Military Rulers and Jihadist Rebels in the Sahel

[Music] Hi, this is Hold Your Fire, a podcast by the International Crisis Group, I'm Richard Atwood. Today, we're going to talk about the military authorities in Mali, Pekina Faso and Niger, and their seemingly unending war against Islamist militants. Where's the se-hel headed? [Music] [Speaking French] Africa is a continent that has suffered and continues to suffer due to imperialists. These imperialists have bought one cliché in their head. Africa is an empire of slaves. That's how they view Africa. For them, Africans belong to them. Our land belongs to them. They've never been able to change their ways. [Speaking French] That was Captain Traury, a military leader who now holds power in Pekina Faso. Traury has become something of a folk hero across parts of Africa, standing up to what he calls Western imperialism. Pekina Faso, under his rule, however, is falling apart. The military authorities in the three countries in the se-hel, Mali, Pekina and Niger, came to power in a wave of coups between 2021 and 2023. They all have their differences, but they're united in assertive sovereignty. They've split from the West African regional bloc, ECOWAS, formed their own alliance, and forged closer ties with Russia. But they face increasing problems, particularly a persistent Islamist rebellion across much of the se-hel's countryside. The largest militant group is the Al-Qaeda link, Janim. This past year, it's come close to overrunning cities in northern Pekina. So, as military authorities show little sign of handing over power, let alone fixing the region's problems, what does the future hold for the se-hel? We'll do this show in two parts. A bit later, we'll talk to Genovese Jessicale, crisis group se-hel director. The first, though, I'm thrilled to welcome back onto the show Comfort Hero, who needs no introduction, listeners will know Comfort is crisis group's president and CEO. And she's just come back from Mali, where she met some of the country's leaders. Comfort, welcome back home. Thank you very much for having me. So, maybe then, Comfort, let's start. It's been, what, some years since you were last in Bamako. Obviously, it's a very different world and a very different, very different region. What were your main takeaways, the main reflections from your visit? Yeah, I mean, in a sense, the se-hel that I visited now is a microcosm of the changes that we're seeing globally, the geopolitical turbulence playing out in the region. It's a region that is certainly radically different from the region that I worked on when I first came to crisis group as West Africa director back in 2001, where the Centre of Gravity, the core actors, the driver of regional thinking, regional action, defining the architecture was very much Nigeria and ECOWAS, the economic community of West African states, very much at their engine room. And now, we've got two regions in one. Today, we've got the Sahelian countries who have now crafted for themselves their own regional architecture. And today, much of the narrative of the Sahel talks about a tussle between the Sahel and the West, but there is a tussle also between the Sahel and the region. So it's brothers, neighbouring countries, who are at a standoff between one another in terms of the vision of the region as well. That for me is significant and that's really the change, the global change, but what it means in the region as well. And the other point I think is worth reflecting on, Richard, you know, we've been talking in the last few years about rising middle powers. Well, there are rising powers in West Africa versus the regional power, which is Nigeria. So Nigeria is not able to have its say. Neither is Ghana, for example, have its say. There are other actors who are wanting to have their say, and that's the outcome of this ongoing split between the Sahel and the coastal West Africa countries. And maybe also Senegal now playing a sort of role that tries to straddle in some ways both the ECOWAS countries and the Sahel. Exactly. In fact, you mentioned that I just came from Bamako. Before I got to Bamako, I came to Senegal because, you know, Senegal itself, you know, if you're looking for poster child that defines the change in the evolution of West Africa and its peace and security and where the centre of gravity, Senegal is certainly a country that you shouldn't ignore. The Sahel Mali specifically, it's on its border. It has reasons to be concerned because the spillover of insecurity, the jahedi threats, there have been news coming in before I arrived of attacks close to the border between Mali and Senegal. You'll recall at the height of the decision by the Sahelian countries to begin the process of divorcing from ECOWAS. And ECOWAS, you know, turned to Senegal as an anchor country, as the country that could potentially talk to the leaders and cajole them back into the region. I think that's a recognition of the shifting geopolitical landscape in the region in terms of who's best place to talk to the Sahel countries. And I guess it's easy from a distance to tell the story as one of not just the splits that you talked about between the ECOWAS countries, the coastal countries and the Sahel, but also as a story of dwindling Western influence, particularly French influence and growing in the Sahel Russian influence. And I know that we often push back on that framing as too simplistic. But what are your impressions having just visited? Well, I mean, look, regardless