Special Episode: What Does the RSF’s Seizure of El Fasher Mean for Sudan’s War?

Hi, this is Hold Your Fire, a podcast by the International Crisis Group and Richard Atwood. Earlier this week, the rapid support forces captured Al-Fasha in the north of Darfur in Sudan's west. As most of our listeners will know, the RSF are paramilitaries fighting the Sudanese army, the SAF, and various other groups allied to the SAF, including former Darfuri rebels who'd help the army defend Al-Fasha. This is Army Chief Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan explaining why his forces abandoned the city. We've agreed to withdraw the army from Al-Fasha to a safer location to spare the citizens and the rest of the city from destruction. We are determined to take revenge for all of our martyrs for what happened to our people in Al-Fasha, the crimes that are being committed there and that were committed before that in all parts of Sudan, in full view of the world. The RSF takeover of Al-Fasha has prompted an exodus from the city. In their thousands, men, women, and children flee Al-Fasha, bringing with them the UN says horrific testimonies of indiscriminate violence, starvation, and ethnically targeted killing. There is immediate blackout in Al-Fasha, only pictures like these of militants celebrating taking over the city have emerged. The RSF now control pretty much all of Darfur, as well as parts of the Kordafans just to the east where they're also fighting the army and allied groups. So for more background on the war you should check out the episode we did three weeks ago or any of the many previous episodes we've done on Sudan. Today we're going to do a short update episode to look at the implications of the RSF's capture of Al-Fasha and of what now looks like a de facto partition of Sudan with the RSF and its parallel government controlling much of the west of the country and the army controlling the capital Khartoum and the east. To what extent is this a turning point in the war and what does it mean for the peace talks US envoy Masa Boulos has tried over recent weeks to get going? To talk about all this I'm joined by Sherwitt Walden-McIle, who is crisis group Sudan expert and Alan Boswell, our Horn of Africa director. Sherwitt, Alan, welcome back home. Thanks, Richard. Thanks for having us, Richard. So Sherwitt, as we just heard, the RSF now control Al-Fasha. Should we start by talking about how that's happened over the last few days? Yes, the RSF has more or less taken control of Al-Fasha, which has been one of the key fronts in Sudan's war for the past two years, or particularly since November 2023 when major Darfuria armed groups decided to side with the army, fearing a total RSF takeover of Darfur. Well, there were multiple moments over the past two years when we thought the RSF was close to capturing Al-Fasha, but Saf and the Darfuria allies managed to repel successive offensives. But this time, however, the RSF has managed to almost fully capture the city. They have taken control of Saf's last remaining base in Al-Fasha and the whole of Darfur. And they've been besieging Fasha for a while and they control parts of the city, but do we know what's tip the scale? Yes. I mean, there are several decisive factors that played into their victory. First, like you mentioned, the RSF imposed months long siege on the city. Its forces had encircled Al-Fasha, they dug trenches and built defensive barricades to block any retreat or resupply routes. And by cutting off the supply lines, the RSF made it virtually impossible for Saf and its allies to bring in reinforcements or essential provisions. And as conditions deteriorated, starvation and displacement increased in the city. It affected civilians, but it also affected the soldiers fighting alongside Saf. And many fighters reportedly surrendered before the last RSF assaults on the city. The second thing is that the RSF has employed more advanced weapons in 2025, including anti-aircraft systems that have effectively limited Saf's air support to its fighters in Al-Fasha. The RSF also made extensive use of drones, both for reconnaissance and targeting Saf and allied positions. They've also used a lot of heavy artillery to breach army defenses. And of course, we have all heard reports of external military support to the RSF, particularly from the UAE through Chad and Libya, which likely enabled the RSF to sustain its long siege on the city and mount this decisive offensive. But what might have finally led to Saf's defeat is Saf's own command decided that holding a no longer defensible position is not viable in the long term. Reports suggest that Saf officers have been gradually evacuated from Al-Fasha in recent weeks that they have gone to Tawila, its southwest of the city. And in his speech yesterday, General Burhan confirmed that the army carried out a tactical withdrawal. And residents were also urged to evacuate shortly before the RSF breached Saf lines. So in the end, RSF faced little resistance, at least organized resistance inside the Sixth Infantry Division, Saf's headquarters in Al-Fasha, as most Saf personnel had already withdrawn. And Richard, I just add one more factor, which is this was quite a dramatic few days because right before Al-Fasha fell, there was the first at least attempt at peace talks, I would say, which occurred in Washington, DC. This was under this Quad format, which we spoke about last time, but it was the US together with officials from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. And they brought delegations from Saf and the Port Sudan government on one hand and RSF on the other. And these Quad officials shuttled back and forth with both delegations on this proposal to start with a three month