Ron Brownstein: It's MUCH Worse for Trump Than 2018 | Bulwark on Sunday
44m 38s
The 2026 U.S. elections are being shaped by a deep and broad wave of public discontent against Donald Trump, whose approval ratings have fallen to levels not seen since the 1970s, with over 50% of voters strongly disapproving. This decline is most pronounced among non-college whites and white evangelicals, who were once core to Trump’s coalition. The wave is spreading into traditionally Republican states like Ohio, Iowa, Texas, and Kansas, where Trump’s support has dropped below 50% in states where he previously won by large margins. While Republicans maintain financial advantages, the structural shift in public sentiment is making it increasingly difficult for them to hold onto power. Democrats are seeing strong potential in the House and Senate, particularly in states with a history of voting for Trump, but they are currently underperforming in converting disapproving Republicans into votes—only 70–85% of such voters are supporting Democrats, compared to 89–93% in prior cycles. A key uncertainty is whether disapproving Republican voters will show up in sufficient numbers, which could significantly alter the outcomes. The Senate is viewed as far more pivotal than the House due to its six-year terms and influence over Supreme Court appointments; Democrats could gain enough seats to prevent Republican control before 2030. Economic factors, especially rising gas and diesel prices, are seen as potential disruptors that could energize the wave. Overall, the election reflects a rare convergence of deep disapproval and broad geographic shifts, making 2026 a potential inflection point in post-Trump American politics. While a final reversal of swing voters remains possible, current polling and trends suggest a strong, if not decisive, advantage for Democrats, especially in key battleground states.
Hi, Bill Crystal here. Welcome to Bullwork on Sunday. Before I begin discussing what's going to happen in just over three weeks with Ron Brownstein. I just want to remind people we have a little southern tour coming up Charlotte and Columbia are sold out a couple of few tickets left for Atlanta. So if you'd like to come see us in Atlanta, I'll be there actually on Tuesday night. I believe it is October 20th. Go to the Bullwork.com/events and we'd love to see you there. Okay, enough about that and I'm joined by Ron Brownstein, old friend and excellent commentator on American politics. Broadly on American politics, American music too for that matter. We're just chatting about before we went on camera. And especially elections, I think it's fair to say. When did you become? I became an election junkie when I was pretty young. How about you? Not really, you know, I was, I was a baseball joint. I was at National Journal in 1983. I guess early 1984 and Mike Wines, the great Mike Wines left National Journal to go to the New York Times and the late great Dick Frank plugged me in to help cover the 1984 presidential campaign. And I never looked back. I did take care of it. I became an election junkie because I was a baseball coach, so I had the baseball media. Yeah, well, Michael. And I studied all I studied all, you know, the back of the baseball card and the numbers in the back of the baseball cards. And I thought, well, elections is basically similar, you know what I mean? So I still have that. But you know, Michael Barone before he kind of became more ideological when he was just kind of a numbers guy really the first of the great congressional him and Kevin Phillips really kind of the first the great number cruncher. He was a baseball guy and and and then found that it applied to politics and he peter heart as well. I think it's a high correlation. Yeah, sports. Right. But especially on the election stuff has maybe baseball likes which were for these are generation we're kind of unique by you didn't have those kinds of statistics football or basketball. And of course baseball has that individualization anyway enough about all that let's talk about 2026 even I've discussed it before. Let's take a few minutes just on the general lay of the land. You know, I spoke. I was on a panel Friday speaking to a whole bunch of German students actually. Very nice group and the final give. Okay, two minutes. Give me what's going to happen in 2026. What's the big thing to watch? Give me your two or three or four minute. Top line on 2026 and then I'll go through some of the some of the aspects of it. The big story is it's the wave versus the wall and both are bigger than in 2018 by any measure the wave of public discontent with Trump and the economy is bigger than it was in 2018. His approval rating now is as much as 10 points lower than it was in 2018. Lower, in fact, then Biden in 22 Obama and 10 Clinton in 94 even bush in 06 which was the weakest of any modern president and I think a big part of the story this year bill is not only the depth as I've just been describing of Trump's decline but the breadth of it and in a way that was not the case in 2018. Seeing cracks in his support even among core groups in the Republican coalition particularly whites without a for your college degree role voters, Pew had him at 54% among white evangelicals in their poll last week. That's probably not that bad but and the breadth of the decline is the key to what is widening the map for Democrats without a doubt. You know you would you could not realistically be talking about a state like Ohio Iowa if Trump was still in the 60s among non college whites because you know they're there they're majority of the voters in places like that. I think the wave is bigger than in 2018 is also I guess broader I mean like it has potential but but the wall the wall is substantial to and by the wall I mean the Republican money advantage is much bigger than it was in 2018 when Democrats actually I think had the had the net it out everything Democrats had the advantage. The money doesn't seem to be mattering as much as Republicans had hope but I'm not sure we can say it won't matter at all. But the bigger the bigger change