Lithuania's EU Presidency: Leading Europe in a Contested World
32m 3s
Lithuania’s 2027 EU presidency will focus on transforming European security and resilience in response to escalating hybrid and kinetic threats from Russia and Belarus. The country emphasizes that Europe must either react or lead, criticizing past inaction and advocating for stronger, more coordinated responses—especially through expanded sanctions, credible deterrence, and a clear political stance against re-engaging with Russian energy. Lithuania will push for a fairer burden-sharing model for Ukraine’s defense, committing to 0.25% of GDP annually for ten years and urging other EU nations to follow. The presidency will accelerate EU enlargement by advancing Ukraine and Moldova’s accession processes, closing key reform chapters, and promoting merit-based criteria for all candidate countries. Deepening cooperation with NATO allies, especially the UK and Nordic states, will be central to strengthening defense industrial ties and cross-border resilience. Lithuania will also champion energy independence, highlighting its status as a green energy exporter and urging the EU to bolster infrastructure protection against sabotage. Success will be defined by concrete achievements: a new multi-year financial framework with dedicated security funding, closure of key accession chapters, and strengthened democratic and internal security institutions. The presidency aims to shift Europe from reactive to proactive, ensuring long-term stability through unity, transparency, and strategic foresight.
Hello. Welcome to RUSI in London. I'm Patras Kajtnas, Research Fellow in Climate, Energy and Defense.
And this is a Global Security Briefing, the podcast from RUSI's international security team that provides insights on security developments around the world.
And in today's episode, we'll look ahead to Lithuania's presidency on the Council of the European Union.
On 1 January 2027, Lithuania will assume the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time.
The European policy landscape has changed substantially since Lithuania's first presidency in 2013.
The EU is facing a tough geopolitical situation.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is nearing its fifth year.
Transatlantic relations, once seen as stable, are now being questioned on both sides of the Atlantic.
Europe is still dealing with an energy crisis that has exposed itself.
It's been a time when the EU has lost its dependency and driven up costs for households and businesses.
Hybrid threats like sabotage, airspace violations and using migrants as a tool have become daily worries, especially in Eastern Europe.
Vilnius sums up its approach to the presidency simply: "Europe can either react or leave."
But what does that really mean?
Today, on our podcast, we'll talk about what this looks like in practice.
I'm joined by Minister Kastutis Budris, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.
Minister, welcome to the podcast.
We are glad you could join us.
Thank you for having me here today.
Thank you.
So, Minister, Lithuania takes the chair at the moment when almost every assumption about European security is being tested.
What does a frontline member state bring to the presidency that others might not?
And what would you like the EU to have decided by the end of the presidency?
Our priorities are five for our presidency.
If you would look for the common denominator,
that's security and defense.
So external security, internal security, and also more representation of security-related items in the multi-year financial framework.
Within these areas, and I will talk later on about other priorities related to enlargement and competitiveness.
But within the security area, we do not see a lot of contradictions with our trio partners.
That's Ireland and Greece with the current presidency.
And Greece, that will be after us.
And it is a reflection in the way of the expectations of EU citizens.
We see in a different pulse that EU citizens, they want more and more involvement of European Union as organization to the security matters.
And we have to achieve this.
So from the very frontline, of course, what we are bringing in, that's the sharpness to the issue.
That's absolutely top priority for us nationally.
So it means that we put
more energy and political capital in what we are trying to achieve.
But we are not just the frontline.
We have a lot of agency in what we are doing in building our own resilience,
leading by example, what concerns our security investments,
not only defense investments, that's the highest in the free world and within NATO,
but also in many other areas like transport, like energy, what concerns resilience.
So we want these practices to be applied Europe wide.
And of course, with also additional involvement of financial instruments.
So we want to have the really push forward in these topics, security and defense, first of all.
Thank you.
Recently, you said that Europe has a choice to react or to lead.
Where concretely do you think the EU has been reacting when it should have been leading?
That's everything that is happening in our neighborhood.
We missed the opportunities, good opportunities that we had to take leadership,
concerns shaping the security environment in our neighborhood.
Now, currently, what is happening with consolidating European position towards
stopping full aggression against Ukraine, I think this is a very good example.