humanitarian truce. One thing that we've seen throughout this war is that when peace negotiations pick up, the RSF often is launching offensives, presumably to sort of increase their bargaining hand at the table. It's quite a crude power plane, but I'd be surprised if the timing was completely coincidental. So we'll come back to the Emirati support that you talked about to the RSF, which seems to have been, as you say, decisive, but I think still denied by the Emirates, despite all the evidence that we talked about many times on the show before. And we'll come back to those Quad talks, the talks in Washington as well, but show it what's going on now in Al-Fasha. For months, there've been fears of a bloodbath at the RSF's hands if they captured the city, given their track record or what they've done in other places. Well, now it's hard to say exactly what's happening in Al-Fasha because communication is mostly down, but from what we've been able to gather, the situation remains extremely tense and volatile since the RSF took over the city. People on the ground are reporting widespread insecurity, house to house searches, arrests, and even targeted killings. Hundreds of civilians accused of having links to the army or local defense groups have reportedly been detained. In several neighborhoods, RSF is patrolling and they're going door to door, rounding up men of fighting age, many of whom are believed to have been taken to makeshift detention sites, some of them in old army compounds and government buildings. We don't really know much about their conditions beyond this. And videos have also surfaced online that show summer executions and targeted attacks, and while the RSF leaders have publicly ordered their commanders to prevent abuses, we know that kind of control is often inconsistent on the ground. Now, amongst the population, there's real fear that Al-Fasha could see reprisals on a much larger scale simply because of the city's size, the diversity of the communities that live there, and the number of militias that were fighting against the RSF there. We are also hearing that the RSF is holding a large number of prisoners of war, including senior officers from the Sixth Inventory Division. And in terms of the humanitarian situation, it remains dire. We haven't heard of any new aid deliveries or food supplies reaching the city. Humanitarian agencies, as far as I know, still haven't been granted access. Electricity and water are still down, and thousands of civilians are trying to flee on foot, mostly towards Sawila, southwest of the city. I'm told that many women and children have managed to get through, but men are finding it much harder to leave. They're mostly rounded up for further investigations. For those who remain in the city, people are facing not just hunger and disease, but there's a constant threat of reprisals and arrests. It's still very much unclear whether aid will be allowed in any time soon, but the situation is looking very dire. And just to say, Richard, that as we've discussed before, both sides have committed atrocities, including massacres of unarmed civilians throughout this war. But of course, the RSF has a deep history, even from its roots, going back to the Darfur War two decades ago of atrocities. And early on in the war, there were massacres that took place in El Janina in West Darfur. And it's been a huge concern of ours and many others that should RSF take al-Fasher, that we would see more atrocities take place. And the way the RSF carried out the siege, including at the end by constructing this earthen wall that completely surrounded al-Fasher, you can see it from satellite images. It wasn't a good sign heading into this about what the prospects would be for those stuck inside. So unfortunately, we've seen these videos widely circulate, and the UN has put out a statement saying, you know, that already they're very concerned about what looks like credible reports and video documentation of atrocities. And it even goes to the point of satellite images that are coming out of red stains visible from outer space on the ground that people are assuming are various pockets of blood, essentially, on the ground. So I think it's pretty clear that it's quite likely there will be atrocities that are well documented at the hands of RSF by the time this is all done. Yeah, I saw those reports as well. My pools of blood visible by a satellite doesn't bode well, of course, if that's true. So Darfur is obviously a big area, much of it desert, hard to completely control. But now that the RSF holds al-Fasher has recaptured the last SAF military base, does this mean, broadly speaking, there's going to be an end to the fighting in Darfur, and the RSF is going to consolidate its control there? Well, not necessarily. So the RSF's victory in al-Fasher effectively ended the army's organized presence in Western Sudan and marks a major turning point in the conflict itself. The Sudanese army has acknowledged a tactical withdrawal from the city. And the RSF now claims full control of al-Fasher, but some remnants of SAF-aligned fighters and local resistance militias may still be contesting some neighborhoods within al-Fasher. But beyond the city, the RSF now controls most of North Darfur, though Darfur-y armed groups are still holding positions near al-Tine, which is close to the Chadian border. Whether they can regroup for a major counter-attack remains uncertain, particularly if reports of the killing or capture of senior SAF commanders prove accurate, which their movements haven't really confirmed yet. But there are rumors that they managed to successfully leave al-Fasher. But if they have managed to successfully launch counter-attacks, still remains uncertain, given