Operation Vivaldi

I think the Volody's roots go back probably all the way back to Kursk in 2024. The software layer that digitized command and control system in Delta that doesn't just connect things, it allows the collection, aggregation and exploitation of data in a way that I still think most Western armies are not capable of doing. You need to destroy the enemy's saturation of senses and fires before you look at committing your armor. So that's why they're not a first or even a second echelon kind of capability now. Hey welcome back to the MWA podcast brought to you with the generous support of the West Point class of 1974. I'm John Ambo and I'm joined on this episode by Retired Australian Army Major General Mick Ryan. Just a few weeks ago Ukrainian officials publicly confirmed the ongoing operation Vivaldi. But looking backward it's clear that the operation began months prior and the foundations of what it has achieved relayed even farther back. When Vivaldi was launched the word Ukraine had long ago settled into a largely static battlefield with little opportunity for maneuver and only incremental changes to the front lines. So how have Ukrainian forces, with pretty remarkable speed, retaken nearly 200 square kilometers of territory in the Russian occupied Donetsk oblast? And what does it tell us about the war's future trajectory? Mick is a close observer of the war and his exploration of those questions makes for a really insightful discussion. Before we get to it though just a couple quick notes. First a very special thank you to the West Point class of 1974 for their generous support to MWI and second as always what you hear in this episode are the views of the participants and don't represent those of West Point, the Army or any other agency of the US government. Alright here's my conversation with Mick Ryan. Mick Ryan thank you so much for joining me once again on the MWI podcast. Thanks John, it's great to be back. So listeners, long time listeners will recognize your name and perhaps your voice, you've been on the podcast a few times and even those who maybe haven't heard you on the podcast will likely be familiar with your work. I assume there's no shortage of people amongst our audience right now that are listening to this who see you as the same sort of resource that I've seen you for years really but especially since the war in Ukraine kicked off your sub stack, your Twitter account have been invaluable resources for following the war but also benefiting from your insights and understanding what we've been seeing in that battlefield. So that's why I ask you to come on the podcast today because we have sort of seen I guess some new developments as of late namely surrounding the Ukrainian operation that has now become known as Operation Vivaldi. I've seen various statistics, various figures thrown out there in terms of how much land has been re-liberated that had been previously seized by Russian forces but it's a not inconsiderate role amount and Ukraine has been able to do some things on the battlefield in terms of maneuvering employing combined arms that have sort of eluded them. I think it was only a few weeks ago that Ukraine officially announced or acknowledged Operation Vivaldi and used the name. I think if you look back on it it actually probably makes sense to conceptualize it as beginning earlier this year when Ukraine's third core began implementing some of the hallmarks of what now have become known as definitive or characteristic of Operation Vivaldi. At what point as you were watching because I know you keep a very close eye on developments in Ukraine. At what point did you see something and say hey I think this is something new then what we've seen previously? Well firstly thanks John it's great to be back and hopefully people will see me as a resource this is my way of paying back the armies and the soldiers and officers that I benefited from over 35 years and not just the Australian army but I spent a lot of time with the US army in my career including serving with them in Baghdad so please use me as much as you wish. I think Vivaldi's roots go back probably all the way back to Kursk in 2024 where the Ukrainian army achieved not just tactical surprise but operational and strategic surprise and it showed that even in a battle space that is dense with drones and sensors I don't subscribe to transparent battlefield and we can have that conversation but it is certainly a highly visible battlefield. Well they proved that it was still possible to undertake offensive maneuver. Now what they didn't prove then was you were able to link it to good strategy and I'm not convinced that was a good strategy at that point in time but tactically and operationally they proved their case. We saw them more recently in February this year when they were able to blind the Russians with the white listing of Starlink in southern Ukraine once again they demonstrated the ability to maneuver and to advance and to take ground so I guess if there's two strands of intellectual provenance for what we've seen in Vivaldi they'd be the two I'd look at. But I'd add a third institutional level of provenance which was the formation of army cause last year until the cause were formed really what you were seeing was a whole bunch of brigade battles defensive mainly but sometimes counter attacks and things like this without a lot of infrastructure between the brigades and the general staff the cause solved part of that problem and then the regional commands above them with dedicated staffs professional long-term commanders but more importantly a mindset about