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Michael Howell: Bullish on Gold, Cautious on What Comes Next

49m 52s

Michael Howell: Bullish on Gold, Cautious on What Comes Next

Trevor Hall of Mining Stock Daily speaks with Michael Howell of Cross Border Capital during LME week in London about the global liquidity cycle, monetary policy, debt, inflation, and gold. Howell contends the liquidity cycle peaked in growth terms in Q4 2025 and is now turning down, producing a speculative, volatile market with poor-quality returns. He argues the Federal Reserve has shifted from rate management toward liquidity management, maintaining ample bank reserves through Reserve Management Purchases after reserves fell sharply, while the Treasury conducts "Treasury QE" by issuing bills bought by banks and credit providers, effectively monetizing debt. Treasury buybacks, he says, cap volatility rather than control yields, preserving the collateral multiplier and leverage in the system. Howell attributes rising bond yields to strong nominal GDP growth rather than fiscal deterioration, noting falling term premium and widening junk spreads. He questions whether higher rates still cool economies, since governments are major debtors and rate increases boost private-sector income. He warns that debt compounding at 7–8% annually forces eventual monetization, historically supportive of gold and liquidity. China's PBOC balance sheet expansion is a major underappreciated gold driver, with China accumulating gold to anchor the yuan amid a possible bifurcated dollar-yuan system. Howell expects the liquidity cycle to bottom in 2027, possibly earlier, and recommends watching Bitcoin, the yield curve, PBOC data, and bank reserves, favoring bonds over commodities near term.

