Lessons for Pentagon Procurement from the Special Operations Enterprise
from Cogs of War
40m 56s
The Cogs of War podcast features a deep discussion on how to scale fast, agile acquisition models—originally developed in Special Operations Forces—across larger defense portfolios like unmanned systems. The core idea is the "trade winds" model, which blends commercial procurement practices with open, merit-based competitions to allow rapid, flexible buying without sacrificing compliance. This approach emphasizes speed, adaptability, and decentralization, enabling warfighters to respond to dynamic missions rather than being locked into rigid, slow processes. Key lessons from SOF—such as prioritizing operational efficacy over technical perfection, fostering trust with end-users, and enabling rapid pivoting—are seen as transferable to broader military operations. The conversation underscores that the real challenge isn’t technology, but culture and leadership: overcoming risk aversion, empowering frontline decision-making, and holding leaders accountable for delays. A major insight is that drone and counter-drone systems suffer from over-engineering and excessive pricing, making them unaffordable for field use. The discussion calls for a reimagining of acquisition success metrics—shifting from process adherence to real-world outcomes and risk reduction. Ultimately, the goal is not just faster procurement, but a more human-centered, responsive system where taxpayer dollars directly serve mission success and human protection.
(upbeat music)
- Welcome to the Cogs of War Podcast.
I'm Jonathan Panther, executive editor
of the Cogs of War Vertical,
brought to you by Warren the Rocks and Booz Allen Hamilton.
Today's question is this,
how do you take an acquisition model
that works small and fast and make it work for a department
trying to buy hundreds of thousands of drones?
I'm joined by Carateter, Chief Technology Officer
for Special Operations Forces Enterprise
and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations Analysis, Resources and Capabilities.
In the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
I'm also joined by Bonnie Evangelista,
Acquisition Director, Direct Reporting,
Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems
and Project Agent Court.
Karen Bonnie, thank you for joining Cogs of War.
- Thank you.
- Thanks for having us.
- I think to start out our listeners
would just be interested to hear about your backgrounds
and what brought you to your current positions.
No, so I started this journey at 18 years old.
I went off to the Air Force Academy
with eyes towards the stars, some ridiculous wanting
to be an aerospace engineer and a test pilot
and kind of all of the traditional things
and very quickly found myself falling in love
with a different mission set than the Air Force
looking at intelligence analysis in particular.
And then that really started this crazy journey
that's brought me here to be the CTO of the Soft Enterprise.
So I was an Intel Officer on Active Duty
jumped over to the Air National Guard
where I started a dabble in cyber operations
and understanding that and had a really unique opportunity
to go stand up a cyber portfolio
at Air Force Special Operations Command
ended up not leaving.
Crossed over to the civilian side there
was a civil servant in the Air Force
got called over to the Army
to be a program manager for research and development
in electronic warfare and multi-domain operations.
And then about a year ago
was extended the appointment to come here
and join the Salt Lake team.
So for me, it's been a long walk
from being very downstream within that process
and an end user and a consumer of technology
starting to build into understanding the problems
they're in on how do we bring in new things
amid a speed of relevance.
It was able then to do that
from a program management capacity from the Army
and then come to really put that all together
in the portfolio here.
And along that journey when I was in the Army
really started the conversation two, three, four years ago
about needing to change our relationship with technology
and change the way that we bring that into the formation.
I was introduced to Bonnie
and Bonnie became one of my heroes
in the acquisition space about people really leaning in
and doing things differently.
And so she and I have stayed in touch
and when we had an opportunity to join forces
before she very right to sleep for the nation
is gonna go over and lead in the counter-UXS land
we were able to bring her over
to special operations and intensity conflict
to be our acquisition director.
- When we crossed paths a few years ago
it was kind of in my early journey
of trying to bring trade-wind solutions marketplace
to as a model or an exemplar for how we can do this.
Didn't have to be the path for everybody
but I was like this is a pretty good way to think about this
and a lot of the learning that I've talked about it
on this podcast before that in terms of like getting
to people to do this at scale is not easy
and there's a lot of unlearning that has to happen
there's a lot of culture things that get in the way as well.
In that journey I haven't left that journey I feel like
and that's when I crossed paths with Cara again
and she asked me to help her do that
for the soft community essentially
like let's do this at scale across soft
and then very quickly right after that
like so we did a big thing.
I felt like we created another exemplar for them
to potentially follow with the accelerator day
which I think we're gonna talk about today
and very quickly after that I was kind of asked
to do the same thing for the unmanned systems portfolio.
So that's where I'm currently trying to wrap my hands around
and understand like how do we do that?
How do you create the acquisition engine
that's necessary at that scale?
- So what we're gonna be talking about here today
is essentially how to buy things
and how to buy things faster
and perhaps how to use a model of procurement
and acquisition that you learned in one place
and that we're now expanding.
You've mentioned a lot of different things
just in both of you in that introduction
but let's start with one.
You mentioned something called trade winds, what's that?
- It's a buying model.
