Public Philosopher - Citizens of Nowhere?

This BBC podcast is supported by ads outside the UK. Investing with Schwab is like spending a Saturday at a great farmers market. You can fill your reusable tote with a bit of everything. Maybe you go for some free range self-directed investing. Or perhaps you pick up a few farm fresh trades while you peruse. You can even get help from a dedicated advisor. That's full service wealth management. Mix, match and change your mind whenever you want. Because at Schwab, you can invest your way. No matter your goals or appetite for investing, Schwab has everything you need all in one place. Visit Schwab.com to learn more. How many streaming subscriptions do you have? Is it the same for your business? Avoid it by having all your business on one platform. Try Odo for free at odo.com. That's odo.com. Thank you. Thank you. My name is Michael Sandell. Welcome to this episode of the public philosopher. This time, we come to you from St. Paul's Cathedral, a magnificent sacred space that is also a remarkable place of civic gathering and deliberation. Our question is one of the hardest questions of contemporary politics. What has become of the common good after decades of globalization? Have we lost sight of what it means to be a citizen? Prime Minister Theresa May has suggested as much. "Do many people in positions of power," she said, "behaves though they have more in common with international elites than with people down the road." "If you believe you're a citizen of the world," she said. "You're a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what the very word "citizenship" means." Well, what does citizenship mean? What do we owe one another as citizens? And what are the competing conceptions of community to which the common good refers? To explore these questions, we have gathered here on the stage of St. Paul's Cathedral under the Magnificent Dome, a group of about 80 university students. I'd like to begin by putting to them the following question. About a recent development in Germany. In Essen, Germany, there is a food bank. It's a charity. And the demand for the services of the food bank were very high. The food bank decided that priority would be given to needy Germans over needy foreigners and refugees. And it's a question I'd like to put to our students here on the stage at St. Paul's. Was it right or wrong for the German food bank to give preference to needy Germans over foreigners? Raise your hand. A small handful of people. How many think it was wrong? Both on the stage and in the audience in St. Paul's, the overwhelming majority have raised their hand saying it's wrong. What is that wrong? Yes, tell us your name. My name's Nimra. I think it's wrong because it's given power to one nationality over another nationality. And it's determined that one particular identity is worth more than another. My name's Delfine. I think it's actually a reductionist to say it's wrong right. I think we need to remember the nation's state balance. If you were running the food bank, what policy would you take? Well, I think it's more a case of obviously helping those who actually need it regardless of nationality. But the nation's state, including any institution within, will protect its own sovereign nationals. Should it? That's a different question. Well, that's our question. Yes, what do you say? I think that there are people who could be foreigners that needed more. So I would give priority for those who are in more need, even if they're not Germans. And what's your name? The most needy, regardless of nationality. Those of you who think it's wrong to give preference in the German food bank to Germans, is that how you would decide based on need? All right, let's hear now from someone who said that it was right for the German food bank to give preference to needy Germans. Hi, my name's Mohammed. And I think there seems to be a pressure against nations protecting itself when it's intrinsically the most human thing to do. As much as we want to be unnecessarily good and unnecessarily benevolent. If I, for example, if I have a family and I have food, do I give it to my son or do I give it to a homeless guy out there? Technically, he needs it more. My son has eaten, like, three times a day. It is not wrong for someone to do that in their family so I don't really see why it's wrong for a nation to do it to themselves. Mohammed says, think of the analogy of a family if your child were hungry. And somebody, some stranger's child, was even hungrier. Would it be wrong to feed your own child? That's a pretty powerful challenge. Who has a reply to that? Hi, thanks. My name is Jacqueline. I think something that we need to recognize is that Germany has allowed, as accommodated people, given them the right to live in Germany that aren't Germans. So I think if EU nationals, do they not deserve the support of the community through the food bank? So long as Germany lets them in, in the first place, they have to treat them on a par. It's food bank with other Germans, what do you say? Hi, my name is Ramsey. I think on top of that, it largely depends on the influences which, for example, Germany may have had on those people. And so in terms of Germany, if they've influenced other nations, then arguably that might justify them having to balance the system out in terms of giving to all needy. So if the refugees are Syrian refugees, as many are in this community of Essen, if Germany is implicated in the conditions that led the Syrians to flee their country, they have to look after them. Is that the idea? That's my idea, that's the idea I'm trying to say. And if not, if they simply admitted refugees whose condition they didn't contribute to creating? Then, at least in this example, then I would say that Germany has a Western power, has a power that has a role in the wider international community, they have an obligation, and they've influenced the dynamic which exists now in Syria. And so the refugees fall under their obligation in that light. But only if the country