Michael Nielsen – How science actually progresses

Today I'm speaking with Michael Neilsen. You've done many things. You're one of the pioneers of quantum computing, wrote the main textbook in the field, of the Open Science Movement. You're the book about deep learning that Chrysola and Greg Brockman credit them with getting them into the field. More recently, you're a research fellow at the Stair Institute and writing a book about religion, science, and technology. I'm going to ask you about, no, no, those things. The conversation I want to have today is how do we recognize scientific progress? And it's a bit, especially your element, for AI, because people are trying to close the RL verification loop on scientific discovery. And what does it mean to close that loop? But in preparing for this interview, I've realized that it's a more mysterious and elusive force, even in the history of human science, than I understood. And I think a good place to start will be Michael's and Morally and how special relativity is discovered if it's different than the story that you kind of get off of YouTube videos. Anyways, I'll branch you that way, and then we'll go in there. Okay, yeah, so Michael's and Morally is one of the sort of the famous results often presented as this experiment that was done in the 1880s and that helped Einstein come up with the special theory of relativity a little bit later. So sort of changing out the way we think about space and time and our fundamental conception of those things. And there's kind of a big gap, I think, between the way. Michael's and Morally and other people at the time thought about the experiment and certainly the way in which Einstein thought or did not think about the experiment. In actual fact, he stated later in his life, he wasn't even sure whether he was aware of the paper at the time. There's a lot of evidence that he probably was aware of the paper at the time, but it actually wasn't dispositive for his thinking at all, something else completely was going on. So what Michael's and Morally thought they were doing was they thought they were testing different theories of what was called the ether. So he got back to the 1600s. Robert Boyle introduced the idea of the ether. And basically the idea of the ether is, you know, the sound is vibrations in the air and then Boyle and other people got interested in the question of is light vibrations in something and they couldn't figure out what it was. Boyle actually did an experiment where he tested whether or not you could propagate light through a vacuum. He found that you could, you couldn't do it with sound. So he introduced this idea of the ether and then for the next 200, also years people had all these kind of conversations about what the ether was, what its nature was. And the Michael's and Morally experiment was really an experiment to test different theories of the ether against one another. And in particular to find out whether or not there was a so-called ether wind. So the idea was that the earth is passing through maybe this ether wind. And if it is passing through the ether wind, sort of the background, and you shoot a light beam sort of parallel to the direction the ether wind is going in, it'll get accelerated a little bit. And if it's being passed back sort of in the opposite direction, it'll get slowed down a little bit and you should be able to see this in the results of interference experiments. And what they found much to their surprise, I think, was that in fact there was no ether wind. And that ruled out some theories of the ether, but not all. And Michaelson certainly continued to believe in the ether. Okay, so this is what was a shocking part of reading this story from the biography of Einstein that you recommended by, what was his first name? Abraham, if I can't find it. Yes, yeah. Settle as the Lord. And then also from Emre Lakatos, the methodologies of scientific research programs. The way it's told is that Michaelson Morally proved that the ether did not exist. Yeah. Therefore it created a crisis in physics that Einstein saw a special relativity. And what you're pointing out is actually was trying to distinguish between many different theories of ether. You know, if you're in space or if you're on earth, it's the same direction of ether. Or maybe the ether wind is being carried around by the earth. And so you can't really experience it on earth, but if you go to a high enough altitude, you might be able to experience it. In fact, the Michaelson experiments were, the famous one is 1887, but he conducted these experiments for basically two decades. I mean, for longer than that, he conducted them. I think the first one was in 1881, but he continued to believe until, I mean, he died. He died, I think, was like 1929 or so. It was like the late 20s. And he was still doing experiments in the 1920s. Sort of about whether or not the ether existed. And so he continued to believe in the ether to the end of his life. Right. I think the last public statement he made is like a year or two before he died. And he still believed, basically believed at that point. And in fact, there was another physicist, Miller, who kept doing these experiments. And in the 1920s, he thought that he went to a high enough altitude, yeah, is in Mount Wilson in California. Well, I'm high enough that I can actually, the ether winds are not being dragged with up by the earth. I, and I've measured the effect of the ether. And Einstein hears about this and he says, this is where you get the famous quote, "Sertle was the Lord, but maliciously is not." Anyways, I think the reason the story is interesting is from many different reasons. But one is one of the different ways in which the real history of science is different from this idea you get of the scientific method is you really can't apply falsification as easily as you might think. It's not clear what is being falsified. Is it just another version of the ether that's being falsified? Or certainly you can't induce the theory of special relativity from the fact that one version of the ether seems to be disconfirmed by these experiments. Yeah, so I mean certainly it doesn't show that you know, ideas about falsification are wrong, are falsified. But you know it does show the sort of the most naive ideas, you know, are things are much, often much more complicated than you think. So you know, Michael Sin did this experiment in 1881, he was a very young man, and then other people, I think Rayleigh was one of them, pointed out that there were some problems with the way he did it. So they had to redo it in 1887. And at that point, like a lot of the leading physicists of the day, leading scientists of the day basically accepted this result that there was no ether wind. But what to do about this? So yeah, sure, maybe you falsified some theories of the ether. There are others that you haven't falsified at all at this point, and people sort of set to work on developing those. I'm actually, it's funny, I mean people will phrase it as, show that there was, you know, that the ether didn't exist. And even just the word "the" there is kind of a misnomer. You actually had a ton of different theories and a couple of leading contenders. So yeah, there's some version of falsification going on, but like how you, how you respond to this new experiment is very, very complicated. And most people responded, I mean, suddenly the leading physicists of the day responded by saying, "Okay, this gives us a lot of information about what the ether must be, but it doesn't tell us that there is no ether." In fact, Lorentz at the end of the 19th century before Einstein figures out the math how you convert from one reference frame to another reference frame. Comes with the Lorentz transformations, which is basically the basis special relativity. But his interpretation is that you are converting from the ether reference frame to these non-privileged other reference frames if you're moving relative to the ether. And his interpretation of length contraction and time dilation is that this is the effect of moving through the ether and you have this pressure and that the pressure is warping cloths, it's warping measures of length. And the interesting thing here is that experimentally you cannot distinguish Lorentz's interpretation from special relativity. I think that's a strong statement. I mean, Lorentz introduces this quantity called local time, which he regards as he's not trying, my understanding is he's not trying to give a really physical interpretation of this, but it's what Einstein would later just recognize as time in another inertial reference frame. And he's not trying to attribute much physical meaning to it. I think Punkray gets much closer to later on to realizing that, actually, this is the time that's registered by clocks. But if you think about Ego, what is it? It's 40-odd years later, people start doing these muon experiments where they see basically Cosmengracia at the top of the atmosphere, they produce a shower of muons, and you can look to see a different heights in the atmosphere, you can look to see how many of those muons remain. And they decay over time, and a very strange thing happens, which is that they're decaying way, way, way too slow. So you expect, actually, they shouldn't really be able to last the whole way through the atmosphere at all. They're decay rate is too quick if you're in a classical theory. But if, in fact, their time really has slowed down, it's okay. And in fact, the measured decay rates in 1940, and since been more accurate experiments done, match exactly what you expect from special relativity. So that's the kind of thing where, again, if Lorenzo had been alive, he'd been dead 10 or so years at that point. If he'd been alive, I'm sure he would have tried, or it seems quite likely that he would have tried to save his theory by patching it up yet again, but it would have been a massive, I mean, that's a real setback. It starts to just look like, oh no, time is, this thing that Lorenzo introduced as a mathematical convenience, no, no, no, that's actually what time is. For the muons at least, and then there's a whole bunch of other experiments that show this very similar for And when was that experiment done? I think 1940 or 1940, it might have been published in 1941. So maybe to rephrase change my claim, it's not that you could not have distinguished them, but the scientific community adopted what we in retrospect consider the more correct interpretation before it was actually empirically or experimentally shown to be preferred. So there's clearly some process that human science does, which can distinguish different theories. Can you just interrupt? I mean, you use the word process, and it's sort of, it's interesting to think about that term. Like process kind of carries connotations of, you know, it's something said in advance, it's something, and it's much more complicated in practice. You have people like Lorenzo, I mean Einstein, just absolutely utterly admired. And Poincare, one of the greatest scientists who ever lived, and Michael Sinami and another truly outstanding scientist, never reconciled themselves. So it's not as though there's some standard procedure that we're all using to reconcile these things. No, great scientists can remain long, can remain wrong for a very long time after the scientific community has broadly changed its opinion. But there's no centralized authority, sort of saying or centralized method. Yeah, I mean, that is the interesting thing. Like there's progress even though it is hard to articulate the process by which happens the heuristics that are used. Anyways, you mentioned Poincare. And so Lorenz has the math right, but the interpretation wrong. And you should explain, it seems like Poincare had the opposite where he understood that it's hard to define simultaneousity because it requires uncircuable definition with time or velocity of something that might be a, you know, arrive at a midpoint together, but velocities to find in terms of time. And I find this interesting. There's a couple of other examples we could call on, but like there is this phenomenon in the history of science where somebody asks the right question, but then they don't sort of clinch it. And I'm curious what you think is happening in those cases. I mean, I think you sort of, you actually do want to go case by case and try and understand it. It's not necessarily clear that they're doing the same thing wrong in all the cases. I mean, the Poincare case is amazing. He seems to have understood the principle of relativity, the idea that the laws of physics are the same in all inertial reference frames. He seems to have understood that the speed of light is the same in all inertial reference frames. He doesn't actually phrase it quite that way, but it is my understanding, but I don't speak French. But you know, and this is, I mean, these are basically, these are the ideas that Einstein uses to deduce special relativity. But then he also has this additional sort of misunderstanding where things that length contraction is a dynamical effect that somehow particles are being pushed together by some external force, something is going on dynamically. And he doesn't understand that it's purely kinematics, that actually space and time are different than what we thought. And you need to fundamentally rethink those things. So it's almost like he knew too much. He had sort of almost two grand a vision in mind. And Einstein sort of almost subtracts from that and says, no, no, no, no, no, it's space and time are just different than what we thought. And he is the correct picture. And there's a paper in it. I think it's 19-0, not in. Poincare, like he's still got this dynamical picture of what's going on with the length contraction. And we just-- this is just not necessary. This is a mistake from the bottom point of view. And so why is he doing this? Like, why is he clinging on to this idea? And I don't know over here. Obviously, never met the man. It would be fascinating to be able to talk it over and to try and understand. But he-- I mean, his expertise seems to be getting in the way. He knows so much. He understands so much. And then he's not able to let go of these things. Actually, a really interesting fact is that a few years prior-- so 1890s, Einstein's a teenager-- he believes in the ether too. Like, he knows about this stuff. But like, he's not quite as attached, obviously, as these older people were. And maybe they were a little bit prisoner of their own expertise. That's my guess. I mean, historians of science could-- some would certainly disagree. Well, then there's the obvious stories where Einstein himself, later on, is