is that the map you know the wall the the essence of the wall is the map you know the selection is being fought overwhelmingly in places that voted for Trump. And they have a lot of residual Republican leaning in their DNA I mean where there are only eight House Republicans in districts that voted for Harris even after redistricting and there were triple three times as many in districts that vote for Clinton in 2018. And in the Senate Susan Collins is the only Republican of course in a state she's the only Republican left in a state that voted for Kamala Harris 19 states voted three times against Trump Susan Collins is the last Republican left in those states. And then Roy Cooper is the only Republican only Democrat running for Republican seat in a state that voted for Trump by single digits every other Senate see Democrats are contesting is in a state that voted double digits for Trump. And if you go back through history that's not easy even in a big wave year it's not easy to flip a state that voted double digits only two years before for the other side. So you know I would say that all the wave is growing faster the Republicans are stacking bricks but the wave is growing so high that you cannot fully contain it. But does it extend into Iowa you know Texas Texas looks actually yes Kansas Nebraska that's really it I mean where does where does the where does the wave hit the wall like how far above the wall does the wave get. Now that's that's very well said very helpful actually I think you and I have always been I will say to our credit a little ahead of the curve and thinking the wave was going to be big and was getting bigger. And I think one of the big tip also it was in the summer often I've seen this before this wave but then it kind of received some picks up a little bit sometimes the last month to do they was really never a moment has not yet been a moment this year honestly when there's been any. Let's call it reversion to the me or Republican evidence of Republican voters coming home doesn't mean it couldn't happen right in the last three weeks but I feel like that's pretty significant I mean you know talks about that Bill John insolony the Democratic bolster was who is Biden's bolster and really has been his whole career polling in red states you know red districts the hard places for Democrats and he said the other day that you know August is always good for Democrats and then September is miserable you know like September is when you see. September is when you see that snap back particularly in the kind of places where he works which are the kind of places that will decide how big this gets and he said just it just didn't happen this year like it just never snap back you know I am a structuralist probably to an excess like I I you know probably do not put as much weight as I should on individual candidates and idiosyncrasies you know I just look at the fundamentals and the fundamentals is the fundamental the key fundamental is that Donald Trump's already is so low. And you know and and you know by the way the other thing I should mention at the beginning when you talk about the wave the other sign of the wave it's really Trump and turn out first money and map because when a president's approval rating is this low and you have such strong disapproval right I mean that's important half of voters say they strongly disapproved of Trump and that historically has been a real marker of turnout and in fact if you look at special elections and if you look at primaries the Democratic advantage over before. The average over performance relative to the previous presidential is higher in special elections in this cycle than it was leading into 2018 and the total share of the primary vote that has been cast by Democrats is higher than it was in 2018 so like all those traditional indicators. Basically say you have a way billy cylinder legs said to me in my story today and she's been doing this as long as we have I mean she's been doing this since the eighties a democratic ulcer she said in my political career we've never had as broad a consensus in the society that a president has failed as we have today in Trump's second term. You keep saying 2018 of course compared to that because that was the previous Trump in term and it makes sense and Democrats picked up a lot of House seats didn't gain in the Senate. I just felt a little more to be though like 2006 or even like in 1994 which I was quite involved in and we used to just a lot of those that year I remember and I just felt early then and I you know I've been wrong guidance about other things as a rare case where I was right that it just could be much bigger than people realized. I guess I felt that all along you you and I discussed maybe two or three months ago last conversation we had like this one thing you were interested well you've been very strong on the president's approval of the single most important thing and that but then the generic ballot the congressional generic ballot was not nearly as dramatic as the disapproval and the question I think the way you put it was is it going to catch up to the gradually catch up never going to get all the way there. They'll always be some Republicans who will stick Republican for the Senate while disapproving with Trump but we'll get closer to the disapproval or is that just a different voters willing to disaggregate them to some degree. So say say a word about the generic versus the disapproval and I think you stress so often so interestingly the importance of how many Trump what percentage of Trump disappears the Democrats can get. Right I think the way I phrased it was that historically the generic ballot has bent to the gravity of the presidential disapproval rather than the other way around and that ultimately Republicans face the risk of at that point the summer a false sense of security because the generic was lagging behind the disapproval and I said the history is that they tend to converge. You know the history is that views of the out party do not matter as much as views of the president I mean you know in the 2010 exit polls.
