Go back

200. Nitin Nohria: CEOs - The best way for boards to manage the manager

40m 25s

200. Nitin Nohria: CEOs - The best way for boards to manage the manager

CEOs often view boards as a surface-level support structure, unaware of the deeper dynamics and unspoken tensions beneath. Many CEOs who are fired feel surprised, typically because boards failed to communicate true risks or performance issues early. A key board role is to build trust through one-on-one conversations, helping new CEOs understand the board’s composition, motivations, and expectations. The CEO’s role shifts from direct decision-making to enabling and empowering others, which can be assessed by team confidence and autonomy. Boards should focus on strategic priorities, such as setting agendas and allocating resources, challenging CEOs to justify decisions while holding them accountable. Time management is a critical but overlooked area, with regular self-assessments improving self-awareness and performance. Boards must balance support with accountability—offering tough feedback when progress stalls, not just pushing for higher goals. Closed, exclusive board dynamics often lead to political outcomes, while open, inclusive processes foster credibility and performance-based decisions. Ultimately, boards function like kabuki theater—surface-level formality masks deep influence—and the key is to watch closely, remain vigilant, and focus on real, impactful contributions.

Transcription

7344 Words, 39281 Characters

English
- Most CEOs very quickly come to recognize that the board to them feels like an iceberg. They see the top of the iceberg, they understand a little bit. - My guest today studied what CEOs actually do from logging their diaries in 50 minute increments to running Harvard Business School's new CEO workshop. He was the 10th Dean of HBS from 2010 to 2020. - I have had a fairly significant number of conversations with CEOs who get fired. - And they all almost always feel surprised. - And I've always puzzled about that. - He says every CEO he has met who was fired was surprised when it happened. So today's question is a simple one. What do boards get wrong about CEOs? - And so when this thing blew up on social media, I said, "Ah, these things have 24 hour cycles at best. This thing is gonna die quickly." And it turned out to be a crisis that lasted for more than a year. - His new book, The CEO, the role, the reality, the responsibility is out now. - Welcome to Enter the Bordroom, for podcasts for boards and board members. I'm your host, Oliver Cummings, CEO of Neural, home to the Enter the Bordroom community, the destination for serving and aspiring board directors. - Listen, welcome to Enter the Bordroom. - Thank you for having me on me. - In 2004, you co-authored seven surprises for new CEOs, which forms the backbone of your new book's first chapter. One surprise was you are not the boss, the board is. I'm curious, 20 years on, what do new CEOs still get surprised by about their board? And what can board members listening do in a CEO's first 100 days to help? - Just amazing. - The CEOs, of course, are go through a process. They get chosen by a board. So they say, this board chose me. They clearly believe in me. They believe that I am the next person to run this company. And then they go to their first board meeting. And so many of them say it's an odd structure. I'm used to going to a meeting in which I had a boss, I had the previous CEO used to be in my boss, or if they were a division manager, the COO was their boss. And now there's these 10, 12 people collectively. I know that they're my boss, but they don't act like any boss I know. There's a norm of politeness. Everybody seems to agree. Yet I know that there's things, it's almost like there's an undercurrent that you sense, but you don't actually know what the undercurrent is in the board because there's a surface theater almost, and then there's what's going on underneath the surface. So I think most CEOs very quickly come to recognize that the board to them feels like an iceberg. They see the top of the iceberg, they understand a little bit, is usually very supportive of them, because especially early on board members do wanna show their enthusiasm and support for the CEO. And yet they know that there's some clock ticking that even though the board unanimously said yes, the unanimity may have had more cracks in it than they imagine. They don't quite understand the social dynamics of the board. There's of course the board chair or a lead independent director if they happen to be chair, but there are other powerful people in the board that can be even more influential than the board chair. Sometimes it's an investor, sometimes it's a family member, sometimes it's just the person who's been there the longest. If they still have a predecessor in the board, that creates its own set of complications. So suddenly they realize this is an entity like nothing that I have ever managed before. They're very good at managing an individual boss, but now they have a collection of bosses that don't act in one voice. And yet in the end is the group that will decide whether they stay in the job or get fired. So it's an unnerving experience for new CEOs and it takes some time before they start to feel really comfortable about their relationship with the board. What can a board member listening do to make that easier for a new CEO? So I think that I have found that almost all new CEOs who end up either themselves or at the encouragement of their board have one-on-one conversations with each board member to in some ways demystify the board as a collective and to start to understand who each board member is. Privately people will say things to you that they will hesitate to say in public. They'll share if you really ask them, what are your best hopes for the company? As I was selected, what are the things that people were most excited about? Are there some things about me