of the Russia dimension, there was already a tense relationship with France right from the beginning when France came in to sort of stop the corridor that you had us coming down from the north of the country. It was the French military operation Barcan. I think it was that basically stepped in in 2013 to stop militants marching south and to oust them from the towns and cities in northern Mali that they'd captured. Yes, that's right. There's always been an awkward relationship between West Africa vis-à-vis France. There's the francophone-anglophone divide. There are some countries in the region that see a range of countries as a stooge to France. Mali was always skeptical about the French intervention. And I think we had reached a peak under President Ibiqa's sort of last few years in power where both France and Mali, plus Bikina and Niger, were going in opposite directions. And there was a sense in which France had a different vision for Mali and the region. And it was hard to ignore, Richard, that there was a limit to the security first approach. You need to find a way in which to deal with the politics of the crisis. And there were also internal tussles that were taking place in Mali. And you found in the end this tsunami, crescendo of clashing ideas that led to the coup, the exit of France, and now a more robust Sahelian countries that are very clear about shaping their future. This would have happened regardless of Russia. And Russia is seasoned on an opportunity, and they're not the drivers of this. They may have put further wedge between the three countries and France, but this would have happened regardless of whatever the Russian ambition was. By the way, Richard, this coincided with Russia also seeking allies at a time that it was facing increased sanctions at home because of its invasion of Ukraine. So there is a logic for Russia to look for allies as well in this story. And obviously, as you say, things weren't great before the coups, and that's always important context. But they're also not great now, right? There are lots of problems in Mali, problems with the economy, problems with insecurity, problems with opportunities for young people. You met Mali and leaders. How open are they about some of those problems, and how do they frame them? Yeah, I mean, look, this is a good question. I have several meetings with national authorities, and it's been very clear that the three countries needed to take ownership of their own sort of security. As you know very well, Richard, we took it in saying the region needed to work out a very clear agenda of what stability looks like. So although we recognise the role of various international actors, the region had to own the process too. And we've made a clear case for the Sovereign Tist agenda that Malians are projecting now in Bikina and Nishe at the same time. The Malians, the authorities will also be very quick to tell you. We want to go back to being seen as one among equals, as being part of the community of the states, and that it was important that our partners treat us as a sovereign nation. I think the big question going forward, and certainly the big takeaway from the conversation that I had, is that what does sovereignty mean in practical terms? And how does it address the basic livelihood situation in the country? One of the key messages that we heard was about the need for quality education. There was a lot of concern about the lack of electricity that made it very difficult to start thinking about the private sector, who have seen people leave the country. They are now questioning whether there's real opportunity for growth and for jobs. The government recognises that its biggest challenge is security. We've seen increased attacks taking place in Mali. But there's a vibrancy also with Mali that it is able to shape its destiny, whether it can do it on its own terms, because there are realities that you can't divorce yourself from. There's an economic crunch. There's a real sort of threat around security. There is a real issue around governance, and there is a real issue about meeting the needs and the demands of the population. Those are facts that you can't get away from. And these are the priorities that the government needs to address, even though it continues to headbutt with a number of international actors going forward as well. And did you leave with the sense that things are more likely to get worse than better? I mean, are there signs of hope, or is further instability? Islamists or jihadists further destabilising cities, the authorities losing support because of the economic problems you talked about, cracking down further, is that likely? Look, I think all those three things are playing out, and it's a government that's under pressure. It's a government that has to show that it's able to respond to the insecurity in the country, that it could do what France couldn't do, what the regional organisation couldn't do, what the G5 Sahel couldn't do, what the UN could do. So it really needs to show that it can alter the security dilemma. As I said to you, there's been a spate of attacks in the country, close to neighbouring countries as well. And right now to date, I think there are real dilemmas as to how an army itself that is weaker, that doesn't necessarily have the capacity to take on the fight against the jihadists. This is not to say also that the jihadists are about to make a run on Bamako, but the most recent attack, Richard, was just 60 kilometres away from