Latin America’s new imaginaries

[Music] Hello and welcome to the world in 30 minutes. The podcast on the events, policies and ideas that will shape the world from the European Council on Foreign Relations. My name is Mark Leonard, I'm Director of ECFR. And today I'm pleased to introduce a new episode of our Summer Special on what we're calling the China Native Generation. In many parts of the world have lost two generations, countries have defined themselves in relation to the West. Some sort to emulate Western development and others were keen to push back against the West, attacking Western hypocrisy in a post-colonial spirit and attempting to create a countermodel to a Western interference. And it's very much through this prism that a lot of people also thought about other countries' relationships with the great powers. For example, when African countries invited the Wagner group in to help and deal with insurgencies, this was seen as a reaction against France and its traditional role in the Sahel, when Angola invited Sinopec to exploit its oil fields. This was seen as a reaction against Portugal and the UK. Many people were driven by a revulsion of bloody Western interventions or the financial crisis. But one of the big differences between countries in the global south and the global north is their demographic profile. In America and Europe, the median age is between 40 and 50 at the moment, whereas in Nigeria, it's 19, it's Africa, it's 29, it lepon and it's 30. And that means that many people in countries in the global south went old enough to experience the war in Iraq or the global financial crisis. And are thinking about the world in quite different ways. Often this generation is not so much anti-Western as a post-Western. Russia and China used to be seen as alternatives for the West. But for this younger generation, the way that they think about China's often not as an alternative, it's just their gateway to modernity to cool. Anyway, we had a fascinating workshop in London with people from every continent looking at the role that China played in their countries, imagine now. And we decided to bring some of the most interesting participants back together to help us understand what role China is playing in the political imagination of different parts of the world. I'm particularly thrilled to be joined by an all-star cost today to look in particular at the Western Hemisphere. First up, we have Adriana Abdenor, who is a Brazilian policy expert, co-president of the Global Fund for a New Economy. She worked between 2023 and 2025 as a special advisor in international affairs in the Office of President Lula. But maybe almost as important for that for this conversation, is the fact that she is trained in Chinese politics and language. She studied Harvard and Beijing University. Also down the line joining me from Mexico is Jodges Castellado Dutman. He is the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico from 2000 to 2003. One of the most brilliant thinkers about international relations and geopolitics in the world as well as in the Western Hemisphere. And he's also a professor at Cios Bu in Paris and author of America through foreign ice. Welcome to. Thank you for having me. Thank you very much. Great to hear you. Great. So we were together a few weeks ago talking about what role China is playing in the imagination in different parts of the world. And you both spoke very, very interestingly about how you think China is seen in the kind of political imaginaries of your country. Jorge, maybe you could go first and just talk a little bit about what things look like from Mexico. Certainly, Mike. Well, the first point I would make, which I tried to make also in London at our meeting, is that there are marked differences between, let's say, the northern part of Latin America and the southern part of Latin America, mostly referred to as South America. I think from polls, from trade numbers, investment numbers, etc. Visits to China and from China leaders, to regions, etc. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean with the possible exception of Cuba today have a very different relationship with China than the rest of Latin America. Our trade figures are low, basically be this region's insertion in the world economy in the broadest sense of the term is with the United States and has been so for the last century or so, a little more than a century. Whether it's trade, whether it's investment, migration, tourism, even military relations, and certainly in terms of image or cultural, soft power type of relations. The Chinese presence in the social imagination is much less than in South America for all sorts of reasons, but basically too, because this is a region that does not have the raw materials, the commodities that have been the basis of South America's tightening relationship. It's not limited to that, but it began with that with China. And secondly, because in the growing confrontation or rivalry between the United States and China, these are countries that mostly cannot afford the luxury of either flirting or actually if you prefer getting into bed with China, because the Americans react very negatively. And we have seen that in several occasions with several countries in this region I'm referring to, and the past was often referred to as a Caribbean Basin. So I would start off by making that point strongly and emphasizing it, Mark, because there is a tendency that's a perfectly understandable one to view Latin America as a whole. In this aspect, in many other aspects, it is absolutely, and it should be viewed that way. In this particular aspect, perhaps it's more productive to see this difference or split between the two regions. Great. So at the same time, obviously partly because of that intimacy which you have with the United States of America, China has been a kind of important part of the domestic politics