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Speaker 1Hey, everybody, Trevor Hall here with Mining Stock Daily reporting from London and the Iron Duke pub here in Mayfair, where we've been covering LME week throughout the week with a number of interviews. And we're going to start releasing those interviews with the one and only Michael Howell of Cross Border Cap talking about all things liquidity and where is it? Is AI sucking up as little liquidity as there is? So a lot to cover here with my one hour conversation with the one and only Michael Howell. Special thank you to Visa Silver, Integra Resources, Revival Gold and Equinox Gold for continued support of this podcast. And also a big thank you to Tara Hutton who make the invisible investable. All these teams help us. Do these trips to London each and every year to cover the LME week and we are grateful for everything they provide for us. So enough of this. Let's jump into my conversation with Michael Howell of Cross Border Cap. All right, everybody, welcome back to Mining Stock Daily covering the LME week here and actually taking somewhat of a step away from metals and really going to focus on macro and global liquidity. And who better to talk about the liquidity cycle here in London than Michael? Michael Howell of Cross Border Capital. Mike, good to see you. I love chatting with you. I've been looking forward to this conversation for a long time. Thanks for joining us here. Well, great pleasure, Trevor. Yes. Always a pleasure. I just got back from a conference in Nashville where I sat with Jared Dillian, Tony Greer, a number of other big macro people. And one of the themes that I think came out of that two-day discussion was how difficult this market has been to make money. There are very few themes that add up. There are very few themes that have actually worked. Right. And I have that in the back of my mind and really using that to set up the question, "Okay, Mike, where are we at in the global liquidity cycle? What have you seen in 2026 that really backs up that difficulty for investment?"
Speaker 2Well, I think just to evidence what Tony Greer has been saying is that this look at the performance of fund managers this year, I mean, most of the fund managers I've got money with have lost money this year. So it shows it's a pretty tricky market. And I think that's the reason why the indexes seem as if they're going up. I think once you drill into that, you can see there's a lot of disquiet. I mean, it looks like the Russell 2000 is probably in a bear market already. You look at stocks around the world, they're not behaving very well. You're seeing tension in some of the new capital raising areas and junk spreads are clearly blowing out. So it's been very tough. And I think what that tells us is we're late in the liquidity cycle. And that's what we've been arguing. Liquidity is a leading indicator. The liquidity cycle peaked in growth terms Q4 last year. It normally leads to a drop in the market. But it's not. It's not. It leads by about nine months or so. And so we're pretty much on track now for saying that we're hitting an air pocket. And I think that's probably correct. It doesn't mean to say the markets are going to go down on a straight line. But I think it's going to be choppy. And this is the environment that we kind of describe as speculative. A speculative market where you can make money, but volatility is high. So the quality of returns is poor.
Speaker 1How much deterioration in asset prices do you expect before liquidity potentially falls? Are you seeing any signs liquidity has found a bottom?
Speaker 2Well, I think that's a very interesting question, Trevor. I think the one's got to sort of explore and look around and see if there are any hints or signs of that. I think if you look at Bitcoin, that's kind of an interesting point to start with. Bitcoin seems to have hit a bid. It seems to be staying above levels of about 70,000, which I think would be a critical break if it fell below that. And it may be telling us a little bit more about what's happening, particularly in terms of U.S. monetary policy. Now, U.S. monetary policy is complicated. It's been made more complicated by the arrival of a new Fed chair and maybe with new directives. I mean, we'll see about that. But it strikes me that the Federal Reserve is operating a very different model than what it's traditionally done. And I think it's fair to say that Fed funds are not a very useful guide anymore to what the Federal Reserve is doing. And that probably ceased to be the case pretty much since the GFC, you know, what, 15 or more years ago. So, I think we've got to start thinking about what the Federal Reserve is up to. And my view is that they're focusing a lot on the repo collateral markets. And they're really saying that what we need to do, and actually, Kevin Walsh made this point very explicitly in the last FOMC Presser. What they want to do is to maintain an ample bank reserve regime. And what that means is they want banks to remain liquid. And by implication, they want money markets to remain liquid. Now, that's telling us that they've got one finger on the pulse of the financial markets. And they don't want a financial market collapse, okay? Now, can they pull that off? That's the $64,000 question. But I think at least they're looking at it. And if you look closely, dig deeply into the data, what you find is that really since the error they made, and the error was fourth quarter of last year, when they lent bank reserves collapse, okay, under the somewhat sort of loose notion that they wanted to see a much smaller Fed balance sheet. If you recall those debates. And consequently, bank reserves were left to tumble. And they fell quite noticeably by about $300 billion or so in that period. You saw huge disquiet in repo markets. Repo spreads blew out. Federal Reserve reacted very quickly, reassuringly perhaps, by introducing yet another acronym. So the acronym, the new acronym is RMP, which is Reserve Management Purchases. This is another QE in disguise. They denied it was QE. But clearly, it is. If it's yellow and it's quacks, it's a duck. And basically, what they did is they lifted the level of bank reserves again by injecting funds through Treasury bill purchases. And that continues. Now, for most of the last year, actually, or since that date, let's say through 2026, they have maintained a fairly stable level of bank reserves. So despite the fact the Fed funds has gone up, you're looking at actually a lot of stability in repo money markets, which is really what they want to do. The other thing to think about is what the Treasury is doing, because there's another leg to this monetary policy now. And we've coined the term Treasury QE to describe what's going on. And that is really a shift away from the old model of Fed QE, which came in after the GFC. This is now Treasury QE. And what the Treasury is doing is basically doing two things. Number one is it issuing a lot more bills. And that may seem a somewhat wonkish or arcane point. But it's very important because what it means is that the Treasury, by issuing bills, is effectively monetizing debt. And the reason that's monetization is it's not the fact they're issuing the bills. It's more the fact of who tends to buy the bills. And who buys bills and very short-dated government debt are banks and credit providers. If banks and credit providers buy the debt, that's monetization. And that is what's going on. So that's number one factor they're doing. The other thing is they're doing Treasury buybacks. And Treasury buybacks are not designed to reduce the level of yields, despite what the Financial Times or Wall Street Journal claim. I mean, Besant is not foolish enough to believe that a $6 billion purchase of a buyback is going to control a $40 trillion market. But what it is doing is actually capping volatility in the markets. And if you cap volatility in the bond markets, in other words, look at the move index for a very good guide to that. If you cap volatility, you basically ensure the leverage of collateral is maintained. So in other words, the collateral multiplier, the factor that turns collateral into liquidity, is still very elevated. If that collapsed, it would be a big, big problem. So the focus of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury seems to me a lot more on liquidity management than actually maybe interest rate management. I think that's a key point. Therefore, the takeaway would be, does this mean the downside is smaller?
Speaker 1Does that mean the downside is smaller?
Speaker 2It should do, but let's see. I don't know. I mean, we've got to see whether this works.
Speaker 1So let me try to simplify the question because it definitely feels like the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, this is one big step towards marrying the two, right? But is it safe to say that you believe the Fed's RMP program is funding the Treasuries, is funding the purchases of the Treasuries?
Speaker 2No, I'm not saying that so much. I mean, they are technically in a very small way, but this is minor. What they're doing is they're facilitating the private sector doing that. So effectively, who is funding the deficit is the private sector, private banks, okay, to a large extent. But the fact that you've got leverage in the markets and you've got a stable repo collateral market really means that banks can do this. And effectively, what they're doing is they're just kicking the can down the road through another vehicle. So this is not Fed QE. It's Treasury QE. It's being funded not by the Federal Reserve in this case. It's being funded by the private sector. But the Federal Reserve is standing behind them, if you like, giving support. So has the Treasury
Speaker 1market effectively become too important for the Fed to allow yields to rise freely?
