Regional Escalation and the Fight Over Hormuz

Hello and welcome to Middle East Focus, a weekly podcast on regional affairs and US policy produced by the Middle East Institute in Washington DC. I'm Alistair Taylor and the eyes enter a chief. Matthew Check-Eye is out on leave, so I'll be flying solo today. Your own war is now entering its sixth month, and this week it took its sharpest turn yet. For a brief fall in fighting over the weekend, and fresh talk of negotiations, hostilities flared up sharply once again with Iran's launch of a surprise ballistic missile attack on American forces. The United States and Saudi Arabia hit back inside Iraq. The first time Riyadh has openly admitted to doing so. A ceasefire meant to run 60 days didn't survive one month. And yet, in Musqat, diplomats are still at the table, working out how Iran and its neighbors might one day share the straight of poor moves. So where do things actually stand? And is anyone still serious about talking? Joining us today to help unpack the latest developments is Alex Batonka. A senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, Alex specializes in Middle Eastern regional security affairs with a particular focus on Iran. He's the author of several books, including most recently, The Battle of the IA toles in Iran, The United States, Foreign Policy, and Political Rivalry since 1979. Alex, welcome to Middle East focus. It's great to have you back on the program. Alex, there thank you for having me. I look forward to our conversation. As do I. Just two timestamps things for our listeners. We're recording this episode of the afternoon of July 29th. The situation is obviously very fluid and things may have changed by the time you hear this. With that caveat given Alex, let's dive right in. Soof argued that risk-taking has become Iran's new normal from the two Sukhoi, Su-24s, and to bomb allodade air base days after Supreme Leader Ali Hamini was killed to this week's surprise ballistic missile strike on U.S. forces, and that the regime now believes it has more to lose by backing down the doubling down. What's driving Tehran's risk tolerance and how far does that extend? I think fundamentally this is a desire on the part of the Iranian regime to survive this war, and they have come to conclude that the best way to assure their survival is to maximize the pain that they can impose on the United States and its partners in the region, while this war is being almost periodically now. We're almost entering into six months. We've had three rounds of war and three rounds of ceasefire, but the Iranians are now making the point that unlike the previous rounds, it won't be necessarily the Americans who'll be breaking the ceasefire. That Iran too can break the ceasefire. In other words, they're trying to, if you will, be so unpredictable that they can throw a monkey wrench into this sort of what they are claiming, and again, it's important for me to point out. This is their reading of the situation, that the United States is happy to be in a war of attrition with Iran if it can control the process. What Iran is doing, throwing missiles at the US base in Jordan when we were supposed to be in a ceasefire, is to say, "Well, you can control the process. I too have a say in this war." I think that's basically what it is. Most of this is also about psychology, that if you think time is on your side, United States, maybe not. There's a sense that you pick listening to Iranian officials and the sources that I use to come to my conclusions. There's a sense that Donald Trump is not really yet ready for a deal with Iran. Not a deal that would work for the Iranians anyway. How do they get his attention? Their conclusion is the best way to get Donald Trump's attention is to maximize the economic pain on the United States, more than anybody else. That's why you can expect Iran to look for ways to keep the price of oil up. You've heard me say this before. And the regime is basically chasing regime survival. But they are now at a point where they don't think just sitting back and having one round after another of diplomatic talks is the best way forward because there isn't American blockade on their ports. They are paying a price. Time might not actually necessarily be on their side, the way Iranian officials just a few months ago were declaring that time was their side. In other words, they're trying to shake things up, to try to get Trump's attention and see if they can get a different result acting in a different manner, if you will. Alex, if all of that is true and that's the sort of prevailing mindset in Tehran, what does it mean for the diplomatic opening and the Oman track? Can a regime that sees de-escalation as the greater danger negotiate seriously at the same time or are those two mutually exclusive? Look, under Oman negotiations, the Oman is obviously the other country that shares the state of Hormuz with Iran and I say, "Share," knowing full well, that's obviously up to interpretation. The Iranians, the Omanis, might consider it territorial waters of theirs, but there is a whole other school of thought that says that's international waterway and so forth. But anyway, back to your core question. I don't think the Iranian