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S7E5: : Are we in another Pre-War Era, reliving the 1910s? Professor Margaret MacMillan OM CC CH

32m 33s

S7E5: : Are we in another Pre-War Era, reliving the 1910s? Professor Margaret MacMillan OM CC CH

The podcast explores parallels between the pre-First World War era and today’s geopolitical landscape, emphasizing how historical analogies can inform—but not dictate—strategic decisions. Professor Margaret Macmillan highlights that while imperial competition was less central than commonly believed, nationalism, arms races, and fears of being outpaced by rivals were key drivers of war. She argues that alliances were weak and poorly enforced, and that political complacency—such as the British dismissal of escalating tensions—played a major role in the outbreak of conflict. In today’s context, the erosion of international norms, aggressive posturing by powers like the U.S. and Russia, and the rise of nationalist and authoritarian ideologies mirror the pre-1914 environment. However, significant differences exist: today’s world is more interconnected, with real-time communication, advanced technologies like AI, and shared global threats such as climate change. These factors could foster cooperation rather than conflict. Macmillan stresses that democratic institutions, transparent information flows, and strong diplomatic engagement are essential to prevent a repeat of war, warning that closed, isolated governments—like Russia—pose a greater risk to global stability. Ultimately, while the risk of conflict remains high, the interdependence of modern societies may make collective action—driven by shared existential threats—more likely than in the past.

