Stephen Walt | Columnist | Foreign Policy Professor, Harvard Kennedy School
from Clearer Than Truth
43m 28s
Professor Steven Walt, a leading realist in international relations, argues that the current global order is shaped not by idealism or liberal progress, but by material power, strategic calculations, and the realities of state behavior. His key theory—balance of threat—shows that states respond to power not only by reacting to strength, but also by considering proximity, military capacity, and intentions. Walt critiques decades of U.S. foreign policy, especially during the unipolar era, where policymakers falsely believed liberal democracy would naturally dominate, leading to overextension and costly mistakes. He highlights how this belief contributed to the Iraq War and the failure to anticipate a more contested world. Trump’s foreign policy, while populist, reflects a predatory approach—seeking unilateral advantage through trade wars, tariffs, and alliance erosion—which undermines stability and weakens U.S. global influence. Walt emphasizes that realism remains essential, offering tools to understand how states manage risk, especially in trade and security. He warns against over-reliance on economic openness or military dominance, stressing that the expectation of conflict shapes how countries manage interdependence. Ultimately, the U.S. must shift from global overreach to strategic restraint, reducing military commitments abroad and empowering allies for self-defense. This realist approach, grounded in power dynamics and historical patterns, offers a more accurate lens than idealism for understanding 2026’s global challenges.
"Whether reason will prevail, depends only partly upon art.
They must cope and thrive for the better.
We must prepare for the will."
Welcome to Clear Than Truth, where we go beyond headlines to impact the forces shaping
global power and politics.
I'm Nathan Keiker.
Today, we're joined by one of the leading voices in international relations, Professor
Steven Walt of Harvard University, a defining figure in the realist school of foreign policy
thought.
Walt has spent decades challenging conventional wisdom about America's role in the world.
In our conversation, we'll explore how realism explains the current world order and the
limits of American influence.
Stay with us.
This is a fascinating discussion with one of the sharpest minds in global strategy.
Professor Walt, thanks for joining us.
My pleasure to be with you.
So we're seeing a lot of these events around the world seem to boil up at once over several
decades.
From balance of theory to the hell of good intentions, you've offered a consistent realist critique
to USA craft.
At this point in your career, what do you see as the single most important idea in your
work for understanding the world of 2026?
That's a big question.
I mean, I think I'd sort of maybe three two or three things that are all connected.
I mean, you already mentioned it, probably my major theoretical contribution was balance
of threat theory, which built on Ken Walt's neorealism, but tweaked it in what I think
was a non-trivial way by suggesting that states did in fact balance against powerful
countries, but they also took geographic proximity and some military aspects offensive
and defensive capabilities, and in particular perceived intentions into account.
And that allowed for a better way of understanding both alliances, but also how states respond
to powerful countries.
In a sense, it's not important enough just to be powerful.
You also want to use that power wisely and use it in ways that attract support from
others rather than repelling them and causing them to join forces against you.
So that's been a, I think, a consistent idea, and that's shaped a lot of the critiques
I've made of American foreign policy and the foreign policy of some other countries, where
I thought that they were acting in ways that actually, either were costly to them, undermine
their overall global position, but also alienated others unnecessarily.
And maybe the third theme that comes out later, much later in my career, was focusing
on some of the domestic political aspects of American foreign policy, not just where
the United States sat in terms of global power, but rather given the remarkable position
the United States was in, particularly in the unipolar era, that gave it enormous latitude
and because it had lots of latitude, that meant domestic politics actually could map.
And so, you know, John Mirschermer and I wrote a book about the Israel lobby, which built
on that, and then my last book, The Hell of Good Intentions, was about how America's foreign
policy elite misunderstood the implications of unipolarity and did a lot of stupid things.
One consequence of that, of course, was to, I think, open the door to someone like Donald
Trump who ran for office in 2016 with a very, you know, pungent critique of both the Republicans
and the Democrats who had preceded him.
I think those would be the big contributions I've made.
Specifically, how did the elites misunderstand the unipolar moment?
What went wrong and when?
Well, I think, most importantly, they saw the forces of history, sort of, in a working
in America's favor, that there were, you know, trends that were going to make liberal
democracy, the default condition of world politics, and that this would be a perfectly,
you know, benevolent, harmonious world.
So beginning with the Clinton administration, you have an effort that I and some others
have called liberal hegemony, the idea that the United States was going to spread these
liberal values around the world, peacefully if possible, but if necessary, coercively,
and if necessary, by using military force, and the Clintonites, and I think also the
Bush administration, believe this would be relatively easy to do.