regime at this point is ready to give up what it claims to be its sovereign right to be essentially controlling the state of Hormuz. The only way I can see them as of right now, obviously that can change, but as of right now, the only way they're going to give that up, if you will, is if you give them something that's even better, incentives that will, you know, might convince them that it's the right price and they give up this claim and control and certainly start shooting at shipping that goes through the strait, which, you know, the Iranians can do. They are obviously concerned about the sort of bad taste, some of these Iranian behaviors leaving in amounts of Gulf neighbors, Omanis, the Qataris, others, but frankly, just listening to Iranian officials, including foreign minister Arokhchi, this is a price they're willing to pay. They feel confident enough to hit, you know, these countries with missiles and drones now for months and they still think that, you know, this doesn't prevent future relations going back to something that looks like normal relations, if you will, but tensions and so on. So in other words, they're gambling that they can get away with what they're doing. They will talk to the Omanis, not because, necessarily, they want to come with a solution to the strait of Hormuz crisis before a more fundamental agreement has been reached with Washington. It takes me back to the point I made before what's in it for Iran? The Iranians are not going to agree to a temporary resolution of the crisis around the strait with the Omanis absent of a bigger package that they can get. Alex, to your point though, about the Iranians thinking that they can kind of deal with the consequences of what this means for their relations with the Gulf later, it does seem very notable that this week Saudi Arabia has now claimed its first strike inside Iraq, targeting Iranian-backed militias, kind of taking them from the role of a quiet backer of the military effort to an open co-baligerent. How big a shift is that in your view for the war, for Iran's calculations and for those Gulf diplomatic efforts that Riyadh itself is backing? Look, I don't think the Iranians are interested in seeing the Saudis or anybody else for that matter, enter this war. They like to keep it between themselves, the Americans, the Israelis. These regional states, if they do take part, obviously, though the Iranians have to do more fighting, if you will. Do they have the sort of necessary respect for the militaries of the Gulf countries to sort of say, well, they're entering the stage, suddenly changes everything? I don't think so. As they're reading, they might be totally misjudging the situation and underestimating what the Gulf military can do to harm Iran. But the reading seems to be that the Gulf countries joining the war against Iran will not change the equation. In fact, some of the hard lines in Iran will probably welcome it because they will say it opens their options in terms of retaliation. You don't need to limit yourself to mostly American bases in the Gulf countries. You can hit a broader set of targets. But look, the issue of the utility of the proxies is many ways in an open question. We haven't, other than the Houthis, who have a proven capacity to actually kind of bring serious muscle, if you will, to bear when it comes to the regional tensions. I mean, threatening shipping in the Babel Mandib and actually stopping the flow of traffic has the kind of impact Iranians love to see. Because there's one thing Iran wants to see is to internationalize this conflict in the sense of economic pain for everyone. Because that's the kind of thing that eventually finds this way to the US market, the American public opinion, and President Trump feels he has to respond one way or another. Not so much. comes to the proxies in the region as such. Unless they also have an impact on the price of energy and the attacks on facilities in Saudi Arabia that the Saudis, the Americans blamed on the Hastushab, the militias in Iraq, which they Iraqi militias denied and they blamed the Houthis for it or the attributed blame to the Houthis. Nonetheless, the point is you are getting that net effect of pressure on energy prices. And that probably is the reason why the US and the Saudis felt they needed to act. Now, is that enough to the reports suggest some 20 individuals were killed including the latest report that are so 6 Iranian advisers among these Hastushab forces in Iraq? Is that enough to put them off? Again, if you go back to October 7th, the months that followed in solidarity with Hamas, the Iraqi Hastushab groups did engage in firing of, I believe it was a combination of missiles and drones if I remember right against Israel, but then they wrapped it up. So you lasted for a few short months and then they wrapped it up. They were not engaged in this open-ended fight because fundamentally I think the Iranian regime to the extent that they control these groups rather have them as sort of cards in their arsenal to sort of wave in the face of their adversaries as opposed to actually risk their existence. And right now, with the Saudi-American attack, it just brings home the point that they or two can be attacked. So I