Sarah Paine – Why Russia Lost the Cold War

(audience applauding) Thank you for coming. It's a treat to be with you and sharing all this stuff. Since we seem to be in a second Cold War, maybe it's a good time to revisit the last one, to see why it turned out the way it did and why the participants in it thought it turned out the way it did. So I'm gonna pose the question, why Russia lost the Cold War and people have loads of different answers to that question. So this is gonna be a tour of the counter arguments. I'm gonna start with an answer that many Americans have. Very simple one, it's like, Ronald Reagan single-handedly defeated the Soviet Union. So that's one possible answer. But then I'm gonna give you all kinds of counter arguments to that. And some of them are gonna be other external explanations of what others did to the Soviet Union. Others are internal ones of what the Soviet Union, the cards that didn't play particularly well and then I've got some umbrella explanations. So that's my plan for this evening. The story that Ronald Reagan did it, well here's a picture at the Reagan Ranch after the Cold War is over, you see the Gorbachev's and you see the Reagan's and they seem to be having a grand old time which suggests there's something maybe off of that explanation. But anyway, the way the Ronald Reagan did it school is Ronald Reagan did a massive military buildup and that's some would argue it bankrupted the Soviet Union. He was a man of words and deeds. He made really good speeches. So we're memorable. Here's one before parliament where he says the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none, not one regime has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root. And then here he is before the Brandenburg Gate. This is in Berlin, long a symbol of German greatness but then it was a locked gate on the Berlin Wall and here's Ronald Reagan. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev opened this gate, tear down this wall and who can forget the evil empire speech which he gave to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, and they skipped Disneyland to hear it. All right, Reagan did a very significant military buildup that actually had started under Carter when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, big mistake, as we discovered. And he also invested, deployed missiles in Europe. He was busy funding anti-communist insurgencies and also others who didn't like the Soviet Union all over the world, starts doing more aggressive military patrolling. Patrolling and by the time he's out of office, he's like half a dozen ships short of this 600 ship navy or whatever it is he was planning to make. And he also was trying to build a missile shield, a strategic defense initiative. And the problem is the Soviets tried to match him on this. And if you add up the GNPs of the United States, NATO allies in Japan, well, that would be seven times larger than the Soviet GNP. And you gotta be aware of symmetric strategy. So the CIA thought during the Cold War that perhaps Russia was spending up to a 20% part of its GNP on defense after the Cold War ended when you're getting more accurate statistics. It turns out it was at least 40 or 50%. And some people say it was up to a truly economy busting 70% if you take into account all the infrastructure investments that were associated with military things. If you looked during the Cold War, the United States was spending less than 8% Germany, less than 6%, Japan less than 2%, and Nazi Germany, which is no Piker, 55%. So you look at all this and it was difficult. So I am going to quoting lots of Russians today because they have thought deeply about the fate of their country, how life as they knew it disappeared, the Soviet Union gone, the Empire gone. They thought a lot about it. And here is a former and Bass Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Valentin Fallen. And here's his take. Following the American strategy of our exhaustion in the arms race, our crisis in public health and all the things have to do with standard of living reached a new dimension of crisis. And then if you add to the arms race of the United States, the arms race that was going on with China on that border, the arms race plunged the Soviet economy into a permanent crisis. And here you have Gargier Arbatov, who was the Soviet Union, late Soviet Union's finest expert on the United States, released the most famous one. He's looking at the Soviet war in Afghanistan. He said, "It is quite clear that the Afghan war was most advantageous for the United States. And we got our Vietnam because the United States is busy funding the other side and it's costly." And Gorbachev is looking at this, as he's telling the Politburo year after he came into power, he said, "Look, the Americans are betting precisely on the fact that the Soviet Union is scared of this SDI missile, the Strategic Defense Initiative's missile defense. That's why they're putting pressure on us to exhaust us correct." So some would argue that the US victory in the arms race guaranteed victory in the Cold War. It'd be go-rani. That's one explanation. But I'm going to give you a tour of the counterarguments and some other explanations, starting with President Ford, Carter, and the Helsinki Declaration. So after World War II, the Soviets had wanted to convene a conference of European states to confirm its expanded World War II borders. And for a long time, nobody was interested. And then the Western Europeans are sick of all the drama. The United States still doesn't want to show, but we go along where there are allies. And our allies insist on including human rights provisions. And we think this is crazy, Lannan, because we know the Soviets are never going to enforce those things. But you get the Helsinki agreements, accords that have all sorts of human rights provisions. Well, low and behold, unbeknownst to anybody, dissidents across the Eastern block and human rights activists across the West start holding the communists to account for the agreements that they have signed and start contrasting the liberation that communism promises versus the dictatorship actually delivered. And this human rights movement took on within the Soviet block and abroad. It took on a life of its own. So here you have the former director of the CIA and former head of the Department of Defense, Robert Gates saying the Soviets desperately wanted this big conference. And it laid the foundations for the end of their empire. We resisted it for years, only discovered years later that this conference had yielded benefits beyond our wildest imagination, go figure. And here is Jimmy Carter with his human rights initiative. And it was Gorbachev's English language translator who said that actually Carter's emphasis on precisely the human rights that were denied to Soviets are really resonated. And it made people think that they wanted a more democratic, open, liberal society. So here's Carter giving an address, graduation address at Notre Dame. He said, we have affirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenant of our foreign policy. What draws us Americans together is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than just financial prosperity. We're bigger than that. And here is Edward Chevere Naze, Gorbachev's foreign minister acuying some of these sentiments. He said, look, the belief that we are great countries deeply ingrained in me, but great in what? Territory, population quality of arms, people's troubles, the individual's lack of rights. And what do we who have virtually the highest infant mortality rate in the world take pride? It's not easy answering the question, who are you? Who do you wish to be? A country which is feared or a country which is respected a country of power or a country of kindness? And others agreed that communism was essential to the survival of the Soviet Union. But it's an undemocratic ideology that fundamentally-- it's a foundation that can't endure forever. And that's the take of Vitaly Ignatenko, the Russian journalist. And Oleg Gnenevsky, the Soviet career diplomat, is saying, look, communist ideology is associated above all with the Soviet Union. It's rejection created a vacuum, and it determined its ultimate fate. And then Boris Yeltsin, who is Gorbachev's successor, said, look, no one wants a new Soviet Union. So someone argue, this counterargument, that human rights clauses of the Helsinki Accords and Carter Subduxquen Human Rights Campaign destroyed communist belief and communism. OK, another president, another counterargument. Those who are fans of Richard Nixon would say, no, no, no, no, no. It was Richard Nixon who played the role. China card. So the United States and China could gang up on the Soviet Union and overextend it financially to record militarily. I think the Chinese would beg to difference and no, no, no, no, it was Mao who played the America card. Because what's going on in 1969, there's a border war between China and the Soviet Union. China's gotten its nuclear bomb in '64 and no longer has to defer to the Soviet Union and start playing more tough on their border disagreements. And so the Soviets are really upset. And they come to the United States and ask us whether it would be okay to nuke these people. Because they think Americans don't like the Chinese. Oh, we didn't. But we said, no, it's not okay to nuke those people. And so the Chinese figure it out. The one that wants to nuke you is your primary adversary, right? Up until then, you think about a China in Russia. For them, the United States was the primary adversary. Now they're primary adversaries with each other, freeing up the United States to decide which one it's going to cozy up to. And the United States decides it's going to cozy up to China. Why? Well, Chinese belligerency forces the Soviets, not only they've already got a big militarized border with Europe. Now they're going to do the same thing on a very long border with China. And this is nuclear arm mechanized forces. Very expensive. Imagine if this country had to have such borders with Canada and Mexico, it would be bankrupting. And we are far richer than the Soviet Union was then whenever it was bankrupting. So someone argued that US cooperation with China fatally overextended the Soviet Union. One could take all of these arguments, starting with President Nixon all the way through Reagan to say make an overarching argument that says, look, each president opened up opportunities for the others who then leverage them. So Nixon plays the China card, which others play with increasing dexterity. Ford comes in and begins dabbling in human rights. Carter then comes in and really goes for human rights and starts doing a military buildup, which then Ronald Reagan really does. So that by the time you get to Reagan, he is dealing in a position of both ideological and military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. And for those who think that US fall in policy was not consistent during the Cold War, you're not looking at the strategic level. There were certain different strategies going on and how best to achieve it. But both parties agreed, the goals were free trade, democracy, containment of communism. Those are staples of US foreign policy, both parties for its duration. So someone argued that President Nixon through Reagan produced a cumulative presidential effects to defeat the Soviet Union. Others would say, forget this great man theory of history business, that's really past say. What really accounted for the outcome of the Cold War was this military platform, that's Pentagon-E's for large military systems. But anyway, it's a nuclear-powered nuclear arm submarine. They say this is the item. The way deterrence theory worked during the Cold War, and I believe now as well, is in order to deter the other side, you have to have a reliable second strike capability. So if they thought of lobbing a nuke at you, they would be guaranteed that you would have the second strike to lob a nuke back. Therefore, they're never going to lob the first nuke. When Jimmy Carter became president, he was a graduate of anapolis and also a Submariner. The United States began a much more aggressive deployment of its fleet, and that's continued even more so under Reagan. Where we're taking our submarines and we're targeting Soviet submarines in their home water bastions. So the Soviets are thinking that we're going to be able to destroy their strike and strike capability on our first strike, and they're having a heart attack. So here you have Valeriy Bolden, a longtime aide to Gorbachev, saying, "Look, the most powerful strength of the United States is the naval fleet, and we aren't going to get one, or our geography actually isn't set up to use one the way the United States can." And then you have Marshall Yazov saying, "For the Americans, the main means of atomic attack is the fleet." So when you get Marshall Akhrameev, who's visiting the United States in 1987, at the end of the Cold War, he will kill himself, but he's still around at 87. And he's telling his American hosts, "You know where our submarines are, but we don't know where yours are." It's destabilizing you. You, the United States Navy are the problem. Go Navy. And here's this