On Bessent, Gold & Idiosyncratic Trades

The macro trading floor. With me, Alfonso Piccatello, founder of the Macrocombas, and former head of investments at a large European bank. And I am Brent Donnelly, president of Spectre Markets. I've been a portfolio manager, day trader, and market maker at the biggest commercial and investment banks in the United States. I'm also the author of Alpha Trader and the Art of Currency Trading. If you want to know what's going on in markets and where they're going, you found the right podcast. Hi, everyone. Alpha speaking. Welcome back to the macro trading floor, as always with Brent. And before we start, you know, you guys keep sending us emails and lumber pings. Where are you? You didn't do the podcast this week. I'm like, it's okay, guys, if nothing is going on, we're not going to bother you with nothing. But this week, this week, or last week, we should say, there's been quite some funny stuff going on. So here we are. We're back. Brent, what do you want to talk about? Man, there is actually a lot going on. It's funny because I feel like the amount of macro news and headlines and excitement is pretty high relative to the amount of actual market volatility. Like the narrative volatility is really high, but a lot of things aren't moving that much. Of course, this week, we got the op-ed from Druck and Miller about deficits. I think one of the most interesting parts of that was the whole debate over AI writing versus non-AI writing, but maybe this isn't the right podcast for that. I think the deficit issue is very well known. My friend, Jim Bianco told me once, in 1985, he was working. He was a young guy at that time. And his boss pointed to a headline that said, "US becomes a net debtor for the first time ever negative investment, net investment position," or whatever. He turned to Jim and said, "You know what, the dollar is screwed. This is the end of US hegemony." So that was 1985. Druck and Miller has spoken about this frequently in 2010, 2013. And of course, there's a lot of logic to it. How can we sustain 20 trillion in deficits or in debt? How can we sustain 30 trillion in debt? Now the question is how can we sustain 40 trillion in debt? It's extremely compelling from the intellectual side to worry about this, but it's very hard to worry about it as anyone. I guess if you have like a 50-year time horizon, you can worry about it. And you can also use it as a structural part of bullish gold thesis or bear-sponsed thesis, but as your time horizon gets shorter and as you get to my time horizon, it's just impossible to worry about these things. And I think you sent out a really good chart and I believe Ed Yardini sent something similar but your chart was better than his, but essentially showing the 30-year yield minus nominal growth. And it makes a pretty good case for the idea that yields are simply normalizing right now. And yes, sure, there's a bit of term premium and there's worries about deficits in Japan and UK and US. And those things are real. However, most of what's going on in the bond market is just a very orthodox nominal growth story. Is that a fair takeaway from your chart? I would say yes. I would say very simplistic to say because nominal growth is 6.5%, then 30-year threshold was 6.5%, that's a very simplistic way of looking at things. It is directionally correct though. The thing that I like the most doing here is to think in how much is your central bank behind the curve because that effectively determines how much term premium investors are going to want to pay at the long end. So the way I think about it brand is I've been working for a while on this little index that tries to score your country for monetary and physical credibility. And effectively what you do is you look at the 6-month annualized core inflation and then you compare it with target and then whatever country you score, it's running above target, maybe borrowing one or two. But then that's fine, that inflation's above target can happen. Then you should have your central bank signaling to the market that they want to tighten, right? Then they want to tighten heavy to offset that and then you can regain some of the credibility in index. And if you score back to G20 countries, only Brazil is there basically telling the market look, you know, we are way ahead of the curve here. Everyone else is behind, who more who less. And you have the US and Japan actually leading the park on the least credible MFC scores, which does make sense to me. You know, as you say multiple times the Fed doesn't hit the current fashion target for what like five years now, so I wouldn't say that particularly credible, right? I mean, and Japan is not. Well, I found super interesting is when you scatter plot these index on the Y-axis versus the slope of the curve, the level of yields, currency in RER terms, you find very interestingly tight relationship, especially if you penalize this score for deficits. If you're non-credible and then you're doing primary deficits, sorry, you're even less credible than before, right? So you basically make up an index with a penalty and then you look at the slope of the curve and it trucks very well a bunch of countries barring the US. I mean, basically the index says the R square is 0.8, looks great, but please exclude the US because you know, these guys have a yield curve, too flat by 50 to 100 basis points. You're like, sorry, model come again, yeah, 50, 75 basis points, long and yields too low. I mean, this environment you have best sense that says, oh, no, no, they're actually too high. We should buy backs to limit it further and Japan gets harassed by the market for their bad mix of monetary policy and fiscal policy, right? I mean, the yen has been under attack for what is it, like four