The Case Against WarnerMount, with CA Attorney General Rob Bonta

[MUSIC] This episode is presented by AMC Network. A new chapter in Anne Rice's Immortal Universe begins with AMC's The Vampire Lestat. Get a backstage pass to the iconic frontman who pace magazine calls a boey inspired rocker that will have fans screaming. Don't miss the legendary vampire Lestat De Leon Corp in his own electrifying rock saga. Watch The Vampire Lestat Sundays only on AMC and AMC Plus. Learn more at AMCplus.com. It is Monday, July 13th. It finally happened after months of speculation, 12 US dates sued this morning to block the merger of Paramount Skydance and Warner Brothers Discovery. Rob Bonta, the California Attorney General leading the charge on behalf of Paramount's own state, for now, as well as New York, New Jersey, and mostly other Democratic states, he claimed the $110 billion deal will inflict substantial harm on movie theaters, basic cable distributors, and ultimately audiences nationwide. I read the complaint. It's interesting how it doesn't focus on the job losses from the merger, and instead defines the antitrust argument focusing on big budget theatrical movies and cable TV channels. In the US alone, the combined Warner Mount would control nearly a third of movies in theaters, and a third of cable channels, including TNT, MTV, and of course CNN. The unlawful merger of these two entertainment behemoths would lead to higher prices, lower quality, and less content for film and television, harming movie theaters, basic cable distributors, and ultimately audiences on every sofa and movie theater seat in the US. Bonta said today at a press conference, he then asked the Ellison family, which is spearheading this merger, to pause the closing of the deal, and if they won't, he'll seek an injunction to stop it. Remember, the clothes were set for as early as this week after regulators in 24 jurisdictions around the world and the Trump Justice Department signed off on this deal. Paramount in response, they put out their own fiery statement, I love a good fiery statement. They said the suit, quote, "distorts settled antitrust law" and is, quote, "based on a misrepresentation of competition in the entertainment industry today." They're bound to fight and saying that delaying the deal will only harm entertainment workers. Okay. So a big lie to the San moment here. And from the writer's guild to the theater industry lobbyists, they've come out in favor of this suit. The legal analysts have been much more skeptical. So today, we asked Rob Bonta himself to come on the show and explain and defend his major antitrust action against the biggest merger in Hollywood history. Our normal Monday guy Lucas Chas here as well. And today, it's the state's versus Warner Mouth. Now, it's war. From The Ringard Puck, I'm that Bellany, and this is the town. All right, we are here with the attorney general of California, Rob Bonta and Lucas Chas are normal Monday guy. Welcome, guys. Thank you for having me, honored to be with you. Rob, I'm sorry to say this, Mr. Bonta, but I am afraid that you are not going to get an invite to the Top Gun 3 premiere. Who knows? I'm holding out hope still. Yeah, you got hopes. All right. So Lucas and I both have questions here. You have done your press release. You're filing of the lawsuit. You did a press conference today in Hollywood. Great background, by the way, with the Hollywood sign. Nice touch. Thank you. Team. I want to start with the question that first jumped out at me when I saw the suit and read it. There are three words that are nearly entirely missing from this complaint. And those three words are Amazon Netflix Apple. Those are in my mind as someone who covers this business very closely. Three of the dominant players in entertainment. So how can you define this market for movies and TV without considering those three major competitors? Great question. You know, we looked at the proposed merger. And as part of our due diligence, looked at the different markets impacted by these two very diversified companies and looked at the market concentration and what it would mean and applied the appropriate law. Here's the Clayton Act section seven. And we determined that the law was being broken with respect to three markets when it comes to wide release theatrical films. Their distribution, the distribution of top-grossing theatrical films, blockbusters, if you will. And also with respect to the licensing of cable channels to cable distributors. And so I know that's a little technical, but it's our duty to analyze the different markets and make a decision based on each about whether antitrust law is violated or not. And so we narrowed it down to these three markets. And Paramount Warner Brothers is still talking about those companies. I think they're trying to suggest that a merged company of Paramount Warner Brothers would help compete with Netflix and Apple and other streamers. But we haven't brought a lawsuit challenging the market concentration in the streaming market. How did you decide that the theatrical movies or blockbuster