host, Admiral Troz, who's going, "Yeah, the inability of the Soviet Union to maintain a strong defensive capability led to the demise of the Soviet Union and to the removal of the Soviets as a major threat to us." So some, you can make a perfectly good argument to say the Soviet Union could not counter technologically or financially the US submarine threat to its retaliatory nuclear forces. So war termination was the only thing it could do. All right. So all of these preceding explanations are naval explanations, spelled with an E as in staring at one's own. They're all about what the United States did or didn't do. So let's get beyond the half-tour Cortennis on the team America. And you need to look at the other side of the net. And this is where the Western guru for things military, Carl von Klausowitz, emphasizes reciprocity and war and the interaction of both sides, that you're not going to do well unless you consider what the other side is doing. So I have given you some external explanations, and I'm going to do the internal ones. And here is Arnold Twinby, one of the finest historians of the 20th century. We're a big multi-multivolium history of the West, which he argues that civilization's die from suicide, not by murder. So I discussed the murder, what the United States tried to do the Soviet Union. Now I'm going to talk about the suicide, what the Soviets did to themselves. And here is counter-argument number one, which the argument is the Soviet Union was an empire. And when that collapsed, that meant they lost the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, there's much fear in the West of the domino theory. And the idea is one country fell to communism, and then the next and next and next and next would fall to communism. Turns out the domino theory did not apply to capitalism, it applied to communism. Because once the democratic contagion hit one Warsaw block country, an Eastern Europe, it spread to the others until it was a seething mess, and they fell like dominoes. So in 1980, '89, there were all kinds of demonstrations in the Eastern block, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union there for political freedoms. In the Eastern block, there for freedom from the Soviet Union. And Gorbachev may have not gotten that detail. But they're all about not only wanting political freedoms, but also they're about crumbling economies, of how to fix their miserable standards of living. And very uncharacteristically, other Russian students and tanks, in fact Gorbachev, welcomed and encouraged reforms in the Eastern block, both political and economic, just as he was doing in the Soviet Union. So his idea of glass-nosed openness and pedastroika rebuilding, they resonated at home and abroad. And these reforms began in Poland. Poland had been a scene of much worker unrest many times in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 80 and 81. In 80 and 81, this is when solidarity, the workers movement gets going, and it gets on a national and international reputation. The next set of strikes are happening in 1988, because in the preceding several years, the Polish standard of living had shrunk by over 3%. And the government was out of cash and wanted to raise basic food prices and polls hit the streets. And the government was in a panic, because it was worried the economy would go into free fall. So the government cut a deal with solidarity, said, "You call off the strikes, and then we'll let you into political talks." And Solidary agreed. And there was a complicating factor on that all of this. It's called the Roman Catholic Church, which is an institution of enormous credibility in legitimacy in Poland, which had a partiality for solidarity, and it had a Polish Pope. And so the round-cable discussions where these political talks, they occurred a year later in February 1989, and the Soviets encouraged them. In fact, here's one Soviet person there advising the polls, "Look, you got to find some quick solutions out of your economic and political mess. You're in itty-bitty country, so when you make mistakes, there'll be itty-bitty mistakes, but if we make them, they'll be big." They got that one right. The Polish Communist Party thought they had this one covered, by the way they jiggered the election rules, not quite. The day they held elections is exactly the same day that Dung Schauping turned the tanks on demonstrators in Beijing, and you have the Tenement massacre. Two solutions for the problem. So the way the elections worked out in Poland is Solidarity 1, every single seat for which it could compete but won. And then only three people in the communist designated seats, actually won. So who won all the rest of them? The box on the ballot called None of the Above. Yes, the Roman Catholic church had helped instruct people that that's the box you want. And with that, the legitimacy of the Communist Party to rule had just been wrecked. And we're onto democracy in Poland. And this democratic contagion spread into East Germany four months later, this is about the 40th anniversary of the founding of East Germany. And 70,000 people demonstrated Leipzig and within the week around, oh, like 1.4 million Germans are demonstrating at over 200 demonstrators. Typically, the East Germans would have sent tanks. That was what they would have done in the past. But would we tank man? Erick Hanukkah was already out of a job. His ruinous policies of living off debt since he came to power in 1971. It just about wrecked East Germany. So he was out. And then less than two weeks later, the council administers resigns. And then in November 8th, the Polo Bureau resigns. And then on the 9th, whatever's left of that government is issuing new travel regulations. And you might wonder what Stravel got to do with it. I'll get there. So in response to a question at a news conference, this guy, Gunter Shabowski, who was one of the remaining communist helping run the show, he gets asked a question, doesn't know the answer. And so he wings it. And the question is, when do these travel regulations go into effect? And he goes immediately, well, crowds immediately started gathering at the six gates to the Berlin Wall. And at one of them, the border guards decided that discretion was a better part of valor, and they opened the gate. And East Germans poured into West Berlin. And within the first week alone, over half of East Germany's population visited the West. And within the month, 1% of the population immigrated to the West. And like the Polish elections this opening the gate was a pivotal decision. A pivotal decision, whatever it is, there's no going back to the way it was. And here's good old Gunter going, gosh, we had an occluded opening the wall was the beginning of the end of East Germany. OK. Better luck next time. And the Russians were shocked by how unpopular they were. They were thinking they were going to get credit, Gorbachev, for East Europe's liberation, rather than blame for Eastern Europe's insuffment. And here you have Yuri Ruzov, a scientist and parliamentarian going, all of our former satellites by compulsion cast off from us as fast and as far as possible. And Anatoly Kobel-Yov, who is a deputy foreign minister. So look, and we had no confidence whatsoever concerning whom the East Army-- East German Army is going to shoot, the demonstrators, or us. And the same thing for the Polish and Hungarian armies. Great. With allies like this, who needs enemies? The allies kind of cover it. So this argument unrest in the empire forced the Soviet Union to forfeit the Cold War. OK. I got another counter-argument. It does nonsense. The real problem was the satellites were unhealthy. That's why the whole thing fell apart. So this map is 1960. And you see all those tempting green places. They're about to become independent. And they are really sick of their Western European colonizers. Enter the Soviet Union with a program to put the West out of business. There were many takers. OK. Fast forward to the late 1980s. Soviet Union is on a roll, small hitch. In the late 1970s, there was a big recession. And it continued into the '80s, and it tanked commodity prices. So for some of the new found pals, like Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, it wrecked their export earnings, because they're exporting commodities. These commodity prices are down. In many cases, it halved them. The Soviet Union was really depended on oil exports still is oil prices tanked. And oil accounted for up to 55% of the Soviet budget. So here, Brezhnev has got a deep bench of non-performing pals at a time when he doesn't have the money to support all of them. And worse yet, from the Soviet point of view-- so it's dumped all this money in these third world friends-- meanwhile, it's got its own nationalities who are deeply unhappy. And they want out of the empire. And most problematically, they all revolt at exactly the same time. And one of the rules for continental empire is no two front wars. Well, Russia has so many friends at this point. They can't even keep count. And the unrest in the internal empire of nationalities started as soon as Gorbachev got in. There were student movements in Kazakhstan and Yakutia opposite ends of things. By the time you get to 1990, I don't know, there are like 76 seething ethnic rebellions in different parts of this. There was too much for the Soviet government to handle. So you could argue that the Soviet Union bankrupted itself on the third world, ignoring its own internal third world of nationalities whose simultaneous revolts brought down the Soviet Union. I'd experimented with different video models to help me animate some of my essays. But the thing is, my team and I are very opinionated about what we want the end product to look like. And so for a video model to be useful to us, it needs to be able to follow our instructions for exactly what kind of shot and framing and lighting we want. But all of these labels, which would make it clear how to map from a specific style to a gender-need video, don't exist by default in the pre-training distribution. So when one of the label boxes customers wanted to improve their video generation model, a label box pulled together a team of experts and photographers and editors and directors and had them annotate clips with concise technical descriptions so that the model would have context on things like dolly shots and Rembrandt lighting. As you can see, unlocking broad economic value on these models requires not just coders and STEM PhDs, but people with taste and context in all kinds of different domains. Labelbox can get you experts in all of the above and more. So whatever skill you're looking to give your models, there's a good chance that a label box can help you. Reach out to at labelbox.com/thwarkash. I got a completely different argument for you. If you don't like all of those, I got another one for you. It's the economy stupid, right? That one, that line. One could argue that communism failed as an economic system. If you look at growth statistics for the Soviet Union, they're pretty good post-World War II when they're rebuilding, but they really stagnate from the mid '70s onward. So for the decade preceding Gorbachev's coming to power, the Soviet growth stats were one to 2% lower than those of the United States and the compounding effects of that were enormous. What's going on? Everyone's lying to each other. So the data that Soviets are using is Gorbache. So if you're working for a subunit of an enterprise, you have to lie about the inventories you have, saying that you have less than you do, and then you have to lie about what you need, saying you need more than you do, because you're worried about getting enough things. It's not a market system where you just the price dictates it. This is all about the plan. You've got to enter the right numbers and then you get whatever inputs you get from the centralized plan. So everyone's lying. They're aggregating all the lies. The higher up the food chain, you aggregate these things. The worse the data is, so that the Soviet government has no idea what the actual value of capital or labor are, no idea what actual productivity is, and no one has any idea what consumer preferences are. You're not using markets and prices, so that the misallocation of capital and labor goes unnoticed until it metastasized, it's already metastasized into a catastrophe. And to give you a sense of these misallocations, the Soviet Union was rotting from 20 to 40% of its crops. Well, it's using scarce hard currency for agricultural imports to make up for those crops, total mess. And so you can look at what happens to the economy with oil prices down, and we're into a spiraling mess, so that from when Gorbachev comes in at 85 to when it hits a trough in Russia in 1998, you see this crashing share of world GDP of the Eastern block. As a result of all this, if you look at Soviet statistics on deficits, trade balances, debt, there to soaring, and then GDP growth goes double digit negative. That's called shrinkage, it's not the normal thing. So, Marshall Yazov, here's his take. We simply lack the power of all these wealthy NATO nations. We had defined an alternative to the arms race. So, and here's a foreign service officer, Anatolia