Saas Crash! AI Collapse. Atlassian Hammered. Xero Obliterated. BTC Decimated. CTM Founder Lives Large. Will Canva Take Down Australian VCs.

-Fermacy is a meme stock, right? -That's being generous. -And so we're in this meme now. -Yeah. -My. My ex-firmity was the funniest day I've ever seen. Oh, my God! -I'm a deer shiftman. -And this is the Contrarians with Adam and Adi. And we are back, episode 175. We thought we were going to be a. I'm going to talk about today and then bang the last few days. I'm hoping for a short episode. Although someone came up to me and said to me about the last episode, they said, "Oh, my God, I saw that it was two hours long. I started listening to it." And then I realized that the end of it, actually, like, half the episode was the iron conversation, which was. -Yeah, it could have been longer. -Yeah, and so, actually, they weren't complaining about it at all. I think they thought that really it could have been its own episode and we'd kind of just jammed it in at the end of the episode. Michael Android did the system chapel. Definch, you did the Mona Lisa. You did that iron take-man. I think it's taken like 30. I'm not sure the correlation here, but 30% off the share price. But I think your. -Well, we can say that. -And we can say that. to go into that company better than really anybody on the world. Because nobody realized what the hell was going on there. And you tore it down, like, Samson tore down the walls of Jericho. This was remarkable. And we've seen. -I think they tore the walls of Jericho. -I don't know. I think they came down. -They came down with the. -They were blowing the ramps. So I'm sure far thing marching around the walls seven times. I think that's how the walls came down. Might be a dubious story either way. These Samson pulled pillars down or something. -Yeah, pulled pillars down. -I don't know what it was. -I think I pulled down and started iron. -Well, I will say with an iron. You think iron can be dead. Now Bitcoin's crashed and gets that later on. Now they're one remaining revenue source till this Microsoft Luca comes through. He's in all sorts of trouble. Although I think people still bullet. I know it's down 30%. I will say, call way this down. Like 20, 22%. So it's definitely deviated from coin, which as it should. But I'm not sure. There are enough true believers that I think that party is still going to go on. And I haven't changed my view that firmness will get away in one way or another. -I was in Blackstone's talking about. -And Blackstone's special sits fund. Which means that some sort of so highly structured note. So it's not real equity. It's something. If it gets a six billion dollar headline valuation, the real value of Asian fraction of that. What firmness does next. But I don't think firmness gets away ever. But you think they don't get away as they go broke? Possibly. I don't think I've. I think I'll list. I think somebody might take a map. Well, no one is listing tech for the next nine months. Yeah. Like, unless something dramatic happens. We've seen even good companies like Rock, which is highly profitable growing, not list. So they're. They're arguing it was pretty good and honest. I thought, which is, we can't be focused on listing now when the entire world is going through this AI moment. We need to be focused on that. And I'm not sure Bruce's really wanted to be a listed business. He's done a great job as a private CEO. I think he's happy growing things somewhere in his mind. We were going to be focused by saying, our favourite people to run businesses, I've got to chip on my shoulder people, right? You agree with that. And so don't you think he just wants to demonstrate what had Dom Quantas was for not making him CEO? I think he's demonstrated that. May, but last. The last act is being a public company and being a public company CEO. Yeah, potentially. I think. He's got a $7.8 billion valuation. Actually, not that different. I want to do more. But then, like we said, I know we're going to spend half of this episode talking about what's going on with AI, what's real, what's fake, etc. But rock, you look at rocked, don't you think that would be part of the panic of can some vibe coders just put together an alternative to rocked? And then rock's argument would be, yeah, but the thing is, number one, our tech, which I don't do. No, it's a marketplace. Number two, it's got. Well, they would say their tech is very good at optimising revenue per. like CPM revenue, basically. I think. But they would say we've got all these advertisers. They all trust us. Totally. And so I think that's their real story. But me and I've got a two-sided marketplace. Both sides are almost impossible to build. Like getting the inventories very difficult, probably the hardest part. And getting the advertisers is slightly less hard, but still very hard. So building that inventory post-purchase, no one can replicate that. We can talk about it in the market place, versus AI versus SaaS, because there's three different businesses and they're all being lumped together. And they think they're contracted. Do you think those that invent. When you say inventory, that's what you're contracted. eBay says to rocked, you can rest after someone buys something or whatever. And so do you think that's contracted? Yeah, and it's also exclusively contracted? Well, I'm sure the contract can be ended. Why can't I. Well, I don't want to use the word vibe coding, but I'm going to use that hesitantly to say, why can't I get through a really high quality software engineers? With this so much, this is like a foreshadowing of lots of stuff we're going to talk about. Marketplaces and coding is not software engineering, but I can get through really high quality software engineers, let them vibe code with some AI models, replicate a rocked offering, and then I can go to the inventory and say, like to eBay, and say, we're just going to let people run exactly the same ads that are running on rocked, but we'll put them on your site, and we'll give you 50% more of the take, and then I go to all of the advertisers and say, run exactly the same ads don't change, and just put them on our platform, and I'll charge you a bit less, and then what you have is commoditization, leading to margin compression, which is, I think, one of the real risks that's going on with the rise of AI is a margin compression. I think in some cases, that. I think marketplaces are not making on rock by the way. Compared to like, and we talked about. It lasts in jumps to mind, and we'll talk about that later, because they're renouncement dropped. Their numbers has dropped a few days ago, but I think, whether it's car sales, seek, rocked, or whatever, two-sided marketplaces are very hard to dislodge, because you need to build both sides, and it costs billions of dollars, so I don't think rock's going anywhere. I don't think car sales is going anywhere. I don't think six core businesses is going anywhere. Like, the question is valuation. Rocked is not really a two-sided marketplace. Absolutely it is. It's not because a real two-sided marketplace says, all we do is act as a platform to bring buyers and sellers together. Is that what rock does? I think that's what rock does. Okay, maybe. I thought they had a more active role in deciding what inventory went where, and effectively, they're kind of making promises to win. Or more like Google, is what you're saying. Well, I thought they were making promises. Well, I think Google's a real two-sided marketplace, because they just go and get people that are searching, and then they go and get people that want to advertise, and they let the system match them. But I thought rock was more when they make. I could be wrong about this, but when they make deals with the inventory, to eBay, they kind of make certain commitments about returns that they're delivering them. No, no. We're being an advertiser and advertising. Okay. And so that's not the case. Okay, so you think they are a genuine two-sided marketplace? Yeah. Okay, I agree with you in the past. I don't understand why people are panicking about those particular providers. I think Bruce just doesn't want to list. I don't think anything happens to Rock's valuation really. I think it's just as good a business as it was a month ago. We'll talk about some other block businesses. But no one's IPO-ing tech businesses today. How you gonna IPO tech business today? You were talking about Firmus. I know, but that's not this afternoon. I think they'll still get away. Yeah, but Bruce wasn't this afternoon. Maybe Rock was this afternoon either. Yeah, this is like falling noise at the moment. You're taking it away for what easy than Firmus? Like there's no question. Well, you say that, but like, give me a. I'd take Firmus as a meme stock, right? That's being generous. And so we're in this meme now. I thought it was the funniest game you've ever said. Oh my God. Oh my God. You know, I basically try and get lost. But I've never made him laugh like that before. You watch the YouTube video on the side. I mean, a meme stock already feels generous. I thought that was very funny. There you go. I can't compete with those laughs. It depends if the meme that Firmus is part of keeps going. If the meme keeps going, I'll get away. I'll get away. No problems. If it crashes to. We're seeing Iron. Which you've. I know. You've got to slide. I know. I know. You've got to slide. Can that spane destroyed? Core waves destroyed. Like I'm not sure I have this little idea. But you don't think it's the end of the AI bubble, do you? What this reminds you of? We were talking over the last year where we in the 1999 to the end of the cycle. And I thought we were pretty close. And this is. By the way, this isn't nowhere near like 9.00. This could be. There could be anz back. We've seen this bubble re-inflate multiple times. We saw liberation day. We've seen a multiple. We've seen liberation. This is everything bubble. But I just assume this isn't. Well, because I tell you the emotional difference that I feel. So definitely what has hit the market is irrational fear. There is no doubt about that. That same is not the end of the 2000, really, right? Same irrational fear. Definitely the. There are margin calls being made on people that have borrowed money to buy stuff. Why is it irrational fear? Why is it irrational? It's fear, but why is it irrational? Because the market is not trying to figure out winners and losers from AI at this point in time. It's trying to kind of just slaying everything. If you look at. All tech has been pulled. In videos not has a main slide. Well, we'll get. Well, taking away. Apple hasn't been. We'll never rose through AI. In videos that I know, but. Big daddy of AI. What I call mean is. Maybe I'll say this. Let's talk specifically about. Non-AI tech. So in video I put them to the side. And I haven't looked at what's happened to Microsoft and those. They're four last month or so. But not terrible. Really, it's SaaS marketplaces, those types of businesses. No one is trying to figure out who the winners and losers are from AI. They're just. People are really panicking and flying out of them. And so I can feel irrational fear when I talk to investors. And so there's that. And there's margin calls on people that have borrowed money to buy stock. And now the prices have dropped. And the banks are asking for more collateral. Did you know what I was saying in Bitcoin as well? Yeah, and they. So they've been. It's force selling. Definitely there's force selling going on. There's no doubt about that. But I think the difference is that in 2000, it's hard to communicate this. But like the feeling was. This. Everything is junk and a total fraud. And we don't want anything to do with any of it. It was just a huge hoax. I'm going to talk more about. Well maybe we'll talk about now like what's similar and different about the.com boom. But I think people don't think the whole. Like AI and tech sector is a big fraud in a hoax. So people thought the internet was a hoax in nine hours. I think they thought all of the companies that were internet companies,.com companies had all perpetrated this huge hoax on every night. I think they thought the internet was a hoax. The underlying technology. I think they thought the technology would. I'm going to tell you what you think about this. I've been thinking about this a lot. I want to tell you what I think. Similarities and differences with the.com crash. So this is what happened in the.com boom. Businesses were being valued on usage. They were called eyeballs. And that's true, right? Yep. And so today business. Today AI businesses are being valued on. I'm going to compare this to AI. The AI boom to the.com boom. Forget about that. So today AI, what are they called frontier models? I think they call them some fancy rubs. They're the LLMs. Yeah. They're being valued on usage, right? Yep. Okay. Number two, people were terrified. So that's the same. That's the same. People were terrified of the disruptive power of a new piece of technology that were going to change the global market. Same. Same as today. And they're going to change the global market. Crazy Capix, boom. Crazy. And so this is why I think, like this might be the dot-com boom and some parts of the GFC, the financial crisis, linked together. Because of the heavy involvement of financial markets in this, the last thing I thought was-- There's a lot of private stuff. There's a lot of private stuff. There's very little public stuff. Well, really, it was OpenAI, ChatTpT, which is-- And that's got a somewhat 500-mil notional valuation. But it certainly raised a little bit of money to get this. There's a phrase or fraction of that. It's not like it's raised like $100 billion. Yeah, that's true. It's a $20 billion business. Let's say there's taking at the hyper scalars. There's like five really impressive foundational models and plus the hyper scalars, debatable if they're making money on their AI. Because there's this huge cost. Oh, I'm pretty sure they're not giving the Capix. Yeah. Or even taking away the Capix. I mean, if I agree with you. And then there's everybody downstream that's using the models. Like, so all these businesses, I don't want to start naming startup names. But any startup that says where the AI for this, they are-- AI for legal. Yeah, they've got like a tax that they have to pay to there. And so they're also-- In their own way, they're buying processing for $0.50 in a dollar. And then selling processing for $0.50 in a dollar, right? Downstream. So the other thing that happened in the.com boom that people forget is that there was a massive overbuilding of infrastructure. And so basically-- It's fiber optic. 