Rebuilding America's Critical Minerals Base

[MUSIC PLAYING] [MUSIC PLAYING] Welcome to the COGS-4 podcast. I'm Jonathan Pander, executive editor of the COGS-4 Vertical, brought to you by War on the Rocks in Ruzal and Hamilton. Today, I am joined by Alex Grant, co-founder and chief executive officer of Magrathia Metals, a US-based startup producing magnesium from seawater and brines using a new electrolytic process. And Westboro Lock co-founder and chief operating officer of Principal Mineral, a startup that acquires and relaunches midstream manufacturing firms such as the solar group, a maker of printed circuit board materials. Gentlemen, thank you for joining COGS-4. Thanks for having us. It's awesome to be here. Hey, good afternoon. To set the stage for our listeners, critical minerals are elements the US government themes essential to economic and national security. They're about 60 of these ranging from rare earth elements to copper and lead. The supply chain and simple form runs from exploration to extraction, to processing and refining, to midstream manufacturing, which is turning refined material into metals, alloys, magnets, and so on. And finally, to end use products. So let's start with the big picture. What does our vulnerability look like? And what has the government been doing? Been working in this space from the government perspective for the last 20 years in the Air Force. We retired out of the office's Cheetah Capital and Halfworks. And what we found as part of the biggest issue with a lot of this was we have a lot of government support with regards to how we buy capabilities. We buy aircraft carriers. We buy F-35s. But we don't buy rare earth magnets. Or we don't buy printed circuit boards as an acquisition tool. We expect those to be taken care of. And we expect the primes, the OEMs, the people that are getting those contracts to integrate that. So what we create is an incentive structure that doesn't allow us to really make sure that we shore this up from a holistic full supply chain look. And I think that was-- you put that on top of globalization. And that acquisition process and that focus area. And we found ourselves becoming more and more vulnerable to the resiliency of the supply chains, which board itself out in COVID and supply chains were interesting until people didn't have toilet paper. Became very tangible to almost anyone. Now we're seeing that realization come back. And we're really seeing the energy behind it from people that realize that these things are important. Supply chains are important when they're something that is near and dear to your personal self. But when we can't achieve national security objectives because we don't have those supply chains. And when it's not necessarily just an economic thing, it's the ability to access thing. We don't have that optionality. That really changes the paradigm of what I think the country expects. And I think this is kind of worldwide allies, et cetera. But also, it's the incentive structure-- you show me the incentives. I'll show you the outcome. I think that we've seen that kind of shift in recent years. And I'm really kind of hopeful that we'll see the impact of that. But these things don't move quickly. We talked about Eric F. Carey's. You don't turn these on a dime. I think that we're seeing the pendulum swing and kind of excited about what the future looks like. Yeah, I think that was a really good way to put it. And to build on that, I've been working in natural resources and extraction metallurgy for a decade now. First, in the battery supply chain and now in the defense supply chain working in main-easy metal production for the defense industrial base. And there is a focus now on actually solving the supply chain issues that underpin all of these products that the Department of War and defense primes by that did not exist before. That's very exciting. And hopefully, it's not too little too late. We should have been making these investments a long time ago, or maybe a better way to put it is we should have never stopped making these investments. 20 or 30 years ago, we decided to stop investing in chemical production, technology, and mining assets. We were very happy to let China do that for us, and that was a huge mistake. So we're now paying for those sins and sort of reversing course. And it's really exciting times. Well, you guys brought us in almost immediately to one of the more controversial questions I think that we have in this space. You painted this picture as of sort of a progressive offshoring of these capabilities to our competitors, which wasn't deliberate in any way. It was just a function of being in a market economy. And you brought this up as well. It was cheaper, right? So for 20 or 30 years, almost biosmosis, gradually, and without even recognizing it, we suddenly had multiple supply chains, depending on China, and not just in critical minerals. You mentioned toilet paper, whatever it might be. And so now, as you said, we have this sort of new era of government intervention, new spending, new attention from newly empowered bodies like OSC, which as you mentioned, you helped set up. So the question I think a lot of people have, certainly one that I have is, to what extent is this new era of government intervention in any sector? Let's keep it to yours, to critical minerals, metals, materials. Is it really just to tie this over until a matured market can be self-sustaining, a domestic market and production capacity for these things? Or do we expect that these efforts to prop it up are going to be a long-term feature of the system? I think some of the moves that the Trump administration's making now could be seen as sort of emergency stopgap measures until the problem of Chinese dumping is solved. So China has weaponized its industries against us for 20 years to deliberately destroy our