Automation, he said, look, our problem is, problems began with the departure from isolation. There are main reasons for collapse, were internal, not external reasons. The Soviet economy was literally exhausted from this monstrous arms race, militarism, enemies with half the world. That's his take. And Gorbachev told the Central Committee, he said, look, we're encircled not by invisible armies, but by superior economies. Many often told people, living this way any longer, is impossible. So you can make a powerful argument. It's the Soviet economy that lost the Cold War. This gentleman, Alexis de Tocqueville, is very famous for writing a book about the last days of the French monarchy before the French Revolution overturned it. You also wrote something about democracy in America, both excellent books. But this one's come from the one about France. And which Tocqueville observes the most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it begins to reform. Russians of all political persuasions agree on at least one thing. And that is that Gorbachev's role and how the Cold War turned out was pivotal, that he paid, played in a very essential part. And Gorbachev made his decisions based on certain false assumptions. One of them was the irreversible direction of history. Gorbachev thought of history going always forward towards communism, never backwards to capitalism. Of course, Eastern Europe took a U-turn. He went straight back to capitalism. And here is Leanne Shibarschen, who is a senior person in the KGB, their intelligence office. He said, the thought never occurred to the government that it's possible to withdraw from socialism. And if you think about both communist theory and how imperialism works in practice, usually the mother country is more developed than whatever all the colonies are. Well, the Soviet Union was an inverted empire. People in Eastern Europe as a group were more well educated and they were richer than Russians. It was like a donut empire. So that when the empire went to Eastern Europe, Russians could no longer siphon off the wealth of these insurf populations in Eastern Europe, which explains why they leave, wanted to leave. It also suggests why Putin wants them back. Another false assumption has to do with the sentiments of the neighbors. Gorbachev was convinced he was going to get credit for liberating Eastern Europe rather than blame as a Russian for having insurfed them in the first place. For Gorbachev, the clock began on his watch for other people. No, no, Stalin's when it began when he started shooting a lot of people. So here you have Amatoly Chernaev, foreign policy adviser Gorbachev saying that Gorbachev thought that bringing freedom to our Eastern European satellites would have them adopt socialism with human face. He made an enormous mistake because these countries brutally turned their back on us. Really? If that's brutal, then what pretellable Stalin? And then it gets better. The politics and connection with our former friends were totally unexpected to us. Really. You occupy people. You never leave. You shoot a lot of people in their government. You put in a new government. You siphon off a lot of their wealth. And you impose a non-performing economic system. And you wonder why they don't like you. Think about the United States. Interviews, intervenes all around the world and other people's troubles. Dumps, billions in economic aid. And even leaves. And people don't like us. I don't know why the Russians think they're so special. Another false assumption. Gorbachev believed that if the Warsaw Pact disappeared, the military alliance of the Eastern block, if that disappeared, the NATO would disappear. And that if the Comic-Con, which is their trading organization, if that goes away, then it's a European community in those days. It becomes the European Union later. Anyway, that would disappear. Not quite. Because it turns out that organizations that are coerced versus those that are voluntary, they dissolve for different reasons. And then Gorbachev also assumed that the United States would share a continental outlook of not wanting strong powers, and that the United States, therefore, would not want a unified Germany, let alone a strong unified Germany. So when all the unrest is happening in Germany, Gorbachev is off taking a vacation, poor life choice. Because at that moment, President George Bush, Sr. and Chancellor Cole of Germany, are working on fast-tracking German unification of a fully sovereign unified Germany both halves in NATO. All right. So many of Gorbachev's closest supporters at the end of it all blamed him. They said, look, his foreign policy mistakes were a function of his domestic policy mistakes, and it destroyed the Soviet Union. And back to this America expert, Vladimir Lukin, Gorbachev was no dungshelping. And our botov, who's their premier America expert, the stupidity of our leaders, caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So the big bozo was playing with plastic bags, stuck one on his head, committed suicide. It was by mistake. All right. Lukin continued, in the last, they love Gorbachev. Because everything took place so easily and deeply, basically like that. But only for you. For us, it was expensive. But you could argue the time to reassess all the Stalinist stuff was long overdue. All right. Here's a completely different way of looking at it. I've been giving you sins of commission. And now I'm going to do sins of omission. That's a good framework. It's useful for other things. So the sins of commission, or all the things Gorbachev did, now what I'm going to do is what the army didn't do. Some would argue that the red army should have done exactly what dungshelping ordered his army to do. You just send the sent tanks against civilian demonstrators, and they will truly crush them. And it'll be over. Communist Party is still in power in China 30 years later. So there are some people who believe that this was a terrible mistake. So this argument, we'd be that timely tank deployments, TTT, my contribution to military acronyms, would have changed the outcome of the Cold War. All right. Others will be back to the great man of history and sins of commission. And they wouldn't be picking on Gorbachev, but his successor, Boris Yeltsin, who-- and there are two big pieces of evidence we look. He removed Article VI from the Soviet Constitution, which basically guaranteed that the Communist Party would always be the-- it would monopolize power. And then in addition, the following years-- so Yeltsin's the head of Russia, he gets together with the heads of Ukraine and Belarusia, and they sign the Belovia Accords, which then formally dissolve the Soviet Union. So according to this way of thinking, it's his fault. It's suicide on purpose. And what it does is it opens the door for multiple parties and for the nationalities within the Soviet Empire to become independent. All right. So I've given you internal explanations. I've given you external explanations. Now I'm going to give you some umbrella explanations. And they're based on all the preceding evidence, and they come to opposite conclusions. The first one was, well, any of the above, it's inevitable. And the opposite conclusion from the same evidence is no, no, no. It took all of the above, the West barely one. So I'm going to start with any of the above. You could argue with this many serious problems, it was a matter of time before the Soviet Union collapsed. And it was an objectionable system for precisely the reasons the West didn't like it. It had a brutally inefficient economic system. And Russians who invented the thing at the end of the day didn't want it either. So by this way of looking at it, you have people like Yuri Ryzhkov, a genuine rocket scientist, who says, look, the main reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union is the rottenness of its system. And then here's a journalist, Timuraz, Jopanov, who said, look, I think from the beginning, the genes of disintegration were contained in the genetics of this governmental political formation. Don't you love the products of the Soviet educational system? Don't ever use wording like that. All right. So you could argue that the Soviet Union was destined to fail with this many problems. Others would come to the opposite conclusion. They would say, no, it took every single one of them for the Cold War to end on Western terms. And here's back to Anatoliy Kovaliyov, the deputy foreign minister, he said, look, all these factors merge. Internal ideological economic military, it's all of them. You remove any one of them, and you get a different outcome. Maybe the Cold War ends, but it might end completely differently. So by this line of reasoning, the best where barely one should feel very fortunate that it did. One can take this last argument and say, it was more than that. It also took the confluence and office of two very talented leaders, Helmet Koval of Germany and George Bush senior of the United States, not the son who got into those forever wars, but the dad who didn't. George Bush senior had one of the most amazing resumes any prayer. president ever to any person become president of the United States. Just look at him. When he's really young, he's a war hero in World War II. He's a Navy pilot, dangerous thing to do. He did it. And he comes back and he gets his BA at Yale and graduates with honors. And then he becomes a representative for this district in Texas after he's already made himself a millionaire by the oil business that he started. And then he becomes ambassador to the UN, followed by US representative to the PRC. It's before we had formal diplomatic relations. So he's the guy who's sending that off, becomes director of the CIA. And then he is Ronald Reagan's understudy for eight years as vice president. He is incredibly fit for the job. And Helmock Hall is equally fit for the job. He is the longest serving chancellor in German history since his illustrious predecessor, Otto von Bismarck. He starts out getting a PhD in history and political science. He also starts out in business. But then he works for state government initially as a representative, then as a governor. And he becomes chairman of his political party, the Christian Democratic Union, for a quarter of a century. Once he gets in, he decides he's going to buy up East Germany one tourist at a time. How does that work? East Germans turned out really like to travel. West Germans had always been able to travel to East Germany, or they long had been able to travel to East Germany. But East Germans definitely could not easily travel to West Germany, why? 'Cause they have it a habit of staying. But all of a sudden, East Germany eases up on the travel regulations. And you might ask why. And the answer would be money. Just like the polls, the East Germans were deep in an economic mess of their own making. Would be Tankman, Eric Haniker, who got the boot at the very end. Well, his staying in power paradigm that he implements in 1971 is going to be easily going to live off debt. He needs to make certain social benefits available and consumer benefits available for labor stability, not having labor unrest. And the way he's going to do that is he's not going to do many domestic investments, and he's going to do a lot of borrowing, particularly from West Germany. Well, that's unsustainable long term. So by the time you get to the end of the Cold War, if he's going to fix that, and even out the accounts, it would be a 30% decline in East German standard of living. So he really needs the pocket change from the tourists. So what Karl does is a brisk business of tourists and things. What he does, in return for the easing of travel restrictions, he pays East Germany several hundred million Deutschmarks extra to allow that to happen. And then he gets the Hungarians to go along. He gets the Hungarians to open up their Austrian border to let East Germans out that way, and he gives them a half a billion Deutschmarks for that little favor. And then I, and Karl introduces his ten point unification program, because now he's thinking he's going to get both Germany's together. This is when he starts doling up big bucks to the Soviet Union, whose economy is unraveling. And Gorbachev is going to be desperate for this cash, as that's happening. So West Germany provides a hundred million in food, especially in meat for the Soviet Union, that doesn't have these things. Nevertheless, these, the unrest just keeps on going of the Berlin wall, as I've told you, is breached, and then you wind up with a West German caretaker government, and the financial situation in Russia itself is unraveling. And by the time you get to January 1990, Bush and Colgat together, and they just decided they want a really fast track German reunification. Why? Because they got to get it done before this unraveling crisis that Gorbachev falls from power as a result of it. So they have got a game going, the two of them. And it's complicated. And here's why. Gorbachev was dead against Germany, a united Germany in NATO. He's not keen about really a united Germany, let alone one in NATO. The US State Department experts, the guys who know everything, are saying, no, no, no, no, you want to go slow on this