is implicated in creating the conditions? Yes, does it need to treat them as equals to its own citizens? Sure, yes. Hello, my name is Ute from Germany. And I think it is very dangerous in the context of Germany to talk about racial issues decide who we give something to and who we don't. If we take the analogy of the family, are we a family in Germany or are we a family as human beings? And any other human being who is in front of us as our brother or sister? And so I think especially in Germany with an upcoming, very strong, right populism wing, we should be careful of dividing people in races. So you reject the analogy of nations to families? Yeah, I agree with the analogy, but not with the definition of who is my brother and my sister. I think as soon as we have someone in front of us who needs help, it is our brother and sister. So German or not German is not what matters. Jewish Christian, Muslim, Hindu, whatever it is, it doesn't matter, especially in German. And I think we have a lot of experience in doing it wrong. Suppose we weren't talking about a food bank. Suppose we were talking about benefits, welfare payments by the state. Should the German state, or let's talk about Britain, should the British taxpayers allocate benefits on the basis of human need? Or on the basis of who is a British citizen? I think as long as this person is in Britain on a legal basis. even on an illegal basis if that person is about to die, then I think there should be support. Who disagrees? Who thinks that the eligibility for benefits for income support should go only to British citizens? Yes. - Hi, my name's Hamad. I don't disagree with the point wholeheartedly, but I would contest the notion somewhat, just as you would not begrudge a mother for feeding her child first as compared to a stranger's child. Right, you should not begrudge the state for, or even the British taxpayer for wanting their tax to be directed first and foremost to the legitimate citizens of Britain. And what about the argument that the relevant family here is a family of humankind? I mean, that is a very lovely and almost idealistic notion, but I would pose that up to the question of whether that fits with practicality. I mean, if we concede that we have a notion of a global citizenship, are we not saying that the states that do exist at present are what, in some way irrelevant? No, we accept that they are relevant. In the sense that concepts such as citizenship do exist for the exact purposes of protecting those domiciled within a particular state. And so with that practical side considered, I don't think there's anything wrong with saying that a state has a prerogative to place their citizens first and foremost as a priority. What do you say? Hi, my name's Park. I think part of the problem with some of the discussion has been that we're really taking for granted our definition of the state and of citizenship. And we're also not considering the ethics of migration that are playing into this kind of thing. We need to consider whether or not the state does, in fact, have a right to exclude certain people from citizenship. And what do you think about that? I think the state-- well, I mean, I have worries about the legitimacy of the state anyway. But I don't think that we should-- I don't think we have a moral right to exclude others from participation in the state or from physically being here. And I think that plays into some of these arguments. So you think morally speaking, it's wrong to have restrictions of any kind on immigration. There should be open borders, morally speaking. Yeah. So you hold a thoroughgoing universalist idea about borders, citizenship, and benefits. Yeah. And what do you say, Pa, to the arguments we've heard voiced that within a family, surely a parent has a right in it. It may be an obligation to give special concern to his or her child. Do you disagree with that? Yeah. You do disagree with that. Partly in virtue of the business I hold on that, I feel like I am somewhat committed to actually take that strong stance and say that I don't see-- I mean, I have issues with the family as a concept anyway. I think we should critically reevaluate how it factors into society. And I worry about the family being used as an analogy with the state. But I do think that we have obligations-- I do think we have high obligations to every individual. I don't think it's that we have lesser obligations to people overall. But I don't think it's right to value the family as being the ultimate decider in who your obligations are to. So I want to bring Ahmad back in, who is just now the example of the family. Ahmad, you just heard Park say that even a parent favoring his or her needy child over somebody else's needy child is, in effect, a kind of prejudice. It's a morally illegitimate prejudice, right, Park? OK, yeah. What do you say? I can definitely see the perspective being brought forward. But I think that puts morality and biology at odds almost, because we have an inherent affinity to our own family. A mother has an inherent affinity to her own child. She will-- I mean, it's evident in animals as evident in humankind that a mother will protect her children for the most part, even place the child's survival and well-being over her own. And so to deny that for a universal notion of placing everyone at equal footing whilst it sounds absolutely wonderful on paper is, I'd say, at odds with our very nature. I see your point about instincts and that kind of thing. But I'm mostly very cautious of reducing my moral stances to my emotional instincts. And I think that we should be-- whilst they can inform where our sorts of preferences tend to lie, I don't think we should use them to do our moral world building. Yes, in the back. Yeah, just sort of follow that up. I also think that the idea that we identify with other people is a basic precondition to us willing to express solidarity with people or to support people, where we have any sort of large-scale redistribution between rich and poor. Then that does actually