Bamako as well, which is quite significant. On top of that, I said it's the economic difficulties that the country is facing. And then the last point that you made, Richard, we were there in a context where the government itself has neutralised, has basically silenced the political class, and has said that the opposition has closed down the political space as well. So what is your ambition? What track of an electoral process is there willingness to begin to engage political opposition? And what about the young people themselves, who on the back of the coup supported you? And yet there are question marks as to whether the government is capable of addressing those issues around reconciliation, economic growth, employment, education. These are real facts. You can see it in Bamako as you go around the city. There are vibrant sectors wanting to boom, but they see a country that is hobbled by a regime that has a multitude of crises that it has to confront at the moment. Comfort, thanks for coming on. Thank you. So for this last segment, I spoke to Jean-Ave Jessica, who is Christchurch group's Sahel director. And I started by asking Jean-Ave how he would compare things now in the Sahel to how they were some years ago before the wave of coups. Well, you know, Richard, what struck me the most when military to power is the level of support that they enjoy among the population and the hope they have inspired, especially among the youth. By contrast, the silent population of little hope in the former city and leaders expected very little from the state. By then, of course, there were a lot of exceptions to that. But overall, I would say that a significant part of the population, especially the urban population, had hoped that the state under the military could do something, could make a difference. But today, after years in power, the situation is not moving in the right direction and the population appear increasingly disoriented. Hope is waning. Overall, the security situation has not improved quite the other way. Violence against civilians is still on the rise. Sahelian economies are struggling. And the state financial capacity has been reduced by the tension with Western donors and so with the rest of the region. So as I sometimes say, the sovereignty that the military regime promotes has restored pride. It has restored hope in the state. It has mobilized the population. But you cannot eat sovereignty. You cannot drink sovereignty. And sovereignty does not give you electricity. It does not give you any job. And so the sovereignty rhetoric that you're talking about adopted by the three authorities, sovereignty, I think they call it. But what aspects of sovereignty do they emphasize? Is it really just about the end of French influence, French military operations? There are, of course, still Russian forces there, which we'll come to. So what are they talking about when they're talking about sovereignty? Well, it's a very simple, but I would say a very powerful notion. The meaning is simple. It's the idea that the power to decide belongs to the people of the Sahel and not to any foreign interest. Many people in the Sahel believe that the former civilian leaders betrayed sovereignty and that they let foreigners, especially France, do whatever they wished, including stealing resources. So this is a very basic idea that has possibly some history ground, to be honest, but that also largely distorts the reality. But it's an idea that is very appealing to the population. At Crisis Group, we have suggested to look at this sovereignty narrative as a political tool with two faces, kind of a positive side that allows to mobilize a population that gives back hope to the population, especially to the youth that has lost any hope in its own future. But it has also a dark side that allows a small group of military leaders to brutally confiscate power. And what is at stake is the balance between the positive side and the dark side of sovereignty in the Sahel. And I'm afraid that in the last few months, the dark side of it is prevailing. Jean-Ave, the three authorities in Mali, Burkina and Niger, it's easy, of course, to see them as part of the same trend. But there's some important differences among the way they're wielding power. Now, even if they all justify their hold on power with this sovereign East territory. What is striking is the similarities between the three, also the centrality of this notion in the discourse of the new military elite. It's really at the core of what they want to do, the way they try to legitimate themselves out of any kind of electoral process. I would say that the Mayan regime is the most stable of the three. We have five young generals sharing power. I think that in the first years, they really try to maintain some balance between capturing power and allowing some space for a national political debate. They even organize a referendum adopting a new constitution. Unfortunately, the latest evolutions are not good. Political parties have recently been banned. In Burkina Faso, we have one leader, a young and rather despotic figure. Captain Traure was engaged in very worrying trends toward violence. We should call it a dictator. Opposition is actively repressed much more systematically than in Mali. What is astonishing is the level of popularity of Captain Traure. I would say not so much inside, although he has supporters inside Burkina Faso, but also outside of Burkina Faso, in Africa. Even in Anglophone Africa, you have people looking