Taiwan’s upcoming local elections, especially the Taipei mayoral race, are not just local contests but critical indicators of future political leadership and national security strategy. The race between DPP’s Puma Shun and KMT’s young candidate highlights a shift toward grassroots resilience and local policy focus, with Puma Shun gaining traction through practical, community-oriented messaging rather than confrontational rhetoric. Despite progress in civil defense planning, including emergency drills and infrastructure hardening, Taiwan’s efforts remain fragmented, politically polarized, and underfunded. A significant challenge is the growing divide between parties over resilience, where defense initiatives are increasingly partisan. U.S. defense commitments, including a $29 billion arms backlog, face skepticism due to delays and political obstruction, particularly from the KMT, which has questioned transparency and efficiency. Meanwhile, Chinese coercion tactics have evolved into covert, low-profile operations, such as naval exercises and intelligence probes, signaling a persistent but less overt pressure campaign. The U.S. pursuit of strategic stability with China risks weakening Taiwan’s defense readiness by delaying essential reforms and eroding trust. Ultimately, Taiwan’s security future hinges on effective, transparent, and coordinated defense planning—between government, military, and civil society—that transcends political divisions and responds to real, tested threats.
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This episode is about Taiwan's political and security future.
It features three of the smartest analysts I know on the topic.
Amanda Sal of the RAN Corporation, Mike Hunsiker of GMU and Peter Matis of the James Town Foundation.
Enjoy the show.
We've got local elections coming up in Taiwan on November 28th of this month.
It's coming up.
The campaigning has been accelerating and it's been a really exciting campaign season to watch.
Just reviewers or listeners, the Taiwanese local elections are for over 10,000 seats across
the island for nine different categories of local offices.
These are not elections at the federal level.
It's not the presidential election, it's not the legislature.
It's really very local and the key races to watch are the really six big ones.
Why does it matter nationally if it's just local?
The Taipei mayor going back for the left, like since Taiwan has had democracy, the Taipei
mayor has always been a presidential candidate, if not someone who becomes the president.
Right now, we actually have a genuinely contested race between DPP candidate, the ruling party,
or at least the presidential party, Shambuoyong or Pumashan as many of us know him in DC, who's
well thought of academic.
He's helped build civic training and education programs and he's been in the legislature.
Six months ago, it felt like he might be a sacrificial lamb running into the breach
of a Camtie who a woman don't stronghold.
And this is quite contested.
It's closer than anyone thought it was, probably within a margin of error.
And in some cases, I think he has a real chance of winning.
And on the Camtie side, you have a young one on who has been one of the young kind of
stars of Camtie politics.
And so you, in a sense, have a fight between star power.
You have a fight between the two sort of two real young guns that could be our presidential
contenders in the future.
And so this is just one of a number of kind of interesting races.
I think it is important, especially because a lot of us are going to be listening to this
right after the US midterm election to just keep in mind that as Amanda was pointing out,
the 9-in-1 local elections are not quite equivalent in that the Taiwanese are not voting on national
security issues.
They're not voting on cross-strait relations or US Taiwan relations.
At the same time, these elections are going to have important implications for those types
of issues.
And to build on this previous point, one of the reasons is because the candidate for Mayor
and Taipei is Puma Shun.
And he has become the face of kind of the DPP's push for social resilience.
I think that is a key reason why we should watch the race for future rising stars.
So even if Puma Shun does not win the race and Taipei, what he has effectively created
is an infrastructure for the future, and he has a much more hyperfile brand now going forward
for his future political career.
So it's possible we'll see him run for the legislature in '28, and it obviously creates
a narrative that he is a likely future presidential contender.
I would say that on the bit about his positioning on resilience, that is what Puma rose to fame
for, right?
That's how he built his initial brand.
But I do think that when you look at the way he's campaigned and Taipei, it's been very
focused on local issues.
And I think that is a key reason why he has surprised voters and both parties that I think
the K&T sort of expected to be able to capitalize on the fact that he has been really outspoken
on resilience that he has taken on a more confrontational posture towards China.
And this is something that they were going to try to use to their advantage.
But instead, what he's done is he's gone around and talking about, you know, tree canopies
across Taipei, transportation issues, the sorts of things, childcare, the sorts of things
that Taipei voters really care about.
And that's been his appeal with great competence, I would say.
Well, and he's shown up on K&T media or with or blue-leaning interviewers and he's given,
you know, concrete answers, he's given, he's talked about, again, all of these kinds
of bread and butter, home-life type issues that matter to voters much more than, you know,
at least today, more than say the cross-rate issues or more than some of these other ones.
But I want to kind of move out of Taipei because I think there's some other important things
to realize, kind of like the United States, though, there's a lot of, say, protection
of critical infrastructure, the issues of sort of resilience in the face of catastrophe
or invasion that are done by local mayors, by county leaders.
And so that does have a role in these things.
And who is the mayor and the anti-Jong, who is the mayor and Gao Shiong, who is the mayor
in Taoyuan or Shinbei, new Taipei city?
If this all matters for power plant certification or, you know, is coal being put in reserves
rather than, say, trying to wrestle with building more LNG storage, like they're all of these
other kind of nitty gritty policy issues that matter that probably are not going to be
on voters' minds, but they certainly matter to the United States in terms of the implications
of the election.