Transcription

6500 Words, 36374 Characters

English
Hello and welcome once again to season 7 of Talking Strategy. My name is Paul O'Neill from the Royal United Services Institute in London. In this season my friend Professor Beatrice Husser and I talk to experts about some of the most important strategic issues affecting global security today. The history and implications of great power competition, deterrence in a multipolar world and the future of the international order. We're delighted that this podcast is once again made possible thanks to our long-term partnership with Cornferry, a global consulting firm that powers performance. Working with businesses across every major industry including defence, they help organisations bring together strategy, operations and talent to turn ambition into results. Their understanding of what enables organisations and people to perform makes them an ideal partner for talking about the future of security. Strategy. Now the views expressed in this interview are the speakers alone and do not represent those of Cornferry, RUCI or any other institution. So allow me to hand over to my friend and colleague in Hamburg. Beatrice it's good to see you again and over to you. Thank you Paul and hello from Hamburg. Our world order is breaking down and great powers are doing as they please while rivaling one another. In this season we are considering in a number of podcasts where the historical analogies help in our search for strategies to navigate this troubled world and in avoiding a slide into a world war. In today's episode we consider similarities and differences to the eve of the first world war and to help us with this we have the guidance of Professor Margaret Macmillan. Having accumulated multiple degrees from the universities of Toronto and Oxford including her DPhil, Margaret Macmillan was a professor of history at Ryerson University in Toronto from 1975 to 2002 including four years of teaching at the University of Toronto. She served five years as department chair. Then she was provost of Trinity College Toronto from 2002 to 2007 before becoming warden of St Anthony's College Oxford and professor of international history at the University of Oxford. Professor Macmillan has served on many prestigious boards and represented the Order of Canada at the coronation of Charles III. She is also a member of the Order of Merit of the United Kingdom. Her most important publications relevant to our topic are the two that ended peace, How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War which was published in London and Profiled Books in 2013 and Peacemakers, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war at John Murray that was so popular that it kept being reprinted in 2001, 2002 and 2003. She will keep us on the straight and narrow with regard to historical analogies as she is also the author of The Uses and Abuses of History, Penguin Canada in 2008. So perhaps I should ask you first therefore where you think historical analogies are useful and where they amount to abuses of history. I think analogies are useful when they help us to think constructively about situations. I mean we do this in our own lives don't we? You say this person is rather like so-and-so, I know they're likely to behave in these ways. We may get it wrong and that's what we have to be careful about. Analogies can become traps. I think the appeasement analogy that was a mistake to try and appease the dictator was a mistake to try and appease the dictators in the 1930s on the part of the democracies became a trap in many cases. It became a trap I think for the British when they went into Suez in the 1950s which ended very badly because Anthony Eden who was prime minister thought that Abdul Gamal Nasser, the president of Egypt, was just like the dictators Mussolini and Hitler he dealt with in the 1930s when he was in fact not. It became a trap also for the United States and Vietnam when the argument was if we don't fight in Vietnam we'll be fighting the communists everywhere. And so I think analogies are helpful in thinking but they should not be seen as guidance and you should be really careful they don't become a trap that you only think in terms of one analogy and you don't look at the other possible ones. Margaret thank you. Thinking about the lead-up to the First World War we see competing ideas about what the world should look like. What role did those different views of the world order play in the origins of the First World War? I'm not sure they played a direct role. I think they helped to shape the thinking of the various statesmen who were responsible for events at the time and so you had leaders who thought that the great powers could cooperate with each other as they had done in those days the great powers were mostly European although Japan was beginning its rise to Pacific power and Asian power and of course in the West the United States was beginning its rise to world power. So it wasn't entirely European affair but the center of power in the world was still very much in Europe before 1914. Europe was the richest continent. Its countries collectively controlled well over two-thirds of the earth's surface through their colonies and then controlled a great deal more informally through their informal empires and so I think there were different views among them of how the world should be organized. Some thought that as long as the great powers got together and acted as a sort of committee to maintain order they really certainly did not want to go to war that they would all benefit and there had been something informally called the concert of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars which ended in 1915 which had worked to keep things fairly stable in Europe. It was conservative and a lot of people disapproved of it. It consisted of in those days the powers of Prussia which later became the heart of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia and Britain but you had alternative views of what the world order should look like and that was a more liberal international view which is the one which we've perhaps been more acquainted with in the 20th century that you could have a world order in which you had shared values, shared laws, shared institutions that ran for the benefit not just of the great powers but of the smaller powers as well and so there was a tension in Europe over what sort of orders there should be and of course there's always going to be attention over who dominates and there was a lot of concern in the period before 1914 certainly in Britain and in France and also in Russia about the rise of Germany, a very new country. It only came together in 1871 but it was a great military power and it was increasingly a great economic power which was dominating the continent of Europe more and more and so there was concern about how to contain this rising power and within Germany itself you had not surprisingly the debate between those who said look why don't we just wait because we have this economic power things will fall into our lap sooner or later as a great German industrialist Hugo Stinnes said and others who said look we need our place in the sun, we need to be seen as a great power, we want what the other powers already have, we want colonies, we want a navy, we want an empire and so on and that caused attention and so you got a Germany which was both powerful and in some ways erratic in its policies which alarmed its neighbors. Before 1914 there wasn't a consensus on how Europe should be managed, there were these different views and