It is technically I'll call it an acquisition pathway
in the set for a like a procurement pathway
in the sense that we did something that had not been done
before in the sense that we took some of the best pieces
of what was going on.
We looked at the defense innovation units
the way they purchase commercial technology
and we looked at how they thought about commercial
and from a buying perspective
and they had something called
the commercial solutions opening procedures.
I don't want to get into the weeds
of how they view commercial solutions opening procedures,
CSO versus the defense regulation CSO
that's maybe another conversation
but we took that model.
We looked at Afrox, we looked at how the Air Force
was doing innovation kind of left of requirements
and they had something called the open topic model.
So we liked how they did broad announcement,
general solicitations and nothing prescriptive,
things like that.
And we kind of smushed it all together
with some other things that we thought were innovative.
Basically we found a way to have a direct pathway
to buy products and solutions that were commercially viable
based on merit, similar to using what's called
the commercial solutions opening procedures.
So we were stacking multiple authorities together
under one general solicitation
so that we were trying to be compliant
with as many authorities as we could
so that we could have flexibility as a government buyer.
So when Cara came to me and said, "I need to buy,
I have no mechanism to get to company X."
Run them through our competitive evaluation process
and then you can choose that company
on the back end of the marketplace based on merit
if there's an operational need or a mission gap
or something like that.
I called it simply an accelerated competition
and assessment process.
That's a very like top wave way of thinking about it.
And then another way we think about it
is we have a post competition environment.
So if you, there is due diligence,
like there is a competition process,
there's evaluation criteria you have to meet.
If you get through that, you are essentially,
quote unquote, "awardable"
so that there's no further competition to be done.
There's no source selection, there's no additional rigor.
We have a post competition environment
and we can execute contracts based on merit.
So that's probably the planest way.
- Yeah, and I think based on timing also.
So when talking about that ecosystem
that exists on the back end,
I think is a really important part of the conversation.
There is a lot of different dependencies that are at play
at any point when we were trying to bring new technology
into the formation.
Sometimes that's the operational environment.
Sometimes, and we've seen just what's been going on
in the Middle East as things continue to change,
you can look at the war as Ukraine as another example.
When you're doing acquisitions that only give you
that singular moment in time,
hey, you need to make a decision right now
and you're gonna have to stick with that decision,
you're leaving a lot on the table
that you can do the work on the back end
and say, hey, it's not no, it's not right now.
And if the situation changes,
you can go back and revisit that same pool
without having to gen up an entire new ostensibly acquisition
cycle to attempt to recompede something,
you've already competed the baseline concept
of what you have to go after.
So that really creates then an ecosystem
that you can start to pair and tailor based on your needs
and where you are in the storyline,
'cause there's storylines happening at all points
in all times.
That's one of the big things that we're trying to change.
It's not just how do we buy and not what do we buy, right?
I think we get very, very focused on that moment
of acquisition when it's time to make the decision
and apply money, but from really my CTO seat,
maybe it makes me a bad CTO to say, hey, that's not really
the technical issue that I'm trying to tackle.
It is re-contextualizing our relationship
with technology in general.
That is re-looking at what the fire team
of the future really is.
That is the center of gravity being the warfighter.
That is an acquisition professional being close
to their ecosystem that is both the person
that knows how to go out and touch industry
and technology and bring that in,
but also close to the decision maker
on who can give them that permission to win.
But the third leg of that triangle is private industry.
Is these technical minds that really can answer
these difficult questions?
How do I create synergy around them
and start to really remind the warfighter
that acquisition works for them?
These are not different pillars of things
that you input an idea or requirement
on the back end, coughs out technology.
The world doesn't work that way.
Any more technology changes too quickly.
The war environment changes too quickly.
We have to be responsive to them within that
and create really that ability to be flexible
and to give choice,
ultimately designed towards the risk owners.
And that's where I think that we've been disconnected
in the technology realm.
We've looked at it very myopically through,
is it technically feasible?
Is it going to do all of these things
and getting stuck and trying to build perfect solutions
where you have operational command or screaming
I will take good enough
because this is the reality that I exist in today.
So it's trying to close that loop
throughout the entire process.
And I'll add one more, I don't know if this has been yet,
or just a kind of layer on top of what she's saying
because I think part of our conversation today is not,
I don't think either of us are wedded to the tactic at all,
but we love things that work.
And when they work, we want to promote that
to the extent possible.
The whole trade win solutions marketplace,
the genesis of it came from the soft community,
whether I'm not sure if I've ever told this story
before publicly,
but it was interacting with lower echelon unit members
and understanding that's the story arc she's talking about
and the timing issue.
And I didn't understand, you know, just sitting in my seat,
you know, far away at the other end of the spear.
I didn't understand deeply what she was talking about
until I saw and felt what she was talking about.
And I realized a lot of people in my position
in the acquisition community, all good intentioned,
would throw the rule book in their face
when they asked for help.
Like, that's how it felt like to me.