85% of the fiber that was rolled out was dark. Nobody used it for 15 years. But that was not obvious at all points of the.com boom. Like in '97, people thought there was an insatiable appetite for fiber. When you say.com, there was multiple facets to that boom. So you're talking about the.com, the Amazon's, which-- Yeah, Amazon dropped massively, no, but yeah. And obviously, increased massively. But what you're talking about is the global crossings, which is Gakor Garry. When he grew recently passed away, I said he had bankrupt, even though very thought he was a billionaire. So he cried as-- He was an ex-banker. He cried as business called global crossing. Everybody thought was worth billions. This was built in fiber optic across-- Just rolled out for ocean. Physical fiber. Physical fiber. That's nice. That's nice. So there was-- And there was Bernie Ebbers business MCI. Welcome. Good memory. Yeah. And there was Cisco, which obviously continued, but lost most of it was most most variable VBs in the world briefly. There was this big infrastructure boom alongside that-- What does that remind you of? To understand the boom. To understand. And so that's really similar. And so of course today, it doesn't look like there's an overbuilding. Actually, when I was reading about this more, Microsoft's bigger problem. I thought they're problems getting chips. And that's why they loved iron. They're bigger problems getting energy. And so that's actually why they love iron. But like, I think what we're already seeing-- I don't-- people are not really onto this. But what you're already seeing in secondary markets is tons of really high quality GPU chips that are not the cutting edge anymore, heating the secondary sale market, flooding the secondary sale market. Because the replacement cycle is like, you know, kind of 12 to 18 months on these things. And if you're trying to build the-- these models constantly demand more processing power to take incremental steps. And so you can't use anything but the latest chips. And so chips at 18 months old, they are flooding onto the second hand market. So that is part of this overbuild of infrastructure. I think one of the most interesting differences between the model of the dot-comberment today's model is when you think about it, the argument of the dot-comberment is you build the bottom of the bottom. The argument of the dot-comberment is you build a website and then the incremental cost to serve is zero. But that is totally not the case with these models. There is always an incremental cost to serve of token-gener-processing-- That's the ONAI problem. Yeah, exactly. And so I think that this is nowhere near as appealing as the dot-com boom in a lot of ways, right? Because there's not infinite gross margin possibilities in these business models. So I feel like it's just amazingly similar to the dot-com boom. Well, they're both booms. So they're both bubbles. I think with the dot-com bubble, and what popped it, and then the popped it happened, right? Pop happened to start the peak happened in February 2000. I think maybe February or March 2000. And these things never drop overnight. It's always a slow people keep thinking, and we saw this in 1929, and then we went up. Yeah. And then we're down and up and down. Because people don't want to accept the new reality for a while. It's the fourth stage of grief right. And so until you get to like the acceptance in grief or what I call despondency in financial markets, where basically you've sold all of your bad assets and you still don't have any money. Now you have to sell your good assets, and you've given up. You've lost hope, right? Yeah. Like you only get bargains when hope is gone. That's very important. That's bar. But you have to be patient. It's 18 months to two years after a crash. Well, I think GFC was less. But if you go to 1999, what pop, what started the pop was the famous macro soft? Yes. Antitrust. Antitrust. Yeah. That was actually overturned on appeal. Yes. But that, so what happened there was they had the macro soft, um, case, macro soft loss. It looked like it had to be broken up. And what met that happened was everybody saw these valuations and went, hold on. This is stupid. And that led to this cast signing of selling. And well, we're both been, what we call the contraire. And what we've both been saying for the last probably 18 months. This is the biggest boom we've seen. Certainly since then, like we were arguing about where on the 99 clock it was, I think I thought really bit closer. You thought, but we're basically saying the same thing. But we haven't had a macro soft case. We've had, I think just a culmination of, or this realization that all this stuff isn't going to add value. And then you've got, I see what happened was all these businesses. And we talk about SaaS and Marketplace. But SaaS and Marketplace business. And people stopped valuing. And these businesses, like I said, look at this. And when you say, when I can get value, you should say your great line, which is value creation, without value capture. That is what people are worried about, right? Well, if you look at people valuing these businesses on revenue multiples. And you know, when there's no better sign of the bubble, then people start using revenue multiples instead of a cash flow multiple, or an impact multiple. And if you look at it, like, I'm going to pick some great businesses. Zero, sake, at last year or last year, less, more question. Zero and say two great businesses. Well, I'll give you a better last year later this episode. Yeah. And we'll talk about sake later as well, and zero later as well. But zero is a great business. They make a couple hundred million bucks each. They'll be, they hit it like 10 to 20 billion. Like in zero's case over 20. That was what was so ridiculous. So those are on the promise of tomorrow's cash flow. It was a revenue multiple. A revenue multiple is a proxy for the promise of tomorrow's cash flow. It's a proxy for something, but it's not a proxy for any common sense. Well, hang on, let's say a business between you got profitability. If you've got no profitability and you sort of have no choice, you've got to use something, use your, these companies had profit. Have profit. I might try to see what you've been. So if you've passed the inflection point, and you're deep into, like, you've scaled up dramatically and you're deep into profitability, your argument would be, don't use a revenue multiple on those businesses. Look at, I think that's a good idea. See, it's a dominant marketplace. You can argue LinkedIn, whatever, but see, it's a dominant drop. You're going to laugh about anything again or nothing. I'm not going to cut the time so far. No, YouTube shorts are not hitting the spot. I'm just waiting for the next thing. See, it's a high quality dominant marketplace in a business hearted strap. Like LinkedIn, maybe, whatever. And making a couple hundred million bucks a year, if you're, it's hard to keep the VC fund and all that stuff. Makes a couple hundred million bucks. Maybe a little more, maybe a little. No, no growth. It's actually gone backwards. It's negative growth. I think revenue might have gone 1% forward. I think 1% back 1% forward. It was like a quarter zero. And profit is not going forward. It's going backwards. It's so much stuff in there. Yeah, that's hard to break it up. Yeah, but the Australian business is a business with very high margins and good moats, but very hard to grow. Yeah, it's going, it's a best-staying steal. So you think a business, like, forget that it's a, let's just say some random business makes widgets that makes 200 million dollars a year. It's not growing. You give that a 10 to 12 times p multiple because it's not growing. Like, if you had some growth, maybe more. Yes, it's dominant, but it's not growing. So what we'll probably end up saying is, because you're kind of at your terminal cash flow. Yeah, exactly. So, please, probably get worse. Like, you're at the end of the DCF model. Yeah, we can say, I mean, not everyone's financialist. There's like models to try and work out valuation, which is called discounted cash flow. Work out where the, where the cash flow is going to be and where it's going to end up and discount it to today's value and try and work out the company value on that. And everybody always argues about what the terminal value of cash flows. And nobody ever gets there. Your argument is, no growth, highly profitable business, is at the terminal point of its cash flow. Plus, you've got LinkedIn in its launch. Plus, you've got people like employment here, sort of chipping away. Plus, you've got record unemployment. I hate DCFs, by the way. Yeah, I hate them. I hate them. They're so overly susceptible to small changes in the sun. Wack, we're cussed to capital, but let's just assume that $200 million with probably dropping earnings, a best flat, and probably as good as it's going to get, this is a lot of unemployment as well as I've had, it's a $8,000 well in periods of low unemployment, because you're more likely to withdraw at them. So this is a business that probably is the, what they're selling is job ads. Yeah. So when they're more job ads, they sell more stuff. It's not hard to work out, right? Yeah. So $200 million bucks, let's give it a 10, let's give it a 15 multiple, it's a $3 billion business, big generous. The mark goes paying it like $12 billion dollars. And you're basically saying the other investments are not worth $9 billion. They're worth something, but who knows? It's like a billion, two million, whatever it is. It's worth something. But like, clearly this is a good business, which is, people just forgot about, let's look at the profit of building this business. Let's just take some revenue multiple, because we've got some rule of 40, and look at rule of 40, this is a 40 rule of 40 business. It's times about five, guess what we do. Investors got so lazy. But I don't think so. And so stupid. They gave these businesses ridiculous value issues. I don't think so. I don't think so. I just think now of being a very high earnings multiple, because of the predictability of the cash generation. How can you get an earnings multiple when you're not growing your earnings? Well, you can still get an earnings multiple. You say, why are you getting a high earnings multiple? I think what people are paying for was just the predictability. And the government bonds have predictable earnings? That's true. No, it gives them. No, you're right. What you should be paying for is growth. I can put the pay for it. But you pick on tech, but like, I think a good thing about Gussmann Ego is, I think it's still trading on 130 times earnings. We make issues with the leases. How do you account for all that kind of stuff? I know. But like what I'm saying is this valuation philosophy, let's call it, was not constrained to tech. Since you mentioned-- It was focused on tech. But since you mentioned one marketplace, there are three dominant marketplaces in Australia. So they're all very different. Like I'm shocked that it had different-- To RIA cars, I'll say. Yeah. So RIA is growing. Like RIA, I think-- You'll know that I'm a bit of the me, but I think they might have grown their revenue like 15% and their earnings 25%. So that's growing. Yeah. And I think car sales is half that approximately and say you just say it is basically zero. Yeah. And so, you know, the multiples that they're on, do you know what multiples they've come down to now? When I say, "Daddy," Is this, is, "Inpet multiples?" Yeah, earnings multi-exact. I actually haven't looked at cars. I've seen car sales on RIA. Remember when we talked about that insane acquisition of domain by co-star at a price-- At the smark at the summit. If Mike went to laugh about something, he should be laughing about that price. Because that price was laughable. And that was paid at 45 or 50 times-- Amazing, right? Right. We were pretty good at life and for a few things. Yeah. That was a master's strike. And so, RIA, I mean, he got the same multiple as RIA, which was ridiculous to begin with. But RIA was trading at 45 times earnings. Yeah. It's plummeted. Yeah. It's now down to 35 times earnings. Which feels pretty decent on a 15% revenue growth, 25% earnings growth. It's starting to get viable in my view. Totally. And it looked like a business like NetWolf, which is, I think, a great business. And this is a business-- Obviously, we love Matt, and it was well run. But even without that sort of bias, this is a business that gets 25% inflows from Super. We are doing anything. So, little in fact, this is a great platform, and that makes great returns. And that's down to 47, I think, times or 45 times per year, which feels like there's some good stuff that has actually been hit. Along with the overpriced stuff. But car sales is also trading on a similar multiple to RIA. Yeah. And it's growing much more slowly on both the top line and the earnings line. And so I think-- But I think RIA has got a bit of a bit of a difficulty risk around it, whereas car sales has nothing. That's true. And people are worried about the resurgence of domain risk under co-star as well. I think co-star has got some massive problems of thorn. There's a real question of Andy Florent, who's going to survive like this. Oh, is that right? He's down low. But the point has been-- That's been an absolute disaster. Co-star has been an absolute disaster. So you can actually say, man, disaster, people think domain. Is a