then you got of course the rise of revolutionary and what became international socialism, an idea that there should be a thoroughly different way of organizing the world, that the workers of the world who produce the goods of the world should unite and that it was hoped national borders would come down. And so you had a number of different ideas floating around and you had also of course and I think this helped to contribute to the outbreak of the first world war suspicions and rivalries among the powers and so you had a really uneasy situation getting increasingly uneasy before 1914. I'm glad you mentioned the rise of socialism. The good Marxist explanation of the origins of the first world war would focus on capitalism and the competition of the great powers for imperial possessions overseas. By contrast, Hugh Strawn in his book on the beginning of the first world war concentrates much more on individual human agency and theories and rejects the idea of irreversible trends as propelled by Marxist interpretations. So what are the main causes that you see for the first world war? Yes, I'm more inclined to agree with Hugh Strawn than with the Marxist analysis because I think a lot of the competition from empire was effectively over by 1914. Africa had been pretty much carved up, China there was a sort of stasis, a number of powers and including the United States and Japan were involved in China and they'd carved out spheres of influence where they had exclusive rights to things like mines but that didn't mean they were prepared to divide it up and in fact I think there was a informal understanding among the powers involved in China they had better not try and carve it up because it would lead to conflict. The one area that hadn't yet been carved up because it was still a power in its own right was the Ottoman empire and that was causing tension among the great powers and in 1912 Italy broke an unwritten rule that no power would try and take a piece of the Ottoman empire which was possibly declining irredeemably and Italy took over what became Libya and that encouraged other powers to think they might do the same thing. So imperialism was a factor but I don't think it was the only factor and in fact if you're looking at a Marxist analysis it would have been much better for great powers, particularly I think Britain and Germany, to get together. They were each other's greatest trading partners, they could do a lot together. Britain had the world's biggest navy, Germany had the world's or certainly Europe's most effective land army and if they were truly being moved by Marxist ideals, economic views, they would have cooperated rather than fighting. Much more important and I think Hugh Storm would probably say this was the arms race that was developing before 1914. Nationalism, ferocious nationalism in many cases, which believed that not only was the nation-based system, but it was also a political system, it was a political system, it was a social system, it was a political system, it was a political system, it was a political system, that whichever nationality they were was best but also believed that they had hereditary enemies, that they were bound to fight them. And so I think if we look for rationality, explanations for the First World War were really missing out a very large, irrational and emotional aspect to the outbreak of the war. In an alternative world, how could the First World War have been avoided through different decisions made by key governments, by different ways of seeing the world? And what should we learn from that today? Ah, the $25 million question. The British government could have done more to deter Germany, particularly from attacking France. And I think if Germany had been faced with a situation where it knew that it would pay a penalty for attacking France and it would have then been left facing Russia, it might have well decided to come to terms with Russia. I mean, there were those on both sides in Germany and Russia who said we are natural allies, you know, that we could actually work together. And there were those also in France and Germany who were saying very much the same sort of thing. If Britain had deterred Germany by making it clear that it would enter a war to defend France, and Belgium, it might have made a difference. Now, the argument always was, I think, made by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary and his defenders, that they couldn't do anything until Parliament had done something. But we all know that there are ways of sending very, very strong hints that if you do this, I'm going straight to Parliament and you'll be in trouble. In the very last frantic weeks, there was a lack of a sense of urgency. And Sir Edward Grey went off to his country cottage, where there were no communications directly. A boy had to come on a bicycle from the nearest village with telegrams, announcing the latest. Steps towards war. There was also complacency. They'd been through various crises in the Balkans and they thought, we'll sort it out again. We'll have a conference of ambassadors. This is just another of these silly things. And it was only when it suddenly started sliding to war that it got too close. The German government too is culpable, the civilian government. They had deliberately, I think, not informed themselves about what the military were planning. But I think it was only in 1912 that they actually found out about the two front war and the Schlieffen plan and what the military were planning. And they were able to do that. And at that point, the chancellor said, well, if that's what the military are planning, it is our job to make sure that the diplomacy is in place, which I think was a real abdication of responsibility. I think the civilian government in Germany should have informed itself and should have put pressure on the Kaiser and on the military to inform the government and if necessary, have had a public debate. So I think there was a complacency, a lack of a sense of urgency. And there were particular decisions that were made. The decision to go into Belgium, which was done for military reasons by the German government, was a decision that was made by the German government. And the German government, because they were concerned about trying to jam too many troops into the north of France. But the decision to go into Belgium outraged world opinion, including in the United States, and gave the British a very real reason for going in. It wasn't just an excuse. The British felt very strongly about neutrality. And they felt very strongly that Germany had broken its own commitment to respect the neutrality of Belgium. And I think that caused a real shift in public opinion. Arms races depend on critical raw materials. And you know, you mentioned that concerns were there about the ability to access the critical minerals. To what extent did that play a role within the First World War and drive that sense of impatience that you spoke about, perhaps in Germany? I think there's something to what you say, that there was a feeling among the powers that unless they controlled the sites where the raw materials they needed were, and unless they controlled the places they wanted to sell their goods to, unless they controlled the markets, that others would try and cut them out. As we know, quite often, it's possible that they would cut them out. And I think that's a very good point. It's possible to buy raw materials that come from countries that you don't have any stake in. And Germany was getting everything it needed. But there was that fear that