But we missed previously so many opportunities and we're just reacting to
what Putin was serving us, what he was doing instead of taking the lead and initiative.
What I have in mind, look at the position of President Trump,
for example, with strong sanctions package, at least threatening to impose sanctions,
was taking initiative and forcing Putin to adapt to these new situations.
So in our hands, in European hands, we have sanctions policy, we have frozen assets.
And of course, we have the huge responsibility of supporting Ukraine for
the upcoming years and showing to Russia that is for us to decide when we will stop doing this.
There is no intention to stop supporting Ukraine.
It means that Russia cannot outlast us and it won't be decided this winter.
What concerns our political will, we will continue.
This is, I think, and returning to your
previous question about the additional added value of frontline nation being
the presidency, this strategic awareness that we have with the immediate neighborhood,
with the development in Russia, seeing what's happening in Belarus and what are the
intentions of Kremlin, what concerns the future European security.
So we are bringing this into agenda,
but with very concrete also proposals on our action list.
Thank you, Minister.
I would propose to stay as well in our neighborhood, in close neighborhood,
in particular in Ukraine, and we know that Russia's full scale
invasion of Ukraine will be at the center of the presidency.
How will Lithuania keep support for Ukraine,
military, financial and politically at the top of the agenda as we
see around across the Europe fatigue grows and specifically in some capitals.
And attention seems that shifts elsewhere.
In our case, we made a decision and to my knowledge, we are the only country that
made a decision to support Ukraine for 10 years.
So we put it into our agreement with Ukraine.
So for 10 years, we will spend 0.25% of our GDP for security and defense needs.
And then there is no difference whether the ceasefire will come sooner or later or
there will be the peace agreement. We will do it anyways.
Of course, we want to achieve it sooner rather than later.
And this is the example that we were also
promoting with the NATO and within the EU for others to follow.
Just pledge the number, put it into your budget and you will avoid
this continuous political discussion, whether it is enough,
whether we should do more and so forth.
So in our case, it's very clear what concerns burden sharing within the Europe,
as we understand that we are the ones that are
responsible for supporting Ukraine in so many fields, because we are in the
immediate consequence area and zone if Ukraine cannot withstand its positions.
So within the Europe, we have to share
the burden fairly, more fairly than it is right now, because now the support is
concentrated in the North, Nordic Baltics, Germany and Netherlands.
I'm not listing down all the countries, but that's the chart that you would see
from Kiel Institute, for example, countries that are supporting the percentage
of their GDP the most in Ukraine.
And this number drops when you're going south.
So it's not fear because the consequences for all Europe are the same.
It's not only immediate neighborhood that would suffer.
And we have to look for the European level
solutions, as we did last year with European support loan,
some substitute for using the frozen assets of Russian Central Bank.
So now looking into the next year, seeing how there is an increase in Ukraine's
loan for defense support, for macro financial support.
We will be forced at the end of this year to decide on additional package from EU.
And we will have highly likely two options.
Again, that's the use of the frozen assets or we will put additional support into the
new multi-year financial framework, or we will generate in combination with the new
support loan, because otherwise we will be in real big trouble.
So from our side, of course, we are showing the national leadership
and national support will be once again needed, because even this year we had
also to fulfill those gaps with national contributions.
But at the European level, that's the must.
I want to stay still in Ukraine and
New Eastern Europe, if we might define that as well.
So enlargement is one of your stated priorities as well.
Is it realistic to move Ukraine's and Moldova's succession
talks forward during your six month, given that the United has repeatedly been
the obstacle and what would count as a real progress for these two countries?
We really want to see EU enlarged and also
the candidate countries closer to finishing negotiations.
Of course, we must first of all allow them to start negotiations.
That's why the opening of the last two
clusters for Ukraine and Moldova is so important.
We expect it to happen during
violence presidency, so it means this year and for us then what will be left.
So setting the eyebar that is the benchmark for first cluster,
all the reforms that are related to fundamentals, rule of law,
fighting the corruption, judicial system and the others, both for Ukraine and Moldova.
And also we expect that during our presidency,
some of the chapters might be even closed for these countries.
