Peace in the Middle East

Hello and welcome to the world in 30 minutes. The podcast on events, policies and ideas which will shape the world in the European Council on Foreign Relations. My name is Mark Leonard. I'm Director of ECFR. And today we have a very special episode for you straight from ECFR's annual council meeting in Vienna. ECFR's council has gathered here over the last two days to discuss how Europeans can survive in a world of unorder and multiplying crises. And against the backdrop of the 14-point MOU between Iran and the United States, which was just announced. We decided that rather than doing a normal episode, we would publicly release a fireside chat between my colleague, Junion Bond's Desi, the Director of ECFR's Middle Eastern North Africa programme. And Prince Faisal bin Fahan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia. These were the Minister's first public remarks following the release of the MOU. And I hope you find the conversation as interesting as I do. We're really delighted to have the Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Fahan held sound with us. His excellency was with us three years ago in Madrid and we're really grateful that you've come to be with us again. Particularly grateful that you've chosen to make your first public appearance since the Iran-US deal with ECFR. So we're all eager for your sense on where you see things and how the situation is playing out. Given that you've come all the way to Vienna to speak to us, I hope you will allow us to push you and to scratch the surface a bit to really get your sense and where we are and where the kingdom stands at this moment. But let me jump straight in. We've just had this disastrous war. We have the semblance of an MOU that will be signed between Iran and the US this Friday in Geneva. Can you give us your quick sense on how you read that deal on the situation? Well, first of all, thank you for having me. It's great to be with you again and certainly wonderful to be here in the speed of our city of Vienna. I think it's incredibly important and very significant that we have an MOU that will hopefully put an end to this conflict and more importantly open the pathway towards resolving many of the outstanding issues, primary among them, of course, is the nuclear issue. I am hopeful. I am optimistic that there is real intent on both sides to give diplomacy a chance. I am very appreciative to President Trump and his team for having gotten to the point where this MOU is now ready to be signed. Can you give me a sense of where your sense of hope and concern is with the terms that have been suggested apart of this MOU where are the vulnerabilities that worry Saudi? But I guess the flip side of this, where is the need to focus attention to make sure that this is a durable deal that can withstand the pressures to actually deliver the sustainable peace that we need? I am not going to comment on the MOU specifically because I haven't seen the vinyl version, but I will point to the issues of concern and hope and concern. And where we have risks, obviously, the nuclear program is the issue that is of primary concern. And my understanding is that there are clear commitments to resolve that issue along lines which I think are very significant and very very much in line with what we are hoping for. So addressing the possibility of a pathway to a nuclear weapon, the detail will matter. It will be most important to see the verification mechanisms that I in place beyond the actual commitments on enrichment, the actual commitment on removal or down blending of the nuclear materials. How we will have a long-term sustainable verification regime is what will matter. The most and that is what will give the international community but also the regional countries the most confidence and the ability to look towards a better future. And of course, there are the issues of freedom of navigation at the straights of our MOUs and the broader regional security context that will need to be addressed. Some of them, I think, will be covered through the MOU or the final agreement between Iran and the U.S. And there is a need, of course, also for a regional security dialogue between the countries of the region and Iran to address those concerns and to make sure that we build a framework that respects national sovereignty, that respects the national security interests of all parties in our neighborhood and ensures that we are never faced again with the risk of such a huge devastating conflict. Can I ask where you see the role for Saudi Arabia in this ongoing process? I mean, you've been one of the mediating countries, the step group of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. What is the place that you see for yourselves in the immediate 60 days in the moment after that? Obviously, we're going to have U.S. Iran negotiations on the nuclear front. Where is the space for re-ad in that makes you feel part of the process? There's obviously a lot of talk about the need for economic resources to be opened up to Iran, whether it's their frozen assets or potential reconstruction fund. Where in the mix do you fit? So, just like the process that got us to them, you, I think, we will play primarily a supportive role. I