Japan felt very much because Japan had and has very little in the way of minerals. It doesn't have a big oil industry. It doesn't have the sorts of things that an advanced industrial nation depends on to run its industries. And I think the Japanese fear was that unless they could control the sources of raw materials, and unless they control their markets, if they were going to have to export, if they were going to try and maintain their power, their level of prosperity and deal with their own growing population, unless they could control markets, unless they could have access to raw materials, they would always be at the mercy of other powers. And so I think it was the apprehension of not having them as much as the actual fear of not having them that mattered. I mean, if you looked at Latin America, where a lot of resources came from, technically, it was independent, it was very much influenced by outside powers, but a number of powers, powers that ended up on opposite sides in the First World War were getting what they needed from Latin America. And so I think that's a very good point. Margaret, let's look at the factor of time. I think it's Stig Förster who emphasized the element of time in this context, namely that all sides feared that the others might become too strong to oppose and sought to exploit what they saw as a window of opportunity, a sort of flight ahead. Do you agree? And what do you see as the implications of this for the present? Yeah, well, that is a very good question, indeed. And it's one that I worry about. I think there is, as you call it, the flight. The problem with an arms race, I guess, as in any sort of race, is that if you have an advantage, you know it will be temporary. You know that someone might catch up, that there are always the footsteps running behind you. And so do you strike at your enemy while you have the upper hand, while you still can? And I think that was a very real consideration in 1914, as it was, of course, again in 1941, when the Japanese attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and attacked British holdings in the Far East. It was a factor. It was a factor in 1914 because Germany and the German high command were very concerned, both about the growing relationship between France and Russia. And in those days, Germany had a border with Russia because there was no independent Poland and then an alliance between the two potential enemies. And they were, I think, increasingly concerned about Russia because Russia was developing very fast. We tend to have a view of Russia partly because of the revolution as a country that was a basket case that was in desperate straits. In fact, it was expanding very quickly, indeed. It was expanding very quickly. It was growing. Its industries were growing. Its military was growing. It was building a network of railways, many of which came right up to the border with Germany. And so the German fear was that Russia was getting stronger and stronger. And as the German high command saw it, if Germany were to take on Russia, it needed to do it while Russia was still weaker than Germany. Germany still had the edge. And that is precisely the argument that was made when Japan debated whether or not to go to war against the Western powers in 1941. Could I ask you then about the alliances and the balances of power? You'd mentioned earlier about the concert of Europe, but also there were a series of what today I suppose we might call mini-lateral alliances. How do you see the shift from the large multilateral alliances to those mini-laterals and bilaterals? There's a big argument about this, isn't there, that the alliance system was an uneasy balance and there was always the temptation to go to war, either to show that your alliance was still functioning or to try and disrupt the alliance. And so there was a big argument about this, isn't there, that the alliance on the other side, there was the triple entente between, first of all, France and Russia, and then Britain joined in, and then the triple alliance between Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Italy. And I'm not so sure they led directly to the war because they were loose alliances and they were defensive alliances. In other words, you didn't have to come to the support of your alliance partners unless you were attacked. And in the event, Italy stayed out because it argued that Germany had attacked and therefore it wasn't a defensive war and Italy joined the Allies in 1915. The thing about alliances is if you decide not to obey the terms of the alliance, who's above you? What's the sanction? Who's going to enforce it? It's not like a civil dispute in our societies where you go to the courts and the judge or someone says you were right and they were wrong. And so I don't think the alliances in themselves led to the First World War. I think it was far more the pressures that were building up and there were all sorts of pressures, domestic pressures, competition, rivalry, the army, the army, the army, the army, the arms race, fears, nationalism. I think there were a great many factors all making it likely there'd be a war. But in the end, we get down to the decisions, don't we, that were made in the summer of 1914. The Americans, of course, drew the conclusion from the First World War that these were entangling alliances and they must retreat into isolationism, pull out of this European corrupt world again. And then you didn't actually have proper alliances in the interwar period. So it's on the Council of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, not really getting together into an alliance, not really doing military planning together for defensive or other purposes. But after the Second World War, the complete opposite conclusion, namely, let's form NATO. The punishment for letting down the alliance once is that they might let you down next time, of course. So it's not the punishment coming from a superior power, clearly. People have been going on and on about solidarity and how important it is to stand by Article 5 because otherwise the credibility of the alliance is gone. So how do you see NATO today? I find alliances fascinating, but they're like any sort of human relationship. They take maintenance. And when a crisis comes, people may not behave in ways that they expect to behave. And I think you can make all the plans you like. It will make it more likely that you'll stand by your alliance partners if you know them, if you've worked with them, if you're deeply integrated with them. In my own country, Canada and the United States have a very deep military alliance. I mean, we have interoperability, but we have more than that. We have shared command in some cases in the past. And I think that's a good example for the defense of North America. You will have an American commander at the top and his subordinate will be Canadian. And that will go right the way down through the ranks. And so I think we have expectations that we will support each other. And these are based on long periods of trust and relationships. But it doesn't mean in the ultimate crisis that those making the decisions will say that we're going to stick by this. They may well say it's not in our interest. And I think what we're seeing at the moment is the United States United States government, certainly President Trump, but also people around like the Vice President J.D. Vance or the Secretary of State Rubio, suggesting that they will not come to the support of NATO countries, claiming falsely that the other parties in NATO, Britain, for example, or Canada