Speaker 2Well, the Treasury market was always the most important element. That's why central banks exist. People forget that. I mean, this whole thing about fighting inflation and trying to create employment, a new remit, the whole idea of a central bank is basically to maintain the interest rate. Basically, to maintain the integrity of sovereign debt markets. That's what they were invented for in the first place. And that's pretty much what is going on now. If push comes to shove, central banks will basically go back and protect the bond markets. I mean, you saw that in the case of the Liz Truss moment in the UK when the Bank of England switched from a QT to a QE policy overnight to protect the bond market. Yeah. So that's what will happen. And the US Treasury, Fed, are not going to do that.
Speaker 1Yeah. no different yeah do you think there'll be a time where the fed and the treasury officially just become one well i think more or less they are one i mean well i mean yeah i agree with you they they mostly they mostly are one but i think it's
Speaker 2cosmetic that they're
Speaker 1they're separate yeah but do you think there will be time where they just officially come out and say like we're going to end the fed and move everything into the treasury or vice versa
Speaker 2well i think that would be sort of politically inconvenient um but um i think it works pretty well at the moment so if it if it ain't broke you know why fix it
Speaker 1all right fair enough has the the roles of besant and warsh made you kind of re-evaluate your game plan or what's changed in your day-to-day or the or how you do your work and analysis since those two have come in and done some things a little bit
Speaker 2differently i think the i think the first thing is that they're clearly working together okay and i'm sure that warsh's appointment was in some way signed off by by besant i'm sure that must be the case um i think equally if you look at um uh at how policy is re-changing it's really this introduction of bill finance or in other words the much greater use of bills to finance the deficit uh which is really the key thing and that gives the treasury a big monetary footprint um in the markets yeah isn't that
Speaker 1exactly what janet yellen was doing
Speaker 2yes and he she was criticized ironically by scott besant right doing that right i mean
Speaker 1people are saying she needed to go to jail this was criminal yeah and now they're doing seems like they're doing the exact same thing but nobody's out there saying besant needs to be locked behind bars i think
Speaker 2that's right you remember i think probably about three or four years ago stanley drachenmiller the famous u.s investor actually went on stage to say that what janet janet yellen was doing basically the economics of argentina you can't really say that now but i mean that's more that's what he said yeah um and um effectively it's a very inflationary policy the question is how inflationary um it's not just inflationary it's not just inflationary it's not hyperinflationary but it may add a couple of percentage points to underlying inflation let's do let's do
Speaker 1talk about inflation and where you stand i i i think i have empathy towards all arguments obviously costs are going up i i see it every day today and anecdotally um and it seems like obviously the fed stance is to subdue inflation there's you know they will use fed policy rates uh to to do so but it certainly feels like more of the inflationary pressures right now are from supply side dynamics on the energy side you know and our my our friend barry knapp will always argue that inflation is always a monetary and fiscal phenomenon now we can battle inflation by providing more supply on the energy side there's actual tangible things we can do that we didn't have to go to you know the federal reserve policy to fix do you feel interest rate high or is it necessary okay well let me unpack what you just said i think there were
Speaker 2there are two questions there what what's driving inflation and secondly will higher interest rates affect that now i think the question on the interest rate front is what are high interest rates really mean now i'm not sure i already get that i'm not sure the fomc or the bank of england or wherever it may be understand what they're doing if you're raising interest rate what are you what are you trying to achieve that's what i'm i'm not clear about uh or a lot less clear in this current in this current world because if you've got a situation with governments a major debtors to the private sector and interest rates go up okay surely on the government debt you are actually increasing your transfer payments to the private sector you're actually increasing your income payments your interest income payments into the private sector so if interest rates go up you give more money than you take out therefore it's an income boost it's a boost to the economy so give the fact that nobody's really borrowing huge amounts for capex uh you know part shape the ai boom in the us the capex boom in the a in the us but mostly generally worldwide uh most capital expenditure is basically done by state organizations i.e chinese corporations we're not really interested in what the interest cost is okay so you can't say that interest rates play the same role in the economy that they did probably 30 40 years ago okay the textbook model is higher interest rates cool the economy i don't think that's true anymore i'm sure that's not uh it may be the case that if bond yields ultimately rise there is an effect via the housing market that's possible okay uh or consumer credit or maybe that avenue but the traditional route is actually mysterious and so i'm not clear whether higher interest rates have any effect at all okay what really matters uh is the volume of liquidity because you might get a financial crisis and that financial crisis may throw the world economy into recession and then a deflationary balance so i think that that bit is more and more important and i think that's more important to uh to understand if you come back to the question about what's driving inflation i think you've got to recognize there are two moving parts with inflation okay there's a monetary element which i think we're all pretty assured that is going to keep buzzing away uh or humming away at a reasonable clip okay maybe that's going on i would argue at about seven to eight percent per annum okay that's your monetary inflation element and then on top of that you've got to add or subtract what i think of as cost inflation or deflation and that's the thing that's going to affect inflation okay now that could be from higher energy prices it could be from productivity gains it could be from cheap chinese goods that have been dumped it could be a whole range of things higher taxes whatever that's your supply side element now to my mind main street inflation which is what we're talking about is a cocktail of those two elements and for much of the last 20 years we've had the benefit of technology lowish energy prices and cheap chinese goods all deflationary so all deflationary so all deflationary so all deflationary so you add the monetary inflation which has been going on the whole time to the cost deflationary elements and main street prices don't move very much okay you look forward and you've got the monetary inflation still there have you got the supply side disruption i don't know i think you can argue it one of two ways you could say ai is a great productivity booster you could say that we're in a world now where there's a scramble for resources and uh energy is going to be more expensive or uh copper or whatever inputs are more expensive and then you've got the supply side inflation and therefore you get more cost inflation that way uh that's possible okay i'm not clever enough to decide that one but all i would say is that let's say that's a wash you've still got the monetary inflation element which is causing prices to go
Speaker 1up what is this in relation with uh maybe a step here but the liquidity cycle where we're at with a capex cycle if we are talking about supply side inflation we can alleviate that by allocating more capex to bring more supply right in the long run term that would be deflationary yeah but where do we sit right now in the in the capex cycle compared with where we obviously doldrums of liquidity okay
Speaker 2well the way i would argue that driver is to say that all money that is anywhere must be somewhere so if it's in the financial markets it's not in the real economy and if it's in the real economy it's not in the financial market so often you see a seesaw effect so when liquidity in financial markets goes down it's not necessarily because central banks are tightening it could easily be but the real economy is absorbing funds and actually crowding out financial markets and that's normally with a big capex cycle okay so the capex cycle or the economic upturn that we're seeing now is actually pulling liquidity out of financial markets okay and that is the main reason that the liquidity cycle is inflected lower not because central banks have hit the break okay but they're doing that tentatively uh much more that the real economy is is growing very fast and we've made the case that if you look at for example the u.s treasury market which is really in the sort of the eye of the storm in many cases or actually you know partially that probably the french market is more in the eye of the storm as we speak but you get the idea that treasury uh treasuries are generally um of concern because yields have gone up now a lot of people say uh i would say ill-informed commentators particularly a lot of media um with some exceptions but mostly the media say this is all to do with deteriorating fiscal finances this is all to do with the trump effect or the besant effect or the fact that debt is too high or whatever it's not true at all there's no evidence anywhere in the data that that's the case okay what you're seeing is bond yields going up because the economy is red hot okay and what we're looking at is nominal gdp growth uh in the u.s economy which is at its fastest clip hard to believe but in nominal terms this is correct the fastest clip since the mid-1980s okay now inflation is a large part of that so the quality of growth is poorer i on that but the level of nominal gdp growth is high back in the mid-80s bond yields were about seven to eight percent okay and where are we now we're approaching six five and a half six okay so you could see that relative to the economy the bond market looks to be pretty fairly priced to understand the um element about is there too much net supply of debt other concerns among investors about the quality of debt or whatever you've got to look at term premium term premium are flat to falling okay so it's not the fiscal side uh this evidence if you don't if you can't do or people don't have access to term premium look at something like the 10-5 yield curve spread that's falling okay that's telling us that we're getting a situation where term premium are going down and it's basically not about fiscal funding it's all about economic growth so that would suggest that if you've got the prospect of attenuating economic or business cycles in 2027. bond markets are not a bad
