NIOD REWIND Episode 7 Peter Romijn

[Music] Welcome to Neal's Rewinds, a podcast on war and mass violence. This podcast is made by Thais Boutnicht and myself, Anna Vermaulrich. In this 7th episode of Neal's Rewind, Thais and I are talking with the story on Peter O'Main, who just published a new and kind of remarkable book on the Second World War. Remarkable because when it comes to the war in the Netherlands, we almost always mean the German occupation. Baiter, on the other hand, writes about the continuity of war in Dutch history, from the German occupation to the Indonesian War of Decolonization. In this month's episode, we will also discuss Baiter's co-responsibility for the Neal's report on the fall of Cedranicht, which was published in 2002. And we will also talk about his research within the project, Independence, Decolonization, Violence and World in Indonesia, in 1945-1950. Hi Baiter. Hi there. You're a historian and senior researcher, head of research at the Neal's Institute for War Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Since 2002, you're also a part-time professor of 20th century history at the University of Amsterdam, specialized in public governance in times of wars and crisis. And in 1989, you defended your dissertation on the purges of Dutch collaborators and their subsequent reintegration in Dutch society. The title of your dissertation was, if I translate it to English, quick, strict and fair. Would this also be the title of your autobiography? No, because I'm an elderly person now. And I'm not intended to rush through my career for the next couple of years. So now I will be a slow historian. A slow history will be my specialization. If I'm severe, I don't think I'm a severe person. I can get angry when things are, I would say, done in an unprofessional way. And if I'm fair, yeah, well, I'm not sure if my purpose is to be fair. I think that the idea of my historiography is to be situational, to understand situations in specific historical context and historical circumstances, and then try to provide an explanation for how things have come forward. So my work is not that much judgmental as it is a situational or a situationally oriented. You're also our boss. That's a very strict answer. Now, if we start with re-riding a little bit because our podcast is rewinding and you talked a little bit about slow history, and when you were young and you were making decisions on what you were going to do, and looking at perhaps the historical context in which you were growing up, can you tell us a little bit why you became an historian and what interested you in history? And were you perhaps already interested in slow history then, or were you still more in fast history? No, I think I had kind of a schoolboy's interest in history. I think that I was thinking that history was showing so many fascinating aspects of life, life in the past, which could be connected to aspects of life in the historical present that I was living in. I think the main reason for me aspiring to be a professional historian was that public library was established in our village next to our house. What was the village? Fris Indrento. And that was a major event because enormous amounts of books at once became available. My parents were not very strong readers, we had books at home, but more like novels that didn't interest me that much. Actually, enormous amounts of books on an Internet topic became available, and I even solicited to get a minor assistant drawing that taking care of the loan, registration and everything. So I developed into an art and reader of books of history, and well, if that could be part of an academic career or an educational career in the first place. It seemed to me a very interesting challenge. That's why I developed an interest in history or historiography. Of course, there was also a sense of history in the family. There was a second world war history in both parts of the family, and I was very interested in that part of history. But that the past could play an important role in the lineage where you come from, in your pedigree, so to speak. What was an interesting experience? I had the privilege of knowing some grand uncles and grand aunts who had lived through the 20th century. I was born in '55, so they had lived to parts of the 20th century, and I was always eager to hear the stories. The stories of everyday life, but also particular experiences they come through, and well, actually that was a very different time. I sort of have always the feeling that we live in very politicized times. During your work, especially here at the Nile, you have also been involved in researchers into cases that are, or perhaps are still, are very politically sensitive. Amongst those cases was of course for granted certain in the role of the Netherlands. And perhaps it would actually be interesting to get your perspective on how to approach, as an historian, such political, politically sensitive issues, and how you deal with it, and perhaps also advise future historians on how you approach it in the past. Because surveillance there was of course not the only politically sensitive subject. The social memory of the second world war has always been a politicized thing. I mean this institute was constructed, don't forget that, as an instrument of politics of memory. It was finally in order to transfer the lessons that the Dutch elite wanted to teach posterity about the experience of the second world war. And the Dutch elites of course identified with a population as a whole and the refers also a court. But