should have come to the support of the United States in its war on Iran, which is not within the terms of NATO, was never expected to be what NATO was meant to do, and is not, I think, a good reason for trashing NATO. But that's what's happening. And so I think there's a big question mark now about how much longer the NATO alliance will survive. It may well survive without the United States, but the United States is sending signals and has been sending signals that it doesn't really have much confidence in the alliance anymore, and it's not clear that it's going to go on supporting it. But as I say, we often don't know what will happen until there is a crisis, at which point decisions have to be made. Margaret, I can see analogies today from the description you've given of the period leading up to the First World War. And some differences as well. I wonder, could you just expand perhaps on those similarities and differences and which ones we ought to be perhaps most focused on when we revert to this idea that we're somehow in a 1910s moment? We now have at least one power within the Western alliance system that is prepared to break the rules and the norms, and that's the United States. And we have other powers that aren't part of that system. Russia, of course, is the obvious one that are also not prepared. I think it's important to pay any attention to rules and norms that have helped to keep international relations more or less on a stable keel since 1945. And I don't want to idealize the period since 1945, because as we know, there have been many crises and moments when the world came very close to war indeed, and there have been an awful lot of wars. But what concerns me now is there seems to be this feeling that we can do whatever we want. We can be as aggressive as we want. We can declare war on our neighbors. We can break the rules. We can interfere in the politics of other countries, often quite openly. You're not even bothering to hide that you're doing it. And, of course, others will be tempted to follow. And that's what concerns me, because that is what was happening before the First World War. What also concerns me is we are getting, I think, into a dangerous frame of mind. And I see this even among some of the military I talk to, where we're not saying there might be a war or there might be a conflict. They're saying when there is. I was quite struck talking to someone in Washington about three years ago who said, casually, when we fight China, and I said, don't you mean if? And he said, oh, yeah, maybe, I guess I do. But it seems to me we're getting into a mindset where we begin to think something is bound to happen. And once you think it's bound to happen, you tend to read every signal in a way that fits into that thesis. You get people beginning to assume scenarios which may not be true, but it guides what they do. And I think we're seeing something rather like what happened before the First World War, that a war is coming. What do we do? We might as well just accept it. And that, I think, is what we're seeing. I think it's dangerous, especially given the level of armaments today. That's quite a downbeat assessment. There will inevitably also be differences, because this isn't 1910. What would be the major differences or things that perhaps give you some sense of optimism? Well, I think the nature and level of the armaments we now have, if that is not enough deterrence, I don't know what is. We're looking at things like drones a lot, but we need to remember that there's been a proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of other countries will be thinking or will be going nuclear, I think. Saudi Arabia clearly would dearly like to have a nuclear bomb. And even in Japan, which has been so opposed to nuclear weapons, there is now talk about whether Japan needs its own nuclear deterrent to resist China and Chinese pressure. We have a development of biological and chemical warfare. I think it's a fairly open secret that a number of countries are developing such weapons. We have the means to deliver. We have the capacity. And we are a very integrated world. And so that whatever happens is likely to reverberate around the rest of the world. It also, I think, should act as a deterrent if we are aware of it. We all have so many things to worry about. I mean, people are worrying about their lives, their children, their mortgages, their jobs. And to worry about what's going on in the wider world is necessary, I think. But often people simply don't have the time for it. And that concerns me. And I think you have governments in many countries which are looking inwards and not truly thinking about what's going on in the world. And then that also is dangerous. And then we have the whole advent of AI, artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence, which more and more seems to be capable not only of managing things on its own, but running rogue if the latest stories in the newspapers are right. Are there some differences between now and then that are making you optimistic about anything? Please. I'll do my best to be optimistic. And I am, because I do think there is increasing concern. I think in the United States, there are a number of people who are concerned about what's happening to their own democratic institutions and are pushing back. And I think that is a good thing. And there are a number of Americans who are concerned about what's happening to their own democratic institutions and are pushing back. And there are a number of Americans who are concerned about the behavior and the attitudes and the position of the United States in the world. But also, I think we can't escape from this. We just are so interlinked. The age before 1914, when the First World War broke out, was the other great age of globalization. And it was an extraordinary age. But this one, I think the globalization has gone even further. The movements of people around the world, which was there before 1914, the interdependence of world economies, the spread of communications. I think we are even more globalized than we were before. I think we are even more global. And of course, we face collectively as a species, the threats of pandemics and the threats of climate change. And if one thing has happened this summer, it's told us that climate change is not just a blip. You've talked about the different mindsets that came together on the eve of the First World War and how many different ideas that were floating about. But would you agree that a number of the ideas that are now popping up again, particularly fierce nationalism, religious fundamentalism, authoritarianism, et cetera, seem to be going back to the late 19th century and the eve of the First World War, rather than the sort of enlightened progress that some of us have been hoping for? I'm afraid I'm going to have to agree with you on this one. In fact, some of the ideas that have been floated around, white Christian nationalism in the United States is very much a 19th century idea. And this casual talk of inferior peoples, I mean, that again is pure 19th century. I never thought I'd see social Darwinism coming back. This misapplication of Darwinian thought to human societies that they're all engaged in a struggle for survival. They have natural enemies and some are superior to others. The talk of a superior civilization. I mean, a lot of this goes right back to the 19th century. And it was certainly there in the discourse before the First World War. Even notions of honor, which were talked about, and masculinity, which were being talked