We were the unipolar power.
We didn't have any, you know, powerful opponents who were going to stop us.
And very importantly, again, the forces of history were all moving in that direction.
You know, the wind was at our back in some respects.
So you could knock off Saddam Hussein and a flourishing democracy would replace it very
quickly.
Other parts of the world couldn't wait to become like the United States.
China was going to develop, develop a middle class and become a liberal democracy, too.
And because they believed democracies didn't fight each other, ever, we'd have a peaceful
prosperous harmonious world.
And it would have been wonderful if that had worked out.
But you know, most of those ideas, I think, were wrong or at least greatly exaggerated.
And the result instead was sort of the opposite of what people expected in the 1990s and in
the early odds.
I'm interested in that point because you know, it strikes me that, you know, one of the
seminal movements when President Trump was first running for office was in his debate
with Hillary Clinton or, I guess, you have to go further back than that into the, into
the primary where he's, he's on stage with Jeb Bush and he says, your brother didn't
make us safer after his brother talked about, or after Jeb Bush talked about the invasion
of Iraq.
And to me, that was just this extraordinary kind of lay-majesty moment where kind of a lot
of these, you know, sacred cows about, you know, liberal hegemony and kind of the ideas
around the need to spread democracy were sort of, you know, denuded from the public discourse.
And so, you know, I just wonder, I mean, do you think that in some ways President Trump
has made, you know, realism in some form relevant again to academic debates in a way that it
may have been, you know, receding in the past or resolved that kind of a fake notion?
Well, what I think Trump did do was kick the door open to a much wider discussion.
He made it possible to say things, you know, more intelligently than he often does because
he took positions that were outside the mainstream.
That mainstream, by the way, was a bipartisan consensus as you alluded to.
Both Republicans and Democrats prior to 2016 didn't disagree that much on foreign policy
issues.
You know, it's worth remembering.
Hillary Clinton supported the Iraq war.
Joe Biden supported the Iraq war.
Barack Obama was the big exception in the Democratic Party.
And it's one of the reasons he got to be president.
So that was a pretty powerful bipartisan consensus.
By 2015, 2016, this isn't working, right?
And it's sort of obvious it's not working.
And unfortunately, for all of those other rivals of Trump, they weren't willing to say so.
And he was.
And so his critique was critique, not just, as you suggest, of Democrats, but also of the
Republican sort of stalwarts like Jeb Bush, like Marco Rubio back in those days, et cetera.
And some of the points he made back in 2016, you know, resonated with people.
Certainly, the idea that allies weren't paying their fair share of collective defense.
You know, that was a complaint that lots of people had had, but Trump put it more pungently
than others had.
Certainly, by 2015, 2016, people were not happy with hyper globalization.
Just letting markets go around wild without taking into account what the effects might
be on the domestic economy, things like that.
So he had a critique that made some sense.
And finally, you know, the fact that nobody was ever held accountable, none of the people
who screwed up the economy in 2007, 2008, or who screwed up Iraq and Afghanistan, again,
Democrats and Republicans alike, ever really paid much price for this, either professionally
or personally.
And that gave Trump, I think, a very powerful, you know, position to go after them, leaving
aside whether he's improved things or not.
That's a separate question.
Once he did that, that opened up some space for a much broader debate about what America's
role in the world ought to be.
And that has, I think, opened the door for, you know, other realists, you know, like
me to maybe get, listen to a little bit more than we were in the past.
How would you describe President Trump's foreign policy?
Is it realist, really?
What is it?
Well, I have taken to calling it actually predatory hegemony.
And what I mean by that is in its attempt to use America's still dominant position, all
of those sources of power we have around the world.
But to use them in a predatory fashion, that is to say to insist that all bilateral relationships
have to be better for the United States than for anybody else, that even if we do something
cooperative with another country, we have to get the lion share of the benefits, of the
goods.
Now, all great powers are predators to some degree.
agree, but they tend to be predators primarily towards their adversaries.
You want to weaken your adversaries.
You want to always get the better of them in any exchange.
You tend not to act that way towards your allies.
You want your allies to be powerful, strong, the ungood terms, et cetera.
And the Trump administration has a different view that all relationships should be won
where the United States extracts the greatest amount of benefit that it possibly can all
of the time.