and part of hedging strategies. And it's been kind of when it comes to trade negotiations and the future of your relationship in Mexico with the US. It's been something which has bloomed quite large, hasn't it? Well, I don't want to speak for too many of the Central America and Caribbean nations, although I think their situation is very similar to Mexico. Mexico cannot even afford to hedge. That's why I use the term flirt, which is perhaps more expressive, but hedge is more conceptual. They can't afford to do it. I'll give you two very concrete examples when the current government, the President Shengbong's government, which is considered to be, I don't agree with that, but it doesn't matter. It's generally considered to be a progressive left of center government, which would have a sort of natural inclination to perhaps try and hedge, perhaps as you say, when the renegotiation of the US MCA or trade agreement with the US and Canada began about a year ago, almost unilaterally, although obviously there was US pressure. Before even the negotiations began, Mexico slapped the 50% tariff on goods coming from China. We disguise this by saying from countries with which we have no trade agreement, which by the way includes Brazil, Cahdianna and I know the Brazilians weren't happy about that, but it was directed at China, just didn't the Mexican government didn't want to say so, but it was directed at China, and you can imagine a 50% tariff on cars coming from China, for example, is a big deal. Actually, it didn't work, but the Americans are still complaining, and we're going to have to do more. But, secondly, when BID, which is perhaps the largest Chinese car manufacturer, and certainly the one that is most present in Latin America today in terms of sales, wanted to set up a factory here, like they're doing in Salvador de Bahia in northern Brazil, and they went around looking shopping for land, where to do it, the Americans said no, full stop. And the Mexican government immediately refused authorization for the factory to be even begun work on. So, and we could give you many more examples. So, no, there is really no hedging. The temptation is there every now and then you'll hear a Mexican politician or intellectual toy with this idea, but it's way too dangerous for Mexico to do this, and not even too very progressive governments, as they like to call themselves, like Lopez Obrador and Shinbam, have attempted to have dared to do it. Okay, Adriana, you're going to speak for the rest of South America. Can you talk a bit about how China, the role that China plays within the kind of Brazilian political imaginary? I mean, it's obviously been absolutely central to the Brazilian economy in recent years to many different sectors of it, but also Brazil is a member of the BRICS and has kind of been building quite a lot of a deeper political relationships with China, but also seeing itself as part of a new political architecture which is being developed as we move on. away from Western and Germany. Thank you, Mark. I think maybe the point of departure for talking about Brazil, perceptions of China and Brazil, China relations here is actually to engage a little bit with your framing and placing whether to place Brazil within the Western block. And just as Jorge was saying that there is no monolithic position or perception of China within Latin America, I can also say that there is no monolithic perception of China within Brazil. And I can only speak about Brazil because that's the context in which I work and which I know best. So this doesn't necessarily apply to the rest of the region, even South America. But I wanted to parse this out a little bit, because on the one hand, there's this long discussion about whether Brazil is part of the West. And you have different camps in Brazil. And the reason I'm going to talk about this a little bit is because it helps to explain Brazil's tradition of seeking strategic autonomy, including vis-a-vis relations with China and the United States. But I think, again, the starting place is to say that there is one tradition within Brazil and foreign policy thinking that tends to emphasize Brazil's Western heritage, the inheritance of legal, of political institutions, heavy influence of Christianity and its culture, the historical ties to Europe and to North America. But there's another camp that stresses Brazil's identity more as a developing country, as a former colony whose interests often align more closely with a so-called global South. And that tends to drive this diplomacy of strategic autonomy. But I think in general, despite these different camps, Brazil and foreign policy, perhaps with the exception of the Bolsonaro period during which we had a far-right president, in general, I would say that Brazilian diplomacy has resisted this kind of binary, whether Brazil is West, and it's not West, and whether that should drive its foreign policy. And instead, it's sought to maintain productive relations with the Western democracies at the same time. So simultaneously, it seeks to strengthen sound cooperation. It has advocated for a more multipolar world order. President Lula does this now very strongly, but he did this even back in 2003 when he was first elected president. And that is not a break with the past that is actually a lot of continuity with Brazilian diplomatic thinking. So that's, I think, a very important point is that framing Brazil was unequivocally Western, and by the same token, Brazil as non-Western is, I believe, a very limited analytical value, because it tends to obscure the Brazil's kind of long-standing strategy of acting as a bridge across geopolitical divide. And so I think the more useful question is not one of, whether where Brazil belongs civilizationally, but rather how it leverages multiple identities, and it's not the only country to do so, to expand diplomatic influence and pursue greater