The KMT expected to do poorly, it sounds like, do you think that has any relationship
to their cross-rate policies?
Like, you know, there was the KMT at this big party leader, this big visit to China that
probably didn't go over well with many people.
At least I had started to hear pessimism from the KMT side earlier this year.
I think some of that, most of that was related to structural problems, meaning that this
election season, the KMT is facing 10 open seats.
So they've lost in a currency advantage, and a number of those areas are green leaning
in general, so they were facing a bit of an uphill climb already.
This was for the cross-rate piece, and it's only one who is the leader of the KMT, her
visit to Beijing and her efforts to career engagement.
I think that's something that we've seen a lot of local KMT politicians try to create
distance from.
In the campaigning across Taiwan, it hasn't been the most popular person for these local
politicians, so I think that tells us a lot about how local politicians understand what
voters want when it comes to China policy.
An observation that I would make off of talking with some of the KMT campaign people versus
some of the Kaylas called the KMT governance type people is that there is, I think, a
gap in understanding of where voters are and what they think that's there.
Perhaps the KMT headquarters has a bit more distance from when you talk to the people
that are going to run campaigns that are pushing it, where they've got a different view
of what's at stake, a different view of the races that are in play, a different view
of the factors that are there, and that's, I think, the fact that we've seen some distance
created, I think, is a testament to the fact that there is a gap in understanding about
where voters are and what matters, and this is why they're possibly also, for resource
reasons, a bit more distance from these campaigns.
Mike, you first brought up social resilience, which is basically this movement to prepare
Taiwan for not just disasters, but for invasion and resistance.
How would you rate Taiwan's progress on being better prepared to defend itself if the worst
should happen?
I know this is an issue you follow very closely.
At the macro level, I think we can say that trajectory has been positive, maybe even
very positive, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine war, who really serious grassroots
efforts.
You know, go forward, Alliance, Pumashan, and the Kuma Academy, lots of other organizations
that maybe don't make the news in the United States.
They're doing very meaningful work in terms of increasing, first of all, just awareness
of the problem set, and second of all, actually in very practical and tangible ways, preparing
people for all sorts of range of potential disasters and so on.
We also see a ton of very important work from the top down, particularly in the lie administration,
this whole of society, resilience committee that he put together a couple of years ago,
which on one hand might seem like just kind of a talk shop, but on the other hand, it
really is in meaningful ways, breaking down some traditional bureaucratic stovepipes,
getting actors and agencies in the government and the private sector just to start talking
to one another, which helps to establish both the precedent, but also an important framework
for how the sort of integration is going to have to happen.
So I would say, all in all, good news.
The challenge, I think, is, I would start with a twofold.
One is resilience coming back to the local elections.
It really has become a very partisan issue, such that candidates themselves, you know, it
almost is as if to participate in some of these training exercises is to identify yourself
as being on one end of the political spectrum, and you see on the DPP overwhelming support
for these efforts, and you see on the KMT side are KMT leading voters sort of opposition
or concern that actually these are the sorts of things that are likely to antagonize
you.
That's not a very good sign.
That kind of division when it comes to defending your country, a kind of political division.
One of the big challenges is, like, how do, I mean, we from the United States, who I think
many of us who follow this closely, think that these are very important initiatives.
How do we help these grassroots organizations in particular overcome that perception, and
they're doing what they can, but it is a very difficult obstacle to overcome.
I would say the other challenge is, and here I'd open up, love to hear others' thoughts,
I think resilience is kind of become the new national security buzzword that asymmetry
was just a few years ago, and in this way, it kind of becomes anything that you want it
to be.
to go back to Washington and say we're making meaning.
improvement in our ability to kind of withstand and resist, you simply label something resilience.
And that's making it very difficult, two ways, one for Washington, I think, to pay attention
to where, where's the smoke and then what's actually the stuff that's happening that matters.
And then everything that's ending up getting labeled resilience, the more resilience grows
as a category, the more challenging it is to the degree that that category has become
highly partisan.
The lie administration, because they don't control the legislature, because they don't
control many of the local political groupings, whether it's a county or city, has chosen
to make it largely a national level program that's driven, you know, the resources are controlled
from the top, the policies are driven by the top, and the KMT, because they have, you
know, some reasonable doubts about whether or not they can really get the presidency or
bring an L.I. majority with it, where you really take over that kind of national leadership
again, is much more, much more interested in having policies and localities drive some
of this, you know, where outsiders have played a pretty productive role is in trying to bridge
the conversation between it, because if you start talking about, you know, what do we
do with air defense assets, it to protect, say, Tijel, right, like in Taipei, you know,
the military is going to make its judgment calls and say, here's how we protect the national
command.
You know, I don't think it's something that the Ministry of National Defense or others
have talked about or thought about in conjunction with local authorities about what makes Tijel
work, what, make a Gaussian work, what makes Tainan work, or Tallyen.
And as a result, there's been, I think, some productive work, you know, yes, it gets
a little amorphous.
There's been productive work on how do you make telecommunications function?
How, you know, where do you position air defense assets?
What should they be protecting and what should be done with energy?
How much of a buffer do they have?
How much, you know, what do they have to protect?
What other reserves are possible?
And these are conversations that weren't taking place a couple of years ago and at least
they're moving forward.
So agree on that, I think we shouldn't understate how much work is happening.