Speaker 1place to be on there's been so much emphasis on capex build out from the hyperscalers here and that's actually been a huge talking point in markets here with seeing those um you know core weave has been there's basically the markets compared to what where where their debt is trading now is about 50 50 if that company is right actually functional or not right i think that's pretty telling but is that an uh just kind of a sign that we maybe overdid it uh is that more anecdotal on corey's part or is there real concern that that debt that they've taken on is just too much in an environment where you know where the payback
Speaker 2is just well there's not going to be cash flow is weak i mean this is the i mean the fact is that you know you can um you can go back to what warren buffett always says is when the liquidity tied down you can see who's swimming naked right and that's pretty much the story and you know what we're seeing is that a core weave is clearly one particular example but just look at junk spreads i mean junk spreads are beginning to blow out quite seriously okay even if you look at a investment grade i mean they're beginning to rise relative to treasuries so there's an increasing bid for safe assets in the system yeah such as safe assets well i think safe assets one's got to look at things like the i mean the ultimate safe asset is the u.s treasury but it's equally if you look at the german bund the german bund is the safe asset i mean the whole problem the euro system has i mean why the euro system is a bonkers system is there's no safe asset in the euro system the only safe asset is the german bund which is not a european asset it's a german asset and the problem comes is when push comes to shove in the euro system okay what do people buy if they want a safe asset they buy german bunds so you get spreads in the bond markets blowing out which is what you're seeing now i mean it's not just a the great paradox that you're that you're looking at within the french bond market is not the fact necessarily the term premium the risk premium of french bonds is going up a lot it's much more than the german uh risk premium is going down right it's because of this whole phenomenon and so whatever it takes uh the to use the term that draggy came up with whatever it takes to fix the euro system they will have to go and buy peripheral debt uh which basically means that they're printing money so why would you want to own the euro system if you're going to buy a euro in this sort of environment hence the dollar goes up could
Speaker 1we see a situation where we continue to see strong economics underlying the whole system but but rising yields really don't have much of an effect on the overall um on that on that that speed of growth like people just accepting that you know bonds are going to rise and and but the economy still stays strong as you said well i think is there a breaking point i guess is i
Speaker 2think it's possible i mean i think the point that i was trying to say earlier on is the fed funds make but don't have very much impact okay um bond yields have a lot more impact uh there are much there are much larger part of monetary conditions then you've got adding things like the exchange rate i mean that clearly matters and so once you start to look at what's happening stronger dollar rising bond yields high energy prices this is clearly crimping growth and the fact is that if you look at the exchange rate and the exchange rate and the exchange rate and the exchange rate and the exchange rate and the exchange rate and the exchange rate look into 2027 it's quite likely that this sort of burden will cause economies to slow meaningfully now you've still got the ai ai capex bend you've still got a government deficit of six percent of gdp in the u.s um so there's still momentum in the economy but it could easily slow down quite markedly and that is maybe what the bond markets are going to start telling us pretty soon um and that's the warning for commodity prices okay we're
Speaker 1going to get to commodity prices here in a little bit i i do want to go back i i don't know i think it was about two or three years ago mike like you know we've done over 4500 episodes of mining stock daily and so i have a handful of conversations that i've had in the past that really like stick with me and the conversation you and i had in frankfurt a couple years ago during kai hoffman's event i will never forget because we were talking about debt monetization um and you've argued that governments ultimately have to monetize our debts because widespread default could undermine the entire credit system and you put some numbers in front of me in that conversation i about fell out of the chair so i remember this conversation where does that sit here today uh you know mid-october in 2026 is that argument still as strong if not stronger that they will
Speaker 2yeah look the the trends in the system haven't changed and what we've got to remember is that we live uh in a in a debt dominated world okay that's that's the clear fact and debt is compounding uh and it's mostly being driven by government debt that's the main driver right now and what you're seeing is pressures on government spending um worldwide okay it's aging populations i mean i have to rehearse the arguments but aging populations uh you know more welfare handouts more defense spending okay uh governments need to invest in infrastructure because they haven't done that for a long time so the spending the list of spending demands is getting longer and longer and longer can they tax us anymore well i mean you know deep breath hopefully not but they're going to find some ways of doing a little bit more maybe through wealth taxes that seems to be inevitable so you still can't close the gap with spending so the only thing to do is to monetize that okay i mean you can issue debt but ultimately debt has to be paid back and it won't be paid back so it'll be monetized and so that is really the the path that we're on and because of this big pile up of debt what people forget is the debt has to be periodically repaid there's a refinancing sign and average duration of debt in the world economy is about five years okay which means every five years notionally that debt has to be rolled over now you need balance sheet capacity to do that if you don't have balance sheet capacity you get a financial crisis okay that's what financial crises really are an inability to refinance debt so what happens is that ultimately the central banks have to provide the liquidity because they're the source of all liquidity and so they have to bail the system out so what you've got is a situation where number one debt is growing exponentially number two liquidity follows but liquidity has a cycle to it as well which is why you get the booms and the busts in the financial markets but ultimately it travels the same course so the first question to answer is how much is debt growing my view is that debt is compounding at a rate of about eight percent per annum seven eight percent that sort of figure uh this is looking at the u.s but the u.s is a very good benchmark for elsewhere seven to eight percent per annum what does that mean in real terms uh in practical terms it means that if you grow at seven to eight percent per annum you're more than doubling every 10 years okay so the stock of u.s debt okay which is now 40 trillion will be 80 trillion by 2036 okay okay it'll be 160 you know um again you know another 10 years so 2046. so these are these are big numbers right if you look back in history as a guide from 2000 sorry big pun from actually go back even further 2000 to applies but you can go back even further to 1970 okay 1970 or 1971 to be accurate the u.s came off the gold exchange stand at bretton woods okay the dollar was freely floating this was the era of paper money okay um without any backing at all from gold in that period federal debt grew at an average rate of eight and a half percent per annum okay the stock of debt wasn't a straight line but that was the compound rate global liquidity which is effectively as i've tried to argue as a monetization of that debt grew by 8.6 percent per annum on average okay the price of gold grew by 8.6 percent over that same period okay is that remarkable is that a coincidence or is this how we should be thinking about things so if you've got seven to eight percent growth uh in debt over the next 10 years let's say what's going to happen to global liquidity what's going to happen to gold so those are the benchmarks and in my view if you look at all other commodities they price off gold okay that's my view we'll see if that's yeah proof is in the pudding both putting in the eastern world now if you then look at equities equity markets over that period looking at the s p did a short 10 percent so they were better than gold over that period uh hasn't always been the case but that was they were better over that period and if you look at the bond markets they were a lot worse so you barely got uh six and a bit percent out of 10-year treasuries and you this is per annum i remember and you got at least 100 basis points less out of the five-year note so you're looking at you know bonds underperform this is the world we're in okay politicians are kicking the can down the road there's no change in this okay there's still a cycle and you've got to remember there's a cycle but there's a trend and that trend is becoming embedded you you mentioned