don't know where we are going to go in terms of the proxies, their capacity to engage in violence is known, but their capacity to actually change the equation of this U.S. Iran, that's a whole different story and we'll have to see where events are going to take us to judge their capacity to be a game-changer if you will. Yeah, I think for some of these groups, the threat of them getting involved is kind of a greater strategic card to play that the actual reality of how much they'll change things. We've danced around this a couple of times, but I wanted to ask specifically, we've talked about Iranian calculations and the thinking in Tehran, who's actually calling the shots there? We've got a newly installed Supreme Leader in Moshtaba, Hamani, who hasn't been seen in months. We've got a major change in the revolutionary guard leadership. Again, who's calling the shots? How do you see that dynamic? How do you see the calculations being shaped in Tehran? So, Alice, to look, we're just referring and how you and I are speaking in the afternoon on the 29th of July, just a few hours ago, there were reports that the Israeli Mossad and I believe U.S. intelligence were pretty comfortable in assessing which Tehran would have to be alive. But yet that he is so in such a precarious situation in terms of his physical safety that dealing with him in meeting him and so on is a very difficult task. If this is true, I have no way of knowing if this is true or not, but if this is true, it just goes to tell you that Mochzaba Hamani's capacity to play a central role, just from a practical point of view, given the restrictions he has to deal with, is going to be limited, at least in the short term. Now, you could also raise the bigger issue of does he politically actually matter in terms of the decision-making process? Is it a kind of voice that say the revolutionary guards need to be in the room where decisions are made? And my answer to that based on my assessment is no, they don't need him in the decision-making process right now. He is the symbolic figure, he can be in hiding, but he doesn't have the cloud to one way or another sort of shape where the Iranian decisions are going to go this way or that way. Mochzaba is not his father. Even if he ever becomes his father, he would need a good number of, at least short few years before he can sort of have that kind of authority in practice, not just authority in the sort of embedded in the name of the office of the Supreme Leader, but actually have the authority to pick up the phone and make decisions. So, for various reasons, they'll just stay down. He can pick up the phone because he might give away his position and then somebody might be trying to assassinate him just like his father. And the other thing is political authority, right? He's really not that central figure right now. He and his appointment is about symbolic continuity of the Islamic Republic. The regime needed somebody very quickly after Ali Hamid was assassinated under 28th of February quickly to put somebody in place to say there is no security vacuum. Everything's going to continue like before. We replaced old Ali Hamid with younger Mochzaba Hamid and that's it. And that's important in terms of symbolism. I don't take that away from from the regime, but I would be cautious in terms of attributing too much centrality to the man Mochzaba Hamid as this regime is fighting for its survival. I think plenty of folks in the revolution of guards from the first generation are still around to be able to have a consensus in terms of how to go about moving forward in the war. Alex, Trump has continued to insist that the talks are on, even as Tehran has said, it's negotiating only with Oman. How do you read that gap? And I guess more importantly, how is Trump's continuous talk about talks being read in Tehran? Look, ended today, what he has done is they don't take him seriously. They don't think much of what President Trump says because the narrative in Iran is you cannot trust the American president. He will say certain things he will promise peace, you get war, you promise war, you get restraint. So that's how they look at it. They look at him as someone that in fact you could, Alex, you could make the point, because earlier I made the point Iran does not want to get in a situation of war of attrition. It's not in the interest, you know, you're hearing an Iranian commentary that the last thing Iran wants to become is another Gaza before October 7th, where when Israelis, whenever they feel like they could go in and, you know, as they say in Israeli, lexicon, mode of grass, right? Iran does not want to become that kind of a challenge for the United States that if you attack us, we attack you back in kind, we increase the price for you. So you won't go bad and do it again. So there is that fundamental reading that Donald Trump might actually have bought into this argument that which is basically the Israeli argument. The argument of prime minister being in Netanyahu that you don't need to invade Iran. Because, you know, Netanyahu is savvy enough to know that's not going to fly in this Trump White House because American public opinion. But you can keep the sort of war attrition going on. And