about before the First World War. Look at Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense in the United States, who I think has just stopped his own testing temporarily in the military, but seems to want a bunch of people banging their chests and rushing around rippling with muscles, rather than what you probably need in modern warfare. And that is people who are very good with computers and AI and drones. Margaret, war clearly isn't inevitable. And you've made that point. So what do you think governments can take from this era prior to the First World War that might make it less likely that we inadvertently slip into a conflict? Well, clear chains of command. Who is making the decision? How the information is getting to those making the decision? I think I have much more faith in democracies, because as open societies, they have more sources of information and their leaders are less sheltered. What concerns me are societies like Russia today, where from all we hear, and it's very much an enclosed society, particularly at the upper levels, President Putin receives only the information that those around him think he should receive, only the information that will make him happy. And that's the kind of information that he should receive. And that's I find deeply concerning, because our leaders need to be talking to people who don't agree with them. And they need to be talking to people who give them different views. And as I say, democracies do that much better. I think what we also need is good diplomatic services. And this has been a very unfortunate modern development that leaders think and the public think that we don't need diplomats, that all they do is go to tea parties, and they're not much use. And of course, what we do need is people with deep knowledge of different parts of the world, and that includes diplomats who have established relations in that part of the world, who understand the culture and the background and the history of different peoples and who can advise their governments accordingly. I find the lack of knowledge of each other is very, very worrying indeed. And I think there's this mistaken view that you can just fly in, meet someone, have a nice chat and then disappear. I mean, I don't think it works like that. And I find that very worrying. If I could maybe build on that, we see in lots of governments the desire to engage populations in preparing for the threat of war. Are there lessons from the run-up to the First World War about how you prepare populations without feeding the beast of militarism and therefore making it more likely that you get swept along towards war because that's what your populations want to do in a fit of patriotism, but is actually against the more rational judgments of leaders? I think you can prepare people, for rainy days, without turning them into water beings. What we need is political leaders who will say, and it's beginning to happen in Canada with Prime Minister Carney, we are going to have to spend more on defense. We're going to have to think seriously about defense and we're going to have to raise your taxes. We can't do everything you want us to do. Collectorates have got used to the idea they can have cake today, cake tomorrow and have whatever they want without too much financial pain. And I just don't think that is fair. And I think that's a very, very important issue. I think it's fair to the electorates and I don't think it's fair to the government of the people for the fact that the world might get difficult. Some of the Scandinavian countries encourage people to keep a supply of food on hand. I'm interested in the talk of renewed forms of national service, not in terms of marching and militarism, which I agree can be a very dangerous thing, but the idea that you have an obligation to your society and that there are ways in which you contribute to it, which I think is also actually beneficial for societies. Countries that have some form of national service actually help to lower social barriers. So it's work with each other, live with each other, get to know each other in ways that they may well not do in the ordinary round of civilian life. We have a lot of testimonies from the First and Second World Wars. I never knew that the lower classes read poetry, for example, would say a young upper class officer. There is a sense that we are part of a larger society and I think anything can be done to foster that, I think is important. Margaret, you have given us a wonderful tool to resolve different factors that came together to bring about war in 1914. I think Paul and I were hoping you'd give us slightly more optimistic ideas about it, but still, and it's depressing that the factors you put forward that might and should help us pull together now and that we're all threatened by is actually climate change. May you be right that climate change will, in a bizarre way, possibly contradictorily save us by actually having to fight it together. Thank you so much for sharing your wisdom with us today, Margaret. Goodbye. Thank you for those very hard questions. Thank you for joining us for this RUCI podcast brought to you in partnership with Korn Ferry. If you would like to catch up on any of our earlier episodes, please visit your usual streaming platform or try our webpage at ruci.org. And to hear about future episodes, you can follow RUCI on social media. Having examined the extent to which the idea that we are in a pre-war era is accurate, as far as the First World War is concerned, next time we'll turn our attention to the 1930s leading up to World War II. Professor Joe Maiolo joins us to talk about the similarities and differences and how even where trends are recognisable, it is often how even similar events interact that makes a difference to the outcomes. We hope that you can join us as we discuss how the emergence means that the future is never preordained. Thank you for listening to the RUCI Podcast. We hope you'll join us for the next episode.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Historical analogies can be useful for strategic thinking but risk becoming traps if overrelied upon, as seen in the misapplication of appeasement policies in both the 1930s and 20th-century conflicts.
  2. The pre-World War I period was marked by competing visions of global order—conservative concert systems versus liberal internationalism—creating tension over power, sovereignty, and influence.
  3. Nationalism, military competition, and fears of rising powers (especially Germany) were more significant causes of war than imperial rivalry, which had largely been resolved by 1914.
  4. The arms race and mutual suspicion, particularly between Germany and Russia, combined with a sense of urgency and time pressure, drove decisions that escalated into war.
  5. Alliances were loose and inconsistently enforced, failing to provide reliable deterrence, while the perception of a "window of opportunity" encouraged aggressive action.
  6. Today’s world shares similarities with 1914 in the erosion of norms, rising nationalism, and aggressive behavior by key powers—especially the U.S. and Russia—though global interdependence provides greater risk of mutual consequences.
  7. Modern threats such as AI, biological weapons, and climate change add complexity, but also potential for collective action, offering a counterbalance to conflict.
  8. Democratic societies with transparent decision-making and strong diplomatic engagement are better equipped to avoid war, unlike closed systems like Russia where leaders receive only favorable information.