shaping longer term thinking about campaigning and these kind of things. So I think for me you know there's two operations and an organizational reform that provide the provenance for what we're seeing take place now in operation for Vivaldi. So having you know noted each of those developments you know how quick were you to sort of assign responsibility for successes that we were seeing tactical successes certainly perhaps operational over successes already earlier this year assigned responsibility to those factors. I think they all contributed they they built a corpus of knowledge in the in the Ukrainian military at least in the good command teams and you know not every brigade is a great brigade but there are certain brigade and core commanders who have proved to be superb contemporary military leaders and the commander of the third Army Corps is clearly one of those. This is a very professional is the kind of guy that you know in the US Army would be you know would be a David Patreas kind of figure you know highly professional hyper motivated nose nosey's people nosey's organization. So you know I think these that's a that's an important factor as well we can never leave out the leadership kind of functions that have have contributed to the success of this operation. These are the reasons that we've been talking about are kind of mainly operational level and strategic level reasons but tactically is Ukraine are Ukrainian units other brigades fighting differently than they had previously. I think what they're doing I mean combined arms still matters if you talk to a Ukrainian brigade commander or a core commander combined arms is still the rule of the day you need to be able to integrate all your arms and services to achieve an outcome. It's just that there's the arms and services are slightly differently now because they all have autonomous systems as well as crude systems. They all have a better view of the battle space and of the enemy whilst the enemy has a better view of them but the basics of combined arms are still crucial when it comes to the conduct of these operations. Now when you have a look at the wherewithal for combined arms they look a little bit different than a Western or European brigade I mean a Ukrainian brigade will generally have four to seven infantry or make infantry battalions. It'll have an armored battalion or unit it'll have one or two drone battalions and it'll have to own integral air defense electronic warfare engineers a whole range of integral elements that allow it to sustain and support operations and then they're building the same capacity at the core level. So they have the capacity to sustain operations probably longer than a Western brigade does just because they have more units that they can cycle in and out of operations but by and large what they do and how they look is recognizable to any NATO officer. They just have capabilities that no NATO country has taken the time have a four years to really invest deeply and that's in particular not just drone units but the software layer that digit command and control system in Delta that connects everything and doesn't just connect things, it allows the collection, aggregation and exploitation of data in a way that I still think most Western armies are not capable of doing. You know one of the sort of ongoing discussions that kind of surround the war in Ukraine is you know the degree to which unmanned systems are everybody knows they are becoming a feature of war but are they becoming a central feature in the sense that you know is war still an endeavor that requires humans to seize and hold territory I think this is this operation is an interesting juxtaposition of maybe both positions on on either side of that discussion because drones and unmanned systems including autonomous systems have been an integral part of the operation but ultimately what are the accomplishments that are touted it's recapturing settlements it's recapturing cities it's liberating you know square kilometers of land have we learned anything on that front in terms of you know I guess that maybe the limits of how much a war can be defined by unmanned systems from this operation I think there's important lessons here I think a core couple of lessons firstly war remains a human endeavor I mean at the at the end of the day you talk to Ukrainian commanders and they say you still need the infantry drones don't replace infantry drones don't replace anyone what drones do is extend capacity they extend individual capacity they extend the capacity of a combined arms team they extend the capacity of a commander to collect and you know with using AI analyze information but they don't replace what humans are doing there I mean I'd use a you know something that's similar is you know I heard a podcast recently about Korean shipbuilding and how they don't use individual welders they use each expert welder to control 50 robotic welding machines and that's the process we're starting to see happen in war is that we're not replacing humans we're just extending what humans can do with autonomous systems so I think that's an important lesson here and for policy makers you don't replace humans with machines you protect them better you extend their capacity finally just on you know I think on what war is if war was just machines fighting that is not war I mean we I think we should be very clear that the presence of humans and violence to achieve political clings is what makes it a war if we think we can just do things with drones that is no longer war because there are no there's no existential state there there