T.V. Paul on International Security - Part One

Hello and welcome to this episode of the Thinking Global Podcast by eInternational Relations, the world's leading open access website for students and scholars of international relations. My name is Kirin Homerah and I am your host. Although this week your host is really going to be my deputy director and producer to Sharika Decker who is in conversation with Professor TV Paul on International Security, which is a fantastic interview so stay tuned for part one of that. Before that however don't forget to check out international relations on social media, on TikTok, on Instagram, on Facebook, on Twitter, on Twitter, on X, on Blue Sky and of course now we are on Substack so please go over to Substack to sign up there that'll make life so much easier for you to be able to get all the content the eInternational Relations has to offer. Also don't forget to click on that little like share, subscribe or follow button depending on what platform you're listening on. A lot of few people ask me why do I say like share, subscribe or follow and it's literally because we're on like 20 platforms. Some platforms follow, some it's like yeah right but don't forget to follow that way you'll be able to get all the content that we at Thinking Global have to offer. This week to Sharika is interviewing TV Paul. Professor Paul is Distinguished James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University Montreal in Canada and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He served as the President of the International Studies Association from 2016 to 2017 and he is the founding director of the Global Research Network on Peaceful Change and a distinguished scholar at Asia Pacific Foundation in Canada. Professor Paul is the author or editor of 24 books co-editor of six special journal issues and author of over 19 scholarly articles or chapters in the fields of international relations, peace and peaceful change, international security and South Asia. He is the author of his most recent work, The Unfinished Quest India's Search for Major Power Status from Nero to Modi with Oxford University Press alongside being the author of Restraining Great Powers, the Warrior State Pakistan in the contemporary world, asymmetric conflicts, war initiation by weaker powers and he is the lead editor of the Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change and International Relations. Professor Paul currently serves as the editor of the Georgetown University Press book series South Asia and World Affairs. Professor Paul has also received a number of awards, not least from the International Political Science Association alongside receiving the 2024 International Studies Association Canada Distinguished Scholar Award and the 2025 International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. For more information you can find that at their website at www.tvpull.com there is a link to that in the description box. Okay, Tisharika, over to you. Hey everyone, welcome to another exciting episode of EGYOS thinking global podcast. I'm your host Dr Tisharika Deca, edited large EIR and Deputy Director for Thinking Global Podcast. Thank you so much for all the love and support you have sent for the previous episode with Dr. Rubillah Sen. I have read all the messages and I feel really humbled. Today, it is my absolute honour to introduce someone very special. I'm joined by Professor TV Paul, a true global scholar whose work has significantly shaped our understanding of international relations, international security and regional politics. Hello Professor Paul, thank you so much and welcome. Great talking to you Tisharika, look forward to your questions. So before we begin about your work, I just want to know, and this is something I ask most of my guests about yourself. So tell us a bit about yourself, your journey into international relations and what first drew you to study security and conflict in global politics? Yes, that's a long journey I had. I was born in Kerala, so they're the most part of India in late 1950s. And when I was growing up as a child studying in local schools, I used to read national newspapers like Hindu and Indian Express, as well as listen to BBC news often, very unusual for the children of my time at that point. But what bothered me was the Vietnam War was at its peak when I was in maybe a school like a few years of school. And the war really bothered me because the war was happening in such intensity. The Americans were bombing these people who had nothing to do with American security in a very direct sense, yet the coverage that the world media was giving a normal fare, which bothered my little mind, why is it happening? And then simultaneously there was intense nuclear buildup going on. The great powers were engaging in the so-called Cold War. So all these topics bothered me as a young mind and I decided to take up international relations as a field of study after my undergraduate studies in India. I went to Delhi, did my amphilla JNU or Javallar University. Where while studying, I was also working with the press list of India as a journalist. And where I had the responsibility of handling foreign news for one of the several editors of this news agency. At that time I found the topic of nuclear proliferation. As you know, India and Pakistan were building up. This is in the 1980s. There are nuclear capabilities. And so all these topics really fascinated me why these conflicts happened so regularly among the wave powers and non-grey powers and among regional states in particular in South Asia and then engage in this intense arms buildup. So I then started looking at some of these questions. I did my amphilt thesis was on India Pakistan nuclear buildup. And then I got admission to University California Los Angeles for PhD where I studied the subject of nuclear arms control, nuclear weapons. But more broadly international relations and comparative politics. And I did my PhD there. And since then I have been, I had finished my PhD in five years. And then I got this position at McGill University in Montreal, Canada in 1991. I came here as an assistant professor, got anywhere