rest on the idea that there's something shared in common. And also in strong institutions, like trade unions, which again, rest on attachment to a place or an industry or some sort of community. So I think the idea that we should be kind of universalize everything and have obligations to everything undercuts any sort of support you could ever have to redistribute in that way. You think that redistribution and generosity presupposes solidarities of more particular kinds. But why? Tell us your name. My name's Nick. Nick, why do you think that generosity and the willingness to help those in need presupposes solidarity or loyalty to a particular group or identity such as a nation? Because to do that, you require the support for, say, people paying more taxes, which will go to universal services or to be redistributed in a way that will support other people, rather than people just seeing themselves as a sort of atomized individual floating in abstraction. Well, part of those are fighting words. Automized individuals floating in abstraction. Nick says, will not be very generous types. How would you reply? So I would say that a lot of the work that is done actually does exist outside the state and does happen beyond the state. And I think solidarity is very often the actually built very much against what the state would rather happen. And I think that often the state will actually push back against the harder work that needs doing. I want to turn in our audience in St. Paul's to David Goodhart, who has distinguished between people from somewhere and people from anywhere. You've heard the debate that we've been having on the stage. And the debate is already identified two competing philosophical approaches to generosity, a willingness to help those in need. There's the view that says we need to think of ourselves as shallow human beings above all in universal or cosmopolitan terms. And then we've heard from those who say, no, we need more particular identities and solidities to prompt generosity. What do you think? I think we have an extremely unrepresented group of British people in this wonderful cathedral. But I want to know what you think. How do you evaluate these arguments? I'm a weak cosmopolitan, I believe, in the morally quality of all human beings. But I don't think we have the same obligation to all human beings. I think our obligations are primarily to our families and our friends that roll out from that to our neighborhoods and our nations and then to all of humanity. And charity begins at home, but doesn't end there, is how I would put it. And why do you think that we have stronger obligations to those closest to us than to those further away? Why do you think so? Well, I think for the world to work, we have to behave in that way. If the nation state is the root essentially of our freedoms, of our welfare, or all the things that we most want politically and morally in some ways, you know, democratic accountability, redistribution between classes, regions, generations, and so on, this happens essentially at the level of the nation state. And if the nation state has no emotional support behind it, I mean, this is the point that Theresa May was making with her citizens of nowhere. If it doesn't have the support, even of the powerful and the influential and the rich, then it's diminished. And we're all diminished by that. Thank you for that. Yeah. Hi, my name's Alex. I just wanted to go back on this point about the state. Well, the state of Germany took in over a million refugees, and that came out of that collective sense, I'm not an expert, but I believe of guilt for how they treated the Jewish people before, and that only came out of that collective feeling of guilt that you get by being part of a broader community. And if you don't appeal to what actually will motivate people, then you won't get the outcomes that you want. So both you, Alex, and David Goodhart just now, have pointed to what will actually motivate people? And you've both suggested that what motivates people begins at least with those closest to us. We care most about them. And so morally, we should build upon that de facto motivation. Hi, my name's Nate. What I would say is about this concept of solidarity and how our willingness to help people coming from solidarity with that person is if you walked past a person on the street and they were dying, you wouldn't walk past them just because you don't know them, and you have no personal desire to help them. You would help them because it's the right thing to do, and it's the morally correct thing to do. Nate, here's a question there. we commonly distinguish between benefits or income support for fellow citizens and humanitarian assistance or foreign aid for people in need who live elsewhere. Are you suggesting, Nate, that morally speaking there is no real difference between the two? Yes, I do think there is a useful distinction in that you give the money to the people who are closest to the people in need so that decisions can be made by those who know how that money can be used. But there's not actually a moral distinction for the reason why you're supposed to help these people. It's just a functional useful difference. So morally speaking, your obligation to help your needy child, let's say, is no different from your moral obligation to help a needy child in Bangladesh. Morally speaking, the obligation is the same. Yes. What about companies hiring policies? Should British companies give preference in hiring to British workers? Those of you who think they should? What would be your reason? Yes. My name is Jake. I think there's something here to be said for like the principle of reciprocity and the idea of people who have given a lot to a certain sort of system of cooperation over a period of time tend to expect something in return for the fact that they've sacrificed themselves so through the form of paying tax by complying with laws, etc. So I think that kind of idea under kind of underpins a lot of sort of sentiment about why people should be sort of