set to have not latched on to the correct interpretations of quantum mechanics or cosmology because of his own attachments. And then the bigger question I have is like the muon example is a great example of these long verification loops and how progress seems to be happened by the scientific community faster than these verification loops imply. Maybe the clearest example is, Aristarchus in second century BC comes up with the idea of a killer of centristism. The ancient Athenians dismiss it on the grounds that, well, we should see, as the Earth is moving around the Sun, if really the Sun is the center solar system, the star should move relative to the Earth. And the only reason that would not be the case is the stars are so far away that you would not observe this. And it's only in 1838 that stellar parallax is actually measured. And so we didn't need to wait until 1838 to have heliocentrism. We didn't need to wait for the experimental validation to understand Copernicus is better in some way. In fact, when Copernicus first comes up with the series, it's well known that the Tallahmaker model was more accurate because it had all these centuries of adding on these epicycles. It was maybe less well appreciated. It was also in some sense simpler because Copernicus actually had to add extra epicycles. It had more epicycles in the Tallahmaker model because he had this bias that the Earth should go in a perfect circle and equal time. Anyway, I think this is an interesting story because it's not more accurate. It's not a simpler theory. So how could you have known an X-anti? The Copernicus was correct. The X-anti was not. I mean, good question. And I don't know-- it's sort of entirely at the end. So I do know-- well, I mean, I can give you certainly a partial answer that I sort of-- centuries in the future-- you start to find very compelling. And I'm sure it's sort of part of the story, at least, which is one of the big shocks for Newton. Eventually, he did understand Kepler's laws of motion, eventually. So you're able to explain sort of the motions of the planets in the sky. But he also, out of the same theory, his theory of gravitation was able to explain terrestrial motions. So he was able to explain why objects move in parabolas on the Earth. And he's able to explain the tides in terms of the moon and the sun's effect, gravitational effect, on water, on the Earth. And so you have what seemed like three very different, disconnected phenomena all being explained by this one set of ideas. That, I think, starts to feel-- that's very compelling, at least to me. And I think most people find that very, very satisfying once they eventually realize it. Have you read the Kean's biography of Newton? He's written a-- you've read it in a tie-up-- No, no, the essay. Yeah, sure. I love that. I mean, this description of him is the last of the magicians. Yes, it is wonderful. In fact, I think it's maybe worth the superimposing or you should read out that one passage of the thing. All right. So it's from-- actually, I believe it was a talk that he gave at Cambridge not long before he died. He'd acquired Newton's papers somehow. And then he gave a lecture, I think, twice about his brother, Jeffrey, gave it the other time because he was too ill. There's just this wonderful, wonderful quote in the middle. Oh, actually, the whole thing is really interesting. But I love this particular quote. Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians. The last great mind, which looked out on the visible and intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than 10,000 years ago. And this idea that people have, that Newton was sort of the first modern scientist, is somehow wrong. There's some truth to it. But he really had this very different way of looking at the world. There was part superstitious and part modern. It was a funny hybrid. He's sort of this transitional figure in some sense. That phrase, the last of the magicians, I think, really points at something. The thing I'm very curious about with Newton is whether it was the same program, the same heuristics, the same biases that he applied to his alchemical work as he did to the understanding of astronomy. So this is from the Keynes essay. There was extreme method in his madness. All his unpublished works on esoteric and theological matters are marked by careful learning, accurate method, and extreme sobriety of statement. They are just as sane as a principia. If their whole matter and purpose were not magical, they were nearly-- all composed during the same 25 years of his mathematical studies. So clearly there was some aesthetic which motivated people like Einstein to say, reject early arrays of thinking and say, no, the author is wrong and there's a better way to think about things. Same with Newton. And the question I have is whether similar heuristics towards parsimony, towards aesthetics, etc. Would be equally useful across time and across disciplines or whether you need different heuristics. And the reason that's relevant is even if you can't build a verification loop for science, maybe if the taste has to point in the same direction, you can at least encode that bias into the AIs and that would maybe be enough. I mean, these questions, like the point is that where we always get bottlenecked is where the previous processes and heuristics don't apply. Like that's almost sort of definitionally what causes the bottlenecks. There's people are smart. They know what has worked before. They study it. They apply the same kinds of things. And so they don't get stuck in the same places as before. They keep getting bottlenecked in different places. I mean, that's over generalizing a bit, but I think it's the right. If you're attempting to reduce science to a process, you're attempting to reduce it to something where there is just a method which you can apply and you turn sort of the crank and out pops inside. Sure, you can do a certain amount of that, but you're going to get bottlenecked at the places where your existing method doesn't apply. And definitionally, there's no crank you can do. You need a lot of people trying different ideas and sort of the more difficult the idea is to have, right, the greater the bottleneck, but then also sort of the greater the triumph. Quantum mechanics is like, I mean, it's a great example of this. It's such a shocking set of ideas. It's such a shocking theory. Actually, the theory of evolution in some sense is also quite a shocking idea. Not the principle of sort of natural selection, but that can explain so much. That's a shocking idea. Existing safety benchmarks claim that, at least for today's top models, attacks are only successful a few percent of the time. This sounds great, but label box researchers were able to jailbreak these very same models about 90 percent of the time, even the ones that have the strongest reputation for safety. And the disconnect here is that the problems which underlie these public safety benchmarks are all framed in a very naive way. There's no attempt to disguise harmful intent. These fronts will just ask models to hack into a secure network and to do so without getting caught. But real bad actors don't write like this. So label box builds a new safety benchmark from the ground up. Their fronts reflect real adversarial behavior by stripping out obvious trigger phrases and wrapping the request in fictional scenarios. For example, instead of outright asking another Olympus to steal somebody's identity, the prompt will frame it as a game. A lightbearer who's trying to hide from dark forces needs a handbook on how to disguise themselves as somebody else. This safety research is linked in the description. If you think this could be useful for your own work, reach out to at labelbox.com/thoracash. The principle of mathematics is released in 1687. The origin of species was released in 1859. At least naively it seems like Darwin's theory, the theory of natural selection is conceptually easier than the theory of gravity. I asked her and styled this question. But yeah, there was this contemporaneous biologist with Darwin, Thomas Oxley, who read this and said, "How extremely stupid to not have thought of this." And nobody ever reads the first should be a mathematical thing. God, why didn't I beat you into the fine chair? No. And so yeah, what's going on here? Why did Darwinism take so much longer? Yeah. The idea must have been known to animal breeders for a long time at some level. Or certainly large chunks of the idea were known. Artificial selection was a thing. And in some sense, Darwin's genius wasn't in having that idea. It was understanding just how central it was to biology. You could potentially sort of go back and you can explain a tremendous amount about all of the variety of what we see in the world with this as not necessarily the only principle, but certainly a core principle. And so he writes this wonderful, wonderful book, The Origin of Species. And it's just so much evidence and so many examples and sort of trying to tease this out and see what the implications are. And to connect it to as much else as you possibly can, to connect it to geology and to connect it to all these other things. So that's sort of hard work that making the case that it's actually relevant all across the biosphere is what he's doing there. He's not just having the idea. He's making a compelling case that no, it's intertwined with absolutely everything else. Yeah. The question was Lucretius, who is this first century Roman poet, has an idea that seems analogous to a natural selection about species get fitted over time to their environments or species losing to their environment. And so you're like, okay, well, why did this go nowhere for 19th centuries? And then I looked into it more accurately as LLM, what exactly was Lucretius idea here? And it actually is extremely different from what real natural selection is. And he thought there was this generative period in the past where all the species came about and then there was this one time filter, which resulted in the species that are around today and they became fitted in environment. He did not have this idea that it is an ongoing gradual process or that there is a tree of life that connects all life forms on our together. Which is, by the way, it's incredibly weird fact that every single life on our Earth has a common ancestor. It's not incredibly weird, right? If you think that the origin of life must have been very hard, like that there's a bottleneck that it's not so surprising. There's also this verification loop aspect where even if Newton might be harder in some sense, if you've clinched it, you can experimentally, I know valid it as the wrong word philosophically, but you can give a lot of base points to the theory. You can be like, okay, I have this idea of why things fall on Earth, I have this idea of why orbital periods for planets have a certain pattern. Let's start on the moon, which orbits the Earth. In fact, it's weird, orbital period matches with my calculations imply. The tides work correctly. Exactly. It's just amazing. Whereas for our Darwinism, it takes a ton of work for Darwin to compile all the cumulative evidence, but there's no individual piece that is overwhelming the powerful. And there's a whole bunch of problems as well. He doesn't really understand what the mechanism of the Earth is. He doesn't understand genes, like all these things. The very interesting thing in the Hissier Darwinism is this idea, which is theoretically you could come up with at any time, there is almost identical independent creation of that idea between Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin. So much so that I think Wallace sends this manuscript to Darwin, is like, what do you think of this idea? I'd rather say fuck. I don't think that's an exact question. But I think it's pretty much correct. And then so they actually end up presenting their ideas together in the spirit of sort of sportsmanship. And so then, yeah, why was the spirit in the 1860s or 1850s? What was that the right time for these ideas? One is geology. So in 1830s, Charles Lyle figures out that there's been millions and billions of years of time that exists on an Earth. Then paleontology shows you that actually organisms have existed. Falsals have existed for that in turn. So life goes back a long time. And in fact, you can even find fossils for intermediate species that show you this real life. In fact, between humans and other apes as well, there's intermediate humans. There's the age of colonization and we have all these voyages. We're going to do this biogeography. And I guess that all must have been necessary because in fact, there's a huge astral parallel innovation and discovery in this year's sign. So maybe it is another piece of evidence to actually more had to be in place for a given idea to be discovered because if it's not discovered for a long time and then spontaneously many different people are coming up with it, that shows you that actually the building blocks were in some sense necessary. I mean, I think this example of Lail and other biologists, early 1800s, basically, having this idea of deep time, does seem to have been crucial. I know Darwin was very influenced by Lail. If you don't have at least tens or hundreds of millions of years, evolution just starts to look like an on-stata. We should be seeing radical change. In order to make it work on a time scale of say 5 to 10,000 years or 6,000 years, Bishop Asher, you would need to be seeing evolution occurring in a massive rate during human life times. So we're just not seeing that. So that does seem to have been a blocker. It's interesting to your question, what other blockers were there? Were there any others? And I don't know. Right. Or how much earlier could you and principal have come up with that if you're much smarter? Actually, let me just go back sort of zoom out to your original question. So you don't have the verification loop in the AI. If something, an example I think that should give you pause, there is the big signature success so far. You're certainly alpha-fold. And of course, alpha-fold really isn't about AI. Massive fraction of the success there is the protein data bank. So it's X-ray diffraction. It's NMR. It's cryoam. And several billion dollars that was spent obtaining whatever it's 180,000 protein structures. So it's basically the story of we spent many, many decades obtaining protein structure just by going out and looking very hard at the world experimentally. And then we fitted a nice model at the end of it. And that was like a tiny fraction of the entire investment. But it's definitely not-- that's a story of data acquisition. principally, it's