Lawfare Daily: Trump's New Plan for Gaza, with Joel Braunold
49m 13s
The podcast discusses the Trump administration’s new 15-point plan for Gaza, a follow-up to the earlier 20-point framework, aimed at ending the conflict through phased Hamas decommissioning of weapons in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal. The Board of Peace, led by figures like Adam Boehler, negotiated directly with Hamas, which surprisingly agreed to the plan, including detailed verification mechanisms and international oversight. President Trump announced it as a historic agreement, but Israel, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, rejected it, citing distrust of Hamas and political constraints ahead of elections. The plan’s core mechanism ties decommissioning in specific areas to Israeli withdrawal from the "yellow line," originally 52% of Gaza, but Israel has expanded to 70%, creating confusion. Hamas’s acceptance is seen as a strategic move to shift blame onto Israel, which now appears belligerent. Key institutions like the NKG, meant to govern Gaza, remain stuck in Cairo, while the ISF has not deployed, and the Board of Peace struggles to deliver on its promises. The deal has weakened the "precedent thesis," as Netanyahu uses rejection to bolster his campaign, making future agreements harder. The hosts conclude that the plan’s success hinges on U.S. pressure on Israel, but with elections looming, progress seems unlikely in the short term.
(upbeat music) - The Israelis think this is all a con, but they realize that they need to do something. But their own politics won't allow them to do something. And the board of pieces stuck now, that they've got this agreement that President Trump has announced and has loved, but what can they deliver? - It's the Law Fair podcast. I'm senior editor Scott R. Anderson, joined by contributing editor Joel Bromald, managing director of the center project. - But so far in Lebanon, the negotiations are slow, and are difficult and the Israelis are very sensitive before the election for anything leaking about what they're agreeing to. And any leaks will just make them not be willing to do anything at the table, giving the sensitivity of everything that's happening right now. - Today, we're discussing the Trump Administration's new plan for Gaza, and why Israel isn't on board. - Joel, it has been an eventful couple of weeks, slash months in the last time we caught up on the state of the kind of Israeli Palestinian conflict, as a whole, we have not won, but two frameworks, this administration has kind of hailed a historic, a more recent one in related Gaza, earlier one from last month in Lebanon. Both of which have gotten hung up on kind of a similar problem of sequencing between disarmament and Israeli withdrawal, to some extent, although it's in different ways. So let's walk through and talk to people about what these two deals are, and how they fit into the broader picture. Let's start with the Gaza deal, which of course is the product that's come out in the last two weeks, that's particularly notable, particularly because we're seeing this unique political alignment with a very open break by the Israeli government from the plan, and less so interestingly by Hamas and other parties in Gaza are traditionally much less aligned with the Trump Administration around this. Let's start with, how do we get to the 15 point plan, to this idea that we need a 15 point plan, and how does it replace the 20 point plan that we're all familiar with from the beginning of this administration? - So the 15 point plan, which I will urge the listeners to look at, you can go to the Board of Peace's ex-page, and it is the pinned tweet, the pinned post at the top, is the text of the 15 point framework between the Board of Peace and Hamas, as well as an explainer of what's going on. And the first point of that explainer tells you what it is. It fundamentally is, as I'll read from the plan, all parties reaffirm their commitment to the President Trump's comprehensive plan to achieve peace in Gaza, which constitutes together with UN Security Council Resolution 2003, and agreed upon international framework guiding the implementation of this process. Through this process, the parties aim to end the cycle of destruction, secure the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, restore normal life, enable Palestinian governance, reconstruction, security, recovery and economic development, rehabilitate damaged sectors and facilitate launching a credible political pathway that achieved self-determination and stated. Okay. Why is that very long preamble, very important? If we remember when we were debating and discussing the 20 point plan, we said it was really a three different plans that was questioned to one. Point one was a hostage prisoner release deal that was supposed to also undergird the principles that no garsens would be forced to leave Gaza, that there would be some level of amnesty for Hamas, if they would go through this, and that there would be an eventual withdrawal from Israel from Gaza. Okay. That was sort of part one that just the commitments that those were where we were aiming towards. Point two, the phase two, which was always the one that was bedeviling everyone, was we could replace Hamas as governance in Gaza, what would we construction look like, what would a decommissioning instead of disarmament, we used a timethe commission that basically Jonathan Powell, who was the British National Security Advisor, was very involved in the Northern Irish peace process, sort of brought into this equation, saying don't use disarmament and use decommissioning, it's more of an acceptable process where, you don't give up weapons, but you make them inoperable. What does that process look like? And then there was a third part of the 20 point plan, points are 18, 19 and 20, which really looked towards creating a political horizon for the entire Palestinian national project. And the third part was, you know, had this Gaza link into the wider regional integration, how does it link the West Bank? Two Gaza and all the other things. So what the 15 point framework is, is basically a recommitment to the 20 point plan, and the implementation framework for phase two. So it's very important to see it within that context. Now, since the 20 point plan was announced and started, sort of just a little over a year ago, we did of course have the hostage release and prisoner release, there was an increase in humanitarian delivery, and Israel was supposed to and did it, at the beginning was drawn to 52% of Gaza, that was called the yellow line. Now, the yellow line was demarcated within the maps. The yellow line's gonna become very important to this conversation. The yellow line, as understood in the document, is 52% of Gaza. Israel remains on 52% of Gaza. The rest of Gaza is a Hamas control. Now, before the Board of Peace made this agreement with Hamas a few weeks ago, like almost 10 days ago, there was a move in the Israeli cabinet to enable the ISF, the International Security Forces, which is based to be the international group that will go in, not to create a peacekeeping role, but to sort of be between forces, between Israel and Hamas, and sort of do that. So not an internal securitizing, DDR sort of role of disarmament, but really to sit between the forces. Israel's cabinet agreed to extend the immunity laws to the eventual ISF, but they made some conditions, all soldiers that are part of this need to be have countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel, and are not trying to hurt Israel in an international form, read no Turks and no Qataris. But before