the the the the share of voters were the favorable image of the Republican party was no higher than the share of voters of the favorable image of the Democratic party and Republicans won 62 or 63 house seats because that's not what they were voting on right, right? So, so today, as as you know, as I said, it's not only the depth of Trump's disapproval, it's the breath. It's not only that he's staring at a 60% disapproval. It's that he is underwater in states that he won with 55% or more of the vote in the New York Times, did its polls the other day of it was the last week in the red states. He was on he was at 41% or below in Iowa, Ohio, Texas, Kansas and Alaska. Yeah, all of the most in 41 and 38. Yeah, between 41 and 38 in states where he got 55% or more, right? And that pretty much tells you there was there was a sienna pole, right? Again, Santa, Santa. And I think people kind of respect the Sienna New York Times polls more than anybody at this point in Stefanox district that he where he was at 60% of the vote and he was under 50. The Washington Post, char school polls had him in Virginia one in five that he won comfortably under 50, right? Consistently in national polling now, he is only at around 50, 50 among non-college whites. He's one, two thirds of them in all three of his presidential campaigns in Ohio and Iowa and those near time polls, he's around 50, 50 among college whites. Now, you know, many of those voters, there's almost there's almost a paradox here. We as you move deeper into Republican core Republican constituencies and find that the the rot of Trump disapproval is spreading there. You're encompassing more voters who are really reluctant to vote for a Democrat, no matter what. So it is unlikely to me that Democrats are going to match their performance among Trump disapprovers that they had in his first term in his first term. 90% of voters who disapproved of Trump said they voted Democratic for the House in 2018 and 93% did in 2020. Every Democratic Senate candidate except Sarah Gideon except again Susan Collins in 2020 and every Democratic Senate candidate except Gideon in 18 and 21, at least 89% of voters who disapproved of Trump. As you and I've talked about, that's what we saw in 25, when Jay Jackson, 189% of Trump disapprovers in the Virginia AG race, Jay Jones, sorry. And Spamberg and Cheryl, one over 90% of Trump disapprovers. OK, Democrats are not there now. I mean, if there is a worrying sign for Democrats is that they are way underperforming that number generally. They're generally on a good day. Democrats are like 80 to 85% of Trump disapprovers and the races that are not where they should be given the approval there in the high 70s. And that really is the game. I mean, they don't need, you know, Trump's disapproval is so high. You don't read, you don't need to wait 90% of Trump disapprovers to win in most places anymore. You probably need low to mid 80s. Right. And so, you know, as else, I had going to get there against Mike Rogers is Tolerico going to get there is Troy Jackson going to get there against Collins. That by the way, that's the difference in polls in Maine. Like when the polls that have him four or five points ahead have him around 83, 84, 85% of Trump disapprovers. And the polls that have it tied only have him in the 70s. Susan Collins held Sarah Gideon to 71% of voters who disapproved the Trump. That was far better. As I said, no other Republican held the Democrat to less than 89% of Trump disapprovers in any Senate race and combiner challenger during his first term. You know, I, you know, depends on the state, but like somewhere around 83, 84, 85% is probably the magic number of a Democrat hits that among Trump disapprovers, they're going to win in most contested places. And as you said, you said it very quickly. So I just, I mean, there's a reason, of course, you're not going to get to 90% of these places. You're getting so deep into the Republican bucket that you're just going to, they're going to be less able to flip than the soft, than the soft Republicans who flipped in 2018. And also, you know, the final number may go up because there are a fair number of people and I think you're, I think you have said this as well. You know, if you are a Republican leaning voter who disapproves of Trump, how many of them are ultimately going to show up? Well, that's the key, right? The differential turnout question. What do you see about that? Do you have any indications on that? I mean, that's been a, Democrats are kind of counting on that to give the final. Yeah, final cherry on the Sunday in a couple of these especially in the red states and red districts, obviously. Historically, you'd say a fair number of them don't show up. I mean, like, if you look at 2024 and I had Pew run some of these numbers for me with their validated voters that people love is probably the most respected post election. Many people say it is the most respected post election survey, you know, only about seven or eight percent of Hispanics who voted for Biden in 20 