at Captain Traure as an African hero. He's seen as the one who has pushed the Western interest out of Burkina, who is building the nation, but in reality, the country is on the verge of chaos and collapse. And his popularity owes then to good communication or what explains it? I'm not sure that this is another main reason that they better manage their popularity. I think that there is kind of a void for this kind of an African hero fighting the foreigners and especially fighting the Western foreigners and leading the nation as a powerful and young leaders. And I think that Captain Traure, who is young, who looks good, who looks muscular, I think that he fits the expectation from the Burkina Bay themselves. I'm sure that of course they control their communication. But even without that, his popularity has developed by itself, especially on social networks. You have millions of views, literally millions of views on fake video of Captain Traure building roads, fighting French spies. They are viewed in Nigeria, they are viewed in Kenya, they are viewed in the US or so among the African diaspora. And it is really astonishing because the country is really on the verge of chaos and collapse. And at the same time, you have this description of Captain Traure as the new hero of the modern times. And we'll come in a moment to Niger, but it's not completely clear that Traure has consolidated his hold on power within the military, right? There's often talk of another coup or him being overthrown from within the military, within his own ranks. Yes, I mean, and regularly Captain Traure appears on TV saying that he has identified a new coup attempt and that they are going to arrest opponents that for an interest in the region and outside the continent are plotting against him, so the situation appears extremely unstable. He controls the capital, is well defended by his closest associates, but in the countryside is losing control, not only over the territory, I would say, but also of the army itself. And very hard to anticipate what will come out of this situation, the possibility of a coup or some military uprising in the countryside appear as a stronger possibility. So if in Burkina, Captain Traure's grip, as you say, seems precarious for all his popularity, in Mali, maybe the authorities more stable, but also increasingly repressive, facing lots of problems, how is it then in Niger? So first, the situation is Niger on a security level, he appears a bit less worrying, although it's just relative compared to Burkina Faso and Mali. But overall, I would say that Niger is a weird version of the sovereignty turn. Unlike Mali and Burkina, power has been confiscated by aging generals who were already there in the previous regime or were already benefiting from the previous regime. It is very likely that actually they had anticipated a possible coup from the younger generation and they decided to move first to capture, you know, in a way, the potential of the sovereignty narrative for themselves. So we have three different regimes, but at the same time, they share the same appetite for the sovereignty narrative. And also together, they have formed a new alliance, a new confederation, the Alliance des Etats du Sahel in French, and using the science to fight all their opponents, being the jihadists or the so-called neo-colonialist powers. And in Niger, what sort of supports they enjoy, given that they're more part of the old guard than new leaders? It's hard to evaluate, to be honest, but surprisingly, I would say that also in Niger, you know, there is a good level of popularity for these military rulers. However, they were already present, you know, and benefiting from the previous regime. I think it tells something about the influence of this sovereignty narrative that comes at the moment of despair. And people are expecting something to be different. And this narrative is able to generate new hope for how many years we don't know. And I guess notwithstanding the differences, none of them show any sign of giving up power. Or if they do move to elections, it's only if they were confident that they could agree on a candidate and a military candidate prevail. The three regimes are currently engaged in a capture of power, increasingly in a brutal capture of power. They have banned political parties. They have given a mandate of at least five years to the president of the transition. So actually, these are not any more transition. These are new regimes trying to impose themselves using increasingly violent means to do so. But none of them is fully stabilized because they struggle to contain jihadist insurgencies. And none of them have managed so far. So let's talk then about the jihadists, the militant groups and the war across much of the Sahel. And we'll talk mostly about the Jinnim, this big al-Qaeda linked group. Although maybe we should also talk about what it means to be linked to al-Qaeda today, given some of the changes in the global movement, whether it even really exists anymore. There's also this Islamic State branch, but the jinnim is really what the big insurgent group. How active is the fighting now? Or is it more that jinnim controls the countryside and the various armies, the cities in the areas that are most affected? Fighting is still active. The jihadists are still making progress. Although we cannot say that this is for a steamroller crushing any opposition. The jihadists are very strong in rural areas, but they still struggle or they are