it was and still is an instrument of politics of memory. We will next year have the 75th birthday of our commemoration, sorry, and the first three of the liberation, which is also not incidentally the 75th birthday of this institute. Already in the run up to this phenomenon we are seeing that we are told what to think about the meaning of the second world war, the impact of the liberation, the responsibility of posterity, etc. We are told we are told insensibly. And I think that as historians we should be aware of this politicized aspect of our work. We should not be instrumentalized and we should be critical, remain critical all time. Because otherwise our profession will be lost and we are just profilers of illuminations and textbooks. Of nowadays politics. Of politics of nowadays, yes, which have their roots in the past but also are projected towards the future. Having said that there is a general political background and sometimes it gets very specific. The Srebrenica case of course was very interesting because it was a matter that just negated the Dutch political sphere. There was lots of uncertainty building up to bad consciousness about the role of the Dutch government and the Dutch armed forces in the fall of the enclave and the consecutive miles laughter in the meantime categorized as genocide. So this is a very complicated story how we got involved. There was no parliamentary majority for a parliamentary inquiry or for parliamentary inquiry. I think that would have been the best and only way to deal with these issues because it connected to what has happened on the ground, it connected to what had happened not in grounds to political decision making and to the responsibility of the government as well as the political classes of all. Given the fact that there was not a parliamentary majority there was still a call for inquiry in all circumstances relevant and then the idea came up in government circles that in the European Union. commission. And Hans Blom, one of the former directors, a very prominent historian in the Netherlands, was at the time he was the director and he took some hesitation but he believed that we were up to the job and after long considerations with internal and external advice and we said, "Well, this is not second world war, but it's the kind of issues that we are connected to. Content-wise, but also research-wise." So we accepted the challenge. Not necessarily. It was a huge challenge. And we didn't do it unconditionally. We have a couple of very important conditions. The first one was there would be no time limit. This would be a very complicated issue and we didn't know about the sources because it was a very recent occurrence. We accepted in 1997, late 1997, to study a huge international conflagration that occurred two and a half years before. Were the files even organized yet? No, but that was not a thing that we didn't know at the time. But we suspect it. So the first thing was no time limit. The second thing was no money limit because it would cost a lot and you cannot make a budget for such an inquiry without knowing that. We were told that we could negotiate ourselves through all money we would need. And the first thing was no government interference whatsoever with the research project. So we would keep silent until the very end when we produce the final product. The final condition, no government interferes in access to every document or source that the government could dispose of to that government. That was a condition that was kept. Interesting. The money thing was also kept. But the time limit was not kept. In that respect, we may have been naive. That was an expectation that it would take two or three years perhaps before the next election so that the government could make a clean slate. The whole issue became quite complicated because the sources of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Exterior, the Prime Minister's Office, etc. were still all in the desk of the civil servants. They were not orderly organized. So it took about a year for our researchers to basically categorize and select all files that should be researched. And then of course the international scene was enormously complicated. We had hoped to get the cooperation of, for instance, the American government, the British authorities, the French authorities, the German one. We did not talk about the Yugoslavs. That didn't work to make a long story short. United Nations was a little bit less complicated but I mean in principle they were prepared to cooperate but as a matter of practically couldn't tell us where the files were. Most of them were discovered in sea containers in the Newark port area just a year before we published. So that kind of stuff. If I'm telling you that I still cannot imagine that we produced within five and a half years but everybody said, "Well this is way too long and it doesn't. You've been lazy well you've been sitting in your chairs and writing reports etc. It's utterly unfair but actually it was part of the politicized environment we're living in." This time limit was in our perception it was a technical issue in the perception of the Dutch politics and Dutch journalism it was a part of a whitewash operation and that made it extremely difficult to relate to the outside world because there was all kinds of suspicions about what we were doing and well this was an institute funded by the government so they would have an interest in producing certain results etc. etc. The distrust was mounting by the month. If we use your situation approach on this right