autonomy. And of course, what's interesting about this is that it's not static, right? The world is changing very quickly. And so the motivation, the rationale, the tactics, and the strategy for preserving strategic autonomy also changes across time. And it may be to draw a quick comparison to Mexico. I think by virtue of the economic structure of a historical trajectory is even if it's geographic, relative geographic distance with respect to the United States. Brazil has often enjoyed a little bit more strategic autonomy, but of course, it's facing major challenges just like Mexico that are shaping its foreign policy, choices including vis-a-vis China, no doubt about. Brilliant introductions from both of you to that. Maybe we could kind of think a little bit more both about, you know, what's happened recently with Donald Trump, but also with the kind of hotting up of the competition that you're talking about. Okay, I mean, Mexico in many ways has been a beneficiary, at least in the early stages of that competition because of, there's a lot of Chinese investment in Mexico and goods being assembled there in order to get into the US market. And obviously, as you were saying, it's a very constrained space for, for Mexican governments, but Trump has obviously made life much more complicated for these different governments. And in Brazil, you had a period where your raw materials and the food production and things like that have benefited massively from the relationship with China, but there are kind of questions now about what happens in the next era and whether China might be a kind of meal ticket for ever in the way that it's been in the past, lots of people in Europe are worrying about China's shock 2.0, the challenge to China in terms of going up the value chain. I think those debates haven't yet come to Brazil in the same way, but I think they're asking still questions about how China is trying to build its own autonomy. And actually, for the food sector, that is something which is become a near obsession for seaching ping and, you know, you can't go to China for very long without hearing discussions about food security and independence. I'd be very interested to hear how you both see this kind of very dynamic and complicated geopolitical situation with Trump and seaching ping affecting these perceptions in the future, but also apart from the kind of purely interest-based relations with China, how people see China as a power and the ideas that are coming out of it and China as a kind of whether China is a model in some areas or whether this is much more of a sort of transactional relationship in terms of seeking, you know, greater space on the global stage and using these different relationships in order to create more kind of sovereignty. Kothi, do you want to go first? Maybe again? Well, I'll address one of your points certainly. Firstly, this is a very dynamic situation. The United also emphasized this point in the case of the Mexico and again, perhaps some of the Central American country, the Caribbean is a bit different. The exception of the Dominican Republic maybe. Things are moving very rapidly in the economic relationship at least with China. A couple of examples which are symptomatic. The first one is that over the past year or so, a little more maybe. Mexican automobile sales to the United States, partly because of the tariffs imposed by the Americans have begun to stagnate. They are not growing at nearly the same rate and in some categories light vehicles, for example, they're slightly decreasing for the first time in 25 years. Conversely, the shipment, the export of Mexican, in quote unquote, electronic goods have increased stratospheric growth numbers of 30, 40% over the past year. At the same time, Mexican imports of the inputs for these exports from Vietnam and Taiwan mainly a bit from China have also skyrocketed. This is not especially positive for Mexico because we're kind of trading automobile exports with a higher degree of value added and domestic inputs in Mexico. Built up over supply chains over the past 30, 40 years for export industries with 80 to 90% imported inputs from these countries. Now the questions the Americans are beginning to ask is, are you sure these are Vietnamese inputs? We know they have a stamp on them saying, "Shipped from Vietnam" and entering into Mexico with a stamp saying, "Vietnam, proceeding from Vietnam." Americans are asking, "Are you sure?" And what about Taiwan? Or are these Chinese products either triangulated through Vietnam and even Taiwan? Or are they products of Chinese companies that have moved to Taiwan and Vietnam mainly to produce the same stuff that they used to produce in China so they are not affected by the American tariffs? And this is already an issue, particularly in the USMCA negotiations. For the same reason and many others, the Americans are now pressuring Mexico in those negotiations to adopt the same tariffs schedule as the US with regard to China, kind of even a sort of Uyghur Nga Dhuonera Customs Union only for these two countries and only for China, which does not only imply the same tariffs, but the same rules regarding how you inspect goods coming in from third countries, which may or may not have Chinese inputs in them. And this again is making it even more difficult than it already was for Mexico to have to sort of, quote unquote, play that card. The Americans are very adamant about this. It's perhaps one of their most emphatic negotiating stances in the USMCA revision or reviews. And I think we'll continue, especially as the Chinese as skillful and as bold as they are, find ways precisely to get around US tariffs on Chinese goods, but continue to export. The last common I'd make is that Chinese cars, electric but not only electric, have conquered now by the end of this year, it'll probably be around 30%. Of the relatively small Mexican automobile