switched to vote for Trump in 24, 28% of Hispanics who voted for Biden in 20 didn't vote in 24. That was, that not showing up is now a measure of disapproval. It's like swing voters are not only people who swing between the parties and people who swing between the couch and actually coming out to vote. And so historically, you would say, yeah, I think a fair number of those people are not going to vote. That'll change the math. I'm not thinking here. It'll change the denominator, I guess. And the number, the Democratic share of Trump just approvers could be higher than it is today. The only caveat is where we started, like, you know, we're talking about elections in Ohio, Iowa, Texas, Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska, South Carolina. There's a lot of Republican DNA in those states. And can you, you know, I was in Alaska, and I came back thinking there are like 10 different things working for Mary Peltola. She's a great unusual candidate. Trump's really unpopular gas prices, grocery prices, corruption in Washington, frustration with the political status quo. And there's one thing working for Sullivan. There's one thing working for John used to one thing working for Ken Backstaff, one thing working at all these races, which is that there is probably still a majority of voters in those states who are reluctant to let Democrats set the national direction. Like there are at least uneasy about a Democratic majority Senate. And so can you weaponize that enough to overcome everything else? They're unhappy about, you know, I would say no, in most cases, but like deep down, would any of us be shocked if a Republican wins by a point in the end in Kansas or Iowa or maybe even Texas, I think Texas would be more surprising at this point because the candidate is so weak. But that really is it, you know, I mean, you're kind of, you're kind of running, and this might be, I mean, you're kind of running as the out of limits of places and states that Democrats can win because Trump is weaker than any other president has been in the midterm. I don't even think Carter was not this low in 78. Certainly Reagan was not in 82. And, you know, Ford, pardon Nixon. So maybe, maybe this is the lowest since Truman in 50. Now, it's where I've been, so I've always been bullish for Democrats. I think I was early on campus. I will say to my credit, which is how treated as a correctly, I think, as an up in the air stage is like Iowa. But I've always thought that even the great plain states were more getable. And one reason was there's some just individual reasons some of these states, the independent candidate for the Democrats is withdrawn and so forth, little more acceptable to Republicans, a little less motivating for them to say Republican. But also because I've instructed your researchers and the numbers have shown this, I think, very much right. People talk about the white working class, but the not evangelical white working class is different from the evangelical white working class. And I've always thought, well, okay, those, those great plain type states are less evangelical. The South is more so. I've always thought, I've always thought the South wouldn't come through. I've got to say now, looking in, I'd like you to go through these numbers. I now look at South Carolina, even Florida and Florida and think, I don't know the cracks in the evangelical support are there too though. And, you know, just final point, you can react to all of them. I mean, people are a little overdoing it that you think on how Republican some of these states are. It's not like none of them is ever elected a Democrat in modern times. It's not like Sheridan was actually set up for Ohio, Kansas, America, Democratic governor, and, you know, and et cetera. Some of the habits, I'd be elected like South Carolina. That's pushing it a little Florida was a what a one to one or two point race in 2018. Texas, where everyone's so surprised by a final point I make by Taloriko, certainly though, if you took came to us from, you know, we were some guy from Mars, came down and said, okay, Beto lost his crews by what two points in 2018 and Texas, two and a half. Trump is 10 points 10 points weaker next today. Yeah, then he was then Trump is much weaker. Right as approval is five lower five five or six points lower. Democrats have probably a maybe a more acceptable candidate to a little more if you were in dependence over against the beta was and Republicans have a lot weaker. candidate tax to then cruise, why shouldn't why shouldn't tell her we go beyond five points. I mean, why shouldn't there be seven points for Texas, you know, so just the evangelical not evangelical. Yeah, I've written is is is not just enough by people, you know, I've written several stories over the year about what Mike Pothors or somewhat tongue in cheek calls any NCAA right non evangelical mom college whites. As a former political director of the AFL CIO, he always resents the idea that the white working class is the bulwark of the Trump as a word coalition.