where do you see forms of coincidence in this and where do you see forms of planning and organization? In how we were working or in how the environment was working? Exactly how the environment was working. Well I think that the environment was working on the basis of incident-driven impulses but the incidents were very powerful because there's quite a lot of normativity we were not only players in the field there was the NGOs who were working with the widows of Osprey Brunitsa and we had said from the onset we will not investigate what happened with the victims after killing. We are investigating how the killing happened and how it was prepared by the Bosnian source but we were also very heavily criticized that we didn't find out where the male suffice was assumed to be hidden in Serbian mines or whatever. So this was something that we couldn't cope with as a matter of fact. I wouldn't say we were in the ETH but we were positivistic in our approach. Think well if you produce a means of research then that will have a convincing impact. And the lesson we learned actually was that you cannot depoliticize a problem by means of historical research. Can you use that lesson now with the research to decolonization of war and violence in Indonesia 1945 1950? Yes well I think that the circumstances are different because the Indonesian project is open in that respect that researchers are free to communicate with the outside world and the outside criticism. And what happens now in the Indonesian project is that we are judged by critics about our intentions and not by way of the output. And we are discussing all the time that our intentions are good. We have found very interesting approaches. We are cooperating with interesting people and they say well no it's not true. So this is an ongoing discussion in which the parameters are more or less open. In this German-Itsar case we could not make these discussions because we had said we will come up with one report. We didn't want to be influenced from the outside world. Just for the listeners who are perhaps not so much aware about the Indonesia project. Could you briefly explain what it is about and how perhaps it's comparable to Schurrensor or not? Yeah perhaps one one side step before that lessons learned from the Sabrina's project was we had an internal evaluation and I was basically the only one that we shouldn't do it. A thing like this next time. I was concerned about the political connotation in which we were working and that was that we were working for the government as a cover-up. We didn't do that and I could convincingly explain I think myself that it wasn't true but it was almost inescapable to escape such discussions and actually I think also that political class tried to afford it responsibility by commissioning us and I think we shouldn't do such a thing. Again Hans Blom was because we had come up with a report that was considered to be substantial and in many ways convincing he was kind of relieved and regaining his optimism about things. But I'd say we shouldn't do that and actually years later when there was this discussion about the Dutch involvement in the Iraqi war I made myself very strong that we would not get commission. So I'm not certain that it was my voice but actually the president of a different solution found by nominating the former president of the Supreme Court. It was more judicial approach to the story. Yeah well it was something between constitutional law, international law and history as a matter of fact. Under what conditions do you go to war? It's a very interesting topic and for us historians to work on and to comment on but not to solve a political problem for the sitting government and I think that the Indonesian project is different because the Krieger Research Institute that that have proposed this project have done so from their own point of view and said to the government you've got the responsibility to fund it because this is a problem where that society is struggling with. So we're not commissioned by them. We use them as a funder like the Dutch Research Council and we came up with a full-fledged proposal. This is what we want to do and of course there was discussions about in in in in in parliament about what was interesting what not and what should be stressed in the in the research project but basically we're free to do what we want and what we proposed and that's why also why the discussion is very much about in with the critics is very much about the intentions. Yes, but expectations are very much connected to judgment about intentions. They do not expect that we will say something anti-colonial in a substantial way. Why not? I mean this is also a misinterpretation about what the study of history is. The study of history is working from open question, studying from the past from open questions but post your questions in such a way that it will create a sensible research project. And for for people involved because I'm just now thinking about it. So for instance the descendants of victims or people who are still living in Indonesia. Do you find it difficult to explain to them that this is in fact then an academic exercise which is funded also through for an academic scheme rather than it is another foreign research because I think for a general audience that would be something they would not understand or not willing to understand or is it difficult to explain that? Well I think that no research program on which topic whatever is covering history as a whole. That may sound disappointing for non-professionals and