I was not going to judge kind of some of the things
you were talking about, the other parts
in the acquisition process that do need to happen,
I was gonna own my part though and be like,
I'm not gonna be the problem for getting them
what they need when they need it.
And I wanted to give them a pathway similar to what,
if you're familiar with small business innovation research,
Sibber phase three contracting,
where you can go direct to vendors
because they've already been competed.
And so solving this problem,
like put the rules aside for a second,
what could this look like?
How could I do a contract in a day?
How could I get this person,
what they ask for when they ask for it?
And that's where the ideas came from.
So the model was a result of an end state we were driving
or an outcome we were trying to get to.
And the model still works, it's still around.
So like yes, please use it as much as possible,
but like I think in our community,
we lose sight of like sometimes building the right pipelines
and the right models or workflows,
buying models in particular.
We're not solving for the right outcomes sometimes.
Yeah, I mean, 'cause we're grading ourselves
in our ability to follow a process most of the time.
That is easy to measure and that feels very good,
but at the end of the day is what outcome have you generated?
And starting to switch that vernacular around to understand
because this is a Rubik's Cube that we're trying to spin
to get this to look right.
Sometimes speed is the leading indicator.
Hey, I need a 60% solution to field tomorrow
is gonna be better than the 90% late to need.
And so being able to balance all of these
and I think really the bottom line of this is saying
there is no singular right way to do this.
They're certainly wrong ways.
And I think that we're getting better
as a community at identifying that.
But getting people comfortable,
not having an exact, you must do step A, B and C
because you have choice.
I think that people actually are inherently
just want to follow the same process over and over again.
And that's not with the mission demands anymore.
We need to be able to meet the need
and sometimes that is still a far-based contract.
That is not the enemy, that is still okay.
But pushing towards using the max extent of the law
possible to generate those outcomes.
'Cause it is life or death.
And that's the other large portion of what I am designed to do
is to say we can talk a lot about technology
on the other end of technology as a person.
And it's the first soft truth
that humans are more important and hardware.
And that is the way that we measure against things
and how we tip the scales is to say acquisition
at the end of the day really is just trading
harder and taxpayer dollars for human lives.
Either the protection of our own
or if we are called to use violence
in support of the missions of the nation
that we are effective.
I'm in good stewards of that, moving forward.
- You're both saying a lot of things
that I think buck the conventional wisdom
and I'm having a hard time keeping track of them
in my head but two of them really stick out to me.
One thing you said is sometimes the most important thing
isn't the technology that we're buying.
It's the processes behind it and we've gone into that a bit.
And the other thing you said is that there's no one
right way of of doing something.
And the reason I say that bucks the conventional wisdom
is at least when you read the trade presses
or you're exposed to what's going on in LinkedIn
or sub-stack or you're following,
the defense tech sort of literati universe.
You would think that the most important thing
is the technology and you would think that
there's only one right way to do it,
which is the commercial solutions opening
or one in particular path.
So what I'm getting out here is I'd be very curious
to hear from you guys what translates
from you think the experience that you've had it
at soft with special operations forces where speed
is it a premium adaptability is it a premium,
but sometimes the capabilities aren't those
that might be as relevant to the larger force.
What lessons translate perhaps first
and then maybe what doesn't?
- I think that there is a little bit of a misnomer
about soft peculiarity.
We talk a lot about that.
It's the foundation of how we go forward
and get money for soft.
It is a separate major funding program,
PLEV and funding it's designed to do that.
There are some things for us that are not applicable
to the larger joint force
'cause they just may never find themselves
in that situation just due to the nature of the mission.
But quite often it's not that it doesn't apply,
it's that it's just really early.
And I think we have a lot of key examples
through 40 years next year since
U.S. Special Operations Command was established
where things that started in soft
and started as soft peculiar have come over the fence line
and are now in larger programs of record.
As warfare has changed right
and really I think autonomous systems
starting to come into the cornerstone of this,
there's not that much daylight in between us anymore.
And like I said, not that there ever was,
but it's really about the speed of adaptation
and sometimes the soft peculiarity is just how quickly
we're going to go do that
or in some cases with partnerships
that we do have this deep nexus of doing it
with allies and with other partners.
So I think that the biggest part of that
that I would say that does transfer,
it's that mentality on getting to a best athlete model,
where we care a little less about the programatics
and more about the efficacy of that technology
and in having that willingness to pivot
and say, hey, just because,
and this is why getting after how we approach technology
is important.
If I lock myself into a good piece of technology
but now I'm stuck with the same thing
and need to sustain that for the next 10 years,
that might not serve the mission space anymore.
Do I have the ability to pivot away from that
and bring things in?
So I think that that does translate
into some of the problems, not all of the problems
and that goes back to the saying,
there's no single BB that fixes anything.
The answers you have to be able to do,
I call it, are we gonna put a human being
in a pressurized tube?
So think things that go in the sky,
things that go underwater,
is a different process and a different approach
than when we're talking about edge compute power
and UAS systems and things that are gonna mature
in the private sector more quickly.