you know if humans aren't at risk we are not engaging in warfare we're engaging in in something different so you know I'd like to see that debate about these extraordinarily wealthy tech bros who think they understand the future of war without humans and so well that's actually not war you mentioned that each Ukrainian brigade typically has an armored battalion alongside the many more infantry or mechanized infantry battalions you know that was one of the early in this war early after the invasion in 2022 there was a lot of discussion about tanks is the tank dead is it obsolete is its purpose changing have tanks been an essential feature of Ukrainian combined arms operations during Operation Vivaldi yeah absolutely armored vehicles are still used they're just used very differently you know they're not first echelon capabilities anymore they're second or third echelons there if you if you you know have the break-in battle which is always drones and infantry if you want to exploit armored vehicles are often used for that because you need speed and you can't generate speed by walking so you still need some kind of armored mobility indeed in the last 48 hours we've seen vision of Ukrainian turtle tanks being employed during Operation Vivaldi and if you go back about 18 months when the first Russian turtle tanks come out people thought it was a silly and hilarious idea I actually wrote an article called a node to turtle tanks because I actually thought it showed a serious Russian attempt to solve an operational problem which was successfully cross tactical tactical distances physically but also support the break-in battle on the ground but also in the electromagnetic spectrum and what we've seen is the Ukrainians fast follow that concept in Operation Vivaldi so you know armored vehicles aren't just about rapid mobility they're also about supporting electronic warfare they're also about you know absorbing as many drones as possible because you know they'll each get hit by 50 to 80 drones so they still have a role but it just looks very differently to say the battle of 73 easing or some other better known armored warfare examples from history so tanks what do they provide they provide mobile protected firepower I guess do we at least in this case do we need to reconceptualize the role of tanks is it still mobile protected firepower or is it just about firepower now I think mobility piece is one of the most important bits because speed and shock action matter and you don't get speed and shock action by walking unfortunately you know dismantled infantry have a whole range of extraordinarily vital functions on the modern battlefield but speed and shock action is no Israeli achieved just by dismantled infantry the accompaniment of fires and mobile fires is crucial to that the key thing now is to employ armored mobile systems you need to undertake a whole lot of shaping actions before you can employ them you need to destroy the enemy saturation of senses and fires before you look at committing your armor so that's why they're not a first or even a second echelon kind of capability now they they generally held well back and they committed only when you've shaped the conditions for them to be employed in a way that they have a fair chance of surviving and achieving their mission the the battlefield Ukraine as it has evolved to one a quite positional battlefield characterized by a traditional warfare approaches you know it's what we've seen is the emergence of these very static lines that are characterized by widely dispersed and deep defenses layers of defenses they go back tens of kilometers in in some cases how much has the these are these sort of defense and depth prepared defensive positions I guess how much has has Ukraine's success in recent months dependent on being able to solve that problem because unlocking unlocking 20 kilometers of defenses is very different than breaking through a single front line absolutely and this was a lesson we learned in the first world war right is the great ear depth and the location of your forces you know what percentage did you have forward how much did you have back I mean by the end of the first world war you generally had about five or maybe 10% of your troops forward the rest are well back in counter attack locations counter penetration forces those kind of things and that's what we've seen occur in eastern Ukraine I mean the first year or two the Ukraine is did not invest a lot in fixed defenses but you know I drove down the road from Harkiv down to Lehman about 18 months ago and that entire belt had a huge amount of construction and fixed defenses minefields you know enhancing natural obstacles these kind of things but also just the the structure of a defensive layout now I mean a Ukrainian brigade will have a frontage now of one to three kilometers but a depth of up to 20 or 30 kilometers so you have these very narrow slices back from the front line and I use that term loosely because the front line can be tens of kilometers wide but you know you have very very deep defensive regimes by both the Ukrainians and Russians and so getting through those is is extraordinarily difficult but I'll just say you know this was the same problem in 1916 and early 1917 on the Western front you had an era of not just new mobility and new lafality but remember you had a battlefield that was more visible than any previous battlefield because there was no cover you had airplanes flying over which provided a transformational ability to see what your enemy was doing in depth and yet they still found ways in 2017 and sorry 1917 1918 to