Space Security: Threats, Capabilities and Europe's Path Forward

Hello and welcome to Sound Strategic. I'm Maya Nauens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defense Policy and host of the IISS Sound Strategic Podcast. Today's episode gives an insight into our research on space security at the IISS, focusing on our latest research paper, Advancing European Military Capacity in Space. This paper examines how European countries are working to build up their military space capabilities against the backdrop of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and growing questions about Europe's dependence on the United States and the space domain. It looks at what Europe currently has, what it would need to operate more independently, and what that would cost. Joining me to discuss these issues are two fantastic colleagues from the IISS, Dr. Aaron Pobjie, Senior Fellow for Space, and Dr. Alexander Balfouras, Head of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control. Aaron, Alex, welcome onto the show. Aaron, why is space security an important topic for Europe right now? Dr. Alexander Balfour: European governments have woken up to the strategic importance of outer space as a military domain. Many strategic enablers based in space, and these include satellite communications, positioning, navigation, and timing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, space-based missile early warning, and so on. NATO already declared space as an operational domain in 2019, while the U.S. now regards it as a warfighting domain. And since 2021, NATO has recognized that attacks to space are an important part of the U.S.'s to, from or within space, present a clear security challenge to the alliance and could even lead to the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the same time, the US, Russia, China and others have already developed, tested and in some cases used counter space capabilities to target satellites. So this is on the military side of things. At the same time, the space economy is also growing. Around 15,000 satellites are now in orbit and most of those are commercial. Concurrently, civilian dependence on space is also deepening. Many satellites provide services underpinning critical civilian infrastructure, such as communications, navigation, weather and climate monitoring, financial transactions, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. So in this congested and contested space environment, satellites are at risk from accidental collisions, space debris and natural hazards, and also increasingly from deliberate hostile acts. And it's therefore become critical from a military, commercial and civilian standpoint to ensure freedom of action in, through and from space and to be able to protect these space assets. Following on from this, Alex, your research paper, Advancing European Military Capability in Space, notes that Russian counter space capabilities already pose a threat to Europe. Can you give examples of Russian counter space activities? The most familiar version is probably the jamming of satellite navigation in Europe, Finland, Norway, of course, in the Baltic region, especially there have been extended GPS outages that are mostly attributed to Russia, impacting commercial civilian flights in those regions for a couple of years now. Then there is the cyber peace, which is maybe the aspect that has already caused the most damage. If we think back to the very morning of the beginning of the full-scale invasion that Russia launched against Ukraine, there was this cyber attack against the Viasat system, and that led to tens of thousands of modems being bricked, impacting Ukrainian military communications, a lot of European civilian customers, and even the remote monitoring system for German wind turbines. It gets a little bit more interesting when we move into outer space itself. It looks like Russia is going to be able to do a lot of things. We're going to be able to do a lot of things. Russia has been running rendezvous and proximity operations, both in low Earth orbit and in geostationary orbit since at least 2014. There will be Russian satellites that sidle up to European commercial and government satellites, park themselves next to them in orbit. And there's a clear example that the Germans have been talking quite a bit about where some of their intel satellites have been shadowed. And it looks like, according to some European officials, that the Russians have been able to intercept communications from these satellites, which also serve the German armed forces. Russia has not done anything kinetic to a European satellite or ground-based space capability, but it's clearly capable of doing that and has demonstrated that ability with a direct ascent test against one of its defunct Soviet area satellites. We can presume, although this hasn't happened yet, of course, that the Russians have been targeting quite a bit of the European ground-based infrastructure that supports its wider space capability ecosystem. Erin, how does international law currently treat that kind of activity and what options does it give European states in response? International law, including the UN Charter, applies in space. We know this. It's confirmed in Article 3 of the Outer Space Treaty. Some of these actions constitute prohibited use of force under Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter. But there are challenges of applying existing international rules in space due to the unique physical environment of space, but also because of interaction with international space law. So some of these challenges of applying existing rules include attribution. Some of these counter space operations are easier to attribute than others. For example, in the United States, for example, the United States and the United States, for example, kinetic or physical counter space capabilities are relatively easier to attribute than electronic warfare. It's a challenge when it comes to how do we treat non-state actors in space, so commercial space actors, whether they are the ones acting against other satellites or themselves, the victims of interference, and how to characterize some of these acts, especially when the effects of counter space capabilities against a satellite, might only be temporary and reversible effects, which could still have devastating consequences downstream. Another challenge is discerning the intent behind the act, so whether the act is deliberate and hostile, or if it's accidental. For example, the use of kinetic counter space capabilities, such as a direct ascent or co-orbital ASAT to destroy a satellite, would be highly likely to meet the threshold of prohibited force, and as I mentioned, relatively easier to attribute to a satellite. So, for example, the use