and points out that, yes, if you look at the non-college whites who are not evangelicals, Democrats perform much better and sometimes win them, they don't always win them. I mean, they still lose them, and I think the non-evangelical non-college whites in the Rust Belt states, but they're certainly more competitive there. And Iowa does have a lot of evangelical-- and so does Ohio, I think, less so. Kansas may as well, actually. I mean, Kansas may be another state where that's an issue. One of us, if you had graphics, we could Google on the Public Religion Research Institute has a very nice map of American religion and we could tell you what sheriff, Kansas voters, or what even jungles. But yeah, look, I mean, you're right. I mean, these are states that have-- where Democrats were certainly more competitive in the Obama era. I mean, one of Trump's greatest strengths is that he has taken red leaning states and made them really red. I mean, that he has done. He has taken Florida, Ohio, and Iowa, really off the board. And Democrats have a chance to put them back on the board. I mean, you have to say they're favored in the governor races in Ohio and Iowa, probably favored in the center race at this point in Ohio, and a coin flip in Iowa. I don't know what to make of Florida. I mean, we have divergent polling. I guess I'm kind of skeptical until proven otherwise. I could imagine, again, it is easy to kind of get voters to look past their ideological priors in the governor than in a Senate race, right? So I'm not vastly easier. You and I have talked about, I focus a lot on the Trump 25, the 25 states that have voted all three times for Trump. Democrats right now have zero of their 50 Senate seats, but they do have three of the governorships. Right, Kansas, Kentucky, and North Carolina. Not vastly more, but at least a little bit of an in-road. So yeah, I mean, again, but the wave is really high. And it can wash over into these places, but I don't think I said I'm not going to be surprised if Republicans hold on narrowly in Kansas and Nebraska. I'm going to be surprised if they, at the trajectory we're going, it often gets worse at the end, not better. And given everything's happening in the Middle East or diesel prices, the attacks on Saudi Arabia, I mean, are diesel prices going to spike again before the end? And that's critical in these farm belt states, obviously. You know, by the way, by the way, the, you know, you can make a case that once you start getting passed, I don't know, 230, 232 in the house, you're renting seats for two years that you're going to get back. And like, so what, you know, I mean like really, the Senate is six years, okay? How old are Alito and Thomas? Like every, every additional Senate seat reduces the odds of Republicans regaining the Senate before 2030 and maybe 2032. Given how little playing field there normally is, right? So, you know, if people have been listening carefully, I said that, you know, Democrats have zero Senate seats in the 25 states that voted three times a Trump. Republicans have only one Senate seat in the, in the 19 states that voted three times against Trump. There's very little movement. There's very little a give in the Senate. So if Democrats can swipe in an historically bad year, seats in Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, much less South Carolina and Florida, you could build a cushion that will make it very hard for there to be a Republican Senate, I think, before 2030 and probably 2032, which would require Alito and Thomas to stay on six more years. - No, it's so interesting. I mean, and important, I think Tim Miller and I have him pull their hair out about this. I think you've commented on it in a less, pulling your hair out of way. I mean, the Democrats still, everyone's always like, I mean, I don't blame them because I probably am the opposite. You're a structuralist, I'm a momentum guy kind of, so I always move or do it a little probably. But the idea that people, you go to these, I was at a meeting just two, four days ago. The House is the key. We need to focus on the House, this Democratic Offerer of Types. And I think, are you kidding me? The House is done, I think. I mean-- - Right, what's the difference? - And what's the difference between having 225, 230, or 235, honestly, in the real world? They're not going to govern for the next two years. They'll pass most of what they want to pass. Trump will sign any of it. The Senate matters so much more. One Senate seat is worth so much. I feel like it says, do you ever play jazz? I mean, the Dishes versus Nights kind of debate, which is really worth it. The Senate seat is worth so much more than the House on the margin. And as you say, it's six years, the Senate will tip one way or the other. It confirms, just Supreme Court justices, but all federal judges, it confirms cabinet officers having both houses, even with narrow marches, it's worth so much more than having one house, even with a city you can march. You think the Democratic Offerers and Donors are finally realizing that, yeah, and these are cheap states and sentences. And who knows whether you can pick up Nebraska at the Kansas, you might well be able to, who knows you, or even if you go up to South Dakota with the independent, if you go down to South Carolina. But picking up one of those just for, it's worth so much more than the extra four house seats on the board. - Well, there's no question. - And do you think Democratic or operative in front Donor World is adjusted to this? - I don't talk to Donor World enough anymore to really know what Donor World is thinking. I think the, but objectively, first of all, Democrats probably may need to get to 52 Senate seats if they, because with 51, the drama, the drama alone may appeal to the federalment, to be the center of the universe and shift it back to a 50/50 Senate, in which case, Alito and Thomas would certainly retire in 27 and 28. Democratic Senate, I do not believe, I do not believe, after McConnell, Garland, a Senate of the opposite party will, again, in my lifetime at least, confirm a president. You know, a president of one party could not get a Supreme Court Justice or a Senate of the other party. I don't think, if it's on day one of the presidency anymore, I really think that's over. Like, I just don't see it. Now, you know, especially in kind of the, Democrats have been confirmed, obviously, a lot of Reagan, Democratic Senate confirmed Reagan, what was it, they confirmed Kennedy, and, right? - After, after defeating Bork, though. - After defeating Bork, but they did confirm Kennedy, right? - Yeah. - And they did confirm Kennedy. And I just don't see that happening again, after Garland. So yeah, I mean, and you look forward to 28, obviously, that's the class of '22. There is seats, Democrats don't have to worry about. But I think they, you know, you start getting up to 53 or 54 Senate seats. - Yeah. - You know, you're building a little bit of a cushion. You know, here's an interesting, okay, I'm just gonna say if I find the number. You know, you and I have talked about, I, one of my other obsessions beside presidential disapproval and of the vote, and maybe it's related to that, is how difficult it's become to maintain unified control of government, right? The last five times a president went into the midterm, important phrasing, last five times the president went into the midterm with unified control of government, voters have revoked it. So that is Biden in '22, Trump in '18, Obama in '10, Bush in '06, Clinton in '94. The asterisk is that Bush lost unified control in a one when Jeffords switch and got it back in '02. But basically, if you go into the midterm with unified control of government, and voters see that clearly you are the party in charge, no president has defended that since Jimmy Carter in '78, and that was an anti-deluvian time when Democrats could not lose the South. That was the only reason he defended unified control. However, however, the flip side is also true, is that every president since Clinton, every newly elected president, has arrived with unified control. So Biden had unified control when he got into the first time. Trump had unified control when he got it for the first time, when he got it in the second time. Bush got in with unified control. Clinton, I went back this weekend, only six times since the formation of the modern party system in '18, '28, only six times has a president come in without unified control. You haven't a serve in a couple of them. The Reagan and the Bush administrations, but it is common for voters, now it has become common to revoke unified control quickly, but they also tend to grant it to a new president. So that is just something to keep in mind, that if Democrats win the Senate and the House this year, and they win the White House in '28, the odds of them losing either Chamber while winning the presidency are very small. And again, like whatever you think, a Democratic president may or may not accomplish in their first two years, tearing down the East Wing, et cetera, tearing down the ballroom that tore down the East or in tearing down the arch, passing a public option on health care, there's nothing more important than outweating the clock on Thomas and Alito. Nothing, there's nothing that can happen, I think, in domestic legislation that will change America more than whether Democrats can hold the Senate long enough to get a legitimate shot at five Supreme Court seats. - No, that's so, yeah, that's so interesting. And it is, no, it's very-- - I gotta write that. - You should be there, and I think, I mean, the Democrats want to talk about their agenda a little bit all the time, and I don't like it when I say, you know what, you should just talk about, you need to check Trump for the next two years. That's what the voters are voting. I mean, people sometimes make it seem like voters kind of.