And I think, you see this most visibly in the trade policy.
This idea that trade relations are measured fully by trade balances, that if we're running
a deficit with some other country, that means there's somehow stealing things from us.
So they're getting free goods that we're not getting, they're cheating us in some way.
And that's rhetoric that the president uses.
And so we have to restructure our relations largely through tariffs and other forms of
coercion to try and rebalance things in our favor.
In Trump's mind, I think we ought to be running a trade surplus with the entire world, with
every single country, which, of course, I think is completely unrealistic.
There's more to it than that, but that's how I think of it.
It's power-oriented, but it's fundamentally predatory, and I'll just add one other point.
Part of it is also, of course, extracting personal benefits for Trump or his family.
But these deals with different countries are often linked to them, making various concessions
that will align the president's pockets.
And that's, again, what you would expect a predator to do as well.
Well, I mean, I do think it's somewhat unfortunate that there's been, I think, a lack of a unified
messaging around the tear of strategy.
When I was in DHS, I sort of saw that the balance of trade was a proxy, I think, for how
much content trade had, you know, at the low value of goods from China.
And the reason is that the CCP has effectively helped establish such a dominant position
of its country in the production of goods that, you know, if you look very closely, almost
80% of goods under the value of $800 globally, you could say kind of an origin in China.
But nonetheless, you know, I mean, to the extent that that still needs to be articulated,
I think it's extremely important.
But, you know, I would just put out there, you know, something I wouldn't, in graduate
school, I always found sort of refreshing about realism is that it was, you know, so materialist
in a sense that it was, you know, in some ways, interested in not all the froth of discourse,
right?
And you were looking at the ability of states to make war.
And this, you know, was implied by the theory that, you know, there was a kind of deterrent
value to this.
So just to ask the question, I mean, to the extent that the trade policy is aimed at creating
this industrial base, right, or this ability to make war with critical minerals or invent
as well as case access to oil, is there a kind of realist quotient to what the president
is doing in the sense that the United States may be 10 years from now or five years from
now will be perceived as, you know, more able to defend itself due to access to more of
these resources, or is all of that off base?
Yeah.
It's not, it's not off base at a logical level.
There's a question of, I guess, the empirics of it, of whether you actually think that you're
going to, that what they're doing is going to rebuild the manufacturing base or whatever.
I mean, I'd say a couple of points.
I mean, certainly one of the great exceptions to liberal trade theory, the idea that, you
know, you basically increase overall prosperity and your own wealth and well-being by letting
markets decide and allocate where resources should go, and if China can produce a particular
good cheaper and better than we can, then we ought to let them do that, and we'll specialize
in things that we're better at, that sort of standard trade theory.
But one of the exceptions to that is sort of general national security grounds.
So there are some industries you would want to keep, you wouldn't want to have to buy your
fighter planes, for example, from China, from a potential rival, although it's interesting,
you might end up buying some of the components that go into fighter planes the same way that
they might be buying components that go into some of their military technologies.
So again, there are some exceptions.
You could make the same claim with regard to rare earths, which have been in the news
a lot lately, there it's a case where the United States, back when we were feeling very
optimistic about the future, didn't allow China to take control of all the rare earths
in the world, rather we let our own ability to process rare earths languish.
So it's not that we can't get hold of rare earths, we actually have lots of them in the
United States and could get other supplies else for pretty easily.
Right now we don't have much capacity to process them and that will take some time to rebuild.
That's not as efficient as letting China do it, but it's the smart thing to do because
you don't want to be completely dependent on a potential adversary for things that might
be needed.
So there's now then there's the larger question of whether everything else that the Trump
administration is doing is consistent with realism.
I think, for example, the idea that we're going to get some great strategic bananza out
of Venezuela and oil is nonsense.
First of all, Venezuela and oil is crummy oil.
It's hard to extract, it's very heavy, it's costly to refine.
You need a global price of about $80 a barrel in order to make it economically viable and
the current price is about 60.
Moreover, regardless of what the president thinks is gradually weaning its way off of
hydrocarbons.
Right?
So the best thing you could do with most Venezuelan oil is leave most of it in the ground
if at all possible.
And finally, it's going to take $100 billion or so of investment to rebuild the Venezuelan
oil industry, even if you could find somebody who wanted to do that.
So I think the idea that suddenly Americans are going to have lower gas prices and we're
going to be sitting on this great ocean of oil that we can control.
I think it's just propaganda.