So I think that the biggest thing
that you can take away from SOF is that ability
to say what problem am I going after
and who do I have to be to go solve that problem
and kind of changing to meet that?
- Kind of what I see is I've always believed
procurement contracting is the easiest part.
We are kind of in this cycle
because of our budget cycles where there's such a rush
to obligate funds, especially with, you know,
CRs that seem to extend really late into the year, et cetera.
And everyone thinks their job is done
when the contract is awarded.
And that's actually like farthest from the truth.
So there's in terms of things like that work
and that don't work for like to have buying models
like what we're talking about
where you're placing bets, early bets.
And you wanna look at the efficacy of something
and you have a community like the SOF community
who is willing to take that on probably more so
than other communities.
So you have like this proving ground of an ecosystem
where you can inject things very quickly
and they can give you that quick feedback.
But somebody has like you don't know the answer
when you award the contract.
You don't know if it's going to work.
And this is kind of the flipping the acquisition script.
We are used to planning for certainty.
We are used to planning and thinking we know the answer.
And I think there's been lots of GAO reports
and other articles that I think criticized
where we bought the exquisite capability
and we thought this was gonna be the thing
and then it goes in the field and it's quite maybe
not exactly what we were planning.
So we get into these planning cycles
where we are delaying and we're pushing decisions
and that increases risks on the operator
and we've done it at what cost.
So if you flip that script and we say okay,
we're gonna place multiple bets early on,
spend less money upfront, but now you don't know
if it's going to work.
So someone has to stay engaged after contract awards.
Somebody has to keep a pulse on what happened in the field.
And so to me, it's your creating decision space
and you're leaving enough runway
to collect enough operational evidence
to make the next best decision.
Do you pivot? Do you keep investing or do you divest?
And that's the harder part that I think
is going to challenge the department
because that's a new way of doing business.
Like that's not a muscle I think we're used to exercising.
- No, and I'll say I think that they're very candidly.
I think that there are corners of the department
that are doing that better than we're doing
in this off-community. And I think that's a large part
of making change and advancing is willing to have the humility
to sit and look around and say who has this figured out.
And what I would offer is the Arnie's drone marketplace
right now being a really key example
of a really great way of doing business
from the perspective of we're not really putting
as much of the burden on you need to have
the singular right solution and you need to go feel these
to every single unit that's gonna go and do all of the things.
We are finding better ways of doing asset management
and carving off kind of pots of money and going.
Here is the money you commander need to go by drones.
Here are your options that have been vetted right
to be on this marketplace there is criteria for that.
So doing that kind of umbrella acquisition work
that creates an ecosystem, but that instead
of me handing something that isn't gonna work for you,
you now as the commander who is the ultimate risk owner
in this has some choice in the matter.
Based on the task that you are given,
which of these 200 things are best suited for that,
that I think is a really pervasive model
that starts us to walk away from what I really think
is an obsession with programs of record.
I don't think that back to my point on pressurized tubes
that you put people in, sometimes it makes a lot of sense.
And sometimes we are just going back to old behavior
because we're comfortable and in really need to step in
to be comfortable being uncomfortable.
I think that we are ready to do business like that.
Congress is ready to support that.
If you look at exactly what we're doing
kind of within the UX else around going,
we are going to let the technology lead in this case,
but it's an intelligent conversation between
where is the technology in a state of maturity
and where is the use case and how that's needed
and working that back and forth before we come in
and affirm some large amount of decision,
but it's returning some of that decision back to the people
who lives depend on it back to that previous point that I think is probably one of the biggest
Well, one of the challenges, though I see here is what I'm what I'm hearing from both of you is a premium on decentralization for instance
on a premium on no size fits all a premium on closer cooperation between the the warfighter and the procure and feedbacks and all that
Certainly I agree with and I think most people would find unobjectionable the same token
There's a reason we have centralization sometimes right we have it for compliance purposes
We have it for ensuring the taxpayer money is stewarded wisely
We have it because you can't really scale without it to some extent right unless it's a stable demand signal coming from the government
And now we're starting to see it with something like auto warcom which you know bony or I think a huge part of building from where I understand
With unmanned systems and with counter unmanned systems because the technology cycles are so fast the adaptation is so fast
How are we going to do that sort of standardization and control from the above and also allow this you know sort of these iterative feedback loops
You're talking about the devolution of authority for procurement decisions. How can we square that circle?