disaster. I suspect he's gone at some point. And I think who knows what happens with domain. But this is a real problem. They've got some real problems going to start. Do you think-- so you could say, I think, the plummeting of-- because let's put seat to the side. Because let's talk about the two growth businesses in marketplace and Australia. Do you think this plummeting of the share price is justified based on the high valuations? Do you think it's happening because of that? Or do you think it's happening because people are worried that AI is going to cut the-- No, I think it's nothing there. I think that's just general panic. Right. Because I do hear stories. I think I saw an hour or a half quality businesses. Yeah, I don't think so. He's, but I think those two are. But you don't think any of those three marketplaces are getting displaced anytime soon. No, not by chance. By vibe coders. No. I totally agree. You know this argument. I read this article. Like, you know, I respect the fact that they wrote an article. I've probably got a lot of views. But like, this article was like, I saw my house using Insta with some AI blah, blah, blah. And that's the end of RIA. Like, I don't think that is anywhere on the horizon. I agree with you. I think they're coming off just very high multiples. But fundamentally great business. I got caught up in the everything bubble and just got over-inflated. But now they're like, RIA 30 times multiple events. That's an atom-shot buy. And I'm feeling I'm buying public. But it's not 30 years. Yeah, but it's getting there. Like, it's getting to a pretty juicy. Okay, now let's argue about where Adlessia is at buy. Because this is-- I actually think Ring the Bell, we're getting not far off being bought. Oh my God, I thought I was going to be able to argue with you about this. Sorry about that. Now that sounds 75% or something. So-- Yeah, and I've had multiple arguments with earlier last year. And so still continue to claim I'm attacking Salt and Mark. This is my thesis now on Adlessia. And I think the moment has come for my plan. Which is the English plan. Yeah, which is, you know, like the problem that they had is kind of like the zero problem. Yeah. They can't do what's right because it will destroy their valuation. And what's right is make money. Yeah. But now the valuation is destroyed. And so they're a business that is doing six and a half billion dollars USD of revenue. They're growing at like 22, 23% on the top line. Although not customers are growing at like 10%. I saw that, but I'll take the pricing power. That's great. I read that they said-- That last drop point. No, but what they said is people are moving up to higher plans to get access to the AI. Although they are paying the token tax if they're doing that as well on that revenue. But what I think is this. So if you've got a business, it's six and a half billion. And it's going to grow at another 20%. It's like 6.3%. You're going to get to 7.5 billion dollars in 12 months time. You agree it's very possible to make a billion dollars of earnings on 7.5 billion dollars of Atlassian software revenue. I could do it. You could do it. You agree, right? I'm just looking at the numbers. Look at the last six months. Look at this look at JP, which is the more relevant metric. That's going from 2.5 billion to 2.5. Pretty good. Yeah. Talking at say, no, growing. This is good. This is growing. So definitely there's no question. It's R and D. So it's caught. 1.3 to 1.6. So that's going to plummet soon. Well, let's get back to that in a second. Yeah. I know what's going up, but I think it's going to plummet. Let's get back to that. Marketing. This is the real worry. Marketing went from 5.24 to 7.12. So they seem to not be able to grow without really spending a lot. Like, I don't think you take back that marketing line. It's the problem. Why not? Because then you revenue drop. You're saying they're not growing really that fast. You're going, no, I'm talking about Atlassian 23%. Yeah, but they're not. You say they're growing 10 or 15% on customer count, which I agree with. Yeah. So you don't need marketing to get expansion revenue. No, but the customer can't go down because they're turning. I'm not sure. You know what? I'm not sure they even need half of that marketing. Like, because you know what it's like in these organizations. It depends how tough they are with the marketing. Or can they get out of their Formula One contract and stuff like that? That's what something's marketing cost is. Like possibly. Yeah. Where I think we can potentially deal with that. Well, hang on. I don't understand what's between their revenue line and their gross profit line. Like, how can their revenue be six billion and their gross profit is two and a half? That's for half year. For the half year. Oh, okay. Well, that makes more sense. Yeah. Okay. There's plenty of money to make a billion dollars a year. Well, not when you're spending all these money on everything. Okay. So let's go half a billion a year, profit on two and a half billion gross profits. And they're losing their, let's work out their losing because there's a few things in the lot. They're lost. They're operating loss because they got some non-operating stuff. Operating loss is about three hundred million bucks a year. Yeah. So you've got to turn that around as well. I'm 1.3 billion. I'm super confident I could do that. Here's your problem. I know where you're going with this. They don't pay people in cash. They pay them in quasi cash called quick vesting stock. Right? That's going to be your pitch. And that's a prox only equivalent to their free cash flow. I know this argument. I kind of agree with it, by the way. So they pay about one point six billion in stock base comp. Which is approximately what their free cash flow is. So that's about half. I forget. I'm not even talking about that. Yeah. One thing matters. So you're a less than employee or any a million dollars a year. Well, another day, getting a product managing, getting a million bucks a year. Which is probably what they get. Like they pay 500 grand cash, 500 grand stock. Yeah. RSU is getting in free cash. Yeah. That stock is worth 125 instead of 500 a year later. But the good news is they'll be selling it within three months. So that's that's that's that's that's that that can't sell because they're getting tax fully then. So I think you want to be selling that stock within it. So that's lost that 75% whatever that's that's done. Now I come to now it's May and I come to you. I'm your manager. You come to me. Well, you gave me 500 500 last year. But you have to give me a lot more stock this year because my stock last year went to share. You got the delusions. The delusions going. The delusions for it. Well, welcome to all business problems that are the same when you're paying people in stock. Right? It's not unique to them. They had the benefit of the stock going up all these years now. So suddenly they're real cost of stuff is going to massively increase because they can't give it. And I've got the sheep stock. I got expensive stock now. Not cheap. Well, look at the suddenly you're trying to go from $300 million lost to a billion dollars profit while your employee costs are three XC. But your employee costs are not going up in dollar terms. In dilution terms. In dilution terms. Your shareholders are paying more for your employees. I get it. I'm a days of pretending that stock base comp doesn't exist and now gone for it. I would still move it to the side and say, we can't solve all problems in year one and two. But I'm pretty sure you can get this business to a million dollars of earnings. A billion. A billion, sorry, in year one slash two. And let's say you did that. So let's hear the business growing 20% on the top line doing a billion dollars. I think you get to a billion, but I don't think you're going at 5%. And that's where we talked. This is where we're going at 5%. Because you get to get to 15% of a 1.5. 15% of its expansion revenue charging assistant customers more money. that can't go on forever. I think that's gonna go for a long time. The, the, the, the Jewelena Atlassians crown is the fact that's so cheap. And the fact that people don't switch as much as they should, because it's, and hence the whole, the vibe-coding argument go, "Well what about the vibe-coding gear went so cheap?" 15% is 30k to what? 30, 34 and a half k. Okay. Let's just make a difference. No one's gonna cancel it for that. I think you can get your billion dollars in earnings. I think you're, you're, your revenue growth drops off. So I think you get, I think you get two billion. Would you buy this company at 20 times earnings? I think it's a 30 times earnings. I think it's a 35 now. It's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a $100. Yeah, it's not in that box. So it's now it, it, it's a, I think it's on 30 or 35 times earnings. What's the, it makes a loss now. So it doesn't, it doesn't, it doesn't any. Oh yeah. Well, but yes, that's true. It's kept at 25 billion US. So sorry, you're right. I wasn't thinking about PE. I was thinking about market cap. And what PE would I pay on the one billion dollars? And so now I think I'd be paying, it's kept at 25. I thought it was high 26, 25. Yeah. So now I'd be paying six percent of a night. Yeah, that's true. So now we're paying 25, 26 times earnings. On your own. On my notional one billion dollars, which actually it's higher because mine would be pre-tax. But whatever these guys are not paying tax for a long time. So that's fine. Well, I do pay some cash. How can I just losing money? Yeah. So do I think it's worth 25 bill? No, because there's execution risk in what I'm saying. Do I think it's worth 15 bill, definitely? Like I think $60. Where's really worth? That's really worth. What do we see? $60. A year ago. I think we talked about market cap. And I think I said, I think I said 10 to 20, which caught 15 mid-range, which is kind of where we're not aware of. And at that point, I'm now not a seller. And you know what happened yesterday? The announcement yesterday? The market's got stop selling. First time in like nine years. Well. Stop the selling. Yeah, that's just fine. Now you don't really realize cheap. They knew it was overprice. Yes, they're not idiots. And now they've gone, oh, now it's going to approach in fair. And that's also-- No, I agree. I think we exit our short position on Adlession. Yeah. It's fun to exit that. Yeah. The 75% gain in a year. [LAUGHS] I think, yeah, I think now it's getting to buy. Because-- but what you want-- you wouldn't buy it till you see this change in attitude. You know, we wouldn't have shorted it. Like, because of our overwhelming confidence, we would have just bought tons of put options at a much higher price. Because can you imagine when it was like what, $400, can you imagine how cheaply you could have bought $200 put options? Yeah. So that means like the right to sell shares for $200, you could have bought them for basically nothing. Nobody thought that $400 was going to $200. Yeah. But now that's at $100, you basically make $100 profit on every one of those options. Speaking of successful wages, you're all made, many dealt over who's obviously friend of the pod. Me and him had a-- we never actually made the benefit short because we couldn't come to terms. We wanted our unlimited upside and obviously keep it going. But we had a bet on a business called strategy, firmly noticed micro strategy. I claim it was a Ponzi's game. Many was a true believer. Well, poor old strategy is down, a lazy 75% as well since we pretty much said that. Almost everything is massively down. That's 75%. That's why I don't really take credit for iron because like-- I mean, obviously I don't take credit because-- Yeah. But like, I think it's just completely obvious. Yeah. It just so happened that when people started panicking, they realized the emperor had no close on that business. Well, I think we're using this. You got the full credit for iron when it dies in six months. So I think what you can take credit for is the fact that you dissected that business model so beautifully. That hasn't come out yet. This is-- yeah, this is just that-- Yeah. Everything gets thrown out in the trash. But it's really going to get thrown out in the trash when it rent a dies in a year. Yeah. What do you think it will? You look at micro-- so micro strategy obviously basically levered to Bitcoin. Yeah. We had this ridiculous situation in New York. So this was basically a business that was doing what? Throwing money to buy Bitcoin. It was issuing shares to buy Bitcoin. It thought a credit is perpetual money machine. How did this ridiculous valuation where it was-- had this pot of Bitcoin worth caught $100 billion. And the business was worth $200 billion. Which made no sense at all. It was like two times in A.V. It's a major, a fund manager that owns $100 million worth of companies. New bangers. But made no sense at all. Because almost all of these exchange traded funds or listed investment companies, they traded a discount to asset value. Yeah. It was a part. Like whatever. Excuse me. And people would make all these. And this is what happened in bubble. You have smart people saying stupid things. People think, well, that's absolutely true. That is the worst, like not the worst, but like, you know how I say these things? Like if you want to make a lot of money, believe something that other people don't go in hard and be right. It is hard to believe something other people don't. When people you really respect and who are really smart are saying the complete opposite to you and basically that you're dumb. It is hard, right? It's harder for me than you, I think. Because that just motivates you. But like, I think that it's not easy. I think you think more people are smart than I do. Absolutely true. And the people I think are smart like John Hampton, who are ones who are getting killed out there and now obviously look like geniuses. Because John E is, but you know when people are criticizing Buffett and Hampton, then there's a bubble. That's like the