return to the offensive so this is an intellectual problem it's not a technological one it's one that the Ukrainians have been working on for several years and it's one that is imminently solvable for Ukraine and other parts of the world as well well haven't we seen in your opinion why haven't we seen Russia successfully you know accomplished something like what we've seen Ukraine accomplish this year because that chosen a strategy that doesn't. enable that kind of operation, they chose about two years ago to embrace a strategy of broad front, of, you know, bite and hold in hundreds of hundreds of simultaneous dis dispersed operations, rather than, you know, doing the narrow thrust that, you know, it goes back to the broad front, this is narrow thrust that Eisenhower Montgomery argued over after Normandy. And I think, you know, the Ukrainians are looking at, you know, kind of narrow front versus the Russians broad front approach at the moment. Now, if the Russians do mobilize a few hundred thousand more soldiers, noting that they'll be poorly trained and probably poorly equipped, they may sit to generate effect on a narrow frontage. But I think this really goes back to the kind of choices that the Russians have made. On top of that, I think, in the last year, you've seen the development of drones that fill the gap between the short range tactical strike out to about 30 kilometers, 40 kilometers, and the longer range hundreds of kilometers strike. So you've seen the hornets and these kind of things that allow what we might approximate to interdiction, the kind of air land battle that, you know, the US Army developed in the 1980s to to, you know, interdict operational level logistics locations where reserves are held, headquarters, drone operations centers, which are extraordinarily important to reach out to about 200 kilometers. And that's clearly the kind of shaping that third Army Corps in operational operation for Voldy undertook for a long time before it committed to advancing across the line of departure. A lot has been made of Ukraine's evident ability to effectively take Rubicon, right, Russia's military drone enterprise out of the fight early in this campaign. Is that overblown or has that really been one of the keys to, and again, I hesitate to say success because we're still in the middle of this operation, right? And I think we have to wait until afterwards before we clean it as a success. But, you know, accomplishment, what Ukraine has achieved has taken Rubicon out of the fight even for brief windows been a central key to that. Now, I think that has been one of the important shaping operations that the third Army Corps and probably in collaboration with unmanned systems forces and others. I mean, this is one of those lines of operation that are essential if you want to be able to maneuver on the modern battlefield. You need to be able to suppress, you probably can never totally destroy, but suppress and generate periodic superiority in drone and sensor operations on the modern battlefield to a depth of a couple hundred kilometers. And that's what they appear to have been able to done at least at times. And, you know, I think we need to caveat that by saying we haven't seen a full accounting of what occurred and how they planned and how they executed this, we've seen some wonderfully constructed videos produced by those who planned and executed it. But, you know, I hope in due course, we'll see a bit more granular detail in the execution of, you know, what we might describe as counter drone saturation operations by trying to degrade the enemy saturation of visibility and fires using drones across a wide swath of the battle spas. The Valdi famously is the Italian composer of the four seasons. We've seen, you know, illusions to this operation consisting of sort of four parts. I just, as Zelensky was meeting with Third Corps soldiers in the past couple of days, reminding them of what's been accomplished in the first two parts. I sort of have gotten the impression they were meant to be in the third part right now. Presumably, that means a fourth part to come. Have these, you know, if we do divide this operation into four constituent parts, have we seen differences in tactical approaches, differences in what appeared to be campaign objectives during each of those four? Or are they clearly a cohesive whole and maybe the Valdi, you know, four seasons is a bit of artful, description, but less useful as an operational sort of framework? Yeah, I mean, using the Valdi was very clever. I mean, as we all know, you can't just win wars these days. You need to win the story of the war at the same time, and that's clearly what Third Corps is doing. They want to win the story of this operation, not just, you know, achieved mission success on the ground, because winning the story of it has an impact on piece negotiations, that impact on the morale, Ukrainian people, and these kind of things. The most recent update I saw this morning from Third Corps indicates that the third phase is, if not over, is closer being over, and President Zelensky in his visit yesterday to Third Corps headquarters where he presented medals and things indicated, in fact, he said, I look forward to the fourth movement of Valdi. So there's obviously another phase to come. The breakdown of these phases will be interesting. I mean, I'm not sure whether there was a phase zero there, you know, that would have been, you know, the shaping and collection before commencement, but you know, phase one I would have thought would have been, you know, these deep shaping counter drone saturation, these