unwilling to control cities. You know, I sometimes say that the war in the Sahel is a fight between two weaknesses. On the one hand, the jihadists are strong in rural areas, but so far they are unable to take the cities. On the other hand, the state can put pressure on the jihadists in the rural areas, but it cannot reclaim any territory lost to the jihadists. Although I would say that recently the jihadists have decided to push much more pressure on cities. And this could be a game changer, not because they control any city, but because by pushing the urban population out of the cities, they could create a situation that becomes impossible to control for the military regime. The scenario of the jihadists taking over one of the silent countries, controlling a capital at some point that seemed impossible a few years ago, appears now as one of the possibilities for the years to come. Although, I would not say that this is the most likely scenario either. And what do you mean by pressuring cities? What does that actually entail? They're a tax city. They took it for a few hours and then they leave. They don't really try to control it for more than a few hours at most one or two days. So that's really about kicking the security forces away, killing elements from the different forces, frightening the population. So one argument is that they are forcing the state to concentrate even more resources in the cities, to defend the cities so that they are free to control the rest of the countries, the rural areas. But there may be something more in that. And the jihadists have released audio messages in which they are warning the population. And this kind of message encouraged the population to move away. And so increasingly, people are being forced out of where they live, especially the countryside, but not increasingly from the secondary cities. And in Burkina Faso, you have literally millions of people who are either internally displaced or seeking refuge in neighboring countries. And this put a lot of pressure on the authority. In the capital, Ouagadougou, you have hundreds of thousands of people in the last few years who have left the countryside, left the secondary cities and tried to find refuge in Ouagadougou. So it could be that this is also a tool to put so much pressure on the authority that they reach the point of collapse. And really, you're talking here about the cities in the east and the north of Burkina and the north and the center of Mali. Exactly. It's mostly in Burkina Faso, the north and the eastern parts. But we are seeing also the same kind of strategy in Mali, maybe with less capacity to literally storm an entire city for a few hours. But still, we are seeing the pressure on the cities. And let's not forget that a few months ago, in September 2024, the jihadists were also able to strike Babako, the capital of Mali, striking even the international airport. So it tells you about the capacity of these groups to pressure the very center of these states. And Jonobé, how should we understand Jinim today? I mean, often on footage, it all looks a bit chaotic. Guys on motorbikes or vehicles with RPGs, not heavily armed in the way that maybe the M23, for example, these rebels backed by Rwanda in the east and Congo. But is it right to sort of understand all these different Jinim battalions, these different groups across the Sahel as a single insurgents, essentially directed by a Jinim leadership? I think that the group is possibly the most structured among the jihadist group, especially compared to the local Islamic State presence. It's also the one that has developed the most in recent years. Jinim now seems to be the dominant jihadist coalition, although the Islamic State still exists and maintains some presence on its eastern flank. That's mostly Niger. Mostly Niger and some part of northeastern Mali. Jinim has expanded a lot in recent years, but it's also facing challenges, one of them being to maintain coherence within its ranks. You know, the history of jihadist groups is a history of merger and splits. And so far, one of the biggest achievements for Jinim, since its creation in 2017, it's the fact that Jinim has avoided any major split. Why do you think they've managed to avoid splintering? Because, as you said, the history of militant groups before has been one of commanders breaking off, joining other groups, forming new alliances. How has the Jinim managed to remain so coherent? Well, this is one of the questions that we are currently exploring. But in a nutshell, I would say that they have managed to maintain a good balance between giving some form of autonomy to local commanders, and at the same time, maintaining some form of coherence and central command. You know, toward the end of the previous decade, there was a split, not a major split, but there was a split of combatants joining the Islamic State. They reacted really by using force against them, but they consumed a lot of energy in this fight. And I think that they understood that if they wanted to maintain some coherence, given that they are also extremely diverse, you know, in terms of geography, from Norsan-Mali to the border between Bokina Faso and Norsan-Bena, they are also very diverse in terms of ethnicity, for instance. Try elements, try combatants from Norsan-Mali to Bariba combatants from Norsan-Bena, or Morsi combatants from Bokina Faso, or Bamalankan-Bambara combatants from Mali. So they're trying to maintain this kind of coherence by giving autonomy to the