Speaker 1I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. My guest on today's show is Paul Enright, a private investor managing his own capital under single-family office Kranos Capital. Paul opened Kranos after a dozen years at Viking Global Investors, the multi-billion dollar long-short equity hedge fund that also has been one of the most successful breeding grounds for talent in the industry. He has a deep understanding of the intricacies of long-short equity investing and a knack for explaining it well. Our conversation covers Paul's career path to Viking, training while there, and advice to early career investors. We dive into the distinction between business analysis and stock picking, and the importance of portfolio management to investment success. In the process, we discuss liquidity, shorting, portfolio rebalancing, incentive compensation, and market structure. We close with Paul's approach to managing his own money, and his answers to a terrific set of questions sourced from his Twitter feed before the show. I hope you enjoy the show, and if you do, this week it might be time to go back to the office and talk to your boss. Now there'll come a time when you have to make small talk in a way that was protected by virtual work. Well, if you're a virtual investor, you're going to have to make small talk in a way that was protected by virtual work. We'll figure out how to do that in a few minutes. Well, fear not, we have a suggestion. Just before that awkward moment hits in the hallway or the elevator, turn to them and say, you know, I had a chance to listen to the Capital Allocators podcast during the pandemic, and I think you'll really love it. You'll earn a few brownie points for the idea, and probably a big bonus next year after they've listened all year long. Thanks so much for spreading the word. And while you're at it, leave a rating or write a review. Thanks for your support. Capital Allocators is brought to you by AlphaSense. Every allocator sits at their desk for hours preparing the work around investment decisions, getting up to speed on a new theme, prepping for the next investment committee meeting, and tracking what changes across an entire portfolio. AlphaSense just launched something built to help. It's called SuperAnalyst, an always-on agent that works like a power user on your behalf. It draws on over 500 million premium sources, including broker research, expert transcripts, company filings, and earnings calls, and keeps working long after you've gone home for the day. Point SuperAnalyst at a theme, company, or market, and it learns the coverage universe so you can easily turn new insights into the briefs, models, and memos you'd otherwise build by hand. 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Speaker 2You're welcome. Long time coming. Why don't we start with your background? We'll just go from there. I think the thing that stands. To me is that I grew up in Brooklyn, middle-class background, never thought about a stock ever. Didn't have family that talked about the market. Wasn't in a neighborhood that talked about the market. Everyone talked about the Giants and the Mets back then in the 80s, right? That's all I remember talking about. But the other thing I remember is that I think it was a community that grew up in the shadow of World War II, where the country was moving from a manufacturing base to a services base. And so what was beat into my mind, as a kid was, get a diploma on the wall that they can't ever take away from you, a pedigree. So lawyer, doctor, accountant, those are the three things that I was pushed towards. And so I was kind of felt like those were my options and I never thought about anything else. And I think in some ways, the path of least resistance was to be a lawyer. I was Jesuit educated for eight years, and it was a very broad liberal arts education. It wasn't pointing me in any one direction, the range of things that I studied subject matter, as well as the Jesuit way of solving problems through discernment is something that sticks with me now. And discernment is just Ignatian way of awareness. In modern terms, just sit with something and notice the emotions that it makes you feel and discern to disaggregate the thoughts to respond rather than react. But it wasn't until law school that I woke up and I realized I was never really working particularly hard in my life. I was coasting through. I was just kind of having fun. And so then I really woke up and started working harder and realized that I probably could have carved out a higher pedigree path had I worked a little bit harder. But then I also realized I didn't want to be a lawyer, but I was sort of sunk cost in it halfway through. And I just continued down the path of what can I learn in law school that could be applicable to businesses. And then when I get to leave law school, I get to Pricewaterhouse and the compliance piece of tax is terrible, you know, filing tax returns and doing that. But what was really interesting to me was. was advising on deals. The deal would get done and then they'd hand it to us and they'd say, I was like, I'm going to be a lawyer. make a tax-free. And I'd be reading through the documents. I'm like, this is really cool. I want to be on the front end of this. And I was lucky. My cousin was a sell-side analyst at DOJ at the time. He's like, I'll get you interviews with the bankers and you can come talk to them. I went and I talked to them and I was like, oh man, I don't know if I want to do this. Right. It seems like a lot of grunt work and it doesn't seem to be as substantive as I thought. And then at the same time, he said, I also have a friend who's a sell-side analyst who is a applied mathematics geek. You guys are very complimentary in a way. Maybe you should go meet him. And I met, I talked to him and he described the role to me and I was like, oh, this is it. And I spent two years working with Greg Miller, really getting a nighttime MBA by reading every book I could get my hands on. And it was after those two years that I was like, okay, now I got it. I know what I want to do. I don't want to be a sell-side analyst. I actually want to invest. But it was very late. I'm a late bloomer. Very late. So what was the path
Speaker 1from that first job to finding yourself in the seat that you wanted to be in?
Speaker 2People will come to me and ask for advice. And the advice can take two forms. The one form is, can you help me figure out what I want to do? And I'm like, no, no, you have to find that for yourself, right? You have to sit, you have to be aware, think about it, decide what you want, and then ask people to help you get what you want. And this goes back to that discernment. I think I sat with it and I always knew what I wanted and what I was leaving something for to go to the next thing. So when I was on the sell side and I was sitting there and the days were going by and the idea of, I see what this person, the stage they're at, and then the next person's at, I started then looking outward to buy side firms and saying, who is operating, who's calling me and asking me questions in a way that I find really impressive. And that zeroed me in on Viking and Maverick. Brian Olson was the co-founder and PM at Viking. I targeted Brian and I just kept cold calling Brian and saying, I think I could be helpful. I think I'd be helpful. And Brian pushed me off, pushed me off. And I, but I zeroed in on the way he thought, the way he asked questions, the way he carried himself in meetings that we sponsored and just made it clear that I wanted to work for him.
Speaker 1What were some of those characteristics of how he asked questions, how he conducted himself in meetings that attracted you?
Speaker 2I just sort of remember the level of detail, and then his understanding of union economics and the way he asked me questions about unit economics when nobody else that I knew of in the industry, and this is 2000, 2001, nobody was talking about unit economics. And that really struck me that here's a guy that seems to have a knowledge base that you can't learn in books. You can't learn anywhere. I want to learn more from him. That was really the idea behind it.
Speaker 1You were a Viking for a long time and Vikings had a long series of people that it's trained spun out that have done well. Not a lot of firms are like that. What was your training like over that period of time?