Summary:

The podcast explores parallels between the pre-First World War era and today’s geopolitical landscape, emphasizing how historical analogies can inform—but not dictate—strategic decisions. Professor Margaret Macmillan highlights that while imperial competition was less central than commonly believed, nationalism, arms races, and fears of being outpaced by rivals were key drivers of war. She argues that alliances were weak and poorly enforced, and that political complacency—such as the British dismissal of escalating tensions—played a major role in the outbreak of conflict.

S. and Russia, and the rise of nationalist and authoritarian ideologies mirror the pre-1914 environment. However, significant differences exist: today’s world is more interconnected, with real-time communication, advanced technologies like AI, and shared global threats such as climate change.

These factors could foster cooperation rather than conflict. Macmillan stresses that democratic institutions, transparent information flows, and strong diplomatic engagement are essential to prevent a repeat of war, warning that closed, isolated governments—like Russia—pose a greater risk to global stability. Ultimately, while the risk of conflict remains high, the interdependence of modern societies may make collective action—driven by shared existential threats—more likely than in the past.

FAQs

Historical analogies can be useful for constructive thinking but may become traps if they oversimplify complex situations. For example, the appeasement policy in the 1930s was wrongly based on an analogy to past dictators, leading to disastrous outcomes. Overreliance on a single analogy can blind decision-makers to alternative perspectives and lead to poor strategic choices.

Nationalism fueled intense rivalries and created a belief in inherent enemies, making states more willing to go to war. Many leaders saw their nation as superior and believed in the inevitability of conflict with other nations, especially when those nations were seen as threats to national identity or security.

Imperial competition was a factor, but not the main cause. By 1914, most colonies were already divided, and powers had informal understandings not to divide them further. The real tension came from military competition, arms races, and fears of losing strategic advantage, especially in raw materials and markets.

Alliances were weak and often ineffective due to lack of enforcement and clear obligations. Today, alliances must be actively maintained, built on trust, interoperability, and shared command. A crisis can reveal whether a country will support its allies, and trust must be earned through long-term cooperation, not just declared in times of peace.

Today, there is a sense of urgency and competition where powers act aggressively, break norms, and declare war openly—similar to the mindset before 1914. The U.S. and other powers are seen as acting independently, while Russia and others don’t follow international rules, creating instability and a dangerous sense that war is inevitable.

Leaders who receive only favorable information—like Putin's inner circle—make poor decisions. In democracies, open discourse and access to diverse views are vital. Leaders who ignore dissenting opinions or rely on propaganda are more likely to misjudge threats and take reckless actions that escalate conflict.

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