local commanders, still trying to exercise some degree of control and making sure that the local commanders also follow rules, you know, the general rules that the leadership of the group wants to impose. Sometimes people are trying to understand how Iyad Aghrali, the leader of Genim, has maintained influence, and some contacts of us who engage frequently in conversation with rank and files. He told me that if we want to understand Iyad's influence over the group, we have to understand that he's not like a supreme commander giving order, and you know, there is a hierarchy below him following his order. He's more like somebody who is, you know, providing advice to his companion, helping the local commanders to run their own units. So maybe this is, you know, a way to romanticize, you know, the leadership of Iyad, but I think it also tells something of the capacity of Genim to maintain this balance between autonomy and central command. And I want to talk about Iyad Aghrali, the leader in a moment, but can we just talk first about the spread into coastal West Africa, we did a whole episode on this a while back, but how do you see this now, the encroachment of Genim in particular, into what Northern Benin, Northern Togo, into the North's coastal countries? Yeah, it has developed in the last few years, especially after 2021-2022. This expansion has generated some form of panic, especially in Benin, where attacks have literally multiplied in the last year. But I would argue that the core of the Giyadis' fight remains the Central Sahel. The coast appears as a secondary scene for their fight, which is where the Giyadis can find new recruits, where they can find safe even when they are pushed away by military in the Central Sahel. It's a place that they can use as logistic hubs, for instance, but that's not the core of the fight for them. And it's the reason why, you know, they can be active in some of these coastal countries. And in other countries, they tend to avoid any direct confrontation with the states because they want to maintain logistic flows, keep some safe even for combatants. The issue is that while the Giyadis' leadership is probably focused on the Central Sahel, the local commanders who have developed the capacity on the border between the Central Sahel and coastal West Africa, and for instance, between Southern Burkina Faso and Northern Iorico, or between South Eastern Burkina Faso and Northern Benin, these commanders, they also have their own agenda, their own interests. They enjoy some form of autonomy and sometimes really at a local level, the situation deteriorates and that they fight against the coastal states. And Ied Agali, the Junim leader, we talked about him a bit on previous shows some years ago. He's a former Tuareg separatist rebel. He had, in that role in the past, some years ago, even decades ago now, struck deals with the Malian state. But he's been fighting with militants for a long time now and leading this Al Qaeda Sahel branch for some years now, as you say. But Al Qaeda, as a global movement, obviously, Zohar Hew is dead. The new leader hasn't been formally announced, but it's presumed to be this guy, Saif al-Adal, who's supposedly in Iran. And it's not really clear what the global movement represents or consists of now. Plus, of course, in Syria, as we've talked about on the show before, President Ahmad Shahra, the new president, has himself broke with Al Qaeda some years ago, now sees power and has just met President Trump in the Gulf. So in some ways, of course, it's going to be hard for Agali, I think, to take the whole country in the way that HTS Hayat Takhar Al-Sham Shahra's movement did in Syria. But what do you think now Agali wants? And what conclusions, if he has, do you think he's drawn from Syria and from Shahra's break with Al Qaeda? That's a tough question. I think that, definitely, Jehanim is looking at what is going on in Syria and they are inspired by the recent development in Syria. But I think that there are also a lot of differences. And I would say some limitation on what Jehanim can do when compared to HTS in Syria. Yalla Agali, we don't really know where he is. You know, he's somewhere in northern Mali. It doesn't show up easily. He's still making some audio, he's still making some video. But most of the time, it's also other figures. Military leaders from Jehanim who are appearing on the official audio and video of the group. Yes, he has a long experience. But first, he appears aging and some people say that he's sick. So he doesn't seem to have the same kind of energy as other Jihadist leaders. And second, I don't think he's contested as a leader. But he's also a leader who is providing more advice than strict order. Also something that appears key to me, you know, as a difference between Syria and Mali, between HTS and Jehanim. I think that Jehanim have, you know, developed military capacity a lot. But they have developed very limited political capacity. By that, I mean that the capacity to engage in political dialogue with other, you know, interests is limited. The capacity to articulate a political vision of what could be a country under their rule is limited. Beyond, you know, very general statement that are more religious discourse than a political vision. And how should we understand now the relationship between Jehanim and some of the Tuareg separatist groups that the army has also been fighting that ousted from this northern city of Qidal about a year ago now? So there has