One final thing is if, by some miracle, you could wave your magic wand and bring all that
oil online in a year or two, it would put a bunch of American shale oil producers out
of business because they're already at the margin given where the price is.
That will drive the price down and so we'd lose a bunch of businesses here at home, which
is not exactly consistent with America first.
Isn't there benefit though in what we've done in Venezuela in terms of our strategy towards
both Russia and China, who we're trying to align themselves more deeply with Venezuela?
Does it not sort of put the screws into our rivals?
Which ones?
Russia and China.
Well, probably not. I mean, first of all, if I were the Chinese, I would be delighted
by this move.
It's a distraction for the United States.
We're going to end up focusing a lot of attention there and not on Asia.
And remember, oil is purchased in a global market, right?
So right now China gets some oil from Venezuela, but it's not like they can't buy it elsewhere.
The price of it may go up in some places.
They'll spend some more on it, but that means we'll spend more on it too as well.
So the idea that you're going to be able to cut China off, bring its economy to its
knees.
And by the way, the amount of oil that China gets from Venezuela is relatively small.
I think it's three to four percent of their consumption.
So again, this is not the sort of mortal threat.
It's not much of a threat to Russia at all because Russia, of course, is an oil and gas
exporter.
You could argue maybe if at some point down the road, this oil came online, that drives
the price down and that's bad for Russia.
But also, Trump's not anti-Russian.
You could argue one more or less realist aspect of his foreign policy.
It's been this idea that we should try to improve our relationship with Russia.
Maybe pull Russia and China apart.
That hasn't worked out very well, but I don't think he's anti-Putin at all.
So I don't see this as a move that has much of a positive implication for the United
States in terms of great power relations.
You've spoken a bit about the need to not alienate our allies.
But in a zero-sum world, at what point will President Trump's willingness to alienate
allies in the short term for short term benefit actually have an impact in the U.S.
his ability to do statecraft?
If you take the extreme case, for example, suppose he ordered the 82nd Airborne to occupy
Greenland and said, "We're going to take it," and NATO completely collapses at that point.
The rest of NATO invokes Article 5, but there's not much they can do, and so NATO is effectively
over at that point.
Then in the United States, then decides it wants to conduct military operations somewhere
in the Middle East, which, of course, we've done repeatedly.
We can no longer use any of the facilities in Europe to do that.
We can't use any of the air bases that we use to bounce airplanes through there.
We can't have any of our warships serviced in ports in Europe.
They've all got to be at serviced here in the United States as well.
So it starts to immediately limit America's power projection capabilities in other parts
of the world.
Now, if you think the United States shouldn't be projecting power into any of those places
ever, that may not bother you, but that's one very immediate consequence of a full rupture
of our relations with Europe.
Let's assume it's not going to be as extreme as that.
I think one of the most likely results of the way the Trump administration is now approaching
relations with both our European allies, but to some degree also our allies in Asia,
is not that you'll see aggressive anti-American balancing by these countries.
What you'll see is various forms of resistance, of hedging, of cutting deals with others, of
looking to diversify their ties away from the United States as much as possible to try
and limit American leverage.
We're already seeing the Canadians do that.
Mark Carney has talked about doubling candidates for and trade without not counting the United
States by 2030.
The Europeans just agreed to sign a trade pact they've been negotiating for years with
the Latin American trade group, Mercasur.
I think that's the kind of thing you're likely to see, and in all those moments where the
United States would like to be able to get other countries to line up behind us, whatever
the issue might be.
You'll find other countries dragging their feet, or even more likely promising to do something
and then not doing it, you know, shirking in various ways.
So one of the things that's accompanied a lot of the trade negotiations in the past year
is foreign countries saying, well look, if you'll lower the tariffs, we'll agree to invest
in the American economy.
You start looking at these in detail.
These are like five to ten year commitments, none of the money's shown up yet.
It's not clear that it's ever going to.
It's not clear who's going to monitor it, et cetera.
So one of the ways you deal with someone pointing a gun to your head is you agree to say yes
now, and then you don't fulfill it later on.
And I think we're going to see more behavior like that in the future.
Well, just to raise the NATO pointing, you know, I'm currently working on a manuscript
that is delinquent, but I'm adding to it every time I get a chance to go to an archive.
It's about Ukraine's decision to give up nuclear weapons.