classic bubble when genuinely smart people. But if you look at, so, strategy had two problems. One, it was levied to Bitcoin, which has a zone set of issues. Bitcoin is now down 50% since the Trump bump and who knows what. It's now at 53,000 is that point of resistance. If it breaks through there, God knows what happens. I think that there's essentially no inherent value. It's basically been an environmental destruction machine. If we're not too bad at it, right? Because of the power you see. I think, I certainly think that. I think that uses more power than Poland. So, my Bitcoin, I'm serious. I think Bitcoin, as I've always thought, Bitcoin in principle makes like, I think the notion of digital, as limited digital gold makes sense. I love it. When it trains in a narrow range, it tells you. The problem is it's never traded in a net. It did briefly. We've looked at strategy. Strategy was the perpetual money machine. It was listing effectively selling shares at two times. People thought this thing would go to the movies. So, it basically goes, sells $2 worth of shares. And buys it coin. Buies it coin. Buies it dollar of Bitcoin. Yeah, and it goes up and up and up. And that was what happened. And then I said, this thing was a Ponzi scheme. And that had disagreed with me there. And we tried to make this bet. And it's exactly a Ponzi scheme. It's just dumb. Like, I don't, it's not a Ponzi scheme. It's not, but it's more transparent than a Ponzi scheme. I have to take money from you to pay Mike. This promised return that doesn't exist. And the minute that someone doesn't give me the next lot of money, you're going to catch on the fact that it's a fraud. Well, there was, there's Ponzi elements in that it needed to keep rising money, to feed this petrol money machine because there was no justification for this value. And all that would happen then is the share price would fall. It would fall to the level of the Bitcoin price. That's right. It shouldn't be. Bitcoin price would sell for an over-value. But the thing about a Ponzi scheme is, like, it's always got negative equity effectively. And so it just collapses to zero, to negative when no one puts in more money. And then you start getting angry at Mike because you said, Mike, you took my money and Mike's like, no, I just got the return that was promised. That's a part. So it's just dumb. These things are so dumb. And so the thing is this though, smart people look at these things sometimes and see how dumb they are. And what they say is, well, I think I can make a lot of money before people realize how dumb they see this. And that is what happens a lot, right? Like we can be very smoker and say that's dumb, that's a bubble, that's dumb. And like lots of other people say it too, but they get into it and get out of it. Whereas we just like don't go near it. Pretty hard to get out of it. But yeah, like some people do, but we're talking like two percent of people get out of it. So I feel differently about Bitcoin. Because like if you bought Bitcoin at $10,000, there is no way you could have known it was going to $100,000. But if you bought into Nvidia, when you felt the momentum and saw where things were going and you've made, let's say, I don't know, 20x on your money, I think that's like, you know that that's a bubble, but you also know that there's enough momentum behind it that the bubble might run for another year or so. It is a kind of weird case and that the multiples quite low, which is based on this CapEx thing. And it depends on the whole thing. Something in video is how genuine is this CapEx? How much of the, how much of the buying is not, is being funded by something other than shareholders losing money on companies downstream. Nvidia, handing out its own money to get back in the form of revenue. And like hyperscalers funding it as well. Here's the similarity, interesting similarity. Hyperscalers using their balance sheets to fund revenue growth effectively. Here's another interesting, that point, interesting similarity between 9 and 9. So look at the poster boy of 9 and 9, it was probably AOL. It wasn't the most about it. No, I totally agree. AOL was called this. The symbolized that, which obviously merged with Tom Warner and became a disaster. But what was AOL? AOL was getting money from these startups. Like I'm paying a bunch of money to AOL, I have this closed wall garden. And it all, like, raised my AOL collapsed in like after the merger. It was all these startups around the business. So these startups being funded by venture capital money. So the venture capital money is flowing through these terrible startups. And it was basically flowing through to AOL. This is kind of, and it was called, it was revenue, but it was fraudulent revenue. The AOL had real revenue, I think real profitability at the time. Nvidia has real profitability and real revenue as well. But it's also coming from fraudulent revenue, it's because the hyperscalers, so aren't very sales because unlimited bottom money as well. So we're spending this CapEx off balance sheet as we talk about repeatedly. So it's not impacting. Imagine what happened to these hyperscalers, not valuations if we had to put this CapEx back on the balance sheet. Well, it's against matched. Well, it's kind of, it's, the dishonest part about that accounting is that they're spending money off their balance sheet and buying assets. And so that's not an expense on the income statement. And, but it eventually becomes an expense on the income statement as you depreciate it. But the thing that's going on here as we all know is they're going to depreciate this over five or six years. But it's going to become obsolete after two. And so really they should be doing accelerated depreciation of these assets, which would totally change the income statement. Yeah. And that's not, that's not the CapEx. It's the first one. Well, what's worse about this is, let's say I'll just pick Microsoft. Microsoft goes and buys a ton of CapEx and it doesn't put that on as an expense on the profit and loss. And then it just depreciates it down too slowly. But it is going to generate a mountain of revenue from that CapEx because it's maybe well, it is, but the revenue is going to be generated possibly in a loss. But there's going to be a mountain of a real loss, right? But there's going to be a mountain of revenue that comes in like there's some, like I think Microsoft is generating five or six billion dollars a year from copilot subscriptions. That's not much. Well, Microsoft. I know. But that is like just from straight copilot that that's still a mountain of revenue that can terrible product. That has almost no operating expenditure against it today because it's CapEx and two slow depreciation pay for that thing. There's some, like there was a significant, maybe there's 15 million people paying for it. It's a lot of people pay for it. It's like the worst thing I ever seen. So I use it. I totally agree with you that we're also seeing like a VC arbitrage, not for good for VCs going on at the moment. We're VCs are giving money to these startups and that money, if you follow it along the whole chain, what's actually happening to that money is that the average consumer is being subsidized to use AI processing at 50 cents in the dollar. If not less. If not less. Yeah, absolutely true. I'll let me say this last thought on AI that I was thinking through. Don't tell you about SaaS. So we could want to talk about SaaS. Yes, SaaS. The SaaS is being powered by. Right? Yeah. And everything has been pummeled. Like I look at the cross-sense and like it just depends how much you're pummeled. Yeah. Like, like, catapult is down to where it was a year ago. And like I think you guys still well up on like 2020. Well up until yeah, that's right. There's a lot of these businesses that dam on 29. That's what's the biggest. And so we would say expect a 2014 pricing. Yeah. Well, that's unbelievable, right? But like like like three. I find three. So like 360. Yeah. They kind of back to where we are. Like as in back to parody from a year. Also, I know a pretty good business. Yeah, I think that's a great business until I 360. And so everything's been smashed. And so this is how I've been trying to think through the effect of AI on SaaS business. So let me say these things. Number one, anybody who has ever written code will know that coding is not software engineering. Like there is a lot of architecture and strategy, et cetera, that goes into it. And so just getting a layperson to vibe code, let alone with co-work. But I'm even talking about coding. The coding is probably the least element of software engineering. Yeah, it's not software engineering, right? And the other thing I'd say is that when you run a big SaaS company, coding is the easy part. Like I'm not saying coding is easy. But like the hard part is like strategy and compliance and getting sales and servicing customers. Like all of that is much harder than the code. Or if you're vibe coding your needs out because you vibe coding yourself. But like, don't get a cell. Well, certainly it's only people to buy it. No, but if I'm vibe coding, you're a luxury escape. Yeah, I'm sorry. Okay, we'll get to that point in a second. But what I'm saying is that for big SaaS businesses, coding is the easy part. And so making that easier, they'll have some advantages I'll talk about. But that is not this, oh my god moment. Like for example, you know, I want to code my own Gira. But like, I don't know if you care about sock to compliance or you even know what it is. You probably do and do. Yes, that's right. You probably use advanced. Okay, Vanta. Okay. Compliance is like, I don't know, it's like kind of like ISO 27001, right? Similar, not the same. Some compliance thing around security and data safety and all of that. Now, like it's, it's important to businesses to be sock to comply. At least it obviously spends a lot of time making sure that stuff is sock to comply. Anyone vibe coding something, etc. I'm not saying they can't achieve it. What I'm saying is the coding is the easy part, right? There's lots of other parts. Then we say, how might it displace SaaS? So there's two ways that I can think of. One is your example. I guess I tell you you're the worst customer in the world. I'll never service you. And so you liked that mark. I didn't get much of a lot of that. That was nice. What have you done to him? He's done it because suddenly it's your hilarious and you think, "Huh, that was fun." I love that. I thought that was good. It was good. It was me to laugh. I know, I know. He's trying to suppress it. We made a deal before we came into that. We're going to pump up your ties. So you can do your little version, which is, I'm going to get my own stuff. To code up these applications for my own use. And you might say, I only use 30% of the features in JIRA anyway. So we'll just do 30% of those really, really well. And you might do that. But for the vast majority of companies, the idea of coding and maintaining that, because you know, they say, "I can maintain. I'll take a give you a tip. It can't maintain." So coding and maintaining this software, it's just something that most companies are not going to want to do for their own core functions, as you said, especially when it's cheap. And then the other alternative is, so why will you want to take a step back? Forget the vibe coding, JIRA thing, which is whatever, people do it by their own. I think the reason these SaaS businesses have been smashed isn't because they're necessarily, I think vibe coding is the Microsoft case. I think what's happened is people realize, "Horough, in these valuations are ridiculous." Like, why were paying so much for, it could be, but when there's less, when there's sales, where any of these businesses that we'll just overpaying on this rule of four months ago. But there is a, I'm telling you, there is the predominant narrative that I hear at the moment that is around panic is AI is the death of SaaS. That is a market narrative going around right now. I think that's the Microsoft case. I think the real issue is the valuations are too high and now they're coming to a point. That's in there still too high, but there's now less high. But like, that's still a bit high, but it's now within striking distance of getting what I think will be fair about it. So I also think about it like this. So you could do your own stuff that would be bad for SaaS or there could be lots of competitors because of vibe coding. People vibe coding competitors are another potential. And so let me explain this, which you would know. Every major SaaS business in the world already has a significant number of really high quality viable competitors that they're fighting. And what you're saying now is we're just going to flood the market with a whole lot of worse competitors. Like that is not going to make much of a difference in my view. The biggest risk might be to seats and I saw that. So I'll tell you the upside of the dish. So I think what people are missing to me. So I don't explain what it's meant. Yeah, so I'll say it in this way. The thing I think people are missing about software is we're in what I might call a retooling phase now where I might compare this at some point to the industrial revolution. But what's happening is people are spending lots of money on retooling their companies with AI tools and that's expensive. But down the track they're going to get the benefit of retooling which is much more operating efficiency is my guess. Like we're seeing it with software developers. Like we're going to get lots of operating efficiency. Predominantly that will accrue to software companies because 30 plus percent of their expense line is software developers R&D and maintenance and whatever. And so that's going to be great news for software businesses down the line massively increased their margins I think. But the flip side is that every company that is going to be using AI and that means when they go and buy a SaaS product the number of human beings inside the company that are going to be there using that SaaS product will maybe