that people had concerns about that I could learn from so that I can improve upon them? Did people have thoughts about how I might compliment myself on my team? So actually be a little vulnerable in asking for questions as opposed to just feeling, you know, like I'm the CEO, they've chosen me, of course, everything is right. And then also ask the question, how do you wish to most contribute? In what ways can I leverage your presence on the board? The most, where do you feel you can make the biggest difference? How can I count on you to be helpful to me? So I think establishing these one-on-one relationships, if you can do that, most CEOs go on a listening tour, they listen to employees, they listen to customers, they listen to investors. I think CEOs should go on a listening tour and listen to each of their board members as well. And if the CEO doesn't do that because they may feel awkward or shy, I think it's important for the board in the first 100 to 180 days to make sure that there's been an opportunity for every board member to have even a 30-minute conversation with the CEO. Another of the seven surprises was this idea of the realization as a CEO that you can't run the company. You can only shape the context that enables others to make decisions rather than making most of those decisions for themselves. Curiously, how you as a board member satisfy yourself whether a CEO is doing that. - So it's striking right away. I just had one of our CEO workshops just last week and a new CEO expressed very vulnerabilities. As you know, in every previous job I had, I thought I could outwork the job. Like I just needed to work harder. And in the end, I could outwork the job. And I finally have realized I can't outwork this job. But I have to enable other people to do the work. - So I think it takes time for CEOs to come to this recognition. They often came to the job with operations and being chief operating officer. Even if they weren't a chief operating officer or they ran a big unit or they ran a function, running things was their myth here. That's why that's how they became successful. So I think over time, you have to have a little patience. But if you're in when you have people come and present to you and every board will have an opportunity to see other members of the management team present to you. How often the CEO interrupts and how often the CEO feels that they need to explain what was just said by the person who's presenting on their behalf? How much does the person who's presenting look at the CEO to gain their continuous approval even as they're presenting? versus how self-confident do they feel that they have the ball, they've been given the responsibility. This is their business. They're the ones who are making the call. Yes, the CEO is aligned with them, but they can answer any question that they have the CEO, let's them answer any question that the board has as opposed to feeling like they have to be the traffic cop between all of these conversations. That's a small tell sign, but it's always been a good tell sign for me about whether the CEO has actually become comfortable about shaping the context, which starts with having an extraordinary team that they can trust, because that's the single most important thing that CEOs need to do to move away from being and operator themselves to being someone who can actually run the company through others. So if that is wrong, even that is wrong, then the likelihood that they are still overly involved in the business is very high. And so that's my tell sign, but you have to give them a little bit of time. Early on for the first year, CEOs do want to show that I'm in charge, I'm in control, I know the business, they want to intervene. So a little bit of patience is useful, but if by year two, they haven't, you aren't sharing other people in the management team, feel like they fully own their part of the business and the CEO trusts them to do that. They're probably managing too much directly as opposed to through the context. Now while we're talking about the role of the CEO, you wrote or co-authored one of the articles that has been most helpful for me as a CEO around how CEOs manage time. And you benchmark the highest performing CEOs and looked at what they spent their time on. The back of the eye went and refactored my entire calendar and now really tried to lead my day with my calendar or my to do this or my inbox. Cures to hear how and whether you discuss how a CEO is spending their time as a board member with the CEOs you work with. 'Cause it's not something I often hear board members or boards talking about their CEO's time allocation. And I wonder whether it should be something that they are thinking about and talking about more explicitly. So I can say that on actually every board that I worked on. I have encouraged the CEO to take at a minimum to do a quick self-study of their time. At least once a year, ideally every quarter, I think that's an even better cadence on which to evaluate their time to pick any categorization that makes sense for them, right? So I don't even mandate what the categorization is. I offer some suggestions. I give people an opportunity to read the article and I have on every board found a way to make this at least once a year or something that the CEO reviews in executive session, which is a simple, this is what my calendar looked like over the last six months. Here's what I learned from it. Here's where I think I'm, I feel very good about how I'm allocating time. Here are some places where I think I need to reallocate my time. But just to give, to create some transparency and it's almost an accountability as well, both transparency and accountability, like look, your time and we're not very rarely in these cases do we as the board then end up being very heavy handed about saying no, no, no, look, your allocation of time is all wrong. You should do this or that. You don't want to get involved in the weeds. I just