And one thing that this has led me to really ponder is whether this huge debate over NATO's
enlargement and expansion, whatever you want to call it, kind of led to a misunderstanding
of Russia's real kind of world view that in fact was the presence or lack thereof of
hard power that sort of decides whether Russia is going to think that crime pays and take
over Ukraine and so on.
And so I wonder, do you think that President Trump is offering us by a dent of these kind
of really provocative statements about the alliance, you know, kind of a view into whether
we may have over emphasized, you know, this article five frontier in Europe.
And I'm asking this in a provocative way because I think it's important that we kind
of reassess how much emphasis is placed on NATO given, you know, that foot-tracking that
I think has actually been in play among European allies for a very long time.
And I'll just give one example of that.
I mean, Germany's statement that it was going to spend 100 billion euros on its military
and then just to watch that unravel into basically nothing, you know, this is the wealthiest
country in Europe.
So I'm kind of throwing that out there because I'm interested in your views.
Yeah, no, it's a great point.
So I think every American president since Dwight Eisenhower has wanted Europeans to spend
more on defense, and, you know, we actually have a pretty good theory that explains why
that doesn't happen when the theory of collective goods in unequal partnerships, the wealthiest
or strongest end up bearing a disproportionate share of the burdens for sort of logical reasons,
as long as they have a common interest, all right.
And what a number of us have been arguing for a long time now is that the United States
should gradually be doing less in Europe.
Now that the Cold War was over, now that the Soviet Union was gone, and Russia, although
it might be problematic, was not a potential hegemon in Europe wasn't going to dominate
Eurasia.
It just wasn't powerful enough to.
And therefore, Europe, given time to prepare, had the wherewithal to defend itself with
the United States as sort of ally of last resort.
So if you asked me what I would have recommended, I would have said, you know, the United States
should declare that it's going to be reducing its military role in Europe.
Gradually, over a 10-year period, it was going to do this in a cooperative way with the Europeans.
It was going to help the Europeans build up.
But it was going to make it clear that that's what it was doing.
And it wasn't doing it because it was angry.
It wasn't doing this because out of rank or hostility, it was doing it because we felt
the Europeans should be responsible for their own security.
And we're able to do that given the threat environment that they faced.
Now, that's not what we ultimately did.
What we did, instead, of course, was we kept expanding the NATO Eastward, taking on additional
security commitments without adding additional resources to actually fulfill those new commitments
and assuming that Russia would never actually push back in any serious way.
And this was, again, a bipartisan mistake made by the Clinton administration, the Bush administration,
and I believe also the Obama administration.
And eventually, we saw beginning in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea.
And then in 2022, with the direct Russian invasion, we saw the Russians who were no longer
as weak as they had been in the 1990s, finally pushing back against this.
And there's a whole cottage industry of people now arguing that NATO enlargement had nothing
to do with this.
And I think that this line of argument just is a complete head in the sand refusing to
look at the evidence kind of explanation for this.
The Russians made it clear from Boris Yeltsin onward, even Gorbachev, actually, that moving
NATO Eastward was going to be a serious problem for them.
They'd repeated it over and over again, and it makes perfect sense.
Why would any country be comfortable watching the world's most powerful military alliance
moving steadily closer when that same alliance is led by a country that says it wants to
change the world.
It wants to remake the world in its image.
It wants every country around the world to be a liberal democracy.
I always like to remind people that the United States spent a half a million troops to try
and determine the geopolitical alignment of South Vietnam back in the 50s and 60s, and
we lost 50,000, 56,000 troops doing it.
And that was a country that was 8,000 miles away from the United States and a very little
strategic importance.
Now if we can do that in the 1960s, you can imagine why Russia might have worried about
a country of 35 million people right on its border aligning with the United States and
with NATO possibly becoming a site for military installations.
And even if joining NATO was many years off in the future, Russia, of course, couldn't
assume it wouldn't happen, and there was growing security cooperation between the West
and Ukraine even before then.
So again, that is not a justification for Russia did, Russia's invasion was, I think, illegal
and immoral, but we ought to understand why it happened.
And part of it was our hubris in thinking we could keep doing this with no consequences.
I might add it's the Ukrainians who have suffered more than anyone else as a result of that.
Right.
Yeah.
And just to switch gears into trade just once again, because I'm fascinated as I am asked
actually now to begin teaching a course on national security and trade policy, if there's
a sort of definitive, realistic count that you would prescribe for understanding international
trade.