Every ministry has been tasked with upgrading pre-existing emergency plans, a lot of which
were about how to respond to natural disasters and adapting them to explicitly to a Chinese
invasion or Chinese high end coercion scenario.
With that work has started in earnest, the trajectory is correct.
What I have a hard time assessing, and I think any outsider would have a hard time assessing.
And again, there's a lot of work being done like we talked about Tide Zone.
Tide Zone has been asked to exercise what happens last year they did an exercise to talk about
how to respond to potential Chinese missile strikes on their LNG facilities, right?
They're talking about medical preparedness, hospitals are undergoing hardening.
They're moving, they're trying to figure out how to move things into basements.
They're figuring out the parts of their supply chains that are vulnerable to the Chinese.
So Taiwan has actually started to produce its own blood bags.
So there's a lot of concrete things that are happening.
My issue is that it is hard to assess what all of this means in terms of impact and outcome.
So we've got a lot of stuff on paper, got a lot of numbers, right?
Also every part of the government has been tasked with inventoring stockpiling.
How much do we have of this critical good?
How much do we need?
There's a lot of updating of plans, but that doesn't actually tell us if Taiwan is ready.
And that's where it's difficult.
It's quite a high standard because what would accept the event itself, right?
Well, I think one thing that needs to be done is there needs to be regular testing of
the plans under increasingly realistic and complex conditions.
This is not unique to Taiwan, it's not unique to the US-Taiwan relationship with this obsession
with inputs and just using those as a substitute for outcomes.
Outcomes is what we think will shape deterrence in Chinese perspective.
I would wholeheartedly agree we should not understate the amount of work that's been done.
I guess the only thing I would add to that is I don't think we should also understate
the amount of work that remains to be done.
A couple of key things I would just highlight, most important, and maybe I'm an outlier
in this, but I think that any effective deterrence posture has to begin and end with the military.
And it has to be holistic, but the M&D really has just shown no institutional interest to
play ball with the grassroots organizations.
And of course, although it has representatives on the whole of society defense, the fact
that we're talking about municipalities making decisions on air defense just shows the
degree of disconnect.
So that's a huge problem.
There's another problem, which is, and again, not unique to Taiwan, but this sort of in
order to show movement on resilience, creating new things, which are just getting layered
on top of old things.
It's not clear how the old things, and by that, I mean the civil defense laws and institutions
which already exist on paper and in practice, but how are those going to integrate with
the grassroots efforts that are happening and the military efforts.
And so although integrated deterrence is maybe a concept that has gotten a bad rap in Taiwan's
case, I think it's definitely something that really needs to be explored in just a very
serious way.
Well, you did bring up the defense budget.
What's going on there?
The KMT last time I was following this more closely really pushed back on a lot of investments
that the government wanted to make.
Where do we stand now?
I think one of the bills just made progress in the legislature yesterday, but I'm not
really sure what happened.
The 2027 defense budget, which is a fairly significant increase, is it was moved forward
in committee, but it just means that they're going to be holding hearings to review it and
to discuss it.
And this is going to get -- this is where the politics comes in, right?
And I think this is something where Americans should have a far greater appreciation for
what the issue is.
We talk a lot about Taiwanese politics being symbolic or rhetorical.
When, in fact, if the presidential party doesn't control the legislature and doesn't have
the votes, then you're going to have politics to get a policy outcome.
And we need to be cognizant of that that is what is going to take place.
If the last year and a half was any indication that it's going to be messy, it can get ugly.
There have been deliberate targeting of critical defense programs like backups on satellite
communications to try to zero them out.
It can get really, really nasty about some important things that are hard to see.
And one of the things that makes this difficult -- as Americans, we like to complain about
Congress and we like to complain about congressional staff, but the resourcing and the knowledge
level that is available to congressional members, especially to the Armed Services committees,
is much, much higher than anything that is in Taiwan.
There are a handful of experts in the legislative UN, but one of them is going to be stepping
down, does not want to go through another term in office.
And as a result, even if the administration is trying to be transparent about certain things,
that doesn't mean that the legislative staff or the legislators are going to understand
what exactly it was.
To give an example, we had to explain that, yes, Taiwan had purchased the missile systems,
but if you didn't have sensing, then you were going to be able to target them.
That is actually a kind of level of knowledge that you can expect from some tail-marry
of those things.
Well, then they'd be called rockets.
The defense budget needs to go up, but I actually think that Washington's emphasis on
showing more spending is unhelpful in a couple of regards, the most important of which
is that there are some very good faith concerns about inefficiency, corruption, misallocation.
Again, Taiwan is not unique in this regard, but it doesn't have a defense production apparatus
akin to what the United States has.
There are sticky fingers all over this process.
And so when the KMT is bringing up oversight issues and transparency, I will be honest,
if a presidential administration in the United States proposed an equivalent bill, roughly
the same size scale as that special defense bill that was, and it was as long as the special
defense bill was, I too would have tons of questions.
And so by really fixating on top line spending, it's sort of playing to these partisan debates,
it's triggering some very understandable good faith concerns about oversight.
And let's be honest, a huge piece of the defense budget is still going to very expensive
traditional symmetric weapons, which the United States is not going to, and the only
the US can produce them, the United States is not going to be able to deliver in any meaningful
timeline.