diminish. And the way that they not grow and the way they sell, the way a lot of SaaS companies like Salesforce sell their product is how many seats a how many human beings. How many licenses do you need? Yeah, for a human being. And if you've got a diminished number of human beings because AI is doing a lot of stuff then that pricing model is problematic. And the question is do you accept the shrinking of revenue and offset it with the efficiency gains in your own business of not having your core expense is going to diminish or do you say we're still providing the same value to the company. So we need to change our pricing model. That's tricky right to move to usage based pricing. It's a big change for a big problem. And so that's the hard part about what's going on. I think there is an element. If you look at Jamass 8090 business, I think there is an element that even if companies aren't vibrating their own I think there are competitors that will emerge to like look at Salesforce which is frankly a terrible product but is a legacy product like Gear up Terrible with Legacy. There's very ordinary and brazier so dumbness with Salesforce with that AI but it's a competitors will emerge with people who I would have vibed code where it maybe it was impossible to take on Salesforce before. Salesforce had a few competitors but none that really had the feature set. I think there is definitely a risk and I don't know the level. I think the seat thing is a bigger shorter term issue. I think that's it. And the meaning term issue is competitors are easier to come up. Around the smaller clients. Around the smaller clients because like Microsoft is not earning if they're on Salesforce or not but like like SAP like they're falling 25% they got their own problems but it's a great great great business like you know like vibe coding is not going to do anything to them but they've got maybe a seats issue potentially right. So I think probably an over value and you got the interest rates in the US potentially not dropping like people thought they would. There's a few other things that play it. Crutches are like playing crashes. It's like market crash. I need like seven rate things to all come together. No you're absolutely right but I definitely think people are not factoring in the long term that the single largest cost of software businesses is likely to diminish substantially and that's R&D and this is the thing that I'm shocked that no one is talking about and like it's just I know why people are talking about it but it baffles me so like venture capital that came into existence in like the 60s because tech was new and you needed lots and lots of expensive physical equipment to start building tech hardware and nobody could afford to pay for it. Venge capital didn't really get going properly to the 80s. It should be even an anti-spec cleaner in the 80s and started. I know the way it started. I want to build this great product, tech product mostly hardware. It's so expensive to buy all the stuff to build this. I don't have the money and like a bank won't lend me the money and then they specialised investors popped up that said will lend you the money for this and take 80% of your company and like that's how you can build this business and then the rise of software happened and venture capital kind of transitioned across to funding software because building a piece of software from scratch is very expensive because you need to hire lots of developers. But now I don't need to hire lots of developers to launch a startup. I can do it myself with one other person and some AI that I'm buying for 25 cents in the dollar or less and so why do I need venture capital? Any model launch software startups? Is this not a pivotal moment in the entire venture capital model? Could be. Like why would anyone, why would any startup building software today not start by just building it themselves with AI and getting it to a point where maybe they're at series A or B before they need money for expansion? I think seed funding is over. That's interesting. Well, to a journal had an article about a month ago, noting that US venture capital firms dropped 25% last year. The most dynamic stretch in six years. We've money flowing primarily to trust an investment firm so the big disappointed. The six billion raised last year was a 70% drop on 2022 according to a pitch book data. That's kind of bearing that out. Look at some of the bigger messes. Light speed raised, nine billion, pettitail raised, four point six, but new funds basically can't be raised. We are seeing that already. This is a year ago. Why would you take? Let's say, pre-seed. So pre-seed means I've got an idea of no product. That's a hell dilution because your stuff's worth nothing. And so why would you dilute at that level? You can go and build it out with AI yourself. And then you get to seed. I've got a product now when I get it into the market. Okay. So why would you raise there? Why don't you just put it out there? You probably built it super quickly. You can get it out there. And so I think like until, let's say, series A where you say, I've got product market fee. And now I need a scale, a new scale at marketing. I do need money for that. I can't AI that. Right. Basically, I think there's going to be lots of delayed fundraising to series A. That means less things to fund and more expensive entry points for VC. So all these great returns that VC's got on Canva when they got in. When they go back to Canva in a minute. They've got it in a seed, right? Yeah. Pre-seed, maybe, I don't know. Well, it's canva's been rising through the jack. I know, but a lot of the mega returns that VC's make are in the really early rounds. And I think when you can delay because you don't need the money, fundamentally that shifts the early stage of VC model. I was saying to a VC, a Melbourne, who I really like yesterday and seeing this like, I'm an LPN 3VCs. And I think three very impressive VCs. And they've had, and these funds are probably returned in the end 15% annually. I reckon for me, eventually, when we get this, all right. This is going to take 15 years to get this money back. A 15% a year for 15 years. That's good. It's okay. But not what we saw VC in any way. Every other general, if you've got benchmarks first, it was like 100x. Is it on what was written on the box when you sign up to those VCs? Well, certainly it was. I would be very skeptical to ever, not that any VCs crying out for my tiny little project. Let's be clear. But I will be assuming with VC investment, I'll get the money back in seven or ten years. That's not happening. Like, it's 15 years, best case. And you get troops and drabs, sorry, grand, you get 10 grand, you whatever. It's just useless. But if someone said to you, I'll give you a VC investment of 15% for 15 years, I'd take that. What did they tell you were going to get? That I'm probably not implying for that. Is there a hurdle return rate they have to get over before they can take performance fees? I actually don't know. Just look at that. Yeah, I didn't know. By the way, it'll be a lot less than 15%. But like, and think of a straight, like take out the cameras and whatever. It's an Agis camera because if you look at a culture, I'm obviously struggling a lot. I can't really actually drop right back. Safety culture, like that's a, who knows? Well, that's bad. Exactly. So really just got Campbell. Effort talk about in a few minutes. But think about in the last ten years. So are we talking about a camera? Well, that's just a half a minute. In the last ten years, can you name a company coming out of Australia that's actually done anything? Done anything. Like being a great business in Australia. Like you're not giving me cocclier or something because it's just that 70 years ago. I mean, like in the last ten years. So something that's popped up in the last ten years? Post that first blackbird fund. Oh, sorry. I just have to, you know, this is your version of a quiz that's not a quiz. You have to figure out the quiz. I have to figure out what the question is. So Namage VC back company that since 2017 founded in the last ten years, that's been a stand out. Yeah. Well, a lot of these space ones would say they are. Maybe Gilmore. Yeah. So what about you? What about you? Direct, you know, that business. Direct, D-I-R-A-Q. They're known after a very famous physicist. No. It's a quantum computing business that just raised another $20 million from the future reconstruction. No, but right from taxpayers. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, but they also got a lot of money. But I think, as $20 million forget about, I'm the real business. The people, that could be real. Yeah, but like what about some other quantum? A billion dollar plus. Anything a billion dollar plus. Worth a billion dollars plus. Yeah, I think that would be nothing. You could. A colyptus. That's worth a billion dollars. That's in the last ten years. Oh, you might not love their model. But that's, if it is purely on the J.U.s of team, but there's nothing else. So like maybe a mega revenue growth. But let's see with that. I'm not giving you that. But you have to give me that. It ticks the box. Well, it's not official. So we'll question who's had an official with all this. Your question is, name a business that blah, blah, blah. Has it had an official being ticks Adam's box? Has it had an official billion dollar round? The box is a billion dollar genuine round, which hasn't had yet. So no, in box tick. Has it hit the box? I was going to say wait two weeks, but actually at the moment, it's a bit tricky, right? Let's say. I'm trying to think of more. I'm not the best person to know about this world, right? We would have heard about it. We've seen the financial view. We'd say it somewhere. It hasn't been a good company, I've Australian 10 years plus. Well, isn't lorricate worth, was that civil? Oh, lorricate guy. That's that's 100 million. Still early. It was that early. That's AI. That's the token tax as well that they have built into their business. Yeah, it was the other guy. But Steve's great guy. I'm also like, oh, but it's the only nice. I can't think of one because I don't exist. I can't think of one. So like drone shield. For some reason, that's more than 10 years old. It was back out of New York with it. I know. I know. I know. I know. I don't know. There is. I don't know. Because there is it. We would have heard one of you, one of us would have heard of that. Well, one of the VCs should go and like tell us. They should say, this is an investment that came out of a VC fund in the last 10 years. And it's worth. It's done around. And if there is one, like we've missed one, whatever, like one. No, let's say that. That's five. We might just not know. You're in these funds. I don't really invest much in these things. Trust me. I would know about it. There was an impact. And they had to make. So it's. Oh, it's got a quick break. There's so much more to talk about. I think you should buy a software. I think I don't know when the bottom is. It's a big catching a full knife right now. I don't think it's getting any. It's getting any. I think we are in a moment where it's been a long time since people underestimated the future growth of software as a global economic driver. I'm more excited by some marketplaces than some software. Like I'm more excited by an RIA than zero. For example, I'll get the zero effect. You know what? The next few weeks, I've got some great deep dives of interesting businesses for us to do that are like their valuations. In many cases, in some cases, are single digit earnings multis. Well, I think we're getting to put where we're not far off. We're obviously in super bearish on the last year and a half and been proven. Like I'm panting for this victory lap. We've had a year, eight months of us being the bearish and we could be plicking to being balls at some point. Like at this continuum, I think it makes you happier than the misery of people that you think were fools. Yeah, absolutely. That's every human being on it. I'm not sure about that. I generally don't like people saying that. They have a word for that. They're shouting for it. I know. Generally, it's even deeper than that. They're going to get into the German vibe. But no, I think I generally am not happy about people being sad even if they were dumb. No, I know. I know. Let's go to Super Cook break. I want to be more to talk about on this very point. And we're back. Is now the Canva conversation? Give us like one minute. All right. I got some massive breaking news. Exclusive to the contrary. People say we're not on news breaking poker. I think I'm going to blow that out of the water. This is a little bit your leg or something. It is a real breaking news. Okay. But it does involve someone in hospital. It's been a little bit of rumors about this, but Betwara of the pod. Oh, no, not another Daniel Andrews. It's my reflection. I've had two trusted sources. High level trusted sources tell me that he had a extremely. And this is actually a life threatening stroke. You're not happy about this. No, you can't be happy about this. I'll be spbreaking the news. I'm not combining on whether it's good or bad. A life threatening stroke. I don't know a lot about this in some way. Some won't care, but some will be highly interested. He was in. Almost net death is what I've been told from people who got it from doctors who were working. Multiple two trusted sources who don't know each other. Tom in this. So, multiple source that he's now recovered somewhat. I don't think it's perfect. He's obviously a lifelong heavy smoker. It wouldn't have helped, but. He's not very old. Maybe 50? Maybe 50 years. He's 53 years old. 53 years old. Right. Well, I'll say I think it's terrible. We're not going to comment on where he's got a bad, but it is far more serious in the media has betrayed. He was. I heard close to death. Less close now. I think he. What I've been told is he will pull through and will, at some point leave hospital. But this is a story that somehow was kept on the wraps for like three months. Why