years now and the yield curve is exploding in the long end in Japan and the US gets a free pass, normally structural free pass and then best sense as, no, I won't even a bigger free pass and then the market goes like, okay, then no free pass anymore. Okay, should we talk about that? So that has been a very, very interesting development. Yeah, and one, I guess the most interesting thing from the best sense day is the reaction in gold and in Bitcoin. And we had been speaking a few times really since June about the setup in gold with, you know, put the options market went bid for puts, it was just grinding around 4,000. And I went long a couple of times, but I lost patience. And I did manage to go along Bitcoin after the, the best thing. And more on some other reasons, but also on that reason. And what's really interesting to me about the, the reaction in Bitcoin and gold is the, you know, best sense thing, okay, does it really matter that much, you know, the amounts are tiny, but it's an important signal potentially. But is it really because he's just doing exactly what Yellen did, even though he was a harsh critic of Yellen, you know, everyone's a hypocrite in politics, both sides of the aisle. That's just the way it works. Anyways, so the reactions in gold and Bitcoin were like multiple standard deviations. And the reaction in yields was like basically nothing, right? So it's a super interesting situation where I think what it highlights is starting conditions being so important for things like another example is the Canadian dollar sold off decent amount this week on the tariff spat. But again, the amounts are tiny, you know, the other tariff announcements dollar cat actually went down. So the Canadian dollar appreciated in the past. But again, the starting conditions where dollar cat had been selling off for weeks and weeks. It was oversold. And so it's so much easier for things to rally on news when the initial conditions are very ripe. And so we had extremely ripe conditions for Bitcoin and for gold. And then some news, which of course was like kind of biggest news. But the more important thing is everyone was asleep and the news came out of nowhere. And so I guess the question now is where do we go from here on those things because the debatement trade has come back with the vengeance. But do you think it's maybe a bit of an overreaction or simply like, you know, a move that was going to happen anyway. And then finally, it got its reason to happen. Or do you think this is the start of like gold back to new altem highs and Bitcoin back to 120,000? And my basic assumption is the one where I think you shared the chart that I once did for macro research, where the gold called to put skew had become negative again after five years. So people were not overbidding gold calls over good put somewhere in summer, basically all the gold states and the central banks in Poland and Philippines and Thailand were basically selling their gold holdings to fund their economies. And so this was having a big pressure down on gold and even the option market had gone no premium for gold calls at all. And so I think the level of, yeah, well, draw down and fear basically holding gold upside that evaporated positioning all together. So it doesn't take much right for an volatile asset like gold or silver to stage a 20% rally, which they did. And now going forward, it's interesting because you can make an argument, brand that what The best thing is basically what Katayama has been doing for a whole time or a long time. just talk blah blah tell people look this is my buyback size is now double by the way even through the interview oh and the next buyback operation is in September we'll see how much buybacks we will do you know the typical threat of who says it's going to be four billion maybe we do eight billion at that buyback just to signal to you right and and then I've seen people point at these national numbers and say they're low ah guys I think that's the wrong framework and a one billion purchase in third-year bonds is vastly different for the market than a one billion purchase in five-year bonds vastly different because the DBO1 or basically the P&L of risk for basis point you're taking away from the market at third-year or five-year is very very different so the duration absorption basically that best end is doing is very very large at two billion is small at four billion my analysis it's still small-ish at eight billion is a pretty reasonable operation twist like event and if you have been around in two thousand and what was it man two longer twelve thirteen something like this when they did the operation twist I think it was when in 2012 man that was quite a thing so in 2011 the long end of the ill curve became an anchor because the Fed says where at zero we don't care we are recovering from a recession there was some attempt at doing fiscal in the US if you remember to restore some economic growth inflation temporarily went to 4% annualized and so the market was like what is this rates at zero inflation at four fiscal on top let's go I think I remember Golden Silver had a massive rally in the last part of 2011 the long end yield the long end part of the ill curve steep and then they came in with this operation twist which is nothing else then basically buying back a bunch of long end bonds and funding it via issuing short term bonds right it's relatively similar to what best and as in mind and that did have a large impact so now question is brand is it just Katayama we're just blabbering about something and it will do nothing because if he does nothing then the impulse for gold and Bitcoin to keep rallying is weaker I would say right if it does yeah then then we're going gold all new all-time highs in in two weeks I think if it