Yeah, I think that that's where you have to accept that two things can be simultaneously true
So innovation and that's the buzzword we love to use for anything innovation is inherently disruptive
However, institutionalizing innovation takes some amount of discipline and takes some amount of oversight
So I think that we tend to see these models as either we're going to centralize everything and you're going to get what you get
And somebody's going to make a decision and you're going to be happy with it or the opposite of here's some money
Don't worry about it go to find your end-future
There's a middle ground and I think that that goes into what we were already talking about in things like marketplaces and things like
White lists of capabilities where you can apply all of the compliance
Base things that you need to through a centralized contracting office
But it's starting to disaggregate back to that who is making what decision and why that we can begin to push that down
Two lower commanders where it makes sense and this is where it's it just can't be a one-size-fits-all model
But I think that Giada 401 being a great example in the work that they've done to bring some standardization and kind of communal site picture
They still have the ability to be a focal point that can help
Parentaler and I think that that is the biggest difference is that all of this will still require some amount of centralization
It's still going to require guideposts
It's still going to require oversight to make sure that it is compliant and legal
but instead of whether it's end-users or commanders and pick whatever down-stream echelon
You want to do that coming back to the acquisition system and saying I have a problem or I need help and or this is not good enough
People will look at them and say well, you just don't know how to use it or
Yes, it is and you don't understand or too bad and just really culturally problematic ways that I think that we've
forgotten people that are either in or adjacent to the acquisition system that we serve them, right? And so this is one of the things that I tell my team
And I'll say very publicly is if somebody brings you an issue and
And you are the program manager and an end user comms and says hey, this is why this isn't working for me
If your first-cut instinct is to be defensive or to try to explain to them what they are the problem within that process
You have forgotten what it is that we do your answer should be thank you
Thank you for starting to have the trust back into that centralization to be able to bring those problem forwards because that
That's the other cornerstone of this is that there's a lot of things that we have to be able to sit with quite frankly
Before we can move forward and to change all of these ecosystems and one of those is that we has lost the faith of the people whom we serve
And I think that you can go to the end users and say hey, you know
People don't listen. So we need to earn their trust back. We need to earn the trust back of private industry to understand that hey
We owe you being better customers. We owe you a better way of articulating what our needs are
We owe you a fast yes and the fast note and to be able to kind of move you through this process and and we you know
We really owe it then to ourselves. We able to sit down and say hey, are we measuring ourselves against the correct thing?
And that is not to transition technology and that's the other interesting part of this is we start to weigh all of the tangential things
Not just writing the contracts, but you can look at S&T and RDT&E work holistically right large
We normally measure that by a transition rate that has been the gold standard metric by which we look at that and I
I don't offer I don't think that that serves us anymore rather than using transition as a metric
What have I done to de-risk a larger acquisition decision down the road?
Maybe I you know if I apply a hundred thousand dollars two hundred thousand dollars whatever the number is to something and I do
Learning in such a way that either this approach is going to work great and we can proceed or even better yet
We were off base in our approach to this to begin with I would much rather that figure that out early in an RDT&E process
Then figure that out after I've made a hundred million dollar procurement and I realized that that I made a bad decision
Five years down the road when it's not working. So it's about risk right and and just finding a new way to articulate
Where is the risk actually and risk is the boogie man that lives under the bed?
What is the real risk and how do we apply value to what is the risk of if I don't do anything or if I don't change and so that's
I think the other hard part of this is there is risk that we are not thinking about because back to my point on the
Back end of that is
People without technologies to defend themselves from inbound drone attacks. I mean we are we're not there yet
And I think that you can you can look at the news and even what happens in the nation at airports, you know
They all right. We're gonna stop. We're gonna wait and that's not an adequate answer
Yeah, we got to do a whole episode on counter UAS just at airports like I'm really fascinated by this but
So I actually would really want to ask you about culture because you've now brought it up a couple times and you and I discussed this
Briefly before the before the show a lot of things you're talking about you're thinking talking about how to encourage people to accept a higher level of
Risk or how to get officers to deliver a faster yes or a faster no to industry or if you're talking about
I'm making sure that people are aligned on the importance of centralized compliance
But also not being afraid to dissolve some decisions making so on and so forth. These are all cultural questions
But culture is just one of these really fuzzy
Concepts and it's very hard to operationalize it, right?
So how do you change the culture and I mean in really specific terms? I mean you guys are you're both in positions where I imagine you hire
People or you find allies within the building. You know whom you have to lean on perhaps whom you can't how do you
Build the culture you want into the people around you. I've been thinking deeply about this in straight wins because I realized very early on
It started and things were you know, it was very early. We had nothing and we we started seeing success
I thought I had gold. I was like man acquisition community is going to love this and
The more I kind of did my grassroots remove it and we would go to the services we go to lots of we went to so calm
The more we talked about it, I could see the resistance and I would simply ask people though what is
Stopping you from using this model and the top two answers I got were my boss will say no and legal will say no
And I may have said that last time I was on the podcast as well because this is an example of the culture we're talking about
So I want to share a quick anecdote on something she was touching on there's many layers of culture
There's the department's culture you have like enterprise culture and then you kind of have your sub cultures
Like you have a command you sit in you have your team culture
You know if you're in a unit like it's totally if you're military versus civilian like there's many layers to culture
One part of our culture from an acquisition perspective. I want to see change is that relationship with the end user
You were talking about I don't remember the specifics, but I think you'll get the gist of the story or the sannicto where it was
I think two or three years ago something happened in the field where
Somebody I think used a technology they weren't supposed to something like that and there was this story going around
And most of the narrative of the story that I heard at my maybe level was how like was very punitive
Toward somebody did something they were not supposed to I've heard this whole like end user shouldn't write requirements like narrative
I've heard this my whole career
This is not unique to the department because the end user in it kind of goes towards that whole like customers
We'll just ask for a faster horse like we need an engine kind of thing like they you know you can't how do we do that
How do we plan for that how do we control for that things like that?