wouldn't say that we were mediators so much as we were supporters and we were helpful behind the scenes in trying to encourage the both parties to give primary focus to the diplomatic track, to bring opinions together where necessary and to give, let's say, words of advice and try and push in the direction of a resolution for an end to the conflict. And going forward, we will obviously want to play a role certainly in the regional context on addressing these regional issues. We have an incredibly important role to play there. We are, of course, interested in making sure that we get that right so that we avoid potential areas of conflict and flashpoints in the future. But also on the nuclear file for us, obviously, ensuring that there is a civilian nuclear program in Iran that is not a risk to its neighbours is critically important. I think all, not just the kingdom, but all of us in the region have a stake in that. And I'm certainly going to be very vocal in advocating for, as I said, ensuring that whatever agreement is reached is a solid agreement that has the necessary safeguards and the necessary verification mechanisms that are long lasting and that are, that will give the confidence to the international community and us in the region, that we are finally going to be able to put this issue behind us and move to a future of, you know, more cooperation, more focus on development and focus on a model that is free from this area of tension. President Trump this morning seems to have been facing a bit of pressure back home and has come out saying that we're not going to put a sense into this reconstruction fund. And I think Vice President Vance has been talking about the Gulf Coast states, presumably the GCC, being the ones that pay up in terms of the $300 billion number that is floating around. Would you put money into Iran and do you think that is a necessary part of the equation for regional stability? I mean, how do you deal with that after what you have faced over the last two months, the bombings, the military campaign, the fact that it was initiated by the US and Israel and now they're saying that you guys are the ones that are going to have to pay. And Iran, on the other hand, has bombed you and is now expecting that again, you will be the ones to pay. First of all, I have no details on this fund. I have no information or insight into the concept behind it. I will comment on it specifically, but what I will say is, as you mentioned, as a result of this conflict, Iran attacked not just the Kingdom, but all of the countries of the GCC. That has created a significant gulf of trust, a significant gulf, a significant loss of trust between all of us. But just in the beginning process of rebuilding our relationship with Iran as a result of the Beijing understanding after a significant period where we had broken off relations, and that was only just starting to really gather momentum and we were starting to, at the edges, explore potential areas of opening up on economic cooperation and things like that. I think we are now, actually, we have since then regressed and we're going to have to have a conversation how we rebuild that trust, how we rebuild that relationship. Before any concept of economic cooperation, mutual investment or anything like that can rationally be addressed. And I suspect that similarly goes for many of the GCC countries as well. You know that we in the Kingdom, we have a very ambitious domestic investment programme, we have our public investment fund, our main vehicle for investment has a long-term strategy that was actually there. just approved and they have already committed their funding streams to areas that are targeted at our domestic economy, whether there is anything available to invest beyond that is something that I don't know. That's out to the relevant ministers on the investment side, on the economic side. But even before we can look at that as an option, there's going to have to be a rebuilding of trust and a rebuilding of relationships and then maybe there is eventually in the future some pathway to greater economic cooperation and investment between on and the kingdom and the GCC. Certainly, in an ideal world, that's what we aspire to. This is, as I said, when we were working to normalize our relations after the BGC, after the Beijing understanding. It was a focus, we had started gradually, we had started in opening up for visitors from Iran and starting to look at the reopening trade relations, all of that. That in itself was not an easy journey. Again, this has now regressed, so we're going to have to start some of that over and it's a conversation we will have bilaterally with the Iranians, but it's also, I think, part of the very important dialogue that's going to have to happen in the context of a regional security framework. That's, I think, we are quite early days yet before talking about any real economic cooperation between Iran and its neighbors, although that in the long term should be the objective and the goal. But the bet will still be from the kingdom, one of regional diplomacy. You led a process of re-engagement with Iran over recent years, hadn't gone through a very contentious, almost heart-conflict in different theatres. We've now gone