Speaker 2I think about my Viking experience in two chapters, right? Chapter one is I go, I work for Brian. Brian's only there for like nine months. The whole team was orphaned inside Viking for a little while. And then I worked for David Ott directly for a little while for maybe six months. And David is, I think the secret weapon inside Viking, right? David is, if you took all of the aspects of Michael Mobison that everybody thinks is amazing, and then all the aspects of Steve Mandel, and you put them together, that's David Ott. And so I had that one-on-one with Brian, the one-on-one with David, and then ultimately Dave was the CIO. So I couldn't work for him directly. So then I got really lucky and Tom Purcell took me on his team. I don't know why he did it. I still to this day don't know why, but he changed my life. And I think there's no real formal training program there. So I got to see three different styles within a year working with three different folks. And people talk about tiger cubs and tiger grand cubs. I've always joked that there's the tree of Tom Purcell. Every single big successful person in the first 15 or so years of Viking came from Tom. Everything emanated from Tom for a really period of time. And it wasn't formal. Tom was just this amazing combination of like a great human being, really thoughtful and a great investor. And he was also really patient, right? Like I'm not the best employee and he used to just laugh at me. He didn't take things personally when I would like get frustrated or do things. So it was just really great, but it's very stylistically the same world gearing towards the same thing, which is to have some sort of differentiated edge on earnings or some metric that we can then make a bet. It was variant perception investing, but how you got there was not prescriptive at all. There was not that much formality to it.
Speaker 1I'd love to go through some of your thoughts on, let's just start with stock picking. You mentioned variant perception. You mentioned thinking about earnings. There's business analysis. And then there's being a good stock picker. How do you think about both of those things?
Speaker 2I don't know why it's a controversial topic, but it is. And I think this is in some way related to the Fed in that with interest rates being so low and all risk assets being anchored to a zero bound, everybody just assumed that you could just think about business quality because everything went up. Like stocks were missing numbers and going up because the most important input was what was the risk-free rate doing for a really long period of time? And I think that's a really good point. But I think people got a little bit confused and got away from that. And so I find it ironic that today everybody's like, oh, there's no dispersion. There was no dispersion on the way up either. Like stop pretending like this is something new. Everybody benefited from this. And I think that led people to think picking a stock and picking a business are the same thing. And I think that they're very, very, very different things. And I think that you have to start with understanding the underlying business if you want to be a fundamental analyst. And that is its own set of analysis. And it's talked about all the time. But then separate and apart from that, you have to understand the dynamics of the stock. At a minimum, the table stakes, there's valuation. And then increasingly, you have to understand liquidity, technicals, factors, exposure. And then you need to understand those stocks, how they interact with one another. If you underwrite every business, this is where you start to bleed from stock selection into portfolio management. But if you underwrite every single business, on its own, but then you don't think about how they are stocks that trade publicly in a market that is volatile and has liquidity, and you have some element of leverage. But if you don't think about how those things all interact with each other, and maybe you don't have 20 discrete business bets, but you have one big factor bet, that's part of the job, right? And I think that there's business selection, there's portfolio management, there's stock selection, which sort of bridges the two in a lot of ways. And I think that there's a lot of leverage. There should be more focus on that. And it has to be more focused on that.
Speaker 1Let's break down each of them. So business analysis, we hear a lot about. How do you think differently about business analysis when information is getting disseminated so much more quickly than when you started doing this 20 years ago?
Speaker 2The more information gets available, the more information asymmetry there is in private markets versus public markets. And you see folks wanting to push into private markets. The more I look at public market quality business investing and saying there's no differentiation there at all. So the idea that somebody is like, I love Snowflake. It's a great business. Like, yeah, who doesn't think Snowflake's a great business? Why is that a thesis? I don't care. I'm just going to own it. And then the question comes down to, okay, so what is the price you're going to pay? And if that's your model, right? Like we can talk about game selection. There's the game within the game. If you're investing in public market securities, we're all playing the same game to some extent. If you're investing in the public markets, you decide, I just want to invest in stocks for fun. Okay. Or are you investing in stocks to outperform? Okay. I'm investing to outperform going for right tail events. Well, if you're going for right tail events, then you're opening up and subjecting yourself to the risk of left tail events. And so if you're doing those things, how do you figure out where to find the right tail events? Is it just business quality? And to me, with all of the information out there, that can't be the differentiating factor. That can't be the variant perception, the inefficiency, so to speak. It's got to be something that where there's a disconnect between expectations, between the degree of how good the business is or something, because we know if you're looking for those right tail events, I remember looking at this, the half-life of all companies is 10 years and less than 5% compounded greater than 20% for more than five years or something like that. There's those are the stats, right? So if you, what you're saying is I want to, I want to find a handful of great businesses and I just want to sit in them and I want to compound, that's pretty reductive. Like how, how do you do it? And I don't think how you do it is just by saying I bought a great business. Cause invariably, I think what you're going to do is you're going to buy a great business that everybody already thinks is great and you're going to overpay for it. And then you're not going to compound. And so that's why I get frustrated with like, yeah, I'm just going to own a great business. Like, well, maybe it's been a great business for three years. How do you update? How do you constantly update your business? How do you constantly update that view? And how do you constantly refresh that view in your portfolio? So I think it's incredibly silly to start with. I only want to own great businesses. What's the alternative? The alternative is to be thesis driven. There's a minimum threshold of the quality of business. It can be a mediocre business. Maybe you say I have a rule. I'm just not buying a bad business, but I want to buy a business where there are trends that are accelerating or where the market thinks that it's much worse than it is. And then you want to own it for some period of time. If you buy a stock and you pay way too much for it and you look at it and you say, yeah, my IRR in the first three or four years isn't great, but years six through 10 are going to be amazing. How do you know the statistics of that many companies generating that much performance for that period of time are so low? So it's like, if you think that you can find some variant perception in zero to three months or zero to six months, you're probably deluding yourself, right? Because that's the kind of that's really hard to predict. But if on a rolling nine to 18 months or so, and you're updating, you're being very Bayesian and you're updating it in every single day, what you think versus what is being priced into the market, then I think that's the real way to make money over a real period of time.
Speaker 1Let's turn to the stock picking aspect of it. So let's say you figured out the theses you want to invest in. You mentioned a bunch of things. To assess for a stock compared to the business, certain factors, liquidity, why don't you walk through some of those and how you think about it?