deployment, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Foreign Minister all need to agree. So it was really just sort of a technical move, but I think that the Board of Peace was banking that, as the Israeli acquiescence that we were moving into face to. So then what happens? The Israelis were convinced, totally convinced their securit, their intel groups and everyone else, that there was no way that Hamas would agree to ever give up their weapons. That it was just the Americans won a full skull. And lo and behold, Hamas finished its some part of its internal elections. Haia was elected, who is sort of the Gaza main representative, and still one of the last survivors of the uptapers seventh leadership, and he is doing his tour, he sits with Fidan, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, and a few others. And lo and behold, the Board of Peace actually manages to get a commitment from Hamas to agree to this 15 point plan. And if you go through all 15 points, it's actually pretty detailed with international verification regimes. When Engag will come in, which is the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, who will pay the debts that the Hamas government put up amounts of no more than 400 million, how will decommissioning work? You know, there'll be stored in warehouses before the decommissioned under Shana Sheikh Protocol, the responsibility of the police, you know, genuinely, and honestly, this is not a nothing document. This is a pretty detailed as it goes document, but the core way that the document works is that as Hamas decommissions its weapons in point by point in different areas of Gaza, so as they do, you know, do our baller, for example, and then it is verified by an international committee of verifications, which includes the guarantors, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, as well as the US and others, then Israel will start withdrawing from the yellow light. So that is the mechanism that was somewhat agreed within this document. So Hamas agrees and President Trump announces on Trump's social and historic agreement, and to his credit, this is a big deal. Trump's entire mechanism on the 20 point plan, I've remembered, was just to say, look, we've all agreed to phase one. Let's just put in phase two and three, and we'll get there, we'll use the momentum. We have lots of skeptics and everything else, but you know what, he used the momentum over the past year and some of the pressure that Israel moved beyond the current yellow line of 52, and now occupies 70% of Gaza, that they continue to kill, continue to do airstrikes, you know, was sort of putting pressure on Hamas to move them. And now Hamas has moved and has agreed to do this sort of disarmament process. So the momentum thesis worked, right? It sort of moved in. But it was curious about why now, why did Hamas agree now? We are 90 days before Israeli elections, at a time where there is the least amount of Israeli ability to agree. So Hamas agrees, and there was complete silence from Jerusalem. You know, not, you know, the right wing of the cabinet, but Ben Gves-Mottwitch starts screaming, this is unacceptable. We never agreed to this. We have to say no, we have to tell President Trump, absolutely not. And Prime Minister Netanyahu is coming under increasing pressure to say something. There's a meeting between Nikolai Miladinov, the high representative of Gaza, our air-light stand, the CEO of the Board of Peace and Prime Minister Netanyahu, in which afterwards Miladinov tweets saying that Hamas needs to complete its disarmament before there's a withdrawal, seemingly indicating that he's now changed the agreement, though they keep talking about the same yellow line. And it seems like there are two different yellow lines. There's the yellow line of the 52%, and the yellow line of the 70%. After Hamas agrees, is our steps up its airstrikes on Gaza. So it looks like they're just continuing to step up that airstrikes on Gaza in order to force Hamas out of compliance. So there's a lot of pressure on the Americans to get Israel to stop basically imploding the 15 point plan before it's even had a chance to stop. The one thing coming out this meeting is that strike procedures change from the head of southern command to the head of the entire of the IDF. So now if you wanna commit to striking Gaza, you now need the permission of the chief of staff of the IDF, which as you can imagine, is pretty significantly high up the decision-making change.
So it seems like at least the meeting has now prevented Israel from just going off the Hamas targets as they saw fit, but now it's somewhat more of a restrainer. So finally Netanyahu's forced to say something because this is becoming a huge political issue in the campaign. You're going to withdraw, you're going to give Hamas lying to the international community, we're not going to believe them. And Netanyahu two days ago says we reject the 15 points. We have nothing to do with it, we reject it, it's nothing we don't agree. So which the board of peace does an interview on Channel 12 with our minute Segal saying is I was not party to the board of peace anyway. This is really an agreement to us and God and Hamas which is a curious thing seeing that the idea of course needs to agree otherwise this whole thing doesn't really work. But basically again doesn't really dictate which yellow line we're talking about. So for your listeners at the end of this very long sort of answer, here is what I think is going to happen is going to go up. The head of the Shabbat, the Israeli sort of domestic secret police who really responsible for a lot of security vis-à-vis the Palestinians and like Mossad that operates beyond his borders called the Hamas signing of this a diplomatic October 7th which by the way, an absurd thing to say, a horrendous thing to say. But it was like we were surprised and again they've destroyed us internationally. So many ways Hamas, if you don't believe that Hamas is serious, they've basically learned off Israel to say yes and throw the blame game over to Israel. Knowing that Israel can't agree to this in the next 90 days, they say yes and throw the blame game back over to the Israelis. So learning from the mediators and everyone else and the guarantors, Hamas says yes. Now Israel has to be the one who looks like its belligerent rather than Hamas and Israel is like well they're not, you can't believe them and the board of peace is like well you didn't believe us when we said we could get the hostages and the bodies of the hostages and we did. So let us try and do this. So A, the Israelis think this is all a con but they realize that they need to do something but their own politics won't allow them to do something. And the board of peace is stuck now that they've got this agreement that President Trump has announced and has loved but what can they deliver. So in the next 90 days here's what I think they can deliver. One as we've seen, I think there can be pressure to prevent targeted assassinations which aren't imminent threats. So really to a strain Israeli activity on that side. I think two, while it won't happen before the election, this ambiguity about the yellow line, I believe that the Trump administration is going to put significant pressure on the next Israeli coalition, whoever they are, to pull back from the 70% of Gaza that they've got back to the 52% of Gaza because there are no IDF troops supposedly deployed between the 52 and 70% that just sort of moving these concrete blocks further and further pushing Gaza, garrisons and civilians into a small and small area. So therefore that that once again go back to 52% and use it as a deposit to