movies were a market unto themselves when you have, you know, to Matt's question, a company like Netflix that releases dozens of original movies a year. Apple Amazon also make movies that might not fit that definition, but would seem to be competing for the time and money of movie fans. Yeah, one of the highest-grossing movies of the year in theaters this year came from Amazon. Project Hail Mary. Great movie, by the way. We'll have that movie. You know, we looked at the markets that we think the entertainment industry recognizes as different markets. You know, wide release theatrical films are different than, you know, select release theatrical films or and release of films straight straight to movie theaters are different than films that get released to streaming platforms first. And then later are released to theaters. And so and blockbusters are, you know, an animal market unto itself. And we think that the entertainment industry recognizes those markets as separate markets. And we wanted to look at the impact on each. And we saw that the impact in the blockbuster market in particular. That's where the, you see the biggest market concentration. But each of the markets as we define them is creates a limiting, substantial limiting of competition that makes them presumptively illegal. And so we think we have a really strong case in these three markets. Are there other markets that exist in the entertainment industry as you rightfully point out? Yes. But these three are the focal points of our lawsuit. And so it's really just the amount of screens that you are putting your movie on. Because when we talk about budgets for movies, I'm sure if we opened up the books of Netflix and Amazon and Apple, they're spending as much or more on the movies that go to their platforms as these high budget studios are doing for movies that go to theaters. Often they do go to theaters in certain ways. And in many cases, this seems like you're, you're defining this essentially by what the theaters are getting from these. Not necessarily by what the studios are producing. Right. It's a relationship and that the consolidation in the market has an impact on when to previously competing distributors of theatrical films now merge, they have the market share, the market power, the negotiating power to dictate terms. And who do they dictate those terms to? They dictate them to the theaters where they release the films. And so that means that the moviegoers, the audiences will pay more to see those films because of the poorer negotiating power of the theaters and that the experience will be eroded, it will be less than, will be decreased. You won't have premium screens, you won't have comfortable seating, you won't have the same quality and variety at concession stands. But yes, it is because of the concentration of power's impact on the entity that they negotiate with. And here it's movie theaters. For cable channels, you know, the merged Paramount Warner Brothers would have 50 of the most sought after cable, basic cable channels in the nation. And when they negotiate with Xfinity Comcast or AT&T or Spectrum or Cox, they will also be dictating terms and they'll be able to threaten them with a blackout and say, if you don't pay the terms we're asking for, you know, I've gotten any of these great channels from MTV to HGTV, the Cartoon Network, you know, the list goes on. Nickelodeon Comedy Central, the list goes on. And so that means higher prices for cable subscribers and satellite dish subscribers. So you know, this, I don't want to be lost in the, you know, the market definition and the variety of different ways that TV series and film, films arrive at audiences. This is about affordability. And this is about everyday people's ability to enjoy and experience some of the joys of life, a movie, a TV series, you know, at home through cable or satellite or, you know, God forbid, at a movie theater, you know, for a night out. And this merger will, we'll make that experience the quality less and make it eroded and it will make the price higher. Your suit, you know, it mentions not just what would happen in terms of concentration with Paramount and Warner Brothers getting together, but you draw that connection with Disney. And I'm curious because we're now, you know, seven years or so out since Disney bought Fox's movie studio. The risks that you're warning about in this case, did you, have you seen demonstrative evidence that kind of the combination of Disney and Fox both led to higher prices for consumers and degraded the movie experience because I'm just curious in your suit, you also describe that theatrical business is booming. So it would seem like those are maybe at odds with one another. Yeah, you know, part of the analysis that we've done here is talking about the concentration of power, the, sorry, the additional market concentration here with the Paramount, Warner Brothers proposed merger in an already concentrated marketplace, one that has seen a consolidation in the past, as you mentioned, Disney Fox. And what we wanted to point out about Disney Fox and