of kinetic counter space capabilities, such as a direct ascent or co-orbital ASAT to destroy a satellite, would be highly likely to meet the threshold of prohibited force, and as I mentioned, relatively easier to attribute to a satellite, whereas something like electromagnetic interference to jam or spoof satellite signals would be harder to attribute, and would also need to have rather more severe effects to counter the use of force. So, just as on Earth, Russia plays with the grey zone in space, and often conducts activities at, or slightly below the threshold of prohibited conduct. When it comes to options for European states to respond, this depends on the legal characterization of the incident that they're responding to. At the highest level of severity, states have a right to use force in self-defense against an armed attack, subject to necessity and proportionality. At a lower level than an armed attack, the victim states can take countermeasures, such as sanctions, or other acts below the use of force. I think it's also important to note that the response doesn't have to take place in the same domain as the original act, but it could also be terrestrial. So, just because a state is a victim of an act, it doesn't have to take place in the same domain as the or even an armed attack against a space system. It doesn't require the response to also be against space systems or take place in space. It could also be terrestrial. All of this really underscores the need for good space situational awareness, or SSA, in order to detect, attribute, and characterize hostile acts against space systems, and also the need for clarity about how to take place in space. So, I think it's important to note that the response doesn't have to take place in space. All of this really underscores the need for clarity about how to take place in space. All of this really underscores the need for clarity about how to bodies like the moon. It would also potentially violate other international treaties like the threat of force in Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter. And of course, actually detonating a thermonuclear weapon in orbit would likely violate other international laws, including international humanitarian law. Something notable is that in April 2024, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have reaffirmed Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty and would have called on UN member states not to develop nuclear weapons specifically designed to be placed in orbit. Alex, what does Russia's potential placement of nuclear weapons in orbit mean for strategic stability in the space domain? And how should European governments factor it into their planning? Maybe starting with a bit of context first, that follows really nicely from Aaron's point about the Russian diplomatic position in 2024. So that was in April. But of course, two months before that, it was in April. So that was before that is when the United States publicly accused the Russians of developing a space-based anti-satellite weapon, pointed to a satellite called uh cosmos 2553 as a likely test bed for that kind of a capability that's what made this a live issue and something that european governments are quite concerned about and it's a really interesting question about the strategic implications because a russian nuclear weapon in orbit really would be a a coercive instrument if it were to be detonated in low earth orbit the estimate is that it would take about a year for that orbit to be usable again and you might wonder why the russians would want to do that because they of course also have quite a few space assets in that orbit but compared to the west certainly compared to the united states they rely on it much less operationally and so it's kind of seen as an asymmetric threat that the russians can hold against the united states or against europe and of course if such a weapon were to be detonated it would have massive implications for life on earth including for commercial satellite capability that everyday life depends on how european governments can can prepare for that is the the second part of the question in a sense there is no direct defense against a russian nuclear detonation in in orbit and so really all the europeans can do is to not just invest in space-based capabilities but making sure that there are terrestrial alternatives for communications position navigation and timing having spare satellites and most importantly the launch capacity to put replacements up quickly even in a contested conflict kind of environment and that's something that that the europeans have not been looking at quite as much yet because they're mostly focused on putting the first layer of capability up it sits a little bit outside of the usual strategic stability that we typically look at in the nuclear domain where we count warheads and missiles and and their capabilities in the space domain what's different is that the russians seem to be pursuing a capability that would simply deny the entire world and orbit if they felt that they were backed into a corner when it comes to increasing the resilience of systems this can also be done through measures like hardening of satellites against radiation so many military satellites already feature this kind of hardening commercial satellites are less likely to have it because it's quite expensive but it is a possibility and another option which is common across different arms control regimes is looking at verification and there is research being done about whether it's feasible and how one could verify the presence or absence of a nuclear weapon on a satellite and being able to verify that there is no nuclear weapon on a satellite is also quite reassuring being able to signal the capability to verify the presence of a nuclear weapon on a satellite can also act as a form of deterrence alex the us is developing golden dome which includes space-based components the report notes this could prompt further investment by russia and china in counter space capabilities how do you assess the arms control implications of that and are existing frameworks equipped to manage it the russians have long been deeply concerned about american investment in missile defense capability and that is because the worry is that the russians could lose their secure second strike capability the scenario they worry about is that the united states would be able to launch a disarming first nuclear strike against russian nuclear forces and then use missile defense capability to intercept whatever remaining forces the russians still would have available to them the chinese have similar fear and this is an issue that goes back way into into the cold war there were agreements to to limit the kinds of missile defenses that