We see now this as the window
of political opportunity to speed up a bit
with the enlargement process. We are very clear-minded what concerns political landscape
and political calendar in Europe, with the upcoming elections in France, in some other
countries, and then preparing for elections in Germany. But next year, I think there will be
around 15 or 17 with municipality elections in Europe in total. And enlargement is not that topic
that is very attractive to EU citizens. So for us, that would be the time to convince them why
we need new member states, how they contribute to our security, how they will contribute to our
economy and prosperity in the future, and why we have to invest. So summing up,
for till our presidency, we want all the clusters being open. And during our presidency,
even the chapters, some of the chapters closed. If we are not proceeding with this speed,
we cannot achieve, at least for us, this is the goal and deadline to have the Ukraine
among us by 2030. So theoretically, we are still acting according to the schedule,
even though understanding how challenging it is. And of course, it's not only for us being ready
and opening the clusters and chapters. It's about keeping the merit-based process. And it means that
also for the candidate countries, for the Western Balkans, it means that these countries have to
go through the reforms, and then all the conditions for everyone are the same, equal.
And it means that Ukraine, even being in this horrible situation now with the continuous
attacks from Russia, has to pass the laws and to go through the reforms, because that is what we
expect, that Ukraine will be as much as we are within the European Union family.
Thank you, Minister. I would like to move on from Ukraine to another partner country,
and used to be a EU member state. It is United Kingdom. And recently, British Prime
Minister Andy Burnham expressed openness to reconsidering the UK's relations with the EU,
including the possibility of rejoining in the long term. How do you view these developments,
and what role could Lithuania's EU presidency play in strengthening relations between London
and Brussels? What concerns our cooperation with other European countries, and especially now
our NATO allies? Lithuania supports and is very strong in this position,
especially in the security and defence areas. We see it as part of our allied relationships and
our strategic relationships. So we are really supporting openness of our investments and
support mechanism for defence industry, and in many also other contingent areas. Looking into
the future in our new European security architecture, that already has the fundamentals from the current
period. And we are also looking at the future of the EU, and we are also looking at the future of the EU,
and we are also looking at the future of the EU, and we are also looking at the future of the EU. We have
to build this together with non-EU but NATO countries. So Norway, UK, Iceland. Same with
Turkey, we have to also integrate into European security system as much as we can, and act as the
one geopolitical area. So as a vision, it is this as the practical solution.
So our cooperation within the defence industry, I think that is the
priority, because we have to boost up our production, and also to be fast. And in mentioning
these countries, additional, our partner, and I hope that future ally, also Ukraine, must be part
of it. As we see how much Lithuanians, small, medium enterprise, and the whole sector is advancing
because of our close cooperation with Ukraine. So we have also to embrace them in our political
initiatives. Our future
lies in the deeper cooperation within Europe in different areas, and it might be with the
different speeds and different level of ambition of cooperation. So we want to see flexibility,
also what concerns other non-EU countries. And we see UK, we are absolutely close, what concerns
our security and defence cooperation, and not only through NATO, but also within NATO in the regional
formats. To mention one, that's the GEF format, Nordic, Baltic, plus Netherlands, plus the UK,
that has very practical use and application. So to add also additional EU related instruments and
the ones that helps to attract capital and have the financial flows. So I think it would add also
value into this.
Thank you. Probably now we should switch to energy policy. And Lithuania, as we know, was one of the two countries with the highest energy policy in the world. And I think it would add also value into this.
the first countries, if not the first country, that totally phase out Russia's hydrocarbons, oil, gas, and coal. And since then, Russia's weaponization of energy has fundamentally changed how Europe thinks about energy security. Yet the EU continues to face geopolitical risks, dependence on external suppliers and vulnerabilities in its critical energy infrastructure. In your opinion, how should energy security features in the EU be used in the future?
And what role could Lithuania's EU presidency play in advancing this agenda?