Hamas to say, okay, look, we've demonstrated that Israel is withdrawn and now let's start a decommissioning process. The last thing I'll say, what this has done, right? Ultimately, it's really got rid of something that I like to call the precedent thesis. So the precedent thesis said that if you could get this Israeli government to agree to something, then the next Israeli government would be able to do it even more. So whatever you can look in now, lock in because it will make it easier later on for a new Israeli government because they can't be snipe by the right. In many ways, the 15 points in the Hamas decommissioning linked to Israeli withdrawal, despite the fact that it was this Israeli government who signed it, and despite the fact that this Israeli government signed that there would be a pathway to a Palestinian state, 90 days before the election, there's no way that they can agree to it. And instead of this being an enabling move, it's actually a disabling move. Because what will happen now is that BB will run on, I will not agree to this and will say that anyone who agrees to this can't stand up to presidents even if it's president Trump. And so this concept that you can get precedence right now to lock in as much as possible is no longer really holding true. And it's not holding true because President Trump's popularity as well has dipped because of all this stuff to do with Iran and America not sort of fulfilling what the Israeli commitment they thought it was. And so unless President Trump inacts some very significant political costs for Netanyahu, which is unclear if you will during an election campaign, the aim of trying to push Israel today before the elections in order to open up space for a new Israeli government is somewhat depleted. It is a wild story with a lot of moving pieces. That's an amazing overview of where we are on this agreement. I think one thing as we look forward to think about is what is the state of these institutions that we understand are supposed to play this central role if we ever make it to this next step. We know we have the board of peace operating. We have Malatanov, it's kind of the special envoy heading up that effort on the diplomatic front. We know we have now a Skag, a Parminaskega, an NKG, a body set up of Palestinians intended to fill the governmental role that Hamas now has formally seated as of, I think July 6 of Iraq, correctly, basically saying our civil authorities are disbanded but we still have our paramilitary and security forces still armed, at least in still this agreement is implemented. And then you have the ISF that's supposed to come in and play that mediating role. And presumably I think still provides some security for the people doing disarmament inspections, things like that. We know we are some country commitments about that but we haven't really seen it as far as I'm aware of much steps retaining operational. So where are these three key institutions now and how close are they actually being able to deliver themselves if the parties ever come to the table to say, yeah, we're ready to move to this next step. So let's start with NKG. The NKG is 15 commissioners that are Palestinian headed up by Ali Shath. NKG plays, they've been stuck in Kaira, they haven't been allowed to go into the strip. The Israeli fear is that if they go in before, well, the cynical one is like we don't want any Palestinian governance, we want Palestinians to leave North to go back in, right? And we can see that on Israel not allowing, there's a big push to allow patients to leave Gaza to get cancer treatment or students to go abroad. There's no guarantee from Israel that they can come back in, right? So there's still, even though there's a commitment that from the board of peace and in the 20 point plan that Gaza should be allowed to return, there is still no Israeli counter commitment and so there's still this tension from coming in and so NKG's inability to enter as can be seen as the Israelis are just blocking any potential future. But there's also a non-synical risk that they don't want to lebanization model where you've got a civilian government that has international impromptur where you've got Hamas really controlling everything behind the scenes with their armed militias anyway because that would give Hamas sort of a diplomatic community, which is what they really don't want to have. So NKG the past year has been sitting in Cairo, they've had some conferences, they've done some stuff in Cyprus. They're really subservient to Nicolai Miladinov and the board of peace. Legally they have the ability to run Gaza but there's a liaison committee between Nikolai's office and the PA because should the PA reform up to standards then ultimately that's what NKG will be working with in terms of illegal set of precedents coming from Ramallah rather than sort of new Kennedy school-esque or Tony Blair change institute-esque reforms that they're creating in Cairo. Right so they're sort of in public policy school right now working out all the different things but there's been nothing operational. So they're ready to go and the main thing they've done is to try and recruit a police force. They opened up applications, they had like 300,000 people applied. They've got sort of a training they're trying to kick off the training for who will be the civilian police, who will be like the one gun, one power sort of underlying of Gaza and they need to do that but they don't really have civil servants. You know as part of the whole demobilization, disarmament process many of the Hamas civil servants once vetted will basically just switch over to work for NKG afterwards. So they're sitting there sort of working up that you know Dachlan who is you know an abas opponent fatach guy who sits in the UAE as an advisor to the Amir there. You know he has a lot of allies on NKG as well. He and the UAE still control a lot of the economy that's still currently going into Gaza and interestingly he put his own reputation on the board for the 15 points backing it in some way we're not really clear it's not public how he's done it but he basically after his or reject today publicly condemned Netanyahu saying that he's humiliating President Trump because Koli Dachlan put his reputation on the line as well. So that's NKG. The ISF the US has been sort of slowly closing down the CMCC the civilian military coordination center that was set up just after the 20 point plan and is building more of a permanent base which looks like from the logos that are on it. The permanent headquarters of the ISF the international security forces I think there's been a US general appointed who will be the head of the ISF in some way and then there have been I know Uganda and Morocco have committed some level of troops but we're talking sort of under 200 troops in totality I think Albania might be around there I've got to check like it's sort of that sort of level and so until the 15 point plan is agreed upon and then you've got the agreement of the Israelis to allow them in they're sort of just sitting waiting as well in terms of what's going on. And then the board of peace itself is this bizarre entity right so it technically has on it a representative of the World Bank that holds a trust fund for the reconstruction of Gaza but that operational fund seemed to be a JP Morgan Chase account that they're using it seems and they've signed at least some construction contracts for sort of a small pilot humanitarian city on the Israeli side of Gaza near Rafa that they're supposed to start with I think 10,000 people where the aim is to say if Hamas won't agree so ironically they now have agreed to a 15 point.