through this new ward. Do you see the kingdom pushing that again? Are you going to lean hard into that? Do you think that actually the only way forward is diplomacy? We have a lot of people talking about the need to boost defense mechanisms in the Gulf. There are some states looking to take a more assertive stand. How do you fit into that equation in terms of how we stabilise the region in a meaningful way? Look, the reality is you can't have effective diplomacy without a strong deterrent and a strong resilience to be able to deal with potential threats and challenges. So we're going to have a dual track approach for this is absolutely certain whether it is on building our defense capacity to ensure that we are able to face threats, whether it's from Iran or elsewhere and also building our resilience from logistics and economic perspective. That said, we are committed to diplomacy. This is why we supported the diplomacy that helped cut us to the MOU. This is why we're going to be very actively engaged in supporting the success of the negotiations that will follow the MOU and it's why we will work with our partners in the region to begin a regional dialogue to start the conversation about how we can overcome, again, the trust that has been lost as a result of its conflict and how can we look to a better future and how can we ensure that potential flashpoints of the future can be addressed through diplomacy rather through the confrontation. Indications that we've seen of the shape of the nature of the MOU suggest that there's zero mention of regional dynamics. That was one of the reasons that I think Trump referred to when initiating the conflict, but clearly now we've narrowed it down to opening the straight of our moves and addressing the nuclear issue. What does that mean for you and the fact that the region issues have been sidelined and what does that mean in terms of how you take forward this process that you're talking about now? Are we just going to see a U.S. Iran nuclear track and everyone left to pick up the pieces or do you see those being integrated, do you see a U.S. role in that? Who is going to lead that process and what does a regional dialogue possibly look like in the context where we have a number of states that have been or are pretty much still at war with each other. Missiles and drones continue to fly across the seas in the airways. How do you take this forward in the context of an MOU that's completely neglects a regional dimension? So I think one of the lessons that we learned from the J.C.A., which also ignored the regional context completely, is that if we don't address the issues that concern the region, the risk is always that any agreement on the nuclear issue becomes less secure and becomes a source of contention and a source of, you know, risk is much as addressing the nuclear issue. So I firmly believe that there is a need to address all of the issues that concern the region. The issue and beyond, it may well be that there's a dual track approach potentially where there is a U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiation, and I think that there is a rationale to that because it's a very complex issue on its own. But I suspect that it will be very difficult to make concrete progress on the nuclear negotiations without there being a level of engagement on the regional files that gives the confidence that allows those negotiations to proceed correctly. And, you know, eventually if there is a nuclear deal, there is the issue of sanctions relief and that, as you know, is a very complicated issue. It's complicated within the U.S. context and it's also complicated within the European context. And the more that the regional issues are addressed and there is a level of confidence that we are able to look towards a future where there is less risk of confrontation. The more likely it is that the potential benefits in the areas of sanctions relief can be delivered more quickly, more effectively with a less opposition, both from, potentially from us in the region or from, you know, quarters in the U.S. and in Europe. Putting aside the question of normalization with Israel that you and the past made very clear as tied to Israeli steps on the creation of a Palestinian state, presumably Israel needs to be part of that regional conversation if it's to be durable and sustainable. I mean, in the long term, that's certainly the most rational approach. Is it possible now? Is it possible with the policy approach that Israel is taking? I think, you know, there are many challenges in that. You know, from my perspective, the region includes the Palestinians. Are the Israelis ready to sit with the Palestinians at a table to discuss regional issues? It doesn't seem to me that that is a potential outcome right now. It would, I think, serve the interest of everyone to have a real discussion about how we address all of the issues of regional tension and the core issue, the thing that drives most risk in the long term is, obviously, the unaddressed issue of the rights of the Palestinians. And the same goes for the issue of Lebanon, Syria, etc. You know, so, Israeli is part of the region. That means they should be part of the regional conversation, but Palestine is also part