And we have to avoid those initiatives that tell us that, oh, maybe after the peace agreement, we should return with the trade with Russia. And also we hear these ideas coming from the other side of the Atlantic. So from our position, no, we cannot allow ourselves being dependent. We have to move on with our achieved results. We cannot make Europe dependent on countries that politically manipulates and already proven how they manipulates with their supplies.
probably the first green energy exporter in EU. And we have achieved this through the constant
national policies promoting solar and wind power, and this can be replicated also elsewhere in
Europe. There are no reasons why we cannot achieve it wider. So from Lithuania's position, there will
be no back to Russia again. Thank you. It's always happy to hear these words, especially being from
Lithuania myself. Minister, you mentioned as well Belarus, and we probably need to talk about
hybrid security threats. And Lithuania and its neighbors, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and other
countries across Europe, faces more hybrid threats. And these hybrid threats are such as
airspace violation, balloons from Belarus, sabotage, damage to undersea infrastructure,
These issues are putting more pressure on European security overall. According to you, what steps can the EU take to improve its collective response?
I think that especially talking to Rusi with all your research that you are doing and being on the very edge of different ideas and also the researchers in the field, what concerns Russia's activities, Belarus' activities, I think that we should also discuss a bit the very definition of the hybrid.
And especially in the case. of Russia's activities, whether it is applicable at all.
In the current phase that started probably in 23, now we have GRU, the military intelligence, mainly responsible for these activities that are kinetic in the essence and unconventional as the operations.
It brings with sabotage, with assassinations, with arson operations, brings damage and casualties directly.
So I don't think that something that 10 years ago we called hybrid, meaning FIMI, some propaganda, cyber activities is relevant.
It's different now. And especially when we are trying as the collective NATO or EU member states collectively produce the response to return to deterrence to this field, hybrid doesn't help us as the definition.
So for Belarus, hybrid is still applicable, I would say.
When they weaponize migration, put them, migrants at our borders, now with the smuggling balloons, interfere into our airspace, disrupt the civil aviation, same electromagnetic interference from Russia side, from Kaliningrad, with GNSS disruptions, jamming, spoofing.
So, OK, we can agree that this is something hybrid that is conducted from their own territory, but with agents and operatives running on our soil.
And trying to damage our critical infrastructure like it was some weeks ago in Lithuania, with attempts to destroy the Starlink antennas in one of the companies in Lithuania.
This is not hybrid anymore. This is sabotage and this is unconventional warfare.
And knowing that the military is responsible for it, so this is not a civilian institution, this is the military officers that are planning and conducting these operations, recruiting the agents.
That are implementing their tasks.
Our response has to be also multilevel, multilayer, and very much also political.
Otherwise, we won't stop it. We need credible deterrence.
With credible deterrence, and especially in this field, of course, we are talking about the deterrence by punishment and political price.
So what price Russia pays for these operations?
If we won't increase it through additional sanctions on Russia's major companies, they are not going to be able to do what we want them to do.
If we don't increase it through additional sanctions on Russia's major companies, they are not going to be able to do what we want them to do.
major companies in the energy field and finances that we are still struggling to sanction. We're
stopping issuing visas to Russian citizens, limiting the travels of Russian diplomats,
denying in the future and actually forever the entrance to EU for Russian combatants.
And also as additional measure, we are proposing designating GRU, this main organization that is
responsible for this operation as the terrorist organization. There won't be consequences,
the ones that would force to reconsider Russia, its behavior. We cannot just increase counter
intelligence capabilities and disrupt the operations, even though our agencies and
services doing really great and cooperate, share information, react, but we won't stop it on the
field. This is not something like organized crime, transborder crime. This is something conducted by
the state.
By the state actor. So we have also to respond at the state level, but not symmetrically,
asymmetrically. And knowing that the purpose of this operation, the main goal of this operation
is to diminish support to Ukraine and our societies. We have to increase support to
Ukraine just because of that. So you try to burn something or to destroy some factories.
Now they're even intimidating the CEOs of our defense industry.
They're even intimidating our security companies that are supplying Ukraine. Okay, here you go.
This is the additional package of support to Ukraine. So this should be the dynamics. And what
is the enemy of this approach? I would say in Europe is this poisonous idea that we cannot
escalate with Russia. If Russia escalates, our behavior has to be to deescalate. I don't know
where it comes from, but it is ridiculous. It never helped. Never in the history, looking back
into the history of Ukraine, we've never helped. We've never helped. We've never helped. We've never
the tsarist time of Russian empire or looking into the Soviet times, it never, ever worked,
de-escalation with Russia. We shouldn't be afraid also to put forward our measures to escalate till
the point when Russia will see that there are outcomes. If you need good examples of our
behavior, that was the Baltic century and Eastern century enhanced vigilance activities from NATO.