plan that there would be some sort of humanitarian city that Encan could start running as sort of a pilot program where everyone coming in is vetted. And also on that, who's going to live there? So there are militias, anti-Hamas militias that have weapons that Israel has enabled to operate on its controlled side of Gaza that have been attacking Hamas. Now as part of the disarmament deal of the 15 points, they also have to give up their weapons. And as you can imagine, they are very not keen to give up said weapons. Same Hamas is lying and will all be killed. But of course, everyone has to give up their weapons according to a DDR deal. And so you've got sort of these competing medalities, whereas do we allow the Rafaq humanitarian city to move forward? BB it seems the defense minister are pushing to allow that to move forward now in order to take focus off the 15 point plan. But Hamas is agreeing to the 15 point plan, why would you only start reconstruction on the Israeli side of Gaza? These are some of the sort of pressure points that are going on. But the board of peace itself, you've got Meladonov, you've got Blair, you've also got these very larger than life billionaire figures like Mark Rowan and others who sit on the Gaza executive committee, who are supposedly, you know, going to be creating mega deals for Gaza and everything else. We'll see what happens there. But the real operative part of the board of peace seems to be its professional secretary out, which is R.A. Lightstone, Nikolai Meladonov, that crowd. But it's still not clear what kind of legal entity they are. And that matters now from a US context is they look to try and get, I think around 200 million in peacekeeping support from the US federal budget. And not to get that, you know, President Trump has signed an executive order saying that they are able to receive defense articles. But what's their legal standing, you know, your far more skilled on this than I am Scott. But there's a lot of still outstanding questions. It's sort of very much one like a startup rather than the serious international agency. So it's very unclear. Let's shift focus now from Gaza to Lebanon. We've got a good sense of what the picture is in Gaza. And Lebanon a few weeks ago, we were in not a totally dissimilar position. We've had for a while now a nominal framework, Trump administration, Trumpeted, you know, had a, to reasonably high profile signing here in Washington DC and April or May, as I recall, of the steps towards this framework for trying to get Israel to give up the 20% or so of Lebanon. It is occupying and has been occupying for, you know, a better part of a year at this point. Hinging again on a process of disarmament this time headed up by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese government. And we've also asserted themselves in this Israeli health territory and actually effectively disarm that seems to remain the hold up. So talk to us about the status of that framework agreement and where we seem to be stuck on it, given that we haven't really seen that much progress, at least from an observer outside observers perspective for the last couple weeks. So, you know, as we mentioned last time, Lebanon was really the big question that is our head on the MAU with Iran. And it's just to have freedom of action and the Trump administration created the separate formal government to government track in order to disentangle the Lebanese, the Iran dominated his bullet track. You know, who basically is a ceasefire in Lebanon declared in Beirut or is it declared in Tehran was really the question. The Israelis if it's declared in Tehran doesn't work. But if it's declared in Beirut, then there might be something to work with. Now again, the general thesis coming out in Israel on a pretty mass popular level is that on the lessons after October 7th is that we should have these sort of buffer zones around us and one of those buffer zones is in the north. Sort of the place going up to Bufon Castle, sadly, as you said, sort of that they're trying to hold on to right now. But the Trump administration created this process directly between Lebanon and Israel that's, you know, their thesis is that if the L.A.F. the Lebanese armed forces can disarm, has bullar and move into those pilot zones. Then Israel can start withdrawing from those pilot zones. The Israelis have been signaling both in the negotiations and publicly that everyone should have very right sized expectations. These pilot zones aren't within the kilometers that they care about. Sort of the buffer zones as in they took more territory than they needed, at least in their own security and plan in order to give back that territory while holding on to their own territory. And so they're over anchoring in the negotiation discourse in order to sub-ancola afterwards with the promise of normalization sort of being dangled out at the end once this whole thing is concluded. Where is it up to? So in the last, the negotiations seem to be held in Rome in the last round. The Israelis cut short the negotiations because they claim that the Lebanese were leaking from the room. There was an incident, a security incident where I think two Israeli soldiers were killed and four were injured as an IED went off as they were clearing some of the tunnels and houses and some of the villages and southern Lebanon. The Israelis claimed that this was a ceasefire violation and wanted to go back to striking Lebanon. But interestingly, the Americans reviewed it and said it was not a ceasefire violation. This was an ID that had been planted before the ceasefire was in power input. And so it shouldn't be counted and the Israelis didn't go on to commit strikes in South Lebanon. Now the Israelis, meanwhile, there is significant, just like in Gaza, political cost, if you withdraw anything from Lebanon right now. And there's also from early reports a real dissatisfaction with the job that the LAF is doing, claiming that they're not really challenging. And it's just another version of the unifel sort of forces that didn't help after 2006. And so there's a lot of pressure on the Lebanese to sort of get this right. Now the Lebanese, unlike the Palestinians, have real diplomatic allies in the US ambassador in Lebanon, the US ambassador to Turkey, who also is a special rep now for Iraq, Tom Barak. People who are very close with President Trump and President Trump really does not like to see at least from his own language, destruction and death and wants to see economic commerce, you know, the president of Lebanon got to go to the White House. You know, I don't really see President Abbas or the head of Hamas being able to do that. So the Israelis don't get to somewhat dictate times as much and the US seems far more willing to sort of put significant pressure. The people who actually get the most eye from the Americans on the Lebanese file are the French, who of course are the former colonial power in France and like to think of themselves as being involved in that after the relationship between Paris and Jerusalem just collapsing over the past few years. The French really have been banned from the room in many different ways. And all of these negotiations are getting on sponsored by the Americans between Lebanon and Israel. Slow process. But again, we see something that's very different than the Gaza context that I think is very important. One