think that the mere accountability itself proves to be quite powerful and see as a very good self-learners once they just do, they have the discipline. So what's stunning to me and we found, you know, Mike Porter and I found this when we used to do these quarterly studies is that every CEO when we reflected their own data back to them found one or two things about their own time that surprised them. They said that can't be true. It cannot be true that I spend so little time with customers or it cannot be true that I spend no time this quarter with frontline employees or that I spend 18% of my time with consultants. I mean, used to be some egregious thing, but still they used to always say that can't be true. And then we said, no, you know, we'll go back, we'll check the data, we'll, we'll, you know, and then we used to say, yeah, the data is what you sent us unless you gave us wrong data, you miscoated the data, your assistant didn't know what you were doing, which is all possible, unlikely, but possible. This is what your data say. So the important thing to recognize is that when it comes to managing time, we each have inadvertent blind spots. And this discipline is an important discipline that forces CEOs to take more accountability at that time. And I think boards, at least every board I've been on, I've encouraged this. And every CEO has been appreciative of it, not a single CEO has pushed back. And yet it's, I don't think it's a very common practice across boards. Now, when you rose about the CEOs work in setting the direction you got those seven different areas that you've touched on setting the agenda, leading change, communicating and listening, running meetings, shaping decisions, allocating resources and motivating people, curious to hear where in your experience have you seen CEOs need most help from their board. So there's two things that I think are the most important places where boards can be helpful to CEOs. One is setting the agenda. And in setting the agenda, I think the most important thing that boards can do is to have CEOs recognize that less is more. The lesson I constantly fail to learn, I remember when even when I became Dean, which is not quite a CEO job though, I sometimes joke that you know, for 20 years, I taught in our CEO workshops and just as a scholar of leadership. And I was excited to learn about what these people used to do. And then to my great surprise, I was chosen Dean. And I suddenly realized that these 20 years had almost been like a training for at least a mini version of the job that these CEOs occupied while because there's many differences between being Dean and being a CEO for company. But you know, her business school is a billion dollar enterprise. It has multiple constituencies. And I remember that I set out a set of priorities that were five priorities. And I presented them to my board, which is a board of Dean's advisors. And to a person, everybody said, you know, like five, nothing like can't there be three. And I had my own reasons for choosing five, which is I wanted to make sure that I'd gone out and done a listening tour of everybody in the school. And I found that there was a critical mass of support for each of these five. And that if I dropped any one of them, there would be a group of faculty that fact disenfranchised. And of course, running a faculty is different than running a company where having everybody be feel enfranchised in the agendas, even more important. But I always remember that, you know, like how people wanted to really push hard and say, nothing can't there be three as opposed to five. Half a day, we got five, and we made great progress on five. But I think that is the job of the board to challenge the CEOs priorities to always ask the question, not can there be one more, but almost always ask the question, can we do with one less? And if you're going to have for explain why, why for why these, what's the logic of these things? That's one place where I think boards play a very vital role in, in both challenging the CEOs thinking and then aligning and supporting them fully. And then the second thing is resource allocation decisions. I think this is especially true of the hard resource allocation decisions, selling a business, making a big bet on something new, supporting moving on from a beloved team member who for whatever sort of reasons carried the company over the last 20 years, but it's not the person is going to carry the team for the next 10 years. Could be quite beloved by the board as well, because the board was there in the past and feels a sense of debt to the person who did so much for them, but the CEO now says, I'm not sure this person, I don't want to disrespect their past, but we're trying to drive this company into the future. I think these kinds of resource allocation decisions, whether it's around people or around businesses or on projects, that's where CEOs both need to support, boards need to support CEOs when they make tough decisions, but not to do it lightly. They should not also just give a buy to or a pass to the CEO and important resource allocation decisions. They should interrogate those decisions, thereby I should be to support the CEO, but they should support the CEO only after the CEO has made a compelling case for these resource allocation decisions. And every now and then they should challenge them too, right? Like sometimes CEOs feel like they want to die at the hill, saving a business that they feel that if they conclude that it didn't work or if there's a priority that didn't gain momentum for whatever sort of reasons the CEOs feel like it's going to be a mark of personal failure if I let go and they overcommit to it. And at that point, someone on the board has to also have the courage to say, you know, it's okay, we can, you don't have to bet 100. You can, if one or two balls drop having the courage to say that this one's not going to be one that we're going to win. In fact, let's