The Baltic century was launched after disruption of our critical infrastructure on the bottom of
the Baltic Sea, cables, electricity lines, pipelines. When we increased the amount of
vessels in the Baltic Sea, it stopped. Someone would also say, oh, why we escalated in the
Baltic Sea? Maybe the increased military presence would put pressure on Russia and they would do
something even more crazy. No, on opposite, they stopped these activities.
So there were for more than one year, zero incidents, what relates to our subsea infrastructure.
The same effect was created by Eastern century when NATO allies increased the presence of their
ground-based equipment and also fighter jets on the very front line. And incidents dropped
immediately because Russia took precocious measures and wanted to avoid further increase
of the presence. Same logics and same principles have to be applied also what concerns this.
Kinetic, unconventional warfare that is launched against us.
I want to specify one question. So you mentioned specifically Baltic century and
some sanctions on Russia and on Belarus. During the presidency, or do you think the EU's current
approach is sufficient to deter this, both Moscow and Minsk, or should Europe adopt stronger
measures to prevent such action? And if yes, what can we do more to prevent these actions?
So on prevention side and bringing back deterrence, that's sanctions. Sanctions to Russia, as
we did actually a bit later, but as we did after Leipzig incident or operation, we should
call it. So when we sanctioned 1,600 entities and individuals from Russia, when Germany
bilaterally responded by closing down the general consulate in Bonn, and some other
measures were also taken. I think this is the way forward. So sanctions.
First of all, same with Belarus on what they're doing on our border. We have also be very clear
that we are ready to also impose sanctions according to the now additional criteria on
hybrid activities. And then that was adopted in EU just to remind you after smuggling balloons
started to disrupt our civil aviation. On the protection side, on vulnerability side,
this is the role of EU to increase resilience of our infrastructure and also,
of our borders. So in Lithuania, we invested a lot that was more than half a billion on
building the fence on our border with Belarus. That is almost 700 kilometers long with all
the sensors, CCTVs, and all the other measures that we applied there. So that was the investment,
but we cannot limit ourselves to the very immediate borderline. Also other infrastructure,
we have to increase the level of protection together.
With our business entities doing this, so defense industry, transport, energy, critical supplies,
this is the new reality. We have to protect it. And in doing this, EU has, of course,
financial instruments, has the organizational capacity, and also has the opportunity to involve
Ukraine in doing this as they produce the best practices, for example, what concerns
energy infrastructure. And now when we know that Russia is also
planning some operations, sabotage operations against our infrastructure, Ukraine is the best
place where we should look for the lessons identified and learned to be better protected,
because it's not only about the source of threat, it's also about us. It's about our
vulnerabilities and the reduction of it. Thank you. Before we let you go, I have
last question. If we meet again in July, 2027, what would demonstrate that Lithuania's presidency
made a tangible difference? The practical, very practical results in all the areas of our
priorities. So I hope that we will have MFF agreed already and also with the European Parliament.
And within it, there will be the line related to security and resilience, the same amount as we have
right now within the competitiveness fund. We will have the military mobility package already. This is something where EU
has the concrete added and tangible value in line with also with the NATO planning. Within enlargement,
we will have a couple of chapters closed with Ukraine. I know this is ambitious, but we will push it forward.
Also other candidate countries, Moldova progressing. I hope that we will have the accession treaty with Montenegro
signed, what concerns enlargement. Within internal security, we're looking forward to increase some powers to Europe
and Frontex, agencies that are responsible for fighting trans-border crime and also preventing the migration crisis.
Democracy, resilience, in practice we helped our candidate countries, not once, it was protected.
the independence of their democratic processes. I hope that we will have also tangible results of
it being applied during the elections in Europe. On competitiveness and economic security,
for Trade Council, where I will be chairing the meetings, economic security will be number one
priority. And I hope that we will have a working party established within Council and once again
showing that we see it as the strategic task in front of us. We're also building the stronger
single market. We're progressing on one Europe, one market roadmap. And on social security,
we have initiatives related to biotech and also on labor, quality labor places and labor mobility.