production capabilities for a whole range of materials, metals and minerals. It was not for a very long time. American companies or Western companies competing with Chinese companies. It was Western companies trying to compete against the CCP. They were trying to compete against a Chinese state. It really actually was. That was truly the situation people were in. And the only way to compete against the state is to have another state backing you. So until the problem of Chinese market manipulation has solved, and I know that the administration has a couple of creative solutions for doing that, which I think are really compelling, then focused strategic support of specific companies will continue to be necessary. But to build a durable business, both your cases, you have to depend on a stable demand signal, stable prices or at least to some extent predictable prices. If Chinese dumping is always around the corner, no matter what the current deal is that's made today under this or any other administration, how do you build the business based on that? I think that sometimes when we get into this conversation, we get to general on what are the tools that are being brought into bear. I think for me, it's personal. We started looking around during COVID and found that there was 135 different federal credit programs across the government. There was only not a federal credit program at the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor. And we saw during COVID with Operation Warp Speed and we were using the Defense Production Act, I was at the Development Finance Corporation, that there was a demand to use tools like government debt to lower the cost of capital, to increase the return and investment for investors so they could meet their fiduciary responsibility and get the same return on investment that they would for e-commerce or SaaS or what, the private capital market strove, but also achieve the policy objective. And I don't think this is like candidly, I think you said that this was kind of a now thing, but this has been happening for a long time. We have had federal credit programs since before we had the Pentagon. This is a similar conversation to 1957, Sputnik goes across our skies. In 1958, we get NASA DARPA and the SBIC program, which was a debt-levard fund program that was utilized to help incentivize private capital allocators to help us develop these technologies at a time when R&D from the federal government was about 80% of overall R&D. That's 180 out now. R&D is coming from the private sector and so for the government to be participating in this space, we need to be good partners in this and to figure out where these technologies, and I know that I'm talking technologies and we're talking supply chains, but they're the same thing. And all of these problems, like you said, it goes across all of the critical technology areas, all of the different spaces, if someone's trying to build a manufacturing facility and they can't make the math math, make the business case, because you don't want to raise $100 million equity round to build a manufacturing facility in Ohio. That's just not the right use of capital. The ability now for the government to use all of these tools, and I think that we have a lot of experts in the private capital markets are kind of coming into government. We've seen a commitment to service from investors and private capital allocators, I think is very, is a huge coming out of COVID all the way through now. It's continued to ramp up because that is one of our competitive advantages around the world is to tap into our private capital markets, use that, but use it in a way that you can make a business case that you're not trying to do this in short spurts. We're not just subsidizing it. We're catalyzing the private capital to where that business case works and it works for the long run. Right now, I think we're seeing the effects of not just globalization, but because of globalization, people trying to make that work, we've seen a huge, say, the last 20 years, deferral of capital expenditures. Like, you've got to rebuild back these factories to make them work. It's not that the business case, if the factory was in fighting shape, you can make a business case right now. If you're building back 20 years of deferred catbecks and then to get your head back to level, then you can't make a business case. And so I think some of these conversations right now are to account for the deferred catbecks to make a competitive manufacturing, critical minerals, supply chain story. I think once you get there, then you can start to see a business case where this works because people are starting to realize it is great to get stuff cheap, but first and foremost, you've got to get stuff. And so you have to be able to do both of those to make a business work now. And I think from OEMs to Primes to early stage technology companies, everyone is thinking supply chains matter from the beginning. And I think that's a huge, a box that wasn't really previously being checked. We just assumed it would be there. And then we saw that it wouldn't. And I think that goes to the innovation another one of our competitive ads where people are like, okay, I need to adjust the-- model now we're moving out with this and we're seeing real, real headway that we haven't seen. And in a way, I think a lot of that was catalyzed from COVID where everybody's like really rethinking how to approach things. And I think it's a huge advantage. And I think it's also a huge advantage to a lot of the places that we see these manufacturing facilities or places that these jobs really matter. It's a double benefit for political constituencies, for financial constituencies, but also for local governments and just people having jobs in the US. It's been a really rewarding ride and I'm excited to keep it going. I think you and I