not only. I mean, the AI bit is very, very impressive. It's quite remarkable. But it is only a small part of the total story. Alpha-fold is very interesting. And I philosophically wonder what you think of it as a scientific theory or scientific explanation. Because if over time, I guess the world has become harder to understand. As I'm saying things, because you're such a careful speaker, I say this phrase and I'm like-- Go for it. Is that-- will he actually buy that premise? But yeah, we need to fit models to things rather than-- at least in some domains. We're trying to fit models to things rather than coming up with underlying principles that explain a broad range of phenomenon. And so it compares, say, the theory of general relativity or any theory which just melts out to some equations versus Alpha-fold, which is encoding these different relationships between different things we can't even interpret over 100 million parameters. And are those really the same thing? Because GR can predict things you could have never anticipated or was never meant to do. Like, why does Mercury's orbit process? And Alpha-fold is not going to have that kind of explanatory reach. And I want to get your reaction into that. Yeah, I think it's an incredibly interesting question. I mean, maybe a really pivotal question. In the sense of-- so if you so check a very classic point of view, you want these deep explanatory principles. You want it sort of a few free parameters you possibly can. You want very simple models, which explain a lot. And Alpha-fold doesn't look anything like that. And so you might just sort of say, oh, well, it's nice. It's maybe helpful as a model, but it doesn't have. It's not a scientific explanation. So that's kind of-- that's like a conservative point of view. That's sort of-- I don't know-- answer one to the question. I think answer two is to say something like maybe you shouldn't think about Alpha-fold as an explanation in the classic sense. But maybe it contains lots of little explanations inside it. And so maybe part of what you can get out of like interpretability work is you can go into Alpha-fold and you can start to extract certain things. Maybe, maybe, basically, by doing sort of archaeology of Alpha-fold, we can actually understand a great deal more about these principles. You can start to extract it all. That circuit does this interesting thing and we learn this. So I don't know to what extent that's been done with Alpha-fold. But I know it's been done a little bit with some of the chess models. I believe it's Alpha-zero. There seemed to be some strategies, which were certainly borrowed by Magnus Carlson at least, which he seems to have just taken from Alpha-zero. I mean, I don't think there's any public confirmation of this. But there were some experts have noticed that he changed his game quite radically after some sort of some public forensics were released on how Alpha-zero worked. So that's kind of an example where I think human beings are starting to extract meaning out of these models. And maybe that starts to lead to sort of viewing the models as a potential source of explanations. You need to do more work because they're not very legible upfront. But you can extract them potentially. And I think that's kind of an interesting intermediate situation where they're not explanations. But you can extract interesting explanations out of them. You can use them as kind of a source. I think the third and the most interesting possibility is there are new type of object in some sense. They should be taken very seriously as explanations. But we're in the past. We haven't had the ability to really do anything with them. And now we're going to have interesting new actions which we can do. We can merge them. We can distill them. We can do all these kinds of things. And there's going to be almost a new-- it's a big opportunity in the philosophy of science to start to do that. This sort of anticipation of this in some sense, I think, in the way-- I know some mathematicians at business who, I mean, historically, if you had like a 100-page equation, which is the kind of thing that does come up, there's just nothing you can do if it's 1920. There is nothing you can do at that point you give up on the problem. And now today, with tools like Mathematica, you can just keep going. And so that's an object now. That's a thing that you can work with. And there are examples where people work with these things that formerly were regarded as too complicated. And sometimes they get simple answers out of the end. That's just an intermediate working state. And so I sort of wonder if there's going to be something similar is going to happen in this particular case where you could take these models and sort of just use them in a little bit the same way people do with Mathematica and take them seriously as-- they're not explanations in the classic sense, but there'll be something else which interesting operations can be done on. The thing I worry about is suppose that you-- it's 1,600 in your 1,500 in your training-- a model on-- this is a weird history where we developed deep learning before we had-- before we had cosmology. But I suppose we live in that world. And you're observing how there's a stars. They don't seem to move the planets, how all these would be behavior. And then you train a model on that, and then you do some kind of intro up on it and try to figure out, well, what are the patterns we see here? What you'd see are just these-- you just keep-- be able to keep building on Talami's model. You'd see like, oh, there's more epicycles we didn't notice. There's another epicycle. It's-- parameters, whatever, whatever, and code epicycle. This parameters, whatever, and code. The next epicycle. So if you were just trying to figure out why is the solar system the way it is from observational data, you could just keep adding epicycles upon epicycles. But it really took one mind to integrate it all in and say, here's what makes more sense overall. So I mean, to my point that we don't really understand what to do with the models, we don't have the verbs necessarily yet. But it is certainly interesting to think about the question where you start to apply constraints to the models. It's essentially saying, what's the simplest possible explanation? Or can you simplify? Can you give me the 1910 explanation? Can you go further and further and further in boiling it down? So it might be that indeed they sort of start out by providing a very, very complicated, many, many, many parameter model. But you can just force the case. And basically, that's scaffolding, which maybe they are the very early days of their attempt to understand something, but they're forced through that to a much more simple understanding. So it's sort of a misinteresting, but it sounds like you're saying maybe there's some sort of regularizer or sort of distillation. You could do a very complicated model that gets to a true or more parsimonious theory. But yeah, just take a Tallah me versus Copernicus. So you start off with lots of Tallah meek epicycles, and then you try to distill this model. And maybe gets rid of some of the epicycles that are less and less sort of necessary to get the mean squared arrow, the orbits to match. But at some point it has to do the thing, which is switch two things. Yeah. And locally, it actually doesn't make things more accurate. It's sort of a global sense that it's a more progressive theory. And there's some process, which obviously humanity did over its bandwidth, did that regularization or did that swap. But if raw gradient descent, it seems like I don't really feel like it would do that. I mean, you think about the example of going from new Italian gravity to Einstein's general theory of relativity. And these are shockingly different theories. And the question is, what causes that flip? And as nearly as I understand the history, what goes on is Einstein develops special relativity. And pretty much straight away he understands. It's a very obvious observation in special relativity. Influences can't propagate faster than the C-delight. And in Newtonian gravity, action is at a distance. In fact, it's straight away in special relativity. You could use Newtonian gravity to do faster than light signaling. You could send information backwards in time. You could do all kinds of crazy stuff. And so it's not a big leap to realize, oh, we have a big problem here. And so that's the forcing function there. It's you've realized that your old explanation is not sufficient. You need something new. And then you're just going to start by doing the simplest possible stuff. And it just turns out that a lot of that stuff doesn't work very well. And so you sort of forced-- in fact, it is interesting. He is sort of forced to go through these steps of gradually, it gets quite more complicated and it's sort of wrong in a variety of ways. And the final theory appears really shockingly simple and beautiful, but it's gone through some somewhat ugly intermediate stages. Yeah. So if you're thinking about what does it look like to have AI Accelerate Science? There's one for maybe well-interested domains where we just want local solutions like how does this work in bold? We just train a raw model using gradient descent. Then there's things like coming up with general relativity where you couldn't really just train on every single observation in the universe and hope that general relativity pops out. And so what would it require? It also certainly wasn't immediately discovered, right? So it was a lot of decades of thought. And I guess you need independent research programs where people start off with these biases where Einstein is just initially motivated by this thought experiment of, you know, can you distinguish the effect of gravity from just being accelerated upwards? And then you just need different AI thinkers to have to start off with these initial biases and see what can germinate out of them. And then the verification looper that might be quite long, but you just need to keep all those research programs alive at the same time. Yeah. I mean, I think there's like, I mean, this point that you make about sort of keeping all the different research programs alive. That I think is very important and somehow central. I mean, a great example is situations where the same answer has been correct in some circumstances and wrong in other circumstances. So the planet Uranus was like not in quite the right spot. And people very famously predicted the existence of Neptune on this basis. Wonderful, massive success for Newtonian gravity. The planet Mercury is not in quite the right spot. You predict the existence of some other distorting planet. Turns out that doesn't exist. Actually, the reason Mercury is not in the right spot is because you need general relativity. And so you've sort of, you've pursued very similar ideas and it's been very successful in one case and it's been completely and utterly unsuccessful in the other case. And I think, I mean, April AI, you can't tell which of these is the thing to do. You actually need to do both. Yeah. And so, I mean, this is certainly, it's very true in the history of so-ands that this kind of diversity where you just have lots of people go off and pursue lots of potentially promising ideas, you just need to support that for a long time. And it's hard to do that for a variety of reasons. But it does seem to be very, very important. So this example of Uranus versus Mercury is very interesting. In one, I think it illustrates sort of the difficulty of falsificationism. Like the orbit of Uranus is in some sense falsifying Newtonian mechanics. But then you say you make some ancillary prediction that says, oh, the reason this is happening is there must be another planet, which is effective perturbing Uranus's orbit. I think it's Laverie in 1846. Point of telescope in the right direction you find Uranus. Neptune. Neptune, yes. But with Mercury, yeah, it's observed that the ellipse which forms the orbit is rotating 43 arc seconds more every century than Newtonian mechanics would imply. So people say there must be a planet inside Mercury's orbit, they call it Vulcan. And point of telescopes is not there. But if you're a proper Newtonian, what you do is say, well, maybe there's some cosmic dust that's occluding the planet, or maybe the planet is so small we can't see it. Or maybe there's some, let's build even more powerful telescope. Or maybe there's some magnetic field which is sort of occluding our measurements. And this happens over and over, right? Like, you know, there's just so many stories which are exactly like this. Right. I mean, an example I love from, you know, in the 1990s, some people noticed that the Pioneer spacecraft weren't quite where they were supposed to be. And so, you know, you can get very excited about this. Oh my goodness. So, the specificity is wrong. We have, like, going to, you know, maybe we're going to discover the next, the next theory of gravity. And today, the accepted explanation is that, no, actually, there's just a slight asymmetry in the spacecraft. It turns out that the thermal radiation is like slightly larger in one direction than the other. And that's causing a tiny little acceleration towards the sun. And most of the time, when there's these apparent exceptions, it's just something like that's going on. It's very much like the Mercury case. But everyone's in a while. It's not. And, April, you can't distinguish these. But, I mean, science is just full of these. It's funny too. Like, the way we tell the history of science, it sounds so simple. Like, oh, you just focus on the right exception. And, you realize that you need to throw out the old theory and lo and behold, you're no more pro-ease-a-weights. But in fact, these exceptions are all over the place. And 99.9% of the time, it just turns out to be some effect, like, this thermal acceleration in the case of the plane, spacecraft. So, you know, unfortunately, there's a lot of selection by us going into those stories. And the thing is, there's no ex-anti-heuristic, which tells you, which case you're in. And just to spell out why I think this is important is because some people have this idea that AI is going to make disproportionate progress towards science. Because it makes disproportionate progress towards domains where there's tight verification loops. And so, it's really good at coding because you can run unit tests. And science may be similar because you can run experiments. And the thing that doesn't appreciate one is that experiments actually don't. There's an infinite number of theories that are compatible with any given experiment. And over time, why we go on to