Speaker 2Yeah, we'll distinguish between stock selection, longs and shorts. And when I talk about longs, I'm mostly talking about my experience in a long short context. But I do think some of this has universal applications to just all long picking in general. And I think the starting point has to be valuation. How you make money is not the quality of the business you buy, but the price you pay for the quality of the business, period. And that often gets lost in the I want to own great businesses forever concept. And I think there are two ways to think about that. One is this idea of time horizon. Time horizon to me is in isolation and irrelevant concept. Time horizon has to be mixed with price. And oftentimes when I hear people talk about, well, I just have a longer time horizon. I think the idea is, well, I'm buying something where the downside is really limited and I don't know what's going to work. But I'm going to own it. And perhaps over three years, something good should happen because it's so cheap. And if it doesn't, I don't lose any money. That's how I used to think about time horizon. But when you have this crazy bull market that's gone up for all this time, time horizons turned into, well, I bought it pretty well. It's up 300%. I know it's stupid expensive and I'm going to take a 50% drawdown because I have a long-term horizon. What? I don't understand that, right? So I'm going to buy it. I'm going to buy it. I'm going to buy it. I'm going to I think that when you're thinking about the stock, the stock is where is it at this point in time for the quality of the business and relative to my expectations for what I think it can do. And I think not only did we just have a period where it was, I'm going to just take the punch in the face and look at 10% punch in the face is totally reasonable. Maybe a 15% punch in the face of 50, 60, 70% punch in the face. That's not reasonable, especially when consensus numbers have continued to creep up. The opinion of the business has continued to grow and there is no differentiation. There is no edge. I think the starting point always has to be bottoms up business analysis. What do I think? What are my numbers? What is my belief about this company? And where within one of the three financial statements, do I believe that I have some differentiated edge where I take some narrative, convert it to numbers? And then when do I look at the stock? And I start with valuation. And is this being appropriately valued? Is there some way I'm not looking at it? Is there some way I'm not looking at it correctly within the valuation that I should be? Is there some hidden asset? These are all stock things. Like a hidden asset isn't a question of the business. And I think if you're looking great business, sit on my hands for 18 months, it finally pulls in. I want to understand the technicals. I'm not using technicals for anything else to understand what are the supply demand dynamics for this stock. And when I look at the supply demand dynamics, and I look at the earnings revisions estimates, and I think about the IRR, I want to factor it all together so that if you said to me, here's the greatest business in the world. I think earnings are still 20% too high. And the stock is a falling knife. Why do I want to buy that? And those are stock elements. Those are not business elements. But if you said to me, look, the stock's down 90. I think it's one of the greatest businesses in the world. I think we've had three cuts. There might be a fourth. And I think it's a 10X from here. Well, I'm going to buy that. I'm not saying to isolate one variable and people are going to pick on one variable. I can't believe you do that. I'm saying looking at it in its totality, that is stock picking. Put all of it together and decide, is this a good idea? Not is this a good business, but is this a good idea that's going to make me money? That's what I think.
Speaker 1How do you think about liquidity's impact on the framework of whether it's valuation,
Speaker 2time horizon? Mobison did a study where he showed that when large caps outperform, alpha is harder to find because they crowd everything out. And so if funds get bigger and large caps outperform, there's even less alpha to find. And so liquidity becomes even more important. And so I think about liquidity in those terms to some extent. And in terms of, and I thought about liquidity much differently and suffocatingly is sometimes where you'd be like, if I'm going to do a thesis driven idea, I can't own 20 days volume of it because eventually I might have to change my mind. That's one side of it. And then on the short side, which is a totally different complicated set of parameters around stock selection. On the short side, it's a totally different complicated set of parameters around stock selection. On the short side, I think you have to have rules. I'm not shorting a stock that has greater than 10% of the market cap shorted. I'm not shorting more than a day's volume of a stock that I think could double in a day, right? There's got to be certain parameters around what you're doing to make sure that you don't get caught in a liquidity trap, especially when you're talking about callable debt on the long short model, where everybody always forgets that in a drawdown, your gross exposure goes up because your capital base goes down. And I think that that is at least every hedge fund manager forgets that at least once a year. What are some of the other differences in shorting? On shorts, I think that the business quality is important because I do think the business quality determines the underlying beta and underlying riskiness of the stock to a large extent. And I think that in the same way, you can't have a hundred percent of your portfolio all in high quality stock. You can't have a hundred percent of your portfolio all in high quality stock. Because you're just in one trade. If your whole entire mantra is, I just short bad businesses, eventually you're going to get caught in a real bad bear trap. So I always thought about the difference between short ideas and short books. Pick an example, right? Like if you're picking a basket of SPACs, there's got to be a bound for how big you want to be in SPACs and that you have to manage that risk together. So if you decide, oh, I'm going to put 10% in, 10 individual SPACs, and these are the characteristics, and I'm going to own a hundred basis points of each, but I'm comfortable with that because that's not more than one day's volume in any one of these. So if things started to go against me, I could shift around and I'm never going to let it get above 12% exposure. And every time it goes up. And then I think where you get down to the stock selection, business selection versus portfolio management decision is that if they work and go against you and they start to grow, you have a choice. You can either say, this is the worst one. I need to get out of this. Or you can say, I'm going to evenly reduce each of them and that's a portfolio risk decision. It's not an individual, I'm singling out this one idea. So that's one way you deal with it. And then I think in order to aggregate a book, I do think that sometimes you have to cheat on the short side. And I think as you're building a short book, you have to have some sort of philosophy on how do I want to construct this short book because I can't just have all bad businesses because the volatility of that short book is too much, or the number of ideas that I would need in my return on time. It evolved to, I'm going to have offensive shorts where I'm going after the business. Then I'm going to think about what I would call moderate shorts, which are relative to my longs, not pair trades, but relative to my longs, the dynamics that are affecting the long. And the same way it's misunderstood how positive it's going to be for the longs, it's misunderstood how negative it's going to be for the shorts. And then the third batch is where do I feel the market is, right? And people always get a little upset about this, but like the market's trading at 23 times earnings. Maybe you want to be short a couple of stocks that are a proxy for the market being expensive. The market's trading at 15 times earnings. Maybe that third bucket doesn't need to be where it needs to be. And if interest rates is zero, maybe you need something there. If interest rates are at three and a half, you're like, yeah, I'm fine. And that becomes a lever on what you do with your net exposure.