So unhelpful in just, I think, all sorts of ways.
You know, the KMT criticized US deliveries and the lateness of them, right?
But the only parts of the special defense budget that they approved in the spring were
the things that relied on the US.
They actually didn't approve the special budget that relied on joint production in Taiwan
and direct commercial sales.
The opposition really dragged its feet last year.
It was unprecedented.
How long it took for Taiwan to pass its annual budget in 2026.
All of that, we know.
I think what's interesting, which Peter's pointing out, is the KMT, first of all, there are
very different voices within the KMT.
There are the more sort of moderate pro-defense, pro-US engagement side of the KMT.
And there's the side of the KMT that is much more skeptical about US defense purchases
and much more pro-engagement with China, right?
And so first, there's that.
We talked about the local elections.
One of the key implications of these local elections will be on internal party dynamics
within the KMT.
To be more specific, the future influence of the current head of the opposition party is
only one.
If the KMT faces a routing in their local elections, Zun's influence is likely to decrease.
Now, we don't know if she's going to resign.
There's no inevitability about that.
But her influence may decrease.
Why does that matter?
Because as soon as the local elections are over, we are fully into campaigns.
for the 2028 presidential elections.
And so we are fully into the primary season
for both parties.
And so the extent of,
since influence over that nomination process
over who the Camti candidate will be will matter
and with that will determine to some extent
the Camtis positioning going forward
on things like the defense budget.
But I will say they've shown, you know,
I think the Camtia has shown sensitivity
to what the US wants.
They've also shown some sensitivity
at the end of the day to what most people in Taiwan want, right?
Because polling suggests a majority of Taiwanese
do actually favor increasing defense spending.
- We should be very careful of dividing the Camti
into these two camps.
Because even the so-called moderates or pro-US types
have done things to sabotage Taiwan's defense.
They've done it.
They've done things to sabotage national resilience
preparation.
And so I think this is one of those areas
where we really have to get into, you know,
who's who, what have they done?
And, you know, to your point Ryan, like what are the actions?
What are the outcomes?
How do you look at this?
Because no one's hands are entirely clean, right?
The DPP had plenty of chances over the last decade
to make different choices on defense to push things forward.
And some of those were very slow in coming,
like changes to the conscription and like terms of service.
But we've got a real problem.
I think if we just say here and say,
oh, well, if it's not Jung or it's not this type
then everything's fine.
Because, you know, the so-called pro-defense pro-moderate,
pro-US, former chairman Julie Lund, Eric Chu,
and my former mayor, he's someone who is responsible
for bringing Fu Kuan Chi into legislature
and helping ensure that he had power and a powerful voice.
And that clearly is not something
that has worked out well for the defense,
but he's known as being the king of Hualien
because he ran a local political machine
and he has really thrown a lot of sand,
maybe wrenches even into the gears
of trying to make the defense better work.
- Nobody's hands are clean when it comes to who is responsible
dragging their feet on defense reform.
And I will certainly not sit here
and just apologize for the KMT writ large.
It is unquestionably the case
that they're leveraging good faith concerns
among the citizenry of how their money is being spent
for bad faith political purposes.
But just to suggest how far the overt and window has shifted,
if we go back to the KMT for dragging
on the special defense bill
and we look at the smallest of the counter proposed budget
items or levels, it's still almost twice the size
of memory serves me correct as president's eyes,
special defense budget of $8 billion over five years.
So it goes to show, and maybe this is because the KMT
has simply been politically painted into a corner,
but the conversation has moved in important ways
and it goes to show that the US has been pushing
even the DPP for quite some time to do more.
There's one other point I would just kind of full circle
on why it is that I think really harking on percentage
of GDP as a good measure of military effectiveness
is so challenging and is really building on this issue
of bandwidth.
It just, we are asking Taiwan, it's diplomats,
it's military, it's grassroots organizations
to wholesale transform the entire apparatus
to arguably become something much better than even what we have
here in the United States.
To do it in a timeline that is just,
I mean, it's almost comical how fast we're asking
to make these transitions.
And they have a very small on all sides
of the political spectrum, very small bench
of people who really know what they're doing.
And that is either overburdening them,
so they're running 24/7 firing on all cylinders.
Never mind all of the congressional teams
they're coming over on a constant basis
and those have to be well managed.
But at the same time, it's just increasing the incentives
to cover things, to put lipstick on a pig,
to shift numbers around, maybe in bad faith,
but also sometimes just because they don't even know
what it is that they're looking at themselves.
Speaking of shifting numbers around,
they recently changed how they count
what constitutes their defense budget.
Are you, we were talking before we started recording?
- One of the challenges is, of course,
the Trump administration wants to see more defense spending
and particularly more defense spending
and buying things to get US items.
We can discuss that all day long,
but one of the just very inevitable responses
was for the live administration.
And again, understandably, to say,
well, if you're gonna hold me to task about defense spending,
then I need to be able to count what I spend on,
and I should say national security,
in the same way that say we hold to our NATO partners.
And so what happened in the transition from 2025 to 2026
is, in essence, with the flip of a switch,
they said, well, we're gonna start counting things
like military pensions, Coast Guard budget,
things which even in the United States,
we oftentimes include in our national security budget.