are probably closer than you think on this. I wasn't necessarily criticizing the government intervention per se and I certainly agree that if you look in terms of the raw numbers of direct government investment in research and basic research and technologies that was much higher during the Cold War as you pointed than it is today. I think what's probably unique is the extent of the financial engineering. And as you said with many of those innovations coming from the market, it's a different model of spurring innovation, also a different model of looking. In fact, we're making up a delta that wasn't there during the Cold War manufacturing delta because we came out of the second world war already the peak of our manufacturing capacity and built upon it. We said we're starting from essentially zero because we zeroed ourselves out in the 90s and outs and trying to bring ourselves up to a point where yes, there will be economies of scale and then it will make sense for the ordinary consumer, even the absence of subsidies to purchase products from American down the South companies. Now we've gotten a little deep into the grant policy arc here so let's get back to the subject. You see in different places in the supply chain. So would you tell us where you sit? So Magrathia is rebuilding supply of primary magnesium metal from natural resources in the United States. 95% of the world's mag is made in China, zero in the United States, zero in Europe, zero in Canada, Australia, Japan, etc. And that's a problem because mag is used in a whole bunch of munitions applications for countermeasure flares across the economy. You cannot make an aluminum alloy without magnesium. So China essentially controls the world's aluminum industry by controlling our ability to make aluminum alloys, which essentially means cars, planes, helicopters, beverage cans, everything in between. I think what's funnier though is most people hear magnesium. They certainly hear aluminum and they assume these are very abundant elements, right? We're not talking about palladium or something like that. So why is it so difficult for us to do this ourselves? So magnesium and aluminum compounds or salts are abundant in nature. Like rocks are aluminum silicates. You can theoretically make aluminum metal from a rock for many kinds of rocks, but you don't. You go after a very specific type of mineral called boxite to make aluminum and then refine it in a sort of complex expensive way. Just because the atoms are abundant in nature doesn't mean that the metal is categorically obviously abundant also because making metal from salt or compound can be very challenging. And the extractive metallurgy for making aluminum metal from boxite is very mature. Aluminum is now quite large industry, even 60 million tons of aluminum was made every year. Magnesium is about 1 million tons. Magnesium smelting has historically been much more challenging. The technology never settled into one specific way of doing it, the way that it did for aluminum. So every single time a magnesium smelter has ever been built, it's been built differently. And there's always been issues with that smelting technology. So at Megrathia over the last five years what we've done is essentially revisited everything ever done over the last 120 years of magnesium smelting and figured out a much lower cap ex and more robust, simpler way of making mag than has been available previously to try to make magnesium metal more accessible and easier to finance in the US. Aluminum in the extraction part but also the refining. These aren't exactly segmented, right? It's probably more of a spectrum, you're in that part. So process that's typically integrated from natural resource all the way to final metal product. So there are possible concentrates that you could stop at in the process, but you normally don't. You just one shot it all the way through. So we start with seawater or brine or we could theoretically start with mineral, but usually it's easier just to go through a brine. We make a concentrate from that brine which we then smelt into metal and we do it all in one, all in one plant. Where do you find these brines? Are they, is it like low tidal pools or something like that or is it caves? There's a whole bunch of different types of brines. So I've been working brines for 10 years. I can talk about brines. Okay, I make pickles. Does that count? That does count. So we can actually make magnesium from seawater. The largest magnesium and smells are ever built was built using seawater. So Dow built a 90,000 ton per year facility in freeport, Texas in World War II. That ran for 80 years. It only shut down in 1997 when a hurricane hit it, making metal from the Gulf of America as we know call it. We are building the first new magnesium smelter in the country in the last like 40 or 50 years in Arkansas where there is a subterranean brine 10,000 feet below the surface of the earth that we pump up using pretty conventional well field technology, create a concentrate from using conventional hydro metallurgy. You can use brines from salt lakes like the Dead Sea or the Great Salt Lake. So yeah, you can actually use a whole bunch of different types of resources. That's what's really interesting about MAG is that it's not a resource problem. You can make it from a ton of different stuff. It's much more of a downstream smelting technology problem. And ways you're on a very different part of this problem set. Yes and no. I mean, I think that when we talk about, if we're talking about anything upstream from the finished product, we're having a very similar conversation. There's either you're building an economy of scales to make the math math or you're bringing innovative technology that hasn't previously been tried to do some of these industrial processes that will make the math math better. We talk about smelting