of the big critiques of Israel when they say, well, we just want Hamas to surrender and then we can rebuild the society and they point to what happened in World War II with Japan or Germany, one, Germany used to talk about this quite a lot. A lot of Israeli commentators do is that Germany and Japan was still countries, right? The governments might have been defeated, but no one was talking about the end of Germany. I know it was divided into West and East Germany, but the aim was that it was going to be unifies and was still Germany, or Germany, not all, or Germany. Same as Japan, right? So, you know, the aim was still Japan. So Israel has not agreed to a state of Palestine. So who are people did he are into? And that's why the logical thing is that it either remains in rubble, which is what one form ahead of Israel's national security agency said, or that Guards and leave, right? The solution for this is that it's no longer a problem, which is ethnic cleansing, it's war crime, it's all the things that we know. In Lebanon, there is an entity, the Lebanese Armed Forces has broken this difficult and the terror agreement that ended the civil war that was negotiating in the Saudi Arabia, obviously framework for how the Lebanese state can operate without malicious debt. And there is a general sense within the region, in the most parts of the region that is in Iran, that we don't want armed groups operating in sovereign spaces because it gives us well an excuse and others an excuse, whether it's the Houthis, whatever else, to bomb those places, and it would be good if sovereign governments were in charge of all of their territory. There is a regional interest in the LAF succeeding, and there is a US interest in restraining the IDF to enable that time to succeed, but should they not succeed, I don't know how this gets better, but so far in Lebanon, the negotiations are slow and are difficult and the Israelis are very sensitive before the election for anything leaking about what they're agreeing to, and any leaks will just make them not be willing to do anything at the table, given the sensitivity of everything that's happening right now. And there is another front that we've seen pop up, particularly in the US and media ecosystem increasingly often in the last few months, and that is the West Bank, kind of simmering in the background, not at the sort of active scale of conflict of Gaza or Lebanon, but a place where we have seen increasingly aggressive Israeli actions around settlements, including in just last week or two, really, I think, FFRQ correctly, including a number of high profile conflicts with international media, with at least one US Congress person, who was there trying to represent a Vrocona who had an encounter with security forces and settlers that got a lot of media attention here in the United States, and it's an issue set that I think is rising on the list of at least the public profile here in the United States, and to some extent has never been that far down the list for a lot of the world, even as Gaza has blown up, Lebanon has blown up, the West Bank was always kind of visioned as the number one problem before October 7th, and has always sat there in the background. So, talked about what we're seeing there, particularly as Israel enters this critical moment before the election, where we know the status of settlements in the West Bank and of the West Bank itself is such a domestically significant political point. So, the West Bank has not been calm, it's never really been calm, and it's definitely not been calm since October 7th. And while of course for obvious reasons the majority of the world's focus has been in Gaza, you know, the Israeli. The finance and deputy defense minister, Patel Smootrich, has seen this as his opportunity to try and collapse the Palestinian Authority in every which way he can, from trying to starve it, from resources to encourage wildcat settlements to legalize what were in his rail eyes illegal settlements and try and do as much as possible to foreclose any potential possibility for Palestinian state. He's doing that on bureaucratic levels at the settlement ministry. These posting pictures of peace now reports show extreme growth of settlements as like campaign ads saying, "Good, right, look, I am killing this opportunity." The one line that Trump has put out is no formal annexation. There's lots of things up to the formal annexation that are basically formal annexation that they're trying to do. It also seems that the other red line, I'm going to get to the violence in the West Bank and one side, but the other formal red line that seems this constant undergoer doing one of the only places where Israel and the PA still touch right now is on into banking relations and economy. Smootrich has refused for the past 10 months now to give any customs revenues to the PA despite their legal obligations to do so under the power of spread schools. The PA is starving of money and he keeps playing around with the banking and immunity letters that provide because the Palestinian economy is in shackles and you need to have a shackle based bank clear your revenues. There are two Israeli commercial banks that have done it because Smootrich kept playing around with not extending the immunity letters to basically risk analysis of those banks as they don't want to do this anymore. They've now basically stopped doing that and that is this big push and it seems that this is an American red line to make sure that the Palestinian banking sector does not collapse before there is the election. That seems to be another red line. Whether it's not a red line, it seems, is on the complete explosion of violence between the settled communities and Palestinians. When the Palestinians are premissed, they are asked a few times and other people have been asked the question or he says, "Oh, it's 150 youths. They don't even in the settlements. All the settlers are wonderful people." That's why it's that. The question always comes back, "Well, if it's 150 youths, why can't you do something and then he blames the courts?" Well, the courts are very lean in on them. It doesn't really pass the smell test and it's very clear that there's been increasing amounts of violence in the West Bank that is happening. The Israelis claim that the Aresi is a Wild West. The Palestinians are trying to take over as much of that land as possible. The Oslo courts said that Aresi was Israeli, at least administratively controlled and security controlled. It's a Wild West sort of land fight of who can create as many farms and facts on the ground. Palestinians are like, "Look, we've got ancient towns and villages here in the Israelis, not only in sea, but also in B, are trying to push us off those towns and are basically enabling settler communities to attack farmers and scare them off the lands and try and get rid of as many of them as possible." A very significant incident happened two weeks ago in the Palestinian town of Tel, where a bunch of religious, I think most of them were from the settlements, but some might have been from mainstream as well. Inland as well decided to go on a hike that they did not coordinate with the IDF, and they went into a Palestinian village in area B or in the Aresi, but they went into the village that was clearly an intimidating thing, like an orange march, whatever, or one side's arm and one