if you keep doing that and experimenting with ways to put the regime on the pressure, maybe even towing with the idea of civil unrest in Iran using various groups that are in opposition, that eventually in time it was a road to a point where what failed back in February or early March when the US is really, um, war first was launched. You remember, Alistair, there was this idea that the regime is the House of Cards, it will fall apart with in quick order. I mean, in fact, now that late Senate the Graham, there are now videos coming out as a big proponent of that war against Iran, articulating exactly that, that the United States and those people proponing proponents of war saying, "Sphere cities will fall and within that you got a domino effect and the regime will be gone." So there is that perhaps understanding in many circles from what I can tell in Iran who says that game plan hasn't changed. The tempo might have changed. There's a recognition that actually the regime is more entrenched than many people thought. It won't fall as the House of Cards within hours or days or weeks, but it could fall after a couple of months or a couple of years. So keep the pressure on and that's what the Iranians are pushing back against. The regime, I should say. They're saying, well, not so fast. And so in that sense, again, going back to question, what did they make of Trump? They think he is just, you know, dragging him along with the illusion that peace is possible, but they look at everything that he's doing to them, saying, "The evidence just isn't there. It doesn't add up." For example, after the MOU was signed on the 17th of June, I was just reading some Iranian official commentary and really important for me to point out, I'm giving you their narrative. This is not necessarily something I agree with, but it is important to put their side of the story out here in this podcast. They're saying, you know, we signed the MOU believing the America except that Iran has the sovereign right to control the straight of her moves. As controversial as it is, but that was their understanding. Turned out, the Americans didn't actually abide by that. They quietly created a sudden corridor trying to avoid the Iranian coast, so shipping could go back and Iran and have control. That's why Iran started firing those missiles on the 25th of June, one week after MOU was signed. And you know, United States didn't freeze any of their funds or unfreeze any of their frozen funds and so forth. So you have basically, if I could tell the story, perhaps in a few words, the core of it is total lack of trust, lack of trust in the American president, lack of trust in the diplomatic process that we have it right now. But what the Iranian regime doesn't tell you in their narrative is where is their willingness to actually build trust? How are they willing to take steps other than demanding control of the state of almost? What are they offering Donald Trump to say that actually there could be a prospect for a genuine agreement of source between this Trump White House and the Iranians in terms of normalization of relations will take a lot of time. We're not even close to that point, but at least move forward beyond just a ceasefire. So again, I did a I think a fair job in putting out the Iranian official regime narrative, but if I could very quickly point out, I would say if they are saying Trump isn't serious about diplomacy, you could make the same argument about them. Say, well, then not exactly a very serious cider. Alex, you touched on the June 17th memorandum of understanding a minute ago there, and I wanted to ask about that. It obviously had some flaws and some ambiguities that maybe we're not resolved and the two sides had a difference of opinion, shall we say. But it did lay out a process, a 60-Date period for talks on the nuclear program, sanctions relief, some clearly unresolved issues about the control of the straight. But do you think at this point any of that framework or ordeal language could be salvaged or they just kind of scrap in that and if they can get to an agreement it would just be starting over from scratch? Look, that memorandum understanding was actually many ways very ambitious. I mean bullet point number 14 talks about the UN Security Council sort of putting it stamp of approval at the end of the 60-Date period. Where was the evidence that the two could overcome so much bad blood and many differences in the course of a short few months? There was no evidence of that. In fact, the whole thing is we just discussed, collapsed within a week. It was unlikely to have worked out. It was essentially and I hope I'm not being crude but pretty unserious piece of agreement if you will. What they need to do if they want to revive anything like it is to be far more realistic about what each side politically can engage with. You need to start with something very small and that very small thing is the opening of the straight of hormones in a way that works both sides and the mechanics are understood for both sides and you don't end up in this sort of ambiguity dictating what happens because that's exactly what happened last time right. There's too much ambiguity. The US has to give them something back in