kind of operations to enable the actual physical movement forward of soldiers, whether they were dismounted or mounted. But I think there's another phase here, and I wouldn't be surprised if after this we see other cause getting in on the action. I mean, there are other really good cause in the Ukrainian army who have probably been paying a supporting role here, who might all be just watching and getting ready to launch their own kind of activities based on what they've learned from Valdi, but also to exploit Russian moves to, you know, reorient forces to cover the gaps that have been created by Operation Valdi because, you know, we know the Ukrainians will have been watching the entire front line very closely to see where of the Russians move their reserves, where have potential gaps and opportunities opened up that other cause now might be able to exploit, but they weren't able to exploit before the conduct of this operation. So third call might have another phase, but I think there's a broader picture that's worth having a look at here. Is this the best example of operational level campaign design and execution that we've seen since 2022? I think so. In the grand environment, I think so. You know, I do think that the reforms, the organisational reforms at the core level have played a really important role in underpinning this. The technological developments of allowing drones to reach into that mid-strike or the, you know, a core level deep battle as, you know, US Army doctrine would probably describe it. I think they've been very important, but I think this is the most important development we've seen in, you know, three or maybe even four years in ground force maneuver. I do think when it comes to various campaigns, the mid-range strike campaign of the last six months is also important. The long-range strike campaign of the last couple years of the Ukrainians is very important, but for ground force operations, I think the Volody, you know, I think office offers us the glimmerings of a new phase in this war potentially. That's what I wanted to ask you about, because there are, I mean, at the risk of simplifying it, there are two different ways that this could go from here. This could be a harbinger of what's to come. Other Ukrainian core will learn from this. They'll implement some of the lessons that Third Corps has learned that, you know, at considerable cost, or Russia will look at it and respond and try to reimpose this sort of static character of the battlefield that really endured for a couple of years. Which of those is more likely? I think it's easy to imagine both happening. You know, I think not every Ukrainian core will have the capability to learn or action what they've seen from the Volody, but some will. There's probably four or five really good cause that are looking at this. The air assault core, first as all, and a few others will look at this. Oh, we want to do this next because we can do it and they do it. But the Russians will learn from this. I mean, you know, I've just published a few pieces and I've a longer report on this topic of fast following throughout the war. The Russians and Ukrainians, while they both innovated, more often than not have fast followed very quickly. The innovation of the other sides, whether it was the Ukrainians copying fiber optic drones or the Russians copying a range of things the Ukrainians have done. The Russians will look at this and they will copy it as fast as they possibly can. So I think you'll see the Ukrainians want to do this again. You'll see the Russians respond defensively and third, you'll see the Russians respond and try to undertake their own similar kinds of offensive using the same kind of operational and tactical methods you Ukrainians used. A large port portion of the submissions that I get at the Modern War Institute over the past. A couple of years really have focused on this debate about whether or not the era of maneuver warfare is dead because the battlefield is too laden with sensors because what can be seen can be killed because of the difficulty of marshaling enough combat power to affect a breakthrough of defensive lines for instance. Should this be understood as a sign that, hey, maneuver warfare is still eminently feasible despite all of those challenges, is it, you know, a sign that, hey, within certain parameters, maneuver could still be possible at least for a limited duration of time in a limited geographic spaces? However, is this likely to be, you know, a moment and interlude, so to speak, before returning to the dominant character of this war over the past four years, which has been positional static? Yeah, I don't think maneuver ever dies, but it certainly rests every day on them due to new technologies and things like that. I mean, well, one was an example, interwar period, you know, I think the immediate aftermath of, you know, in a 1973 war in the Middle East when we saw the emergence of, you know, airline operations and the integration of anti-tank weapons. We saw maneuver rest and look around and go, oh, we better think up some new ideas here and airline battle emerged from that. So, you know, I don't think this is historically unprecedented where we find it difficult to go on the offensive. It's happened before it'll happen again. I just don't like these prognostications where it's a definitive argument that the tank is dead or that maneuver is dead. I just, there's no historical precedent for that and I just don't think the evidence is there. Now, it's an interesting topic for a debate and interesting title for articles and stuff, but the reality is