of the region. They need to be part of that conversation. Are the Israelis willing to accept that? If that were the case, that would be, I think, a move in the right direction. I want to get on to Gaza in a bit more detail in a second, but before we do that, just on the broader Israel question. There have been those that have expressed concern that Israel is going to be the one actor most opposed to this deal. And there have those that have suggested that a number of Israeli strikes on Beirut over recent weeks have been partly intended to try and disrupt the prospect of the successful completion of negotiations. How do you view the evolving US-Israeli relationship? There have been reporting that Trump has essentially tried to shut Nessonyahu down and said, don't do this attack. There have been reports that the Americans have not been prepared to share the draft and review with the Israeli system. Does that create pressure that can be constructively channeled towards helping regional peace? Are you worried about the fracturing there? How does one address the fact that Israel has indicated that it is not at all happy with this deal and it clearly has the willingness and the unilateral capabilities to take military action that could be disruptive? Certainly Israel has that capacity. Is it the right thing to do? I don't think so. Is it in Israel's interest? I don't think so. I think, you know, for Israel to insist solely on the military approach in the long term will be very detrimental to Israel's interest. The reality is, when it comes to Lebanon, there is a process that the US is facilitating, where there's a dialogue between Lebanon and Israel. The insistence that, you know, for Israel not to try and maintain some territory, some buffer in Lebanese territory, I think is not the right approach. We see that repeated as well in Syria and of course we see that even more acutely when we look at the issue of Palestine, whether it's the issue in Gaza, where Israel is not indicating any willingness to withdraw. Obviously Hamas is also resisting disarming and using Israel's refusal to withdraw as a pretext for that. But if we look at the West Bank now, there is also a complete unwillingness to engage with the Palestinian Authority. and systematic dismantling of the potential for Palestinian state. All of this only serves to raise tensions. And to me, the idea that a purely military approach is viable in the long term, I think is completely incorrect and is not going to be in the interest of any way. So I would really focus our efforts on diplomacy. And here I think the US obviously has an important role to play. The US, given its historic strong relationship with Israel, has always had an important ability to facilitate dialogue in a way that could possibly allow a resolution to these efforts. As I mentioned, they're trying to do this in Lebanon. I would hope that they also give additional attention to the issue of Palestine and the West Bank. And I think there's actually some activity behind the scenes that's quite positive on that. And the same applies, I think, now to the broader regional context. A US commitment to diplomacy, but also to regional security is critical and important. And for us, the US is always going to remain the most important security partner. I think that continues to be an important factor for stability. Gaza. You were spending a lot of time on Gaza. One of the very unfortunate, I mentioned at the Iran War is that we've all turned our attention away from the unfolding tragedy on the ground there and there were millions, hundreds of thousands, suffering at great intensity. And none of us are focused on that. There does seem to be a real risk that the ceasefire process collapses. We've been stuck in phase one. We don't seem to be moving towards phase two. And there seem to be two narratives here. On the one hand, you have a narrative that Hamas did what it was supposed to do in phase one. Israel has not done -- met its expectations for phase one. That would then move us towards phase two, whereby Hamas would start its disarmament. You have a second narrative which is actually that Hamas should disarm now potentially not in accordance with the initial agreement and that's what's needed to unlock progress. Where do you stand on that? Can we make progress? How do we break through this deadlock and move things forward? First and foremost, for the needs of the Gaza's on the ground? Look, I think the biggest challenge for Gaza, you know, and it's something that's quite in my view, repeated in other scenarios, is Israel's unwillingness so far to embrace the political track, to embrace the need for a political horizon for the Palestinians, whether it's the Palestinians in the context of Gaza, more broadly the Palestinians in the territories in both of West Bank and Gaza. It's the same applies in Lebanon, you know. This minimum, you know, there is this reinforcement of, you know, in rhetoric and in policy of the military option of the security option, which then obviously gives the other side legitimately otherwise it's up to you to interpret, but it gives them the space to say, well, I don't have a partner that is committed to a political track therefore I am also going to hold onto