return. Obviously that we're the lifting off of the blockade on Iranian ports. You get that going while maintaining ceasefire. You might just have enough of a platform to build on and then the sequencing comes in. What should then be discussed? We know the usual suspects. The future of Iran's nuclear program sanctions relief for Iran. If you get that going that's when you start getting into territory with Donald Trump can say I actually got a better deal than Obama did in 2015. He looks like a winner. The Iranian regime can say now they've tried to crush us militarily. They couldn't regime survival is assured and so both sides might have something to move move along forward with. Assuming they appreciate that they have engaged in a lose lose war. Both of them have been losing as a result and that they want to prevent this from happening. But I think it's really important now that they point out certainly on the Iranian side. I remember Vice President Van's talking about the Iranian's buying agricultural goods from the United States as a result of some of the sanctions relief and how badly that went down in Iran. They're like what you just killed our supreme leader and how you want us to use our money to buy to bail out your farmers. It just didn't add up for him. That that level of emotion shows you that you need space. You need time and space for us to move away from the 28th of February for this regime to start thinking beyond assassination of Ali Hamini and the 40-day war and start thinking about their future. What would be good for them to survive? Again, sequencing is important. Time is important and I have to say both sides have been guilty of engaging in this bravado in the social media. The sort of talk of having defeated the other side thoroughly which those of us who are observing this thing can see there's no clear cut winner here. So they need to start putting the experts to work and get some real clean mechanics to actually uphold any kind of agreement with his administrative or most sanctions relief. That needs to be done and I would have wanted to sit here officials engage in far less bravado and as I said let the experts get to work. Alex on that point in particular on the mechanics. I wanted to drill down in a little bit more detail on this umani proposal for the straight-of-war moves. Can you just want to walk us through what the umani's have put on the table in terms of what that would look like on the the fee mechanism and the sort of share control and walk us through the thinking in Tehran on this. What would compel them to accept a proposal along those lines and maybe just flesh out a little bit the role of Umani and why it's once again a key intermediary on this. Yeah, look very quick answers to that is the arrangements have rejected the umani effort and to the point of what that effort is my understanding is it's very similar to the Malakar straight kind of arrangement where ships that sail through voluntarily contribute towards environmental and other kind of maritime services. I wouldn't claim expertise on that. I don't know what maritime services means but I'm sure there's a lot that you know you can charge for when these big vessels go through uh oftentimes with cargo that you're something goes wrong God forbid you got to clean it up so you can make that kind of argument that's basically what the umani's have done but it from Iran's point of view um you know again symbolism kicks in. US insists you cannot give Iran the right to demand fees whereas the Iranians are demanding fees because that's how they can then claim sovereignty and they can play this card next time a potential war is around the corner they can say well you attack us we'll we'll close the straight because everybody agreed back in 2026 that you know it's Iranian sovereignty so you've got this you know the the sort of fear of the precedent that this sets uh the umani's are trying to sort of engage in a very tough balancing act they are among the Gulf countries probably the closest to Iran in the sense of having dealt with them over decades literally going back to the 80s when they were mediating between Saddam and and Homanie back in the 1980s they are balancing that fragile set of relations to have a Tehran with their close ties with the fellow Gulf Cooperation Council which uh it seems to me the umani's and this is important now as there seems to have brought the Gulf countries on board uh then say you know what for the sake of the collective good let's just give the Iranian something and get get over this straight of almost issue but obviously it right now it's stock because the umani's thought this sort of voluntary mechanism where fees is collected and Iran can maybe take that as a victory that has actually been as far as I know as a right now rejected by the Iranian so uman put it very briefly to you has put a huge amount of capital in trying to mediate between US and Iran oftentimes on appreciate it oftentimes accused of of acting in a surgery way by both sides the Iranians blamed Homanies to play the game of the Americans the president Trump at one point talked about blown up Homan if you remember just a few months ago so it's not always been appreciated but it hasn't stopped