we set forth in the complaint is that the content output decreases, the number of movies is fewer. And they will cut on content and on output because they can and it'll save the money. And, you know, the Disney executive leadership said that, we quote that in the complaint. So the impacts that we are suggesting will occur here, we've seen with some demonstrative evidence in this, you know, in the entertainment industry specifically, we've also seen similar impacts when it comes to other markets and in other spaces, but you know, generally consolidation means higher prices, lower wages, jobs that get cut, lower quality, lower competition and less choice. You mentioned before the cable channel distribution business. So I'm going to read you the Nielsen gauge numbers from last month, 48% of viewing in this country was on streaming services. 22% of viewing was on cable channels. Clearly, the overall market for watching content at home has moved beyond cable. And that, you know, by all we covered all the time on this show, that is a dying business. It's not a nothing business. It still serves its audience, but it is not where the growth is and is where the consumers are going. So you're essentially alleging here that this is an anti competitive merger in an area of the business that by most accounts is going away. How can you not consider the larger viewing ecosystem when looking at this consolidation? Because they're competing with it. They're absolutely going up against Netflix and Amazon. Yet you're saying that this one aspect of television viewing in cable channels is the one that is anti competitive. One of the three. Yeah. In addition to the two theatrical film releases that we're talking about, you know, wide release and as well as blockbusters. So we did not look at it. We looked at all the impacts. And, you know, I think as we're duty-bound and obligated to do, and you know, the streaming market is different than the cable market is different than the theatrical release market. And each one has its own independent analysis and where we landed was three clean markets where the impact of the merger is presumptively illegal based on a clear threshold that the law has defined. We think we have a really strong case. And if we block the merger, then the whole merger gets blocked, not just the merger in those markets. And so, you know, we think that it's our job to bring forth the best case that we have based on the facts and the law. That's what we did here. Paramounts statement on that issue says that I'm quoting here, "The practical effect of this lawsuit is to shield those dominant streaming platforms like Netflix and the technology companies from much needed competition while preventing the significant benefits this transaction will deliver for consumers, creators, workers, and the broader Hollywood economy. Are you are you shilling for Netflix?" Obviously not. You know, the statement, it's painful to hear at each time I hear it, and I've heard it multiple times in a row. Why is it painful? I mean, like that they're helping consumers and creators and workers and the Hollywood ecosystem. That's not what the producers say, it's not what the independent filmmaker says, not what the director says, not what the writer says, not what Sag After says and the actors and the creatives. So I'm not sure why their perspective is different than the actual people they're trying to speak for. Well, I could think of some reasons. I mean, obviously, I mean, it's self-serving and it's just not true. You know, this is a $110 billion proposed merger, the largest merger in the history of Hollywood should have be consummated. And they want to point to someone else who is a black hat. They want a point to Netflix. Well, but there are these monoliths that are dominating Hollywood right now. We're seeing it scale matters. And these are globally vertically integrated companies for the first time in the history of the entertainment business that can do it all. Distribute film and television around the world instantaneously via the internet. And it has completely caught the rest of the entertainment business flat-footed. And they are now scrambling to catch up. So, you know, the argument would flow from there that by combining forces of these two companies, you could perhaps create a real competitor to Netflix or Amazon. That's their argument. But why are they wrong? Because we're not challenging them based on that market. And, you know, they're missing the mark by a mile. We haven't challenged their merger based on the impact on the streaming service market, on the streaming market. We've challenged it based on three other markets. And I mean, I don't see their argument is almost, like, you have to allow us to do illegal things so that we can create a combined mega-corporate relation that can compete with these other mega-corporations. And that's not how the law works. If you break the law, you've broken the law. We only need to have identified that they violated the law, antitrust law, in one market. We've done that three x. We've identified three markets. And