no longer allocate resources to this and find resources that we can allocate to something else. I think these are the places where boards play the most powerful role alongside CEOs. In general, I think that the bias that I have is that CEOs that the board should focus on the what and let the CEO do the how and these are what decisions, right? Like what should the priorities be? What should our resource allocation choices be? The how is how do I do culture? How do I execute? How do I run the business on a daily basis? So many of the other levers, how do I organize my meetings? These are not things that even as I said about time, time allocation is a how. But you do that gently. You don't do that in the same way as you might do prioritization and resource allocation. Now, for a board member listening to this, who's scratching everything, you know, like I get this, we need to sort of focus on these seven different areas, but I'm struggling to make that tangible in terms of what do I as a board member do? Can you give me an example? Then he one of those seven where you've seen a board add most value and just bring to life about this and how they went about doing that. I'll give you this example personally from this board where we just this was a hospital that prided itself on being the best hospital in in the country and it used to be celebrated as one of the best hospitals because it had a great research reputation. It was widely recorded as having done some of the most pioneering both medicines and surgeries in the country. And then at some point we got data from a national benchmarking organization that the quality of outcomes and how long patients were staying in our hospitals were in the bottom quartile. So I remember in the board, someone saying, how can we think of ourselves as the best hospital in the country in which yes, we will provide the most extraordinary cure to the most for the most difficult person. But if a person comes in with the hernia with an average problem, we're going to provide them with care that is in the bottom quartile, like we're only attracted to the most difficult problems. And so the board insisted we created a quality committee, which a new committee was created by off the board. Management was required to develop a plan for how it was going to improve quality, how what would be a way in which we would move from bottom quartile to top quartile and how much time it would take. And this became the first topic that the board would discuss in every meeting. So it went from the quality report used to be the last report. It became the first report that the board asked on and execution of this became a priority. And you know, happily in 18 months, you could start to see the slope and you could start to see confidence that the hospital was going to do much better. I can describe examples like this from other places as well where the focus was on strategy or the focus was on culture. But you have to find that this is a deeply important board responsibility. If you think that management needs to be focused on something, you have to align on that priority and that lever has to become a force, a source of zeroed in, shine the spotlight on it, sunshine is the best medicine. We're going to make sure that we see everything on this and we're rooting for you to succeed, right? Like this is important. It's not like we're doing this because we don't want you to succeed. We're rooting for you to succeed, but we want to see progress on this matter. So there was a company that I was involved in a long time ago where the strategy of the company had to be that it was a consolidated industry and there was a real risk that the company was either going to be bought or it had to find a way to increase its own scope, which meant that the company had to choose a set of areas in which it was going to at least have a shot of dominating the industry and engage in acquisitions. It could pass, it could not allocate resources across all of the existing opportunities it had. So this company chose, it was a utility company and it chose speaking generation as where it could dominate. And then it went out and we the board aligned on okay, that means that distribution, we're going to sell some of our distribution companies, we're going to double down on finding peaking plants and acquisitions where we could acquire the best portfolio of peaking plants across the entire country. And this was a three year project and the board really really got zeroed in on this and every border the discussion was okay. How much have we made progress? How much have we reduced our distribution portfolio? How much have we increased our peaking generation portfolio? And so it was a real, you know, like the metric was, what's the slope on each? And in one case, we needed to see a downward slope and in one case, we needed to see an upward slope. And here three years later, the company went to being, you know, from 20th and peaking generation, the country to the top five and from 10th in the company on distribution to essentially irrelevant because we had decided that business was not a business in which we would focus. The jump to chair is one of the most significant shifts in a board career. There are far fewer roles. The competition is stiffer and a capability shift is real. Without exposure to how chairs actually think, how they lead CO succession, navigate, activist pressure, manage board dynamics, it's hard to know if you're ready. The end of the boardroom community gives you direct access to chair level peers and structured discussions that build the pattern recognition the role demands. Search the end of the boardroom community. What would have happened differently if the board had not been there? Because it sounds like, as you again, and much like the first example, the real value being brought there was that focus and accountability and discipline. I think that's what it is. And sometimes, you know, people