entitled to greater benefits by virtue of the fact that they have contributed to the system of cooperation to to outsiders. They're part of they're part of a society. They're part of a society. They've made kind of a community that where certain people make contributions. And so they should their fellow citizens have a special responsibility for them as do companies hiring in their country. Quite a basic moral intuition. I think the idea that if you give something you deserve something in return. The idea of reciprocity over time within the framework of a community, yeah. Hi, I'm Rebecca. I think there's an interesting geographical question behind this as well because I think we're oftentimes thinking about skilled labor within Britain. But British companies resort to developing countries for the vast majority of the labor that actually powers the country's economies. So as a geographer who works in Bangladesh looking at the garment industry, for example, you see the masses of people who's very inexpensive labor is what allows us to buy cheap goods and yet they have no path to citizenship on the basis of their labor. But you're raising an interesting challenge to those who say British companies should give preference to British workers. Are you suggesting that if one thinks that then we have to call into question outsourcing? Correct. If global capitalism leads companies to create factories in low wage countries, say Bangladesh, does that suggest that capitalism is unpatriotic? I have many thoughts about capitalism, but perhaps we should turn to somebody else. What has a view about that? My name's Elizabeth. I would say that companies recognize borders when it's profitable for them. It's not about a moral question for them. It's about what does or doesn't make them money. And how do you think it should be? How do you think companies should conduct themselves? Should they give preference in hiring to citizens of their own country? No. They shouldn't. No. They should be citizens of nowhere. Companies, ideally. Yes. Alex. I think it's morally fantastic that capitalism doesn't pay much attention to borders. I grew up in Singapore. It's a country that's got rich on providing cheap exports and it enables people all across the world, millions of them, hundreds of millions in China, for example, to get rich and lead lives that they couldn't have imagined before. So I think often it's a bit pro, because I say, well, is this bad for us? I mean, we need to look at a bigger picture and see how beneficial it is to other people as well. And also I'd say that it's kind of difficult to pin it on the system. I mean, because the decisions that people make up what to buy in capitalism are their own. So if everyone wants to buy British say then they could within the capitalist system. But as a whole people chasing whatever is cheapest, I think it's done wonders for Asia where I grew up. So I'm in favour. I'd like to bring in Jesse Norman, who's a conservative member of Parliament. I use struck by the strong, I think it's fair to say, that's pretty strong, cosmopolitan, universalistic, conceptions of the common good that we've been hearing articulated thus far. I am struck by that. I would say that there are some big words we need to come back to. One of them was reciprocity. Another is giving and the responsibilities that go with receiving a gift and the sense of duty that comes in a family from being the recipient of an inheritance and within a society for being the recipient of inheritance. And that feeling that people have, that that binds them together and places them under a duty, under an obligation to pass something on to others within that society. And therefore the context we're talking of is not merely one of receipt and of right but of duty and obligation as well. And you think there is something in the analogy that we've heard between duties associated with family membership and duties associated with national identity and citizenship. I think what is interesting about the analogy is that it forces us to ask the question, who are we? What is the we we're talking about? And is that the family? Is that the community? Is that the nation? And does it go wider than that? And that's, it seems to be the argument that you're really probing at all those levels. But the real question is, who is the we? And for me, inevitably the we is about culture and society as much as it is about economics and free trade. We've been talking about special obligations to citizens of one's own country, whether with a charitable food bank or benefits funded by taxpayers or the conduct of companies in hiring. And lurking in this discussion just beneath the surface are competing conceptions of what community means. Is the highest moral community, the community of humankind undifferentiated by family or neighborhood or nation? Or are there meaningful sources of community that should matter morally that are short of our of humanity as such? I'd like to come at this from a different direction by asking how our students on the stage identify themselves. And I would like to ask, put the question in the following way. Would you agree or disagree with the following statement? I have more in common with other students in my university, regardless of nationality, than I do with people in the place where I grew up. How many agree with that statement? How many disagree with that statement? Here we have more or less an even distribution of opinion. Now, what I'd like to get at is the moral status of the commonality you feel. So let's see who agrees and who disagrees with this question, the normative question. In an ideal world, we would think of ourselves not as British or French or German or Chinese, but simply as fellow human beings. How many agree? How many disagree? Here we have a roughly even distribution, but I think the majority in favor of the universal cosmopolitan view. I want to hear from someone who disagrees here on the stage. What do you say? I have more in common, I think, with the people I grew up with