market, it's not a big deal, it's a little more than a million cars, but still for all of the companies in Mexico producing cars, some for the Mexican domestic market. That's fascinating, thank you very much. Adriana, do you want to address some of the questions I asked as all? Yes, sure. So I think usually the story of Brazil, China relations, especially in the contemporary setting, they tend to start to waste the fact that China is Brazil's top trade partner, that it's a huge source of investments that we actually do have a history of technological co-development, thinking here for instance of the satellite joint production and development, cooperation, partnership that we've had since the 1980s and 90s. And so China has become sort of an inevitable actor, but again, not the exclusive actor, Brazil has started to diversify and maintain relations with a very wide set of partners within and outside of the region. But there's also I think a lot of realism and perception and recognition of the need to address symmetries, right? Our trade imbalance is characterized by a very low added value on our side of the trade equation. We also face the challenge of deepening relations with partners just as we are trying to rebuild our industry on more sustainable basis. We're also, there's this growing concern now with preserving the economic dynamism of our agricultural exports. And as you mentioned Mark, China has as one of its core interests of the Chinese Communist Party, as food security. And you know, it's a five-year plan makes it very clear that boosting productivity and finding new sources of food abroad are very important. And this has ramifications for Brazil in so far as it has been a very powerful source of food and inputs for China. And so I think even the agribusiness sector, which is a very dynamic, as I said, is now facing the fact that it has to have a long-term plan for itself. But I think there's also increasing interest in the issue of how do we access the green technologies that are allowing China to be at the leading edge of the global economy. And even if we're not talking about the leading edge, how do we jump on that boat? How do we secure access to affordable technologies? And of course, China now plays a very central role not only with solar panels and wind turbines, but also other kind of battery-related technologies that we see as very essential to not just the economic development of Brazil, but to assure the well-being of our population and being able to secure our sovereignty and our strategic autonomy. But beyond sort of these bilateral ties, I think there's a lot more interest here in Brazil in the Chinese pathway of development. For instance, the way that the state articulates with the market, which we know in China has changed very, very dramatically, even since the beginning of the reform period with a Deng Xiaoping, the process of state planning, how to develop a shared vision around the, you know, mid to long-term sets of goals, which is of course much more difficult within the type of democratic setting that we have in Brazil. And so there's also some, there's also awareness of the limitations of the analogy, right? I think there's a real interest within the democratic camp in Brazil, which is not just the left wing that, you know, part of the center is deeply committed to our democracy. How do we learn lessons selectively from China and preserve the democratic of the Brazilian system? So I would say that, you know, Brazil's trajectory of being healthily skeptical of automatic acceptance of particular development models, whether they are prescribed by the Breton Woods institutions and the so-called West. I think a minority group within Brazil is, you know, the model to be followed. I think you land in this idea that there are lessons to be drawn, but they always have to be adapted in light of Brazil's particular circumstances. Brazilian characteristics, yes, to use some Chinese language there. And just to close, I think in addition to these two dimensions, China's increasingly viewed by Brazilian foreign policy thinkers, also as a thought partner within a multipolar world. And yes, it is a deeply asymmetric multipolar world and China's part of that story. But the fact that we interact so much, not only, you know, on UN reform, but as part of the G20, as part of the BRICS, we have a growing conversation with China and global governance issues like climate change, like the International Trade Regime on AI. At a time when the US is, I would say, not being particularly constructive, enough and shutting doors, I think this is a new dimension of Brazil's engagement with China that again falls within this equation of strategic autonomy, but enriches the conversation. And I would say that, you know, most of us hope that we can reengage on these same terms with the US at some point when it doesn't adopt such a coercive stance and reengages on the multipolarity and multilateralism debate more constructively. Mark, I'd like to jump in here for just a very brief comment about the Brazil's exceptionality or whatever you'd like to call it in Latin American terms. I think, and I've written about this often, that I really believe that Brazil is one of the few countries in the world. India is obviously another one. Indonesia probably is one that can get away because of its size, its dynamism, its population, et cetera, with a truly non-aligned or autonomous or equidistant or multiple equidistant position with regard to the United States and China. President Lula has shown this over the last year and a half in his dealings with Trump and what on occasion have been very aggressive measures taken by the Trump administration, directly addressed to Brazil, like, for example, the last tariffs that were imposed on Brazil and that have been the subject of important pushback by the Brazilians. I would be careful, though, in thinking that