And I asked this because I remember being in graduate school and reading Robert Gilpin,
who's trying to articulate a realist theory of trade.
And I get these sort of flashbacks to when we were discussing some of the executive orders
around President Trump's trade policy.
I'm sure this is a short coming of my own, right?
But Gilpin himself says there's this liberal theory of trade which kind of subverts the
interests of the state for a kind of broader distribution of goods and wealth across the
international system.
And then there's a nationalist version of trade which does sort of the opposite.
It only puts the interests of the state above the whole international trading system.
But there's a lack of a kind of profit motive derived from, you know, how trade could
conducted. Do you think that there's a kind of theorist who is out there, or maybe even just a public
intellectual who's kind of made these points in the past, and should we be looking to some kind
of paradigm that's already out there, or do we have to think creatively to understand this?
Right. It's a great question, and I'll mention someone in a minute, but let me tell you how I
think about this problem. I mean, I'm a big believer in the liberal theory of trade. I think it
holds up both logically, and I think it holds up empirically that states that are generally open
to trading with others do better overall. And if you try to cut yourself off from the world,
you want to be an autarkic country, you tend to fall behind. You don't want to be North Korea.
I don't see anybody lining up to buy the next North Korean smartphone, or just about anything else.
So it's important if you're a great power to actually remain open to the rest of the world to
compete as fairly as possible. And that means you do have to sometimes play hardball if you think
one of your trading partners is cheating, and that's what trade negotiations are all about.
But the United States would end up being weaker and poorer if we tried to cut ourselves off from
others. All right, the person who I think has done the best job of giving sort of a realist
account of this is Dale Copeland has a big fat book, Economic Interdependence and War, which looks
at this whole question of, you know, does economic interdependence make war less likely?
Very common liberal idea. And his basic argument is that if the danger of war is relatively low,
then states want to open up. They want a relatively open trading order. They are willing to send
capital abroad, invest in other countries, because they're not worried about losing it if a war
breaks out. They're willing to trade with countries who might be rivals, because they think that's
you know, far over the horizon. Right. If on the other hand, you think a war might be in the
offing, or the rivalries are getting worse, then you start to have more reasons to place some
limitations on your vulnerabilities. You're going to want to make sure, as we were talking about
before, that key industries that might be necessary for actually fighting a war are either in your
hands or in the hands of a reliable partner. You don't want to be vulnerable to a potential rival
as well. You start to worry more about relative gains. If I'm trading with one of my adversaries,
are they getting more out of the deal than I am as well? And in circumstances like that, actually
tight levels of economic independence can actually make conflict more likely. You start to worry
about those vulnerabilities. You start to worry about trying to gain control of resources
that you might need, or gain control of key areas, you know, see lines of communication, etc.
So in a sense, what he's arguing is the expectation of future conflict is what drives just how open
you're willing to be in terms and how open you should be willing to be. So if you asked me sort of
what's the best, you know, realistic count of how international trade should be thought about,
I'd probably point you in his direction. One last question, if I, I'm sorry, and I don't mean
to monopolize, but I've really wanted to ask someone who knows this sort of literature a bit about
this. I mean, I'm fascinated by kind of these theories that we're put forward. I think in many
cases, by realists, about the role of hegemon, true hegemon in systems, right? For example, trade,
right? And so what truly is remarkable to me is that in many cases, it seems that the theory
sort of stops when it describes what a hegemon has to do to sustain itself, right? And so I just
want to ask in a very abstract way, I mean, do you think that at its, you know, previous trajectory,
the sort of trade system, which the United States underwrote through providing, you know,
the free transfer of ships over the seas by propping up the dollar, by making sure that, you know,
pirates at crucial choke points weren't able to stop ships. That was a very costly endeavor.
And if we were sort of playing this role of a hegemon providing the stability for trade to
flourish, you know, was there a necessity to come up with a stream of revenue to kind of prevent
the United States from bankrupting itself? And is that a way, perhaps, to understand a more
aggressive kind of global application of tariff, or is that completely off base? I'm just curious
by your view. I don't want to say to my host that anything is completely off base,
but I don't think that quite gets that. Certainly, there's not as much, there's not money in the
tariff war that's going to pay for a global hegemonic role for the United States. I mean,
rule number one is tariffs are not paid by foreigners. Tariffs are attacks on American consumers.