unification business. And then Colg is running a coalition government. There are people in that government, he cannot fire, who are, because they're from different political parties. One of them is his foreign minister, the Skye Genscher, who is very skeptical about Germany being part of NATO. And then it turns out, although Britain had talked a good piece during the Cold War, it didn't actually want a unified Germany-Norded France. Why? Because that unified Germany would eclipse theirs economically. They didn't want that to happen. So Colg and Bush divide up the tasks. Colg is going to reassure the Soviet Union that Germany's not going to be belirgerned or do horrible things. And Colg is going to work on the financial unification. Because the Soviets are thinking in terms of military unification, where you deploy your troops, that determines things, wrong instrument of national power. Precisely because the Soviets didn't understand finance, that's why they're in such a mess. Whereas the Germans do, what they're going to do is get East Germany on the West German-Deutschmark. And at that point, they will control all the money and they will control decisions. But the Russians aren't going to see that coming. Meanwhile, Bush is supposed to work the alliances with, particularly Britain and France, in the West. There are all sorts of meetings that were coming up. And Bush's job is to delay those meetings for as long as possible. So German unification can proceed as far as possible. And the two of them are doing a tag team diplomacy with Gorbachev, that he just can't keep up with, with given that his own home economy has got this double-digit shrinkage rates. So here's how they go. As the trades get bigger, the amount of money you pay Gorbachev gets bigger. So first of all, it's just to get a unified Germany. Then it's to get a unified Germany with West Germany still in NATO. Then it's to get unified Germany with all of Germany in NATO. So here's how the money goes. Gorbachev agrees to German unification. We are no longer paying hundreds of millions of Deutsch Mark. We're paying billions of Deutsch Mark, five billion Deutsch Mark for that one. Then Gorbachev agrees that states can choose their own alliances, i.e., whether or not to join NATO. And then he gets the U.S. offers nine assurance, but it's also a trade agreement that Gorbachev really wants. And then the economic union goes into effect. So we've now done the financial reunification of Germany. And this is when London, there's a London declaration that's inviting Eastern European countries to coordinate more closely with NATO. And then in return, Gorbachev has got a promise of a G7 summit meeting that's going to fast track aid to him, which it will do. And then Gorbachev agrees to German NATO membership. And at this point, even bigger things are happening. Germany's going to agree to its border with Poland. I'll get there and explain. And Germany provides 15 billion Deutsch Mark, including building all kinds of new apartment buildings for repatriated Soviet soldiers who are going home. Why are you doing that? Because you want those soldiers focused on buying furniture, not running a military coup. That's what they're doing. So the unification happens in mid-September 1990. And here's the Polish borders. At the end of World War II, Stalin moved Poland, 200 kilometers to the west. And it winds up taking a third of German territory, but time that's all over. And so the Germans don't really want to sign all that away. And in addition, as part of that, there were 12 million German refugees who were thrown out of where they were living to send them back to Germany of whom two million died. So this is a big deal, and it's in living memory. Germany agrees to this. That the borders are done, German Polish borders are set. Complicating factor, a month and a half before this unification, treaty assigned, Saunem Hussein decides he's going to invade Kuwait. Because he's broke, because he's had a long war with Iran, huge debts, many owed to Kuwait, which doesn't want to pay back. So if you invade them, that solves that problem. And also, he would take over Kuwait's very rich oil fields. And together, that would make Iraq probably the swing producer of oil. So he thinks that's a great idea, except the coal wars over, actually. And the Russians are more than willing to cooperate with the United States. Gorbachev really needs more money. And he is willing to go along with Iraq out of Kuwait, but not with regime change in Iraq. Because think about Iraq as a very important creditor state to the Soviet Union, it owed them between $10 and $13 billion. That's a lot of money for a broke creditor. But Gorbachev is being extraordinarily cooperative with Bush Sr. He sends Evgeny Primaakov on multiple missions to Baghdad. And the first one, Primaakov gets all Russian hostages out of Iraq. And then on the second trip, he gets all Westerners out Americans included. Third trip, not so lucky. He's there for the coalition force bombing. I don't think he liked that very much. But imagine that bombing going on if there were Westerners. human shields going down with every target. Russia took that card right off the table. And here's some of the reasoning. Sergei Tarasenko was an aide to Foreign Minister Chevere Naza, and they understood that the United States was going to do something about this invasion of Kuwait. And so the Russians thought it'll be better if we force all of this to go through the UN where Russia has a veto power. And he said, "Look, there was a division of roles. It extends to China, the help that Russia provided." When the Americans asked us to work with the Chinese, we told the Chinese, "Think about it. You're one of the big five with veto player. Doesn't it suit your interest to funnel everything through the UN where you can put your foot down?" And the Chinese came around to that idea. However, the Russians had red lines. And here's Anatoly Koboldiov again, the deputy foreign ministry. The red line is, "American troops stay out of Iraq. No regime change in Iraq. You do that and you will tank termination of the Cold War." And that would be the goal. Here's Koboldiov saying, "I advance the basic principle that we must support the territorial integrity of Iraq. This was our sacred position. But we must not permit a division of Iraq." So if you wonder why the ground war ended after 100 hours, this is it that the big thing out there is war termination of the Cold War. That's the big thing. Saddam Hussein is a minor event over there. Sorry, but he was. Anyway, so if it had tanked Cold War termination or upset the reunification of Germany, France and Britain might have been very happy. Because François Mietronau, who is the president of France and Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Britain, were against German unification. They knew it would marginalize their own country and Germany is going to be a bigger economy, which it is. François Mietronau eventually found solace in expanding the European Union, European community to the European Union, when you're incorporating all these eastern block countries into it. And he plays a really important role in concluding the Mausricht Treaty that forms the European Union. But Margaret Thatcher just plain lost. She was just upset about the whole thing. She said, Germany will be the Japan of Europe and worse than Japan. I guess she hadn't been to Japan lately. She said that Germans will get in peace with Hitler couldn't get in war. And she wanted to leave red army troops in Germany for the duration. Imagine if that had been the case and now dealing with Putin. If he had troops in Germany, we would be in trouble. But Bush and Cole worked around all of them. And Bush said to Cole at the end of it, he said, look, I'm not going to beat my chest and dance on the Berlin Wall. Both of them were very careful never to humiliate Gorbachev about the Soviet laws of the Cold War. Why? Because they didn't want, they knew that if they did that, he might fall from power sooner rather than later. Also, they were afraid that if they did that, the hardliners would come to power much more rapidly than they actually did. It was 20 years before a consolidated, started consolidating his power. And the newly independent countries at the Eastern Europe needed those 20 years to integrate militarily, politically, economically with the West, so that the cement could set before you got the Russians trying to destabilize them. So they bought them 20 years to do this. But there's a cost to all this. Bush never got credit for his essential role in ending the Cold War on Western terms. So he was not reelected for a second term. But anyway, when it came time for Nobel Prizes and why the Cold War ended, on a totally out of mission, this Soviet Foreign Service officer said, "Look, it's difficult to die. The Soviet Union was the one that ended the Cold War." And Edwin Meas, who was a Councillor of Reagan, also his attorney general, said, "Look, the Cold War began because of the Soviet policies, and it ended in a sense because of Soviet policies." And the Nobel Prize Committee agreed. They awarded the prize to Gorbachev, not to Bush, for his role in liberating Eastern Europe. So when you're thinking about this question of why Russia lost the Cold War, I hope you will come up with a more complicated answer than Well-Rani did it. That there are probably other causes at work as well. Anyway, thank you for your attention. That's what I have for you this evening. [Applause] So I've been trying to hire a writer for the podcast, but I ended up getting way more applications than I anticipated. But as I started to go through them, I noticed that many of them didn't feel like they were actually written submitted by real human beings. So I started looking for a way to detect, bought its emissions, and I ended up using Sardine. Sardine was built to assess customer risk for banking and retail. But it's also useful for spotting fraudulent job apps. Implementation was hilarious to straightforward. It took my general manager Max less than an hour to vibe-cote Sardine's SDK into our hiring flow. Now, Sardine is assigning every single application we get a risk score based on a ton of different rules and signals. Did the candidate use a throwaway email? He's the device they're on already associated with another application. He's the candidate's IP address, mashing the country that they said they're from. The list goes on. I'm just using a basic web form, but you can integrate Sardine into any application. So if you need help with risk, whether that's for hiring or any other type of fraud prevention, go to sardine.ai/porkash and ask your ATS if they're using Sardine. Alright, back to Sarah. Sarah, thank you so much for doing this. Thank you for having me. That would be the more important thing. There's an interesting question of why the Soviet Union collapse when it did. I think the even more interesting question is why a system that was so centrally planned, monstrously inefficient, brutal, a colonial land empire, how such a country could survive for so long into the 20th century. So I feel like that's the thing that actually needs explanation. How did this regime last for 74 years? But there are loads of dysfunctional places all over the planet that have been dysfunctional forever and you look, well, why are they dysfunctional? To me, that one, in a way, is the example of North Korea. Of all countries that should fall, a place that has ongoing famines in the 21st century. It used to be the richest part of the Korean Peninsula. So these authoritarian regimes are really good at maintaining the coercive powers. So think about it. In order to educate someone, it takes years as a parent to bring up a little person and then you get them educated. Maybe they're an A-list politician. It takes seconds to assassinate them. It's the asymmetry between construction and destruction. Destruction is so easy that these guys are dictatorships are all over the world. It's a sad part of the human condition. They clearly know what they're up to. In the case of the Soviet Union, there were multiple intelligence organizations. That's what Stalin was using to keep track on everyone. So you want to monopolize information so that you know more information than other people. And then they have a whole bunch of people who are the winners of Nomencletura are the elites there. You make sure you pay all them off. And think about it. Humans society, slaves, surfs. We humans have been doing these things to each other for a long time. So dictatorships can certainly sustain themselves for a long time. But the Soviet Union was special in that by the 60s and 70s, they have a GNP that's 60% of America. And this is incredibly dynamic. In the 40s and 50s, they have much higher growth rates. So much so that prominent economists like Paul Samuelsen are saying that by the 90s, based on what they're seeing at the time, the Soviet Union will have a bigger economy than America. And just quite surprising that they would have such high growth rates. If you just think about how central planning works, people are going to tell you how much steel you can make and which company gets to use the cotton fabric and cement and et