this is something that can be extrapolated to other South American countries. I won't talk about the rest of the world, but to other South American countries. Even if they have very strong trade and investment relations with China, like Argentina, like Uruguay, like Chile, like Peru, I don't think Trump will be successful in forcing these countries away from China where they already are. I don't think so, but I do think that they will have much more difficulty in pushing away from the United States and moving in the direction of even just, sure, what my friends call active non-alignment. My friends from Chile, from Brazil, from Argentina, because it's more and more difficult. It's more and more difficult for different reasons, but whether they are ideological or political or whatever, just recently, for example, the New Chilean government clearly said that United States was their strategic first partner in the world. This was highly criticized in Chile, but it reflected a feeling among many people in Chile, half, let's say, because this is a country which is not really, there's no consensus on this, that even Chile, which has a very low percentage now of its trade with the United States, can afford to go much further and certainly could not resist American pressure or American reprisals like Brazil has. I agree with you Jorge, and I think, you know, Brazil because of its size and its characteristics, and also I think the professionalism of its diplomatic core, which has quite a bit of continuity, has been able to navigate these turbulent waters quite well, but obviously we are operating far more coercive geopolitical environment than before, and I would say that even here in Brazil, there is an awareness, at least within the more progressive camp, of the need to join forces, you know, regionally, that this is not just about kind of resisting coercion by a specific superpower, it's really about avoiding the traps of another cycle of extractivism, right? And this has to do, I think, with a broader story. not just with the United States, but we don't want to be stuck in the lowest value segments of this emerging green and digital value chains. And of course, regional integration has become even more difficult because I think it is viewed by many as an ideological pursuit. And so the regional bodies that we have built in the past are either paralyzed or have practically died away. But I'm still a big believer in kind of joining forces to address sort of the challenges that we face in this area. And that extends, of course, to climate change, not just the risks of AI and of geopolitics. But in the meantime, I do think that we have to think creatively, you know, even if it's many lateral arrangements around specific issues. And again, engaging constructively with the great powers, with China, with the United States, I think even now, I think, you know, Brazil is making the sufferings. It's not interested at all in closing the door, you know, on the Trump administration, but it has to negotiate its positions. And I think this would be even more effective if Brazil were able to lead and co-lead more regional cooperation around these key issues. Great. Thank you very much to both of you. I think that's all we've got time for. It must have been a really, really interesting discussion. But we do have one thing left to do on this podcast. And that's our bookshelf. What's on your bookshelf at the moment, Jorge? Well, there are several things. But one book, there's a second volume out, but I'm not sure it's been translated into English, the first one, which is called Latin Americans Active Non-Alignment, which is originally published in Chile, in Spanish, and published in England, in English, by three authors, Carlos Aminami, Jorge Haine, and Carlos Fortun, three Chileans. But with important contributions by people from all over Latin America, including Celso Amorín, from Brazil, Adicia Barcelona, from Mexico, etc., etc., about this whole idea. And anyone who is interested in the potential and the limits of this kind of approach for different countries in Latin America, I think, will find it very useful to review, to produce this text, choosing and picking whatever countries or whatever themes they're most interested in. But I think it's a very accessible, very broad and very relevant text right now for anybody who's interested in precisely the stuff we've been talking about for the past 30 minutes. Fantastic, thank you very much. Adriana, I was from your bookshelf. So this may seem like an unconventional recommendation for international relations scholars, but I'd like to recommend Osvalde de Andragis, Manifesto, Antropofa, Goodyearth, Anthropofa, Just Manifesto, and it was published in 1928. And the reason I recommend this is, I think it's a really interesting antidote to the kind of binary, that we can detect sometimes in Western strategic thought, you know, that tends to view, and I are as these binary categories of West versus non-West of democracy versus autocracy of our life versus rival. And what Osvalde de Andragis did in this Manifesto, and it, by the way, it's an art manifesto written on the occasion of the modernist revolution in art in Brazil in the 1920s, is that he says Brazil should not imitate, it should not reject Europe, but instead it should create a really devour external influences. So he draws on this perception of Brazilians as cannibals, right, as anthropologists to say, yes, we devour outside influences and we regurgitate something that is completely new. So it's a very unconventional text, it says a lot about Brazilian art, and I think it can also say a lot about Brazilian foreign policy thinking. That's all we have time for today, but we hope you've enjoyed listening to it, and if you have, please do subscribe to future episodes of the podcast and leave us a positive review and a nice rating. But for now, it's goodbye.