in particular for involved people but I think it's important to point at the limits of what we can do and what we will do and I think that for the Indonesian program I consider that to be kind of an act of social hygiene in that respect that we have a if you're talking about politics of memory we have a very strong national story about what the second world world world world was a struggle between good and evil and the right side one and we were on the right side by our own merit. So that is a very clear set story and that's a point of departure of also discussing the darker sides of collective behavior. For the decolonization as a whole we don't have such a story. How come? Because there's so many conflicting interests in the first place and in second place the Dutch have always had difficulty in integrating empire with a nation I mean as long as empire was enhancing the glory of the nation it's all right but the problems of empire are not national problems that's a problem of people overseas and we've got troops or the best negotiators and administrators who take care of business and I think that that that's a universal problem of Western global expansion that the benefits of colonialism are celebrated and the black side of colonialism are more or less pushed away and geographical yes let's stay in the distance. Another question we've got is at the moment you're involved in a project called Ten Years of War and this is dealing with the continuity of war into Dutch history from the German occupation to the Indonesian War of decolonization so the second world war ended in the Netherlands in 1945 but you say this didn't mean that the mobilization of society stopped and another question you can choose which one you will answer first is why do you think it's important to see this period as a period of ten years and not five years? Well the last question is very simple it's a continued mobilization and to answer the first question the strange thing about that society is that under German or even Japanese occupation the Dutch more or less massively and lived through a period of war and social upheaval and mass violence and even genocide and then when the world comes to rest in 1945 and try to and and trying to get get back to normal then that start a full flage war they mobilized troops on a scale unprecedented and sent them overseas on a scale unprecedented and leaving a huge home front that take an active that's taking an active interest in what the troops overseas are living through and it's economically speaking and enormous and therefore that very much hamper and dangers national recovery so this internal phenomenon of continued mobilization for living through war and making war is a phenomenon in itself and of course externally speaking the second world war is changing the international order in such a way that return to colonialism is impossible but how to understand that that that political class and the population as a whole and a majority really took some time to understand that relations have changed and some of them never did so coming to terms with changing international relations and defining the position of your state and society in the international perspective is quite a difficult thing it took at least three years before those are responsible positions considered that they should really work towards a reorientation so internally mobilization for continued military effort and well accepting suffering read the newspapers of the day there are always full of lists of of that you have been killed and actually six thousand that showed you are killed most half of them by by fighting but they were all in the newspapers and they had names and and places where they were living so this was really a national effort that that cost money you never read really complaints about a high degree of victims I mean this is not a thing that is easy to understand on the present day conditions but people really thought that it was worth the price to fight this colonial war worth the price in terms of their own victims but also worth the price in in terms of amount of victims on the other side worth the price of losing moral authority and I think that this phenomenon also has to do with the experience the preceding experience of the second world war violence the continuity of violence of course but also the idea that an evil enemy could only be beaten by means of hard violence not by negotiation so mentally speaking the continuity is there as well and well there's also this this other continuity in personal lives it's my father's experience of being drafted for compulsory labor in in Germany in early 1944 he was one of the couple of hundred thousand who went into hiding and didn't go to Germany others went but this is his age class and then one or two years after the liberation being drafted for a national service in Indonesia and staying there for three or four or five years so and the home front had the same experience you see homefront organization like social care or logistical for workers in Germany turning to supporting organization for soldiers in Indonesia during your career you also published under persecution of Jews the struggle for legitimacy in fascist and Nazi Europe and that history and in summary for the second world war which we already talked about and now of course the Indonesian independence and probably a lot more which of all the things you did learned you most valuable things well it's always the new things that you're doing that give much the most energy and of course while you you're