We're gonna add those in,
which we can debate whether or not
that is an appropriate measure of what we really care about,
which is military effectiveness,
and I would submit that retirement and pension benefits
aren't part of what makes you a more effective military.
But the end result was it allowed for kind of a quick victory
by saying, look, we increased defense spending,
which the live administration did,
but we increased it by a dramatic amount
and jumping by something like 2.4% to like 3.3% of GDP
in a single year.
But about 10 billion of that was this kind of new way
of accounting.
- Well, and let's also remember that one of the issues
that Taiwan has with trying to figure out
these kinds of numbers is that if you're reliant
on US purchases and approvals, right?
These are things that have consistently been basically
since the TRA, the Taiwan Relations Act.
They've been inconsistent about when approvals get through,
and therefore it's like you have to have a vote
in the legislature say, okay,
we're going to approve this special budget.
Oh, wait a minute, those haven't been approved.
We're waiting, okay, well, I guess that's not gonna go
into this year's percentage or how it goes.
So it creates, they have a measurement problem,
and so it's kind of a politically justifiable
or you can understand why they feel like they need
to tinker a little bit with the numbers,
because if you're dealing with these special budgets
going up and down, whether they're passing at the right time,
whether they're expended in a way that you can count them
towards increase, it makes a little tough to be predictable.
- So at the same time that there's been this pressure
from Washington to spend more, and especially by USKit,
we of course still have this massive arms package
that Trump decided to freeze after his tremendous meeting
with Xi Jinping.
How much is that actually causing problems for Taiwan?
- If not yet, when will it start causing problems for Taiwan?
- We have a tendency sometimes as outsiders
to fixate on the numbers, and I will say this,
I think that the delay has certainly contributed
to increasing skepticism in Taiwan
amongst the Taiwanese of US commitments to Taiwan,
of US credibility.
That's for sure, the trend lines on that are very clear.
- But in terms of actual deterrence, of course,
there is a massive backlog of, you know,
arms that the US has yet to deliver on.
- Been proceeding this latest package going back years.
- Yes, so in that sense, this delay
doesn't necessarily have the sort of real world impact
that maybe some of the headlines would suggest,
but at the political level, of course, there is an impact.
It contributes to certain perceptions in Beijing and Taipei.
And of course, those perceptions matter
from a deterrence perspective as well,
because the Taiwanese will become increasingly anxious.
You'll have voters increasingly thinking,
does the US have her back?
If they don't, what kind of hedging strategy
do we need to adopt?
- We are gonna take a quick break from this fascinating
conversation to talk to my equally fascinating friend,
Ari Anderson, the founder and CEO of Kibu.
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when they use our platform.
Learn more at war on TheRox.com/kiboo. That's K-I.
be you back to the show.
So the fundamental issue that a lot of people who don't follow this closely miss is it's
not like Taiwan can turn around to another country and buy arms from them instead.
I think literally no one else who will sell the arms besides the US because most of the
world doesn't recognize them as a country and a lot of democracies have robust laws on
the books about how you can only sell arms to countries.
This is a big issue.
This is where Japan gets interesting because they've changed the regulations on arms
sales and they have joint production with the US, they also have an indigenous one.
And part of the sort of how do we put this, the tension in Japan China relations is because
the Japanese since 2021 have become more and more explicit about a risk to Taiwan being
a risk to Japan and that they feel like this is something that's strongly in their national
interest and that they think is strongly in the sort of under the purview of the US Japan
alliance.
In terms of this quote unquote backlog, we're talking about it, about $29 billion worth
of stuff that we have already authorized on the US side and approved for sale to Taiwan
that is still like not yet been delivered.
Now, it should be clear, when I say backlog, it doesn't mean that everything's overdue.
A lot of this stuff takes a long time to build even under the best of conditions at the
same time for all of the very understandable political and symbolic hand reading over the
$11 billion package that President Trump is currently holding as a bargaining chip.
And in my mind, the bigger issue is just that this issue of foreign military sales has
risen to the level that it is now a presidential level bargaining chip, that's problematic.
But you know, there is stuff that I think there are missiles that we had authorized for
sale in like 2017, which are just now arriving the 66 F-16s that we had sold.
I think the first two, and that was under the Biden administration.
The first two of those have just now arrived in the last couple of weeks.
So I mean, we're talking about a tremendous lag.
And the biggest lag is typically for the most expensive, genuinely symmetric weapon systems.
I think almost everybody in Washington has long been pushing Taiwan to just stop buying.
He and Eastern recently reported that there's been some infiltrators from the mainland who
landed in Taiwan and were arrested.
Who were these people?
What do we know?
What don't we know?
What do we make of this both in terms of the present, in terms of reading Chinese intent,
but also in terms of historical patterns?
I mean, I'll plunge first into the unknown.
I think we don't know a lot about these individuals.
It's not clear how many of them we're trying to maybe just escape from China.
How many of them were, it used to be a Marine 18-year-olds in the military who don't stuff
all the time out there for trying to see what they get away with, and how many of them
are genuinely operating at the behest of a grand strategic plan.
What I would say as just an opening comment, though, is whether these eight individuals
that macawed over a series of years represent a genuine probing attempt or not, I think it
is a really useful wake-up call to say there's just no question the China is probing in every
way possible.
I worry more about the X number that we didn't catch or detect because those are the ones
who are probably the true and consummate professionals.
