Speaker 1this episode is brought to you by nordstrom for 125 years nordstrom has been part of your story the stylist who found the perfect outfit for your big interview the first pair of walking shoes for your one-year-old the tomato soup you shared with your sister at the cafe these are the moments that make nordstrom nordstrom big or small we're here for all of it celebrating 125 years with new moments still add discover it all in nordstrom stores and at nordstrom.com cbn pelo
Speaker 2mundo com bruna santos oi bruna boa tarde boa tarde tudo bem tudo
Speaker 3bem bruna santos falando conosco diretamente de washington e assim como boa parte do mundo olhando para o mundo todo mundo está olhando para o mundo todo mundo está olhando para as eleições no brasil o que é que tá realmente em disputa nessa eleição quando a gente fala de política externa bruna são duas pessoas duas ideias diferentes sobre o lugar do brasil no mundo sim tati
Speaker 4muita gente olhando para as eleições no brasil muita muita pergunta muita demanda assim para entender o que pode vir por aí e eu acho que sim acho que são duas ideias diferentes sobre como o brasil o brasil will preserve its power of choice in a world where we see China and the United States in a dispute of influence. I just wanted to note that the analysis I'm doing is an analysis based, obviously, on government plans, that the candidates put in interviews, but the fact that they haven't debated face to face makes it a little difficult for us to understand the proposals when one confronts the other. We're waiting for a debate in the second round to understand that, because it's really lacking for Brazilian society and for international society for the two to be on stage face to face. I think it's important to start, when we look at the proposals of foreign policy that are in the government plans and what they brought, and especially also in the history of President Lula and what Flávio Bolsonaro has put forward, are the convergences, because they exist, there is a lot of convergence. In what they brought, there is a lot of convergence. in what they are talking about. Both talk about pragmatism, both talk about diversifying markets, they talk about the processing of critical minerals in Brazil, for example, they mention the understanding that, well, security is a matter of sovereignty, but the difference appears when the question is: what is the threat? That is, what dependence does each one consider more dangerous? And then, for Lula, the greater risk is for Brazil to be subordinated to a great power, economically, technologically, politically as well, and for that reason his answer is a greater diversification, especially with the countries of the so-called global south, there, through the BRICS, through the Mercosur, the strengthening of the Mercosur, the strengthening and reform of multilateral organisms appears a lot, and always keeping the idea of a foot in each boat, of maintaining positive relations with the United States, with China, with the European Union. Flávio also defends this idea of autonomy, but within another diagnosis. He defends the idea of keeping a foot in each boat, even because I think this is a very unique tradition of Brazilian diplomacy, but he defends this from the idea of Brazil abandoning the range of countries that he considers ideological, such as, for example, alliances like the BRICS and so on, and Brazil returning to anchor itself more clearly in the so-called West, that is, working with the United States and with the OECD, along with a very close cooperation with Washington. Here in Washington, it is worth noting, and I think I have already said this here, people look a lot at Brazil in a slightly annoying way, they have difficulty understanding the Brazilian foreign policy, the Brazilian reality in its complexity, right? And I think there is a tendency around here to understand Flávio pro-United States, Lula anti-United States. A large part of my work in recent days has also been to bring more nuance to this diagnosis, because I think it ends up being very shallow, right? Both have different visions, but both start with an idea that Brazil needs to preserve independence. The question is how.
Speaker 2And looking at the government plans and the declarations of the two, what are the strong points and vulnerabilities in the two candidates, Bruna?
Speaker 4I think it's really cool for us to be able to talk about this, because deep down, the two, as I said, they disagree on where the greatest risk of Brazilian dependency is. In the case of Lula, the main strong point, I would say, is a coherence through the plan and through the talks, agree or disagree, right? I think there is a very great coherence in the discourse of sovereignty with the industrial policy that he presented during his government, the policy of critical minerals, the vision of multilateralism and what he did with regard to diversifying partners. So I think this is a strong point. He already has instruments, Brazil already has instruments created in his government that give this support, such as the national policy of critical minerals, the whole question of the reciprocity law, also in relation to tariffs, a climate agenda also developed. I think the great vulnerability of the plans of the Lula government, of the Lula campaign, is the search for autonomy, overloading a kind of defensive anti-Americanism, you know, an idea that resisting Washington would become an end in itself. So, I think that's a point. At the same time, I think the dependence on China, of course, reduces precisely this freedom that the discourse of diversification seeks to protect. Another vulnerability that very frequently comes up in the conversations, and I think this is common to Flávio and Lula, is the Brazilian leadership in the climate field aligned with the oil expansion, the expansion of oil exploration. This is something that Brazil tried to make a discussion and a quasi-rhetorical malabarism in COP 30, in the last year, but there are still questions about how to express this vision. One thing that I also consider a vulnerability of the government plan of President Lula is to have left aside the idea of adherence to the OECD. I think the OECD does not require Brazil to abandon the BRICS, it is not a geopolitical alliance, and would give Brazil an opportunity to occupy many spaces, right? To occupy the OECD, to occupy the BRICS, to occupy the G20. So, I think this would also give Brazil an opportunity to make a comparison between peers, to improve public policy in the sense of combating corruption and such. In the case of Flávio, the strong point is that I think they have a very simple message, right? And this helps when it comes to communicating with the voter. It is security and re-approach with the United States, and so, he recognizes Brazil as a mining exporter, at this point, and Lula and Flávio are very aligned, the two want to bring technology to process internally, and so on. Flávio defends an idea of adherence to the OECD, to resume this priority, but the vulnerability for me, the great vulnerability for me, of Flávio, is the distance between the pragmatism of the program and the statement he has of a very automatic alignment, subservient to Washington, because one thing does not talk to the other. And we know that ideological affinity does not guarantee commercial concession, when we are talking about the United States, right? So, I think this is one point. The other great vulnerability of Flávio Bolsonaro's government plan is the weight of the past, guys. We saw in Jair Bolsonaro's government an external policy marked by ideologization, by many bravadoes, in which, in various moments, areas and more pragmatic actors of the government, like, at the time, the Minister of Agriculture, Tereza Cristina, and Vice President Mourão, had to enter to alleviate tensions with China, for example, having seen the importance of China in relation to Brazilian trade. So, to close, I think that looking at the two projects, the two plans, I think we have, we oscillate a lot between a can-turn complex and a pit-bull complex, which is the idea that we are very, we are oscillating between a pole of an almost hyperactive diplomacy, where you have an abyss between the ambition of the country and the capacity, today, material of the Brazilian state, and a policy, or a subservient policy that ignores the game as it is being played today, which is the game in which we know that there is no free lunch in the world of Trump, ideological alignment will not buy any seat on the decision-making table.