does right right so you know it's interesting man when you were talking I had like 50 separate ideas there but so the first one is that for short term traders and even for vol traders I would say normally you would not be watching the buybacks because who cares they're they're on a schedule but the first buyback which I didn't have time to double check here but I'm pretty sure it's the happens on the ninth and the results come on the tenth but you can check on the treasury's website but like Alph said there is this implicit threat or implicit like nudge nudge wink wink that maybe they're going to do more so people are going to be watching that it's you know usually we watch the same things payrolls retail sales etc but every now and then some random thing like the tick data or the pomo operations in 2010 or whatever comes onto the radar so if you're a trader watch out for the buyback announcement because if it's not bigger it'll be a little bit disappointing and if it is bigger obviously that's huge you should be buying gold and Bitcoin on that on that news the other thing I wanted to say is in 20 in 2008 Hank Paulson went in front of Congress and fannie Mae and Freddie Freddie Mac were we're wobbling and he said if you've got a bazooka and people know you've got it you don't have to take it out and two months later they had to bail out fannie and freddy so I remember that whole thing so well because when he announced that we bought so much cross yen because it was bullish and it was actually my best day ever at Lehman Brothers and with so everything rallied on that day because it was like okay the backstop is here and then two months later they were bankrupt now obviously I'm not saying anything about this being like 2008 but I am saying when you announce something like that an absolute critical or crucial part of it is credibility and I don't think that's a political statement I think this is a pretty objective statement to say that bestence credibility is at the absolute lows right now so about three months ago I remember writing something that was just like moderately critical of something that peasant was doing I can't remember even what it was but I remember feeling this is a little bit edgy criticizing the treasury secretary like I better be careful also I don't want to get you know there's always fear of retribution in the current regime that if you say something negative about the U.S. administration you know you might there might be some kind of retaliation but also it just felt edgy because that's you know it wasn't like so mainstream now I mean go on Twitter go in the Wall Street Journal every single person in the world is criticizing peasant people are wheeling out his track record at key square and showing how he didn't make money and all that kind of stuff is all so super mainstream that that creates a problem if you're trying to do an operation based on credibility like if you're selling dollar yen at 156 and people are laughing at you on Twitter and and your you know old boss is criticizing you in public and making you look bad and then dollar yen is at 15950 you know and then you come in a couple of weeks later and say well we're going to try the same thing in the bond market at some point the market's just kind of shrugs it off and doesn't care so ultimately I guess maybe to your point the amounts have to matter enough and that the action has to be repeated to reestablish credibility because that there is not a lot of credibility here all that said yields are lower since he announced it so you know maybe the jokes on everyone else look the other thing that this makes me think about this portfolio construction here because you can make all these assumptions but at the end of the day it takes one hot inflation print just by mere coincidence with this type of skittish behavior about you know the credibility of US policy making which was always challenged but now best and seems to have like waking up a sleeping giant which is the the long end of the bond market imagine there is the next corpus e print is not 20 beeps but it's 30 beeps just something like this brand what do you think happens in the bond market oh my I think they go banana to be honest they're like okay first we're gonna sell the long end heavy then we're gonna basically ask the fat to hike now and fast and if the fat doesn't the fat doesn't apparently wash doesn't tell you anymore what he's doing right so you basically can't even assume that he's gonna do something to backstop this and reestablish credibility it really makes you think like where is the what is the risk if I'm running a portfolio where is that asymmetrically can go against me and you have to think in derivatives of the long end because it just takes one strong data print in my opinion or even not even that what you were saying before is just the market says oh yeah okay let's go and test this at the next buyback you show a poly with four billion four billion okay we can take that so let's go and sell a bunch of bonds and it could be you can't predict where it comes from but it is it is definitely a release valve I would say for macro imbalances that has been dormant for a while and now it's definitely not dormant anymore right and I guess the the intervention means the dollars the release valve and then if there's if the yield is moving as a market rate then the market you know then the yield becomes the release valve and I guess the question also is if worse is going to say higher long end yields are doing the tightening for us and then they don't hike then higher long end yields are being endorsed by the central bank at the same time as the treasuries trying to reduce lower or reduce back end yields it becomes a bit of a goat rodeo or a shit sandwich if you have two parts