fairly fast. And then I got promoted to full professorship. I was determined to make use of the opportunity that was given to me, given that the Canadian system offers quite a bit of financial support as well as the student body is quite good. So McGill has been a great home for me since 1991. I got promoted. I got also today I hold the universities one of the highest ranking chair distinguished James Lincoln professor for life if I want to stay here forever. But in any case this has been a journey that I really think that a lot of determination and a lot of hard work, especially living in a very cold place called Montreal in the winter. But somewhere is very beautiful here. I had a lot of help from my own family, my wife Rachel, children, Kavya and Leia as well as excellent students I trained over time, PhD, yes, well as MA. And I've been very active among scholars doing IR all over the world. And I had a good journey and I'm still going through this process. I'm determined to stay on as long as I can working on various topics related to war conflict, peace, peaceful change. And including South Asia as you mentioned but you can talk about my broader theoretical and intellectual interest in the next questions. Thank you so much for sharing your journey with Hasbro Festival. I don't think you have ever spoken about this so it's really nice to know that and I'm glad to hear so much and it's almost like a proud moment for me to be speaking to you and so inspiring to any so thank you for sharing that. I'm picking up a bit on that about your work so you've extensively worked on topics ranging from nuclear usage and non usage to regional security in South Asia. How have this area shaped your broader understanding of international security today? So the first thing is we used to study global security as well as regional security as very distinct topics. I have come to the realization there I only interconnected partly because partly because of the great power conflicts affect regions and then some regions like South Asia and Middle East and Europe today affect the great power relationships also so this relationships are mutually interdependent although we often don't pay the connections carefully. By my understanding of South Asia, South Asia is actually great theater for doing a broad range of issues in international relations particularly interstate, interstate and human security areas. So in interstate conflict of course the India, Pakistan conflict then you have the China India and Afghanistan for instance internal conflicts quite a few we had in Sri Lanka to Pakistan is going through a registered conflict today and you have India had several if you want to call cashmere conflict a domestic conflict I think it is a transpoundary conflict or a redundant conflict as some people say which means ethnic groups have divided between two territories and states claim both claim each other is territory as they're on. So then there is a human security a lot of tragic developments happen in South Asia very much related to development and security are very connected in this area we had the next-leight conflicts in India and partly because of the lack of development that the next-leight movement came out and then of course the suppression of subnational groups that seek independence and that has been going on in most of these states sometimes some are now subsided but clearly it's a perennial problem as the region develops into strong states and so essentially the states are weak of course variations exist in India maybe slightly stronger than the others but you have a weak state syndrome and so I was very influenced by comparative politics talking about state capacity and then I study how the broader issues affect I mean I connected both the IR world international relations and comparative politics topics are connected and these have been very useful for me because I wrote a book on edited book on India Pakistan conflict in India Pakistan rivalry and also a book on I think you mentioned the warrior state Pakistan's journey as a military dominated state and not a developmental state putting a lot of emphasis on narrow notion of national security so and then of course the how the rise of these states happened and today their involvement in global economic order and how that is helping and we can talk about India's rise in that context it is an interesting region one-fifth of humanity doesn't get the attention that it deserves but it has come a long way from where it started let's say 1947 that's very fascinating and I like the fact that you use the term great theater it's indeed a great theater across South Asia as we speak we are also kind of witnessing different kind of conflict and I wanted to pick up about your first book and I want to kind of let my audience know that you have authored over 24 author to edited over 24 books and have written in over 85 journals I think it is some kind of record I would like to start with one of your early works and which I have extensively referred during my PhD asymmetric conflict or initiation by weaker powers I've also referred to your edited book by the way "Enduring Gravelries" extensively a very good book conceptually what does your first book help us to understand about why weaker actors initiate conflict and when you look at today's global landscape do you think a symmetric conflict are becoming more common or simply more visible so this was a very this is where the advisor helps for matters I just like the most South Asian students wanted to work on India Pakistan conflict and I went to my advisor at the time at UCLA a professor well-known professor past the day Richard Roskran and he encouraged me to think product terms and whether the India Pakistan conflict can be used as a puzzle for understanding larger phenomena in international politics so I started thinking about it and I looked at it and out of the four wars at that time three were started by the weaker party and this challenges all our traditional theories of balance of power or deterrence all of them suggest that the stronger parties often start the wars the weaker party cannot because it cannot win and so I started exploring