the extent to which the RSF has taken control of the city and beyond the city, the deserts of North Darfur. For now, we can say that the RSF effectively controls nearly all five Darfur states, which is at first since the war started in 2023. And what does it mean then for the the other main front in the quarterfans? Does this mean the RSF can move resources there? I mean, or is the army going to try to push on that front to capture back some territory? In the short term, the RSF is likely to focus on stabilizing al-Fasher and presenting themselves as a governing authority through their government-based inyalla. Strategically speaking, however, the fall of al-Fasher ships the worst center its words towards quarterfans, like you mentioned, making north and south quarterfan the new front lines. So while consolidating control over north Darfur, the RSF can also put pressure on key army supply routes and urban centers in quarterfan. We have already seen signs of this. The RSF recently captured Bara in north quarterfan near White Nile state and is closing on in Al-Obaid, which is the capital city of north quarterfan, using siege tactics very similar to those seen in al-Fasher and in Baba Nusa and elsewhere. So they may also push against remaining south bases like Baba Nusa in west quarterfan. So all in all, this to say that the war in quarterfans looks set to escalate in the coming weeks. That being said, I don't expect the RSF to launch offensives towards Khartoum or Eastern Sudan in the short to medium term. For now, I think their focus appears firmly on consolidating gains in west and pressing the quarterfan front. And with the RSF controlling most of Darfur and some adjacent areas in the quarterfans, the SAF, the army and its allies controlling the rest with front line split, as you say, through the quarterfans. Does this mean a cleaner de facto partition? Well, like you mentioned, Richard, this may create a de facto partition with the RSF controlling the west and SAF controlling the east and both having formed their own governments. One based in Niala in south Darfur and one based in Port Sudan may soon move to Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan. But neither side shows much interest in formally recognizing the others authority in their respective areas. And ultimately, both are likely to aim to reassert control over all of Sudan. So the RSF's ambition is not just to govern western Sudan, but be at the center of power of the whole of Sudan in Khartoum. So while the current situation holds, we may see signs of de facto partition, but in the long term, both will try to launch offensives in the opposite direction to gain territory, but also assert authority over the whole of Sudan. Alan, you talked a moment ago about the quad talks in Washington, so US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Emirates aimed at bringing the war and parties together, getting a three month ceasefire. I assume now the RSF's capture of Al-Fasha, at least in the short term, that complicates those efforts. I mean, are there any signs of impatience from Masa Boulos, the US envoy for from American negotiators at this sort of continued escalation by the RSF and by the Emirates in upping their support? Boulos himself has expressed frustration that the agreement among the quad that outside arms flows to the parties should stop, that that provision clearly hasn't been implemented, and it's been interpreted that what he mostly meant was the UAE arms flows to the RSF, but he hasn't said that directly. The Trump administration, as you know, is close to Abu Dhabi and the UAE, and it's doubtful that at higher levels of the Trump administration, there is much anger at UAE on Sudan, which is a country that remains not a major strategic priority for the Trump administration. Whether or not Boulos himself is growing frustrated is a difficult question to answer. At a working level, there is definitely frustration among US officials with the ongoing arms, and there has been under both this administration and the previous administration in regards to what are seen are very, very brutal, real, politic approach by the UAE in Sudan to continue arming the RSF, but also via the RSF continue to drive a hard bargain. What does the RSF's capture of fascia mean now for those quad talks? Are they going to die down for a bit until there's kind of a new equilibrium, or is the hope that they will continue? From what I understood, traditionally, the RSF have been ready to talk to the South. I mean, as Sherwood said, they want a share of central power. It's the South side that is reluctant in reflecting widespread anger at the RSF and at the Emirates. It is reluctant to enter into talks with the RSF. Is that still the case? I think your suggestion that the talks might fizzle out for now, but maybe once things have settled, pick back up again. I think something like that might play out, but it is very hard to fully predict because of the number of different factors at play. On the one hand, you have the US factor, and let's say talks more or less collapse, and momentum collapses for now because of the anger at the South side and SAF's backers and Sudanese at the RSF and the UAE over the fall of Al-Fasher. If that happens, might the US and Boulos essentially lose interest in Sudan and stop engaging as much if they hit a near-term obstacle? I think that's one question. I should also say that the anger among Sudanese from SAF's backers, including Egyptians and Saudis at UAE actions in Sudan, those only grow inflamed at moments like this. I think it might not be a moment where you're likely to see a diplomatic breakthrough in the short run, but over the medium run or even once timpers have cooled down