So also concrete legislation in these areas. In total, we have around 150 items on our
task list. So I won't go through all of these, but definitely there will be
achievements there. Thank you, Minister. This brings us to the end of today's episode on
Lithuania's presidency of the Council of the EU and the challenges facing Europe in a contested
world. I would like to thank this week's guest, Mr. Kostutis Budris, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Lithuania. Thank you very much. Thank you for having me. It was a great pleasure.
Happy to have you here. And Global Security Briefing is available on all major podcast
platforms. Please like and subscribe. For further information, visit www.globalsecurity.eu.
And if you have any questions about the work of the International Security Studies team
at RUSI, please follow us on X at the ISS underscore RUSI. And also find out more about
the ISS team's research on regional security issues around the world on the RUSI website.
But for now, it's goodbye from me, Petros Kajtnas at RUSI in London.
Thank you for listening and I'll see you next week.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
Lithuania’s 2027 EU presidency will prioritize security and defense, emphasizing both external and internal threats, with a clear push for greater representation in the EU’s multi-year financial framework.
The EU has failed to lead in responding to hybrid and kinetic threats in Eastern Europe, such as Russian and Belarusian sabotage, airspace violations, and cyberattacks, and is now relying on reactive measures rather than strategic deterrence.
Lithuania advocates for a decisive escalation of sanctions against Russian and Belarusian state actors, including designating the GRU as a terrorist organization and expanding sanctions on key energy and financial firms.
A major priority is ensuring fair burden-sharing for Ukraine’s defense and recovery, with Lithuania committing to 0.25% of GDP for 10 years and urging other EU countries to adopt similar pledges to avoid political instability.
Lithuania aims to accelerate EU enlargement by opening negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova, closing key reform chapters, and advancing integration with candidate countries through a merit-based, transparent process.
The presidency will strengthen cross-border cooperation with non-EU NATO allies, particularly the UK, Norway, and Turkey, focusing on defense industry collaboration and shared resilience measures.
Lithuania will advocate for a complete end to Russian energy dependence, promoting renewable energy as a model for Europe and emphasizing national and EU-level infrastructure resilience.
Tangible success will be measured by concrete outcomes such as a finalized MFF with security and resilience funding, closure of key chapters in Ukraine’s accession process, and strengthened Frontex and democratic resilience mechanisms.
Summary:
Lithuania’s 2027 EU presidency will focus on transforming European security and resilience in response to escalating hybrid and kinetic threats from Russia and Belarus. The country emphasizes that Europe must either react or lead, criticizing past inaction and advocating for stronger, more coordinated responses—especially through expanded sanctions, credible deterrence, and a clear political stance against re-engaging with Russian energy. 25% of GDP annually for ten years and urging other EU nations to follow.
The presidency will accelerate EU enlargement by advancing Ukraine and Moldova’s accession processes, closing key reform chapters, and promoting merit-based criteria for all candidate countries. Deepening cooperation with NATO allies, especially the UK and Nordic states, will be central to strengthening defense industrial ties and cross-border resilience. Lithuania will also champion energy independence, highlighting its status as a green energy exporter and urging the EU to bolster infrastructure protection against sabotage.
Success will be defined by concrete achievements: a new multi-year financial framework with dedicated security funding, closure of key accession chapters, and strengthened democratic and internal security institutions. The presidency aims to shift Europe from reactive to proactive, ensuring long-term stability through unity, transparency, and strategic foresight.
FAQs
Lithuania will assume the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 January 2027, for the second time.
Its five priorities share the common denominator of security and defense, covering external security, internal security, and more security-related items in the multi-year financial framework, alongside enlargement and competitiveness.
Lithuania has committed to spending 0.25% of its GDP on Ukraine's security and defense needs for 10 years, regardless of any ceasefire or peace agreement, and urges other EU states to make similar long-term pledges.
It wants all clusters opened for Ukraine and Moldova, with some chapters possibly closed during its presidency, keeping the process merit-based and aiming for Ukraine to join by 2030.
Lithuania strongly supports deeper security and defense cooperation with the UK, Norway, Iceland, Turkey, and Ukraine, aiming to build a unified European security architecture across EU and NATO countries.
Lithuania firmly opposes any return to dependence on Russian energy and argues Europe must avoid initiatives suggesting a resumption of trade with Russia after any peace agreement.
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