like we have a copper poil factory, camden copper in South Carolina that like the only one in the Western hemisphere for electric deposit copper poil and hundreds of supply chains for emerging technologies, national security. It's qualified ready to go, but you know, the input is copper. There's not the copper smelting is the the impact of that that we've been seen in the US. It's led us to kind of have issues that we we work with recycled or raw, you know, kind of copper into a chemical process that then puts it into copper sulfate comes out of the electrode of two anodes run electricity over it. Water comes in one side and you see copper poil come out the other side. It's really fascinating. It's chemistry, but making all the industrials work to make that chemistry process happen is is a lot. And I think for us, the midstream, we really focus on the midstream, but what is the midstream? It's anything not at the very beginning, anything not at the very end because we like we talked about earlier with the the incentive structure of integrators or primes or OEMs being able to have to be responsible for that whole supply chain and the supply chain folks being laser focused on the soda straw. They're looking at in their part of the supply chain. They're incentivized to take margin from the downstream and they're incentivized to take margin from the upstream until they're left and right partners in that supply chain are gone. And we've seen this time and time again. And I think that's why the midstream is is broad, but you get really close to either side of that. I think when we talk about rare earth magnets, for instance, we're talking about metals and the the fluorides and the different process there. Previously, you're going to make metal. You're either going to use it based off of your you were at mine. The cost of the metal was just going to be part of your process. So you're going to be a magnet maker and the cost of the metal because the metal itself, the math wouldn't math because that supply chain got squeezed so hard and also because that process is so hard to do, especially in the US. And so we got sourced that part of it. Now we've created a single point of failure in the supply chain that we've seen ground F 35 and that the ability to go after those hard problems and bring technology, bring experience from the policy side and then bring formations of capital together. This what principle mineral has been doing. And so we came to copper. We acquired that a year ago. We've got that back up and running and now absent that we don't make copper foil for printed circuit boards in the US. We don't make it in North America. And there's only one other one in the Western world in Europe that we almost lost again. Now last week, we announced the acquisition of the solar group making copper quite lamina, which is the next stage in the printed circuit board supply chain that you put woven glass and copper foil you stack it together and kind of wafer it. That's what the building of the printed circuit board is, which is critical. And we've had all these conversations about chips. If you don't have printed circuit board, say chips don't float. So that whole supply chain has very critical upstream single points of failure, but it depends on how comfortable we are because it's not just well if we can get it cheaper, but if we can't get it at all, then those supply chains ruin the whole thing. And I say yes, we're in a different part, but it's also the same problem set from what I'm hearing from Alex. Yeah, but I feel like you guys have a lot of different inputs that might differ. And I don't mean actually at the level of sourcing copper versus finding the correct brine deposits. I'm also thinking in terms of you're starting to make, as you said, the math, math better in the industrial processes. And that requires inputs, like, let's say, I'm thinking of the labor workforce, which has been everybody's minds across the defense enterprise. And so when we talk about restoring manufacturing to this country, it seems like that would be less of a case for you, Alex, right? Because I think, or maybe I got this fundamentally incorrectly, you're probably working with pre-sophisticated trained engineers to enable this new, you know, this new extraction process that you've developed rather than metallurgy workers. Labor is a challenge, but I would say capital is actually a much bigger challenge because we can train people up. I've trained up dozens of engineers over the last four and a half years to get really smart on molten salt electrochemistry. That's possible, but it's actually capitalizing these projects that's really the hard part. And people still struggle with. That's what I think is the most capital intensive part of it for you. Coming up, we're going to be building our commercial plant in the next couple of years. Some multi-hundred million dollar plant. We have no balance sheet, right? We're a five-year-old tech startup with like a couple of tens of millions of dollars in the bank that we just raised. You know, it's a really gnarly, hairy problem to figure out how to build that capital stack. And there are people on Wall Street who are interested in being part of that. There's folks who are, you know, obvious candidates in DC who are interested to be part of that. But it's just something that there's just no muscle memory for how to do it in the US and in the West because we just haven't done it in so long. That is actually honestly really the hard part. I want to get on the labor because I definitely, we definitely have that as top of my mind. But I think when we think about these business cases and we're thinking about coalescing public and private funding, it's a chicken or the egg sometimes. I think there's been a little more forward progress on the government funding. And when I think about that