from my city, because we have a common shared experience that's rooted in the sense of place. What I have in common with people who I go to university with is that we will likely have the same socio-economic background upon graduation. We will probably go into sort of graduate white-collar jobs. I don't want my bonds between people around me to be mediated by what class I am in terms of capital. I wanted to be something more than that, mediated by a sense of place and belonging, and I get that from the town city I grew up in, which is Liverpool. Far more than I do, than the fact that I happen to be thrown into my university. I'm a cosmopolitan guy who loves my university, but I don't want my bonds to be mediated by capital, I think. The discussion we've had says that, you know, I don't think most people in this audience do want bonds to be mediated by capital. And yet, the meaningful sense of place we get from, you know, where we grew up on ideas and nations seems to be resisted. I think those two ideas are actually in conflict with each other. - And what's your name? - Peter. - Peter. And why do you think your identity with the place where you grew up, and the people you knew there? Why do you think that that's a more important source of your identity than the profession you may enter into? - Because, A, there's just the fact that, you know, I was there at the most form of time of my life. But I think beyond that, people from Liverpool we have a specific accent. We, you know, we listen to the same music, we all sort of grow up with the Beatles, and these cultural touchstones, and these ideas of self and place come from that. And that's far more important than the, you know, to me than the profession you end up in. What do you think? - My name's Jacqueline. I just like to add to that, I think that the bonds that we've formed with the people that we grow up with, with the communities, with the communities that we grow up in, they're not trivial. And I think that what you're talking about, growing up in Liverpool, I think that when we think about who we are, and if we're closer to the people that we go to school with, I mean, who are we as individuals, I think, comes from our values, and where do those values come from? And I think, at least for me, and maybe I'm flawed in thinking this, but I definitely think I share more with my faith community, and with my community back home, than with a broad array of the, you know, the international student body that is at the campus that I go to. - I want to turn to Bishop Graham Tomlin. You've been listening to this discussion. I'd be interested to know in general what you make of it, but especially on one of the philosophical and perhaps even theological conceptions that seem to be at stake here. When there, we've heard many articulate the view that the ideal we should aim at, is to overcome the particular ties or since belonging, some might even say prejudice, associated with particular identities, including national identities. Whereas others have been making the argument that we need particular communities, that they are not mere prejudices, that they're analogous, some say, to the family, that they should be affirmed, whether for reasons of reciprocity or rooted identities, we're edging up to the big question about whether the common good ideally is universal, or whether the common good is irreducibly plural and particularists. What do you think? - I think it's been a fascinating debate, and I guess one question that's come to me, as I've been listening, is that old statement that it's often easier to love humanity than to love your neighbor. That in general, it's easier to love the human race, but actually in religious terms as a Christian, you know, I hear the words of Jesus saying, your call is to love your neighbor. In other words, I think about neighbors, you don't choose your neighbor. It's the person who happens to be in front of you. You think of the parable of the good Samaritan, it's the story of the person who is in the street, in front of you, and the two religious people passed by, and it's the Samaritan who stops and actually helps. And why the local is important is because-- - Could I just ask you first, why is it? - Do you think harder to love the neighbor than to love humanity? - Why it's that? - 'Cause your neighbor's often difficult. (laughing) Your neighbor's not always easy to love, but that's the person right next to you. It's the person in the desk next to you at work. It's the person who lives in the house next door to you. It's the person who you meet at the bus stop every day, and that's not someone you choose. And it seems to me that the importance of the local, and that commitment to a local community, whatever that may be, it may be a family, it may be a neighborhood, it may be a city, it may be whatever. You know, that's quite important. Partly because variety and diversity is good. We don't want everything to be exactly the same, everybody to be exactly the same. But also because it seems to me that those kind of commitments that we have over a long period of time, to the same group of people, actually cultivate virtues that make society work better. If you have to try and keep on loving the same group of people over a period of time, it cultivates patience and forgiveness, and honesty and the ability to be a little bit humble, 'cause you kind of make mistakes, and you get things right and so on. And it's that sort of development of virtue that enables a society to work. Same time we need the universal as well, if all we have is mere locality, mere difference, then we're locked into it seems to me if essentially conflictual view of the world, where if everything is just difference, and there is no commonality, no kind of unity to any sense of what it means to be the human race, then for we begin to end up with a view of the world where we're almost inevitably going to be in conflict one another because we don't have any common identity and value. So, I think that we need both the local and the