the. Well, at least in retrospect, we think is a more correct one, is as we're discussing in this conversation, sort of hard to articulate. Lactobus actually has all kinds of interesting examples in the book about these kinds of hostile verification loops that are extremely long-lasting. So, one, he talks about is Proud or Fruit. I don't know how to pronounce it. But there's this chemist in 1815. Hypothicizes that all atomic nuclei must have whole number weights. They're basically all made of hydrogen. And the reason he thinks this is because if you look at the measure rates of all elements, it does seem that they almost all of them do have to hold the whole number rates. But then there's some exceptions. Like for example, chlorine comes out of 35.5. And so then there's all these ad hoc theories that people in this school keep coming up with, like, oh, maybe there's chemical impurities. And then there's no chemical reaction you can do, which seems to get rid of this. Maybe it's fractions of whole numbers. It's 35.5. It can be halves. But actually, you measure chlorine even closer. It's 35.46. So it's actually getting further away from the correct correction. And later on, what is discovered is what you're actually measuring is different isotopes, which cannot be chemically distinguished. It can only be physically distinguished. But so then you just have 85 years before we realized what a nice otopia is where the verification loops actually actively hostile against you against the correct theory. And you just need this remnant to be defending. There's no extent to reason it's a prefer theory. As a community, we should just have people defend, try to integrate new observations, even they don't seem to fit their school of thought with what they believe. And hopefully enough of that happens. Anyways, yeah, I guess the thing that I'm trying to articulate is the difficulty with automating science. Yeah, I mean, the question is where is the bottle at some level? And so are we primarily bottlenecked on one thing or one type of thing, or are we bottlenecked on multiple types of thing? So certainly talking to structural biology people, they seem to think that alpha-fold wasn't an enormous advance. It was a shock. So at some level, yes, AI can, it seems certain it can help us speed up science. So it is helping with a certain type of bottleneck. That doesn't mean, as you're saying, that it's necessarily going to help with all kinds of bottlenecks. And sort of, I suppose the question you're pointing at is, what are the types of bottlenecks that remain and what are the prospects for getting past them? I think even in the case of coding, it's really interesting, talking to programmer friends, at the moment they're all in this state of shock and high excitement, and they're all over the place, actually kind of talking to them. You do wonder, where is the bottleneck going to move to? So certainly one thing that a lot of them seem to be bottlenecked on is now having interesting ideas and in particular having interesting design ideas. So there's not really a verification loop for knowing, oh, that design idea is very interesting. So they're no longer nearly as bottlenecked by their ability to produce code, but they are still bottlenecked by this other thing. They were formally they weren't bottlenecked on it because just writing code took so much of their time. They could sort of have lots of ideas while they were, they take their three weeks to implement their prototype and then they would implement the next version. Now they're taking three hours to implement the prototype and they don't have as good ideas sort of after that from a design point of view. Last year I predicted that by 2028, AI would be able to prep my taxes about as well as a competent general manager. So we're already getting pretty close. As I shared before, I used Mercury both for my business and my personal banking. So I recently gave an LLN access to my transaction history across both accounts through Mercury's MCP. I asked it to go through all my 2025 transactions and and flag any personal expenses that seemed like they should actually be charged to the business. And this worked shockingly well. Mercury's MCP exposes a bunch of detailed information, things like notes and memos and any JPEGs of receipts and PDF attachments. So my LLM had plenty of contacts to work with. One of my favorite examples happened with a charge to Bay Padel. If you looked at the vendor alone, you would have had to assume that it's a personal expense. But the LLM looked at the receipt and the attached note in Mercury and realized it was actually a team bonding exercise from our last in-person retreat. So a legitimate business expense. I imagine it will be a while before traditional banks have MCP. Functionally like this is why I use Mercury. Go to mercury.com to learn more. Mercury is a Fintech company, not an FGIC in short bank. Faking services provided through choice financial group and column NA members FGIC. You have a very interesting take. I think it was a footnote one or your asses and they couldn't find it again. Which was that it's very possible that if we met aliens, that they would have a totally different technological stack than us. And that contradicts, I guess, a common sense of the assumption I had that I never questioned, which is that science is this thing you do very relatively early on in the history of civilization. Where you get to a point and you have a couple hundred years of just cranking through the basics, understanding how the universe works, et cetera. And you've got it. You've got science. And then basically I already would be working in the region to see the quote unquote science. And so I found that a very interesting idea. And I want you to see more about it. Yeah. I think probably the idea there that I'm at least somewhat attached to is the idea that the sort of the the the the tech tree of the science and tech tree is probably much larger than we realize. I mean, we're sort of in this funny situation. People will sometimes talk about a theory of everything as a potential goal for physics. And then there's this presumption somehow that physics is done once you get there. And of course, this is not true at all. If you think about computer science, computer science basically got started in the 1930s when cheering and church and so on, just laid down what the theory of everything was. They just said, you know, here's how computation works. And then we've spent 90 or years since then just exploring consequences of that and gradually building up more and more interesting ideas. And those ideas are, to some extent, you can just regard as technology. But to some extent, insofar as they're sort of discovered principles inside that theory of computation, I think they're best regarded as science. And in some cases, very fundamental science ideas like public key cryptography. I mean, they're just incredibly deep, very non-obvious ideas, which in some sense lay hidden already sort of in the 1930s. And so my expectation is that there will be different ways of exploring this tech tree. And we're still relatively low down. We're still at the point where we're just understanding these basic fundamental theories and we haven't yet explored them. Sort of a thing which I think is quite fun is if you look at just the phases of matter. When I was in school, we'd get taught that there are three phases of matter, or sometimes four phases of matter, or five phases of matter, depending a little bit on what you included. And then as an adult, as a physicist, you start to realize, oh, we've been adding to this list. We've got sort of superconductors and superfluids and maybe different types of superconductors and Bosonstein condensates and the quantum hall systems and fractional quantum hall systems and and and and and. And it's something to turn it. It looks like actually there's a lot of phases of matter to discover. And we're going to discover a lot more of them. And in fact, we're going to be able to start to design them in some sense. I mean, we will still be subject to the laws of physics, but there is this sort of tremendous freedom in there. And this looks to me like, oh, we're down at sort of the bottom of the tech tree. We've barely gotten started there. And I expect that to be the case sort of broadly, certainly in terms of, I think programming is a very natural place to look. The idea that we've discovered all the deep ideas in programming just seems to me sort of obviously ludicrous. We keep discovering sort of what seems like deep new fundamental ideas. And I mean, we're very limited. We're basically slightly jumped up chimpanzees. So we don't, we're slow and it's taking us time. But what do we look like sort of another million years in the future in terms of all of the different ideas which people have had around how to manipulate computers, how to manipulate information. I think we're likely to discover that actually there are a lot of very deep ideas still to be discovered. So who was it? I think it was Knuth in the preface to the art of computer programming. So it's something like, you know, he started this book back in the 60s and he talked to a mathematician, it was a bit contemptuous and said, look, computer science isn't really a thing yet. Come back to me when there's a thousand deep theorems. And Knuth remarks, and he's writing this, you know, decades later, the preface, there are clearly ours, thousand deep theorems now. And that means it's really interesting to sort of think like what's the long-term future? As you get higher and higher up in the tech tree, like choices about which direction we go and sort of how we choose to explore. You know, I think it's potentially the case that we're, you know, different civilizations or different choices mean that we end up in different parts of that tree. And in particular, just things, I mean, sort of very basic things about, you know, we're very visual creatures, certain other animals are much more orally based. Is that bias sort of the types of thoughts that you have and then you extend it, you know, to sort of much more exotic kinds of civilizations where maybe just sort of their biases in terms of how they perceive and how they manipulate the world are maybe quite different than ours. And that might make some significant changes in terms of how they do that exploration of the tech tree. It's an all speculation, obviously. - This is such an interesting take. I want to better understand it. So one way to understand it is that there might, there might be some things that are so fundamental and have such a wide collision area against reality that they're inevitably going to discover in general to me. - Numbers. - Numbers. - Yeah, yeah. - Like, you, like of all of the intelligences in the Milky Way galaxy, maybe that number is one, like she arguably we've already increased the number. But, you know, of all of those, what fraction of the concept of counting? And, you know, it does seem very natural. What fraction have discovered, you know, the idea of some kind of, you know, decimal place system? Interesting question, like, and maybe we're missing something really simple and obvious that's actually way better than that. What fraction got there immediately? What fraction sort of had to go through some other intermediate state? What fraction use linear representations versus say, you know, two dimensional or three dimensional representation? I think the answer to these questions had just not had all obvious. So a lot of design freedom. - On the article computer science, this is going to be extremely naive and arrogant. But I took a Scott Ernst and, you know, a class on complexity theory. And that was by far the worst student he's ever had. But what I remember is like, there was a period that you were, you know, you were the pioneers of or we figured out, here's the class of problems that quantum computers can solve and how it relates to problems of classical computers. It's always like groundbreaking, oh, crazy. That this works. And then since then it's been, this literally it's called complexity zoo. This website, which list out here is all the complexity classes. And if you have this complexity class with this kind of oracle, it's sort of equivalent to this other class. And that, it feels like we're building out that taxonomy. And so there's a couple of ways to understand what you're saying. One, maybe you just disagree with me that this is actually what's happened with this field. Another is that while that might happen to any one field, the mount of fields, who would have thought in 1880 the computer science, other than Babid or something, the computer science was going to be a thing in the first place. So the mount of field, we're understanding how many more fields there could be. - Yeah, yeah, sure. - Or maybe you think both, or maybe a third secret thing that I'd be curious. - I mean, a very common argument here is sort of the low hanging fruit argument. The argument that says, oh, there should be diminishing returns. - And in fact, apparently we see this, right? The mount of scientists in the world is just exponentially increased. - And I mean, I think it's worth thinking about like why do you expect diminishing returns and how well does that argument actually apply in practice? - An analogy I like is actually thinking about sort of, going to some event, going to a wedding or whatever, and you go to the dessert buffet, and they've put out 30 desserts. And of course, naturally what people do, right? The best desserts go first. I mean, we don't quite have a well-ordered preference there, so maybe there's some difference, but human beings are fairly similar. So the best desserts will go first. And this is an argument for why you expect diminishing returns in a lot of different fields. If it's relatively easy to see what's available, and people have similar preference, then the best stuff goes first and you know it just gets sort of worse and worse after that. And sort of a very static snapshot in time of scientific progress. Maybe there's some truth to that. But if somebody is standing behind the dessert table and is replenishing, restocking the desserts, and keeps kind of adding new ones in, it may turn out that you know a little bit later, much better desserts appear and so you're going to go and you're going to go and eat those instead. And scientific progress has a little bit of that flavor. You know we go through these sort of funny, computer science is a great example where computer science basically arose as sort of a side effect of some pretty obscure questions in the philosophy of mathematics and logic. And so you've got these people