they're not allowed to violate the law in any market. So, it's an awkward argument. I guess it's from a legal perspective. It makes no sense. It falls flat. From a PR perspective, I think that is probably the space where they might have any support. And I don't know if it's true. I don't know how they're going to compete. I think they're going to have worse quality, lower amount of output, you know, less TV series and less films. So, it's a theoretical argument. I don't know if it would be realized. But I think it's their best PR argument, but it just has nothing to do with this case legally. So, I'm curious about that because you make the point about depressed output. I think a lot of people feel that that is inevitable because it would stand to reason usually when you combine things you're not doing it to make more. They have been adamant that they are going to release more movies, 30 movies a year, increase production for streaming. So, do you just not believe them? Yeah. And it's not enforceable. It's what an executive would say to get a merger done. When history shows otherwise, Disney Fox shows otherwise, output went down, not up. And despite them saying that they were going to maintain or produce more. These unenforceable statements by executives that are self-serving to get a merger done, I can't credit them. What could they do, I guess, to make you feel okay, that they actually mean it? If they are committed to a certain amount of output, committed to spending a certain amount in, you know, for California production, something like that, would that help? These are referred to in sort of the jargon as behavioral remedies. When there's a promise to do something as opposed to a structural remedy, like a divastiture, a breakup, split up to corporate entities. And the behavioral remedies just are tough to realize. And even in ticket master live nation, there were behavioral remedies in that case, and a consent decree from years ago. And we ended up in court with them again for violation of antitrust law and one on every single question posed to the jury. So behavioral remedies, I think, just are not as strong or successful, historically, as structural remedies, as a divastiture. But it could be an alternative to two to three years of costly litigation for an uncertain result. Maybe, you know, enforceability is something that's been very important to us. You know, if you say you're going to do something, you got to do it with a remedy and a consequence, if you don't, saying you're going to do something and then later saying, hey, you know, just the numbers don't add up this year to do 30 films. We're only going to do 15. Right. And they're being- So what I've said from the beginning that would likely happen at some point, you know, they do it for a couple of years, then they'd have a bomb or two, and then they'd say, you know, we're retrenching you guys in the complaint noted that Davis has a lot of the CEO of want to discovery. He promised 20 movies in 2024. They ultimately released nine. Right. So that is a good piece of evidence there. I'm curious why your complaint does not focus on the labor markets here. So much of the complaints about this merger focus on the thousands of jobs that are going to be lost. and hiring for talent and all this, you don't really focus on that and why is that? 'Cause in the Simon and Schuster case, recently that whole monops in the argument about having fewer choices for talent to sell their books to, that was a key focus in that case. You haven't focused on that here. - Yeah, and not for not thinking about it. It doesn't appear in the final complaint, but we've, I think our due diligence brought us everywhere. We thought about the streaming market, we thought about the labor market as you've just described it as a market on its own, but we also, certainly our complaint has multiple references to impacts on workers, impacts on labor, job loss, loss in the entertainment industry of jobs and opportunities of lower wages. And so that's part of our overall, I guess, contextualization of the case and something that's very important to me and I think is an important impact and element of this antitrust case that we've brought, but we didn't identify a specific labor market as one of the markets that we were gonna bring a case on. It's more part of the overall impact of the anti-competitive outcomes from this merger. It will lead to less output as we just talked about, less movies being made, less TV series being made, when there's less movies being made, less TV series being made, workers are working less. There are less jobs, so there's inevitably an impact on the workers based on this merger. And we've touched on that, but not described a separate labor market as you mentioned. - This episode is brought to you by Accenture. When your advertising operations fall out of sync, campaigns slow down, insights get buried, and opportunities get missed. That's why Spotify and Accenture are working together to reinvent the rhythm of ad sales, using automation, analytics, and smarter workflows to simplify