the man from trying and frankly there are a lot of mediators out there the Iraqis are playing a role the Qataris are playing a low Egyptian Turks Pakistanis of course but the Homanies have the longest track record and in many ways the sort of deepest level of ties with the Iranians and they do have a particularly wonderful low profile of operating they don't need the limelight they just want to see results I can tell you that as someone who has visited Homan a couple of times with MEI Medellist Institute delegation in recent years and seen their hard work upfront and I can vouch that they do mean well even though if they oftentimes can get the parties to agree Alex given that you you've kind of made clear how the the control of Hormuz this ability to close Hormuz is really kind of a key to Iran's strategic deterrence equation going forward do you think there's any way that Tehran would accept a sort of joint management of the straight concession and if so what would that actually take for them to agree to that like what sort of I know big blue sky think again is there anything out there that would compel them to do that you know I think a majority of the opinion in Iran seems to believe or agree that look use this control of the straight as leverage but when the time is right give it up and go back to what you were before Iran for throughout his history didn't claim to control the straight you were saying you need to control the straight you meaning Iran today because you were saying it's a must have at a time of war but once the war is over We're going to be back. Would you not be better off having the kind of relationship with your fellow neighbors to yourself, the Gulf countries, where you don't have a few billion dollars in fees here and there dictating the shape of relations going forward. Because ended of day, you know, I can give you one scenario, Alistair. And this is something people, you know, mention that the Gulf countries, for example, could diversify. They could create alternative ports, pipelines, and make straight of almost far less significant. Iran counters and says, I can still blow anything up on the Arabian Peninsula. I can blow things up on the Red Sea. And that's true, technically they can. But where does that leave Iran as a country? As it becomes a gangster state that blows infrastructure up all around it. And at some point, I suspect, and I think a lot of folks in Iran get this, you create the kind of international coalition against you that, for example, Saddam Hussein faced when he went into Kuwait in 1990. Right now that coalition doesn't exist because the Trump administration, frankly, has done a terrible job even trying to build a coalition. But if a lot of countries start suffering because of Iranian actions, Iran's neighbors, Pakistanis are already complaining. This is having an impact on our economy. But for me, that suggests, if I was Iran, I would say, look, all right, we give you the benefit of it out. And wartime, you wanted to use this as leverage to get a better deal for you. But at some point, you have to appreciate this is not going to be an open-ended tool that is at Iran's disposal. It's not good for the region. It's not good for Iran either. So I could see a situation where you have as part of a bigger agreement understanding if there is even Tehran decides to act more like a normal state. And again, this is a controversial thing. A lot of people will say to me, what are you talking about? Iran wasn't the one that attacked the United States. It was the other way Iran. Separate issue. For me, the history of the Islamic Republic that does not begin on the American Israeli attack on 28th February goes back to early 1979 and coming to this Islamist revolutionary system that rules Iran. And that takes me to a more, more larger point with the death of Ali Hamid. The regime's first generation leaders are all either dead or dying. They're not going to be Iran. So there is a question mark for those people who are inheriting this Islamic Republic. What kind of system do they want to have? What kind of system do they think they can control? Because we've spent all this time now, Alistair, talking about Iran and America and Iran and the Gulf. And remember, the Iranian regime's biggest challenge is how to address the many concerns of its own people. And if you want to do that, you need to start acting in a very different manner, both in terms of your relations about the outside world, which fixes your economy or can help fix your economy. And you also have to go back and renew it a contract to extend that this regime can do, but you're on people. I'm not even sure if they can do that, but that would be something that to me would be obvious as a way for the Islamist system in Iran to try and preserve itself, again, if it could. Alex, we're running short on time, but before we wrap up, I wanted to ask you just to kind of conclude, regime change was a stated war aim back in February. And it seems like we had, you know, BB Netanyahu in Washington this week. Israel doesn't seem like it's bought into the idea of a deal with Tehran about the likelihood of that or the outcome of that. Kind of given this, this universe of constraints, if the US