been some talks between the Tuareg separatist groups and the Jihadists. They know each other, especially within the leadership of both groups. They belong to the same clans, sometimes even to the same families. So there have been discussions between the two groups. But, you know, we have not seen any concrete results. We have not seen any formal collaboration between the two groups. And it may be that it is very hard to conciliate on the one hand the separatist agenda and on the other the Jihadist project. So they talk to each other. They have common enemies being, you know, the state and the Russian partners. But so far, we have not seen that they have reached any formal agreement. Before the military takeovers over recent years, the governments in the Sahel, the civilian governments seem to be coming around after a long time in the face of French resistance to the idea of talking to militants, certainly to Janim and Agali. And in Mali, the idea was gaining traction in Burkina Faso. I think the government had even signed a ceasefire, or maybe the army had signed a ceasefire that lasted half a year or so between the military and Janim. Niger had often done deals with militants. So the region seemed to be coming around to this idea of dialogue, at least as a compliment to fighting. But since the coups, the authorities have really doubled down on military operations. Do you think there's any chance of that changing anytime soon, of them trying testing dialogue or engagement again? I think some of the Sahelian governments, some of this is wrong, have recently established relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan and deepen their ties to Iran. I mean, are those possible signs of engagement with militants, or is that just sort of about establishing relations with other states that are pariahs for much of the West? Well, as you said, you know, when they came to power, the three military regime, they have closed the door to dialogue at first, saying that it was betrayal, that the state should impose itself, that they could crush the Jihadist insurgency. I believe they increasingly realized that they cannot win the military league, that, you know, they are even on the back foot. At least some of them understand that. And so we are seeing some small signals that the regime are exploring the possibilities of dialogue. And yes, these meetings in Iran, between especially Niger and Taliban's envoy, could be a way to establish a dialogue with Jhanim, as Jhanim recognized the leadership of the Taliban. But so far, this is very limited. And the military regime often, you know, have a very limited understanding of dialogue as a way to talk with who's among the Jihadists who are ready to surrender. And that's pretty it. So, you know, we have very little hope in the short term. And it's unfortunate because I think that at the end of the previous decade, the three states have started to use dialogue as a tool, along with military means as a tool that you can use to at least try to engage part of the Jihadists, try to find compromises. And maybe in the near future, the three regime will develop some capacity to do the same. But to be sure, they have lost some opportunities in the last few years. And so going to the negotiation table will be even more complicated for the states. And I guess it's also quite hard to know. I mean, Jhanim, as you say, Jhanabe doesn't really articulate goals except sort of establishing Sharia, getting out all foreign forces. I guess they might get that. But his views on central power sharing, devolution, local control, what local Islam is rule would look like. That's all, as you say, quite uncertain. And even if the two sides could get to talking, sort of what would a compromise between Jihadists and military coup leaders actually entail? That's a very good point. It's not only that it's difficult to talk to a group like Jhanim who so far, you know, has a much stronger military component than a political wing. But it's also that nowhere in the world, we have a model of negotiation leading to compromises between a Jihadist group and a state. At least not the Dajna. Maybe then let's just end by talking about the foreign relations of the three countries. So the three countries in the Allianz have broken away from ECOWAS. But is there any sign that they may be able to repair relations, at least get freedom of movement, the freedom of trade, some of the other things going again? So the ECOWAS-LS issue has not made much noise recently. And this could be a good sign. I think that both sides understand that, you know, there is no way to avoid some form of separation. But I would say that in order to avoid a full divorce, the two sides have engaged, you know, in talks, to see how they could materialize the separation, possibly a temporary separation, to see how to preserve the essential being the freedom of trade, the freedom for circulation, and waiting for a better future. And we've seen recently, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mali, showing signs that they are open to re-engaging a conversation with the ECOWAS outside the noises and the drama of the separation between ECOWAS and the OS. And so you think that there's prospects for gradually, even without a return to civilian rule, for the Sahel to get better integrated again into the West Africa community? Not rejoining ECOWAS, but return to some form of relations? I would say that what they're looking for in the short term is peaceful coexistence. They're