side's not. The Palestinian villages went out, there was conflict. At one point, a Palestinian grabbed a gun from one of the IDF soldiers who turned up. There were shots fired, the investigation is not clear about who killed the two Israelis. What they friendly fire was that the Palestinians were shot one and the other one was killed, and then four Palestinians were killed. Some of the videos pretty brutal. It's unclear if it was somewhat summarily executed or whatever else happened, and then of course as was expected, there were riots across the West Bank of Israeli. We used to see riots across the West Bank, and everyone said, "Oh, Palestinians are rioting against it." It's not. Every time we now say riots gets to West Bank, it is set. The Hitler groups or religious groups coming from Israel, rioting in Palestinian villages, and the IDF struggling to control it. We saw multiple different price tag attacks and riots across the West Bank. This is a cycle, and this is a thing that we see again and again in each time the intensity increases. It increases increases, and this has a number of factors. Right now, there is a small Palestinian farm that is being besieged by seven settlers that won't allow food or water to go in. The MKs are appealing to the IDF to clear them out. The IDF seemingly went there and took pictures with the people blockading them and then went home, and they're still there blockading them. Jeremy Diamond from CNN, spoke about this, and lots of people, and as of this recording, it's still happening. It seems like the IDF is just not interested or doesn't have the political capability or preventing what is an assault against the Palestinian local population with the aim of pushing them off their land. Right? That is happening at an increasingly high clip. We get spots when Rocahana is there or when an American is killed, but it's not an American or not a congressman, this is an ongoing campaign. We have seen a response from Israeli civil society of a growth in what's called civilian protection, where you've got Israelis with international volunteers as well, going to protect these villages. They film them. You've seen religious Israelis, a group of an Abraham take part in this. Lots of difference. So you have seen sort of a different form of civil society sort of come up as they sort of push against this and this has become a cadence in the Israeli election campaign. So you see central parties, Eisenkourt, Bennett, the Democrats led by Yegwalan and even some of the slightly more self-right being like this is insane. We can't allow this to happen and that this is the look could allow the Kaharnis to run riot and this is what happens. I know we're going to talk about the election. This has even led into the liquid primaries in some way that I'll get to it a second. But this is what's going on in the West Bank and the Palestinians are appealing for international support and help. There is clearly in Europe a move to do more settler sanctions amongst Democrats. If you look at House Democrats over 180 have signed on to Jerry Nadler's bill, which is to codify the Biden settler sanctions and there's a clear indication from Ramamanio and others when he went to Israel that the next democratic administration is going to be unrelenting and sanctioning violence against Palestinians and maybe even just building in the settlements, but definitely against violence against Palestinians in a far more significant way than President Biden was really going after whether it was government officials or anyone else and making this absolutely clear that this is an unacceptable issue. But it's ongoing, it's significant and it's also humiliating for the PA, the comprehensive people and this is something that dominates Palestinian media and the Israeli system, the security system, understands how significant and serious this is, which is why they're pushing for a return to administrative detentions for Israelis who protest by in this, something that the current defense minister in Israel is resisting for political reasons. And without that tool in their toolbox, they're in this very significant problem where they know who's committing it in some cases and it's not happening. We have seen two responses by the Israeli state that have been rare indictments, never really murdered but some manslaughter and others of some people have passed this baited in this and also cabinet did pass some things preventing the establishment of settlements in area B and restriction of funding for settlers who do other things that go against the Israeli government right now. But ultimately the general trajectory is establishment of as many settlements as possible right now, legalization, massive funding and turning a blind eye or even an encouragement in many different cases. And the last thing I'll say is got on this and I know it's very complicated and we don't have enough time to unpack all of this. So central command in Israel is the West Bank area, it's a very political position. I'll answer and I know we're getting to the Israeli elections, I'll say the piece of that the next question. But one of the biggest issues you've got is you have security squads that are sort of within the settlements that have been especially empowered after October 7th and then you have sort of often reservists or conscripts from the IDF were there. So who really has operational control when it comes to that, are they listening to the settlers security squads, are they listening to the IDF? That blurring of that line, you know, who's really in charge, who, you know, again, like the IDF is naturally inclined because of who it's drawn from and what they do to side on the side of the Israeli Jewish settlers against the local Palestinians, it's just the Palestinian city residents there as well. So the police force itself and the army itself is not incentivized to take this virus particularly seriously. So the background context of all of this as you've alluded to, as I mentioned a few times, is this pending election on October 27th, we have Israeli elections fixed on the calendar, we're a little more than two months out at this point. What are the dynamics leading into that? We know Netanyahu, I think in the polls, I've seen lately is nominally trailing all this till fairly early, the Eisenkath, the kind of leading opposition figure. Where does this fit in? Where are the dynamics leading up to the election around these three areas that are so central to the broader Israeli policy and conflict and increasingly to US policy, whether the administration's policy in the case of the West Bank, a strong political strain that has deep roots reach in the Democratic Party and perhaps in the administration and part the Republican Party as well. That's a lot and it's good for at least another hour. So I'll just give a very basic overview because I'm sure we'll do an election poll cast at one point before the Israeli election. So I've mentioned multiple times that it could primary. So that it could, which is the largest party on the Israeli right, the party of Prime of the Netanyahu, until this particular election cycle was probably the last major party that was still holding party primaries. Where, as well as the list system, so you have to hold primaries if you want, if you're not a personalized party of just one individual, you have chapters and members, you hold primaries.