Full stop. So when you impose a tariff on a good from China or anybody else, a good from South Korea,
a good from Mexico, a good from Canada, most of that price is paid by Americans. So it's a way
of taxing us. Now you could say this is a secret way of taxing Americans. So you then have resources
to go off and do those various things. But it would be more efficient to simply raise taxes on the
United States, on American citizens. And I don't think that's what's going on with the tariff war.
Second point, and I have not thought about this in detail. So I could be wrong here. But a lot of
the things that the United States did to sustain a sort of liberal trading order were things we
were doing for other reasons. So yes, we protected freedom of the seas. But we did that as kind of a
how do I put it? It was an additional benefit or a side benefit of the fact that we'd created a
large military for the purposes of waging the Cold War. And if you had a large military and you
wanted to be able to project power around the world, one of the other consequences of that was
that you could protect navigation too. But that's not why we had the big navy. That we had it
for sort of more Cold War competition reasons. We used it on a few occasions to do that in the
Iran or Iraq war. The United States was escorting tankers through the Straits of Formos. But again,
we didn't build the navy for that purpose. We just had it around and we could use it for that
purpose on occasion. The amount of money that that cost, the actual operation, the amount of money
we've spent on antipiracy operations is a drop in the bucket compared to some of the other things
that we did like invading Iraq and staying there for 15 years or overthrowing this Taliban and
then staying in Afghanistan, which you know my colleague Linda Bilms, you know, calculate was
over $5 trillion. And we didn't spend anywhere near that amount of money on a lot of these
other things. Last point I'd make is America's management of the international economy to the extent
that we did was I think overall a net benefit for the United States. Americans lived much better
lives as a result of being able to have a relatively open order. Americans are in fact wealthier.
Did we manage that perfectly? No. I think we went overboard in the 90s and the odds. We were not
sufficiently attentive to the distributional consequences of hyperglobalization and the effect
it was going to have on some industries as well. But you know, for yes, some industries got wiped
out in the United States, but at the same time lots of Americans had to we're living better
lives because goods were cheaper. Et cetera. So even there was a bit of a mixed bag as well.
Bottom line here is the the America's head humane grow in the world economy. I think it's
been a net positive. It's some of the excesses of our military policies in parts of the world that
ultimately didn't matter that got us into more trouble over time. I would be remiss if I didn't ask
just on the Middle East and to get your perspective on it before you go. You warned well before
the current war that US policy in the Middle East mixed strategic overreach with wishful thinking.
Looking at Gaza today, how much of what we are seeing is, in your view, baked into the sort of
pathologies you described in the health good intentions. And what if anything still surprises you?
Not much has surprised me. I mean, the one shift I'd say in American Middle East policy is
that 10 or 15 years ago, the idea that the United States would have a relationship of
unconditional support for Israel was very uncontroversial in the United States. That was the de facto
situation. That was bipartisan as well. If you suggested otherwise, you were attacked and marginalized
as President Rehsharmer and I were when we wrote our book, etc. It was really outside the box
opinion, even to suggest that the United States should have a normal relationship with Israel.
And now, in terms of public opinion, that's the norm.
All right, and it hasn't affected yet more politicians are doing I think largely because the Israel Avi remains a pretty potent force
But there's been a real sea change in how a lot of these things get talked about
So I haven't been surprised. I'm not surprised that the so-called peace deal in Gaza isn't really a peace deal
Fighting has not stopped dying hasn't stopped
Reconstruction hasn't begun really fade hasn't
Happened and as the New York Times reported today in a very long
multi-page spread
The takeover of the West Bank is proceeding a pace. So we're going to get a
Greater Israel
What happens to Gaza remains to be seen but we're going to get a greater Israel a sort of one-state solution
But it's a one-state solution that will continue to deny
political rights to you know five to seven and a half million Palestinians if they have
And been forcibly expelled or pushed out in other ways as well, and I think this is you know both a tragedy
Personally, it's also not good for Israel as I think is increasingly clear as well
But I can't say that I'm surprised by any of it at this point
Well, the other are not surprised the other item in the news today is that the Iranian regime could fall if that happens
Would there not be a great value in our closest ally being Israel in the Middle East right now?
Well, first of all, we have a number of partners in
The in the Middle East and yeah, what this you could ask the question what exactly does that do to benefit?