I was teaching a class and somebody like brought this up as a way of like why we shouldn't do something and I kind of
Went a different approach like Kara was suggesting. I said did anyone ask how did it get so bad
That this person felt like they had to break the rules to get a technology into their hands because they needed something
I'm like did anyone ask that is and so and that was not a popular, you know
Uh opinion, but like that is a cultural friction and we have got to fix that now to your question like how do you fix these things
So that's like one element of culture and then there's the risk averse culture of acquisition one thing
I truly believe
If we are not humble and honest with ourselves as individuals. It starts with individuals
Everyone is looking for someone else to save them
They're looking for the perfect policy to give them the permission. They're looking for whatever. I've stopped
Holding my breath and I'm like everyone has got to stop doing that and look at themselves and look at the daily choices
You are making for example one of my litmus tests on culture is the silent staff meeting and I always ask like leaders
I'm like when you hold a staff meeting who talks and that is a reflection of your culture
So if you are a leader who says I love innovation. I love diversity of thought if you have a silent staff meeting
That's not a reflection of the things you're saying that that and that's to get a you know layer deeper like you asked
so when it comes to
Changing culture. It's hard to scale. It can be done
But it takes people
actively making certain choices
Like that align with the actions and behaviors we need whether it's whatever the objective is go fast
Break the status quo like whatever the ask is
someone
has got to be encouraging the right actions and incentivizing the right actions and behaviors
that happen on a daily basis. I'm not even talking about like weeks or months and things like that.
And so that's kind of where I always start. Yeah. For you, that's on this too. I do. And I'll
really approach it from the other side of the coin. I think we are stuck at large, right,
with this mentality of I think part of it is just a loss of focus. And that goes back to my,
hey, what are we doing and why are we doing this and getting people to kind of pick their head up
out of a sand for a second and get out of their own sandbox and look around and, you know,
being in DC, I do it all the time. And I'll point over to Arlington Cemetery and say, hey,
if you haven't been over there in a while, maybe it's time to go take a walk and go take a look.
And we can go talk to some of my friends that are over there and say, hey, this is if we're not doing
it to reduce the number of white stones in that field, then how do I find something on the outside
for you to go do that may be a better use of our talents? It's time for some brutal honesty.
The other part of that with culture change is not just incentivizing and we don't do that well.
Quite frankly, everybody loves innovation until you get innovators and they're disruptive.
And their whole reason for being is to change the status quo. And I have watched people look at
young captains in the field who are doing exactly what, you know, in senior leader echelons,
we're telling them to do and they will get their hand slapped and it literally turns into the
conversation of, yeah, but don't innovate like that. That's that's disruptive. So that comes into
it's not just highlight the good behavior, right? When you see somebody doing something that is good,
you need to go screen that from the rooftops and from a much higher level than you would think
that you need to do that because it's not the senior leaders. Everybody's on the same page and
everybody is saying the right words and pointing in the right direction. It's not the people on the
ground. They are doing the same thing. They are, they've been ready. They're screaming for this.
They're running regardless of the support that they're getting. This is somewhere in the middle.
And somewhere in the middle, at some point in your career, and I hope that I never find it,
I think that people wake up one day and they want to be right more than they want to get it right.
And when you can realize that that is it, those are two different positions by what you're going
to approach a problem is where you start to have culture change. For me personally, in my entire
career, I have been deeply lucky to have always found myself sitting at the head of a table where
the people around the table were much better than I was, just about everything that we had going on.
And it went from accidentally stumbling into those scary situations going, oh man,
how did I end here? To doing what I do today, which is going out and finding the bodies and
finding these people and actively going, if I am collecting people who are sitting at this table
with me that are better than I am, that are the experts in their field. As a leader, I need to turn
and look and say, what do I need to do to help you do your job and to go remove problems?
That's not normal, by the way. It's a great special power that she has, not just collecting
humans. People will follow her true leadership, right? Two, she wants to make sure that the
person can go do. That's what we did with accelerator. You unleashed me. And I remember I was like,
are you sure? And you said, no, we're going to do this, we're going to do it right and stuff like
that. And that is not, I've been told to be less mavericky, for example. I've been told to tone it
down, Bonnie, you know, like, so like that's just to give it, I'll add a little color to what she's
talking about. That's not a shared view at someone at her level. The other side, so you can, you
know, you have to empower people. You have to realize that true empowerment means that your
reputation and that's fine because a real leader, hey, you, you know, and I tell folks all the time,
hey, you're going to go succeed. I'm going to take the fall for the failure. And that's the whole
point. It's why you, it's why executives get paid more, right? It should be. It's risk ownership.