either side would be able to field that limited the the soviet union and the united states uh starting in the 1970s in the early 2000s the us withdrew from the anti-ballistic missile treaty and that has been a thorn in the side of russian arms control negotiators ever since they have tried to put it on the agenda in the negotiations so far the united states has resisted that despite that disagreement over missile defense strategic nuclear arms control was still possible up until recently now of course with the announcement and from what we can tell some pretty serious investment into actually building golden dome the russian anxiety has only grown that the united states is trying to deprive the russians of that secure second strike capability golden dome has not been described in full in public it's not entirely clear what kind of capabilities the united states is striving for the public description of it certainly from the president of the united states is one aiming for a complete missile shield which is quite unlikely to to be achieved but it is a system that's not going to be able to be achieved it's a system of system a variety of layered capabilities that would give the united states a better capability in intercepting missiles at various stages from launch through the middle section of the flight to the the terminal phase part of what golden dome is trying to do is to deploy capabilities in space that would be able to act against missiles in the launch phase in the mid course when the missiles are flying through space themselves the money that is being put into this the the vision that is driving golden dome is causing great concern in moscow and beijing as well it seems difficult to continue the the kind of arms control agreements processes that we've had running since the late 80s between washington and moscow while the united states is working on deploying this kind of an ambitious missile defense program a new approach has to be found that accommodates an interest in in the united states and having this kind of a missile shield and also one that accommodates some of the countermeasures that the russians are starting to take aaron the piece about arms control and arms racing there are concerns about an arms race in outer space and this is being fueled by the development of capabilities like golden dome as alex has been describing and i just wanted to highlight that the un general assembly has tasked an open-ended working group at the un to recommend measures to prevent an arms race in outer space the u.s china and russia are participating in these negotiations along with many other states but negotiations are hampered by divisions in the international community between the approach to take so on the one hand china and russia are advocating for a comprehensive binding treaty whereas other states including the u.s prefer non-legally binding measures including transparency and security transparency and confidence building measures so this is one split the other split is whether to focus on capabilities which is the preference of china and russia to define and ban space weapons another approach which would rather focus on behaviors reaching agreement on what is threatening or irresponsible conduct in orbit so concrete measures which are gaining momentum include a ban on testing direct ascent asat capabilities to destroy satellites in orbit the u.s and a number of other states have made unilateral declarations that they will refrain from such testing but china and russia oppose this turning to european investment in coordination for space security which is something you've both touched on a little bit already alex your research highlights europe's significant dependence on the u.s for critical space capabilities how has awareness of those dependencies shaped european thinking about space investment and do you think current plans are adequately addressing them awareness and high level attention in europe has really shifted a great deal this is something that the report was trying to quantify and capture how much actual progress has been done beyond the attention paid to the issue in speeches and articles in europe i'd say one of the the really big moments that that moved the europeans into action was the pause in american intelligence sharing that with ukraine in march of last year and that's where a lot of european officials stopped treating the heavy dependency that european forces have on u.s space capabilities as more than a theoretical problem europe and especially germany has been investing heavily in trying to bring more space capabilities online the technology involved of course means that there are long timelines for developing these and for deploying them in space but there are remarkably quite a few areas where there are very few places where europe is moving rather quickly especially on the ira squared satellite constellation which is growing quite quickly and in some cases even ahead of schedule there is a lot of energy in european national capitals but also multinational institutions in europe like the european union and the european space agency that are committing vast sums to bolstering european military space capability and dual use space capabilities the report we did a bit of a survey of the the main investments and came up with a figure of about 109 billion dollars that is being invested in military space capability at the moment which is a pretty serious uh sum But we did assess that compared to what it would take for Europe to live up to the burden sharing expectation that the current American administration has of Europe would require at least another $10 billion in investment. And for Europe to achieve full autonomy would require at least another $25 billion in our very rough calculations there. Part of it is the money. But where we see Europe not quite living up to the moment and to its ambitions is in the coordination across national capitals and using these multilateral institutions to put together a coherent, combined European military space capability, rather than a lot of parallel initiatives and programs, which are real, but don't quite amount to a coherent capability. Aaron, you're. European space investment plans evidence a shift towards commercialization of military space and dual-use space capabilities with a military and civilian function. We've already seen this in the Ukraine conflict, where commercial satellites like Starlink have played a significant role. How does international law handle the growing overlap between commercial space infrastructure and military operation, particularly when it comes to the questions of targeting and state responsibility? I think this is a really good question and one that is growing in importance. Russia. Russia has already shown