cetera. And you have hundreds of millions of people living under the system. And it has it is actually quite shocking that they actually had notable growth rates after World War II for decades on end. Well, first of all, it's a war economy, essentially. You're putting all your money, you see, you have a big military and Russians define greatness. This is part of it of being a big power and military power territory. So, and most countries in wartime have, they mobilized for the military. This country did it in World War II. All kinds of rationing, right? We're not using market prices. You're setting different prices, giving people ration cards and things. The thing is about the Soviets is they kept it forever. They never got rid of it. So that's one piece. Another problem with the Soviet Union is all of the data. So I don't know what data you've seen. And I know the data I've seen is it's hard to know because because not the rubles a non convertible currency and a lot of things they measure in weight and other things. like they're the greatest TV producer in the world. said, why? Because they made the heaviest TVs in the world. [LAUGHTER] Right? I'm serious when I was there. This was it. And they would spontaneously combust, which is not the normal thing a TV should do for you. Burn down the apartment building. So they're going to measure their heavy TVs as a positive. And the rubble is non-convertible. So there was a guy named Murray Feshback. And I came to which part of the US government when he was. But he was really good at looking at their statistics and then adjusting them. But people didn't know. And I gave you the CIA ones where the CIA, they're not stupid people. They've got the best data they could find. And they're coming up with 20% of the Soviet budget is probably devoted to the military. Then after the Cold War is over, they're going, whoops. We miss-- it's at least double that. And maybe triple. So it's really hard to know, even with the statistics, you're getting certainly what Paul Sandelson had wouldn't be accurate. It's just a gas. My favorite example of this is-- so there were top-down commands that he had to produce a certain amount of steel. And a steel factory would then be incentivized to make thicker bars of steel rather than thinner bars, because that would counter as greater production. Except a lot of inputs actually do require the thinner sheets. So then the other factories have to thin down the steel. But that also comes to GDP. So producing the inefficient steel and then cutting it down to size is both being double counted towards GDP. I want just the whole waste of it. Like the heavy TVs, they probably have four times the inputs that they need to make them that would be good for other things. Yeah, it's this notion that you can actually plan an economy. Prices are miracles. Good old Adam Smith, the magic hand, right, or the invisible hand. That was what it was. That prices are the way to go in markets. It's more efficient. I wonder if one thing that's going on is in the early and mid 20th century, you have economies which are much simpler at least compared to today. So even then, obviously, command and control is less workable than capitalism. But if you just have heavy industry, you need a certain amount of cement, steel, concrete, fabrics, coal, that's much more workable than like, we got to essentially command what SaaS tools your enterprises allow to use. Oh, yeah. Well, it's interesting on the development thing. So the communists have insisted on heavy industry. That's the thing that they want. Forget about the consumer goods. If you look at the countries that really have made it, like Japan and the Meiji Restoration, they're doing a lot of light industry and consumer goods. And then they move into heavy. But they've already got people on bicycles and they got textiles and other things up and running. And that would also apply to Taiwan and Korea. And they do, by all means, they do get heavy industry. But that's not the starter program. The starter program is basic standard of living. And it turns out, and I don't know economists, but it turns out if you just look at who's rich and who's not, that that seems to me a more workable thing. Yeah. There's also the fact that the centralized regime is building things according to the 30s plan. And even after post work of reconstruction, they're still calling back on these plans from the 30s that call for heavy industry for a bygone era. And in the '70s, '80s, we have our rust belt collapse of manufacturing. And people complain about this as, look, the US has this hollow-out manufacturing base. But it's much better to have industries which are left behind so that the whole economy, as a whole, can be more dynamic and move on than the Soviet Union where the entire thing became a rust belt, right? Because it couldn't move on. It's more exciting than that. And again, I'm not an economist. But apparently they missed the plastics revolution, where we think about our own laws. They were finding me out too many plastics. But it's in plastics and incredible material. And they're dismissing that. I remember, can Russia try to figure out where to get sour cream and was being laughed at by Russians? Because I was so stupid in the store that I couldn't find it. Well, we have little plastic tubs with the sour cream. And back in the late '80s and I was there, you had to bring your glass jar with you so you could hand it over the counter. So someone could take a filthy ladle and fill up your jar. This is part of not having plastics. And then they totally missed the computer revolution. And this plays into Ronald Reagan winning the military race. Is we're putting these chips and things into our ballistic missiles. And they can't do that. And that's a problem. Speaking of plastics, I didn't realize before preparing for this lecture, the overwhelming role that oil played in first explaining why the Soviet Union was able to sustain itself for so long and then why collapse. So by the late '50s, Soviet growth rates are already starting to go down, especially compared to the postwar boom that America's experiencing. And in '59, they discovered these massive oil fields in Siberia. And then from '73 to '85, I think, 80% of Soviet Union's hard currency earnings are just from oil. And they use this because the essential planning can't produce even gray and let alone advanced technology. They use this to import a bunch of stuff to sustain the red army, to sustain the population, to subsidize Eastern Europe. And then, of course, prices collapsed in 1985. Do you think that if the Decebularian reserves aren't found in the late '50s, that it's possible that the Soviet Union would have collapsed 30 years prior? I don't know, but they wouldn't have been able to do all the Africa program and things. It just would be too expensive. So certainly, it would have been a reduced thing. It is also the gas reserves they got up. It's like North Central Soviet Union. I can't remember the places. But this is the gas that gets used to get pumped to Europe, because that's the better place. And they make those big investments, and it takes a while for them to pay off. And that was a big deal because they needed help from Western oil companies or whatever, whoever does the gas pipelines, compressors, whatever it is you need. And there was a big to do about that, about whether we should sell the stuff or whether we shouldn't sell the stuff. Europeans wanted to sell. We were trying not to. This is going under Reagan as well. But anyway, they had built a lot of it. And it was essential to their pocket change. But then, when they got all the pocket change, they never saved any of it. They just, whatever the oil wealth was, they spent up to the max. Doesn't it sound familiar? Governments, you have money, you spend it. Forget about rainy days. So after the Soviet Union collapses, there was a period when Putin was still winning somewhat free elections between-- And so if you look at the why Russia's economy recovers and why Putin is so popular in the 2000s-- from 2000 to 2008, oil goes from $10 a barrel to $140 a barrel. And this goes to your point about we give credit or blame to political leaders for often what are just long run macro trends. Well, what I didn't cover is when the Soviet Union collapses, Soviet living standards-- just Russian living standards implode. And it's a mess for 20 years. It is just unbelievably difficult. Oh, and another piece of the brilliant Soviet management in order to maintain control over the empire. Instead of building things all in a place, you'd build some plane parts here, some plane parts there, some plane parts all over the empire. So when the empire goes, great, I've got a quarter of a plane. And then where do I get the other parts? So all of that fell apart. So Putin suddenly has a lot of money. And then he starts spending it on people. Because initially there's plenty of money. Russian standard living do go up. And so of course they like him. And they give him credit for all of that. But then that runs its course. And then it's less good. And then he's more excited about-- well, it's his mindset anyway. When you get more money, you want to get the empire back. And then Russians also like that, right? Speaking of the empire, the Russian economy just has this terrible period after the colossus of a union. A lot of the Eastern European satellites seem to recover in this gangbusters way. Obviously, East Germany, but even Poland today is such a big success story. What's going wrong with the mainland itself? That's-- The other countries are able to recover from communism much better. Well, they had been always much more connected to Western Europe. Czechoslovakia before the war is a full up, highly developed country, absolutely tied to the West. Poland, I believe, Copernicus is a place like Poland. It's a center of the enlightenment. But when I was using the George Bush senior archives, it's fascinating. So it's 88, 89 when the Soviet Union is imploding. And then there's a lot of correspondence between Eastern Europe, particularly Polish leaders, coming to the Bush administration, saying, hey, our banking system, we know it's a mess, our financial systems are mess. We know we need expertise to help us figure out what our legal system is going to look like. And Bush is all over that. And I'm sure he farmed them out to the private sector, who would also be all over that, like giving them free consulting. And so as a result, you do have them really taking advantage of this 20 years. At the same time, when Bush would have loved to have given some of the same advice-- and there were people like Jeffrey Sachs and others who went to the Soviet Union-- but it was not remotely the same thing. This is a people throughout Polish society requesting this advice, not like one guy with an office in Moscow. And basically, the Russians thought they knew it all. and they thought they understood. This is all the unknown, unknowns of things you don't understand your blind spots. Truly economics is a blind spot for the Soviets, 'cause think about it. When the Zars ran the show, it's like a riff off the Mongol Empire of you take cuts from people's businesses of trade that comes through. And then it's also about selling basic commodities. It's not, you're not thinking of under the Zars, Russia doing high-end manufacturers. I mean, I guess Faberier and some jewelry, if you wanna do that, but the thing really, that's not it. And so it doesn't have this commercial being tied into of this commercial tradition of Western Europe and all the sea routes for trade. And so then when you get the communists, they aren't about that at all. So there's really a dearth of knowledge. Think about in this country, with all the little kids selling lemonade, right? You see them on the streets. They're already learning, or the kids are doing newspaper routes. They're already learning about buying things, selling things at a very, and we just take this knowledge for granted. It's just absent. It was absent in the Soviet Union. And not as much absent in Eastern Europe that had been more connected in. - Okay, so I should ask before we get to the period of Russian collapse, let's go back to the end of the Soviet period. Gorbachev starts instituting these economic reforms along with glass, noss and peristorica. But what I find mysterious is those economic reforms not only fail to prevent the stagnation that the Soviet Union is experiencing, but they in fact make things worse. So you would think that reform, even if it's handled badly, would have some sort of positive impact. And if you do it badly, then it'll have a smaller positive impact. But here, it just causes a huge hyperinflation, causes all these problems. So what did reform have this backwards impact? - Well, A, there's so much that needs reforming there. And but part of it, I think, because he wanted to do political reforms, that's what he understands. As a human being, that would be the thing that he's very familiar with. Think about it. He's like an A-list member of the Communist Party to be the guy when they do generational change. He's the one. So he's obviously very astute at that level, but the problem is economics. So he's giving away