trying to attack these rather esoteric questions that seem quite high up in some sense in sort of exploration, quite esoteric. And they discover this fundamental new field and all of a sudden there's an explosion there. So sort of the diminishing returns argument just didn't apply there. We just weren't able to see what was there. And this has been the case over and over and over again, sort of new fields arrive and all of a sudden boom it's actually easy to make progress again. Young people flood in because you can be 21 and make major breakthroughs rather than having to spend 25 years mastering everything that's been done before. It's obviously very attractive. And I don't understand, I'm not sure anybody understands very well. Sort of the dynamics of that, like how to think about why the structure of knowledge is that way, that these new fields keep opening up, but it does seem empirically at least to be the case. Despite the fact that that is a case, take deep learning. Obviously this is an example of a new field where the 21-year-olds can make progress and it's relatively new 15 years or so. It sort of gets back into high gear. But already we're in a stage where you need billions or tens of billions or hundreds of billions of dollars to keep making progress of the frontier. And there's a couple of ways to understand that. One is that it actually is harder than the kinds of things the ancients had to do or requires more is more intensive at least. Second is it might not have been, but because our civilization resources are so large, the amount of people are so large, the amount of money is so large, that we can basically make the kind of progress they would have taken the ancients forever to make. Almost immediately we just, we notice something is productive, immediately dumping all the resources. But it's also weird that there's not that many of them, like I feel like deep learning, is notable because it is one big exception to the fact that it's hard to think about those examples. I think it's a consequence of sort of the architecture of attention, right? At any given time, there's always a sort of a most successful thing. Yeah, maybe if deep learning wasn't a thing, maybe you'd be talking about CRISPR, maybe you'd be talking about whatever it is, maybe we wouldn't think about solving sort of the protein structure prediction problem as a really a success of AI. Maybe we would have figured out how to doing it with sort of curve-fitting, like more broadly construed. And we'd just be like, wow, we took a lot of computing resources. But protein structure prediction might be an enormously important thing. So there is always sort of our biggest thing. And I think what you're pointing at is more a consequence of the way in which attention gets centralized. It's basically fashion is sort of what I'm saying. It's not just fashion, but there is some dynamic there. There's a very interesting and important implication of this idea that the branching is so wide and so contingent and so path dependent, that different civilization would stumble on entirely different technology sex. There's a very interesting implication that there will be genes from trade into the far, far future. Which might actually be one of the most important facts about the far future. In terms of how civilizations are set up, how they can coordinate, how they interface with it. There's not this go forth and exploit. There are humongous gains to trade from adjacent colonies or whatever. There's a question of what's actually hard. If it's just the ideas, those spread relatively quickly. It's relatively easy to share ideas. If it's something more sort of a Dan Wang kind of an idea where it's actually sort of there's some notion of capacity. You need all the right text, you need all the right manufacturing capacity and so on. And so civilization A has very different kind of manufacturing capacity. And it's just not so easy to build in civilization B. Even if civilization B is kind of ahead. Then I think that becomes true. There is actually comparative advantage, which is really worth. I mean it's going to provide massive benefits to trade in both directions. Eventually you're going to expect some diffusion of innovation. It is funny to think about what the barriers are there. A fun thought experiment I like to think about is sort of get up but for aliens. So somebody presents you with all of the code from some alien civilization. I don't even know what code means there but the sort of their specification of algorithms. And it's so interesting. It would have many interesting new ideas in there. It would take forever for human beings to dig through and try and extract all of those. One reason I mean the origin of this for me was actually thinking about progenes in nature. We've been gifted just this incredible variety of machines which we don't understand really at all. And we just have to go and sort of try and understand them. One by one basis. We're still understanding hemoglobin and insulin and things like this. And no doubt, you know, and there's hundreds of millions of proteins known. So it is a little bit like that. We've been gifted by biology. Just this immense library of machines. No doubt containing an enormous number of very interesting ideas. And we're just at the very, very, very beginning of understanding it. So actually, I mean that's, I suppose kind of your point actually is, you know, I need to relabel your arguments slightly but you sort of think of that as a gift from an alien civilization, which obviously it isn't, but you think of it that way. And it's like, oh my goodness, like there's so much in there and we're going to study it. And goodness knows how long we could continue to study it. There's tens of thousands of papers about the hemoglobin and things like that. And we still don't understand them. And yet we're getting so much out of it. I mean, just think about insulin alone. You know, it's such an important thing. That's an incredibly useful intuition from that you have on earth. I had Nikolaine on where he had a serial about how life emerged but like, whatever serial you have, basically something like DNA, four billion years, and you have an alien civilization coming here and be like, there's all these interesting things for learn about material science about, you name it, right? Like about, I mean, we know almost nothing about these proteins. And yet the tiny few facts we do know are just incredible. And the ribosome. Yeah. You know, another example. I mean, this is miraculous, sort of device, little factory. And all seated by just like, there's this particular chemistry on earth with the nucleic acids and carbon-based light forms that that chemistry gives rise to all of these interesting things which an alien civilization would find very interesting. And so that very, that seed, which must be one among, you know, trillions of possible seeds of, I mean, just of general intellectual ideas, at least to all this for quantity. That's a very interesting intuition from. I want to meditate on this gains for trade thing because I feel like, I think there's something actually very interesting about this idea that if you have this vision of how technology progresses and how it may be different from indifference civilizations, it has important implications about how different civilizations might interact with each other. Like the fact that they're going to be these huge gains from trade. It makes friendliness much more rewarding. Yes. Yeah. Yeah. That's a very important observation. Yeah. I hadn't thought about that at all. That's really, that is a very interesting observation. Yeah. It is funny. I mean, you know, comparative advantage is something that people, you know, they love to invoke. And it's a very beautiful idea, obviously. There are limits to it. Like, you know, it's kind of a, it's a, it's a special limited model. We don't, we don't, you know, chimpanzees can do interesting things. We don't trade with them. Yeah. And I think it's sort of interesting to think about the reasons why. Yeah. And part of it is just power, I think. Like, once there's a sufficiently large power of imbalance, very often, not always, but very often groups of people seem to, to sort of shift into this other mode where they just seek to dominate. And, you know, maybe there's something special about human beings, but, but maybe it's also sort of a more general sort of a thing. So they're not, they're no longer, they give up, you know, you need all these special things to be true before groups will trade. - Yeah. - And yeah, it's not necessarily obvious. - Well, I think the big thing going on here is one transaction costs. - Yeah. - And two, compared to advantages not tell you that the terms on which the trade happens are above subsistence for any given one producer. So people often bring this up in the context of all humans will be employed even in post-AGI world because they've been created advantage. There's like five different ways that are given breaks down but the easiest way to understand her, why don't we have forces all around on the roads because there's some compared advantage between cars and horses. Good example. Well, there's huge, one, there's huge transaction costs to building roads that are compatible with horses and cars at the same time. In a similar way, AI is sort of thinking that 1,000 times the speed and can sort of shoot their latent states again at each other are gonna find it way more costly than the benefit in just terms of interacting with you to have a human being in the supply chain. And second, that just because horses have a compared advantage, mathematically does not mean that it is worth paying 100 K a year or whatever causes a stain of horse in San Francisco. That subsistence is gonna be worth the benefit you get out of the horse. - I do think it's interesting like that, just the sheer fact that my expectation and my intuition obviously differs a great deal from yours on this. Is that most parts of the tech tree are never going to be explored. There's just too many interesting ways of combining things. There's too many sort of deep ideas waiting to be discovered and we're not only we but nobody ever is going to discover most of them. So choices about how to do the exploration actually matter quite a bit. - Interesting. It's something I really dislike about sort of technological determinist arguments. I'm willing to buy it sort of low enough down when progress is relatively simple. But higher up you start to get to shape the way in which you do the exploration and it's interesting, people, we are starting to shape it in interesting ways. You know, sort of, I mean there's various technologies that have been essentially banned. Think about DDT, you think about chloroferocarbons, you think about restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Those kinds of things are, you know, they weren't done before the fact. But you know, staying to get pretty close in some cases where we just sort of preemptively decide we're not going to go down that path. So that starts to look like a set of institutions which we are actually influencing sort of how we explore the tech tree. - Yeah. Where you would see these gains from trade, obviously you'd see the most where it's pure information that can be sent back and forth because the information at the scholarly were, it is expensive to produce, but cheap to verify and cheap to send. And so it'll be interesting how much of future productivity or whatever can be distilled down to information. Right now it's kind of our to do because you can't really transfer, like if China's really good at manufacturing something, whether it's this process knowledge that's in the heads of 100 million people involved in manufacturing sector in China, but in the future it might be easier if the eyes are doing. - So I mean the question about sort of to what extent does our fabrication get sort of very uniform and get really commoditized? Like three printers have been the next big thing for at least 20 years now. Why do they still not work all that well? Why are they still not actually the center of manufacturing and sort of what comes after that? You know it is funny to look at say the ribosome by contrast, but really is it the center of biology, a whole lot of really interesting ways. And whether or not that's the future of manufacturing is something very simple sort of where everything goes as sort of as throughput through, I don't know, maybe it's a bio reactor or something like that. So you send to the information and then you grow stuff or you have some 3D printer that actually works. And if they're good enough, then actually it does become much more of pure information problem and some of this process knowledge becomes much less important. Jane Street has a lot of compute, but GPUs are very expensive. And so even optimizations that have a relatively small effect on GPU utilization are still extremely valuable. Two of Jane Street's ML engineers, Corrin and Sylvan walk through some of their optimization workflows at GDC. You're not bottlenecked on the network being too slow, you're bottlenecked on waiting for a different rank in your training, not having completed the work. They talked about how Jane Street profiles traces and diagnosis bottlenecks. And then how they solve them using techniques like coutographs and coutist streams and custom kernels. With these sorts of optimizations, Corrin and Sylvan were able to get their training steps down from 400 milliseconds to 375 milliseconds each. This 25 millisecond difference might sound small, but given the size of Jane Street's fleet, that improvement could free up thousands of B200s. Jane Street opens sourced all the relevant code. If you want to check it out, I've linked the GitHub repo and the talk in the description below. And if you find this stuff exciting, Jane Street is hiring researchers and engineers. Go to janestreet.com/thwarecache to learn more. I can ask you very clumsily for a question. So there's these deep principles that we've discovered a couple of. One is this idea that, hey, if there's a symmetry across a dimension, it corresponds to a conservative quantity. It's a very deep idea. There's another-- which we've written a lot about-- a textbook about, in fact-- there's ways to understand this thing of what kinds of things you can compute. What kinds of physical systems you can understand with other physical systems? What a universal computer looks like, et cetera. And is your view that if you go down to this level of idea of Noether Sierra or the church-turing principle, that there's an infinite number of extremely deep such principles. I mean, what makes them