historical examples and I came up with something like 30% of wars in human history or non historical cases started by weaker parties yet that phenomenon is not explored in international politics and so I went back to him saying that this is something I can do maybe a comparative case studies and fix some six cases and he was thrilled that I came up with this idea and he said that will put you on the map and so I look at six cases as I mentioned the first one is a Japanese attack on Russia in 1905 and then the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that's the US 1941 then a Korean war the Chinese intervention against the US UN forces then the India Pakistan 65 war the Pakistan started the war and then I look at 1973 Arab Israeli war although quantitatively the Egyptians were larger than Israel but Egypt and Syria technologically and naturally much weaker with the US on the sherd US support to the Israelis then the other case was the Fockelins war where Argentina initiated a war against the British of course they claimed the territory was theirs so the one thing that I come up with the some four factors that I test in this case this using comparative case study method one is the kind of strategy that these parties use expectations how their strategy would work and so what I noticed is what I call limited aim strategy none of these powers or states had the capacity to take on this larger power for long or for larger goals it's basically to what you call a FETTA company get the piece of territory or reduce the the stalemate that is stuck there conflict they want to break the stalemate or to get the great power attention so there are different goals in starting wars and it came the conclusion that and the other variables are of course they have a great power support from another great power they have weapons that allow them a short them advantage what he called a window of opportunity and then their domestic politics changes where a more hawkish group gains power so I examine these cases with all this and I came to the conclusion that all of them matter but I think the critical factor is the strategy that if they think they can control the outcome they can make sure the the larger opponent won't escalate sometimes that misfired as the US Japan case shows. But when they start the war, the Japanese thought, for instance, they can fight for a year and a half with the oil they had. After that, if the war doesn't come to an end, they will lose. They knew that massively. And that was a miscalculation in hindsight. But when you start the war, that's not what leaders think. So that book did very well. It was accepted by the Cambridge University Press. It has a book series in international relations. It's very difficult to want to get in. So a 95% rejection rate. So I was very much happy. I got my first book through the Cambridge series. Then that book also generated quite a bit of interest among scholars who do deterrence theory to balance the power. But the topic is much wider than what I imagine. One of the subsequent series of works came out on how do the weaker parties win against stronger parties. And we have so many cases. The Vietnam War, the United States lost Afghanistan, Soviet Union lost. Again, the US lost. US lost in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, the US had to run. It's, you know, the remember the aircraft breaking off the last flight from Saigon. And so there are quite a few cases of these stronger India and Sri Lanka. You may remember India of Indian forces had to retreat from Sri Lanka. And I can just tell you the termals, peacekeeping forces. So this phenomenon actually people are writing about is a great set of works. I was actually involved in some of them. And then came 911. So that's another asymmetric conflict where the weaker terrorist group or insurgents engage in strike on the stronger party knowing that it would cause considerable damage. And that phenomenon people look that seriously. So mine is more traditional warfare, but this phenomenon of asymmetric conflict. And now look at the resistance that the weaker parties put up. The Iran today, the United States, Oregon as well. They don't easily buckle, which shows that there is some calculation that they may outlast or survive. And so this phenomenon of a symmetry in power and that affects the conflict pattern is something that I think has a great resonance. It may not be always the weaker party starting the war, but clearly the weaker party resisting or escalating it beyond what it could. Using different methods, including guerrilla warfare or terrorism. These are all perennial international issues that really deserve attention. We have a tendency to either focus on regular interstate wars or just look at great powers in power conflict. So mine broadens the horizon and it has a lot of theoretical relevance to policy relevance and theoretical levels. [Music] Hey, this is just a quick bulletin, quick memo, quick moment. Yeah, we'll go with memo. This is just a quick memo to remind you to click on that little subscribe or follow button because I know you've not done it yet. So make sure that you click on that button to get all the content that the thinking global podcast has to offer. And don't forget to like e-International Relations on social media on all of the platforms and that way you'll be able to keep up with all the content that e-International Relations produces. Or finding that you can go to e-International Relations @e-IR.info. And there on the website you'll be able to find the daily articles that are published, interviews, book reviews, and books. Full books. Yes, you'd heard me right. You don't have to adjust your iPhone or your device. Free books as PDFs. Just click and download and read. Yeah. So you can find that at e-International Relations is brought to you by volunteers. So please do consider a donation if you enjoy the content and there is a link to that in the description box. Okay, let's get back to the episode. Thank you so much for sharing that. To kind of add on to that, I have always wondered about that phenomenon and your book really helped me to kind of navigate some of the ideas. I've also