from the perspective of what do you want that perfect partnership? When I think about the return investment for a private capital allocator, it's just the economic return investment. Yes, they want to do cool things, but also they have fiduciary responsibility to their LPs to get them the best return on their money. When we think about it from a government perspective, you know, their LPs was the taxpayers, but the ROI for the government funding is the policy objective achieved plus the financial return and investment. So that's the equation. And so when we have such critical policy objectives that they can, that math can on the, you know, economic returns can go down. You know, we saw chips. We saw a lot of these programs Operation War Speed were grants contracts, different direct funding sources that catalyze private capital. But if they're not recurring contracts, your earlier point, that may not allow them to draw the debt based tools or bringing the right capital status because it's hard. That technology is critical, but they can't underwrite that on a 25 year timeline. And so it's been fascinating to people start to figure that equation out together. And I think there's a lot more Wall Street and Silicon Valley interest in how do they get the right capital stack, including the government, but also the ability to use the marginal taxpayer dollar versus having to fund the whole thing and kind of come in as a Operation War Speed was great, except for we can't do that every two years. It has to be a logical measured approach. Yeah, the way I kind of see it, West is the ball has to be passed back and forth between private and public, right? We first raised private capital, then we got 20 million from DPA Tettle 3, then we raised a series A from private investors. And now the ball kind of goes back into the public side of the court again. They see each of their investments as a validation by the other. I think I think that's kind of the way in formula. You're going from venture capital to government to growth equity to government to private equity. That is a, that's a changing dynamic in the, especially in the supply chain. We've heard this time and time again, and everybody agrees long term off-grade contracts will allow me to make a more financial project. Agreed. We should fix that. I think that those are, there's efforts to do that. But in the, in the timeline of these projects to make them economical, you're talking early stage seed funding all the way to big, going public type deals. That is a journey that takes a lot of time. As I hear from you and in our experience, time that we are spending, you know, explaining the finances of it is time taken away from developing the technology is taken away from leading the people. And so for us, that triangle right there is exactly how we built principal, to focus on policy, focus on technology and focus on finance. If you can have those triangle always going at the same time, so you're not letting up on one to do the other, so you don't slow the process. I think that's big. My most enjoyable part of this though gets to the labor force that we've seen, you know, Camden, South Carolina, which is like one of the most welcoming and I've just loved that getting to spend time with the community there. And when we got there and we were analyzing and diligently in the company, I met a guy named Greg Horton who wrote a poem about what it was like to be, you know, working in this critical, you know, material factory during COVID and like they made they had to come to work everybody else to stay at home because it was so critical to like the country. But then because of a bad financial deal, this factory is getting shut down. And he the poem was called Forgotten and it really like it resonates to me like he wrote it listening to Johnny Cash's like ragged old flag and thinking about the culture of what the show up to work, do the job and it's about something bigger than yourself. That really resonated with me, but it also helped me think about when you talk about I can find new ways to build machines. There's no other people making an electric apostolic opera for like can't go on monster.com and find the next guy. And so while we usually think of these as kind of jobs that are more kind of early stage and like, you know, in like doing the work jobs, these are also bespoke technology like this, the how you run these industrials. There's no one else doing this. There's similar processes, but we have guys that the factory that has been there their first job was to work in this factory as it's moved through different owners through from New York to South Carolina. And for 46 years, Mike has been in this factory. It's like as much as DNA and it's much as the magic of how he does is just like a PhD scientist in how they tweak the industrials just to work. I can't find another one of him. I can't build another one of him for years. And so the ability to build that training force that has previously been kind of word of mouth and to scale it because we have to scale these to make the math math is a huge problem set and to make that in competition with other jobs, mines or otherwise is sometimes there's got to be conversations like workforce development. I think there's conversations today that we're like we're having that on a real basis with that's another box to think about as you're trying to make all of these all of these things move at the same time. And it's it's fun, but it's difficult. I think a lot of what both of you just said is interesting. It brings us back to the beginning of the discussion where I was trying to define for the readers know what critical minerals, materials, metals are to some extent. It sounds like both of you in the industry as a whole are deserved by the fact that we talk about such as such a broad subject under just the single