campaign delivery and access better data across the business. The result, less time spent on operations, more time connecting brands with the moments and fandoms that matter most. To learn more, check out Accenture.com/Spotify. - Are you at all surprised that there kind of hasn't been the same groundswell of opposition from the kind of Hollywood labor community to this deal as there was to Netflix? I mean, there's been some, but Netflix, people were framing and sort of like an existential threat to the whole industry. This one, it's felt a little more muted. - Yeah, I mean, I think that's kind of what you were both describing earlier, the sort of growing concern. Maybe it's already at level 10 of about Netflix and these streaming services, and their impact on the traditional studios. I think maybe that was seen as by some as a bigger threat. But I've definitely heard a lot of concern, a major outcry from the different types of labor, from the actors, the crew on the sets, IOTC, SAG, AFTRA. We've heard from the writers, we've heard from directors, we've heard from producers, we've heard from independent filmmakers. All types of workers in the space, and almost unanimously, almost with one voice, they've been opposed and think that this proposed merger is bad for whatever group of workers that they represent. And the writers' guild issued a statement today that was very clear about what they think about this. - I read that. So just jurisdictionally here, you, just so we have it clear, the Ellisons are likely gonna extend their middle finger here and say, "Go with God and file for your injunction." So ultimately, this will be up to a judge, and whether to join this deal before it closes. And you did an interesting thing in the complaint. You have stated that this case is related to an existing case that is already going on in the Northern District. Does that mean that you are happy with that judge in that case, Martina Zalguin? You would like that judge to oversee this case as well? - Yeah, we like that judge, as someone who has experience on this issue already, is already doing some deep thinking and has taken a deep dive into this space. They have that judge has a case in front of her brought by private plaintiffs challenging this merger. So the fact that the judge is already up to speed is thinking about this, thinking about its impacts. We like that. And so we related our case to the private plaintiffs case and we are before that judge who's already thinking about the issues that we wanna talk about. - Just logistically here, there was some reporting around the Justice Department, the Federal Justice Department and how some of the attorneys there were upset that this merger was approved without some of the traditional opportunities to object internally. Did you, were you in contact with Federal Justice Department lawyers about coordinating or them helping or supporting you in any ways behind the scenes? - We have some lines of communication to the USDA and the FTC, the two traditional federal antitrust law enforcers. They are playing a very different role these days under Trump and I would say it's not just that they are absent and doing nothing, they're actually, it's not just doing nothing and doing no harm, they are affirmatively doing harm. They are ushering through proposed mergers that they should be challenging and in the past would have challenged regardless of it being a Republican or a Democratic administration. They're picking winners and losers, they're picking favorites, it's Trump deciding who he wants to help and what companies he thinks he wants to emerge. He tried to bark orders at Brendan Carr to allow next-door tegnah to merge. They embarrassingly, during, after trial already started and ticket master live nation entered into a very weak slap on the wrist, sweetheart deal with ticket master live nation and here, they're not playing the role that they want that they should be playing. They're not allowing the antitrust professionals to apply antitrust law. They're going over their heads at the White House based on something that has no relation to law and to fact. And so that's no surprise, that is on brand, that is what this administration has done, is doing, I think will continue to do, and all the more reason that we need to have state AGs stepping up and stepping in. - On the other hand, that's what people say is going on here. This is a politically motivated challenge, not solid on the law, it's all about politics and standing up to Trump to win points for an election year. - I just don't see it. We have a history here. We've taken Amazon to court for price fixing. We've brought a bipartisan case against ticket master live nation and won every single question posed to a jury. We already have a preliminary injunction and next star, Tegna. That's also bipartisan, red states and blue states side by side. Here, it's unfortunate that there are not red states engaged. I had heard that some red states had concerns about this proposed merger. And you have to ask them why they're not part of this case based on the facts