wondered about smaller states and how they kind of survived. So the book has been a big support to me. Also I think supervisors can make or break somebody's career and good supervisor can really been someone's career. So thanks to your supervisor for doing that and that's all we have such material. So coming to one of your very recent back, the unfinished quest and your search for major power status from Nehru to Modi. You examine industry trajectory towards major power status. What motivated you to write this book in this moment in history and what core argument do you want to read is to take away? Would you want to elaborate on that? Yes, so I, in recent years, I have moved on to a subject called status in international politics. Status conflict status accommodations. So I have an electric collection, a courted collection status in world politics, which actually is. I've inspired a lot of work among younger scholars. I get a lot of PhD applications who want to work with me on this subject. But anyway, while I was doing the work, I realized that India's search for this leading role is not a random story. It is based on a foundational issue in international politics called acquisition of higher status, hierarchical status. Or some people call it a great power status. India wants to be leading power, but it's almost the same thing. And so I started reading at it and realized that the literature is always talking about India rising, rising what? With respect to its position or hierarchical position and the constraints and opportunities it faces. So mine is an exploration that throws back the historical efforts from Nehru and days onwards, even when India was materially weak. And today it is reasonably strong and see what really ties these efforts by these leaders. They wanted a place in the sun to be respected to be treated as better than a normal small state or a weak developing states. And so that led me to initially I thought I will do a theoretically oriented work specifically for the specialist in scholars. But then I realized this has so much resonance with the public and policy world today. In India, for instance, if you go to Delhi, there is one meeting or other every day on India's rise, India's technological relationships, India's relationship with the US. So all that led me to come up with the story of India's Stockholm rise. And one of the things people who work in this here, especially policymakers who don't read history is the rise of a new state, new power. And its accommodation is not automatic or easy. It's usually in the past we have a big literature on power transition conflicts through war, meaning war. And if you defeat it very rarely you will get anywhere Germany and Japan started wars hoping to become lead powers and look where they are today. Of course they're doing okay in the civilian economic arena, but they don't have the great power status. So the winner is the World War II created the current order, the P5 or the security council, even security council P5 members. And they have no intention of changing that order. And we don't have any clue there will be another war that can produce an outcome like that. So we are stuck. So in this case, India is an interesting case. It is seeking this position realizing that it's very much constrained. First of all, in 1947 when India became independent, it missed the boat in the UN structure in 1945 in San Francisco. The UN was set up with security council membership already decided. So India had a very poor representation in the San Francisco meeting. And the British simply didn't support India's position. Despite the fact that The largest military force fought in World War II from a single country was from India, 2.5 million Indians fought along the British. And so absolutely no gratitude from the British side. And then in 1968, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty came into being, which gave a special status to countries that tested nuclear weapons until 1967. They had the privilege of keeping theirs and the rest could not. And India had a not tested weapon and it was categorized as a non-nuclear weapon state, permanently barring it from acquiring nuclear weapons. And India objected to that. And that objection was not purely for security reasons. It was for status reasons that India didn't want to be constrained as a non-veit power eternally and keep this internationally in equality as a permanent state of fair that it has had ambitions. It could not allow China for instance to have weapons and it was not allowed because China had tested in 1964. So this missing the path, then it adopted a non-aligned policy which had a lot of value in hindsight. In fact, today's world, that's what many countries are doing with different names. India calls it multi-alignment. By the way, Canada is trying to become almost multi-aligned, even the challenges the American relationship is causing. So, India's policies have been led by this idea of creating its own space. And then I started looking at it. It's not a very international story alone. It's a domestic story too. Indian elite has ambition but they don't really work hard to gain that ambition the way I say the Chinese do. The Chinese work ethics, the developmental policies that are created, all are meant to make China a great power, superpower by in the next 20 years. The Indian elite talk about it but not necessarily the ordinary folks who work, they have to work hard. So work ethics is missing. So India has not developed what you call a developmental state attitude. It's human development is very, very low. I mean, some states in the south have done well but if you look at both in the northern sphere and in the eastern areas, including Bengal, by the way, unfortunately, has not done enough for calling, claiming this so-called great power status. Because I also think that this military or security based understanding great power is gone. We have to think about how this power uses its capacity to develop its people, its skill sets and all that. And so I start to looking at it and then I realized that India's conflict with the United States, with China, with Pakistan, with the smaller states all have