political power before he's fixed the economic problems. And so China's conclusion is, there is no way you're gonna touch political power. They're gonna hang on to that and then deal with whatever as much of the economics as they're gonna deal with. But that's part of it. But part of it is there's no tradition for all of these things. And then you go, well, how did Russia get this way? What's a very difficult address? It prior to the Industrial Revolution, it's flat, neighbors all invade. And so you needed a big army in order to defeat them. Okay, a big army is gonna wanna war economy, right? Historically, you're gonna wanna support a big land force. And that's gonna, I mean, this is my take and others who are actually experts in these various periods of Russian history can come up with something else. But I think you're channeling your economics into that. Whereas you're looking at Europe, and particularly Britain, it's merchants. I got that, they got a big aristocracy who are not gonna dirty themselves with buying and selling stuff, but they're a tremendous number of very rich merchants in Britain that are gonna influence government laws and things, which is not gonna take place. And then what's nice about the Navy for Britain is you send them away. They're not gonna run a coup in the capital because they're off on the ship somewhere and there aren't that many of them compared to a standing army. So I suspect I can't prove this that this leads to different outcomes. Or contributes to. - One thing I heard of that is complimentary to your theory is that Gorbachev is instituting forums because he thinks there should be decentralizing his current democraticization, but he doesn't fundamentally believe in the market system. So he's delegating power to these quasi firms. At the same time, he thinks the price system is a moral, private property is a moral. So they can't intermediate between themselves using real prices. So then how do these firms intermediate? Well, there's corruption, right? If you can't use actual prices and property to figure out who gets what allocation of scarce resources, it just back from dealing which makes the problem worse. - Well, there's no legal system and you need a legal system. And legal systems take a long time to develop. So you're telling the Soviet Union, "Okay, communism is down and now you need a, like chop chop, we need a fast step, we need a new legal system, it's not gonna happen." Okay, so you were mentioning the problem that Eastern European countries especially had, which is that they're going more and more into debt because they're not able to produce globally competitive exports. And in order to, so they have this like last-dish effort that we're gonna solve our problems with some technological miracle, we need to even get even more over leverage, we'll get some Western machinery or technology and then we'll be able to finally produce something that the world wants. I'm curious up to what point this was a plausible hope, you know, through the '80s and even till the end of the '80s, they still believe that, you know, Czechoslovakia or Eastern European or something, you can catch off with West Europe and everything, right? - They're desperate, right? Think about it, if you're a communist leader, how many other cards are there to play? You're looking, okay, this is the only card I got and they're doing other things because of social unrest, they wanna import food and consumer products because they've been so neglected these things. So, and then there's another piece which is, VCRs, you know the videos, all of a sudden those things came around. I remember this, so we're in Soviet Union, the academic year of 1988-89 and had one of my classmates had been an English language tutor of this person in Moscow and set me up because that was the only way to get a good meal once a week. I would do, for a meal, I would do talk English for an hour and yeah, that what that family wanted more than anything else is a VCR player and they had a diplomatic, you could have hard currency and buy at the diplomatic, whatever it was. So, I basically got them a VCR by going to the diplomatic thing with my very limited foreign currency bought an overpriced VCR for them and they got all kinds of meals to the rest of the year. But it meant that they can all of a sudden get Western movies and there are things like in movies where, oh, like they'll be a picture of, I don't know, a fugitive running by, I don't know, the fruit section of the Berkeley Ball and there were rations of me, oh, you know, it's just unbelievable. I think that Raiya Sagorvichov, Gorvichov's wife when she came and visited, she must have realized that a welfare mother on food stamps had a better buying power than she did by just being able to have access to Walmart. I think the elites is they're traveling, I have no statistical data on this, but as you travel, I'm comparing me getting sour cream in a jar and oh yeah, that was the other thing. Counting up all the things in a Soviet supermarket and the total was something like 77 items total in this supermarket. I don't think that compares favorably to a candy rack as you leave, I don't know, 7-11, right? And oh yeah, when you went by the meat section, the smell just about knocked you out of rotten meat. It was really disgusting. I got to make, I got really good at making Borscht, go to the peasant market, pay hard currency for bones 'cause couldn't afford any meat, but I could afford the bones. And then, would buy, Russians produce really good sugarbeats, got beats, and then you're starting to get rotten apples over the winter, but they at least come from hungry, Russians don't produce apples in those days when Hungarians did. And other Romanian's provided the Tommit Cantamatos and I could do a credible Borscht, but you're talking about, this is Moscow, the center of everything. And we're dealing, I remember buying potatoes at the market and the rotten spots felt gelatinous. So you'd have to cut those out and then you're wondering how many nutrients are in the rest of that potato. It was a really gross year. And then, yeah, I remember going to the candy store and I mean, I would buy caramel from Poland or somewhere. It was like a food item because it was actually edible. - At this point, I bet you were wondering why you didn't write a biography of Napoleon and say you could just visit Paris instead. - Yeah, well, my brother's comment is, you're studying Russia and China, two countries in the breakdown lane. - By the way, the point about the grocery stores having 74 items, it's interesting in two ways. One, central control works much better if you have a much smaller amount of items to optimize over. So if you had things that are standardized, it can work much better. And second, to your point about GDP being hard to compare between the Soviets and the United States, how do you compare a run potato to die to whole ones that you can get? - Well, they were compared it by pound, right? - Exactly, right? - Yeah. - Oh, so you said you were there in 88 and 89. So this is before the Berlin Wall has fallen. - I was watching Tiananmen fall, the Tiananmen demonstrations on Soviet TV. And the only reason you got that TV coverage is 'cause Gorbachev was in Beijing. So all, the press was there. That's why you have the coverage and they stayed on because the students were demonstrating and the Chinese closed society weren't aware of power of television, of guys, they're going to film you doing all this stuff and they will get the film out. Okay, in '88 was the mood, obviously things are going terribly, but people realized that they're only two years away or three years away from the complete dissolution of the zone. Well, maybe the end of the Soviet Union, but there was such optimism of thinking, we're finally going to be a full-up democratic country. It's been wonderful with no sense of the work schedules that go into a capitalist economy, that to create the wealth in this country, a lot of people are working far more than 40 hours a week, and particularly as they're getting started, working enormous hours. That was not something that was in most people's mind. Sure, the kids who became the ballerinas and the bullshoy are working long hours to do that, but as an economy as a whole, they didn't understand the source of wealth and had any inkling of all the things that are missing, not least of which is no one's got the right education. Great, you got Mark's smell at Memorize. That does you zero good. Around this time is when people are finally learning about what actually happened during the Stalinist period. People are optimistic that we can have a changing of the guard and maybe things will improve, but at the same time, they're learning about how terrible their history actually was. So between these two things, and also at some point, they must realize through the 90s that things are actually aren't improving. In fact, they're getting worse. Oh, it's still a part. Yeah, so what is the inflection point at which the mood is just? I don't know because I wasn't living there. I was thinking that there would be impending problems as a, I don't know, chicken little American. The sky is falling. The sky is falling. Americans always think disasters coming. I sort of fit in that crowd. But I think there was a lot of optimism and exuberance thinking we have the freedom to really understand our history and what's happening. This is in of educated people, people with college degrees in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Now what's going on in the rest of the country is undoubtedly a different story because they had, as bad as living in Moscow was, living in the countryside was going back in time far further. So those people weren't living well at all. And it's going to get really bad for them. Okay, so people are learning about these things for the first time. Is the sense that they kind of suspected, I mean, people have family. They must have known my uncle was, he was often this little mining town that he was forced to go to for a decade right there after, oh yeah, yeah, yeah. But so were they totally shocked or was there some sense that things were pretty bad and now we're just learning the extent to it? I think there was an understanding. It was terrible, but I think there's this exuberance of thinking it's going to get mad. It's going to get much better. And then the disappointment is equally extreme. And then there was this feeling that while the West owes us because how I mean, that you're all really rich and you now owe us to fix everything. And the counter-argument to that is no, you are enormous migraine. You set back all of these countries across the globe back in time with this non-functioning communist model that you peddled around there. And now you want extra aid. And the problem was, I think we wanted to do some of the aid, but they're not going to be receptive to it. I think that was another conclusion with the Bush administration is that if we dumped a lot of money and it would just go straight into corruption, that there you need a legal structure and in order to place money and they just plain didn't have it. That was another thing that was worrying the Bush administration. There's nowhere to put the money. Okay, speaking of these different countries that the Soviets and the United States were competing for during the Cold War, you had this presentation where you say, look, Reagan alone did into do this. But I wonder if the broader lesson is just like nothing any US president did in terms of foreign policy. That was all a side show. This Teta Teta competition for different third world countries. We're going to get Brazil. We're going to Vietnam. We're going to get Algeria, etc. That just seems much less significant than the fact that liberal capitalism was more appealing and outproduced communism. So even if some country, even if Brazil goes communist, this is not going to change the fundamental, the fundamental playing board here. If you do not protect the liberal economies of Europe, you're not going to have anywhere to play the liberal economic game. Also, Japan, and one of the reasons you feel that liberal economies work is you've got economic miracles going on in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong back in the day. So if you abandoned those places, also in the Cold War, there was a tremendous amount of economic growth across the world. And particularly in the third world, why? Because in past, if there's a civil war, whoever's losing either comes to us, or comes to the Russians and says, help us. So whoever it is helps, and then the other side feels obliged to help. And then you're just destroying wealth ever more rapidly. And that was going, the Cold War was anything but cold in the third world. Tens of millions of people died in these conflicts. So when you end that, all of a sudden they can start compounding growth. So there's a problem with allowing someone, not countering someone who's going to impose communist systems all over the place. And communist systems are really good at putting dictators into power in a civil war situation. It's very effective. That's how Mao gets into power. And the problem is, okay, then when the civil war, they're