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LH0721 Jefferson and the Declaration

7m 17s

LH0721 Jefferson and the Declaration

The podcast examines the deep European legal roots of the American Declaration of Independence. It argues that the 1776 document framed the colonies' secession as a constitutional fight against tyranny, a concept with a long history in Western law. The analysis centers on the work of the 14th-century jurist Bartolus, who defined two types of tyranny: ruling without a legal title ("absence of title") and ruling abusively against the common good ("reason of exercise"). The Declaration's charges against British rule directly mirror this framework. It accuses King George III of tyranny by "reason of exercise" for vetoing beneficial laws and, jointly with Parliament, of tyranny by "absence of title" for imposing an unconstitutional jurisdiction on the colonies. This legal reasoning justified both resistance and the establishment of a new government. The historical connection is physically traced to Thomas Jefferson's annotated copy of a 16th-century political treatise in the Library of Congress, which itself references Bartolus's doctrines, illustrating the direct doctrinal lineage from European legal thought to the foundational American document.

Transcription

868 Words, 5420 Characters

English
[Music] Andrew Chiquinato is a Marie Curie researcher at the Michigan University and at Hent Andrews. In this podcast, he points out some important historical roots of the American Constitution. In our latest episode, a manuelic woman to venture across the Atlantic, so to say, to begin outlining the profile of legal history and the American continent. A good portion of his analysis assessed the institutional and conceptual relationships existing from the late 15th century onwards between legal experiences in North and South America and the history of European law. It is to one bundle of such relationships that I wish to draw your attention as I invite you to take a closer look at the 1776 Declaration of Independence. As you may know, in the summer of that year, representatives of the 13 British American colonies assembled in the so-called Second Continental Congress to pen a declaration justifying the legal grounds of the colony's resistance to tyranny, their secession from the British Empire, and their corresponding acquisition of sovereignty, which in the words of one of the main drafters of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, amounted to, quote, "the full and perfect powers of legislation," unquote. This sketch immediately alerts you to the fundamental polarity at play, both in the text of the Declaration and in the constitutional struggle fought throughout the American Revolution, the polarity between tyranny, i.e., the perversion, the aberration of powers legal grounds and sovereignty, or the recognition of a supreme, and at the same time supremely law abiding power. This polarity cuts through the history of European law. It is at the very heart of how power has been conceived gyristically by the Western legal tradition. If tyranny owes its most ancient articulation to Greek political fault, its translation into the language of the law occurred only much later and consolidated itself in the mid-14th century, when the Prince of European Jurists, Bartolus from Sosoferrato, drafted legal treaties defining the nature and forms of tyrannical rule. This was the basis, the negative paradigm, if you will, from which conversely a model of positive rule could be inferred. Both the definition and the classification of tyranny provided by Bartolus are relevant to understanding the constitutional reasoning outlined by the Declaration. Tyrant, according to Bartolus, was whomever governed in disregard of the law. Such disregard could be equally disguised or undesguised, and when it happened to be undesguised, it could either occur because power had been acquired unlawfully, that is, in the absence of a justifying title, or because it had been exercised abusively. In this regard of both its limits and the common good for which it existed. Tyranny by absence of title and tyranny by reason of exercise are the two main charges levied by the Declaration of Independence against British rule. Take a look at this blistering indictment, quote, "The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having indirect object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world." He, the Declaration means the King, has refused his ascent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good." The Declaration opens its list of charges against British rule by enditing the King for having perverted the exercise of his power and disregarded the pursuit of the common good. The King, in other words, is charged with tyranny by reason of exercise. A second charge is levied against the combined action of the King and British Parliament. Quote, "He, the Declaration means once again the King, has combined with others here the Declaration refers silently to Parliament, the houses of Parliament, to subject us the colonies to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws." A jurisdiction, in other words, devoid of any justifying title. King and Parliament have acted as "tyrants" by absence of any title justifying the exercise of their legislative authority over the autonomous legislative assemblies of the colonies. What results from this joint and several liability of King and Parliament is the overall disruption of just government. Hence, the famous second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence outlines the constitutional reasons why the failure of just government authorizes not only active resistance to tyrannical rule but the establishment of a new constitutional regime. The elementary sketch I have outlined opens before us a new problem. What doctrinal relationship ties the Declaration to the long tradition dating back to Bartolus? If you're interested, you will find the answer to this question by going to Washington DC and visiting the Library of Congress. There, in the library, are preserved the remaining books belonging to the personal library of Thomas Jefferson, whom, as we have already seen, was one of the main drafters, if not the main drafter of the Declaration of Independence. Among these books, you will find a 16th century treaties entitled "Vindice contra Tirannos", which has been translated in English by George Carnot. It is in Jefferson's annotated copy of that treaties that you will find, just as he did, the doctrinal path leading back to Bartolus and his doctrine on tyranny. [BLANK_AUDIO]

Podcast Summary

Key Points:

  1. The Declaration of Independence frames the American Revolution as a constitutional struggle against tyranny, defined as the perversion or unlawful exercise of power.
  2. Its legal arguments against British rule are rooted in a European legal tradition, particularly the 14th-century jurist Bartolus's classification of tyranny by "absence of title" (unlawful acquisition of power) and "reason of exercise" (abusive use of power).
  3. The Declaration charges King George III with tyranny by "reason of exercise" for disregarding the common good and, jointly with Parliament, with tyranny by "absence of title" for imposing an illegitimate jurisdiction.
  4. This doctrinal link to Bartolus is evidenced by an annotated book in Thomas Jefferson's personal library, connecting the Declaration's reasoning to long-standing European legal thought.

Summary:

The podcast examines the deep European legal roots of the American Declaration of Independence. It argues that the 1776 document framed the colonies' secession as a constitutional fight against tyranny, a concept with a long history in Western law. The analysis centers on the work of the 14th-century jurist Bartolus, who defined two types of tyranny: ruling without a legal title ("absence of title") and ruling abusively against the common good ("reason of exercise").

The Declaration's charges against British rule directly mirror this framework. It accuses King George III of tyranny by "reason of exercise" for vetoing beneficial laws and, jointly with Parliament, of tyranny by "absence of title" for imposing an unconstitutional jurisdiction on the colonies. This legal reasoning justified both resistance and the establishment of a new government.

The historical connection is physically traced to Thomas Jefferson's annotated copy of a 16th-century political treatise in the Library of Congress, which itself references Bartolus's doctrines, illustrating the direct doctrinal lineage from European legal thought to the foundational American document.

FAQs

Andrew Chiquinato is a Marie Curie researcher at Michigan University and Hent Andrews, focusing on the historical roots of the American Constitution and the legal relationships between the Americas and Europe from the late 15th century.

The Declaration highlights the polarity between tyranny, which is the perversion of legal power, and sovereignty, which is the recognition of a supreme, law-abiding authority.

Bartolus defined a tyrant as someone who governs in disregard of the law, which can occur through unlawful acquisition of power (absence of title) or abusive exercise of power (tyranny by reason of exercise).

The Declaration accuses British rule of tyranny by reason of exercise, where the King disregarded the common good, and tyranny by absence of title, where King and Parliament imposed jurisdiction without legal justification.

Jefferson's library contains a 16th-century treatise, 'Vindiciae contra Tyrannos,' which connects the Declaration's reasoning to Bartolus's doctrines on tyranny through Jefferson's annotations.

It argues that the failure of just government due to tyrannical rule authorizes not only resistance but also the creation of a new constitutional regime, as outlined in its second paragraph.

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