feel, I mean, there were people on the board who had supported in the past the build out of the distribution business. It's not like the distribution business had just been built out by neglect. It had been built up in the past with the support of people in the board. There were people in the board who were attached to that business. There were people in the management team who were attached to that business. There were consequences for people in the management team who would eventually have a smaller job to do. Resources would have to be reallocated from one side of the business to the other side of the business. And I think that had the board and the CEO not got fully aligned around this and not monitored progress in this with pretty tough accountability, right? Like we actually wanted to see a slope every quarter on this thing. And the CEO agreed, it's not like the CEO was in a different place. But then, you know, you hold them accountable, and real progress got made because there was real alignment between the CEO and the board, and a real accountability that the board wanted from the CEO. And there was a quarter or two in which things didn't work. And the expectation was, by the next time you're going to catch up, you're not going to fall behind. Talk me through the dynamics there because that's one I'm always interested in, particularly from my private equity days. I'll never forget there was this one senior experience in a board where the management came and they said, this is our budget. And the board said to them, that's not good enough. It needs to be higher. So the management went away and they came back and they said, okay, we made it higher. And then, you know, 12 months later, they delivered the numbers they had originally said. And they said, well, we told you, what did you expect? And sometimes I sort of see boards do that where they go log ahead rather than working collaboratively to promise us to talk me through that moment where it wasn't on target and how you brought it around. Was it just that stick you've got to be better? I have found that on average, beating up management to try and stretch is not something that I find is a terribly productive thing. I think once people run, to encourage them to run faster is easier, but to say to them from the very beginning, you know, you've never run a mile in four minutes, but my expectation is that you're going to run the mile in four minutes because other people can. If I've been running in six minutes, maybe for me, the right goal for the first year is to run it in five and a half. I mean, that itself is a huge accomplishment. I think boards need to trust that they've chosen a person who has enough internal ambition. If you've chosen a CEO who doesn't have the right ambition to even set ambitious targets, your problem is not beating them up to have higher targets. Your problem is that you've just chosen the wrong person. You better actually confront the real problem that you have, which is you made the wrong choice. So I have never found on the other hand, I think that when management doesn't meet its own forecast, a little bit of an explanation is okay, but I don't think you should belabor why it didn't happen. You should just ask, so when are we getting back on track? Was the discussion, when are we getting back on track, or is it more around what? That was what it was. It was like, you know, so okay, we we felt behind on what we thought the, you know, we had megawatts of distribution, megawatts of peaking generation. That was, for example, the metric that we were trying to track, and we were behind relative to what we thought the slopes would look like in one case decline. And we said, "Okay, well, when do you think we'll catch up with the slope that you'd defined?" And the CEO said, "I think we'll still catch up. I'll make this up by the next quarter, I'll make this up in the next six years and next six months." And he said, "Okay, what can we do to be supportive?" Like, is there anything that you need from us to make sure that you can catch up? And so the conversation was more about that. Like, what can we do as a board to make sure that now that we've fallen behind? It's a little bit like, you know, in a race, you can fall sometimes a step behind, but then the question is, what do I need to do to refuel to get an extra pick in the race to run this next leg a little bit faster to catch up? I do think that that sense of the board's role as, "I'm there to support you, but I'm going to be like a tough coach, I'm still going to hold you accountable for you doing your best and producing the results that you have committed to. This is not my commitment, which is easy for management to walk away when they think that, you know, like the example UK of a, you asked me for a goal that was impossible, I never agreed to that goal. So now, guess what? I'm going to deliver to you the goal that I had, but if you set the goal and then you don't deliver, then either we're falling behind or there's something that I need to do to be more supportive of you, is there anything that I can do? And if not, then have the humility to know that you're feeling." And in that situation, what, so CEO turns around to you and says, "We're failing." Is it then a collaborative? I think that this is where boards get the most tricky. I mean, my view of this is that, you know, over the course of having worked with now 500+ CEOs over the last 30 years, we know just by statistics that about 20% of them do get fired, they don't end their term. Not everything is announced that way or declared that way. And not every CEO who's fired will come back and talk to us. So I want to say that it's a small minority of the people who do get fired. But we have built good enough relationships with many of them that I have had a fairly significant number of conversations with CEOs who get fired. And they all almost always feel surprised. And I've always puzzled about that, like, you