Speaker 1Love to talk on the portfolio management side of dynamically managing a portfolio. So what we've talked about is sort of how you construct it. As markets move, one of the things you hear a lot is management of net management of gross and hedge fund portfolio. How do you think about both of
Speaker 2those? So the starting point is having good ideas and the analogy I would, you and I are both baseball fans, both Yankee fans, right? So the Yankees aren't on a pace to win 120 games because they have no talent and they're great managed, right? There's talent there, but analytics have come into baseball in a way that help Aaron Boone understand how to put that talent better together in a way that makes that lineup more effective. That makes the pitchers more effective. And so, for example, historically, your best hitter batted third or fourth. You wouldn't bat him ninth. That would be stupid. Nobody ever did that. But analytics raised the question of, well, why don't you move them up to one so that they get the most possible at bats? This idea of a table setter, a contact guy, best hitter in the whole cleanup. Maybe that's wrong. Analytically, maybe we're just telling ourselves a story that isn't supported by numbers. And I think about this stock selection to portfolio management in the same way. I've got to have great stock ideas. They're probably going to be mostly in great businesses, but at different times, they may not be in great business. They may be in just really cheap stocks that are really great ideas. And that takes a constitution to be able to think about that. And then the question is, well, how do I put them all together? I don't want my best idea batting 10th. Do I? And so the starting point has to be, well, how many ideas do I want to begin with? And what's the right dispersion? I'm going for right tail events. I want to be concentrated. And the starting point for me on building gross leverage to begin with is first thing about gross long leverage. And if my gross longs are going to be less than 100% of my capital, my immediate thought is why? Why am I in business? Because if my DNA is to create spread, but for me personally, I'm going to capture more spread on the longs because longs have the potential to triple, quadruple, short. Going down 100, best case, but probably like 10 to 20. So I want to be tilted more gross exposure in my longs. And if I'm going to have shorts offsetting that, then I want my gross exposure in my longs to be greater than 100% of my capital. So that if I can generate a 20% unlevered return in my longs and put 20% leverage on it, I've just turned 20% unlevered longs to 24%. That's the goal, right? And if I can get to 130%, even better. And I think how I do that and how much leverage I do, that goes back to that 20% unlevered return. So I want to be tilted more gross exposure in my longs that idea of stock selection and how they all sit with each other to the extent that I'm really tilted in high beta growth. And my sharp ratio is going to be really out of whack perhaps with what I would want it to be. If I want to have, say you want high single digit annualized vol and you feel like, no, with these ideas, I'm going to have 15, 16% annualized vol. Maybe my gross exposure is at 110 versus 130. I think that's one factor. The other factor is how much upside is there? If I'm at all these things and I'm realistically and honestly assessing the stock upside and say they can all double in two years, then I'm going to lean in on my gross exposure. And as these stocks perform and move, I'm going to force rank each one of them within that gross exposure to always try to have what I think are going to be my five or so best performing stocks towards the top of the portfolio. And when people think about that image, I'm not suggesting you're constantly churning in and out of ideas. I'm just saying that And if you have an idea, like you put five ideas in your top, five, and they're all sized 12%. And the first two start to work immediately and just randomly. And now they're 14, 15% positions. And the other three are 12. The question I have to ask myself is why are these two ideas better now than they were before? Because mathematically I'm saying they are by having them be a larger percentage of my capital. So I have to assess, is it actually better now? Should I keep them that size? Was I wrong to be equally sized? Or should I take capital out of those two, put it in the other three and flip my exposure and take advantage of that? Because I had the exact same time horizon. I had the exact same upside expectations to just randomly happen to work. I'm going to reallocate within that. And I'm going to actively dynamically think about the data, think about the reasons why this might've been the case. And then I'm going to react to it if it makes sense to react to it. That to me is the starting point. That is how you manage the gross long exposure.
Speaker 1Within that, there's this question of trading around ideas. So you're two of the five randomly run up. So that's important presumption. It's random. There wasn't some news flow or that necessarily would have changed the commission. How do you decide at what point to think about rebalancing so that you're not just turning yourself up in little movements all the time?
Speaker 2And I think that comes down to how much of what you're seeing is just price action. how much of it is a closing of the expectations versus what you thought. That second piece, it comes down to what signal and what's noise. And I think that the last thing you want to do, and this is the instinct for, I think, all young analysts is like, it's up 30, let's sell it. I'll bank it, hit the cash register, and I'll find another one. And what you learn over time is, well, hold on, why is it up 30? What are we missing? Are numbers up? Are expectations closing? Where did consensus go? Where did consensus go for next quarter? Where did consensus go for the quarter after that? Where's consensus for this full year? Where's consensus for next year? Where's consensus for the year after that? What are we missing? That's the immediate thought to prevent yourself from reacting to price, reacting to noise versus reacting to some signal that perhaps your expectation has not changed or has changed. To me, that's number one, right? And then number two is, I think the heuristic is at least once a week, if not a couple of times a month, you want to come in, you want to look at your portfolio, and you want to say, based on all the inputs that I'm getting every day to assess these, if there was a mistake and this book was liquidated, would I buy it back in the exact same form? And if the answer is, yeah, it'd probably be a little bit here. And you're just asking yourself questions, right? Like, why aren't I bigger here? I really like this. I didn't like it three months ago, and now it's kind of sitting here at 6%. Should I get up? I distinguish between force ranking and trading around ideas amongst themselves, because you're looking to improve the portfolio and maximize and work your capital versus the idea of punching a register and going to cash. And I think they're two very different things, because the opportunity cost of going to cash is high. The opportunity cost of reacting to signal and being like, it was down 10% and I had to stop loss. That doesn't make sense to me either. I think it's got to be based on the notion that you are working the capital. The idea, if you are an active manager who's looking to add alpha and charge active manager fees, is to constantly be working that capital to get the highest impact to the fund. And how do you get the highest impact to the fund? If I can have a 10% idea that generates 300, 400, 500 basis points of performance, that's the way I can do it. And of however many 300, 400, 500 basis points ideas that I get versus how many, what's the worst case scenario I want on a loss? 50 basis points. And that's it. That's the math, right? Like that's that analytical piece that you go back to the Yankees, right? Like, what are you trying to do? Well, I'm trying to performance. Well, how? Well, I want 10 ideas that give me 200 to 400 basis points of performance, or I want six ideas that give me 300 to 400 basis points of performance. And that's the way I can do it. 300 to 400 basis points of performance. And I want to minimize my losses to 50 basis points. And if I can have a handful of 50 basis point losses, that tells me I'm taking enough risk. And I'm also maximizing my slugging percentage on the longs. And I want to work the portfolio with the ideas based on the work on the business and the work on the stocks to get that right. That's the goal.
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Speaker 1So at the same time that the longs are moving in such a way that you're trying to work the capital, the markets are moving, and then therefore the short book is moving. So when you start talking about percentages, 12% goes to 13, 14, that's a relative move compared to the other names. But at the same time, if the market is moving up in lockstep, now your short book is moving up as well. Would love to hear how the two sides of the book work together in that same kind of dynamic thought process. Yeah.