silly to be focused on presidential approval. But the fundamental choice voters have is do you want to check Trump, or do you want to get Trump further support? - And that's why he's having to come out the way they have. - Yeah, it's not foolish of the voters. They know the Democrats aren't running the country for the next two years. Certainly, the House, literally, I mean-- - I said that they are making a slightly longer investment, which is why maybe there'll be a little more resistance than a couple of these cases. But I do think that the Supreme Court thing will be interesting. It's helped the Republicans somewhat over the last 20 years basically that issue. - Well, you could not run on that in the States that you have to win. - No, but you know, because I'm not checking. Natural voters would agree with this. - Well, that's a good point. - No, but they do need, don't you think the Democrats need? I still feel like their message just needs to be, ultimately, do you want more of the same, the last few years or not? And they need to sort of forget about, they're all there nice ideas about the public option, and, you know-- - They really have suppressed that this year. - Yeah, they've done pretty good-- - I agree with that, yeah. - They got out of their own democratic-- - They got out of their own way, right? - Yeah, I mean, there's, you know, a lot of it is just undoing what Trump did. I'm gonna put pressure on him to end the war. I'm gonna reverse the tariffs. I am gonna let Medicare negotiate for more prescription drugs. Many of them have the public option. I think the Medicare for All thing is more of a problem. That, you know, may or may not bite Troy Jackson and El Sayed, Peggy Flanagan. And they're, they're important, say, you know, by the way, those three, you know, the kind of the three leftist, most left candidates they've got, Minnesota, Michigan, and Maine, are all running in states where they're electing governors. And the Democrats have nominated more central school editorial nominees. And I think it'll be interesting to compare how they perform versus how they go. I understand you great on the curve because it's easier to, as I said, put aside partners in shipping and governorship. But yeah, I mean, you know, you could literally, do you have your memos from 1994? What was the project for the free republic? For the republic of future. Yeah, no, I don't know if I have them. They're probably available somewhere I can find. But like, you could, you could send that to Adam Hamilton, you know, I mean, you know, you know, because it really isn't that complicated in the midterm. I mean, the single most important factor in how midterms turn out in modern American politics is views of the incumbent president. You know, the, the correlation between approval and disapproval of the president and how you vote for House or Senate in the midterm is much higher than it was in the '70s. And higher even than it was in the '80s. Reagan's approval was 50% in 1982. And they lost 26 seats, you know? I can, you know, and again, go back, like Reagan, Reagan and Bush won 38 states, all three elections of the 1980s. And in January, 1989, at the end of that, Democrats still had a majority of the House seats and a majority of the Senate seats from those 38 states. Right? Now, as I said, Democrats have zero Senate seats in the 25 states of voter for Trump three times. And they have about a quarter of the House seats and that's going down because of redistricting. But this is, I mean, I feel like, I don't know, I feel like this is the once in a century flood that will tell you how far over the levy the water can get because it's never gonna be better for Democrats. Like, you will not have a president this unpopular absent, what? I mean, Trump's in the mid 30s. I mean, Pew had him in 30, which is probably, you know, excessive. And again, since many Trump disapprovers, like if you had to predict today, the exit polls will look a little different than the polling going in because Trump disapproving Republicans may not show up. In which case, his approval rating will be a little higher in the exit polls than it is today. And the share of Trump disapprovers voting Democrat will also be a little higher than it is today. That's probably what's gonna happen. That's what I'm that unhappening. And, you know, is that enough to get to Rick and Hamilton over the line? It's gonna be close. - I mean, it is. And of course, probably we continue to have the same general patterns and rules that we've had even after a big Democratic wave. But it could also be a moment that does change is kind of an inflection point as well because a lot then, a lot depends on what happens in the actual country in the actual governance of the country and the world. You know, over the next two, four, six years obviously. But the degree to which it is a kind of historic opportunity at least for six years, right? - Oh, yeah. - At least for four years. - And certainly for 28, certainly for 28. I mean, again, if you go through American history long before polling, find the examples of a party that held onto the White House in an election to succeed an unpopular president. It does not happen very ever. Woodrow Wilson in 1920, he left office, it flipped. Truman in '52, he left office, it flipped. Johnson in '68, Bush, Biden, the only example, the only example, I think, of the outgoing president being unpopular and his party winning the elections to succeed him was the stolen election of 1876 when Grant left him in scandal and Rutherford B. Hayes had to steal the election by promising to end reconstruction. But if Trump stays where he is, I mean, you know, past performance, no guarantee of future results and all that, but if Trump stays where he is, I would say the possession arrow points to Democrats in '28. I mean, if 60% of the country said he has mismanaged, if 60% of the voters say he has mismanaged the country, it's a lot to ask them to say, let's continue in this direction. Can you make the other side scary enough? Maybe, depending on who you nominate, but maybe not. - And it doesn't help that much as you would suggest to have a candidate from the same party, even if he's not that closely associated with the president. McCain, I was a big McCain guy. McCain's not like Bush. That's not gonna pay a huge price for Bush. - Yeah, I think '65, you know, McCain did better among bush disapprovers than court did among Clinton disapprovers or Bush did among Reagan disapprovers, but it didn't do well enough. There was too many of them, right? - Yeah, the truth is Democrats weren't like to hear this, 'cause they're all gonna be into, we're gonna pass this legislation and we're gonna put Trump on the spot, which is all fine with me in investigations. The single best thing Democrats could then do for the next two years is just keep Trump's numbers down and he's going lower, right? I mean, they won't want to hear this because it is the single by best predictor, though, of what's gonna happen. - As Mitch McConnell said to Major Garrett, when Major was working with me at National Journal in 2010, what is our number one goal? It is to make Obama one term president, so. - They failed that, no, so that's, but that was the first two, but that was his first. - That's the same idea. - No, totally the same idea, no. - And look, you were in the way. I mean, you saw this from the other side. I mean, actually, George Mitchell did do a good job in '91, '92, forcing you to do uncomfortable things, yeah. - We can English. - But less setting it up for Clinton. Final thing, you go and let people go. Governors, I mean, it would make a big difference in American politics. If Democrats, I feel like, actually had the governorship in some of these reddish states where they're now competitive. What or two, they might even control a state-legislative chamber, but you know what they don't, even if they don't win the other constitutional offices. I mean, the governors have really, can make a difference in a lot of practical ways. - Yeah. - And so go ahead and talk about the governors, please. - It's key for Democrats to have