more principled Democratic identity.
Yes, it suggests a realignment where states once thought to be safe for Republicans are now competitive, and the Democratic Party is building a more inclusive, regionally responsive structure.
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