Speaker 1the five-year refinancing cycle and i kept on thinking five years ago we were in covet and i would and you know there were definitely a monetary phenomenon there obviously but is that five-year refinancing i mean it's it feels like it's coming home to roost and that's basically why we're having this huge conversation now because of the refinancing there's a
Speaker 2thing called the debt maturity wall which is basically all to do with debt that was termed out during the post-COVID period when interest rates were slashed near zero, a lot of corporations, personal borrowers decided they would refinance their debts at low interest rates and push them out towards the end of the decade. And that's exactly what's happening. So it's a huge amount of debt coming back into the system in the next few years to be refinanced. That's putting additional strain on balance sheets on top of the AI capex spend, on top of the fiscal spend, the new spend. This is existing debt for refinance. Is this a normal cycle, implications of a cycle? This is completely- No, it's more because what you've done is you've basically taken debt out in the period of COVID. I mean, the question to ask is why have we had this everything bubble? We've had the everything bubble because there's been no debt to refinance and there's been lots and lots of liquidity being pushed into the system. So the vent is always asset markets. This is what happens. So now what you've got is- It's a downswing of the liquidity cycle with a lot of debt coming back into the system to be refinanced. And that's why it's a fairly ugly picture, right? Unless the central banks try and do something.
Speaker 1Yeah. Well, let's talk about that. What forces the Fed to intervene? Or maybe not just the Fed, all sovereign central banks.
Speaker 2Well, to put it bluntly, that'll follow the Fed. I mean, the Fed is in charge. And if you get disruptions, and we're living in a dollar world, if you get disruptions in the dollar financing system, the Federal Reserve would have to act. So what specific event would lead the
Speaker 1Federal Reserve to provide a meaningful, significant additional liquidity?
Speaker 2Well, I think there would be, I mean, there'll be a number of things, but I would say if you've got heightened volatility in the treasury market, if you've got auctions seeing very low bid to cover ratios, those would be, I think, phenomenal. If it would be very difficult to sell debt in any form, I mean, those are really, I suppose, those two previous statements, say the same thing. But problems in the debt markets, and it could be corporate defaults as well. Would a big equity market slump do it? Could do. That's possible. If you start to see, you know, areas of the financial system being seriously impaired, yeah, they'd come in and they'd come out and act.
Speaker 1Let's talk about gold. You mentioned it a little bit in that historical kind of, the benchmarks you have on the horizon here. You've also made argument that China's monetary expansion has been a real important driver in the recent years of the gold price outside of, you know, some of the geopolitical conflicts that we get inundated with. Can you explain how Chinese liquidity finds its way into the gold market? And does it remain underappreciated? Well, I think
Speaker 2the answer is, on the latter point, it's hugely underappreciated because China is the elephant in the room. If you think the West has got debt problems, just start thinking about China. China's got big debt problems. And we know that after, certainly after the GFC, China put its foot to the floor in terms of trying to pump the economy up and trying to pull the world economy out of the slump. There was huge overbuilding in China that was focused on infrastructure and apartment construction and whatever. There's a lot of debt, which is currently being held by local governments in the world. No clear idea about how big this is. But it clearly impairs growth in the economy. China is seeing a situation not a million miles away from what Japan saw about 15, 20 years ago, where it had two lost decades. Okay. If you look at one of the maybe sort of interesting, tongue-in-cheek interesting comparisons that are often thrown out, which is to say, let's look at the US bond market. What is the US bond market yielding? It's yielding circa five and a half. What are Chinese bonds yielding? Circa one and a half. Okay. That 400 basis point spread, according to some commentators, pro-Chinese commentators, this is all about the risk premium now being attached to US assets. It's showing that the world is losing confidence in the US and term premium, risk premium government debt is rising. Complete rubbish. What that's showing is that the Chinese economy is flat on its back. Because if you believe, take my argument, that not nominal bond yields basically align with nominal GDP growth, the five and a half percent may be rising. US government bond yields are reflecting a strong economy in the US, strong nominal economy. But one and a half percent yield in China is reflecting a very poor Chinese economy. And if you assume generously that the Chinese economy may be growing at 2%, real, that's telling you they've got half percent price deflation. So this is not a great environment to hold debt. You're not going to be able to hold it. So what does China do? It could basically do what Japan has done. Or it could do what America did in the 1930s and what Scandinavia did in the 1990s. And the two alternatives are Japan sits and waits. Ultimately, it caves in. So look at Abenomics. Abenomics took 20 years to occur, but it's now cured the Japanese problem. So they've monetized the debt and restructured the economy. And now Japan has clearly suffered a very weak yen, but they've got through their debt burden because effectively debt has been devalued relative to other assets in the economy. Okay. What America did and what Scandinavia did is basically do that with alacrity, with speed, very quickly. So they very quickly devalued, very quickly devalued their currency and their debt, tried to get prices up. And that was a more immediate solution. I mean, the US did another smaller example after the GFC, let the dollar go down, pushed in liquidity. China needs to do that. China has been doing that, but it's not necessarily been a straight line. And if you look at the gold price, and I challenge anyone to do this because I've done it and tried to show this correlation, plot the gold price against what the People's Bank of China's balance sheet is doing. Okay. The People's Bank's balance sheet expands before significantly, before the gold price moves up in 2022. And it starts to top out around the time the gold market starts to come off at the beginning of this year. There's a very clear correlation. You can even go drill deeper and look at changes, monthly changes in that data, and it's still compellingly good. So what it's trying to say is that China is a big driver. Now, why is that? Because China's expansion of its balance sheet, its monetary balance sheet is trying to monetize debt. Okay. What they're doing in my view is trying to create what I call a dual circulation. So you've got an internal value of the Yuan, and you've got an external value of the Yuan. And they're trying to keep those separate through capital controls, through large Forex reserves, and through compliant state banks. They've doubled down on their anti-crypto drive. So you can't get money out through that channel very easily. So what those two systems are, are basically separate. They can keep the Yuan dollar as their cosmetic rate. Okay. And they can devalue internally through this mechanism of basically printing money, allowing domestic prices and wages to go up. Okay. That may take time, but they've got to print the money first. And the vent is unlikely to be real estate because it's on its back. The Chinese then tend not to go for the stock market. They tend to go for gold and precious metals. And so if you look at Chinese retail buying of gold and silver, it's very strong.
Speaker 1Yeah, it has been very strong. In fact, just a couple, what was it, two weeks ago when they came off of their holiday, you immediately saw the gold price move when they were back and buying. But it seems like this is more of an attempt to manage their debt situation than it is anything that people argue, well, they're buying the gold for the next currency regime, but you don't seem to be a part of that camp. It's more of a management.
Speaker 2Well, I think there's another argument, which is not unconnected, which is saying that let's take a step beyond this and say, well, okay, how is the world managing international currency arrangements and my view, we're basically moving towards a bifurcated system whereby you've got the dollar and its satellites, and you've got the yuan and its satellites. Okay, this is looking into the future. The dollar system is backed by US treasuries. Okay. And it may well be an adjunct to that, which is stable coin, possibly. Okay. Let's not dismiss that. And then you've got on the other side, an equivalent Chinese monetary system. But China doesn't have an obvious collateral to back the currency. The US dollar has, US treasuries, which don't accept it collateral. And collateral is important. If the Chinese can't use government bonds as collateral, because they're not widely circulating, what it can use is gold. Everyone understands that. So it's accumulating gold as a way of giving some credibility to the yuan, the paper yuan, to anchor the paper yuan. Doesn't not mean to say this is a gold standard, far from it. Okay. It's a gold exchange standard, which is very different. It's like Bretton Woods. That was a gold exchange standard. And what that basically means is that you have your stock of gold, which is effectively backing part of the currency, and you allow limited transactions. So if you've got a friendly power like the Saudis, and China wants to do a gold oil exchange deal, it can do that, and it can pay for the oil with gold. Okay. And they have set these facilities up around the world so they can do that. I would venture that's possible, But it's not going to be very frequent. These are just cosmetic moves. China doesn't want to let its gold go, obviously. in the same way the Forks Knox didn't want to open the doors and let the French or the Brits take the gold away in the late 60s. So there will be restrictions on that. But that's what I think is going on.