the governorship in the few swing states where, you know, control of the election machinery and the ability to validly certify an election is important. And they are favorite, certainly in Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin and Arizona. They already have North Carolina. Nevada is kind of the other real, you know, swing state. And that's a toss-up, I think maybe slightly Republican, but I think even more-- - Georgia, and Georgia. - Georgia, excuse me, yes, Georgia is the other one. And that, I would say, lean slightly toward the Republican. But again, that's the kind of thing where as the final weeks go on, you could see the undertow pulling down Jackson. The other thing though, I think Ohio and Iowa, the likelihood of electing a Democratic governor is really important. I mean, you know, when you have no Democratic officials, it's really hard to start from zero, you know, that the party has no rallying point, there's no positive imagery of the party. And this could be, and I'm not saying that, you know, in a presidential year, when there are more non-college whites voting, the Democrats are right away going to win Iowa and Ohio. But winning a governorship is a step toward doing that. And obviously, Texas would be even bigger in that regard. I'll believe that when I see it. - Texas is on the governor level. - That would be, I would say that. - Florida, if we wake up on Wednesday morning and Democrats have won the governorship of Texas and Florida, that will be a truly historic day. It will mean they've won a ton of other stuff. I would expect, and that would be a sort of real possible, I would say, you know, inflection point towards the post-Trump of America. - I remember writing a column years ago that Mago will dominate the Republican party for as long as it can hold Texas. And after, if it can't hold, if it can't hold Texas, you have to reconsider it as an electoral strategy. I think I would put Florida slightly ahead of Texas and in terms of Democrats or anything. But like, you know, let's not just glide past the enormity of Democrats possibly winning the governorship in Ohio and Iowa, given the partisan trends in that part of the world in recent years. I think that could be very significant. And again, giving them, would not be possible without not only the depth, but the breadth of Trump's decline. I mean, that's just so important that, you know, in 2018, in the exit poll still, his approval writing among whites without a four-year college degree was still 61%. - Yeah. - Right now, it's usually slightly below 50-50. And again, like when we get to the exit poll, it'll probably be a little better, but Democrats will win more of the disapprovers because some of those Trump disapproving Republican-Laning voters who now say they're not gonna vote Democratic probably won't vote at all. Final question. Thanks to watch for in the next three.
weeks, final three weeks? I think gas prices, right? I mean, diesel prices, maybe above all, you know, and then I'd say the places where Republicans have not spent a lot and are now spending, like I, it's hard for me to imagine the second hundred million in Texas is going to have a lot more effect than the first hundred million, but that's not really the story in Kansas, right, where they're, where they're just starting or self-carrying. You can try to really crush, crush, ever try to carry, not that well-known, it just paid the picture of her. So, I mean, somewhere, this is the hundred year flood, somewhere the firewall will stop it or the levy will stop it. How deep into Republican territory does that go? I do not anticipate Trump's approval getting materially better. I do not anticipate Republican enthusiasm getting vastly better on a national basis. I think if I was going to watch anything, it would be whether, you know, diesel prices and gas prices make all of this look a little worse and the money can matter in places where the two sides have not been spending. And that's true in the House, too. Although, like I said, whether Democrats get to 235 or 242, 232 or 242 and the House probably isn't that big a deal because unlike the Senate, you really are renting those seats. I mean, Democrats won seats in Charleston and Oklahoma City in 2018 and gave them back two years later and you'd suspect a lot of that would happen. And then the other thing to watch is in a very bullwalking way. At what point do Republicans say this isn't working? Are they willing ever to say that? If, in fact, some of the things you're describing happen, do any of them have, say, the emperor has no clothes? I mean, like, you know, you can't run the, you can't run the country this way and expect to maintain support of a majority of the American people. That's a very good question to close on, actually, which we can discuss after the election. But Rob, this has been terrific, really absolutely terrific, primer, more than a primer, to a sophisticated primer of what's going to look for in the next three weeks and how to think about these elections and what to think about when you see some of these poll numbers. So thank you for joining me. We'll get together after the election and have a good sub-save travel. So are you going anywhere exciting in the next two? Well, I'm actually, I think the next race I'm going to is Lawler Conley, in, because, which is the flips. I've been talking to so much about the non-college whites. It's one of the last well-educated, white, you know, suburban districts that Republicans hold, the vacancy, Tom Kane, Fitzpatrick, Lawler. I mean, they could, they could be, you know, same thing happened to the blue dogs in 2010, the Democratic blue dogs, hunted to virtual extinction. And they have good opponents. I mean, this is where candidates, and this kind of about a house like this, which is a lot of money being spent, having a cake, Kate, my mind's Conley, and I know, in New York and Rebecca Banner, I think, in New Jersey, veterans, you know, modern Democrats that follow. Hey, what are you going to be watching most before the end, before I go between now and the finish line? I think just the obvious. I kind of keep waiting in '94. There was, there was a bit of a reversion back to the Democrats, actually, people forget this, and people got very nervous. Understandably, I mean, they had one the house of 40 years right to be nervous. There wasn't going to happen. And then the last two weeks, the way I think of it is like stock market terms, like, the primary trend we asserted itself. You know, it was like, there's a correction, the dip, and then it went back, the trend kind of kicked in at the end. And I kind of think that's happened in most of the wave years. And so I'm, I keep waiting for the dip. There hasn't been much of one, but does it straw out? Is there a little coming back home for the Republicans? Or do we, I'd be very curious to see state level, even district level polls, whether you have a little bit of a continued uptick in the Democratic number, and especially on the enthusiasm to degree that can be measured or not. So I think, I think probably what we're seeing now is a recently good predictor of where the final vote is. It's not going to be off by huge numbers of percentage points. I wouldn't think. But boy, those last two or three points plus or minus can make a huge difference in these states. Again, especially because almost every race is being fought out in a place that voted for Donald Trump in 2004. So the reversion of the mean thing is a risk for Democrats. And as you say, it's not going to be big, but it doesn't have to be that big. And they will probably have some heart breaks, some places where they fall just short. But if that's at the 54th and 55th Senate seat, I think they'll look with it. Yeah, they sure will. Right. Well, thanks so much for joining me today. Save Travels. And we'll talk. We'll talk again soon. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Trump’s approval ratings have dropped sharply, now below Biden in 2022 and lower than past presidents, with strong disapproval among voters—especially among non-college whites and white evangelicals.