know, why do they end up feeling so surprised? And the nature of the surprise takes three forms. I told the CEOs, I told the board the problem was one that I inherited. It was a much bigger problem. So I got undone by some problem. This usually happens in the first. So when CEOs get fired in the first three months or so, or first three years or so, the excuse is always that board never understood what a huge mess I had been settled with. When it happens because performance has been sliding is usually, but we had a plan. And if they had only been more patient, I thought we'd agreed that we had another year to turn this around and another two years to turn this around. And if they'd only given me another three quarters, I would have shown that this plan would have worked. Right. So that's the, and why don't they give me the time? They said they would give me the time, but then they pulled the rug away from me. So that's the second kind of dismay that people have. And the third is some political story, which is, you know, some board member just doesn't like me or there was an issue with the founder or there's some investor who has a different point of view. And I got, I became the victim of a political fight in which a bigger dog kind of one. But that's the three narratives that I've heard the most common as to why people end up being surprised. Of course, if they've done something, you know, egregious, like ethical mistake, I mean, I'm taking all of that out of the picture because those are not as complicated in some ways as these other three are. I think boards find themselves in a very awkward position, right? Like, you want to be supportive and then someday you have to make the call, am I banking on hope? It's a good story. How much rope do I really have that I can continue to give? And what confidence do I have that if I keep giving out the rope, things will get better? I think that that judgment call at some point, it comes to an end, right? Like, you have to make that call and the moment before the call feels like there's still time left, but the moment the call is made, there's no time left. And I think that's the asymmetry that people have that boards and CEOs have, which is boards have no choice but to make that call I've served in those situations where, you know, we were trying to be supportive of a management to save because you're never going to say to management, I don't need you to have a plan for turning it around. I want your plan to turn it around. I want to back you every day to turn it around. And then another quarter passes and you say, it isn't happening. Do I want to give them another quarter? And then there's a board meeting and when someone says, no, you know, I think it's time for a change. And so once that happens, you can't say to a person, I've lost confidence in you, but I'm still going to give you six months, right? So the problem that you have in a board is that once you lose confidence in your CEO's ability to do something, you have an obligation to act immediately. And you can't tell the CEO in advance that I've lost confidence in you, but I'm going to give you six moments. I mean, that's just a symmetry that is inherent to the structure of the job. And that's why I think that in these matters, if you don't see recovery to the plan in that example that you described, then the CEO is on very thin ice. That's why I think you need to do everything you can to get the company back on track. Because if it keeps falling behind, something's going to break. Have you ever had a conversation with CEO where you thought gosh, the board have manifestly got this wrong? And the way they've behaved has been suboptimal. In terms of the board decided to remove someone and they did it in a manner that was exactly the way they went about and there's a decision making framework. Are there any patterns that you've seen there that a board member listening might learn something from? I think boards in which most of the conversation occurs offstage in a small inner circle of powerful board members. My experience is that those are the boards in which sometimes this, the way the process unfolds, the extent to which the outcome fees not just driven by performance, but driven by politics ends up being much greater. So I think boards in which the conversation occurs, has been occurring regularly in executive sessions, has occurred in the meeting. All board members feel that they were involved in making the decision as opposed to what I've seen happen in some boards, which is three prominent people come in and into the executive session and say, we've been talking and we think it's time. And then nobody wants to go against them. It happens very suddenly. It looks very precipitous. There was almost no forewarning of this conversation that was occurring. So the process can end up being political in the end. And even if it was warranted, you just don't have that much confidence in the process by which it was made. Within time has flown, which means it's time for the lightning round where I can ask you a short question and ask you for a quick response if you're ready. Yeah. Best book, every board member should read. And why? There's a great book that my colleague Jay Lorsh wrote called "Porns and Potentates." Just the phrase itself tells you what it is. Like, you don't want to be a pawn as a board member, nor do you want to be a potentate. And so he says the challenge of boards is that they either become pawns or they become potentates. The job is to be really partners to the CEO and together you should make a company great. So it's a great book to read. Well, you've been very modest not saying your new book, which I'm going to say for you, the CEO, the role, the reality, the responsibility, which I really enjoyed reading as a CEO, but also actually through the lens of a board member as well. I think understanding that role of the CEO better, it feels like a no-brainer investment of