I think if you look at the evidence, you know, the last couple years have been very difficult for offensive operations, but both sides have still worked on how do we do that because you don't win a war by just purely defending. Even the North Vietnamese knew that in the 70s that, you know, at some point they were going to have to go on the offensive against the superpower. So, you know, maneuver, which is, as you know, is not just a physical construct, it's an intellectual one and a moral one, is extraordinarily important not just to destroy the enemy physically but to destroy them morally, to destroy their will to fight and to destroy the will to fight of an enemy population. So this has been a necessary journey to get back into offensive operations and for the rest of us, it's extraordinarily important because there is no strategic deterrence without offensive capability. It's why the US Army is parachute divisions, right? It's about strategic deterrence if nothing else. And, you know, I've been writing about this for the entirety of the war is this is an intellectual challenge that we're capable of meeting. We've just got to decide to solve the problem. You know, the theory of victory of combined arms and maneuver warfare on paper is mesmerizingly simple, seductively simple, right? It's an operational campaign plan executed by tactical units to enable penetration of defenses, breakthrough and exploitation all within an overall strategy that makes sure that those that penetration breakthrough and expectation exploitation is aimed at centers of gravity to affect the political decision making of the enemy. The formula is very, very simple. What we've seen is that in practice, it's much, much more difficult. Over the past couple of years and really probably since, you know, Ukraine overcame or sort of surprised so many analysts who predicted a quick capitulation because they saw the, you know, the calculations, the hard power calculations on the ground instead of Russia is just too strong. Once Ukraine defied those expectations, not long after, I think the conceptually, all of us who are involved in public discourse about these things have sort of taken on this often unexpressed assumption that this war, if it ends, will end at the negotiating table. Is this perhaps a sign that battlefield decision is still possible that Ukraine could win this war by employing on a broader scale, the tactics, the approaches, the operational level approaches that it has done, combined that with a smart strategy that aims military power at the right place, is that, you know, is that possible? Could this war be won on the battlefield? I think so. I think that is still possible. I've always thought that, you know, the Ukrainians have the intellectual capacity to come up with a solution to this. Now the problem is obviously Russia has very deep regenerative capacity. It certainly has a deep pool of manpower, which it hasn't fully exploited at this point in time. But it still has a capacity to make Russia hurt so much that it decides it's not worth it anymore. I mean, once again, there are so many historical precedents for the small dog giving the big dog a beating just because the small dog has more fight and a greater commitment. I mean, we saw that in Vietnam, we've seen that in Afghanistan a couple of times. And, you know, we see the Taiwanese studying this very closely indeed. So, you know, there are many, many historical precedents for the small dog beating the big dog. It's extraordinarily difficult. It takes an amazing and huge amount of sacrifice, unfortunately. But it's still not impossible for Ukraine to do, but that is contingent on continued economic and military and intelligence support from Europeans and the United States. We shouldn't forget that the United States still supports Ukraine. I mean, it still gives it a huge amount of intelligence and training support. And you know, it sells a lot of military equipment to Europeans for enchantment to Ukraine. But, you know, long and short of these, it's possible, but very, very difficult. You wrote a book that was published in, I believe it was August of 2024 called The War for Ukraine Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire. If you were rewriting that book or, you know, starting from scratch, not just revising it, but starting from scratch and writing it now, how different would the book look in October of 2026 from the way that it did in August 2024? Um, I mean, the structure, I think, would still be the same focusing on strategy and adaptation. But I think there's a couple of things I would focus more on in the book. Firstly, I'd focus a lot more on generation and exploitation of surprise at different levels. I think that is very important. I mean, you know, the Battle of Kursk, I think, was a very important example of surprise. Not so much a technical operational, but it's strategic level. Ukraine surprised its allies, and I'm not sure whether you really want to do that in war. I mean, it kind of worked, but ultimately Kursk was a strategic failure, or at least not as successful as we would have liked. A second area I'd probably like to dig into more is a regenerative capacity of belligerence and how quickly they can regenerate capability. I think, you know, the early estimates we saw, particularly from European nations about how quickly Russia could regenerate military capacity after the fail battle of Kiev were off significantly. Russia regenerated itself way more quickly, and we've seen Iran regenerate a lot, some of its capability more quickly than expected this year. So I would focus on, on