a willingness to target commercial space actors, as in the attack against Vyazat in February 2022 at the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Also, as Alex mentioned, European governments are also turning to the commercial space industry for defense services to provide and operate these military space capabilities. These so-called dual-use space assets create ambiguity and also risk. One of the key risks is. is that commercial space assets or commercial space actors who provide these military services could be targeted. The targeting of commercial space actors is something that is regulated by international law. In a nutshell, two bodies of law are relevant. There's the use ad bellum, which is the prohibition of the use of force between states, and the use in bellow, also known as international humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict. And both of these have to be considered when it comes to targeting commercial space actors. I really place emphasis on this because often when the topic is raised, and Russia and China really show an appetite for potentially targeting commercial space actors, when this topic is raised, often it's being discussed under the law of armed conflict, which is relatively more permissive. But it's also really important to highlight that targeting commercial space actors could also violate the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter. Force is only. It's only allowed between states if a state is a victim of an armed attack. Before taking this step, there must be an armed attack before targeting a commercial space actor of another state using force. And the risk is that targeting commercial space actors of another state could be considered a use of force or even an armed attack against that state, which is, of course, highly escalatory. When it comes to the application of IHL, these rules apply during armed conflict. And they prohibit direct targeting of civilians and civilian objects. In certain circumstances, commercial space assets could constitute military objectives and be targetable under IHL. But importantly, this only applies in an armed conflict. In the case of Starlink, there is no armed conflict between Russia and the United States. And even when IHL does apply, certain principles must be respected when planning and launching the attack. The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. And here, the creation of space debris through kinetic attacks is highly relevant because this is indiscriminately destructive to other satellites. And also the prohibition of disproportionate collateral damage to civilians who rely on these space systems. So this is known in IHL as the principle of proportionality. In some, dual use capabilities, which intermingle military and civilian payloads or satellite functions, do carry risks of targeting. And to reduce these risks, these functions should be separated to the extent feasible. And existing legal frameworks should be clarified and strengthened. It may be a final question for both of you. Your report concludes that meaningful European space autonomy is at least a decade away. What are the most important steps that need to happen in the near term to keep that goal on track? Alex, let's start with you. There are probably two areas in which European minds could be. could be focused to improve the continent's standing in space. First is the focus on the ground infrastructure. A lot of the efforts that we're seeing at the moment are about putting up space components, which are, of course, needed. But what is needed to operate those space components is a robust ground segment. For example, arranges for common tasking arrangements so that a French satellite can be pointed at something that a German. a German commander has an interest in, and to set up data sharing frameworks with reasonable classification rules. And at the moment, the Europeans have not done a lot of thinking about what kind of ground segments they need to invest in. Because up until this point, most of those decisions and most of that kind of capability has been provided by the United States. Then there's a really tricky question of institutional arrangements in Europe. On the one hand, it is a little bit easier for European countries. to work together bilaterally through partnerships between European firms to build space capabilities like satellites or even to have things like IRIS squared being sponsored by the European Union. The question is whether Europe will be able to create a space command or some unified way of operating its space capabilities so that the whole is greater than the sum of its individual national parts. And that's simply because of the reality. That in Europe, for example, if you're building something like IRIS squared or Galileo, which is a major space actor, sits outside of that, as does Norway, which is also quite capable in the space domain. And the European Space Agency has its own version of that problem. The big question that really needs to be sorted through is not only how Europeans can work together to build their space capabilities, but also how they can work together to operate. And that's really the big question that needs to be sorted through is not only how Europeans can work together to build their space capabilities, but also how they can work together to operate. Effectively. Erin? Alex has pointed to the need for greater coordination across Europe, which is really essential and quite challenging for the reasons that he pointed out, not least of which is the not completely overlapping memberships between the different entities in Europe. So the European Union, the European Space Agency, NATO. In addition to coordination, prioritization is required. And in our report, we set out four key priority areas to invest in, which are the areas where critical dependencies remain in Europe. And these are dependencies on the United States. And the first of these is launch, which I'll come back to in a moment. Secondly, it's ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Third, space-based missile early warning, which Germany and France are starting to develop. And fourthly, space situational awareness, for which Europe, as well as many other states around the world, depend significantly on the United States. When it comes to the key priority out of those, it's launch. European plans for upgrading space capabilities by 2030 that we set out in our report, including these large constellations, such as the EU's Iris Squared and Germany's Satcom BV4, will require the launch of hundreds of satellites. Commercial demand for European launch is also increasing as the sector grows. Satellites that are damaged or destroyed in the natural course of things through, say, weather or through accidents.