and Iran can, you know, manage to restore a pause to again, kind of reengage in talks, what do you think this sort of realistic ceiling is on what's achievable in those talks? Do you think it's just that narrow agreement on on Hormuz, something broader? What's your read on that? Yeah, no, I, I would say, you know, start small, baby steps, essentially, something very narrow, hard to sort of disagree on, like straight of Hormuz is either open or it's not. The blockade on Iranian port has lifted or it hasn't. There isn't much, you know, space to misunderstand one another. That's how I would say if the United States accepts that Islamic Republic is not going anywhere, then this is how you go about building trust. And it will take time, probably more time than the Trump administration has on its watch. So, the other thing is, and this is where we're going to go back to Iranian readings of the Trump administration, does the United States genuinely want to cut a deal with this regime, or is it just sort of engaging in essentially what amounts to a war of attrition that US dictates the terms, we will hit you here, we will squeeze you there, and that's what the fear isn't there at, and they're going to, this is an Iranian regime that today takes risks in ways that it didn't do a few years ago, and they believe that it's worth it. This is a scary situation for us to be in, for the whole region to be in, because you have an Iranian regime that believes the best way of getting the Americans to back off is to create economic shocks to the extent that they can, whether it's in the strait, with Babel Mandel elsewhere. So, I could see military escalation equally being followed by more economic damage being brought across the board in the region. Again, the Iranian intention would be to get Donald Trump to back away, back off, if you will, but the opposite could happen. Which is to say, and that's the line of argument to your point about what Israelis are on this, it's just to say, you just cannot cut a deal with an regime like this, that the solution is regime change, which is obviously easier said than done, because who's going to force the regime out of power? The United States politically is not in a place where anyone seriously talk about forcing the regime out of power by force, which leaves me with the last kind of point I make, a point that was entirely absent in realistic terms throughout this conflict, the role of the Iranian people. President Trump came into this war, early days talking about, you know, U.S. intervened, take over your government. Again, easier said than done. The president, I'm not saying he was not genuine when he said that, but what he should have realized is, you can empower the people of Iran to take over their government, but remember, you have to help empower them, and that part has been missing. So when I look at the landscape out there, where is the Iranian opposition at home or the ones outside that might count, where are they? Who helped them? How are they being utilized? None of that has happened. So that takes me to conclude that actually in many ways, the best way forward is to empower the people of Iran to take over their own country, because if they do, based on what we know about public sentiment in Iran, it will be a country that would have far fewer issues with the United States, where its neighbors will be much more if you will to use that cliche in normal country. But we're not at a point where the people of Iran can take over. They have tried and repeatedly in recent years with protesting what happens to them. They end up in body bags, and nobody's helped them having a more compelling way of seeking political power. So again, if you are the United States, you have two options. Cut a deal with this regime, except what it is, and that might just work. If you cannot do that, then you have to really do much more harder thinking in terms of how do you help the Iranian people? Because that's your only really pathway forward. How do you help them take over, if you will, politically, and take the country of Iran in a very different direction. And one that works for United States much better than Islamic republic has turned out to be as a country to deal with. Alex, that's all the time we have for this week. So we'll have to leave things there. Thank you very much for speaking with us. Thank you, Alistair. Pleasure as always. A warm thanks also goes out to our listeners for tuning in as well as to our production team for all of their work on this week's episode. As a quick programming note, Middle East focus will be on hiatus in August for the summer holidays, but we'll be back in your feeds in September. If you like what you heard, please consider subscribing to Middle East focus on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, YouTube Music, or wherever you get your podcasts. To find more on MEI's coverage of the Iran War and the prospects for talks, please visit our website at www.mei.edu. And you can also follow me on X, Instagram, Facebook, LinkedIn, and YouTube. And subscribe to our email newsletters for the latest analysis and information about upcoming events. I'm Alistair Taylor. I hope you listen in again when we're back in September.