But I think coming back to this whole conversation about resilience and readiness for what China
is actually likely to throw at Taiwan should have decided to roll the iron dice.
There's just no question that we're going to see all sorts of really nasty stuff happening
behind the lines, which is why Amanda's right.
When we talk about resilience, we can't be looking at stylized, prescripted exercises.
We've got to look at things that have been genuinely stress tested when the environment
is degraded and everything you thought that was going to happen just doesn't happen because
the Chinese can do everything they can, I think, to undermine, to surprise, to shock.
One of the biggest issues on the defense side that's not talked about is Taiwan's intelligence
budget, the intelligence system.
How is it being there to provide warning?
Is the warning provided in a way that becomes actionable or the people who are receiving
it knowledgeable enough in the product to understand this is what they're seeing?
Where is it?
And this gets, I think, to the heart of what this matter is of these small votes.
You look at the people that are there and it's hard to say, oh, these guys look like
some PLA professionals.
Mostly people have surrendered.
They haven't resisted arrests.
I think another way of saying factory, military age male is to say unemployed factory worker.
And they're not doing too well in the PRC these days.
So to me, this is more about the intelligence and awareness side, how fast are they able
to pick these things up?
I looked at pictures of the votes that these guys came across, 100 plus miles of open water
at the best of times for those places.
Those are not votes that you want to be doing that with.
I would think that if the PLA were the ones that were doing the testing, they'd be looking
at it somewhat differently.
And they have so many other options for trying to get people in.
Right?
There are Costco terminals at every single major Taiwanese port.
You have. And we also just fly in.
Yeah, there's. Right?
There's so many different ways.
But if you're just flying in on commercial air, you may not be able to bring, let's call
a communications kid and other things that you would want.
Critics of the M&D pointed out even at the time, but M&D built its main headquarters
building, I mean, almost literally right off of the main runway at the main airport inside
of Taipei itself.
So in terms of flying in the shock and awe effect, I mean, there are all sorts of really
problematic things I think China could throw.
And I do agree with this point that we should be diligent, Taiwan should be diligent.
But do these eight individuals caught over a series of years indicate the way this would
unfold?
Yeah, I guess just to say, and it'd be interesting to hear what the others think about
this.
But when you think about trends or recent patterns in Chinese coercion towards Taiwan recently,
of course, pressures are constant.
There's a real creativity that you see from the Chinese side and how they've managed to
expand their toolkit.
There's a constant probing and a testing of new ways of creating pressures on Taiwan.
But I would say that on the whole because of, and this is likely linked to the Trump
administration and this era of constructive strategic stability that we're in, I think
what the Chinese have started to do is to aim for lower profile forms of coercion and
pressures that it thinks will not rise to the threshold of a response from the US in
particular.
So we're seeing less of the extremely formal encirclement exercises that are named and
announced and more exercises that are unannounced, more co-scarred pressures as well, both on the
east side of Taiwan, but around their outlying islands.
So that's the sort of recent pattern that I've observed, but pressures are constant.
We've also seen last month there was a pretty considerable Chinese naval exercise where
I think they had something like three dozen military vessels, including an aircraft carrier
in the waters between Taiwan and Japan and between Taiwan and the Philippines, beyond
the straits, beyond pressure on Taiwan's immediate waters.
It seemed like the signal was, hey, we can interject and stop Japan, especially in the Philippines
from interfering or getting involved.
What do you make of this?
How should we think about this?
For those who are interested in kind of monitoring this stuff in real time, I run a research
group at George Mason University called Taiwan Security Monitor.
We do news aggregation, we do data analysis, but we try to kind of keep folks up to date
who are interested in kind of the top-line story as these sorts of things develop.
So if you're interested, you want some really cool graphic illustrations of what these things
look like in a map, please come and check us out.
I would say, number one, clearly it would seem obvious that the Chinese are trying to signal
that they're capable of these things, but just as we've been appropriately scrutinizing
the Taiwanese military and how much of this is substance and how much of this is for
a show, I think we need to flip it and ask the exact same question.
So are we seeing them demonstrate that they can quickly mobilize ships and send them onto
the eastern side and into these critical choke points?
Yes.
Can they sustain those operations?
Can they replenish those operations, particularly in a degraded environment, which they would
definitely have to do in a situation which they'd be using this?
I think they're the juries out, obviously don't have access to anything other than open-source
intelligence, but from my team's analysis of some of the big-named exercises, everything
we were able to see using planet open-source imagery suggests no.
Like what we're seeing is a lot of flash, a lot of movement of surface combat ships.
Maybe some of the punishment, but if you were looking at what was actually happening in
the ports themselves, you weren't seeing any sort of attempt to even exercise a big logistics
build-up.
In essence, you see the ships leap quickly and come back quickly.
And so, again, I think to the degree we can disaggregate what they're trying to signal
from our assessment of their ability to do this in real time, could actually be reassuring
not just to U.S. voters, but also to the Taiwanese who may be like China just has this endless
series of options and anything they want to do they can do with impunity.
Those sorts of exercises are relatively routine.
We're in peak exercise season, the PLA has consistently sought to project that it'll
seek in a Taiwan contingency to prevent external intervention, right?
And so, none of this is, I would say, particularly new, that it tells us about what PLA intentions
are or the sorts of contingencies that it's rehearsing for.