universal, and that's what's come out of this debate. Thank you for that. I'd like to see if some of the students would like to respond to what you've said. - Hi, my name's Karthik. I think there's like a fundamental difference between our obligations to people who we really know like our family and our friends and people who are in our immediate neighborhood. And then the obligations to this kind of imagined community that's like Britain. Britain consists of 60 million people, most of whom I'll never meet in my life. I mean, I can see why I would have obligations to the people I meet every day or the people who I'll meet regularly in my community, my friends, my family. I don't see that that means I have to accept that I have obligations to all the 60 million people of Britain who I'll never meet. Over and above the obligations I have to all of humanity who I'll never meet. - Thank you, yes. - Hi, I'm Christine. Well, I think ideally the idea of national identity should be dissolved because like to me, identity is a very fluid concept. So it depends on where you are at the moment and like your interactions with other people. Like for example, well, I'm from Hong Kong, so I have a Hong Kong identity. But at the same time, I study here so I identify myself as a student studying in the UK. - All right, thank you for that. I want to put to our audience in St. Paul's into the students on the stage the way the Enlightenment philosopher responded a little bit before the fact to Theresa May's conception of citizenship. Here's what Montesquieu said about the questions we've been debating. If I knew something useful to me but prejudicial to my family, I would reject it from my soul. If I knew something useful to my family but not to my country, I would try to forget it. If I knew something useful to my country but prejudicial to Europe, or useful to Europe but prejudicial to humankind, I would regard it as a crime because I am a person before I'm a Frenchman or rather I am necessarily a person while I am a Frenchman only by chance. Was he right? How many agree with Montesquieu on that? A lot of hands are going up. How many disagree? A viewer number of hands? Why do you disagree? Why is Montesquieu wrong? - I'm an American, so my American identity is important to me. And I think that there's a value to the nation state and that the purpose of the nation state is to serve the people who are most in need and that the nation state can protect vulnerable populations and that there's value and difference and diversity of opinion. - Thank you, what do you think? - I think the very assert dynamics that were described in that group between the nation between Europe and also between the individual and the family are actually very interesting. And we've had quite interesting in an undertaking talk about this establishing the idea of the nation state. I think if we're trying to disestablish that, we are working to an extent against the idea of human affinity. And I think that's something to be cautious about. - All right, well, we've heard some powerful arguments for universal or custom-political conceptions of identity and community. And we've heard little less frequently on this stage but powerfully nonetheless, arguments that more particular identities and forms of community, including families and nations and localities, neighborhoods, matter morally and are not just a matter of prejudice to be overcome. One of the logical implications of that universalist or custom-politic ethic of Montesquieu's is that it's not so easy to occur for the moral weight You have a mind of fellow citizens in the nation state, but to account for friends. If our encompassing loyalties should always take precedence over our more local or particular ones, then perhaps the distinction even between friends and strangers should ideally be overcome. Montesquieu doesn't shrink from this radical conclusion. A truly virtuous man, he wrote, would come to the aid of the most distant stranger as quickly as to his own friend. And then he adds, "If men were perfectly virtuous, they wouldn't have friends. This is striking, concession. It's difficult, it seems to me, to imagine a world in which we were all so virtuous that we had no friends, only a universal disposition to friendliness. The problem, it seems to me, is not that such a world would be difficult to bring about, but that it would be difficult to recognize as a human world. The love of humanity is a noble sentiment, but most of the time we live our lives by smaller solidarities. Now, this may reflect certain limits to the bounds of moral sympathy, but more important, it reflects the fact that we learned a love humanity, not in general, but through its particular expressions. So to our participants and audience here in St. Paul's Cathedral and to our listeners, thank you for joining me for this episode of The Public Philosopher. Sometimes we all need an extra help in hand, especially with the tricky business problem you've been putting off. Claude is a AI for just that. It's a collaborator that understands your entire workflow and thinks with you, not for you, and Claude isn't just for quick questions, handed a whole task like turning a folder or scattered notes into a report, and it does the work and hands back something finish that you can open and edit. Claude can now drive the dock or deck right in front of you, and Claude design now lives right inside Claude. Describe the website or prototype your picturing, attach your design system, and it comes back in your own design language ready to edit right on the canvas. It works with your files and the tools you already use, like Gmail and Slack, and whether you're debugging code at midnight, building a financial model, or strategising your next business move, Claude extend your thinking to tackle the problems at Meta for problems worth solving, get started with Claude at Claude.ai/solve. That's Claude.ai/solve and check out ClaudePro which includes access to all of the features mentioned in today's episode Claude.ai/solve.