do you think. Until now. I don't know. I don't know. Share your conspiracy theories. Why do you think it was kept under wraps? I think most people don't want to know this sort of stuff. Because it's probably. Because he is a private citizen there. Absolutely. He's like a. We're not right with that being kept under wraps. Yeah, I'm probably getting worse. I'm also happy with you breaking news. Obviously we are the news breaking podcast of the Shriya. Like it's. Yeah, I'm all right with that being kept under wraps. I was pretty obvious that something bad had happened to him. I wasn't aware that it was that bad, but it was pretty obvious from. I thought the reporting. If you read between the lines, it wasn't hard to work out that something pretty bad had happened to you. I think the hell's done a report in the last couple of weeks. He said a bad run of health problems. Yeah. There was a fall, obviously, but this sounded significantly more serious than even the media had betrayed. I think the reason why it's coming out in the last couple of weeks is he has recovered somewhat, so they've sort of been using that. But it certainly was much worse. That's obviously some breaking news. And just one final thing. The corporate travel management of that, I've made a post on LinkedIn. I don't know if you saw my LinkedIn post. I was sure of that. But there was. I thought it was. Well, it's argue about it. I can't tell the question. So, it seems that most people. TravelA. And this happens a bit. The thing with travelA, obviously, we are a travelAge in some ways. But travelAge is paid in advance from the customer. So there is that ever temptation if you are a nefarious person that you take the money. So you buy your first class ticket to London, you pay me £100,000. And I go, "Thank you, Eddie. I'm taking the 100-pound gamble at Cranca-Seno." And that happens sadly, not uncommonly. And the law justifiably, so it takes that very serious. That's there. If ten people work up the airport with no ticket, that's not very good. It's bad for the industry because you're on people. What you're saying in that situation is they never bought the ticket with the money. Or they offer the ticket. Or they can't. That often refund it and keep the money. They cancel it and don't tell the customer it's a chance. At least what happened, they kept the money, they spent it and then. It's a craze there on the little Ponzi scheme and. No, I think I. And eventually you get caught and. That is a Ponzi scheme. Yeah, that's a Ponzi scheme. He was traveling. I don't remember it. TravelAge in Sydney was sent in six months jail for £77,000 in debt of doing exact things. Totally unlike corporate travel. Well, corporate travel took money from customers, got refunded it, got refunded and kept the money. What was the difference between what that travel agent did and what corporate travel was? There was no difference. I'd say the fundamental difference. One was a big company, one was a poor individual travel agent. One was a customer who said, "Cancel my ticket." That's corporate travel. And one was a customer who did not want to cancel their ticket. Well, they could have. So I think that is a fundamental difference. No, but the fact is both parties stole the money. Well, one of them was an orchestrated fraud to say, "It's never my intention to provide you with a service full stop." Well, what if at the time she made the booking and then she subsequently canceled the ticket? Well, we don't know that. We don't know if that was the case. We don't know if you said he had mentioned in your own time. No, I know. But I just think there's a fundamental difference between me setting up a business. I used that loosely that says to Mike or Joel, "Come and book with me." And then I know, they're going to book and I'm going to give me money and then I'm going to cancel it and keep the money, versus I'm running this big business and there are cancellations as part of it. But I don't want to finish this, by the way. But when people choose to cancel, I'm just not going to refund the money to their employer. They still have hate financial advantage by deception. Like regardless of whether you went into that with intent or not. You know, I could slightly lessen the intent. I could be intent makes a big difference. They both, but if you give. They're both fraudulent, I agree. If I put money in your account by mistake, if I put money in your account by mistake and then you spend it, you didn't intend to commit that fraud. I just gave you the money by mistake. You then spent it. Yeah. What CTM did, by the way. They spent the money. I think what CTM did is probably worse than that example. I'm going to find the mills. But that's a crime. So your point. So the law considers that a crime. So in your eyes, you just admitted CTM committed a crime. I get it. And what happens to him? Nothing. The CEO found out has quits last week we talked about. Nothing's like, where is. And I loved over Christopher Lee. And I think he's government's incredible government in Queensland. Where is the Queensland government, perp walking these guys? What I have to not be in arrest, this is just staggering that these people can. This is $150 million in customer and taxpayer money, even worse. That has been taken and not given back. And they still haven't paid it back. Like they knew this six months ago. Why has they been paid back in six months? So I don't think those two things are the same enough to be viewed the same. But it's obvious to me that if you go and do. If you go and shut down CTM, too many consumers, business or. Yeah, it's all businesses. Like this is a bit of a too big defiled situation. I don't think any business is too big defiled. This one certainly isn't too big defiled. Like, it's even worse than losing money. They were losing money for the last two years when you factor in this refund. They should have paid that in book. So I guess it's getting worse, not better. And they imagine every customer of CTM, every. So you're catapult, you're a big business. Would you use CTM there? I don't think. Well, I don't think we did use CTM. No, obviously we're not gonna use CTM. If you were using it, would you stay. No. So imagine every single bit. Like your free-dustry is a business. Last thing on it. And somebody is like 10 million dollars, these. This is a significant money they pay upfront and putting the bank can't. They're insecure creditors. So are you gonna be doing that ongoing? Now you're gonna be able to pay it on a. Like a bank transfer? Yeah. Because if you're paying on credit card, you've got a record. Someone would use credit card. If you're a bank, you're gonna be going to be. Like you're gonna be taking that risk when you know what the position is. Well, I think that's another question, right? Yeah. I think you'll provide a merchant facility. I think most still pay by FT, by transfer. So if you're a business. And I've been speaking to businesses who use CTM. Obviously, we have a tiny corporate travel business that's growing really fast, but isn't a competitor with CTM. We target different businesses to them. But people we speak to who are at enterprise level. I'll be running to flights into corporate travel. Corporate travel, sounds like CTM. I'll be 100% transferring to a business like flight as you know you can trust. So they're gonna get worse, not better. So if anything, the gap's getting worse. So the two big defiles getting even bigger. Yeah. I can't argue with you. So this is like. How these people have met. You got this. You're in Crouch Goh who's chairman who's an ex-Senior lawyer. Like. This is just. This beg is belief that this is not a bigger story. So you think your issue is. Why is ASIC not investigating? Why am the police? This is therefore. Why am the police not investigating? Yeah. I don't know if it's ASIC or actual like a federal police type. Yeah. Like both should be investigating this thing. Yeah, I think it's a good point. Can't argue with that. And if you're gonna throw little random travel agents, I'm not defending this 77,000-pid-dollar person who. No, but I think the level. That melis is totally different. She went to jail for six months. She had a family, she had kids like this is serious. Seriously, like mostly. She's like. Jamie Ferris taking 140 million bucks out of this business. He leaves him this 20 million dollar mansion. He's swanning around Brisbane like a billionaire all the while. This perl person has done less bad stuff. And it's in jail for six months. What happened to the money, like the customer. Which customer's over the woman that went to jail? So what got it back from the bank? So I think about half got it back from the banks with chargebacks. And half she's been ordered to pay back. Who knows where this can pay it back? I say no like. Because isn't I added involved in that? It used to be what's called a travel agent scheme. Yeah, insurance or something. Insurance scheme. It's not a ARA. It's called A-TAS. Yeah. That got wound up 10 years ago because people just charged back the bank. So the banks now take the risk. But we all. Like us as luxury scopes, we have to make sure we have to tell the bank that we're solvent. They check us and all that stuff. I think your point is legitimate. I think her jail term was largely to try to send a message to other travel agents. Sure, send that message. But can't send a message to her and not. He's not the guy. Well, anyway. You know what? I think your underlying point, which is why it's not being investigated by authorities, is a good question. It's possible that's why Jamie Ferris quit. Who knows? Because it was a really weird resignation last week. Apparently doing announcement next few weeks, about three weeks, about. The report was now seven months late. So moving on, so I talked about Campbell. I've got somewhat breaking news. I had a great source of the part, a friend of the part, given me this information. So, you know, we know Campbell's famously don't report their financials. So we've been desperate talking about Campbell's financials. We're trying to work out what the hell's Campbell worth. Because this is the business. They don't report them more than they have to. They don't report anything. Well, don't they report to Essex? No, they don't report it. I think they tell the way of business. Oh, yeah, that's true. So we know nothing about Campbell. Basically nothing. Well, tell us if you would like to. Except what they selectively disclose. And we will allow melancholy if they know. And Campbell, I'm believe, will allow entrepreneurs. But what we've never known is, how do we value this business? And I've got some. I always have got detailed financials. I've got some financials. But the friend of the pod told me every Australian business still has to lodge tax information. So this very resourceful friend of the pod went to the ATO or website and said, "I said to them, have you got like the last few years of tax info?" He goes, "Why do I do?" Can anyone get that in there? Anyone can get it. So it's unaware of this. I don't know. I was unaware as well. So 2023, total income 1.4 billion. This is called revenue. It must be. Or maybe it's like, "I'll go to profit or where?" Taxable income, 69 million. Okay. Makes it money. Yeah, I think this is Australian dollars. So it makes money, didn't pay any tax. But we've got. 2024? So it was two years ago. 2024, so you're a bit. Half a go. Total income? 2.2 billion. The fast growing. 54%. Pretty good. Fast growing. Total income? 2.24 million? That sounds good. 1.24%. Paid 49 million tax. Paid real tax. Good story. Good great business. Almost maybe the only people on the tech council that pay tax in Australia. Probably. Yeah. So great, great result. Well, my asterisk though, is. What is this business worth based on this limited financial information? Given where I had this SESC catastrophe last week. And we've obviously got the Figma Comp, which I'll give you in a second. Well, you don't have. That's the last G you've got data for. So a year behind. Yeah. So let's assume a growth route again. So you probably say, assuming the same growth, it's probably incomes at 3 billion, 3.5, and I think so total income. And taxable income probably up to. Or, 400 million. So I think. So what you're saying is, in 24, is that the number you gave me last? Yeah. I'm suggesting a 25. They had a 10% profit margin. Yes. Taxable income. Yes. And you assume they can push that up to 15%, right? Well. And so I think they could. So you think they might do 3 Bill and maybe 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, yeah. Yeah. I totally agree with that. That same series. And that this may or may not be reflective of their real numbers, but we can just use it as a proxy. Well, this is tax. I know, but like, is it all. I was going to say it's all of their revenue being reported in Australia, but this kind of lines up with what the ARR would be. This would be the revenue you could ARR. You're right. Yeah, that's right. No, that kind of makes sense. So they said they made 400 million last year, which is a great number. Very good number. And that is a question of what the hell you do with $1.8 billion in expenses. But compared to what last year, which has. I know, but I just never understand this crazy amount of expenditure. All these businesses. Yeah, a lot of people who work there. But I just assume these numbers are roughly correct. That's sort of. So that would be 25, and then you could extrapolate forward for 26. Yeah. Go ahead and give them. Take them. It's just highly speculative, because we're making up 25. And now we're going to make up to. Are you going to give them another 50% growth? Yeah. Which is a huge interest, right? We've got a 600 million. But like, go to that. So their revenue would go to 4.5 Bill, and you would let them keep. No, you've got to let them keep more than 600 of that. That's a pretty strong five. Well, let's give them 800. They're hitting towards 20% margins. I think you made me too nice, then. Maybe. But then if we can't be nasty, if we give them. I'm not being honest. Like we can't say, "Oh, well, they underestimate." Yeah. So. So, it'd be very strong. So, when we say 4.5 Bill, with 800 Bill. That'd be almost as much as like a. We'll whisper otherwise. All right. All right. Let's just say, okay? Yeah. So how would you value that business? What would you think about that? I don't know. That's an easy business to value on earnings. Yeah. Because let's say 6 to 800, we'll growing at 45% top line. Yeah. And the bottom. The earnings will be growing faster than whatever their top line is growing at. I think. 