of the government you know operating with opposite principles but I mean I don't think we can conclude that worst is just going to let the long end go although you know how much control does he have I guess the amount of control he has is that he can hike and I'm sure that would settle the long end but that's also not guaranteed right like that's I think what you would assume I don't know it's definitely what I would assume but it's not guaranteed it's possible that you know that the whole curve just goes higher as well if they hike right it's not guaranteed that it it comes along and it's it's a function about how they hike and when they hike right they hike I mean not 50 basis point hike but do they hike and they give a very strong hawkish forward guidance well you can't even say that anymore I mean apparently worse you doesn't want to give any forward guidance to anyone so what it's going to hike and it's going to say yeah and then word salad yeah in that case sorry but the long end isn't going to like it either I believe Brent right because the function is the fed is behind the curve that's something the market appreciates they know that already now let's say you hike in an order in order to repair this if your hiking is probably because it's too late anyway so the market isn't just going to give you the benefit of that oh they hike they're such nice guy an orthodox guy no no no they hike it's the bare minimum in my opinion and then you have to go in and say look we are prepared to hike multiple times until we get control of what's going on so basically we're talking about the US imposing what I call the emerging market medicine that is the market doesn't like your set of policies the release valve are the currency and the bond market we've seen it over and over in emerging markets and as a policymaker you have two choices often you have to do them both actually. You have to put yourself ahead of the curve, Brazil way basically, very aggressive tightening cycle. And the second is you have to cut your primary deficit spending. Now, let me try to elaborate this two months to go to midterms. Can you credibly see the United States cutting this primary deficit spending? The answer is no. The ball is on worst court. In terms of fixing this structure, I mean, I'm not like patching it with some buyback attempt, just fixing it structurally. And the worst doesn't even give forward guidance. So even if he hikes one, I'm not sure that that's going to be enough. So for me, the only way out of this is very simple. It's the data will bail them out. At the end, brand, you can get upset as much as you want, but if court PCE keeps printing 20 bips, I mean, I'm sorry, the fact policy is relatively appropriate at that point, because inflation starts converging slowly but surely towards a two and a half percent line, right? And then there is less reason to be upset, I would say. So they can get bailed out by the data. That's possible. And the second is, as you say, the bazooka that bests and credibly says he has, then he has to make the market believe that it's there. And I'm not sure that that in the market, look, I might do four billion or I will do four billion is enough. Perhaps if we have to go down that route, it will be a bit like the JPY. They had to spend a lot of money so far to try and defend the JPY. And we are still at 160, by the way. So, you know, but you know, I think this is really boring as an as an outcome, but I think there's also another case where we just keep on grinding around, right? Like we the soft landing continues, nominal growth stays around here. If you look at where we're 10 year yields in August of 2023, they were exactly where they are here. So the 30 years a little higher, but generally like yields are kind of unchanged in the last three years. So I don't know, I feel like it's a very tricky conflict between the structural stories pretty clear, right? Bigger deficits since 2017, the TCGA unlocked the idea that you can run massive deficits at the peak of the cycle and just keep on pouring gasoline on the fire. And so fiscal policy decoupled from the real economy. And you know, we've been doing that now for nine years and yields normalized, but they're not really like going that crazy high, considering, you know, what deficits and all that are doing. So there's there's all these nonlinear possibilities. There's, you know, the long end breaks because of deficits and high nominal growth. There's the database at the Fed and inflation goes back to 2%. But then there's also this weird steady state, which we seem to be in for years, which is, you know, 6% nominal, 3% inflation, and, you know, tens around four and a half and, you know, party on. I don't know. So like that's kind of like the nothing substance training. I feel like that's actually been a core view that you've had is just like things aren't that bad. And every now and then the media heats up about this debt stuff and all that. But like, like I sort of said, at the top of the show, 20 trillion, 30 trillion, and 40 trillion, it's very difficult to separate what, what is the difference between those three numbers, especially when consumer and business debt is basically almost zero. And it's all been moved to the sovereign balance sheet. Is that scary? I don't know. I mean, it feels like it should be, but I think sometimes it's better to ignore all the structural stuff on my time horizon and focus more on cyclical and, and like what's going on in the next few months. Because otherwise, you can always get sucked into ones are going to collapse. The dollar is going to collapse and gold is going to go to infinity. And those are not bad long-term trades probably. But I feel like sometimes it's too easy to get sucked into the doom doom doom gloom deficit