The “wave” of public discontent against Trump is broader and deeper than in 2018, spreading across traditional Republican strongholds and weakening GOP support in key states like Ohio, Iowa, Texas, and Kansas.
Despite Republican financial advantages, the Democratic wave is growing rapidly, making it increasingly likely that Democrats will gain ground in both the House and Senate, especially in swing states.
Democrats are underperforming compared to past trends in converting Trump disapprovers into votes—only 70–85% of disapprovers are voting for them, down from 89–93% in prior cycles.
Turnout among disapproving Republicans remains a key uncertainty; if these voters don’t show up, Democrats could gain substantial advantages in close races.
The Senate is seen as far more consequential than the House, with one seat potentially altering the political trajectory for years, especially given the long terms of Supreme Court justices Alito and Thomas.
Democrats have zero Senate seats in the 25 states that voted for Trump three times, but the wave could enable them to gain seats in states like Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa, altering the Senate balance.
Key factors include gas prices, economic conditions, and voter turnout—especially among non-college whites—where disapproval of Trump is high but political loyalty remains a barrier to full Democratic gains.
Summary:
S. elections are being shaped by a deep and broad wave of public discontent against Donald Trump, whose approval ratings have fallen to levels not seen since the 1970s, with over 50% of voters strongly disapproving. This decline is most pronounced among non-college whites and white evangelicals, who were once core to Trump’s coalition.
The wave is spreading into traditionally Republican states like Ohio, Iowa, Texas, and Kansas, where Trump’s support has dropped below 50% in states where he previously won by large margins. While Republicans maintain financial advantages, the structural shift in public sentiment is making it increasingly difficult for them to hold onto power. Democrats are seeing strong potential in the House and Senate, particularly in states with a history of voting for Trump, but they are currently underperforming in converting disapproving Republicans into votes—only 70–85% of such voters are supporting Democrats, compared to 89–93% in prior cycles.
A key uncertainty is whether disapproving Republican voters will show up in sufficient numbers, which could significantly alter the outcomes. The Senate is viewed as far more pivotal than the House due to its six-year terms and influence over Supreme Court appointments; Democrats could gain enough seats to prevent Republican control before 2030. Economic factors, especially rising gas and diesel prices, are seen as potential disruptors that could energize the wave.
Overall, the election reflects a rare convergence of deep disapproval and broad geographic shifts, making 2026 a potential inflection point in post-Trump American politics. While a final reversal of swing voters remains possible, current polling and trends suggest a strong, if not decisive, advantage for Democrats, especially in key battleground states.
FAQs
The main factors are the deep and broad decline in Donald Trump's approval ratings, especially among non-college whites and Republican core voters, and the resulting wave of public discontent. This is compounded by strong disapproval, low turnout among Trump disapprovers, and a significant shift in the political map where Democrats are gaining ground in states that previously voted for Trump.
Trump's approval rating is now lower than it was in 2018 and even lower than previous presidents like Obama, Clinton, and Bush in 2006. In red states like Iowa, Ohio, Texas, and Kansas, he is polling below 40%—a significant drop from his previous support levels.
Strong disapproval of Trump is a major predictor of voter turnout and party alignment. Historically, high disapproval has led to a Democratic advantage in elections. In 2026, a large share of Trump disapprovers are expected to vote Democratic, especially in key battleground states, though turnout among some Republican-leaning disapprovers may be low.
The 'wave' refers to broad dissatisfaction with Trump and his policies, which is growing in both depth and breadth. The 'wall' refers to the Republican base's strong political and financial advantages. However, the wave is growing faster and reaching more Republican-held states, making it harder for Republicans to maintain control in key battlegrounds.
In past elections, over 89% of Trump disapprovers voted Democratic, especially in Senate races. In 2026, that number has dropped to around 80–85%, suggesting a potential weakness for Democrats in key races. However, the drop is not complete, and strong disapproval combined with lower turnout among conservative voters may still favor Democrats.
States like Ohio, Iowa, Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska are most likely to see shifts due to their history of voting for Trump and deep Republican roots. However, the wave of disapproval and economic concerns—like gas prices—are weakening Republican support, especially among non-evangelical white voters and non-college whites.
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