a bit, there is a sense in which the fall of Al-Fasher clarifies the positions of the two parties. I think it was a complicating factor in any attempt at ceasefire talks because while there was an attempt to get a nationwide truce in practice, often the main topic of conversation because of the crisis at hand ended up actually being Al-Fasher itself, so it was difficult to actually progress on to the topic of nationwide talks because the disaster that was happening in Al-Fasher just remained at the forefront entirely. So in that sort of procedural sense, sure, it might be cleaner now to talk about a nationwide ceasefire, but it's not clear whether or not SAF is going to at all entertain the notion of talks anytime soon, given the anger that they'll have at losing Al-Fasher, but also given the very real now popular backlash, for instance, against the UAE, which is part of the squad arrangement. And it's partly the popular backlash, but it's also from what I understand that some of the armed groups that are allied to the SAF in Darfur, they can't countenance the idea of cementing RSF control of Darfur in a peace deal. It's the Islamists that also see themselves excluded from any future peace deal. So leaving aside the fact that Al-Burqan himself and the military chiefs, the sort of members within that SAF coalition for whom peace talks pose particular challenges. Yeah, I think what's very clear, and we even saw this in the DC talks, there was an initial delegation from Port Sudan who was in DC to meet with the Quad. And then sort of at the last minute, there was a new delegation headed by the foreign minister who showed up and then took over the delegation. You've seen this every time some of this jockeying within Burhan's coalition take place every time because he has so many factions internally that want a piece at the table, and it's a real coalitional problem he has in terms of peace talks. Because while I think there are some members of his coalition that would be interested in at least exploring potential ends to this war, there are clear camps and very strong ones that much prefer taking a military solution the moment. You mentioned several of their allies in the Darfur armed groups think that if there is any short-term ceasefire, it'll essentially leave RSF clearly in control of Darfur, which for them is not something they want to countenance at all. And then you do have the Islamis, which usually means the former NCP regime under Omar al-Bashir. They remain relatively hostile to peace talks as a whole, in part because the Quad process itself has been hostile to them also. So I think they've been singled out as a group that will be excluded out of a post-peace dispensation, which of course hasn't made them open to peace talks. So within Burhan's camp, you definitely have a real coalition problem. On the RSF side, the situation has been complicated, but I think we need to worry about whether or not moving ahead if the RSF won't start to face some similar problems on that front because they have now formed this broader political front. They've appointed a prime minister and various government officials, all of which will now have entrenched interest somewhat in the status quo. And the longer this war goes on, as often happens in these situations, you will see increasing interest on both sides, not just the Saf side, but on both sides that will be resistant to shaking up the status quo with a new peace effort. So it's one of the reasons we're worried that if there isn't momentum, this will just get harder and harder to unwind. Though maybe at least among some in the Saf coalition, among riverine elites, you know, for whom as long as the fighting kind of stays far west of the Nile, away from Khartoum, RSF control of Darfur certainly is maybe something they could live with in the same way that they've lived with wars in Sudan's peripheries for many decades. It's clear that there are some among the old guard Sudanese central elites who were fine if this war basically ended up a war taking place in Darfur, even in the court of fans. But they could restabilize central Sudan and east of the Nile. And that's a status quo that has been there for much of Sudan's history. This is also an elite that allowed South Sudan to secede so that they could stay in power in northern Sudan back in 2011. The problem, of course, is that the RSF knows this. And hence this strategy we've seen from the RSF to continue launching long range drone attacks in Khartoum, on Port Sudan, in various places in eastern Sudan to try to keep it somewhat destabilized. And also an ongoing ambition from RSF to take the war back to those areas. So I think we have something of a de facto partition right now, but as Suwit mentioned, there are reasons to doubt that this is a durable partition because at the moment, RSF especially does not seem keen to just be content with the western Sudan that it now holds. Suwit, Alan, thanks for coming on. Thanks, Suwit, for having us. Thanks, Richard, for having us back on. Hold Your Fire is a production of the International Crisis Group by Richard Atwood. Thanks to our producers, Kevin Murphy, Marcel Dixon Murphy, Haigo Shalban, thanks as ever. Of course, to all our listeners, please do get in touch [email protected] if you have any questions or suggestions. If you like the show, leave us a nice rating wherever you get your podcasts. And we'll be back for our regular episode on Friday. That's going to look at the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean, U.S. strikes on alleged drug traffickers off the Venezuelan coast, also in the Pacific, and whether the U.S. plans further military action, a regime change in Venezuela. So please do tune in again for that.