of the law. - They should be. - Well, and there's two blue states, Illinois and Maryland that were involved in live nation and are not a party to this case. What happened there? - We have 12 states so far on filing day. I think each state takes a look at the case and the impact that it might have on their state and makes a decision. Sometimes there's some movement, meaning additional states come on board later. That happened in next star Tegna with actually some red states coming on board after we filed. So it might not be that it's just 12 states that you see now are the final states that you see in the lawsuit and work could be added, both blue and red. But each state makes their own decision and you'd have to ask them about why they made the decision that they made. But we have 12 great states in this lawsuit and no surprise that the DOJ career professionals felt that this was the wrong decision about the White House and that the case should have been, the merger should be challenged by the US DOJ. - Maybe the other states are holding out to be the new headquarters of Paramount Warner Brothers from the New Yorker. - Exactly, yeah, what about that? Because this is not, people saw that report last night that Paramount is considering moving out of California. It's not that silly. I have heard that from them. Larry Ellison did that with Oracle, moved it to Texas. He is now residing in Florida to escape Texas and the House is probably big enough there for David to move in with him. They could move this company out of California, which would be a problem. Do you worry about that as a politician here that you're driving business out of the state? - Look, I always want companies and businesses to found here, grow here, create jobs, contribute it to what is now the fourth large economy in the world, make this their home, create good jobs, help our economy thrive. That's my hope. And I insist that they follow the law. If their position is, if you don't let us break the law, we're moving out of the state of California, I don't know what to tell you. You gotta follow the law. It's not negotiable. The law applies to everywhere. Antitrust law is the law. You have to follow it. And so it felt like the statement that they were, you know, yesterday, the first time I ever heard it, that they were considering leaving. Oh, that can't be the first time you heard it. 'Cause I've heard it. And they've been communicating with you. - They haven't said it. - Okay. certainly hasn't been as clear and explicit a threat, which is what it seemed to be. David is surrounded by Larry's people. And this was a tactic that Larry's people used with Oracle and would make sense that they would then suggest to him. Now he has not said publicly whether he wants to do this. If I, you know, having known him a little bit, I would guess that he probably does not want to move to Texas or Florida, but it is something in his arsenal that he could wield against you. Yeah. No, I mean, it seems like what a potential monopolist would do to try to get their way. And to threaten a state that is simply doing its job of enforcing the law here. It felt like somewhat desperate last ditch effort to blackmail the states into allowing an illegal merger to go through. And that's just not going to happen. It didn't happen. It's not going to happen. We have a duty. We have an obligation. We're going to be firm and fair on that. We're going to apply the law. And this isn't illegal merger. Period full stop. And if there position is, you didn't allow us to break the law. We're going to pick up our ball and go home or go somewhere else. I don't know what to say because there's no such thing as being allowed to act illegally. You got to follow the law. Period full stop. And that includes paramount wonder brothers. Can you spend much time with David Ellison throughout this process? No. But I have spent time. I've met him in person. It was with a broader group. He's impressive. And I've also like you, like I'm hearing Matt say, I've interacted with people who know him from his career in the entertainment industry. Many who like him. And this isn't personal though. It's not about trying to help a friend or whether I like him or don't like him. I'm sure he's a he's a wonderful person. And it sounds like there's people in the his ecosystem that that think highly of him doesn't change the fact that it's an illegal deal. And that in three marketplaces we defined it breaks the law. And that's not allowed. So you know, this is about business. It's not personal. And we insist that companies in California as they thrive follow the law. Let's say you can't get the injunction hypothetically and certain settlement things come on the table. If he agreed to sell CNN, would that be enough for you? No. Because I have reported that in your circle around you and you said this privately that that would be something that you would be interested in seeing. I don't know where that came from to be honest. So maybe you're not going to reveal your sources, but I don't think I've ever said that. I don't think I've ever