Speaker 1Speaking of using gold as a management tool, back on the US side, there's Judy Shelton coming in as an advisor for the Treasury Department, kind of leads for the speculation maybe they are interested in some sort of gold-backed note. Is that something that potentially could be on the table using US gold reserves, which we still speculate is or is not there at Forks Knox?
Speaker 2Well, I mean, never say never. I mean, Judy Shelton's always got a lot of interesting stuff to say, that's for sure. The fact that she's been brought in as an advisor, supposedly, is clearly meaningful. Scott Besson obviously respects that. He's been brought in as an advisor, supposedly, is clearly meaningful. That's what she says. And she's worth listening to. But will that mean that the US goes to a gold standard or backs the currency with gold? No, because I mean, governments can't exist in this world if you've got fiscal largesse, which you clearly have. You need the ability to print money, print paper money. You've got to have that. And so there's no way this is going to happen.
Speaker 1We got just a few minutes left here, Mike. So I do want to start wrapping it up. But on the gold side, do you feel that the capital rotation, are we still in the beginning of a capital rotation from financial assets to hard assets? Or is it be a continuing evolution throughout this cycle until we finally get some clarity and some things start calming down?
Speaker 2Well, I think you've got to differentiate the trend from the cycle, okay? Trends may have changed and trends may be clearly changing. And I think that's what's happening. And I definitely believe that. So I think in the medium term, you definitely want exposure to commodities. You want exposure to gold. You probably want exposure to Bitcoin. You don't want exposure to bonds. The problem is, is the short term is almost the opposite to that. And the cyclical downswing may hurt us. But this is an opportunity to buy at lower prices. So in my view, you want to be switching out of commodities right now into bonds, right? And that may be a maverick view, but I think it's a good idea. I think that's what my data tells me. You're not the only one, I think.
Speaker 1Okay. Well, okay.
Speaker 2It's less of a maverick view, but it's an increasingly popular view. But I think that makes sense because bond markets seem as if yields are now generous relative to the state of the economy. And it looks as if if the economy does falter, commodity markets, which seem stretched, may more come off. So I think that's a reasonable call. The point is, though, if you get a slower economy and you get this liquidity disruption, what will central banks do? And my inclination is they're going to have to start putting money back quite quickly because there's so much debt out there that the pressures, the refinancing pressures will be just enormous. And they're going to have to create another upswing. And it may be that you get a difficult period, but that difficult period, which a lot of things will fall in price, commodities, gold, Bitcoin, probably everything, equities, for sure. You're going to have to start, you're going to think about buying back in on the dips.
Speaker 1Well, you have suggested that the liquidity cycle could potentially bottom and recover next year at some time in 2027. What should we be watching that would convince you that that certainly has happened and we see another rise in global liquidity?
Speaker 2I think the number of things, well, let me say this. I'd be pretty certain that the liquidity cycle bottoms in 2027. I don't think that's going to happen. Okay. Period. What I've really been arguing recently is that we originally said that was likely second half of the year. That was most likely the case. So 2027? Yeah. And what we're now saying is it may be brought forward. I don't know yet, but this is what I'm beginning to think because of what I'm seeing the Federal Reserve do. Because the Federal Reserve is so concerned about or seems to be so concerned about financial conditions that the ability for them to tighten in the face of this big debt load may be just too much. So if you look at, for example, what Walsh seems to be doing right now, in my estimation, he's basically tightening at half the pace that Powell did in 22. Okay. 21, 22. So this is a half speed ahead sort of idea. So that may be enough to get us somewhat close to that. So I'd be watching Bitcoin because I think Bitcoin is the most fantastic barometer of liquidity. It's probably the most liquidity sensitive asset on the planet. As it happens from experience. Okay. It's going to be volatile, but maybe that's worth looking at. I'd be looking at the slope of the yield curve. That's for sure, because the slope of the yield curve tells us a lot of information about the liquidity cycle. It lags the liquidity cycle, but it's a confirming indicator. And then I'd be looking pretty closely at two other things of hard data. I'd be looking at what the People's Bank of China is doing because they're one of the two big elephants in the room when it comes to liquidity. And the other thing I'd be looking at is to look weekly basis in terms of accommodating bank reserves.
Speaker 1Okay. So what, is there a corner of the market today that you've investors are failing to appreciate, or is it one of those, we need to just kind of stand and wait for this thing to get some clarity?
Speaker 2Well, I think the thing is that maybe people don't realize that the, the liquidity cycle is turning down. And, you know, the reason for that is you've seen, um, stock indexes elevated for some time and people keep saying, well, it's different this time. It's different this time. They always do at these points. Um, and trying to convince people to move away from risk assets at this point in the cycle is always the most difficult job you've got. Okay. You can never do that. Okay. Cause you, you, you don't get any thanks if it goes right and you get lots of, you know, bad noises if it, if it goes, if you get it wrong. So it's a really difficult call, uh, telling people to sell too early. I mean, people don't mind taking a 10% loss, but what they hate doing is, you know, they don't want to sell too early. So they don't want to sell too early. So they're basically missing the last 10%. And that's just human nature. So it's very difficult to explain to people that thing. What I would say is the big thing that's missing is a misunderstanding of China. And people don't realize that China's got this debt burden and it has to get out of that debt burden. And there's all these sort of, uh, you know, there's this drumbeat, uh, or sort of creed occur coming out of a lot of, uh, Western analysts and economists to say, China's got to revalue its exchange rate upwards. Okay. It needs to appreciate the yuan, not allow it to depreciate. I think could be further from the truth. Okay. This is not what China wants. Uh, what probably one would, what China was going to get either. You simply can't have that situation because it's not the fact that the China's economy is weak, which is the reason they've got this big trade surplus. And they're trying to push their surplus production internationally. It's not because they're super competitive necessarily. Uh, and the exchange rate is wrong. Uh, in actual fact, you just do a very simple test and ask the question, what would happen if capital controls were eliminated right now? Would the yuan go up or would it come down? I would say 99 times out of a hundred, it would come down. Yeah. Uh,
Speaker 1let me, one last question here, Mike, then we'll let you go. Just kind of curious what it would take for an official Fed intervention. Uh, it's been some weakness in the equity market. Would something like a 15, 20% drawdown in the equities kind of corral the, the sentiment towards, you know, the federal reserve providing? I think per se, no, I think that that
Speaker 2would, um, I mean, secretly, I think Besson and Walsh would be happy with that because it would basically mean the funding environment for treasuries was a lot better. Okay. You've got a switch of money. You've got to remember that, uh, a lot of investors worldwide are very underweight fixed income right now. So a lot of money could make that shift, uh, into the markets. If there was disruption in the fixed income markets, if there were, uh, in major institutions, um, then they would act. If there was a risk of recession, they would act. Okay. All right. Good to see you. Thanks so much.
Speaker 1Thanks so much for coming over and spending the hour with us. Always appreciate the conversations, Mike. And, uh, we will do this again, hopefully next year. Look forward to it. All right. Thank you. Why don't you tell everybody about the, the, uh, cross-border cap where they can find your work?
Speaker 2Oh yeah. Okay. Let me, let me do that. Um, a little advert, um, best way is through a sub stack, which is called CapitalWars. Uh, so we write in, uh, on sub stack, uh, two or three times a week, uh, giving data and giving narrative, uh, explanations of what we think is going on. Um, there is a website, which is, uh, glindexes.com, which is where institutional investors can basically get data and, uh, deeper analysis. What about an updated version of the book?
Speaker 1I feel like it's overdue, Mike.
Speaker 2Yeah. I'm actually talking to, um, I'm actually talking to a publisher now about doing another version of that. So we'll see.
Speaker 1But the thing keeps evolving once you publish a second version and you probably need it to do a third. Well, that's maybe the case. All right, Mike. Thanks so much. Good to see you. Good. Thank you. The information presented should not be considered investment advice. Mining Stock Daily and its affiliates are not responsible for any loss arising from any investment decision in connection with the material presented herein. Please do your own research or speak with a licensed financial representative before making any investment decisions.