my guns or I'm going to, you know, continue to resist fulfilling my commitments. So this is the quandary and the canundum we have. That is, you know, there is a need for both sides to live up to their commitments, right now both sides are not living up to the commitments and if we stick within this, you know, chicken and egg kind of dialogue of who's, you know, who came for us or who's supposed to come first, I think we will abdicate the solution to those that actually don't want a solution. So I think again, here the U.S. involvement is absolutely key and I'm confident that they will continue to push both on res and, you know, beyond to eventually get to that discussion about a political horizon that I think will unlock a lot of these issues in a way that is beneficial, first and foremost, for the Palestinians, but I believe also for the Israelis and for us more broadly in the region. Two last questions, if I may. One of the issues we haven't talked about is the straight of hormones, obviously of a immense global concern that that is reopened. Trump has talked about it being a precondition or a necessary condition for the M.O.U. but there's a real sense of uncertainty about what comes next and the Iranians are making very clear that they expect to have some control or some assertion of sovereignty over the straight and are talking about a regional solution managed between them and the Omanis. If we end up in a place where there is, the Iranians are saying it won't be a toll but the service fee of sorts, is that something that the kingdom, well, does it expect that outcome and can you live with that outcome for the sake of getting ships moving again? So our position is very clear. The situation must return to the status quo before the war. There is no other option from our perspective. And if you read, and I have read more than my fair share, now of analysis on what is allowed on the international law and under the unconvention for the laws of the sea, there is no real space for any mechanisms in the context of what the Iranians are talking about right now. And therefore, and more important than anything, the management of the straight was working fine before the conflict. There were no issues, ships were navigating freely. There was no safety issue, there was no environmental issue. There were no issues. So why should we now as a result of a conflict, except some novel arrangement that is going to be imposed on it? That, to me, doesn't make sense. So I think we need to go back to the way it was and that worked fine and that should be the end of it. We are the European Council on Foreign Relations and we haven't mentioned Europe once, which is a sad indictment of Europe's regional role these days. But I want to conclude with a question on that file. Europeans don't have much confidence these days in their ability to really play a regional role when it comes to Gaza, when it comes to Iran. We've clearly been out of the loop, pushed aside, marginalized, divided amongst ourselves. From the kingdom's perspective, is there a role for Europe? Has that role become more important since the eruption of this conflict? Where would you see it playing out? I mean, you've got talk of a maritime naval mission by the French and the Brits. You have talk of supporting a regional security dialogue. And you also have talk of European nuclear expertise in the context of a US administration that seems to be sorely lacking in that kind of expertise. Where do you see a place in any of those areas? And can you give us a specific sense of how you could see that unfolding or looking like if Europe was to step up? I mean, first of all, I think Europe did step up. Europe was very involved during the conflict. It did support many of its traditional allies in the GCC with their defence. And we are appreciative of each individual European nation that contributed in whatever way they could. They also obviously engaged diplomatically, very actively, including starting work on this mission that you alluded to for the securing of the Straits of Hermos. And I think that will have a very important valuable contribution to the post-MOU phase to ensuring safe navigation and also helping deal with the possible threat of mines that might be there. And beyond that, I mean, Europe will have a say because obviously there continue to be EU sanctions that the Iranians will want to see lifted and that will allow the Europeans to be part of the conversation? I think the European, certainly the E3, have a lot of experience when it comes to the nuclear file that they can contribute as well. It's, you know, Europe has a role to play. And I think Europe can play that role. Obviously one challenge for Europe is having a unified voice. That's not always the case. But I would not at all minimise the role that Europe has already played and can play in the future. Minister, thank you so much for being with us. We've done a really rapid tour of the various regional challenges that you're facing. We know that the next 60 days are going to be high pressure, high stakes, and obviously the risk of a relapse into violence remains wrong. So thank you for sharing your thinking with us. Thank you for being in Vienna with us. Thank you. Thank you. [Applause]