time. Boardroom behavior that irritates you most. People who haven't read the material, and yet have the loudest questions. What's a question every board should ask at least once a year? Who are the three people that can replace the top 10 people who work for the CEO? What's a boardroom myth you'd like to bust? That boards are looking for reasons for their CEO to fail. The best question you've ever heard asked in the boardroom, give me the three reasons why this project might fail. What's the mental model that has helped you most in your professional career? Someone in this room has a better answer than me. What if you change your mind on about boards over time? That I want to be a lesson, that I want to be an as few of them as I possibly can. Now you want to be on a few of them as possible. Yeah, I find that I enjoyed being on boards and I think that over time I've come to realize that my better gift is to be a personal advisor to CEOs than to be a board member. I think I can have more influence on CEOs in a direct relationship with them than having to construct that relationship through the formality of a board. But that doesn't mean that boards are not good institutions for other people. I think that you know I've served them there. I'm still on boards and on the boards I serve, I try to do the best job I can. I certainly sometimes wonder with certain types of boards why anyone does them because they are not adding any value. There's a lot of very dull stuff with a high high liability and little upside. I do think that on this matter if we can just take one more second even though this is supposed to be a lightning round. There are many things in life where the opportunity to make a difference is not every day, but when you do get to make a difference you can make a big difference. I think if you have the opportunity during a board to be involved in selecting a new CEO or sometimes even having to chin up to the courage of firing a CEO, that makes service on a board just those two moments are such profoundly important moments in the history of a company that it makes sometimes all of the work in between be worthwhile. Or if you can work with the CEO to set a great strategy, see a company that was going sideways suddenly soar and begin to gain momentum even though then along the way most of the meetings you're just cheering along the fact that you were catalytic. So I think in boards you have to be to recognize the fact that your role is catalytic as opposed to continuous and so you have to allow for a lot of continuous work to find the catalytic moments. Was the last significant judgment cool you got wrong in the boardroom and what did you learn? So I remember there was a crisis that happened in one of the companies in the boards in which I served and when it first emerged I thought it was just going to be something that would diminish quickly. It was a crisis that emerged in social media, maybe it reflected my own ignorance of my own distaste. Sometimes I think it was an important lesson that your own personal biases about things lead you to either overestimate them or underestimate them. I think my bias was that people overreact to social media and it's not really that important. And so when this thing blew up on social media I said ah these things have 24 hour cycles at best, this thing is going to die quickly and it turned out to be a crisis that lasted for more than a year. So clearly an example of me not paying sufficient attention to something more because it reflected my personal bias about how I thought about a field rather than what it could have been has taught me to be a lot more humble about not reacting to things based upon my prayers about them. Best interview question to ask a perspective net independent director. What was the last time you disagreed with a CEO and how did you handle that disagreement? And finally if listeners take nothing else from this conversation what's their one takeaway? Boards are like kabuki theater but if you watch kabuki theater these are important actors and they can play a very powerful role. Watch carefully, don't be confused by the kabuki, do the real work. Evan, thank you so much for taking the time to share your experience and wisdom. Thank you. Really appreciate the time, Ali. And I should ask if anyone wants to get a copy of the book. It's Amazon and if that fails, just go to Harvard Business School Publishing and you you can get a copy directly from the publisher. (upbeat music) If you're serious about becoming a chair, the Enter the Bordroom community puts you in the right room with the right people and the right conversations to prepare you for it. Listeners get 10% off. Search the Enter the Bordroom community and use the code Enter at checkout.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. CEOs often perceive boards as an iceberg, seeing only the surface-level support while missing the underlying tensions and unspoken dynamics.
  2. New CEOs are surprised when fired because boards rarely communicate real concerns or performance risks early on.
  3. Boards can help CEOs by fostering one-on-one conversations to build trust, clarify expectations, and uncover hidden motivations.
  4. A key shift in CEO role is recognizing they enable others rather than making decisions themselves, which is best assessed through team confidence and autonomy.
  5. Boards should prioritize setting clear agendas and making tough resource allocation decisions, challenging CEOs to justify choices while maintaining accountability.
  6. Time allocation is a critical yet under-monitored aspect of CEO performance; regular self-assessment increases transparency and self-awareness.
  7. Boards must balance support with accountability—offering tough feedback when progress stalls, not just pushing for higher goals.
  8. Boards that operate in closed inner circles risk political decisions; open, inclusive processes lead to more credible, performance-driven outcomes.