narrative when because it just makes so much sense, right? Like how can you just keep increasing that and keep spending more money and never have to pay the piper. But literally people were saying that in 1985. So I'm just trying to keep an open mind to the idea that deficits do matter. So like I'm not saying deficits don't matter. I think deficits are a big part of what why we have these supply shocks currently. Why we have more inflation than we would have otherwise. And, but I think a lot of times deficits don't matter in the way that people think they do deficits are usually bullish equities, etc. So I think it's it's more like trying to maintain some kind of nuance view in a world where you know, all the headlines are just screaming 40 trillion or the trillion. So a few word on that. First, you said something very interesting, which is it might be scary that liabilities and that is moving from the private sector balance sheet to the public sector balance sheet. I think it's great. I think it makes our system much more stable. Let's take a look at all the developed market crisis since 1990 or you can go back earlier if you want. They all come from excess private sector leverage, not public sector leverage. So the 2008 crisis, what was that? That was housing leverage, right? So it's private sector leverage. The Asian tiger crisis, what was that? Again, that was the private sector Asian corporates, Thai corporates, Korean corporates, the Eurozone crisis, which was also really state crisis in Ireland and Spain and in the Netherlands after again, housing market, private sector balance sheet. So I'm not saying it doesn't matter because if you if you borrow not in your currency, if you borrow in foreign currency, then you're liable, let's say to foreign investors in not in your currency, that makes of course all the emerging markets over and that crisis come back to mind, Russia, whatever Argentina. But if you borrow in your own currency rent, then from a macro perspective, this problem for me is like a distribution where we're often at the at the body of the controllable risk parameters and the only thing that makes it go banana is inflation because the result of excessive deficit spending in your own currency brings a tail risk that is inflation, that's your risk, right? And then we look at what's happening now, is the US excessively borrowing in their own currency? Yeah, is the US excessively printing deficits versus the cycle? Yes. Can you say that core inflation is going out of control? It's high. Is it going completely out of control? You don't have the evidence to say that. It's been above target for a while, but in macro, in my experience, the second derivative, matters more than the first derivative. So first derivative is year and year change. Is core inflation high? Yes, it's been 3% instead of 2% for a bunch of time. Fair enough. Second derivative, can you look at the last 12 months or six months and say this is going out of control? No, no, looking at the data you can't say that. And the same, by the way, with the labor market, that's even worse, Brent. If you look at the labor market, which is another potentially inflationary source or deflationary source, the labor market is not only not out of control on inflationary side. You can say, it's pretty mild. So I really can't endorse the idea that, oh, this excessive deficit spending is leading to the macro tail that really matters, which is inflation out of control. It doesn't show up in the data. Right. And that kind of goes back to the idea of this steady state, like we're in in some kind of weird equilibrium here since 2023, where nominal growth and inflation and everything are just kind of like always the same, right? There is a ton of volatility on the macro side. And I mean, that is usually the best explanation for why FXVOL, or, you know, I'm an FX guy generally, but that's usually a pretty good explanation for why macro asset ball is low, is that macroeconomic volatility is low. What you want for higher, you know, financial market ball, if that's your if that's your thing, is you want dispersion of macroeconomic outcomes within countries and across countries. And really, we're not getting like a ton of that. There are some interesting things. I guess we're running out of time. But for example, New Zealand is talking about labor, the labor party there, this hasn't got a ton of coverage. But the labor party there wants to go back to a dual mandate, which in the sort of world of central banking is interesting because they just went to a single mandate in 2023, which is classic extrapolation bias, right? Like in in 2020, 2021, the Fed adopted flexible average inflation targeting because they had missed the target so many, so many years in a row to the downside. Like the worst possible timing, obviously, they extrapolated into the future, and then they abandoned it because it was clearly stupid. And now New Zealand is going back to unemployment potentially if labor wins the election in November. But it's actually meaningful, I think, because unemployment is quite high in New Zealand. So if you're ignoring it, then you have one policy, but if you have a dual mandate, you have a completely different policy. So to me, that's probably a reason to receive New Zealand rates and to be short the currency. If you have like a three to six month time horizon, like owning Aussie Kiwi and things like that make a lot of sense. It's a little bit in the weeds, but that's just one thing that I've been looking at. The other thing is Canada's been moving a lot on the tariff stuff. I'm a seller of all the tariff news at at this point, it just you can barely see it in the economic data shirts there, but I just don't feel like it's a good reason to put on a trade. Also, the