status written all over. So India did not approve the US because the US was treating India as a subaltern state. Didn't want to give it any role. Only with the 2005 nuclear record that Manman Singh and George W. Bush signed, India got some recognition. India and the other western countries clubbed India and Pakistan as state as equivalent, so-called parity. India is eight times larger. So that they broke, but as you notice recently it came back again during the last conflict they had over the conflict they had. But still India is making progress, lopsided. And the impact this whole debate had on domestic politics. The Mr. Modi and his BJP claim that they are the ones capable of making India a great power, often not realizing that it's not that easy or will not get there. And the Congress party had different vision and they also have ambitions. In fact, Manman Singh never talked about it, but clearly his policies are driven by making India a leading state. So all that led me to this easy to read book, but a lot of insights, historical and theoretical. And the book has received a lot of reviews including one in Wall Street Journal and it has done well and the commercial field too. It also has an Indian edition by the way published by the West, West land publishers and it also has done well I believe. I'm sure it has done well. And I kind of had another question is somehow to answer me that next question. But I'll still put it out and want to know a little bit more. So how do you see India's evolving role in the Asia Pacific, particularly now and with also the US and China competition. So what should we intake from there? Yes, so India is in a very delicate position in this. India claims or argues it is a swing power. It definitely has a major role in the Indian Ocean region. It doesn't have enough power or naval power to expand beyond that to the Pacific side. But still the fact that the US and other countries now called Pacific, they used to have, they used to call it Asia Pacific. Now it's Indo-Pacific. So that's a victory for India strategically, which means the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean are connected strategically. And so India has the role there. But then the big challenge for India is whether the conflict between US and China is in India's heavy burden on India to take positions. If you want to have a multi-alignment strategy and the US is highly unpredictable as we are witnessing, US wants to control the behavior of almost anybody including its allies. And this is not just Mr. Trump's period. Even before that, they subtly tell you to behave because they think they are the superpowers. So they have power. But they also don't allow the Second Ranging Powers their autonomous behavior. And so what we are witnessing is India does not want wars, for instance, over Taiwan between China and the United States because India believes that it will affect Indian security. The Chinese could escalate that conflict to the Indian border as they have already done if India takes a position in this. So a situation where there is no war is in India's favor. But China, India, rivalry is as I mentioned before is the status conflict. So India wants also recognition of its rising power status. But China does not want. China doesn't want the pure competitive in the Pacific. And China is about five times more advanced than India in economics, in security, in technology, in human development. You know, any area you take. And so China sees in a different class. And it wants to be on par or take overtake the United States by the time the Chinese come in spot is under the anniversary of take over in 1949. Happened. So you have this conflict. At the same time, India sees an opportunity that it can make friendship with countries like Japan, Korea, Asia and States. So it started this policy of first it was called Lucas, Neresimharao's period then it turned into a act is all renamed by Mr Modi. And all are meant to give India a position in this evolving theater. This theater is also the most dynamic economically because the highest level of trade and other activities are happening there. And so India is also the first one of the fastest growing economies in the world. A lot of things in favor of India. But if a war happens, we don't know how that will end. If the United States and China expands though escalates and expands to Indian Ocean region, India will have it have time. So India does not want the war but at the same time it wants US support if China attacks it. So there's a delicate balance it has been playing up to your point. Not always very successful. So this context I think the current policy makes sense because you can't rely on the United States completely but you cannot avoid it either. And so and also you have China as a major economic partner. So how to keep China and the US school and not to engage in intense militarized conflict is in India's interest. And I think that's the interest of all the states in the region. Other states I meant including Asya and Japan, Korea also. India shares in that sense this concern of regional escalation. And that rounds up part one of Tasharaka's interview with Professor Paul. Don't forget to tune in next week for part two. And also don't forget to go check out International Relations, which is now on Substack, which is amazing because that means you're able to access the podcast, all of our posts, everything all in one place. So go check that out on Substack now. Thank you so much for listening. If you haven't already done so, click on that little like, share, subscribe or follow button, on whatever platform you're listening to. Go and check out International Relations at ehyphenir.info. There is just a corner copier of free books, daily articles and lots of features for you to get stuck into on all things international relations. Music was bi-material music and I'd like to give a massive thanks to the e-International Relations podcast team, specifically to Tasharaka Decker and Mariana Caracalacchi, and I look forward to seeing you soon. So I suppose there's nothing left to say apart from I've been Kiran Amira, and together we've been thinking global. See you soon.