Speaker 2And I think that you got to define alpha to start with. And what are the types of alpha that are available to a long short hedge fund? The first one is long alpha. How much are my longs outperforming the market and how much of my longs outperforming my shorts? The second one is short alpha. How much are my shorts underperforming the market and how much are my shorts underperforming my longs individually and collectively? So those are your two main sources of alpha. Then the third source of alpha is gross. How much leverage am I putting on this alpha that I'm generating in my longs and my shorts? And then the last piece is a bit of what you were talking about, but it's a little gross and net or both a piece of this, which is how am I sizing my longs and my shorts relative to one another relative to their attractiveness? And if for some reason my longs go up a ton, and my shorts do nothing and I create pure alpha, then I've got to recycle my longs or I've got to recycle my shorts. Something's got to change there. I think this is part of what's been going on in the market a little bit is that if you just take your net up and you're really making a lot of your alpha quote unquote alpha is on long alpha and gross on your longs and your net is really, really high, you're probably going to delude yourself into thinking that you've captured a ton of spread. But really what you've done is, is you've picked a factor and you've written the beta of that factor. And then your question has to be, what are you doing with the longs? I think more than what you're doing with the shorts. Shorting has gotten so much attention in the last 18 months. I think the drawdowns that we've seen are because hedge fund longs are on average down 50 or 60% in a market that's down 30 and shorts either don't exist or the shorts are down like 10. And that's because that's a bull market strategy. When you're designed to short stuff, that is going to be not kill you. It's going to be up 10 to down 10, but you're going to be long stuff that could be up 50. That's a bull market strategy because when those longs are down 50 and the shorts are still doing the same thing, you'll say, well, there's no dispersion. Well, there was dispersion, right? Just like, it's just the inverse of what you were saying. So I think those are the ways you get trapped. But to me, the way you really, in real time, what I'm looking to do is I'm looking, go back to that business analysis, that stock selection analysis, and I'm having my future expected return for the longs here multiplied by the size of the position on the left side, on the right side, my short book, future expected return times the size of the position. When that future expected spread is really, really high, gross up. When you go through a period where you produce strong spread and that future expected return, you either need to replace those line items. With better future expected return, or you need to take down your gross and your net. And to me, that happens historically, at least once or twice a year where you've got to be front foot and you've got to behave rationally and follow the analytics, follow what the data is telling you. Don't chase your own performance. And this is like, I think there are amazing things about the neutral model. And there's a reason why Citadel is killing it. The only criticism I ever hear about the Citadel model is the better I do, the more gross they want to give me. And so I have these periods where I 13% spread in a quarter and they're like, great, here's two more billion dollars of risk. And like, I don't want it now. I want to gross down. And that's hard. Once you get on that treadmill, that's hard. I always had the luxury of grossing down after really massive spread production. And I think that that's one of the factors that led to, from 2008, really through 2016, we were in top decile performance. And I think that's part of that because we were willing to flex our gross. And again, this is, makes people think we're trading around so much. Like I'm talking about, like, if you produce 20 points of spread in six months and your longs are now screening, like they have 15% upside on a one-year forward basis and your shorts are like flat. If we were running 200 gross, maybe we should be 160 now. Because invariably then when you take the drawdown, because your gross is only going to then go from 160 to 165, and then you can go back from 165 back to 200. And I think that's the goal is to flex because spreads an accordion, right? Like it doesn't get captured forever and continue to grow. It will compress and it will ebb and flow. And the key is to be front foot when it's blowing out and doing great and to be front foot when it feels like it may have gone a little bit too far. And that's people always say, well, how do you know? How do you know? How do you know? You let the numbers tell you.
Speaker 1So generally speaking, if you just took a high level long short equity sentiment for those strategies, it's pretty bearish with the exception of the platforms, Citadel, Millennium, who have that tight risk control. I'm kind of curious, as you've laid it out, there should be a model of this very active management around stocks of good ideas that still works. So much of the tiger mafia came out of the Jones model, portfolio construction, use leverage, certain long short ratio, healthy amount of net exposure. We just kind of love your view of the long short model from here on out.
Speaker 2Part of the reason why I like talking about this stuff is, you know, it's a $4 trillion industry now of which long short, what's long short as a percentage of the four or $5 trillion, it's probably a couple of trillion dollars. There's no sell side coverage. There's no sell side coverage of the hedge fund industry. There's no public market comps. And this is an entire industry based on studying businesses. And this is a business where capital has flowed into capital flowing into businesses makes them definitionally more competitive and perhaps have lower returns. So where is the work being done to study this? I think starting point number one is if you are a fund that has a legacy of doing really well and you're not doing well now is, well, what has been historically your source of alpha? Did you generate most of your alpha on the long side or the short side, gross or net? And I think for a lot of funds, they generated tremendous amount of alpha on the long side and with the gross on the long side. And so what they've done in response to that is they've stopped shorting so that they could get their AUM higher. All of a sudden, now your gross long exposure sits somewhere between 85 and 95. And so you're not even getting a hundred percent performance out of your best ideas, because that's what you've decided you're doing. You've decided you are a primarily a long stock picker fund and your best feature is long alpha, but you don't have a hundred percent of your capital in your longs. Why? Because you're too big and you can't do it and you can't both be nimble and big. And so I think that that's a big part of this is, well, how do I generate the returns that I want while also being big? There are some funds out there who generated so much alpha on shorts. They were amazing, like Mecca of short generating and then got so big and continued to try to generate. Alpha on shorts in the same way they did when they were a fifth of the size. You can't do that because if you short 1% of a company and you get squeezed, you can get out of it. You short 14% of a company and you get squeezed, you could be dead, right? I mean, and I saw this firsthand in 2008, we were up in 08. We were up in equities and we would have been up a lot in equities if you strip out the Volkswagen effect. Cause we got caught up in that just like everybody else. And I was just happening right on one idea. And that dynamic, what happened in 08 with just that one company is happening multiple places all over the place, partially because the funds are so big that it's just easier to happen. And I would also say that the other factor here too, is what is the risk-free rate and what is your hurdle rate, right? Like if you're an endowment and you have a four and a half percent hurdle rate and the risk-free rate zero, you might accept 6%, right? You might accept 8%. If the risk-free rate is going to be at three or 4%, all of a sudden what you expect from a hedge fund might be different, but where do you put it? I don't know the answer. I think there is a place and I know people that do it. There's an amazing opportunity continued for spread, for long alpha, for short alpha, for gross alpha with a moderate net or a reasonable net. It just doesn't scale. I just think it's too hard and I don't know how to solve it other than to stay nimble.
Speaker 1A lot of that ties to this issue of incentives. So we know that there's a lot of things that we can do and we can do it, but we don't know how to do it. I'm kind of curious to ask you a conversation we've had over time about compensation structures within an organization, multiple PMs, and what you've seen that's effective.
Speaker 2I've not seen anything that's consistently effective. I think what is effective is consistency probably is the answer. People don't like being back-traded and back-trading happens a lot. Back-trading meaning when you arrive, you have a certain expectation of how you're going to pay, but it's not in writing. That's probably the best way to say it is like some value accrues to the seat and some value accrues to you for doing it. And how does that split go and how does that work? And I think what the pods do really well is they put it in writing. They tell you what your percentage is going to be, and then you go and you make money. And so that to me seems to be effective. And then what they do is they put a whole lot of handcuffs on you and say, we're going to make it really hard for you to get this 20% of this profit put up. But if you put that profit up, you're going to earn that 20% where everything else is a little bit more subjective. And so it makes it a little bit harder. If you're not a pod, one of the issues that has befallen a lot of the hedge funds is that as financials and energy and industrials have become less investable over the last five to six years, the idea of paying somebody to sit in that seat and voluntarily say, I don't think you should invest a dollar of money in my ideas, but please pay me to continue to sit around and do the work. That became less palatable for people, right? And then all of a sudden you come around and you point to the seat and you're like, where's the energy analyst? Where's the energy PM? Well, they're not here. Why? Because I didn't want to continue to pay them because our incentive structure only compensates performance. So there's got to be some element of how do we keep people here and make everybody feel a part of it. And it's hard to get right. And the reason why there's back trading is because it changes over time. The size gets bigger, the talent changes, the person's sitting in the seats change, and it gets very, very difficult. And that's why it leads to turnover. So I don't know that it's, I think that's as hard of a question as what's the right fee structure for an evolving hedge fund model for the LPs. I think that's as equally as hard.