tariffs aren't that credible. They go on one day and then the deadline is September 8th, and then they're supposed to double on January 1st, 2027. By that time, the US administration is going to be worrying about some other thing, not about Canadian tariffs. They'll be worried about Brazil or Greenland or something by that point. I love the reference to New Zealand for one reason. When you look for ideas that are reducing practical events, even like this one, labor, wind selection in New Zealand and therefore, wind states a domestic dual mandate. If you are able to engineer a trade there and you construct it correctly, it will have nothing to do with the rest of your book. That is the secret sauce to have a sustainable strategy because the sharp ratio of any strategy scales up with the square root of the number of independent bets you have. Now, if you're trading US, Europe and Japan, I'm sorry, but the number of independent bets you're going to be having in the book is very low. It's very low. You will have a very directional, low-ish sharp ratio, but potentially it doesn't mean we can sit behind nominal returns, but low-ish sharp ratio. If you can find a good asymmetric idea in an uncorrelated use in critic theme, that's worth gold literally for any allocator. Go ahead and talk about New Zealand. I'm going to chime in and reference Czech Republic just because we're talking about off-the-beaten past stuff. These guys have services inflation at almost 5%. The central bank of Czech Republic doesn't really eff around that much. Michael, which is the central banker, the governor, is a monitorist here, here. He's actually looking at fiscal deficits directly. He's tying a knot between deficits and the sustainability, like the stickiness of inflation in Czech Republic. The new prime minister, Babish, has instructed the finance minister to, guess what, pump more deficits because Czech Republic has to invest in its own economies on and so forth. That's super interesting. Czech Republic from a macro perspective looked for many years like a mini-Germany, super low amount of public debt, very conservative, monetary policy type of approach. If you remember what happened in 2025 when Germany told everyone, "I'm going to do fiscal deficits," is that bond yields went up and the currency became stronger. Here, you have a central banker that is not going to sit there and wait. He's probably going to respond to this by hiking interest rates and make the Czech corona more palatable. Today, you hear about the Czech corona and you hear about New Zealand interest rates. What a fun podcast it is. And so just to make sure I understand, so you think Eurocheck lower for the next like three, six, 12 months kind of thing? Yeah, I think so. I mean, it's already going, but because there is care, it's a very low-volt pair, Eurocheck, you can also say Czech versus Poland. It's a more reducing credit expression. Poland is on the other side of it. They have elections next year. They're hitting their constitutional debt limit as well. So they cannot really pump a lot of deficits going forward. This might slow down a bit their economy. So if you want to make it really using credit, you go along the chakron and short to polish slotty. If you want a bit more directional, positive care, you can do Eurocheck down, but it's a Czech story. Portfolio construction is up to whoever is listening to us. And I love talking about this stuff because we can talk at now, say I'm about buybacks, but maybe your central scenario happens and nothing happens. You know, data comes in a bit weaker, nominal growth is stuck there. Everybody loses the module to talk about best and then Drac and Miller writing with AI, by the way, personal opinion. Who cares? But okay, some people think that writing is an art, which is also fair, I would say. I don't think that Drac and Miller thought that writing was an art. I think he thought that he wanted to spend the least amount of time possible on this thing. And he went with through a prompt to Claude to produce an AI written thing with his own ideas. That was a fun thing to see. Everybody getting very upset about it. Okay. I guess in the end, the verdict will just be that good writing is good writing and writing that's full of cliches and is bad is just bad writing. And I think that's where it's going to all land is that AI or not AI bad writing is just bad writing and good writing is good writing. That's it. That will be I can guarantee. My bet is that you will never see Brandon Ali say it's not X, X, it's Y. You're not going to see that happening on a Brandon Ali piece, neither on mine, but we I encourage you to look at the ideas and content more than how it's written. But of course, if you appreciate the art of writing, that's a different story. This was a lot of fun. We hope to be back next week. We will, if there is anything interesting to talk about, guys. Next week, I'm in Canada, so we will not I will not be back. Next week. Also, as we do it earlier in the week, we might be back. We can figure it out. I promise you, I won't be here talking to myself for 35 minutes. So either brand is here or it's not. Stay tuned. Subscribe to the thing. So you get a notification when we're out and you need to check your phone like a maniac every Monday or whenever we release here. So we talk soon, guys. Always a pleasure. And as of right now, next week is Schrodinger's podcast. The content provided on the macro trading floor podcast is for general information purposes only. No information or other content provided in this podcast should be considered as investment advice. Seek independent professional consultation in the form of legal, financial, and fiscal advice before making any investment decision. Always perform your own due diligence. [Music]