50 times earnings. Yeah, I think that would be fair. Yep. So 50 times 800. I guess so. 800 or 600, whatever you want. 30 to 40 Bill. 30 Bill to A.U. So, the last valuation is above 60 A.U. I think. Right. So, it feels like a lot of ECs could be a bit ahead of the scheme, I think. Especially in the last. And so, what earnings multiple is Figma running it after their. Figma's really hard. Figma's really hard. I looked at Figma's numbers. It's like. It's a deborshary. Because if numbers go. Well, they had that whole break up fee from. Yeah. Adobe. And then. They make money. Some months, they lose money. They're basically losing money at a bottom line level. They have. They've got a billion dollars in. Yeah. In CapEx. Their growth is quite similar to Canvas growth. Their top growth. Their growth is 40%. Yeah. It's quite similar. But we don't know what Canvas did this year. So, we don't know how to value them. What revenue multiple are they being valued on? They're valued on a. Well, they're market caps are 11 billion U.S. Yeah. I think they're revenues a bad half of Canvas. They're not half Canvas. A billion, right? So, half can be a tight half. But. So, what does that mean? What number? A billion. Give it a billion. Why do you think that's half of Canvas? Because a billion is one and a half billion a day approximately. Yeah. I'll say it. Okay. So, a bill and trading on what 11? 11 billion. So, I mean, 11. But it still a money. Really high revenue multiple. So, Canvas. If Canvas really did get to 4.5 Bill, let's say. No, that's not 30. Yeah, 30. Then they would trade on more than 11 because they're making money, maybe. Yeah. Although, I think we'll make more money as they scale. I think we're clearly behind Canvas. A couple of years behind Canvas. Yeah. So, even if you gave them, I don't know, like 12 or 13 on their 45. So, 12 is what? 54 or something. 12 times earnings on 45, 4.5 Bill. 54. So, that's. Well, because I'm giving you them 4.5 Bill in FY26. That's income. That's not earnings. That's revenue. That's revenue. It's a main revenue. You mean 12 times revenue? Yeah, 12 times. Because, figmar is on 11. Yeah. So, we give Canvas 12. That's conservative relative to figmar. Yeah. And that would take 4.5 Bill of revenue to 54 Bill AUD. That's pretty close to the 60. I don't reckon that much. I think it's. I think. You think the evaluation's falling. I agree. Which I still think is ridiculously good. So, maybe you could say it's 40. Yeah. I'm not sure. I don't know, you know, that. So, Adobe is growing much slower. Adobe? Yeah, Adobe is more of a direct competitor with some of their products. Adobe is much more like us, you know. And Adobe is like, "Toney, I don't be sure." And they're much lower. Yeah. Figma doesn't have Microsoft. Adobe trying to go ahead to head with them. Canvas has that problem. Definitely. Yeah. Well, you know what? Adobe grew 11%. Adobe isn't growing. I know, but it's much slower. But their revenue is much bigger than the 80%. Not 48%. Yeah, their revenue is much bigger than Canvas revenue. Yeah. It's 23 Bill AUS. Yeah. So, it's many, many multiples. And so, what multiple are they on? Trading on? Adobe? Adobe's got a mark cap of 110. So, it's called, that's five times revenue. And what times earnings? 16. Okay. So, and it's dropped in the last six months, a lazy 20%. And the last. Which actually isn't that bad. I don't think it's. I've dropped 30% in the last year. I don't think it's controversial to say, Canva is going to suffer the same consequences as every other SaaS business in the current SaaS crash. Sorry. Let's call it. That's a good name for the SaaS crash. Yeah. And so, yeah, I think the question is whether it recovers. I'll say something. Well, maybe a bit aggressive or controversial. You don't have to agree. I think Canva is one of the most susceptible businesses to the rise of AI and vibe coding, etc. Their entire business is effectively a workflow business. It is just. You know how it was really hard to use? I'm going back in time. But you know how it was really hard to use Photoshop? Too hard. Yeah. Work flow, too tricky. Yeah. We're going to simplify workflow for you. And to this day, everything about what they do is workflow. I've used AI. It's fine, right? But it's not. It's not just generational. They're not. I would not say right now they are at the frontier model of quality AI. I think. I think AI. I don't think AI will be able to go Google. It's much better than Canva. I agree with you. I'm using Notebook. For my purpose, which is different to what we used Canva for. And so, when we talk about who's susceptible, like we said in the last year, it's susceptible because. We'll just simply. Pure cases now. I used to use Canva last year. And now I don't really use it. Right. So, there's a case in point. So, I think we said it last year might be susceptible because they serve as software developers. Yeah. They have seat problems potentially. But Canva might be very susceptible because they're a workflow business. And there is nothing AI does better than enables the simplification of workflow. And so, even if Canva becomes a really good AI business on workflow, all of a sudden there's all these competitors with lots more money, hyperscala competitors potentially, that were not direct competitors with Canva when it was very hard to build workflow software. Yeah. So, to me, Canva feels like a very susceptible business to AI. We think people was worth what, very free 30 or 40 billion dollars or whatever. I think Canva was always private, so it's hard. So, another thing I don't think Canva has been an incredible story, which it has been. I think people just got ahead of it over their skis. And I don't think. I think it's like probably back to. Even if you assume that some of what you're saying is correct, that means they're probably less than 30. But what do you think they're good? To get to above 30, you've got to assume really heavy growth for years to come. To justify that multiple. Do you think they're golden window moment has gone? They missed it or not. Well, you can say that, but then they would have been dumped with excess crash anyways. Well, they clearly been. Well, they know it's a solar-accomplicated store. Do you not think they could have sold their business to Microsoft for 50 billion dollars? Microsoft has a product. Microsoft has compared that in cash. But why would they want it? Why? Are you joking? They want to compete against it. Microsoft don't really buy much. They would powerpoint not only far. They would. They would. They would. Who else could afford it? Who? When was the last thing Microsoft bought? I don't know. But they were trying to compete with it. They would love to buy this, I think. Who knows? 50 billion. Why not? Because I think it's a waste of money. I think they're too disciplined to pay that money. Sure. I'm not sure to waste the money for them. And like Google, they could afford to buy it. Who else could afford to buy Amazon? Or they all would buy it. Those types of cars don't buy that much. Apple don't buy anything. Google paid 23 Bill for that Israeli cyber security business. Yeah. Very special. That only had 300 million revenue. I think that probably regret that now. - You know, who else could buy it? - The Wiz doby, I think. Yeah, the Wiz, a doby I think is too small to pay $50 billion. - What's 20? Isn't it 20 something now? Oh no, what I say, that would be worth. - Oh, I really forgot, they had 20 something revenue. And they're 100. - No, don't be 100. - 100. - So 100, 100, yeah. So that's 50% of their size. Who else, who else is on a Salesforce? What are they worth now? They'd love to buy a Canva, wouldn't they? - No, different business. - Now, 'cause they're trying to pivot to enterprise Canva. - Salesforce 178. - I could buy it, but it's not. - Two don't looted, though. - Lazy 45% this year. - Yeah. - Good riddance. - So look, if all of these businesses are down like this, Canva obviously has to be down. I personally think they're one of the more susceptible businesses to AO disruption for the reasons that I said to you. I said for ages, if I was Canva, I would have sold out that business. - The advantage Canva does have the gearing advantages, it's like cost. So that's kind of a nice. - Yeah, but the problem is you just said you found something better. - 'Cause we're already subscribed to Google. So I could pick, I got Google for free, carry. - That's always everyone. - Yeah, I guess a lot of people do. - So I mean, everyone's, - And you got Microsoft, - Google, and Google, and Microsoft, and Amazon. - It's not a great place to be competing against those guys. - I don't know, you know what? From my own painful experience of like in past businesses, thinking I should have sold that earlier. Like, that's what I've said for ages. Like, there's a limit to how much money you need. There's a limit to how far things go. When it's-- - We're just gonna give it all away anyway. - So you take what, like I think, they might just love running the business. - Yeah, they might rather die than sell your business. - Sure, sure. - Which I get. You know, I will say this in my part of my thesis about AI. I think ultimately, like I kind of was shaped in my view about this a bit by the sea of snowflake, you know, that big data platform business. I think data platforms is where a lot of the AI value will accrue, like very big pools of data, especially specialized data, proprietary data even better. And layering AI on top of that will be massive value creation. And I think there'll be monetization. Like I think there'll be value capture. The reason I feel so positive about catapult is factually, it's a big data platform, like a very large data platform. And I think that it's hard for me to imagine-- - We've got hardware as well. - We've also got hardware that's true. But I feel like a lot of the value in this AI boom is gonna accrue to data platforms. That's my view on this. And that's why I'm much less bearish about, like I keep talking about SAP, like it's a massive heavy-locking data platform, very arcane, you know, and like I always think, what, this is the real switching cost? I take the highest bar of switching cost. This is the highest bar. The person that makes the decision that they want to switch is jeopardizing their employment when they make that decision. That's SAP, right? That was IBM once upon a time. - Yeah, you don't get five for buying IBM. - Yeah. - But I think if you look at Canva, I actually don't think, if Canva got drops to $20 billion, Mill Cliff and Canva still have more money that they can have a span. - Oh, great. - They dropped to $5 billion, they got to have more money. And they said, you know who suffers if it drops to $20 billion? Always VCs have written up their stakes and have done continuation funds. This is the entire Australian VCA ecosystem. - It's the right end on this one company. - It is probably 50% from the last mark. - Yeah. - And we're talking about how, and if you don't have Canva, and you're probably, it's really hard as a VC in Australia. If you do, like, even the Blackbird Fun One, the greatest fund in Australia. So this is like equivalent to benchmark fund. One is the Query Fund, one is the Query Number Five. That's the pendant on, it's a culture, a culture ambs in trouble. - Yup. - So I think culture ambs in your travel? - Culture ambs in your travel? - Yeah, I've got one, and did you get gone? And so all you've got left is really Canva is the big three. And that, that's still a great business, but not what we thought it would be. - What do you think? I don't know very much about safety culture at all. Like, I don't use it. I don't know what all I hear about it. - It's a checklist business. That's what people tell me. Isn't a checklist business very susceptible to AI disruption? - Well, it's kind of entrenched. So that's, again, it's a cheap entrenched business. It's kind of a gender-girabentifit, but that valuation has never made any sense. Like I've known people who've had similar businesses that they thought were a far better business, so 100 million bucks. So the safety culture's all been the most wackt valuation. My response from the tenants and all this stuff, it's just that you can't-- - Always might just not know what's going on inside that business. I will happily admit. I think I lose as many things still. - I think about the Thundergaugh. - Thundergaugh, don't think it makes money. - I know nothing about it. - Like, it's this set feels like a 2021 business. - Yeah. - So I think there's gonna be some rude shocks for LPs and some of these fans who thought they were massively wealthy from these early fans, based on Kamba, and want up these wealthies, I think they are. - Well, do you know what a good-- So by the way, you know these collapse-- - That's trash. - So it's trash. - That's trash. - It's got a rhyme. It's got a rhyme. You know, like stock markets around the world have really deviated in performance. That's one of the things that surprised me. So now's that crunched. - Yeah. - But not as much as you actually would have thought, 'cause the hype scars have held up. That's true, S&P has been somewhat crunched. It's down 12 or 30% or something. - Yeah. - I know, but like-- - It's not crunch at all. - Yeah, I just said it's not crunched. Japan fine. Korea has gone down a bit. Taiwan fine. Israel up. - Yeah. - Like, it's really not a-- - For the UK's been great for last year. So it's not globalized this problem. It is very discreet to anything that is heavy in like software. - And they probably had this crazy run up in the last