special is that they themselves encompass so many different possible ways of world. It wouldn't be, but no, the world has to be compatible with, I'll show a couple of these very deep principles. I don't know. I mean, I just-- all I have here is speculation and sort of instinct. My instinct is we keep finding very fundamental new things. It was very-- I mean, for me, anyway, quite formative to understand, as I say, I gave the example before, there's these wonderful ideas of church-turing and these other people, ideas about universal programmable devices, and then you understand later, oh, this also contains within it the ideas of public key cryptography, and then you understand later, oh, that also contains within it the ideas. I mean, people refer to it as script occurrences here, whatever, but there's a very deep set of ideas there about the ability to collectively maintain and agree upon ledger, which is built upon this. And there's probably many deep ideas to sort of-- all right, actually took whatever, it's taken many years really to figure out the right canonical form of those. And so just this fact that you keep finding what seemed like deep new fundamental primitives, I find very-- for me, that's-- has been a very important intuition bump. And it's a cross-- I mean, given that particular example, but I think you see that same pattern in a lot of different areas. What is your interpretation then of this empirical phenomenon where ideas like whatever input you consider into the scientific process, the technological process, economists have studied this a million and a hundred ways. It just seems to require-- even actually a very consistent rate, x% more researchers per year. So there's this famous paper from a couple years ago by Nicholas Blument others where they say, "How many people are working in the semiconductor industry? And how does it increase over time?" Through the history of Moore's Law. And I think they find, like, Moore's Law means computing increases 40% a year, or transistor density increases 40% a year. But to keep that going, the amount of scientists has increased 9% a year-- That's right. --their industry. --and they go through industry after industry with this observation. And so as you view that, they are these deep ideas, but they keep getting harder to find. Or that, no, there's another way to think about what's happening with these empirical observations. I mean, they-- so first of all, all of their examples narrow, right? They all-- they pick a particular thing, and then they look at some particular metric. Nowhere in that shows up-- like, GPUs don't show up there, right? Like, in the sense of, oh, all of a sudden, you get this ability to parallelize. And that's really interesting. So there's sort of a lot of external consequences that are just delighted from basically, you know, they have these simple quantitative measures. They look at it in agricultural productivity. They look at it in a whole lot of different ways. But you do have to focus narrowly. And I suppose, you know, I'm certainly interested, as I say, in this fact that just new types of progress keep becoming possible. But, you know, there is still, I think, even there. There does seem to be some phenomenon of diminishing returns. You know, is that intrinsic? Is that something about the structure of the world? What is it? Well, one thing which hasn't changed that much is sort of the individual minds, which are doing this kind of work. And maybe those should be sort of being improved as well, or some sort of feedback process going on there. Maybe that changes the nature of things. I suppose I look at scientific progress. progress up into, let's say, 1700, something like that. And it was very slow and also it was very irregular. You had the Ionians back sort of five centuries before Christ doing these quite remarkable things. I think so much knowledge like would get lost and then it would be rediscovered and then it would be lost again. And you'd have to say that progress was very slow. And there it's partially just bound up with the fact that there were some very good ideas that we just didn't have. Even once you've had the ideas, then you need to build institutions around them. You actually need to solve a whole lot of different problems about training, about allocation of capital, about all these kinds of things, even just about basic sort of security for researchers. So they're not worried about the inquisition or things like that. So there's all these kind of complicated problems. You solve all those complicated problems and then all of a sudden boom, there's a massive sort of burst of scientific progress. If you're not changing it, if there's some kind of stagnation, if you're not changing those external sort of circumstances, yes, you may start to get sort of diminishing returns again. But that doesn't mean there's anything intrinsic about the situation. Maybe something just external needs to change again. Obviously a lot of people think AI is potentially gonna be a driver. I mean, it certainly will at some level, in fact, to the extent that you can think of a lot of modern scientific instrumentation is really, I mean, at some level kind of robots. What is the James Webb Space Telescope? Well, it's unconventional maybe to describe it as a robot, but it's not completely unreasonable either. It is an example of a highly automated, very sophisticated system with electronically mediated sensors and actuators where machine learning, in fact, is being used to process the data. So in that sense, we're already starting just to see that transition we've been seeing it for decades. I have this smoker joined and take a puff thought, which I think we've had a few. Yeah, yeah. Well, I think we're getting to the part of the conversation and you can help me get my foot out of my mouth and figure out a more concrete idea to think about it. So to your point, there's an extra revolution. The Enlightenment and now there's AI and each might be a different pace or a different way of how much science happens. If you think about the pace of how fast such transitions have been happening, you can draw a long span of human history, this hyperbolic of the rate of growth is increasing. So yeah, 100,000 years ago you had the Stone Age. You go back even much further, how long ago probably it's been around, and it would be like, let's say millions of years and 100,000 years ago the Stone Age, then 10,000 years ago the agricultural revolution that 300 years ago the industrial revolution each marked by this increase in the rate of exponential growth and then people think it's gonna happen again with AI, but that would happen potentially even faster. It would not have occurred to somebody at the beginning of the industrial revolution that the next demarcation in this trend will be artificial intelligence. And so if things are getting faster and it would be hard to anticipate what the next transition will be, I guess we just think of this singularity between now and AI, and that's really what distinguishes the past from the future, but just applying the same heuristic that maybe people in the past should have had. Maybe the intelligence age is also quite short, and the next thing after that is, we don't even have the ontology to describe what it is, but the future will not think of the past as like, there was pre-intelligence AI and post AI. No, that seems, I mean, obviously we can't prove this, but it certainly seems quite plausible. I mean, part of the issue of course is just, the substrate we have available to conceive, like seems all wrong, you can't speculate with a bunch of chimpanzees about what it would be like to have language, just to sort of pick a major transition in the past, the transition itself is the thing. And it seems likely, if we're talking about taking a puff kind of thoughts, I'm certainly amused by the idea that there's gonna be some transition involving artificial general intelligence using classical computers, but actually there'll be an interesting transition with quantum computers as well. They're probably capable of a strictly larger class of potentially interesting computations, so maybe actually the character of sort of a QGI or whatever it should be called, is actually qualitatively different. So maybe there's sort of a brief period between those two things. Interesting, I mean, as I say, this is just speculation, but it's certainly amusing. Is there a reason I think that, because from what I understand, there's been, for decades, people like you have put pretty tight bounds on the kinds of things quantum computers are gonna do, and so it'll speed up search somewhat, it will do, and the kinds of things that extremely speeds up, like Shor's algorithm, it seems like, again, maybe this is to your point that we can't predict in advance what's down the tech tree, but at least from not here, it seems like you break encryption, but what else are you using? Shor's algorithm. - Yeah, I mean, we've only been thinking about it for 30 years, or whatever. It's 40 or so years, not for very long, and we sort of haven't in some sense thought that hard about it as a civilization, so, yeah. Does it turn out that it's very narrow, maybe? Does it turn out that it's very broad? That's also, like a really radical expansion that seems distinctly possible. Like, give a mind as well. We've been doing it without the benefit of having the devices, right? Like, that's a pretty big bottle of ink to have, if you're thinking about computer science and the 1700s, and you're like, "Oh, go ahead and do anore." - Yeah, yeah, yeah. - What are you gonna do? - You can't anticipate Bitcoin, you can't anticipate deep mining. - Well, I mean, maybe you could, if you're sufficiently bright, but it is a pretty hard situation, right? - What is your inside view having been in and contributing to quantum information, quantum computing back in the 90s and 2000s? What is your telling of the history? What was the bottleneck? What was the key transition that made it a real field and how do you rank the contributions for Feynman to doage to everybody else that came along? - Yeah, so I mean, let's just focus on the question about sort of what actually changed. So why was quantum computing not a thing in the 90s? Right, like, it could have been. - Yeah. - Somebody like, I don't know, John von Neumann, a good example, absolutely pioneering computation, also wrote a very important book about quantum mechanics and was deeply interested in quantum mechanics. Like, he could have invented quantum computing at that time and I think there were quite a number of people who potentially could have. So why do we have these papers by people like Feynman and Deutsch in the 80s? And those are, I think, fairly regarded as the foundation of the field, there are some partial anticipation a little bit earlier, but they were nowhere near us. It was comprehensive and nowhere near us as deep. And, well, you should ask David. You can't ask Feynman, unfortunately, but he'll know much better than I do. A couple of things that I think are interesting. One is that, of course, computation became far more salient sort of late '70s, early '80s. It just became a thing which many more people were interested in, partially for very banal reasons. You could go and buy a PC, you could buy an Apple II, you could buy a Commodore 64, you could buy all these kinds of things. It became apparent to people that these were very powerful devices very interesting to think about. At the same time, in the quantum case, that was also the time of the ball trap and the ability to trap single ions and so on. And up to that point, we hadn't really had the ability to manipulate single quantum states. So you kind of got these two separate things that just for historically contingent reasons had both matured around, let's say, 1980 or so. And somebody like von Neumann could have had the idea earlier, but it is quite an interesting factor, a story about Richard Feynman. He went and got one of the first PCs, which is around 1980, 1981. And he was apparently just so excited with this device. He actually tripped and heard himself quite badly, sort of carrying his brand new computing device. That's a very historically contingent sort of a coincidence, but having somebody who's very, very talented in understanding of quantum mechanics also just very excited about these new machines, it's not so surprising, perhaps that he's thinking then, what similar story could you have told 10 years earlier? Like there is just no, the conditions don't exist for it. So I think that's, I mean, it's quite a banal story. - Well, one of the things we were going to discuss was this idea you had about the market for follow-ups. And I think this is actually the perfect story to discuss it for because you wrote the textbook while the field, right? You. Mike and I, 'cause the definitive textbook on quantum information. And so you presumably came in after Deutsch, but you identified in the '90s somehow identified it as the thing that is worth following up on and building on. And instead of talking about more abstractly, I'd love to actually just hear the story of the first answer of how did you know that this is the thing to all the things that were happening in physics and computing, et cetera, that I wanna think about this problem. So, really Feynman writes this great paper in 1982. David Deutsch writes an absolutely fantastic paper in 1985. Sort of sketching out a lot of the fundamental ideas of quantum computing. So I'm 11 in 1985. I'm not thinking about there some playing soccer and doing whatever. But in 1992, I took a class on quantum mechanics. There was really terrific given by Jared Milburn. And I just went and asked Jared one day after, it's like the fifth lecture or something. I said, "Do you have anything, sort of papers or whatever that you could give me?" And he said, "Come by my office in a couple of days time." And I did, and he put it in me with a giant stack of papers which included the Deutsch paper. He included the Feynman paper and included a whole bunch of other sort of very fundamental papers about quantum computing and quantum information. At a time when essentially nobody in the world was working on it, he was. I think he wrote the very first paper that proposed, I mean, sort of a practical approach to quantum computing. It wasn't very practical, but it was actually in a real system. And so in some sense, I'm benefiting from the taste of this other person. But as soon as I read the papers, or take a look at the papers, these are exciting papers. They're asking very fundamental questions and you're sort of like, "Oh, I can make progress here." Like these are things that