Americans also when regimes fall, you know, be careful what you wish for
You know, it's not clear that the situation in Libya today is a substantial improvement over what it was before
Afghanistan is a mess. Iraq is still
A mess in a variety of different ways. Yemen is a disaster
Right, so yes, the Iranian regime may fall, but we don't know what or replace it and we don't know what the implications will be
You know going forward. So again, I tend to like political order. I tend to like a
More predictable world and the idea that you can constantly make the world better by knocking off regimes
You don't like even if they're not very savory regimes, and that would certainly be my view of Iran
You know again, I think that most realists would tell you to be careful
Okay, Professor Walt, we you've generously given us more than 40 minutes of your time
We'll let you go, but for listeners where can they follow your work and your research and your scholarship?
Well, I continue to write you know scholarly articles in places like international security
I have a new piece coming out in foreign affairs in the next issue on the topic of predatory
hegemony and I write a more or less weekly column for foreign policy magazine on whatever happens to occur to me that week
Thanks again for joining this episode of Clear Than Truth if you enjoyed the episode
Please subscribe and leave a review to help others find clear than truth
You can always follow us on social media and catch interviews with leading thinkers in diplomacy, intelligence and global affairs
I'm Nathan Geiger. Thanks for joining. We'll see you next time
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Professor Steven Walt’s central contribution is balance of threat theory, which shows states balance against powerful nations based on proximity, military capabilities, and perceived intentions—not just power alone.
The U.S. foreign policy elite in the unipolar era misunderstood global dynamics, believing liberal democracy would naturally spread and that peaceful global order was inevitable, leading to costly and misguided interventions.
President Trump’s foreign policy exemplifies "predatory hegemony," where the U.S. seeks to extract maximum benefits from all relationships, often through tariffs and coercion, disregarding long-term strategic stability.
Realism emphasizes material power and state survival, suggesting that economic interdependence increases war risk when adversaries perceive mutual vulnerability, not when trade is open.
U.S. military and economic overreach—especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East—demonstrates a failure to align foreign policy with realistic power dynamics, undermining alliances and global stability.
The U.S. should gradually reduce its military presence in Europe to allow allies to take responsibility for their own security, a shift that would better reflect realist principles and prevent strategic overreach.
Trump’s policies, including Venezuela oil deals and aggressive anti-alliance rhetoric, have short-term benefits but risk weakening global partnerships, reducing U.S. power projection, and creating strategic instability.
Realist insights, particularly from scholars like Dale Copeland, provide a better framework for understanding trade and security, emphasizing that state behavior depends on expectations of conflict, not just economic efficiency.
Summary:
Professor Steven Walt, a leading realist in international relations, argues that the current global order is shaped not by idealism or liberal progress, but by material power, strategic calculations, and the realities of state behavior. His key theory—balance of threat—shows that states respond to power not only by reacting to strength, but also by considering proximity, military capacity, and intentions. S.
foreign policy, especially during the unipolar era, where policymakers falsely believed liberal democracy would naturally dominate, leading to overextension and costly mistakes. He highlights how this belief contributed to the Iraq War and the failure to anticipate a more contested world. S.
global influence. Walt emphasizes that realism remains essential, offering tools to understand how states manage risk, especially in trade and security. He warns against over-reliance on economic openness or military dominance, stressing that the expectation of conflict shapes how countries manage interdependence.
S. must shift from global overreach to strategic restraint, reducing military commitments abroad and empowering allies for self-defense. This realist approach, grounded in power dynamics and historical patterns, offers a more accurate lens than idealism for understanding 2026’s global challenges.
FAQs
His key contribution is balance of threat theory, which argues that states balance against powerful countries not just based on power, but also considering geographic proximity, military capabilities, and perceived intentions.
They wrongly believed liberal democracy would naturally spread and that the world would be peaceful and harmonious, leading to a flawed 'liberal hegemony' approach that underestimated the risks of global conflict and misjudged realist dynamics.
Trump's approach is described as 'predatory hegemony,' where the U.S. seeks to extract maximum benefits from all relationships, often at the expense of allies, reflecting a realist view of power but with a predatory, not strategic, focus.
Realists argue that states are more open to trade when they expect low conflict, but if war is perceived as likely, they limit vulnerabilities by controlling key industries and resources, prioritizing relative gains over open markets.
The U.S. maintained freedom of navigation and a stable international order through military power, not specifically to generate revenue, and this support helped global trade flourish, though it was a side effect of broader strategic goals.
Professor Walt argues that Russia viewed NATO's eastward expansion as a serious security threat, and that this perception was a key factor in their response, including the 2014 Crimea annexation and 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
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