five years. - Yeah. - Yeah. - Can I swoke out once speaking of crazy run ups? Let's talk about zero. And in battle zero boss, kind of seeing Cassidy made a desperate play down so I saw this in the financial view to investors last week claiming that the company's core products cannot be easily replicated by AI tools because its data gives it an edge over new arrivals. - I saw that. - I agree, but also making the focus of an entire presentation. The most defensive argument I've ever heard might not be great. - I think Cassidy said that she used anthropics chord coding calls, which is weird that she said it's but to attempt to clone zero, but the prototype lacked the Troves of Transaction data. - She used it. - She used it. - She used it. - She used software development. - No. - So she used co-work. - Probably. - Well, ladies not what people are using to clone zero. Which I don't-- But you and I both agree. It's not an easy business to clone. - I actually think they're quite competitive. - Yeah, I agree. - And a cheap, and there's a lot of good things about that. - Yeah. - As you know, I mean, the share price is cheap. - No, I mean, the product is cheap. - Yeah. - And lots and lots of people know how to use it. - Yeah. - And you should, that should not be underestimated. - Like when you need a bookkeeper, - The mood keeps jobs. - Yeah, when you need a bookkeeper and you say I'm using this platform and they don't know how to use it. - Totally. - You can't get a bookkeeper. - Which is also a bad case for them in the US, but it's not, because they're not in the US. - They don't need more bad cases in the US. - Yeah. - They've stacked that mile high, right? - Yeah. - So I have a report of that, of course, of Shrek, Sikin and Cassidy. Shrek is, I think, highest paid CEO, Todd Himes says that you still need to process the data, data is prior to you, use the train our models. Infrastructure makes us much stronger than just workflow software. There's no differentiation from messes between software that can be winners, in which pieces of software can be disrupted. Which is a lot of what we've talked about. - I totally agree. - Sadly for Cassidy, who is, of course, received more than 20 million bucks a year, Himes has not believed her spin, and the zero stock has been dumped. - Well, that's not their problem. - Yeah, that's not zero problem. - That's not a problem. - Getting to it. What do you think is down this, in the last six months, zero? - Thirty per se. - Four pizzeres. - Just catastrophic. - I thought our short thesis on that would take longer to play out. - Didn't they? - The SaaS crash helped us a longer bit. It's a bit unfair, right? - Yeah. - So since 2014, go back to that. So this is 12 years old. - Yeah. - This is a lifetime ago. - Yeah. - What do you reckon is annualised growth has been? - Oh, God. - Share us. - And don't think it pays to give it in. So this is all you get from it. - 3%. - Oh, I'd sped hash. - I know. - Yeah, it's hard for you to work with. - 3% is like Western Bongs. - Yeah, that's true. - But like, this is a risky stop, but you're asking me at the bottom end of a 55% fall. - I'm going 12 years back. I've no idea. - 6%. - Oh, I'm not that far off. - You know, I've been like, "Well, why the, I ain't get a lot of points." - You know what? - This has been an absolute astrophysio, shareholder. - You should have said to me, their return over the last, was this high. - Yeah. - And can be up. - Yeah. - That I would have said 12, and you would have said, "No, sis." - Yes. - That's a better pitch. - I thought was a position of Cassidy and Chairman David Thirty, obviously, made of yours. Who, now getting really questioned by investors, giving this a little plus. - I made it like that. - But I really like that. - That's nice. And obviously, what's even looking more disastrous is the merely eye. Because they bought this SaaS business in the US. It was a risky business. - Anyway, it looks more disastrous. It looked completely disastrous at the time of the end of the year. - Now, SaaS has dropped 50% since then. So, Dano, could you have timed the worst acquisition in the worst time than these clowns? This is just, and you can't buy him as Cassidy. So, the board would approve this clearly. So, it's the board as well as her. She's the boarder point in her. So, clearly, the board's completely culpable here and the board needs to go. - Well, I don't, you know, I'm not harsh on that acquisition. I mean, I'm harsh on the-- - We're harsh at times. - We're harsh at times. - Bought. - No, no, no, no. Putting aside what they bought. - Everything about it was about them. But it was very expensive using very expensive stock to raise money and buy. - Well, there's no. Stock was cheap at the time because they're, no, overpriced. - As in, sorry. - Zero, exactly. - I'm actually trying to say what you just said, which is, they basically just leveraged overvalued stock for an overpriced acquisition. - I can use some cash as well. - But I'm kind of a right with that, to be honest. - Well, if, if, I just think they bought the wrong thing. - Have they bought something in UK or any much, as we said at the time, much more of a fine - Yes. - The US where it was, it's a small, like, counting software businesses in the UK. - Yeah, but this may know since the time, it makes even less sense now. - Yeah. - So, this is-- - You know why? Because investors don't want a UK growth story, they want a US growth story. That's honestly the reason. We're like, you think of every box that, in your own, the ASX board, that a board should be doing is, don't overpay the CEO, don't do stupid acquisitions, get your time right, understand your business, no, where your growth is, no, you understand your strategy, these guys have stuffed every single thing up. - Well, my number. - They've got one thing right, these guys. - You know what, number one rule for a chairman of an ASX company, don't join a company, that has an overvaluation at the time that you come in as chairman. - Yeah. - That is, it's not good. - Yeah. - It's not a good plan. - Yeah. - It's crazy things to maintain the valuation and approve crazy things. And like David 30 is a smart, level-headed, good operator, and like the fact that all of this had to be signed off to try to maintain this valuation and growth, it's not good, right? This is just a bit of a good decision. - The braving would have been to say is, we're overvalued, we're going to--we understand that, we're not going to make it worse. - You mean brave in the yes, minister sense, brave, i.e. suicide? That would be the end of him, right? - But it's not suicidal anyway. - I don't think the EVs took it to life. - At least there was a hope of this. It was a little hope. But that other one would have had no hope, right? They would have, like, I don't know. I don't think this was the right job for a chair of his caliber to take, personally. - I was going to have a pretty tough run, given he's also a chair of Sydney University, or Chanston, or Sydney University, for a great way to chair. - He didn't appoint Mark Scott, who's been the most disastrous in the city. - He's dreadful. - He's allowed him to remain, nothing you can say. - So you can totally count by him for appointing Scott, who's been by far the worst. - You know what I think about this idea, which is, you know, I always talk about the fragile versus anti-fragile. - Yeah, I love it. - I love it. And so I've thought about this. - Not necessarily, but it's, yeah, that's the life. And so there, I thought about this a lot recently. There's like truth, and people think the opposite to truth is a lie, but that's not the opposite to truth. The opposite to truth is anti-truth, like people say, so, you know, Israel gets attacked by Hamas, and like it's a genocidal attack. - Yeah. - So the truth is that was a genocidal attack. The lie is that was an agenocidal attack. The anti-truth is, Israel is engaged in a genocidal war. And I think so much of society has embraced this idea of anti-truth, which is totally flipping the truth to be, because I say like the Liberal Party and the Labor Party, they're not opposites. The opposites of both of them is totalitarianism. - Yeah. - That's like the anti of those. And so I think that like a lot of, what we're, like a lot of the arguments that we have about here is about like is this right or is this wrong? But I do think that there is this movement that basically pushes anti-truth, like Trump's fake news is false. His argument is false. Sometimes he's right, sometimes he's wrong. But he's saying, you're saying this is true. It's not true. It's false. But I think, I don't know what triggered my thought about that, but I've thought a lot recently about how there's this idea of anti-truth that has been pervading the Western world, and it's one of the big problems of the Western world. I can't remember what that has to do with zero. Zero is not the anti-truth. - Speak which, you're now supporting me to defund the right as festivals after. - Oh, I know what that's about. - Because I got worked up, because you got me worked up about Sydney University. - Yeah. - I think what was going on at Sydney University was the advocacy of anti-truth. That was my issue with Sydney University. Not that they were saying we should be fair or we disagree with Israel's position. They totally flipped to lies. They presented this something wasn't anti-symmetism, and the Jews were in the wrong. It's not the anti-truth. - I feel it in the lies. - It's like two lies. - It's not even a lie. I would have been fine with lies. If you want to lie about what isn't happening, but to flip it and to make the victim into the purpose. - It's like that's the anti-truth. - You get raped by somebody and then they give you a right. - That's right. Equivalent. - That's right, because exactly in that situation, you can say yes, it did happen. You can say no, it didn't happen, but that's a flipping to the anti-truth to say no, that's the villain. The victim is the villain. So that it was my big issue with Sydney University. They were just advocating this horrible dishonest, western civilization destroying anti-truth. - The CEO, the vice chancellor, is still right. - Still there. - We say David Thoesau really is a moving bad CEO. - That's disgraceful. - There you go. He got me worked up about the anti-truth. - How about worked up at Riders Festival? - Newcastle, Riders Festival and this weird R second out of Riders Festival. - I thought about going to that Riders Festival. - You're going to the session. No, I thought about it. I'm saying this seriously. I'm thinking about going to the session where Louise Acher is interviewing a friend. No, and I'm going to stand up and ask a question and say, like, I think that Israel should be, Israel should exist beside an independent Palestinian state, both of them in peace, that makes me a Zionist. What do you have to say about what you think should be done to me? I just want to confront them about it, right? - I mean, not by the high goo, just by talking about my tax back. - Well, this probably will look around at who else is there for. But I think the way to fight the anti-truth is not to ban it because then you push that talk underground. The way to fight it is to tell the truth. - I have no issue with these festivals happening by the way. I have an issue with tax back, it's funding it. - Yeah, I agree with that. We just need to stop funding everything like this and start from zero based budgeting. If you want to hold a, like I'm not saying, we should never fund anything in the arts again, but everything goes to zero and you have to apply for it. If Louise Acher is involved, you don't get any money, I think it's 0.1. But I think if you can't be shown to be non-discriminatory, non-hateful, but to anyone, be it to house, be it to Jews, be it to everyone, then you don't get tax paid all. I think that should be the fundamental building block. Everybody starts to zero though. And we go back to zero and we probably save some money and maybe Kim Chalper doesn't get anything more dead. - There's a lot of, I don't want to go into this because we have to finish this episode. But we'll be talking about the RBA again in some point in time. I mean, you called that to me. - There's only so many big three left. - You call it to a tie. - No, we're getting paid for TK. - I know. - But you'll come to that. Why don't we go to the Adelaide Festival with a new podcast from there. I think we'll be fun to stand outside. - We'll be fun to stand up and ask questions. I think, let's just a view of come to. You can't fight the anti-truth by trying to silence it. You can only fight the anti-truth by speaking truth to it. Just make it a competition of ideas and show how dishonest the anti-truth is. - That movement doesn't care for truth. We know that. - I know, but that movement is small. - Has any of the one in that single movement said a word about around masking 3,000 people? - That single one has. - So that movement is small, the anti-truth movement, but everybody else is watching and trying to make up their mind about what's going on. And I think the way to fight it is to speak truth so that everyone else can hear what's real. That's my view on that. - Hopefully you're right. - That note, thank you, Mark and Joel, for sitting in for your laughter at the auction box. - Well, I'm not so supportive of that. - I didn't get to say much on this episode. I was just laugh track. - What if you were to say about it? - On a such a serious note as well. - Usually I just get like having the quizzes. I think I missed the quizzes just this morning. - Oh yeah, there was no quizzes this morning. Yeah, small mercies. - I haven't had a quiz. I haven't seen a good quiz lately. I'll look at it for a minute. I don't think not saying a good quiz stops three passes. I had a few though. I had one else thinking about doing it, but it wasn't quite up to my usual high standard. So I passed. - Well, well, look forward to getting over that bar at some point. - Thank you for listening in. Everyone will say everybody on Sunday for Ask Us Anything episode.