that area as well. In the third area, I'd just look at is just continue to look at the accelerating pace of learning, of change, of adaptation in belligerence, because I think, you know, five years ago, I don't think any of us expected the massive scale of which uncrewed systems would penetrate into modern military institutions, but also the huge, huge acceleration in the many generations of aerial maritime and ground systems and the proliferation of different missions they undertake. So they'd be the three areas that I'd probably focus a lot more on if I was to write that book again. Well, I have to tell you, in advance, or in advance of this discussion, I picked it up, I had read it when it came out, and I picked it up and was paging through it again. And I think we're sometimes lured into this trap of talking about adaptation cycles that have condensed from years to months to weeks, and that the battlefield and methods of operation tactics, technique procedures is all changing so fast, technology is advancing so quickly, and being innovated on the front line so quickly that it's a different war, you know, every six weeks or every month or what have you, but broadly structurally, I was a bit amazed at conceptually how well the book holds up. And I think is a good antidote to the temptation to believe that this war is changing so quickly that, you know, an analysis of it from six months ago is no longer valid or because the underlying assumptions, the underlying dynamics have changed so much. Because it's not the, we are talking about a rapidly changing character of warfare, but the nature of war does not change, has not changed in this. And I think that, you know, I think that that book is a very good illustration of it. So, if any listeners out there are put off by the fact that it was published two years ago, don't be, I highly recommend it because I still think it's a very useful resource and a guide to kind of help understand what we've seen in that war. No, thanks John, I appreciate that. I mean, I talk a lot of war colleges around the world and one of the things I always emphasise about Ukraine or the Middle East is most of what we are seeing, the vast majority of what we are seeing is not new. We're just seeing old lessons re-loaned. There's far more continuities, something from everything from the importance of good leadership to the necessity of sound civil military relations and aligning tactical activities with desired political outcomes, you know, logistics, a whole range of things, really just our continuities, but there are a couple of transformative things, and you know, they are, I think, what I describe is the big three A's, autonomy, AI and adaptation. Those three things and how they interact, I think, are transforming the character of war, but wars enduring nature has not changed. Now, there's an argument and I have an epilogue in my first book, War Transform, where I talk about will AI change the nature of war? And the judgment I come up with is not yet, but ask me again in five years. So given that book came out in February 2022, that five-year clock is almost when down, so I might have to revisit that question at some point in 2027. Yeah, I'll make a note of my calendar to give you a comment next February and ask you. Well, I think to kind of close out, we talked about, you know, if we are, in fact, kind of at the end of phase three of what seems to be a four-phase operation, what are you kind of looking for next in the days and weeks to come? Well, we're at a period where we might be seeing the wind down of this operation. Or are we going to see a step up? You know, generally your final phase is consolidation and final exploitation and stuff, or is it just a shaping activity for another call to kick off operations? So I'll be looking for indications of that. I'll certainly be also looking at how much does Russia continue to step up? It's a tack against Ukrainian cities. It's really stepped that up in the last couple of months, which I think is a direct response to its failure on the ground. I mean, it is, it's grand offence of this year is manifestly failed. It's probably taken one to 200 square kilometers whilst losing 600,000 troops as casualties. So, I mean, I'm looking at just how much Putin steps up this big push to destroy Ukrainian cities because he's not getting any success elsewhere. I'll certainly be looking at perceptions of success in European capitals and in Washington DC. I mean, what kind of statements are European leaders making as a response to what they're seeing in Ukraine? Are they heartened? Are they concerned? And, you know, do we see President Trump start to put pressure on Putin? I think you could argue, he hasn't really put much pressure on him yet, but if he really starts to get a sense that Putin's losing might we see more pressure on the Russian government from the US president and his administration? So, all these things matter. And as you know, you've got to look beyond the front line to see really where success might be generated and where it might be located. Well, Nick, thank you again for joining me today. It has been fascinating and insightful discussion as it always is when we have you on the podcast. So, I appreciate you making time for us. It's great to be with you, John. And I always have time for the Modern War Institute, one of the finest institutions anywhere in the world. And I really love reading the blog and some of the fantastic articles that are on there. And I'm always happy to speak with you and the team. Thanks very much. 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