Speaker 1You hear a lot about changes in market structure. Some of that's liquidity, some of it's high frequency trading. Love to get your perception on that aspect of the markets today, maybe compared to a couple of years ago, when you were still on the seat of banking.
Speaker 2The starting point is that there's more passive flows than active flows, right? So there's more blind pools of capital owning machines than individuals. When I first started the Fidelity analyst, they own 14% of the company. Now Fidelity still owns a lot of the company, but the companies are bigger and Vanguard has taken a lot of shares. So there's nobody showing up from Vanguard to sit next to you to have a conversation with the company. So that's number one, the structure is definitely changed in that way. And then I would say, number two is that we talked about it before the competition, the pods are huge. No one knows how much leverage is even in these pods, how many seats there are within a pod. There could be 17 MT teams managing $20 billion of risk inside of one pod, maybe $50 billion of risk. I have no idea. And so you take all of that and then you take the style and everybody wants to own the same good businesses and no one's looking to be as contrarian as they used to be. And you get this crowding. That's the headline. And then underneath, is the plumbing. And the plumbing has changed, right? There's fewer people changing this. So people can be subjective. You could go and have a relationship and say to somebody, I really need you to get me out of this stock. I have something to sell. And they were like, yeah, you owe me. It's going to cost you a point and you owe me. And it's done. And the risk's off your book and it disappears into the ether and it's Goldman or Morgan Stanley. It's out there. That's just harder to do. More and more of the transactions. There's a reason why Citadel has a broker dealer, right? How much of the flow is just internal? I don't know the answer to that, but there's a real reason because that structure has changed. Electronic trading, the pipes, the dark pools, the participation rate, how much of the daily volume could you actually be in a stock with leaving a small of a footprint, right? What is your total cost of trading in specific stocks? And that has gotten more expensive. And a lot of people don't even track it.
Speaker 1You've accumulated just a huge amount of knowledge about how this all works in a way that many people haven't. And yet you haven't decided to start a fund after you have like, so I'd love to hear a little bit of your thought process and leaving and whether you even thought of launching a fund.
Speaker 2Yeah. So I mentioned before that my experience of Viking was in two chapters and I only talked about the first chapter. So after I worked for Tom, Viking was a hub and spoke model. And when I worked for Tom, Tom was one of the first people to start a fund. And I was one of the first people Tom eventually became one of the hubs, right? Because we had co-hubs, if people get that analogy. And when I worked for Tom, I was working for Tom within the spoke. And then I left Tom to run my own spoke. And then I ran two. And so the dynamic, the way that changes is I went from not really understanding what was going on inside the firm, but just working for Tom and just doing my job and just going idea to idea really. And just hoping not to get fired and like literally thinking I'm going to make money. And then the second chapter was being a team builder and a portfolio manager. And that actually went in, had two pieces to it too. One was really much more of a partnership because when I reconstituted the TMT team, there were two very senior analysts, junior portfolio managers in Dan Malkoon and Brendan Diaz, who were world-class, like lights out really, really profitable. And they both put their ego aside and said, yeah, you're the more senior guy. You're next man up. They want you to do this. And we're in, it was much more of a partnership. And I learned so much from them. And so there was that. stage of it, but they both ultimately wound up moving on to run their own TMTs elsewhere. And now Brennan runs his own for fun, which was sort of an inevitable. And then I rebuilt it all again and took over the consumer team. And that period of time felt like I was managing my own business inside of a larger business with one LP. And then you start to become aware of all the other ways that this is a business and things you control and things you don't control. And that just gets complicated. And so when I left, my thinking was, well, I'm just going to recreate that, but with 50 LPs. And I went down the path of doing that. And two things I would say stopped me to pause. Number one was, and this is going to sound crazy, but there's a blogger named Tim Urban. And Tim Urban has this, your life in weeks visual that I had printed on my desk. And I, I always used to look at it and say, this doesn't make sense that you work for all of these weeks. And then you are retired for only this few weeks. There should be a midlife break here. And I was like, I'm going to take a break here where my kids are of the age where I can be impactful and really present in their lives. So I am pressing pause and I'm not going to do this. And I had multiple people tell me I was crazy. And I said, look, I'm going to invert the Jeff Bezos regret minimization framework. I would regret jumping into this and continuing to make trade-offs personally in my relationships and in my presence and my distraction, as well as physically, like I was sacrificing a lot of myself. I would regret more jumping into it to make more money to say that I did it than I would if I don't. And I think it's easier for me to go back and start a fund than it is for me to go back and get that time. And so that was part one. Part two was the more time I spent away exploring curiosities, the market structure was changing and a lot of things were changing. And I was just like, I don't want to jump into this. This same question you just had of like, there's got to be a way to do this. I just kept banging my head against the wall and I was enjoying doing so many other things that I don't know what the right model is. And I've explored doing a long only more recently than doing that. I've explored doing the levered long, but that doesn't make sense. I've explored doing the levered long, but that doesn't make sense to me. And thinking about privates, like someone else can do that. And I'm happy to pay fees to the folks that I trust to do that. So I don't know. And the older I get, then the question becomes, okay, do I continue to do this? And I like doing what I'm doing because I'm going to take seven weeks of vacation and no one's going to bother me. But there is a part of me that thinks, well, maybe the next stage is more, do I become more of like an advisor and do something like that? Because what I miss is I miss teaching. I miss explaining this stuff and helping. And that's what I miss more than anything. If I was thunderbolt stricken with the right model, I would definitely raise capital. I'd a hundred percent do it. And if the right consigliere rabbi type job opened up with somebody I really loved and respected and was going to have fun with, and it was time for me not to manage risk down the road, then I could see myself doing something like that later in life too, as well.
Speaker 1But for right now, this, feels okay. What's been your investment model as a single family office?