sketching a kind of repertoire there's so many connections but also so many connection to new things that I'm doing that I think that sometimes it feels a little bit like a low to have done so many things and if every now and then being asked to return to it but on the other hand what I still like to do is make connections between what I'm doing now when I did in the past not to to be on the easy side I think that's it. That's what I find the most difficult thing I've ever did was to write this chapter on the war in the history of the Jews in the Netherlands. Because it is such a complicated issue. It's of a high, it poses questions of how to recognize evil in a society that's also the subject of my inaugural at Amsterdam University, the evil administration. And my point is that it was so difficult for contemporaries to interpret a situation that came in when there was an administration that was set to commit evil. Nothing, this is a universal problem. People stick to trusted circumstances, to trusted relationships. Actually, to have a normal society working, you have to trust people and institutions. And this falling back of normalcy and being replaced by evil is something that people have difficulties to see. They cannot see it, they're not to see it, they refuse to see it. And that's actually what happens in the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands during the Second World War. People were in a majority not equipped to recognize the evil that would overcome them very rapidly. Think about it. The first large-scale anti-Jewish measures were already taken in October 1940, when the Jewish Civil Service registered. It is not just two years later when the first deportation trade took out to the point in July 1942. So within 20 months, a whole system of persecution leading to ultimate death of a huge mass of people was in place. What did you do not just two years ago? I mean it's now September 1919. So what did you do in December? How was your Christmas in 1917? And how fast is it come? Would you have been able to understand it all, to find strategies, to think about strategies, to take measures to save yourself or the people around you? It's impossible to think of, but that's exactly what's that. How to discover evil? And when it's around you. The question is actually how do people learn to dehumanitize other people and accept that dehumanitizing consequences like deportation? Yeah, well it's not just a matter of. You're talking now about the social environment. And I think it's not just a matter of accepting. It's more a matter that is. Well, there's a broad spectrum between accepting what some people do, accepting even out of convictions, if they're racist. And that's one side of the spectrum and observing is somewhere in the midst seeing what happens. And oh yes, I can't do anything. It's a bad perhaps. And on the other hand, trying to be empathic, but not effective. I mean, there's stories about people who help their Jewish neighbors back. There are backpacks on way to Westubork. There's even stories of people who bring clean laundry of food to Westubork on their bicycle. I mean, this is very empathic, but does it save you? No. Yeah. So, there's a whole range of reactions that are not part of the persecution, but belong to the social environment of the persecution that do not make a difference. But, well, if a bit of humanitarianism, I mean some police told themselves, well, I better take the people to the bus to Westubork or to train to Westubork because if the Nazis do it, they will kick them. Yeah. And I won't kick them. I will even help them. I will be something like a consolation. Yeah. With this in mind, do you sometimes worry about today's society as well? Oh, yes, always. I mean, I have not personally experienced much violence or repression or whatever, but I was reading this obituary of Georgi Conrad, who died a couple of days before the go. And he said, well, in my life, I've always learned to think about violence that's imminent on my doorstep. And I think that is a matter of society, of global society as a whole, and we are living in kind of a privileged little corner of the world. But when it comes to us, we will be prepared. And that that concerns me. If we start to wind up this rewind episode, Peter, sometimes I bump into you in a bookstore. Yep. What have you bought recently? What have you read recently? What would you recommend others to read? You're a fervent reader, we know that. Yeah, we're all. Well, funny, I bought Mary Fulbrook's brick of a book on coming to terms, in legal terms with the Nazi past. And I told one of my colleagues that if this was the last book, I would buy this year, I would be happy. Because I think it's a fascinating book, but on the other hand, I would also say, with novels. Why? Well, I've been reading pretty much a lot of book by Janet Winterson, for instance, who has a very interesting streak of connecting personal stories with thinking about life, about identities, experimenting in two way or magic. Well, magic, magical things. And well, it helps you to. And her style is great. I think that one of the big things about reading for historians is thinking about style. There's been a time that when I was writing an article, I would read pieces by Hemingway because of his concise arguing. I'm not a big fan of Hemingway, I don't know if it's a styleist, yes. It's so those others. So, yes. Is that the Shwaiju? Yes, very, very much. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to have you. Yes. My pleasure. It's self- investigation. [Music]