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. Michael Howell of Cross Border Capital argues the global liquidity cycle peaked in growth terms in Q4 2025 and is now in a late-cycle downturn, making markets choppy and fund manager returns poor.
  2. The Federal Reserve has shifted focus from Fed funds rates toward liquidity management, maintaining an ample bank reserve regime and introducing Reserve Management Purchases (RMP) after bank reserves fell roughly $300 billion.
  3. Howell describes "Treasury QE," in which the Treasury issues more bills bought by banks and credit providers, effectively monetizing debt while Treasury buybacks cap bond market volatility and preserve the collateral multiplier.
  4. Rising bond yields reflect strong nominal GDP growth rather than deteriorating fiscal finances, with term premium flat to falling and junk spreads widening as investors seek safe assets.
  5. Howell argues higher interest rates may no longer cool economies because governments are major debtors, so rising rates boost private-sector interest income; liquidity volume matters more than rate levels.
  6. Debt is compounding at roughly 7–8% annually, implying U.S. debt could double from $40 trillion to $80 trillion by 2036, forcing eventual monetization and supporting gold, which has historically tracked liquidity growth.
  7. China's monetary expansion and People's Bank of China balance sheet growth are a key, underappreciated driver of gold, with China accumulating gold to anchor the yuan in a potentially bifurcated dollar-yuan currency system.
  8. Howell expects the liquidity cycle to bottom in 2027, possibly earlier, and advises watching Bitcoin, the yield curve slope, PBOC actions, and weekly bank reserve data; he favors rotating from commodities into bonds near term.