empowered, they annihilate the opposition. But then it produces compounding poverty thereafter. So there's this conundrum. I generally don't know the answer to this, but in order to beat off these communist factions, then guerrillas, we often, through the Cold War, had to support other dictators. And I think probably in many cases, they were better than the communist alternative. It just very hard to beat pullpaw and Mao in terms of how terrible you can be. But obviously this was in its own way problematic. And even if we didn't have to support dictators, we had to alienate, you had this previous lecture that you gave on the Indo-Pakistani chapter in history where we had to alienate India in order to fend off against the Soviet Union in this little episode. So I mean, I don't know what the solution to this is. I mean, if you think that this theater mattered less than you could say, well, we should have just kept our hands clean of these different, um, sort of, well, countries. But to your point, well, if you want to be able to show that these countries can experience growth under capitalism, then you want them to not be under the subjugation of communist. But then you had to support sometimes objectionable regimes. Well, I think you had a more optimistic generation, ironically optimistic. The people who had survived World War II, there was a real generosity. I mean, American servicemen, uh, and women, but they were saying servicemen, they were welcome to all over Europe and, uh, they were adored in Europe, right? And, uh, they came back, they were a very generous group of people. They, they were others felt generous to them. That's when the GI Bill just passed and saying, okay, you've saved everyone. So therefore we're going to give you college educations, uh, extend home loans to you, not to African Americans. They were excluded from this, which is a problem. But, um, others, the white Americans weren't. And, um, it led to massive economic growth where people who'd never had a college education, their family, they did, and they all of a sudden, instead of having a really hard manual labor, um, this real optimism. And then it extended to foreign countries. This is when this country was tremendously generous to others. And it worked very well for us. And think about the Marshall Plan. It looks really generous, putting all this money into Europe. All we made a fortune off of it as did Europe. It's, you're looking, if you're smart, you're looking for win wins of things where you both benefit because that'll incentivize the other side to join in. This is basic strategy. And this is one of the reasons I've got problems with the United States is turned to zero sum approaches where I'm going to get everything you get nothing. And then I look so smart when we do the clickbait on this moment where I get everything and you get nothing. It's much smarter. And then the other piece is that a lot of things don't pay off immediately. So George Bush is not reelected president. He absolutely deserved to be, um, because what he did, the payoff was huge, uh, ending the Cold War on Western terms. But it doesn't pay off in time for the next election. I think this is where Americans miss it is you're looking at what someone does on a given day when the real implications are what's going to happen in a decade. Like on tax policy, if we keep racking up our debt, it may get us out of the corner today, but is it going to really back us into a corner later on? And this is where Americans need to think a little harder about long term implications of things. I thought when you pointed out that it would cost 60 billion during the Marx for West Germany to pay Gorbachev to basically let him or not let him, but let East Germany join West Germany. That's a lot of money, but if you think about decades and decades of future growth, it's just like it's a huge bargain, right? So it's a mistake to think about how expensive things seem at the moment. It's just like another huge country that you've turned. Well, there's a statement that politicians think of the next election, statesmen think of the next generation, George Bush and Helmut Kolder statesmen. They're thinking of the next generation and the group that fought World War II, also many of US and also allied leaders where states people, they're thinking of the next generation. Or if you're thinking of them, where I've got Mitterrand, who's a Negotiating Demostric Treaty about the European Union, that is states person's work of what's the next generation. So it's important and we haven't held our political, it's been, we need more statesmen, states people, our political leaders. - To try to different these on you. Through this period, the Soviet Union is also trying to buy off other countries, especially when it thinks this economy can grow and especially when oil suffered the 73 oil crisis, oil prices just skyrocket. And this is why some Soviet citizens remember the version of AIRA favorably, just that oil made possible for the Soviets to not only import stuff, but also to, through the version of free, actually there's a net export of resources to Eastern European satellites, rather than the other way around. - That's probably their data. That's the, I get it, their oil really subsidized, but everything in the Soviet Union that was worth having came from somewhere else. The problem is, how do you measure it, right? And they're just gonna measure it by weight or something else, it doesn't really capture what they're getting. - But the larger question being that, it's not like the Soviet Union didn't think of doing things like the Marshall Blend. Obviously nothing to that extent, but this idea that you can win people's favors by providing the military aid, providing them foreign aid, it just that they didn't have the resources to do it to the extent that the US could. - That's true, but there's a real coercive piece too, is if you mess with them, it'll be really ugly. - Economics is such a big part of the story of why the Soviet Union fell apart. That if you don't look at the numbers, you really can't understand this lecture. There's this one side that Sarah has that shows the yearly budget deficits and declines in GDP that you saw in the late 80s in the Soviet Union. And the numbers show just how massive the oil bust actually was. But you can't tell this just from a glance at a table. So we wanted a way to visualize the data, to make the trends super clear when you release the episode. Google's image generation tool, Nano Banana Pro, has been extremely useful for this. In this case, we just took a screenshot of this slide from Sarah and asked Nano Banana to make line wraps from it. And it did it perfectly. Of course, oil wasn't the only reason the Soviet Union fell apart. Another big reason was the sinusovia split. The border between China and Russia is enormous. And it took a massive percentage of the Soviet Union's GDP to defend it. We found this helpful map of the 69 border conflict on Wikipedia. But it's dense and hard to read, if it's just on screen for a few seconds. So again, we just had Nano Banana clean it up. And now it's much easier to see the border itself and also where some of the fighting took place. You can try Nano Banana Pro now in the Gemini app. Go to Gemini.google.com to get started. All right, back to Sarah. OK, here's what I don't understand about the arms buildup during the Cold War. So the Soviet Union is spending, I think, 2% of their GDP just on nuclear weapons alone at its peak. And arms control advocates will make this cliff, which is that, look, we've already got enough weapons to destroy the world many times over. Why do we need more? But that is sort of an interesting question. Why was the point of spending so much of GDP on the marginal nuclear weapon or marginal weapon system? I don't know the answer. But I've read the-- you read the plans about these things, and you wonder what people are thinking. Like, we were trying to develop tactical nukes. There was only a little trick with that. That whoever deployed it would be within the blast range of the tactical nuke. And you're going, oh, who develops a weapon like that? Apparently, we did. Luckily, we didn't deploy it. I don't know the answer of why we had such massive redundancy in these nuclear weapons. Why the arsenals were so massive? And I don't know the story on how you maintain these things and how long they last. And it doesn't make much more sense to me than it does to you. OK, another question. So sinusovia split, this huge diplomatic coup where the Soviets have to put a million soldiers on the Siberian front against China. And they had to spend 2% of GDP just stationing and garrisoning this area, which is obviously a lot. That's often what many countries spend on defenses a whole, let alone just along one front. At the same time, 2% GDP-- well, if they just had one or two more years of extra economic growth or faster growth, that could make up for this huge diplomatic coup. So again, this goes back to the question of, if some domestic policy just caused slightly higher economic growth rates, that would make up for the biggest diplomatic coup of the entire Cold War, which goes back to the economy first, diplomacy second. Well, A, I have real problems with the statistics. And I can relate-- this is-- I got what is it-- sample size of 1, 1. So I remember living in Moscow. It was so backwards. It's just breathtakingly backwards, in just about every way imaginable. From just-- yeah, they got a big fancy subway system looks remarkably retro. And yeah, at least it works. But the consumer goods were so awful, the quality was so bad. You look at the buildings themselves. I get it. They make nuclear weapons. Do they make anything else? Their cars were joke. They're laudas or whatever they were. You just think after thing. And so you're looking at all their stats, because that's what they are telling you that we're so great. And if you-- it really is an emperor where there's no closed moment. The finally, the little kids goes, oh, you're actually naked. Or I can give you an example. These acquaintances in Moscow were talking about hospitals outside of Moscow that some of them didn't have running water. How do you have a hospital without running water? I don't even know how that's even conceivable. When their kid had put her hand through, I don't know, a glass door or something. And they wanted to get her stitched out, because she's bleeding, not going to die, but she's probably bleeding all over the place. And they bring her to one place and, oh, they got no thread to do the stitches. So then they have to go to another place. Who runs a country like this? All right, you convinced me. Bart is acceptable. I'll stick here. The subway is not a big deal. I don't want to move to Moscow. OK, so while the Eastern Europeans out of lights are trying to leave the Soviet Union, this has happened many times through the 20th century. So Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in '68, Poland through solidarity, and every previous time, there's a many million person strong red army stationed in Eastern Europe left over from World War II, which rose in the tanks and prevents these revolutions from taking place. So what happens in the late '80s and early '90s that the red army is still there? There's still millions of red army soldiers. They just don't shoot. Yeah, a generational change. A, the leaders don't have the stomach for it anymore. I don't know how you'd feel about sending tanks and going, oh, we're going to splatter all these people. I think for many Americans, that would not be the choice that they would make. And so this ruthless generation is gone. Another piece is Gorbachev had traveled. And I think he had some Czech friends, and I came over all his list of friends. But they've been horrified by Czechoslovakia in 1968 as young people watching it, as Russian young people watching it. And thinking, it's just wrong. We shouldn't be doing this. If communism is what it should be, this is not what should be happening. And so this is of their youth, Gorbachev, and his-- it's not just him, he reflects a whole generation of communists. And so they're thinking, there's got to be another way. This is just not right. And so then he thinks he's got his other way. And so it's this exuberance of the reforms and things are happening in Russia. There's a tremendous feeling of energy. And so he's telling the polls, you get at it, too. We're all going to do this thing. But it's all the expertise and things that he's missing, that he's unaware that he's missing, as are all these other people. Because how could they have it? They've been living in a command economy. OK, this is what I want to ask you about. So you had the "total" quote about how revolutions happen when governments start to institute some kind of reform. Gorbachev is doing "Parashtroika" glass and "Ost." And there's the conservative reactionary part the Communist Party, which by the way is a. phrase I wouldn't expect to have said, but they're trying to resist this. And so Gorbachev goes about dismantling the party secretariat and instead devolving power down to the individual republics. And we know what happens later is that these republics are say, look, we want