But like Mike said, that doesn't tell us necessarily readiness on the PLA side.
I'm pretty sure we know what PLA intentions are, which is to execute the will of as being
the party's armed wing.
That an ultimate goal does include unification with Taiwan, right?
So, the point is, like, all of these things are being built, are being conducted toward
that end.
problem is a big problem.
We just don't always see how they evaluate the inputs and the outputs.
What do they think that they're getting out of some of these exercises?
In some cases, they seem to have done a better job of exercising under a complex electromagnetic
environment than we have tended to do.
They're clearly learning things off of the Ukraine war that they clearly are studying it.
They clearly have direct actions.
They're trying to apply some of those things to their exercises.
So it's not necessarily a new point, but it's an important one to remember that the PLA
shortcomings, to the extent that we talk about those shortcomings, are almost all ones
that the PLA itself has identified, and they are exercising and testing those problems.
Right?
And so that means that this is a deliberate effort.
It's not just to show peace.
It is something that is a learning organization that is getting itself better than trying
to prepare it towards, let's remember, a political judgment about what it means to be ready.
So we've seen a pretty clear effort both in Beijing and Washington to bring down the
temperature in the US-China relationship toward something more constructive and something
more stable and predictable.
And there's a lot of reasons for that.
I think on both sides, I mean, one, I think we have our hands full with Iran.
China's economy is struggling a lot.
We're still very mutually dependent on one another.
But I want to examine that question, like, to what extent do you think that can continue
throughout the rest of Trump's term?
But also, how should we look at this in the background of, yes, China's ultimate goal
is unification.
But we've been talking about the worst-case scenario, where it still seems like China's
preferred means is to achieve this without going to war through why there's version intimidation,
coercion, whatever it is.
So how do those two things interact with each other?
One of the issues with stability and why it's a, let's say, for Taiwan as a problematic
position is that whenever the US prioritizes stability with China, it tends to have a downstream
effect on Taiwan that's sort of you need to calm down, you need to not be provocative.
Even though Beijing is often the one that's sort of playing with the thermostat and testing
to see how far things can go.
So that's one of the outcomes that's there.
The second is that this is an incredibly unstable stability, right?
It's built around a very narrow set of agreements, if you will, on say, rare earth exports and
licensing.
And you can see that the US is moving very, very quickly and taking actions, even if they're
not the best ones, an action that's taken is better than one that's studied at 12 months,
18 months, and then you may as well get started.
You can see that there is lowering dependency on China on, yes, there's transshipment,
but it's very clear that we are no longer as reliant on Chinese goods as they were.
But one of the issues here, and this is where it becomes really unstable, is that Beijing
is taking action outside of all of those, like the narrow rare earth elements, the processing
to make sure that they can keep freezing efforts or blocking efforts to reduce that dependency.
So you have playing with so blocking of sulfuric acid exports for mining.
You have confiscating passports of mining talent and processing talent so that they can't
go work for a foreign company and that they can't leave the country.
You have restrictions on construction equipment that would be used for mining or using used
for processing, building processing equipment.
I think what we need to realize is that we might have an agreement on one little piece or
we might have poked China in one little area, but in some cases we're provoking systemic
responses and the different parts of their system are kicking into gear.
And I think at some point that has those policy outcomes from Beijing take effect, that
we might say, well, actually this is now a violation of the stability and we can't tolerate
this anymore.
I think that because of these midterm results, so first Chinese watchers have been anticipating
what would occur if the Democrats were to come back into power in Congress.
And so I think there's been a lot of prep work in thinking done already about the types
of changes in policies that could occur given such a result.
So there's been some planning in thinking about this.
I think fundamentally what changes is that the space for negotiation is smaller simply
with the Democrats in power. And when it comes to Taiwan, and I totally agree, it's
that I think with what Pete said, but I think the key question is, are the two sides able
and willing to pursue strategic stability at the same time as delinking the Taiwan issue
from it?
Right. And of course, we know that the Chinese do not want to do this.
They are conditioning strategic stability on a certain Taiwan positioning from this administration.
But I think the question going forward will be, how does the administration and Congress
straddle this going forward?
Can they find a way of preserving a degree of stability?
And I totally agree, obviously, the competitive elements of the relationship have not disappeared
and that is the sort of fundamental aspect of the relationship, even though on the outside
the packaging looks like a sort of detente, right?
But I think the question is really, for instance, let's make a very concrete.
I suspect there will be pressure from the Democrats to move forward on an arms package.
And so what size is that package will likely matter to Beijing?
Can we move forward with the Taiwan arms package, but still maintain that stability?
This is as much a question for the U.S. and its decision-making as it is for Beijing.
We'll Beijing, except that, right?
And I think that is crucial when we're thinking about deterrence and Taiwan's future.
To put this on familial ground and to be very clear about what I think I understand, what
I don't, you know, to only look at this very large question of strategic stability through
the very narrow prism admittedly of U.S.-Taiwan relations and cross-strait deterrence, I think
if we are to take the rationale behind pursuing this kind of mini-day taunt at face value,
it's because there's this recognition that Taiwan's not ready.
We're not ready.
So we need to pursue stability to give Taiwan time to make necessary reforms and to give
us time to do some tremendous transformation in our own right.
But the question is the net benefit of doing that worth it.