Summary:

CEOs often view boards as a surface-level support structure, unaware of the deeper dynamics and unspoken tensions beneath. Many CEOs who are fired feel surprised, typically because boards failed to communicate true risks or performance issues early. A key board role is to build trust through one-on-one conversations, helping new CEOs understand the board’s composition, motivations, and expectations.

The CEO’s role shifts from direct decision-making to enabling and empowering others, which can be assessed by team confidence and autonomy. Boards should focus on strategic priorities, such as setting agendas and allocating resources, challenging CEOs to justify decisions while holding them accountable. Time management is a critical but overlooked area, with regular self-assessments improving self-awareness and performance.

Boards must balance support with accountability—offering tough feedback when progress stalls, not just pushing for higher goals. Closed, exclusive board dynamics often lead to political outcomes, while open, inclusive processes foster credibility and performance-based decisions. Ultimately, boards function like kabuki theater—surface-level formality masks deep influence—and the key is to watch closely, remain vigilant, and focus on real, impactful contributions.

FAQs

New CEOs often see the board as an iceberg, where only the surface appears supportive, while underlying dynamics like power shifts and social tensions remain hidden. They struggle to understand the board’s true decision-making structure and influence.

Board members should engage in one-on-one conversations with the CEO to build trust, share honest feedback, and understand each other’s motivations. This helps demystify the board and creates a stronger, more collaborative relationship.

CEOs learn they can't run the company directly but must shape the context that enables others to make decisions. This shift requires trust in their team and patience as they transition from hands-on management to enabling leadership.

Boards should focus on strategic priorities and resource allocation—such as setting agendas and making tough decisions—while allowing CEOs to manage the day-to-day execution and operations.

Boards add value by creating clear, consistent focus areas—like quality improvement or strategic pivots—and holding CEOs accountable through regular progress tracking and tough, transparent conversations.

CEOs often feel surprised because they believed they had enough time to fix problems, or because the board failed to act on performance issues. The surprise usually stems from a lack of clear communication or accountability.

Chat with AI

Loading...

Pro features

Go deeper with this episode

Unlock creator-grade tools that turn any transcript into show notes and subtitle files.