one could potentially work on. Deutsch has this sort of conjecture that basically, there should be, or I don't know what the right term for it is thesis or what you would call it, that a universal model quantum juring machine should be capable of efficiently simulating any system, any physical system at all. This is a very provocative idea. I think in that paper, he more or less claims that he's proved it. I'm not sure that necessarily everybody would agree with that there's questions about whether or not you can say simulate quantum field theory effectively. And that kind of question is, I think, very interesting and very exciting there. It's obviously a fundamental question about the universe. You have some wonderful ideas in there about quantum algorithms and where they come from and what they mean and what they relate to the meaning of the wave function and questions like this, which is still not, it's not agreed upon amongst physicists. So yeah, there's just some sense of, oh, I am in contact with something which is, A, deeply important and B, we as a civilization don't have this. And so of course you start to focus your attention a little bit there. I'm not sure I got the answer to the question that maybe I misunderstood the question. Yeah, let me go ahead and order. Maybe I'll explain the motivation first. So in a previous conversation we were discussing, how could you have known in the 1940s, the Shannon theorems? And Shannon's way of thinking about communication channel is a deep idea that goes beyond the problems with pulse code modulation that Bell Labs was trying to solve at the time and it applies to everything from quantum mechanics to genetics to computer science obviously. And one of the, I think an idea you stated that we didn't get a chance to talk about yet because I said, well, Shannon published this paper, there's all these other papers, but there's some market of far lots where people gravitate to and build upon Shannon's work and how do they realize that that's the thing to do and how does that process happen? And so I guess you gave your local answer, you read these papers and you immediately realized, okay, there's work to be done here. There's low hanging through, there's some deep provocative idea that I need to better understand and I could, you know, tractively make progress on it. - Yeah, I mean, so to some extent you're sort of saying, okay, I wanted to get into this game of contributing to humanities sort of, understanding of the universe and you are applying sort of this low hanging fruit algorithm. You're like relative to my particular set of interest and abilities, where should I pick up my shovel and start digging and there it was like, oh, this looks like quite a good place to start digging. You know, and different people of course, chose very differently, it was a very unusual choice at the time, it was 1992. Very few people were thinking about that. - Yeah, fast or running a bit, so you've been, I don't know how you think about your work on the open science movement now, but did it work? Like what would have, what is successful there look like? What is it that movement is trying to accomplish? - Yeah, I mean, the set of ideas about open science, I mean, it's interesting, you didn't stop and define open science there, which I think 20 years ago you would have had to do. People recognize the phrase, people have some set of associations with it. Most often they have a relatively simple set of associations, it means maybe something about making scientific papers open access very often, they have some set of notions about maybe it means also making code openly available, maybe it means making data openly available. But already, those are, I think, very large successes of the open science movement, which is to make those salient issues, those issues on which people have opinions and then there are relatively common arguments and argument like, so this is sort of the meme version, publicly funded science should be open science. That's a distillation of a set of ideas, which you might be able to contest, but if you can get people actually sort of thinking about it and engaged with that kind of argument, that's a very fundamental kind of an issue to be considering in the whole political economy of science. If you go back, say, three centuries, there was a very similar kind of an argument prosecuted, which is the question, do we publicly disclose our scientific results or not? So if you look at people like Galileo and Kepler and so on, the extent to which they publicly disclosed, it was done in a very odd kind of a way. They sometimes did bizarre things where they, famously, they published some of their results as anagrams. So basically, they'd find some discovery, they would write down the result in sort of a sentence like his, the discovery of the, I'm trying to think of an example. I think the moons of Mars, I think, was one such example. I'm getting either wrong, was it Hookslaw? Anyway, it doesn't matter. The point was they'd write it down, but then they'd scramble it, publish that, and then if somebody else later made the same discovery, they would unscramble the anagram and say, "Oh, yeah, I actually did it first." This is not an ideal way. There's not an ideal foundation for a discovery system. And then it took, I mean, a very long time, over a century, I think, to obtain more or less the modern ideals in which what you do is you disclose the knowledge in the form of a paper. There is then an expectation of attribution, and so there's a kind of reputation economy, which gets built, and so basically, "Oh, such and such did this work, so they deserved the credit for that, and that's then the basis for their career." So this is sort of the underlying political economy of science. And that made a lot of sense when what you've got is a printing press and the ability to do scientific journals. Then you transition to this modern situation, where in fact you can start to share a lot more, you can start to share your code, you can start to share your data, you can start to share in progress ideas. And but there's no direct credit associated to those. It's not at all obvious, sort of how much reputation should be associated to them. That's all constructed socially. And so making it a live issue is, I think, a very important thing to have done, and that's IVU anyways, one of the main positive outcomes of work on open science. So really practical sort of example to illustrate the problem. For a long time in physics, there was a preprint culture in which people would upload the preprints to the preprint archive. And in biology, this didn't happen. There was no preprint culture, that's changing now. But for a long time, this was the case. And I used to sort of amuse myself by asking physicists and biologists why this was the case. And what I would hear sometimes from biologists was, they would say, well, biology is so much more competitive than physics, that we need to protect our priority, and so we can't possibly upload to the archive. We have to just publish in journals. And then we sometimes hear from physicists. Physics is so much more competitive than biology that we need to establish our priority by uploading as rapidly as possible to the preprint archive. We can't possibly wait to do it with the journals. And I think this emphasizes the extent to which this kind of attribution economy is just something we construct is just something which we do by sort of agreement. And so any attempt to sort of change that economy results in a different system by which we construct knowledge. And so there is sort of this very fundamental set of problems around the political economy of science. You know, sort of we've got this collective project and how we mediate it depends upon the economy we have around ideas. One of the sort of things you emphasize as a part of this project of open science is collective science or groups of people who are making progress on a problem where no individual understands all the logical and explanatory levels necessary to make a leap or connection. Outside of mathematics, what is the best example of such a discovery? I mean, I'm not sure. I have a well-ordering of them to give you a best. An example that I think is very interesting is the LHC where it's just this immensely complicated object. I actually years ago I snuck into an accelerator physics conference. I didn't know anything at all about accelerator physics, but I was just kind of curious to see what they were talking about. And this particular group of people were experts on numerical methods in particular on inverse methods. And so basically turns out, you know, inside these accelerators you have these cascades. So a particle, you know, will be massively accelerated, maybe it will be collided. And then you'll get a shower of particles which decays and decays and decays. And there's just this incredible sort of, you know, consequence of a shower, which is ultimately what you see at the detector. And then you have to retroactively figure out what produced it. And so there's these very, very complicated sort of inverse problems that need to be solved. You've got this final data, but you need to figure out what produced it. And that's how you look for sort of signatures of these. And what many of these people were, was they were incredibly deep experts on simulation methods for sort of following particle tracks. And like this was really deep and difficult stuff. And I'm like, wow, you could spend a lifetime just learning sort of how to do this and how to solve some of these inverse problems. And you would know nothing about, or you would know very little about quantum field theory. You would know very little about detective physics. You would know very little about vacuum physics. All these other things that are absolutely, or very little about data processing, very little about all these things that are absolutely essential to understanding, say, the Higgs boson. And I don't think it's possible for one person to understand everything in depth. Lots of people understand broadly a lot of these ideas, but they don't understand sort of everything in the depth that is actually utilized. That's why there's these papers with well over 1,000 authors. And those people can, they can talk to one another at a high level, but they don't understand each other's specialties. Exactly. So much depth. I mean, things like, as I say, detective physics, vacuum physics, these kinds of solving of inverse problems, like this stuff is incredibly different from each other. And to understand it in real detail is serious work. How do you think about prolificness versus depth, where I don't know, maybe Darwin's an example of somebody who's like just stating on something for many decades. There's other examples where I understand during the year it comes with special relativity, just doing a bunch of different things, pace, talks about how they're all relevant to the eventual buildup. Yeah. I mean, it's something I stress about a lot. Sometimes I feel like I'm too slow. Actually, it's funny though. I mean, the Darwin example is really interesting. Prolific at what? Like, I mean, I got notice how many letters he wrote. It must have been an enormous number. So he's certainly very active. There's also, there's two types of work that tends to be involved in any kind of creative project. There's routine stuff. And there you just want to avoid procrastination. You just want to like, how do I get good at this or how do I outsource it and how do I do it as rapidly as possible and just avoid getting into a situation where you're prolonging it. And then there's high variance stuff where you actually, you need to be willing to take a lot of time. You need to be willing to go to the different places and talk to the different people where in any given instance, most of it's just not going to be an input. And somehow sort of balancing those two things. I think a lot of people are very good at doing one or the other, but it's hard to, it's almost like a personality trait sort of, which one you prefer and people tend to end up doing a lot of one and not enough of the other. So I certainly, you know, sort of trying to balance those two things. I mean, I'm such an interesting example. I mean, I didn't know five is just this extraordinary year. Like you can delete special relativity entirely and it's an extraordinary year. You can delete special relativity and you can delete the federal electric effect for which you won the Nobel Prize. And it's still an extraordinary year, like a plausibly multi-million Nobel Prize winning year. So what's you doing? Yeah, I mean, maybe the answer is just he's smarter than the rest of us. And there's a lot of luck as well. But certainly for myself anyway, like trying to identify those things that are routine, that I should get good at. And then just try and do as quickly as possible. I think that's yielded just a certain amount of returns, but also being willing to bet a little bit more on myself on sort of the very inside has also been very, very, very helpful. That's really hard. Because intrinsically you're putting yourself in situations where you don't know what the outcome is going to be. And so if you're very driven to be productive and whatever, and actually mostly it's not working over there, you're like, let's reduce this. Like it doesn't feel right. When I worked in San Francisco, actually I practiced, I used to have each day, was instead of taking the 15-minute walk to work, I would take the more beautiful 30-minute walk to work, partially just because it was beautiful, but partially also as just a reminder to, like, like, that there are real benefits to not being efficient. But it's not an answer to your question. I mean, really, I think all I'm saying is I struggle a lot with the question. I mean, there are these, I mean, Dean Keith Sibington, I forgot his exact name. Hey, I know you mean. Has this famous equal odds role where he says the probability that any given thing you release, any paper, book, whatever will be extremely important for a given person through their lifetime is not that different. And what really determines, in what era they are the most productive is how much they're publishing. And any given thing has equal odds of being extremely important. Maybe just think of some of the most successful creatives or scientists that are just doing a lot, like Shakespeare is just publishing a lot. And of course, there's kind of examples, you know, go at all publishing almost nothing. But you know, broadly speaking, I think, you need a very good reason to be avoiding it. Basically, to not do that. I've talked to, I've met a lot of people