Speaker 2A lot of experimentation for the first two years and then settled. So then by that, I mean, sat on the board of a startup software company and was really involved and was like, this is just the wrong founder and the wrong situation, but I get it. And then I, with a friend made a loan to a CPG company and sat on, and was an observer on that board and watched and how different that was, right? So things like that, very small experimentation to also taking a GP stake in a emerging manager, Ricky Walters, a Stony Point, and really helping him learn a lot of the things that we were just talking about, right? He's an excellent stock picker, but he had no idea how to be a portfolio manager and trying to help him do that. And what I've settled into on a day-to-day basis, I probably spend about 20% of my time talking to and working with a handful to a dozen real estate developers, trying to find amazing multifamily opportunities where I can be an LP with a group of folks that I'm closely affiliated with in parts of the country where the basis in the land is really cheap. And the rest of the time I spend in two buckets. One is I mentioned, I'm a LP in a lot of different stage private vehicles with people that I know pretty well. And there's somewhere between frequently and from time to time, there's a steady, slow flow of opportunities to do co-invest. And I like that because I'm lazy, right? I don't want to do the work to get. The things that I hated about this job at the end were, I remember going to Davos and people were like, wow, that's so awesome. That's so prestigious. And I remember being on the plane to switch. I'm like, I'm so miserable. I do not want to be doing this. That's the part of the job that I didn't really like. So having folks that I can work with and I really can roll up my sleeves and say, hey, I want to get in the data room too. And I would do this. So I spent some time doing that. And then the rest of the time is public markets.
Speaker 1What does that public market portfolio look like?
Speaker 2Almost a hundred percent long, the occasional short and still gross up and down a lot, but it's been pretty much the same stocks for five years. There are various different points in time. And there were a couple of times where I've actually traded out of things where I don't own Facebook anymore. Last year, I was like, I'm out. Netflix, I was out in January. I should have been out in November. I should have been out in January. In January, I was like, this is broken. I'm out. And things like T-Mobile, I've owned it. I've made it my biggest position by a lot. And then I've taken it down.
Speaker 1So one of the things you've also been in and out of is Twitter. And we'd just love to hear your thoughts on the why and the interaction on that platform.
Speaker 2I was curious as to whether or not there were things that I knew. And based on some of the dynamic of what I was seeing in the market from like 2018 into 19 into 20, and I was, I was just watching this and have this network of people that I'm always talking to. And I was like, I wonder if there's an opportunity for me to just kind of share some knowledge. And I think what was a bit of a changer for me is my friend, Yen Lau, who, you know, Yen taught this class at Columbia for years. And I always used to come and give a guest lecture and the response that I would get from that and the follow-ups and the questions and just the sort of clarity, I think of clarity of explanation in what I was doing. And I think that's what I've learned. And I think that's what it means to be an analyst at a hedge fund and what it means to be a stock picker versus a business picker and how you transition from a stock picker to a portfolio manager and what that path looks like and how you should think about that. I just think that maybe this comes back to that whole idea of Jesuit discernment again. I like deconstructing it and explaining it to people. These are teachable things. There's certain things that are not teachable. And if you're not good, you're not good. I can't teach you to be good, but if you're good, here are some other ways you can think about it to take being good to the next level. And that experience at Columbia, then I was invited to do it at Notre Dame. I was invited to do it at University of Texas and a couple other places. And I was like, oh, there's a reception here. Maybe I should just go out a little broadly and see if it could be a two-way street. And I'd say it's been fine. That was the idea behind it.
Speaker 1So in prep for this, you sent out a tweet and had a bit of a rabid response of questions you might ask. And there are a couple of good ones. So maybe we do this in pseudo rapid fire, but I'm going to ask you a couple of questions that people put in there. And I'm going to ask you a couple of questions that people put in there. I thought were pretty good ones. So what's the process for getting up to speed on a new industry?
Speaker 2So I think the most important thing is to understand the financial statements as quickly as you can without reading a sell-side report and try to contextualize it too, right? Think about the seven powers or Porter's competitive advantage, right? Think about it as you're going through it. Okay, I got it. These guys are a network effect business. They're looking to acquire subscribers. This is the modernization mechanism. When you're going through it, got it. And that's step one, get up to speed as quick as you can on the economics, then distill it down into the unit economics if you can. Okay, I understand what the whole P&L looks like, but what would the unit economics look like if I could figure that out? Okay, great. And then from there, it depends on how old the industry is and how young the industry is. I think that if it's a really old industry, grab a book and learn about the history of it. There's nothing better. So when I wanted to learn Formula One, there's a great book that Ross Braun wrote. It was an oral history of Formula One. There was no better way to get up to speed on Formula One than to read that book, period. There's the single best thing I did. So then when I was thinking about other adding new races, like, oh, this is why, because there's always been this legacy of this, because I heard and I heard the whole story behind it. And there's generally a lot of books for industries that have been around a really long period of time. So I think that that's really helpful. And I think the most important thing, you have to figure out the competitors and you have to figure out ways to understand and make sure you go through the filings of all the competitors too. And then once you do that, and that's what I would call your inside view, Mobison again, then I flip it out and you have to have an outside view. You have to understand the context. Because I think the biggest mistake people make when they get up to speed on the new industry is they think they've discovered plutonium. Like, oh my God, this is the greatest business in the world. I want to buy it. And then you buy it and you lose 20%. You're like, well, what the hell? Oh, because numbers, they misnumber. or they beat by 3%. Yeah, everyone thought they were going to win. to be by 20%, right? Like you have to have the outside view. If you don't have the outside view, once you get up to speed, you're killing yourself. You're setting yourself up for failure.
Speaker 1How can a young portfolio manager adapt and evolve portfolio management skill over time?
Speaker 2I think a lot would probably depend on where you are and what the rules are of engagement, where you are and what you're doing it. Are you neutral? Do you have freedom around your net? I guess this is the best way I can explain it. If you are a sole proprietor portfolio manager, you're both wearing your analyst hat and your PM hat. And I think the first thing to do to transition is to consciously make the decision in the moment to decide, am I wearing an analyst hat right now? Or am I wearing a PM hat right now? And this was one of my observations from last fall was the analysts seem like they were still in charge when the PM should have taken over. And what I mean by that is it's the analyst job to fall in love. And it's the analyst job to fall in love. It's the analyst job to get this idea, to pitch it, to have passion, to know that they are going to be so invested in this, that they're going to stay on top of every signal. You've got to believe that if that person is you, you have to have that. And then you've got to have the ability to step away, look at the portfolio and objectively decide how it fits with everything else. And I think that self-awareness is the first step. And then fitting that into whatever risk model you happen to be a part of. And then through reps, you'll figure out how to do it and you'll learn and you'll understand. And I think these are, understand where your sources of alpha are and understand what your alpha curves are. If you're an analyst who's constantly pitching things three to three months early, take your analyst hat off and be the PM and be like, hmm, should I be buying this right now? This idiot over here is sitting in the other seat. Who's me? That guy's always early, right? Why am I listening to him? I'll talk to him in October. I don't need to talk to him now. You've got to be, have that self-awareness, to do that.