Summary:

Trevor Hall of Mining Stock Daily speaks with Michael Howell of Cross Border Capital during LME week in London about the global liquidity cycle, monetary policy, debt, inflation, and gold. Howell contends the liquidity cycle peaked in growth terms in Q4 2025 and is now turning down, producing a speculative, volatile market with poor-quality returns. He argues the Federal Reserve has shifted from rate management toward liquidity management, maintaining ample bank reserves through Reserve Management Purchases after reserves fell sharply, while the Treasury conducts "Treasury QE" by issuing bills bought by banks and credit providers, effectively monetizing debt. Treasury buybacks, he says, cap volatility rather than control yields, preserving the collateral multiplier and leverage in the system.

Howell attributes rising bond yields to strong nominal GDP growth rather than fiscal deterioration, noting falling term premium and widening junk spreads. He questions whether higher rates still cool economies, since governments are major debtors and rate increases boost private-sector income. He warns that debt compounding at 7–8% annually forces eventual monetization, historically supportive of gold and liquidity. China's PBOC balance sheet expansion is a major underappreciated gold driver, with China accumulating gold to anchor the yuan amid a possible bifurcated dollar-yuan system. Howell expects the liquidity cycle to bottom in 2027, possibly earlier, and recommends watching Bitcoin, the yield curve, PBOC data, and bank reserves, favoring bonds over commodities near term.

FAQs

Howell says we are late in the liquidity cycle; liquidity growth peaked in Q4 of last year and typically leads markets by about nine months. This points to a choppy, speculative market with poor-quality returns rather than a straight-line decline.

RMP stands for Reserve Management Purchases, which Howell describes as another form of QE in disguise. It injects funds through Treasury bill purchases to keep bank reserves and repo markets stable after reserves fell sharply.

Treasury QE refers to the Treasury issuing more bills and conducting buybacks, which effectively monetizes debt because banks and credit providers buy the bills. Unlike Fed QE, it is funded largely by the private sector, with the Fed standing behind it for support.

He argues that because governments are major debtors, higher rates increase interest payments to the private sector, acting as an income boost. He also notes that much capex is done by state-linked entities that are less sensitive to interest costs.

He sees inflation as a cocktail of monetary inflation (running around 7-8% per annum) plus cost inflation or deflation from supply-side factors like energy prices, productivity, and cheap goods. Even if supply effects offset each other, the monetary element keeps prices rising.

He says rising yields reflect a red-hot nominal economy, with US nominal GDP growth at its fastest since the mid-1980s, not deteriorating fiscal finances. Term premium is flat to falling, which supports this view.

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