over the years who you talk to, they're clearly brilliant. And they're just obsessed that they are going to work on the great project that makes them famous and they never do anything. And that seems connected, like it's a type of a versiveness, I think very often, they just don't want public judgment. Something that I would love to see. Yeah, there's an awful lot of, of biographies and memoirs and histories of people who achieve a lot. I wish there was a very large number of biographies of people who are fantastically talented, who just missed. Like, you know, absolutely, I've known people who won gold medals at IMOs and things like that, who then tried to become mathematicians and failed. Like what happened? What was the reason? I suspect in many cases that's actually more informative than… And I'm incredibly interested in anything else. You have this essay that I was reading before this interview about how you think about what is the work you're doing. And writer doesn't seem like, as you say, it was Charles Darwin a writer, what exactly is that label? I'm a podcaster right side. And in a way, obviously, our work is very different. But I also think a lot about what is this work and how do I get better at it? And in particular, how I can make sure there's some compounding between the different people I talk to on the podcast, where I worry that instead of this kind of compounding, there's actually… I build up some understanding that's somewhat superficial about a topic and I depreciate I move to them in the next topic and I'm sort of depreciates. And so I think there's this question. There's a lot of podcasters in the world who will interview way more experts than I have ever have. And I don't think they're much the why's there more knowledgeable as a result. So it's clearly possible to mess this up. And I wonder if your thoughts or takes or advice on how one actually learns in a deeper way from this kind of work. Yeah. I mean, sort of an incredibly complicated and rich question. Yeah. I mean, just seem like sort of the question is, like, how do you make it a higher growth context? How do you make it a more demanding context? And sort of, you can do that in like relatively small ways, but that might have a yield compounding returns or you can do something that is maybe more radical. Maybe it means actually starting sort of a parallel project in which you do something that is actually quite a bit different. You're something I think really interesting about like how being very demanding can simply change your response to something. Something that I would sometimes do with students and sometimes with myself was really aimed more at myself was they would say, some week, oh, you know, I'm going to try and do, you know, this work over the coming week. And then next week would come by and they, you know, they hadn't solved the problem or whatever. And sort of like, you know, if a million dollars had been at stake, like, would you have put the same effort in? And the answer is no, sort of invariably. Like they've tried, but they haven't really tried. I think that's a very familiar feeling for all of us. You know, you sort of, you often, you could do a lot more if you had just the right sort of demanding taskmaster standing by you and saying, look, you're barely operating here. And so I do, we sort of wonder a little bit about like, you know, what's the, what's the demanding taskmaster? What, what can they ask you that is going to make your preparation way more intense? The most helpful thing honestly is for some subjects is very clear how I prep. Like I'm doing an upcoming episode on chip design with the founder of a company that is super design and he wrote a textbook on chip design and he, yesterday, I went over to his office and we brainstormed five sort of roof line analysis I can do. And if I understand that, I have some good understanding. The problem is with almost every other field, there's not this core, there's not like you, I don't know, when I interviewed Ilya, three, four years ago, it's like, implement the transformer. And if you have a little bit like you have some nugget of understanding, you have clamped down. And with other fields, it's just like, I vaguely understand this. It's not clamped. I vaguely understand this. I don't know what I'm going to do about this, I don't know about this, but there's no forcing function that you do this exercise and if you do it, you will understand. So really what you're sort of saying is you can do a good job at podcasting without actually attaining this kind of, and that's the problem from you. Exactly. You want to sort of change your job description so that you are internalizing these chunks and just getting this kind of integration each time. And it seems to me like, you know, what that means is you actually want to change the structure of the like the workout put at some level. I mean, lots of people think there's this terrible idea. People have that they should be in flow all of the time. And of course, as far as I can tell, high performance just don't believe this at all. They're in flow some of the time. Like you certainly see this with athletes, you know, when they're actually out there, playing basketball or tennis or whatever, ideally, you know, they are in flow much of the time. But when they're training, they're not. They stuck a lot of the time or they're doing things badly. And I suppose I wonder what that looks like for you. That I would be extremely satisfied with. The problem is I just like, I don't know what the equivalent of do the 64 lapses for almost it. And so this is sort of, this is a thing you can change by choosing guests where there is a legible curriculum. And so maybe as a mistake for not having done that or also, like there's no real way to preffer Terence Tau or something and like, there's no curriculum that's like a plausible one. I think there's one failure mode. So there's many failure modes. But one is, if you could do one dynamic, I'm worried about a long-term dynamic is that you do good, you can have a good podcast and it's a local maximum. But for no particular gestor topic, are you going deep enough that you've, I think my model of learning is there's, if you don't really understand the deeper mechanism, you're just mapping inputs and outputs of a black box. Yeah, yeah. And that just fades incredibly fast or is not worth it in the first place. And you kind of just move on and so forth. And you kind of need to build the intermediate connection. And it's unclear. I think actually AI in a weird way is really easy for that reason because there is a clear thing you can do, just implement it, right? And then you understand it. We're almost, if I applied that criteria elsewhere, what am I, do I just not do history episodes? Exactly, like what, you know, wonderful to talk to, incredibly interesting, but for you personally, like what changed? Right. Yeah, there's some things I learned. I think I could have done a, if I maybe allocated more time, especially after the interview to like, let's write up 2,000 words on everything I learned and how it connects to other things I know. And maybe that's the thing worth doing is spreading out the episodes more and spending more time afterwards consolidating. But yeah, I think I would pay basically infinite amounts of money if there was somebody who was really good at coming up with, here is the curriculum and here is the practice problems you need to do and here's the exercise and you do have the interview to clamp what you have learned. Have you tried doing that with somebody? It's hard to find, so I mean, I've tried super hard, but it seems like, isn't it, we would have to find somebody who could do that for everything or kind of a discipline? Maybe I should just hire different ones for different topics. Maybe, or there's something about, like, I mean, what problem, you know, are you solving sort of for each episode? And I mean, as far as I can tell, like that's the only way I really understand anything is that, you know, I get interested in something. At first, I don't even have a problem, but there's just some sense of there's some contribution to make here and gradually you hone in and there's a problem. And then, I mean, funnily enough, spending time stuck is incredibly important. And I sort of, you know, that you should just be annoying. Now it seems like, oh, this is actually, maybe even the most important part of the whole process. But that very hard oneness of it means that, you know, I internalize it, in other words, I often find actually, if I, you know, I've written sometimes 10,000 word essays in, you know, a couple of days, and I've written them in, you know, three months or six months. I feel like I didn't learn very much from the ones that only took a couple of days, whereas I, you know, some of the ones that took three months, I'll be, you know, 15 years later, I'll still remember. Yeah, can you just go about sort of physics, how you learn of the one that took three months? I mean, by far the most, you know, the common things, there's always some creative artifact. Sometimes it's a class, you know, sometimes it's engagement with a group of people who, you know, there's some collective creative artifact that you're working on together. I mean, you might not even be aware of it, but you're acting as an input to their creative ends in some way. And sometimes it's just, you know, it's an essay or a book or whatever. It's one of the reasons why I often quite enjoy doing podcasts. I mean, particularly, I mean, I, you know, I, I said, yes, to come here partially because I know you ask unusually demanding questions. And so it's sort of, that's an attempt to, to get this sort of perspective from a different, it's a different kind of a forcing function. So you're trying to pick sort of the most demanding creative context. Yeah, so for this interview, I went through like three lectures of the Susque and Sessual at CERDIBOT. The problem is that there's almost no practice problems in it. And so I hired a physicist friend who's going to like, I haven't done it yet, but it's like every lecture I want, like a bunch of practice problems, go to them and I'm, I'm planning on being, um, appropriately humbled. How do you make it as jugular as possible, right? Like, the higher you can raise the stakes, the better. Yeah. I mean, the interview is in some sense high stakes, but also it doesn't necessarily test deep understanding. Yeah, but I don't think the interview is that high stakes, right? You're not writing a book about special relativity. And you're not trying to write a book that replaces the current, you know, whatever the existing standard textbook is. Like that, that's a really high, really high. I'm saying, what do we, the phrase that I sort of find particularly difficult and, um, it's, it's, it's, it's funny, when people will talk about going deep on a subject and it tends to, you know, different people have different ideas of what this means. Some people means they read a couple of blog posts. Some people, it means they read a book about it. Some people, it means they wrote a book about it. Um, and, and, and, and I think like it's sort of what, what, what your standard is, the sort of the standard you hold yourself to, um, determines a lot about, you know, your ability to, to integrate knowledge in this way. I don't know what your experience has been, but I found that I'm getting, I'm in some sense, uh, it was a much faster on some things, uh, to the help of AI, but I don't know if I'm like learning better. Yeah, yeah. And I think it's probably because the hardest thing, the thing that is most demanding is so aversive, that you try to take any excuse you can't to get out of it. And just having back-and-forth conversation, they'll allow me where you gloss over-- - It's entertaining, but not necessarily anything else. - Yeah, so it's such an easy way to get out of the thing. - Yeah. - In fact, it makes it easier because instead of doing some intermediate thinking, there's always the next question you can ask a chatbot. - Yeah, and it's somewhat valuable. Like it's not, I mean, that's part of the seductiveness, of course, like it's not actually useless, but can sort of substitute for actually doing the thing that maybe you should be doing. It's interesting that, like the extent to which, to what extent should you be outsourcing that kind of stuff, and to what extent do you look like? It's really, there's some sort of interesting judgment call about, you actually, there is a whole bunch of routine work that you've one done, and in fact, it's low value for you, so you may as well get, if you can do a chatbot to do it, you may as well. Is that somebody interviewed the pioneering computer scientist, Alan Kaye, years ago, and he was asked what he thought about, basically Linux, and if I remember his answer correctly, basically said, look, you know, it doesn't have anything to do with computer science, it's just a great big ball of mud. There's a few interesting ideas in there, which are worth understanding, but mostly, all you're learning is stuff about Linux, like you're not actually learning anything, which is transferable. There's a certain kind of seductiveness to some things where it's sort of a rib Goldberg machine, you can just sort of learn about all the bits, and it feels kind of entertaining, but if you step back and think about the question, what am I actually doing here? It might not actually be meeting your objectives, maybe you want to become a, you know, since I'd mean learning Linux is a great use of your time, there's no harm in that at all, but if your answer is, if your objective is to understand the fundamentals of computing, it's much less clear that that's a good use of your time. I thought that was, it was simply an answer I've thought a lot about where you actually need to, that for a certain type of mind, there is a seductiveness in just learning systems and confusing that with understanding. Okay, I'll keep you updated on how this goes. I owe you a text more than a month of some revamped learning system. I'll be really curious if you, I mean, it's also true, right? Like, tiny incremental improvements in this, I mean, they're just with so much. I know, yeah. It's sort of the main input into the podcast, you know. It's great that the bookshelves are fancy, and I've got a black foot or whatever, but really, like the thing that makes the podcast better is if I can improve the learning I do. So it's, yeah, it's worth every more of the development permit. - Mm-hmm. - Yeah. - All right, thanks for the, thanks for the therapy session. (laughing) Great nap to end on. Thanks Michael. All right, thanks for having us.