thought that. I don't think that that is anywhere near sufficient to addressing the anti-competitive harms. That was certainly not the business wise. But politically it would be something that Elizabeth Warren would get excited about. And the democratic base we get excited about. I think people who love freedom, free speech, freedom of the press, an independent press that tells the truth, that truth seeks and truth tells, that holds people in power accountable. And holds their feet to the fire would be thrilled. And it should be. But our job is to look at the anti-trust law here. All right. Last question. Do you worry a little bit that if you lose this one, you're going to make some precedent that it's going to make it harder to bring similar anti-trust cases in the future? I don't. Look, law is always possible in litigation and in life. And I think about the facts and the law. I think about the strength of our case. I think about every day people who just want to get a movie ticket for a special occasion for a first date or an anniversary or a birthday party or someone who wants a cable bill that doesn't break the bank, that's what I think about. And I could lose in any case I ever bring. And sometimes we do. And in the cases we're bringing against a Trump administration, we're winning 80% of the time. In our anti-trust cases, we're on a roll right now with ticket master live nation next to our tagna, some big wins in our Amazon case. And we just look at the facts and the law and apply them. And we think we got a great case. We wouldn't bring a case unless we thought we were going to win. Is it guaranteed? Of course not. There's always risk. But I'm not worried about setting any adverse precedent. I'm focused on winning this case for the people who deserve someone fighting for them. And that's every day people just trying to afford their lives. Well, don't go to the AMC in Century City if you're afraid of high movie ticket prices. It's like 23 bucks now, unbelievable, without the ticket charge. That one's good. I'm crossing out off the list. All right. Well, we appreciate the time. Thank you for coming on the show. It'll be fascinating how this one plays out. Thanks Matt. Thank you Lucas. Great to be with you guys. We're back with the call sheet. Craig, these slaps in my face keep coming this summer in the box office draft. Moana just absolutely craft the bed. 43 million. Budget is 250 million. I mean, we hit the under on our over under this week, but it's not looking good. No, you've had a you've had a rough couple of weeks with minions in Moana. Unfortunately, it's looking like unless unless Avengers really surprises. It makes two and a half billion dollars. You might have back to back losses here at the box office. And and Lucas has Odyssey and Spider-Man coming. Even doing it. It's just going to be a kick in the nuts after another. All right. Well, we don't have to talk about that. But I want to talk a little bit about the entire Disney strategy here because I've seen a lot of people saying, oh, this is the end. No more live action remakes of the animated movies. Disney has learned their lesson. They can't keep doing this. I totally disagree. My prediction is this will not stop. Disney will absolutely continue to make these movies. Moana will be considered an anomaly because 10 years was clearly not enough between the original and the remake. It's not the 10 years. That was the issue. I think it's the it's the 20 months between Moana doing this one. That's the issue. They shot themselves in the foot with the first one. We've talked about this. So I think they're going to distinguish this one. I think tangled, which is already in production. That's happening. I think they're going to move forward. They've got a bunch of others in development. There's Bambi. There's aristocrats with aristocrats. Yes, sorry. Aristocrats are very different. Aristic ads with Questlove is developing that one. They have Hercules in development. I think they're just going to they're going to now maybe they'll bring down the budget. There's probably little reason for these movies to cost $250 million. I think maybe the rock had a lot to do with that this time, but they're going to continue to make them. I mean, I completely agree. Also, you can just look at even look at the past five to 10 years. There's like five to eight live action remakes that made over a billion dollars. A lot of beauty in the beast, Lilo and Stitch, the Lion King jungle book, all those movies made a billion or more. The key stat is the average time between the original and the remake is 27 years. According to the franchise newsletter, they need to go back to that. They can't do more recent ones. It's just not long enough. Yeah, Tangled Not Bad. Tangled was 2010. This will be 17, 18 years probably before it comes out. Yeah. We'll see. But Disney will not stop. All right, that's the show for today. I want to thank my guest Rob Bonta and Lucas Shaw, producer Craig Horoback, artistry's Jesse Lopez and Steph Sanchez. I don't want to thank you. We'll see you a couple more times this week.