about what position you are on the list. And Prime Minister Netanyahu this time is under a lot of pressure to refresh the list. It's the same old names and you know as you can imagine any primary system where it's a smaller part of the population, the ideological crazies get their way, same as everything else. And so Netanyahu for a very good campaign against his party to get a lot of power to reserve the top 11. Why is any of this relevant? So one of the people campaigning in the primaries until today was the Defence Minister Yisrael Katz who was not doing very well in the primaries. And he decided as Defence Minister to basically run in a primary as Defence Minister and curve policy to do that. So there were three instances. Instance number one he goes on Channel 14, which is the very pro Netanyahu television show. He's on the equivalent of the Fox 5, right? So the wherever is. And he basically announced his live on television that he's replacing the head of Central Command. Avi Bluth, who despite being a religious Jew who was generally seen as pro settler, that he feels wasn't listening to him because Avi Bluth wanted to return administrative detention to violent settlers or violent individuals who were in the settlements, it's unclear where they live, who were committing horrendous acts of violence against Palestinians. And Yisrael Katz said no and he's undermined me and so I'm going to replace him. Caused a huge for all the chief of stuff of the idea said you don't have the power to do that and under no circumstances. And so you know the idea for the war with the Defence Minister. So that's one, two, in a different campaigning event in the settlement city of Ariel, the Defence Minister declared that he was comfortable signing administrative detention orders against Palestinians, against Bedouin Israeli citizens, against Arab citizens of Israel but not against Jewish citizens of Israel and that he would basically ethnically determine administrative detention. Again, big for all, but you know he's trying to, you know this is what the primary said. And the third one, he decided to have a primary jingle that AI track was called bomb bomb bomb, which just images of him blowing up villages in Lebanon and in Gaza and other things under a thing bomb bomb bomb. And it got to the point that Prime Minister Netanyah was like, you need to concentrate on state security, you can't be doing this. And so he gave him a protected top 10 spot on the list in order just to have him retouch. He was missing cabinet meetings, right? That why am I saying all this is deeply, darkly humorous and it's not humorous, it's monstrous as this is. It demonstrates to the state that primary politics could affect security policy in the state as well. And in order to pretend that it doesn't just doesn't understand Israeli society in any way shape or for. Okay. So the elections are affecting every single security decision right now. It creates this, Netanyah will do nothing that will challenge his coalition because he wants that block to be his block at the next one. And if he forces to block the split apart on an unpopular decision on Gaza, on Lebanon, on Syria, on Iran, then he knows that he's not going to be prime minister. Because as you said, Scott, the polls right now demonstrate that he is well short of 61 seats if he keeps his current coalition. Basically, none of the opposition parties want to sit with him. And so his ability to maintain his grip on power is incredibly limited and less. He gets like a big wave before the elections that he can get this coalition to return to power. The other underlying dynamics of the election, the Democrats, which has run by Yeh Ego-Lan, have finally reconstituted an actual Zionist left again, which had been sort of dead. They registered over 110,000 members, 85,000 of them took part in their primaries. They had a very active primary list. They're polling around 10 to 11 seats, but they're sort of a very strong poll. As you mentioned, Gadi Eisenkot is sort of the latest main challenger to Netanyahu. He's eclipsed Nafiq Ali Bennett. Eisenkot's a former Israeli chief of staff. He's a brief father. He loved his son and his nephew. In the recent war, that's happened is a Masraqi guy comes from a lot. He's seen as a very working class serious in Hebrew, you say Mamlakhati, like state like person. And Netanyahu hasn't managed to land a punch on him yet, but it's early days in the campaign. One very interesting development, a guy called Yav Steglitz, who was the deputy interior security minister in charge of fighting crime in the Arab sector, as part of the Asia test list, has left the Asia tiered and it is extremely highly rumored that he will be joining Ra'am, which is an Islamist Arab party, which is somewhat crazy to think about. So why is he doing this? Most math shows that you need Ra'am to join the coalition, just like it did under Bennett, in order for there to be an opposing 61-seat block. And the Israeli population at large is still uncomfortable, especially after October 7th, relying on Islamist Arab votes or any Arab votes, to be honest, but Islamist Arab votes. And so one way that they're trying to think about this in a different way is what happens if a very popular member of a former deputy security minister joins the Islamist Arab list, and the Arab community actually really appreciate it, because their number one concern right now is crime in the Arab sector, that they feel that Pink Ver is the current security minister hasn't dealt with, and that Yav was seen as very effective. So should he actually join as the number two in Ra'am, still unclear if it's going to happen, but Rumi Zahra is, it demonstrates one that Ra'am is not just subservient to the Shura Council, which is sort of the religious council, where Ra'am's tried to move away from that, and two are off as a real opportunity to have a government minister come from Ra'am, because everyone knows Yav and he can just come back in, and that gives it a safe way, and it shows that the polling that's happened since that's gone in shows that the arm is gaining seats by doing that, the Arab community likes it, and the Jewish community likes it, and that that may offer an opportunity. And so what's the Netanyahu response, the rights response, not only is the religious mayor of Ra'am further, but also to try and deal with just make the Democrats saying that they are no longer acceptable Zionist members of the coalition, because they're all dirty leftists, whatever else, and that they'll be in charge, and so this is sort of the campaign that's going on right now. The last thing that I'll just say on the Israeli elections, two last things, one, there's a bunch of middling center-right parties, all of which are polling below the 3.25% threshold, one is Benegansis party, another is called the reservist, which is Yuzhandel and Shireli Tropper, another is Gila Dara Dhan, and Yulee Edelstein, all three of these want to be get in and get four seats to control the balance of power, and basically get to pick the prime minister. So far, they're all not passing threshold, which means that all