our own country now. But this raises a question of, okay, if you do inherit a brutal regime and now you say, I want to do reforms and you know this dynamic that the so-called pointed out, which is as soon as you start reforms, actually what it tends to happen is that you lose power, not that people consolidate it under you. What actually should you do, right? Because you're like, I want to be in Profuels lives. But as soon as you try to do that, the whole thing's going to fall apart. This is so far above my pay grades. I mean, I'm a professor. I have trouble justifying a B plus on a paper. I'm a believer in gradual reforms, do it incrementally. For the Soviet Union, it would be gradual legal reforms, work it through their Duma slowly. And do it that way, but seek out help from the European Union that has many, many experts that would be overjoyed if Putin and friends would see, see, stilling their number on Ukraine. And now the problem is you're going to get into reparations for what the horrors they've inflicted. So that ship has sailed sadly for this generation. There's no nice ending for Russians. It's too late. But you can look at Europe itself as improving its institutions and Ukraine's improving its institutions. If you think about what forces you to change, isn't the existential threat on Ukraine if they survive all this? This is forcing them really to clean up their institutions. So it's happening rapidly there. But we don't know the end of that story, how it ends. I do think these are interesting lessons here. Whenever we look at a country from the outside, we have this thing of like, well, just reform everything and just fix your economy. And whenever we understand the system better, for example, in the United States, healthcare is 20% of GDP. And this idea that Trump or Obama or Biden, whoever could just come in and be like, well, I'll just fix healthcare. We recognize that this is a wildly implausible thing to happen. But then we have this expectation that in Russia, Gorbachev or Yeltsin could have just been like, 100% of my economy is messed up. And I'm just going to fix it. American hubris. And actually, think about our country. We have the one of the most crazy tax codes on the planet and neither party can touch it. Because you touch any part of it. Someone negotiated that wording exactly. And yet think of how much of our economy is taken up by the overhead of all the tax accountants, all the misdirected cash in order to take advantage of something that's simply an invention of the tax system. There was years ago when there was talk of doing a flat tax. It wouldn't that be much more efficient. And you can imagine what accountants thought about that one. And that idea has totally died. Talk about inefficiency. I mean, and then we realize we have budgetary problems in this country. This would seem to be something that ought to be on people's radar as clean up tax code. But isn't it precisely that many people don't want the radar on the tax code? And that's why we're wondering who can get in and out of girls or boys' bathrooms. Right? Instead of looking at the tax code, which would be the real thing. I think it should be big deductions for podcasts. [LAUGHTER] If your counselor's research and development. Well, to our cash, you're almost at that stage. You need to add a lobbyist in DC. [LAUGHTER] Well, we're going to. [LAUGHTER] So there's a very interesting book about North Korea. I forget the title where the author is pointing out to that. North Korea could not do-- you couldn't even start doing reforms today. Because as soon as there was some sort of information that from the outside world that North Koreans could see, which would be part of any reform, they would immediately realize that everything the government has told them is false, that South Korea is enormously wealthier. They have this terrible standard of living. And obviously, this is the same experience that Eastern Europeans had. We're literally, in many cases, a country that is-- this is the exact same country. It was just bisected in half. And the other half is living so much richer. And in those situations, I guess this goes back to the question of, well, today in North Korea, how would it even kick off if Kim Jong-un just had a change of heart if somebody else came into power? They just probably trapped in this. To the extent they don't want to keep power. There's nothing we can do. Oh, he's trapped. Because he's a dead boy if he tries to take a gun retirement. What is it? In Asia, there's-- I don't know exactly all of the parts of Asia where this applies to, so it's some parts. There's a thought that things last for three generations, and then it's over. So he's the third generation. And whether this is true or not doesn't matter. If you believe it's true, it will become a self-sufficient prophecy. So I'll be interested. Well, I won't probably live to see it. You in the room well of what happens to the Kim family, whether it makes it to generation four or not. But by their own belief system, in theory, they shouldn't. So who knows? One more question about oil. Yeah? It was based on my big expertise on oil. Zero. Yeah, OK. So during this period between 73 and 85, when they have these huge oil revenues, presumably there were some of them on exuberance. But the government recognized and realized that they're super fragile to the price of oil. And if that collapses, they need some sort of contingency plan, some rainy day fund. You must notice that, oh, this is half my budget, and all of my foreign currency is coming from oil. And this is very volatile commodity. Nobody noticed that? Yeah, well, it's interesting. I was reading this long chronology that it was put together sort of early Putin. So before they really shut down all the information, it was just a chronology of the Cold War, big fat book, just like someone like me to read a book like that. So I'm going day after day after day after day. And it's written by people who are really angry about how the Cold War turned out. And one of the takeaways from the compilers of this thing is they kept criticizing. They showed how much, for every year, how much Russia was making in oil revenues, it was huge. But in their analysis, it was, and they saved none of it. There was no sense of invested in something. There's something called consumption that there's nothing called investment. Long around and buying a bunch of, I think, Western grain is consumption. There's none of this being put in anything that's going to yield anything. And so that was a big criticism of the authors of this book. Is that what the question you're asking is no, they just milked it while they were there. A final question. This is not so much a question as an observation. I don't know if you have a reaction to this. If you just look at Russia's history through the 20th century, Sarasum, to Communism, to collectivization, to more than 10% of your population dying from World War II, then back to Stalin, and then more Communism, and then the economy collapses again, and then Putin, and then especially if you look at the satellite states, well, they had all of this happened to them and worse, and now they're getting invaded. Whereas you have other countries like Japan and Germany also had tragic histories, but then they recovered the tragedy of Russia. Yeah, you're lucky you're not Russian. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, no, it is tragic. It is tragic. And it started as a difficult address in pre-industrial revolution that required certain things to survive, and they were more ruthless than their neighbors. That's how they did survive. I mean, they just, in a previous lecture, I discussed how they wiped out entire princely states and conates and things, just wipe them out. And then you're using their elites because it's a rough neighborhood. And the problem is if you aren't on the winning side, you're going to be on the losing side, right? But in since the industrial revolution, we can do compounded economic growth that comes from commerce and trade and industry and things. So that's the real way to get powerful because you get power that becomes a function of your wealth. That involves having legal systems, institutions, stability, and Russia has found it very difficult getting with that program. And it has to do with, I think, this very difficult historical legacy who rises to power and also all the missing things. They didn't have the Renaissance. They didn't have the reformation, these fundamental movements that were a very influential in the West. And so there's a lot of negative space. If things that didn't happen, there's all the awful stuff. that you saw that did happen, but then they're missing things. So it's very difficult, and then people like Putin can set the clock way back, because he's killed so many Ukrainians. What he's done will take a generation minimum to get to anywhere where people are gonna be thinking about, people we talk about reparations from Russia for quite a while, and they're poor, they're not gonna wanna do that. - I should have thought to end them on a more optimistic note. But. - Well, maybe history's ended, okay? (laughing) - Well, you've outlined the ways in which countries can chart a better course for themselves, and that's where the optimism can come from. - Well, actually, I've told a story about the last Cold War that stayed cold in the industrialized world, which was a good thing, 'cause it would have been nuclear. It was tragic in many other parts of the world, but at least it stayed cold in the industrialized part. And there was a strategy that a very thoughtful generation of people, not just in the United States, but all over the West that put it together to allow for a non-nuclear landing for the Soviet Union when it fell apart. And I've laid out some of the, from this you can derive some of the strategies that worked for ending it that way. And these are the kind of strategies that we're gonna have to use in order to navigate the second Cold War. And so the other piece about the Cold War is, okay, the Soviet Union's living, they're living miserable lives of their own making. But Americans were actually in a good time. They paid taxes, they paid for all the nuclear weapons. But as I recall, people are running around in Disneyland, they're doing their European trips, their buying houses. And so actually Americans, people in Western Europe were actually living fulfilling lives while they're waiting out for others to get with the program. And that would be the, if we're gonna make it through the second one, we're gonna need to start cooperating with our allies, building institutions, improving laws. Don't just burn down the house. And we will get through this one too. And we will live fulfilling lives while we're waiting out, Putin could come up with something different or Xi Jinping for coming up with something different. But if we blow through our good hand of cars, which involves having, so you interview all kinds of people at the cutting edge of technology, if we get rid of all of our university funding. So we aren't gonna have the intellectual capital on which those businesses are based. If we're gonna dump all our allies for unknown reasons and just alienate them so they organize without us. If we're gonna just throw away entire institutions without thinking very carefully about what we're doing, it's called we become a cooperative adversary. And we will be the Bozo putting a plastic bag on our own head. And I look at the rhymes here. The Soviets had this ancient leadership who just couldn't get their act together and they're living off of debt instead of thinking creatively, oh, the rhymes are awful, but we don't have to do it that way. So it is more optimistic, but we need to get our house in order. And that's why I'm doing these lectures. They're lectures and strategy to give you tools on how to come to your own decisions. That's your business, not mine. - Okay, that is an excellent note to close on. Sarah, I want to thank you so much for doing this lecture series with us. It has been a true education across the six from everything from individual wars, the strategic and tactical decisions, which explain them to the broader lessons for today's world. I do interview lots of different kinds of people, like from a sort of viewer minute average adjusted basis, I host a Sarah Payne podcast. If you just sort my popular, Sarah Payne comes up a lot. - Well, you've got it backwards. I was an unknown academic, and then you called call me about doing an interview, and I said, sure. And to our cash, as a result of all this, I'm getting emails from all over the place. So let's talk about who's grateful to whom. Anyway, I'm devoted to your generation. And anyway, thank you for having me. Thank you for coming and being such a warm audience, really appreciated. (audience applauding) - Hey everybody, I hope you enjoyed that episode. If you did, the most helpful thing you can do is just share it with other people who you think might enjoy. It's also helpful if you leave a rating or a comment on whatever platform you're listening on. If you're interested in sponsoring the podcast, you can reach out at twerkesh.com/advertise. Otherwise, I'll see you at the next one.