banner of critical materials and it particularly pertains to this financing component you've both discussed in as much as at different points in that supply chain. The economics are fundamentally different. The returns that you can promise to your investors, the VC style investors, right? If you're coming up with a brand new style of extraction or quite different than in your case when you're rebuilding the economics in the center of the supply chain and you're dealing with these fundamental holdups that may as you said may take decades or at least maybe a decade to reconcile the correct training pipelines until you get appropriate return on investment and so on. To wrap us up here, I've just also and along that similar vein of how broad this field is, if we just look at the specific minerals that you guys work with. What's one surprising place that you've seen the end product end up in? There's a bunch of interesting applications of magnesium and implants in your body interestingly because it can dissolve slowly into your body and your body needs magnesium to survive. Interestingly, magnesium is very biocompatible, more so than other metals. That's a tiny, tiny sliver of the magnesium market, but it's one that I have always found very curious that it's this especially biocompatible material. Because we touch multiple different things, I think if I'm looking at it just specifically, we talk about copper foil, copper clad, like this supply chain for printed circuit boards, everything. It's in everything. Every rockets, radars, it's in everything, it's on aircraft carriers, it's in airplanes, it's in washing machines, it's in everything. And that's that, you know, that's one of the key parts. But everyone's seen that thing in your calculator, that golden green little board that's in there that they put the chips on it. You've seen it every day, you know, we realized how important it was. And like I said, the copper that you can see on that, the copper clad, laminated, that's in between that, that's what we're doing. And so it's because it's the workhorse that puts everything together, it's not necessarily gets the splash of chips. When we talk about, we have a nickel EMI shielding company, every application in space, about, you know, EMP hardening signals blocking. There's a lot of applications that we can talk about, and there's a lot of applications we can't talk about that I think are really interesting. My background I used to work with, I used to be the military aid to the president. So I carried the nuclear football for president Obama and president Trump and got to see a lot of the really cool things that we have in like some of our competitive advantage. There's so many of these things that we can't even talk about why it's important. But it is critical and in the DNA. And I think about the, with the rare earth and the magnets and all that, anything that takes energy to motion or motion to energy, this is the most efficient way to do that. And if the high outputs that is you see it every day, you don't realize, I really like the way you put that. You know, we've been thinking a lot recently about how magnesium is part of this material layer underpinning everything else. Like I mentioned earlier, you cannot make an aluminum alloy without mag. So you can't make anything out of aluminum without magnesium. It's kind of wild. It's a lot of stuff, right? And it's exact same with the products you guys are making. And it kind of like goes back to the definition of a critical mineral in a way, right? Where it's like, we absolutely need these materials in these applications where you're almost by design not supposed to really even know they're there. They're so hidden. And that's part of that's part of what makes it so challenging to build these types of companies too, because it can sometimes be like very challenging to make it sound sexy and interesting. It's not like you're selling a drone or a new car or something like this that is, you know, it's really easy to tell a story about. So yeah, you just have to get very creative and spend spend a lot more time doing it. Well, and I think that they heard some of these other day's like these types of materials and minerals. These are like the offensive line of our economy of our technologies. You don't hear about them when they're doing their job, but when they're not there, the team falls apart. And I think that is really what we're learning. I think the more you dig, the more you find that analogy to be very, very accurate. But people are, you know, drones are sexy and they, all the things that people get a touch and they can, they know what the actual thing is. But then when you dig down one layer, you're like, oh, wait, it's in drones. It's in fighter jets. It's in washing machines and cars. All of those are sexy, but none of those work without the offensive line. Now, what an incredible paradox implies so much to defense tech in general, which is that the essential enabling capabilities that everybody takes for granted are often the hardest sell from an investment perspective, merely because by virtue of them working all the time, people are unaware of them. I flew all the air refueling tankers in the Air Force on the pilot flew the KC 10, the KC 135 and our newest tanker, the KC 46. And we had a acronym, no kicking ass without tanker gas. I think it's like, it's very much a supporting, it's a support system. But the fighters don't get on station and we don't protect the 18 year old private if they don't have the fuel to get there. I feel very at home in this mission. I'm very proud of what we're doing. Alex West, thanks for joining Cogs of War. Thank you. Thank you for listening to Cogs of War. Don't forget to sign up for our free newsletter that comes out every other week. WarntheRox.com/cogs-of-war. Keep reading, keep thinking, and stay healthy.