But the reverse of that is accountability. And I think that that is really at the core of it where
we're sitting at this point. And we can champion things. We can highlight the good. But until there is
honest accountability, and not just the blatantly bad, right? And that's where I think that we get stuck.
We are, we do hold people accountable for you. If you do something illegal or non-compliant,
there, there is a, the system that is going to come in place and correct that. But what we haven't
gotten good at yet is having the accountability when you're not doing anything illegal, but you're
still wrong. And in wrong in this case is not moving quickly enough, not being supportive, not
getting serious. We're not moving the needle. We, we allow this churn. And I think that we are,
I think that culture is changing. I think that we are more willing now to lean in. But, but at the end
of the day, we don't, we don't have technology problems. I don't even think the nation has technology
problems. We're going to figure that out. That's who we are. We have people problems. And that boils
down to leadership problems. And that's kind of my, my challenge is, is going, hey, the senior leaders,
and I was in a conversation the other day. I had a general officer talking to me. And you know,
he made some comment on, hey, you know, we really need your help on this to get the department
to let us to do x, y and z. I said, what, what are you talking about? I'm screaming at you to do it.
That way you are somewhere in a middle echelon is choosing to not get you to yes. And either you
begin to hold those people accountable, or you're pointing right back at the person in harm's
way. And saying, I'm not serious, right? So we're going to get there. We have to. But it's a,
I think the culture change starts from the top. And that's happened. It's bubbling from the bottom.
And now it is about our senior leaders holding that middle management accountable.
Well, let me just say, Karen, and I hope you take this as the compliment that it is. It's so obvious
that you're a former military officer in the way, and I'm just speaking as one of myself,
in the way you speak about leadership. And I really appreciate him. I'm really happy we,
we ended there in this conversation. And we got through culture and went into the absolutely
fundamental role that plays as the substrate between all these processes and what we buy.
And I know we've said that we have the technology that we, you know, that we need or that,
you know, it's not all about the technology a few times in this conversation. But just to wrap us up
because you guys are working at the forefront of how we use drones. I mean, at special operations,
low-intensity conflict, you guys are sort of the pathfinder, I think, for new applications of drones.
And then, of course, Bonnie, with Durbin, you access, you'll be building out sort of a new portfolio
here, trying to send those lessons. So my final question for both of you to wrap this up is
getting to drones. What's one thing everybody's getting wrong today about them?
I kind of already tease this, I feel like the problem is not the contract.
And when I say problem, these are not insurmountable problems, but it's like to her point about,
these are all human problems. There is an orchestration of things that has to happen. I don't know if
the department is ready for, I don't know what to call it, other than cyclical technology changes.
So we're getting ready to do iterative gauntlets where we're looking for the best of the best,
you know, and we're going to prove out what right should look like at a point in time.
What right looks like today might not be what right looks like next year.
So I don't know if our force is ready for that tempo of change from a technology perspective,
from like a force generation, a training perspective, a coordination and logistics perspective.
Everyone who is hyper focused on the acquisition part, again, this is my community,
this is my dojo, like there's plenty to do better here. I am confident we are going to figure
that part out. I would love to feel more confidence on some of the other harder parts
between awarding the contract and getting it into the person's hands.
Canally, I think we're still struggling on the price point. And I think that if we look at that
from an adversarial perspective, when we're talking about mass, right, and I think it depends,
this is one of those going, and what do we mean by drone? Because that can mean so many different
things. But if we're looking at the problem set of what our adversary can do to hold at risk,
our people and our formation and how they used to do that, I think that we're still
and I hate to use the term over-engineering. But I think we're trying to get too fancy
when the answer is be able to do something at mass well and then be ready when that is no longer
valid in the con up to pivot and continue to make those improvements. So I think, you know, very,
very quickly, it, hey, that baseline price is this and by the time you get to what the operational
variant is, it's quadrupled 8x, something in price and now we're suddenly starting to price
ourselves out of that. And I think that that's, it's more than drones. I think that we're at a really
weird point with technology when we're talking about military grade. And that's another thing,
if I could change the way our relationship is with technology, it's to maybe take that back
and to not make it the almost slur that it is. So when I was in uniform right, and we talked
all about this, when you hear, you know, to the public, I think when they hear, oh, it's military
grade, well, that must be really tough. And we would always know in the military, oh, that means
it's probably, you know, really clunky and way over expensive and why am I getting charged,
you know, and I've seen examples of this of something you can buy basically on Amazon's about
$2,500 in the government's paying about $144. So, hey, hold on a minute. At the end of the day,
we have to thread that needle and I'll go back to read what I said in the beginning. This is
taxpayer dollars being traded for human life. And we need to make sure that that scale balances
in that way. And that would be my message to industry is, hey, we owe you better, but UOS
better too on this. And I think that we've been through a period where, you know, in whether it's
bad contract writing or bad decision making, you can point fingers all day long, but the government,
we, we created this ecosystem that we are now pretending that we are a victim of. So there has
to be some rebase lining that looks at this and understands really looking to the commercial side
and what does this really cost versus what do you think you're going to sell it to me for?