Speaker 3Uh-huh. Bolsonaro proposes that Brazil enter the shield of the Americas and adopt the logic of dealing with the PCC and the Red Command, to quote only two of the factions, Uh-huh. narcoterroristas. Rapidinho, o que é que o Brasil ganha
Speaker 4com isso? Olha, eu acho que o Brasil ganha, pode ganhar, um ganho mais concreto seria poder chegar fora do país ao dinheiro, às armas, aos fornecedores, às empresas de fachada que os integrantes das facções têm e que a polícia brasileira hoje não alcança sozinha. Eu acho que a grande distinção é a diferenciação entre cooperação para a inteligência e cooperação internacional para terceirizar o comando. Eu acho que essa é a grande dificuldade. O escudo até hoje, Tati, vale notar que ele tem ainda uma distância importante entre anúncio e resultado. O tal do escudo das Américas, ele criou uma estrutura de cooperação e coordenação militar, que está fazendo ali algumas coisas no Pacífico, mas no que diz respeito às questões de inteligência, de tradução em resultados financeiros comprováveis, a gente não tem visto ainda muitas coisas sendo demonstradas. Então, rapidamente, acho que esse é o principal ponto. Acho que uma coisa é internacionalizar a investigação e a inteligência, outra coisa é fazer cooperação para isso. Outra coisa é internacionalizar o comando, deixar que um outro país esteja sujeito a decidir quem é o seu inimigo, qual operação vem primeiro, quais regras vão ser usadas. Qualquer coisa nesse sentido teria que ser em alinhamento com o Estado brasileiro, com o governo brasileiro, em alguns casos o Equador é um exemplo de um país que convidou os Estados Unidos a entrar e fazer uma operação militar de combate, uma operação militar conjunta que bombardeou uma instalação que supostamente pertencia a uma organização criminosa, mas sem esse convite, sem esse acordo, os Estados Unidos não poderiam, em tese, agir no Brasil. A gente não sabe como isso será, dependendo do governo eleito, aí em uma semana ou mais de uma semana.
Speaker 315 dias. E para fechar, Bruna,
Speaker 2tem gente na campanha do Flávio discutindo uma reforma do Itamaraty inspirada no que fez Marco Rubio no Departamento do Estado americano. O que ele mudou lá? O que daria para mudar aqui?
Speaker 4Então, o Rubio fez uma espécie de uma reforma administrativa que eliminou unidades dentro do Departamento do Estado, que é o equivalente americano ao nosso Itamaraty, e cortou 1.300 postos ocupados. Ele também fez uma absorção de toda uma unidade que chamava o ZAID, que tratava de ajuda externa dentro do Departamento do Estado, e passou a criar ali um modelo de avaliação dos diplomatas e do serviço internacional muito ideológico, olhando para a fidelidade desses diplomatas à agenda Trump. O que o governo brasileiro poderia copiar de mais radical não é necessariamente o organograma, na minha opinião, porque o governo brasileiro tem o Brasil tem e protege o servidor público e os diplomatas brasileiros são servidores públicos, então estariam em tese protegidos pela legislação e eles não poderiam fazer a mesma coisa que o Rubio fez por decreto. Isso é uma coisa. Mas tem uma coisa que eu acho que o Brasil podia copiar, que é sobre o jeito de decidir, que não é uma coisa relacionada ao organograma. E isso eu acho interessante da gente observar, porque o Trump trocou a diplomacia profissional por um circuito pessoal muito personalista. Acho que o exemplo mais claro disso é o Jared Kushner, que é genro do presidente, que não tem cargo nenhum no governo e que toca negociações com Gaza, com Rússia, com Ucrânia, sem necessariamente ocupar, fazer parte da institucionalidade do governo. Isso eu acho talvez o ponto que o Brasil poderia copiar e que seria seria muito danoso, na verdade, a institucionalidade da nossa diplomacia e da forma de fazer política externa, francamente. Esse, pra mim, é um ponto mais salutar da gente observar no Brasil. A principal mudança na política externa americana nos últimos anos não foi no organograma, no reformaço, no canetaço, etc. Foi na forma de decidir, na forma como as decisões são tomadas e na forma como esse fluxo informal de informação e de influência se dá. E acho que o exemplo, o exemplo do Jared Kushner, genro do presidente, é um deles.
Speaker 3Muito bem. Bruna Santos está com a gente às sextas-feiras no nosso CBN Pelo Mundo diretamente de Washington. Obrigada, Bruna. Um beijo pra você. Obrigada, queridas. Até a semana que vem. Tchau, tchau. Tchau, tchau.
Speaker 5Tchau, tchau. Tchau, tchau. Tchau, tchau.
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