I'm sure the jury is still clearly out.
I'm skeptical because number one, it's not like we have, well, number one has already
been aptly pointed out that stability isn't very stable.
Number two, we haven't exactly been using this interregnum to its highest benefit.
We've been engaged in all sorts of other issues that are going to distract us in meaningful
and important ways.
And then number three, although I tend to focus primarily on the hard aspects of military
credibility, I mean, can you actually deliver on effectiveness in the battlefield?
We can't ignore the symbolic importance that if we want to push Taiwan to make meaningful
changes, we have to show that we're going to be there because otherwise an asymmetric posture
based on resilience is just a buzz on a fool's errand if we're never going to show up.
And so to the degree that this pursuit of stability gives all sorts of talking points.
And I hear even the DBP side of folks that I talked to just tremendous skepticism towards
the United States, towards the Trump administration, and this idea of pursuing stability to buy
time for change is just a false pretense.
And this huge decline in faith in American promises and commitments, I just, I think what
we're going to end up with is we're distracted.
We remain distracted and in Taiwan, not so much moral hazard as the sense of actually there
is an argument to be made that we need to find some sort of compromise rather than make
the very painful choices and investments that we need to.
Thank you for listening to this episode of the War on the Rocks Podcast.
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Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Taiwan’s local elections, particularly the Taipei mayor race, are pivotal as they feature rising political stars like Puma Shun and a young KMT candidate, with significant implications for future presidential nominations.
The DPP’s emphasis on social resilience and local issues like transportation and childcare has helped Puma Shun gain public support, while the KMT faces voter skepticism due to its pro-China stance and poor local campaign performance.
Taiwan has made tangible progress in defense preparedness, including emergency planning, civil defense drills, and infrastructure hardening, though these efforts remain fragmented and underfunded.
A major challenge is the growing politicization of resilience initiatives, where defense planning is divided along party lines, undermining cross-sector coordination between government, military, and civil society.
The U.S. defense budget has been delayed and politically contested, with Taiwan facing skepticism over U.S. commitments, especially due to a $29 billion backlog of approved arms that remain unfulfilled.
The KMT’s resistance to defense spending and its lack of transparency fuel concerns about inefficiency and political manipulation, while the DPP has also been slow to implement key reforms.
Chinese coercion tactics have shifted to low-profile, unannounced operations, testing Taiwan’s readiness through naval exercises and intelligence probes, suggesting a strategy of pressure rather than open conflict.
The U.S. pursuit of strategic stability with China risks undermining Taiwan’s security by delaying necessary reforms and reducing the credibility of military commitments.
Summary:
Taiwan’s upcoming local elections, especially the Taipei mayoral race, are not just local contests but critical indicators of future political leadership and national security strategy. The race between DPP’s Puma Shun and KMT’s young candidate highlights a shift toward grassroots resilience and local policy focus, with Puma Shun gaining traction through practical, community-oriented messaging rather than confrontational rhetoric. Despite progress in civil defense planning, including emergency drills and infrastructure hardening, Taiwan’s efforts remain fragmented, politically polarized, and underfunded.
A significant challenge is the growing divide between parties over resilience, where defense initiatives are increasingly partisan. S. defense commitments, including a $29 billion arms backlog, face skepticism due to delays and political obstruction, particularly from the KMT, which has questioned transparency and efficiency.
Meanwhile, Chinese coercion tactics have evolved into covert, low-profile operations, such as naval exercises and intelligence probes, signaling a persistent but less overt pressure campaign. S. pursuit of strategic stability with China risks weakening Taiwan’s defense readiness by delaying essential reforms and eroding trust.
Ultimately, Taiwan’s security future hinges on effective, transparent, and coordinated defense planning—between government, military, and civil society—that transcends political divisions and responds to real, tested threats.
FAQs
The local elections, especially for key positions like Taipei mayor, influence future political leaders. A close race between DPP and KMT candidates signals a shift in political momentum, with young candidates like Puma Shun and Gao Shiong representing future presidential contenders. These elections also reflect public sentiment on issues like social resilience and cross-strait relations, which have national security implications.
Taiwan has made significant progress in social resilience, with grassroots efforts and government-led initiatives focusing on disaster preparedness and defense planning. Local governments are now involved in air defense, energy security, and supply chain resilience, though challenges remain in integrating these efforts with military and bureaucratic systems.
The defense budget is deeply political, with the KMT opposing increases due to concerns about transparency and efficiency. The DPP has also faced criticism for slow progress on defense reforms. These debates reflect broader political divides on how to balance national security, economic constraints, and public trust in military spending.
Taiwan's defense spending is often measured in GDP terms, but including items like military pensions and Coast Guard budgets can inflate the figure. The actual effectiveness is harder to assess due to inconsistent U.S. deliveries, political delays, and a lack of robust defense production systems in Taiwan.
U.S. arms sales are critical to Taiwan's defense, but delays—especially on the $29 billion backlog—have fueled skepticism. While some deliveries have recently arrived, the prolonged wait undermines confidence in U.S. commitments and increases political anxiety in Taiwan.
China conducts frequent naval and aerial exercises, including in waters near Taiwan and Japan, to demonstrate capability and pressure Taiwan. These actions, often unannounced, signal strategic intent and testing of coercion methods, though their actual operational readiness remains debated.
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