And remember, it, you know, we believe in the American dream, I think everybody can win in this
scenario, but I need industry to hear me when I say, you know, truly, if I'm going to, you know,
if you ever deal with me and I'm being a stickler about price, it's not, it's not my money,
it's a taxpayer's money. I am running a calculation of how far can I stretch the money that I have,
because that's just that many more people in my formation I can either provide capability to
or provide coverage to. And I think that more than drones, counter drones is where I get really
passionate about that because I was involved in an Army program when I was a
program manager that the whole reason that the Army program existed was the
current solution from a different formation cost too much and they had to come
in and go I can't cover all of my bases at that price point I just can't make it
make sense can we do something else that gets us there that's the reality of
what we're dealing with and I think that asking folks to meet us in the middle
on that is how I would end. There are a lot of threads that we have to
continue I'll have you both back sometime but for now Karen Bonnie thank you so
much for joining colleagues. Thanks for having us. Thank you for listening to
Cogs of War don't forget to sign up for our free newsletter to live at right
to your inbox every two weeks. War on the rocks.com/cogs-of-war keep listening keep
reading keep writing and most of all keep thinking independently
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The trade winds acquisition model accelerates buying by combining commercial solutions pathways with open, merit-based competition to allow flexible, rapid procurement at scale.
Speed, adaptability, and decentralization are prioritized over rigid processes, enabling warfighters and commanders to respond quickly to dynamic operational needs.
Lessons from Special Operations Forces—especially rapid pivoting, user-centered design, and trust-building with end-users—translate to broader military applications, including unmanned systems.
A shift from "one-size-fits-all" solutions to decentralized, ecosystem-based models empowers field units with choice while maintaining compliance and oversight.
Culture change requires leadership humility, accountability, and active encouragement of innovation, with top-down accountability and real-time feedback loops being essential.
The core challenge is not technology, but human and leadership dynamics—particularly the need for risk tolerance, trust, and faster decision-making between acquisition teams and operators.
Over-engineering and inflated costs in drone systems—especially in counter-UAS—put capabilities out of reach; pricing must reflect real-world operational needs and commercial viability.
Acquisition success hinges on redefining success metrics from process compliance to risk mitigation and mission outcomes, ensuring taxpayer dollars directly protect human lives.
Summary:
The Cogs of War podcast features a deep discussion on how to scale fast, agile acquisition models—originally developed in Special Operations Forces—across larger defense portfolios like unmanned systems. The core idea is the "trade winds" model, which blends commercial procurement practices with open, merit-based competitions to allow rapid, flexible buying without sacrificing compliance. This approach emphasizes speed, adaptability, and decentralization, enabling warfighters to respond to dynamic missions rather than being locked into rigid, slow processes.
Key lessons from SOF—such as prioritizing operational efficacy over technical perfection, fostering trust with end-users, and enabling rapid pivoting—are seen as transferable to broader military operations. The conversation underscores that the real challenge isn’t technology, but culture and leadership: overcoming risk aversion, empowering frontline decision-making, and holding leaders accountable for delays. A major insight is that drone and counter-drone systems suffer from over-engineering and excessive pricing, making them unaffordable for field use.
The discussion calls for a reimagining of acquisition success metrics—shifting from process adherence to real-world outcomes and risk reduction. Ultimately, the goal is not just faster procurement, but a more human-centered, responsive system where taxpayer dollars directly serve mission success and human protection.
FAQs
The 'trade winds' model is an accelerated acquisition pathway that combines elements from defense innovation units and commercial procurement practices. It enables direct, merit-based purchases of commercially viable solutions through broad, non-prescriptive solicitations, allowing flexibility and faster decision-making while maintaining compliance across multiple authorities.
It eliminates lengthy source selection processes by allowing companies to be 'awardable' after passing a competitive evaluation. Once approved, no further competition occurs, enabling faster deployment and real-time responsiveness to mission needs without sacrificing due diligence.
Speed and adaptability allow forces to respond quickly to dynamic environments like those in the Middle East or Ukraine. The mission demands constant change, so procurement must prioritize responsiveness and flexibility over long-term technical perfection or one-size-fits-all solutions.
Yes, many lessons from SOF—such as agility, user-centered design, and decentralized decision-making—transfer to larger programs. The model’s success lies in its adaptability, not its exclusivity, and it has already influenced broader portfolios like unmanned systems.
The warfighter is now central to the acquisition process, acting as the ultimate risk owner. Acquisition professionals must work closely with them to understand real operational needs, ensuring that technology is aligned with mission demands, not just technical feasibility.
It creates a reusable, post-competition ecosystem where solutions can be revisited and adapted without restarting full acquisition cycles. This allows for continuous iteration and realignment with evolving operational conditions and threats.
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