also looking to, you know, develop some form of cooperation on specific issues. It could be a saturing borders, for instance. I still believe that bilateral relations are more efficient than multilateral talks to, for instance, work on restoring some military cooperation at borders. But yes, overall, I think that they are looking for no more drama. And I feel that they hope for a better future. And it's still better than what we had a few months ago. And last year, we've had aggressive discourse. And at least, you know, in the last few months, the situation seemed to be a piecing behind the scene discussions on concrete issues. Freedom of trade, investment, border management, electricity, as you know, these countries share also some electricity projects together. So I would say that the situation is a piecing. And the Russians, I think last time you were on the show, you talked about different levels of Russian involvement in the three countries. So active fighting with what were Wagner forces now called the Russian Africa Corps in Mali, together with the army in Burkina Faso. Also some fighting, but also providing protection to Captain Traurey. And then Niger still sort of deciding which way it was going to go and how closely it was going to draw together with Russia. Has the Russian role evolved? Oh, overall, that's the same with all these differences that you mentioned. We had a few days ago, what at first appears as a major change, you know, meaning the Wagner group living Mali. But, you know, it appeared very quickly that the Africa Corps will take over the Wagner forces, that they will replace the Wagner forces. We don't know the details of the agreement between Mali and Russia on that. But it's more, you know, a change coming from Russia and the way Russia organizes its presence and its military cooperation with Mali than a change in Mali itself. So I don't see much difference. But especially in Mali, where the Russian military presence is the strongest, this is not working. And Africa Corps will not succeed more than Wagner, that in turn did not succeed more than the French Army. Predominantly military answer to the GAD insurgency is not working, being the French leading it or being the Russian organizing it. And it could be that the Russian in a few years could be in the same situation as the French. Let's remember that the French Army was welcomed in 2013 when they deployed. But a few years after that, when it became clear that they were not able to contain the insurgency and to solve the crisis, they were kicked out of the country. In the same way, the Russian has been welcomed. When they arrived, you know, when they deployed troops and when they developed collaboration with Mali at first. But after a few years, the situation has not changed. The security is still deteriorating. So they could face the same fate as the French. So last time you came on, we talked about sort of two directions things could go in the Sahel. And obviously, you know, there's differences among the countries as we talked about. But broadly speaking, either the alliance, the group of states could soften its position. So not hand over power to civilians, but still rebuild its ties to echo us in the ways you were talking about. Maybe rebuild its ties to Western capitals alongside their ties to the non-Western countries, maybe get some more Western investment and aid. Or they could tack the other way, which would probably mean toward greater isolation, worse in relations with other African countries in the West. Though that would mean sort of more difficult economic problems as Western aid and investment dries up, cut off from the sort of trade arrangements in West Africa. And those economic problems would lead probably to sort of greater repression, more resistance to the military authorities. Do you have any sense now on which way it's going or which way it's more likely to go? Yeah, I'm afraid that the latest developments indicate a worrying path. Internally, they are increasingly repressing political opposition, again banning political parties, confiscating power. Maybe externally, maybe we've seen among some of them, you know, maybe some kind of opening, but it's still very, very timid. And overall, the latest evolution are not good, to say the least. We at ICG, at first, we really tried to take this sovereignty narrative seriously. We took also seriously the idea that there was an attempt and a possibility to reform the country, to change the way these states were dealing with the insurgencies. But after a few months, we're seeing the window of opportunities for positive change, increasingly shrinking. And it's not fully lost. We're still seeing small signs that among the new leaders, there is some awareness that they may go in the wrong direction, and that they need some kind of course correction of this sovereignty turn. But to be honest, overall, the latest developments are not going in the right direction. Jornave, thanks for coming on again. Thank you. Hold Your Fire is a production of the International Crisis Group. I wish it outward thanks to our producers, Kim and Murphy, Martin, Dixon, Murphy, Heiko Schaub. Thanks, of course, to all of our listeners. If you have any questions or suggestions about the podcast, please do get in touch, [email protected] or [email protected]. If you like the show, as ever, leave us a nice five-star rating wherever you get your podcasts. And I very much hope that you'll join us again next week. [Music]