Speaker 1What advice do you give portfolio managers that are going through a tough period of performance?
Speaker 2If you're going through a bad period, I think you need somebody, this is probably the single hardest thing, right? Like VCs are always advising founders of businesses, get a partner. You don't want to go through this alone. It's lonely, but LPs are always advising hedge funds. Don't be a multi-manager, don't have partners. It gets complicated. And so it can be a very isolating thing. And then what you, you wind up doing is you wind up having this circle of people and you all just have the same ideas and you all just commiserate and you all do this thing. So it's like, how do you break free of that? And I think the single most important thing is move the body, go for a swim, go for a run, do something that's going to take your mind off of it, and then have somebody who you can talk to, who's going to help you understand that you're stuck. Because the biggest thing is to step away and to get unstuck.
Speaker 1We covered some of this, but what will the best funds, let's just say hedge funds of tomorrow look like?
Speaker 2The question is sort of what will the best, like, is that being the best performing? Because I think the definition of what best is and what success is, is changing, right? Like I think people's identities used to be really wrapped up in, I was up 50 and now people's identities are wrapped up in, I raised another fund, or I was in this deal, or I have $50 billion of AUM. So I think a lot of this will depend on how you define. Great, right? Because I think the assets are going to continue to be centralized unless something happens on the side to decentralize it. And the question then is, well, what results in performance? So there's two types of suffering. I'll put it this way, right? There is the, I own a great business and I'm suffering because the stock is down and I love it. And I'm an idiot because I paid too much for it. And there's the suffering of, I own this mediocre business that trades at seven times free cashflow or four times free cashflow, and it doesn't go up. And I'm really frustrated and I'm suffering and I hate myself for owning this, right? And some people have just decided I don't have the constitution to do the latter. The former, I don't care. And so the funds that are going to do really well are the funds that have the constitution to absorb that kind of volatility, but also the humility to sell the stock when it goes up. I just think that this is not about like the type of fund or the whatever. I think this is human behavior. I think the models are the models. Like I just think, what is your human tolerance for certain types of risk? And can you constantly see the two sides of these elements and make sure that you're not just focused on one side of it? I don't know that a new model needs to exist. The long, short, moderate to mediocre net at like a billion to $3 billion of capital should still do really, really well.
Speaker 1It should. All right. Last one from the crowd. And this is from the other side. What are the best questions to ask a man? What are the best in the due diligence process for looking at investing in a hedge fund?
Speaker 2I think every single question has to come down to the model. I think more and more people think they're paying for a model, but they're really just paying for a story. And the story changes as things change, as the market changes, performance change. Like it drives me insane to hear people take credit for their performance in 2020 as great stock picking and then blame 21 and 22 on a lot of other things. And I think that's a really good question. I think that's a really good a lack of dispersion, a lack of spread. So the strategy that's going to work is the strategy that's true to the model. So much of what has become true over the last five years, all this is about is marketing and telling a story. It's gotten away from the purity of executing to what you say you're going to execute against, because most of it's just about collecting assets and
Speaker 1chasing beta. What questions would you ask to try to figure out if someone is sticking to their
Speaker 2model? I would probably, focus very much on how aware somebody is of where their alpha is going to come from. Long, short, net and gross. If you don't know where your alpha comes from, but you still think you're going to just produce alpha, that's a problem.
Speaker 1All right, Paul, I'm going to ask you a couple of closing questions before we wrap up. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family?
Speaker 2I'm a rugby nut. I played rugby until I was 30 years old, and I'm still actively involved with the New York Athletic Club. And I'm just really passionate about it. I think it's the perfect sport in a lot of ways. That's probably the thing that I'm most passionate about. I just watched the New Zealand All Blacks Ireland match over the weekend. Love it. What makes it the perfect sport? So I think soccer and rugby are interesting in that there's no timeouts. So it's continuous play. All the work, all the preparation is done before the match starts. Coaches don't stand on the sidelines calling timeouts and scripting plays. You get out there, you play, you have half time to make some adjustments, and then you play again. And when it's over, you shake hands, you have a beer, and you socialize and you talk about what you did. And the whole point of rugby is you play offense and defense. You don't get to choose, and it's physical, and you're on the ground a lot. And so the team that gets off the grounds the fastest and the most often will most likely win.
Speaker 1What's your biggest investment pet peeve?
Speaker 2I just don't like intellectual dishonesty, period. That's investment, that's whatever. I believe in agility. Attack it, attack it, attack it, and don't dismiss it. And if you're dismissing whatever it is, then that's because you're just not confident in your ability to defend it. That's my biggest pet peeve.
Speaker 1What type of investment do you gravitate to like a moth to the flame?
Speaker 2I think that the best ideas I've ever had is when I can isolate a change in trajectory in revenue at the same time that there won't. be a commiserate change in expenses. So I love when you can isolate a company coming out of an investment period or going into a pricing period that people don't fully understand how to model. That is so, so attractive. It's so attractive.
Speaker 1How about on the other side? What are your biggest investment blind spots?
Speaker 2I would say the biggest ones are subject matter, right? There are certain subjects that I just won't touch.
Speaker 1What teaching from your parents has most stayed with you?
Speaker 2My parents were very humble and very focused on giving back and generosity. And I think that that is a very, very big part of probably why I do what I do in terms of just giving away advice and things like that. They were very, very generous people in our neighborhood, in our church. And I think that's a big part of my life. I think that's a big part of my life. And that sticks with me more than anything.
Speaker 1All right, Paul, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life?
Speaker 2Reading Carol Dweck's book changed my life. I coasted through so much of the early part of my life because people are always telling me I was good at stuff and I only did the stuff I was good at. And if things were hard, I just didn't do it. And thank God that I changed that later in life. In hindsight, that was a real. I'm glad it's all worked out, but I definitely limited myself and limited my exposure to doing certain things, even sports. If sport came more easy to me, I'd continue to play it. If a sport started, if I started to hit a wall, I'd be like, yeah, I don't like it anymore. But it wasn't I didn't like it. It's just that I think I got scared that I was no longer as good as I thought I was or other people were getting. And I was like, oh no, let's run. And I'm glad that I was able to adjust that later in life. And I think I have a more passionate desire to attend to to attack new challenges because of that. I learned how to ski at age 45. one. But I wish I had learned that earlier. I'm not sure anything would have changed, but it's definitely a mindset shift. And it's something that I try to teach my kids as much as possible.
Speaker 1All right, Paul, thanks so much for taking the time. Awesome. It's good to catch up. Thanks for listening all the way to the end. If you made it this far, how about one ask for me? Tell one friend about the show. It's the best way to keep growing this incredible community. Thanks so much. And until the next one, stay curious and keep compounding knowledge, relationships, and capital a little bit at a time.
Speaker 4All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions and securities discussed on this podcast.