of their votes are wasted. So in September, you're going to have to produce final party lists, we'll see if there are more combos, and that's when the campaign really starts to earn us, then we'll see. Last note about polling, okay? So when you look at the main the three sort of non-partisan channels, all of them are sort of convo-lessing around the same sort of results, when the Netanyahu Coalition is polling between 52 and 54, the opposition not including our votes is polling between 58 and 61, and then sometimes they pass the threshold, sometimes they don't, with our votes coming in between 8 and 10, okay? But when you look at Channel 14, which is Netanyahu Channel in the field of poll, it shows a completely different universe, where the Coalition is polling at like 63, 64 seats and sort of everything's in-bus. So what's going on? Because Filbers is a serious guy. So from speaking to some friends who are involved in the polling industry, Filbers got a different panel about how he uses it, he overindexes young and ultra-orthodox, to try and make up for what is the normal mistakes that the leak could always seems to do better than the polling indicates, because people come home to the leak could and others. However, this election is being seen increasingly in existential ways by the Israeli opposition, saying that if this Coalition gets reelected after October 7th with all of the ideological firmness and extremism that is represented by Ben Kovan, Smolkrich and others, then there's many of them who are like, there's no point in staying and there's huge 23% of opposition bases have said that they considered it immigrating, should they lose, amongst the Coalition, it's like 6%. And so there's lots of things, there's people trying to fly, Israelis in for the election, who have left the country. There's lots of different things going on, but what we are sure of is that the turnout for this election is going to be somewhat different people think than previous elections, and it's really about who stays home rather than who turns up. It's fascinating and we absolutely will have another longer committed discussion on the Israeli election as we get closer to the actual date and things shake out a little bit more up. Until then, I think we are out of time for this session. Unfortunately, Joel Bronnell, thank you for coming back on The Loughair Podcast. Always a pleasure, Scott. Thanks so much for having me. The Loughair Podcast is produced by The Loughair Institute. If you want to support the show and listen ad free, you can become a Loughair material supporter at lawfair.org/support. Supporters also get access to special events and other bonus content we don't share anywhere else. If you enjoy the podcast, please rate and review us where we listen. It really does help. And be sure to check out our other shows including Rache's Security, Allies, the Aftermath, and Escalation. Our latest Loughair presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. You can also find all of our written work at lawfairmedia.org. The podcast is by Jen Patchett with audio engineering by me. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. And as always, thank you for listening.
Podcast Summary
Key Points:
The Trump administration’s new 15-point plan for Gaza, negotiated by the Board of Peace with Hamas, builds on the earlier 20-point framework, focusing on decommissioning weapons in exchange for Israeli withdrawal.
Hamas agreed to the plan, but Israel rejected it, creating a political standoff, especially with Israeli elections 90 days away.
The plan links phased Hamas decommissioning to Israeli withdrawal from a "yellow line" (52% of Gaza), but Israel has expanded control to 70%, causing ambiguity over which line applies.
Key institutions—the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NKG), the International Security Forces (ISF), and the Board of Peace—remain unprepared or blocked, with NKG stuck in Cairo and ISF deployment stalled.
The deal has undermined the "precedent thesis," as Israeli politics now make it harder for any future government to accept similar terms.
Summary:
The podcast discusses the Trump administration’s new 15-point plan for Gaza, a follow-up to the earlier 20-point framework, aimed at ending the conflict through phased Hamas decommissioning of weapons in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal. The Board of Peace, led by figures like Adam Boehler, negotiated directly with Hamas, which surprisingly agreed to the plan, including detailed verification mechanisms and international oversight. President Trump announced it as a historic agreement, but Israel, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, rejected it, citing distrust of Hamas and political constraints ahead of elections.
The plan’s core mechanism ties decommissioning in specific areas to Israeli withdrawal from the "yellow line," originally 52% of Gaza, but Israel has expanded to 70%, creating confusion. Hamas’s acceptance is seen as a strategic move to shift blame onto Israel, which now appears belligerent. Key institutions like the NKG, meant to govern Gaza, remain stuck in Cairo, while the ISF has not deployed, and the Board of Peace struggles to deliver on its promises.
The deal has weakened the "precedent thesis," as Netanyahu uses rejection to bolster his campaign, making future agreements harder. S. pressure on Israel, but with elections looming, progress seems unlikely in the short term.
FAQs
The 15-point plan is a framework between the Board of Peace and Hamas that commits to President Trump's comprehensive peace plan, aiming for Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian governance, reconstruction, and a political pathway to self-determination, with Hamas decommissioning weapons in exchange for Israeli withdrawal.
The 20-point plan had three parts: hostage/prisoner release, governance and decommissioning, and a political horizon. The 15-point plan essentially recommits to the 20-point plan but focuses specifically on the implementation framework for phase two, detailing decommissioning and withdrawal mechanisms.
Hamas agreed likely to shift blame to Israel, knowing Israel's politics would prevent agreement 90 days before elections. This move makes Israel appear belligerent while Hamas appears cooperative, a strategic diplomatic maneuver.
Israel, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, has rejected the plan, with officials calling it unacceptable. They argue Hamas is not serious about disarmament, and internal politics prevent them from agreeing to withdrawal before elections.
The yellow line refers to a demarcation line in Gaza. Originally at 52% of Gaza where Israel withdrew, it has since expanded to 70% as Israel moved troops. The plan ties Israeli withdrawal from these areas to Hamas decommissioning weapons.
The NKG is a 15-member Palestinian body intended to govern Gaza post-Hamas, but it remains in Cairo due to Israeli restrictions. It has been preparing by recruiting a police force and developing governance plans, but has not yet been operational in Gaza.
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